About three years ago, I had a change of view regarding Molinism. Before that time, I had had an inaccurate picture of what Molinism is which led me to believe it was incompatible with Scripture, reason, Augustinian views of predestination and grace, and the doctrines of the Catholic Church. I describe my change of mind and the reason for it here. I had encountered forms of Molinism or ways of describing Molinism which were indeed contrary to the Catholic faith, and I had assumed that these forms of or ways of describing Molinism provided an accurate picture of the views of Molina himself and his earlier disciples at the time when the views of the Molinists were being investigated by the Catholic Church (this was the famous De Auxiliis controversy, which you can read about here.) Through further research, I discovered that the less palatable idea of Molinism I had in my head was not the view of Molina himself or the earlier Molinists (and presumably not the view of many present-day Molinists either). The original Molinism turned out to be a viewpoint that was defensible from the perspective of historic Augustinian, Catholic teaching, not contrary to it.
After I had discovered this, it did not take long for the thought to enter my mind that perhaps something similar would turn out to be the case with regard to the theology of Arminianism, which was a movement condemned by the Calvinistic Reformed churches in the seventeenth century and which has, since that time, been typically seen by Calvinists as one of their greatest arch-enemies. I determined that I needed to go back and read Jacob (or James) Arminius himself. So finally, last summer, I got around to doing that. The works of Arminius are available online here and here. From my research thus far, it seems that my suspicions were correct. The theology of Arminius himself appears to be much less terrible than the "Arminianism" Calvinists seem typically to have in mind and that I have had in my own mind.
Now, I am not saying that this more heretical form of Arminianism doesn't actually exist. I know it does. I've read a number of authors advocating it. One of the most prominent as well as dramatic examples of this kind of theology in the modern day, at least in Evangelical circles, is the Open Theist movement, which I'll mention again just below. But what my reading of Arminius seems to be telling me is that this more heretical Arminianism doesn't represent the views of Arminius himself. So far as I can tell, his views on predestination, free will, and grace seem to be quite Augustinian. It seems to me that he was unjustly condemned with regard to these points by the Reformed churches. (It should be noted that I am not here discussing all of Arminius's views on every subject, but only his views on matters related to predestination, free will, and grace, the matters that are most often discussed in Calvinist-Arminian arguments.)
The more evil version of Arminianism holds that God cannot accomplish all his will for the universe. He is limited by certain laws of reality that even he cannot violate, even though these laws lead to a situation where he cannot produce a universe that matches his ideal. He wants to create truly free creatures, but to be "truly free", in this view, the creature must have a kind of free will in which a person's choice has no sufficient reason for its existence beyond itself. So if Sarah chooses to accept the gospel and be saved, while Suzie chooses to reject the gospel and ends up damned, there is no ultimate explanation for either choice beyond itself. Neither choice is planned by God. God has to watch Sarah and Suzie to see what they will do, and then he can work around their choices to try to make things work out as well as he can manage. God would prefer everyone to be saved, but if he gives creatures free will, he can't guarantee this, because he can't control what people will choose. If Sarah chooses to go right, this choice has no explanation beyond itself. If Suzie chooses to go wrong, likewise. So, in this view, there is an ultimate element of chance in the universe. There are events with literally no prior cause or explanation.
Obviously, this viewpoint violates the doctrine of the sovereignty of God, for it portrays God as having to deal with a universe beyond his fundamental control, a universe where he can't accomplish his ideal desires and where events occur without any prior causes or explanations. Also, in this view, conversion to the good cannot be a product or a gift of grace, for the choice to go right can have no explanation beyond itself. The difference between Sarah and Suzie, in terms of their choices, is something coming entirely from themselves and from chance and not from God. So righteousness cannot, in this view, be a gift of grace. This Arminian view is contrary to Catholic doctrine, and to all the approved schools of Catholic thought on the subject of predestination, grace, and free will--Dominicanism, Molinism, Augustinianism, etc. Molinism, for example, holds that God has what they call middle knowledge, meaning knowledge of what people will choose to do in particular circumstances. But this Arminian view precludes such knowledge, for, since each choice has no explanation beyond itself, it cannot be determined by any previous circumstances. Sarah could be placed in a particular set of circumstances, and yet she might still choose right or wrong. God cannot know from the particular circumstances what she will do, as this is ultimately a matter of chance. The only way he can know what she will do is to watch what she actually does when she actually makes her choice. The most logical of these Arminians (such as the Open Theists) deny that God has any foreknowledge of the future, for they rightly recognize that if God knows my future, my future choices must now be certain But if they happen ultimately by chance, they cannot be certain until they've actually occurred. Catholic theologians recognize that God knows all things through the knowledge of his own essence, for he knows all that he will do and all that he will permit. But in this Arminian view, God only knows the future by looking outside of himself to see what will happen ultimately by chance.
So the Calvinists are quite right to consider this Arminian viewpoint a great evil. Taken to its logical conclusion, it entails the destruction of Christianity and of theism, and even of reason itself. But, from my reading of Arminius thus far, it seems that he did not hold this viewpoint. His form of Arminianism seems rather to have been very much akin to the Molinist view within Catholicism, which maintains the sovereignty of God and salvation by grace. This probably explains to a great degree why the Calvinists condemned him, for they have traditionally been unable to understand what Molinism is all about and have typically misunderstood it as indistinguishable from something like the evil Arminianism I just described. The Dominicans in the Catholic Church have typically had the same problem understanding Molinism. I myself had this erroneous view of Molinism until I looked at it more closely, as I describe here. As I mentioned, this clarification regarding Molinism is what led me to want to look at Arminius more closely.
Arminius's Views
Arminius articulates his views several places in the corpus of his writings. In The Works of Arminius, Volume I, Declaration of the Sentiments of Arminius on Predestination, on the Providence of God, on the Free Will of Man, and on the Grace of God, he gives a fairly systematic account of his views. The Works of Arminius, Volume I, can be found here. I have taken all of my text of Arminius below, throughout the rest of this article, from the plain text version of this document found on the website of the Christian Classics Ethereal Library.
I. The first absolute decree of God concerning the salvation of sinful man, is that by which he decreed to appoint his Son, Jesus Christ, for a Mediator, Redeemer, saviour, Priest and King, who might destroy sin by his own death, might by his obedience obtain the salvation which had been lost, and might communicate it by his own virtue.
II. The second precise and absolute decree of God, is that in which he decreed to receive into favour those who repent and believe, and, in Christ, for his sake and through Him, to effect the salvation of such penitents and believers as persevered to the end; but to leave in sin, and under wrath, all impenitent persons and unbelievers, and to damn them as aliens from Christ.
III. The third Divine decree is that by which God decreed to administer in a sufficient and efficacious manner the means which were necessary for repentance and faith; and to have such administration instituted (1.) according to the Divine Wisdom, by which God knows what is proper and becoming both to his mercy and his severity, and (2.) according to Divine Justice, by which He is prepared to adopt whatever his wisdom may prescribe and put it in execution.
IV. To these succeeds the fourth decree, by which God decreed to save and damn certain particular persons. This decree has its foundation in the foreknowledge of God, by which he knew from all eternity those individuals who would, through his preventing grace, believe, and, through his subsequent grace would persevere, according to the before described administration of those means which are suitable and proper for conversion and faith; and, by which foreknowledge, he likewise knew those who would not believe and persevere. (On Predestination, p. 170)
The context of Arminius's outline here is the discussions in Reformed circles regarding the order of the divine decrees. Previous to this outline in this same work, Arminius had outlined the views of other Reformed theologians and explained what he found problematic about them. What he is especially concerned about is that God's decrees be so described as to make logical sense and to be consistent with all of what God has revealed. For example, he is very critical of the supralapsarian Reformed view. That view says that God's decree to bring some to heaven and condemn some to hell preceded his decree to give efficacious grace to convert his elect, his decree to send Christ as Savior, his decree to permit the Fall of man, and even his decree to create human beings. Arminius saw this as immensely problematic, because it pictures God condemning people to hell without any idea in his mind of the sinfulness of these people, their rejection of the gospel, or even their existence. But, Arminius notes, God only condemns real, existing, fallen sinners who reject him to hell. If God condemned people to hell without any regard to sin, he would act unjustly. Likewise, if God ordained some people to heaven without any regard to whether or not they would choose what is right and accept the gospel, or even without any regard to the redemption of Christ, he would contradict his Word which links salvation to the redemption of Christ and to the conversion, faith, and repentance of people. So Arminius lays out the order of the divine decrees in a way which he thinks makes sense and which is consistent with all the teaching of the Word of God. First, God decrees the creation of people. Then, he decrees to permit the Fall. (Arminius doesn't mention these two in his outline above, but he mentions them elsewhere.) Then, he decrees to send Christ as Savior. Then, he decrees to save all believers. Then, he decrees to give out sufficient and efficacious graces according to his divine wisdom. Then, he decrees to save those particular persons who will choose to believe through the working of the sufficient and efficacious grace of God, and he decrees to damn those particular persons who will choose to reject the gospel, which choice will be permitted by God to occur.
Opponents of Arminius have misunderstood him as if he taught that a person's choice to believe is a chance event, not brought about by God's grace, which God has to look outside of himself to learn about, and then he chooses those who just happen to choose what is right. But this is not at all what Arminius taught. He attributes all things, good and evil, to the providence of God, and nothing to chance. He attributes all evil choices to the free will of creatures, permitted by the providence of God. He attributes all good choices to the sufficient and efficacious grace of God. As with Catholic theology, Arminius holds that God makes available sufficient grace to all, which renders them culpable if they reject the gospel, but he moves some to salvation efficaciously.
I consider Divine Providence to be "that solicitous, continued, and universally present inspection and oversight of God, according to which he exercises a general care over the whole world, but evinces a particular concern for all his [intelligent] creatures without any exception, with the design of preserving and governing them in their own essence, qualities, actions, and passions, in a manner that is at once worthy of himself and suitable to them, to the praise of his name and the salvation of believers. In this definition of Divine Providence, I by no means deprive it of any particle of those properties which agree with it or belong to it; but I declare that it preserves, regulates, governs and directs all things and that nothing in the world happens fortuitously or by chance. Beside this, I place in subjection to Divine Providence both the free-will and even the actions of a rational creature, so that nothing can be done without the will of God, not even any of those things which are done in opposition to it; only we must observe a distinction between good actions and evil ones, by saying, that "God both wills and performs good acts," but that "He only freely permits those which are evil." Still farther than this, I very readily grant, that even all actions whatever, concerning evil, that can possibly be devised or invented, may be attributed to Divine Providence Employing solely one caution, "not to conclude from this concession that God is the cause of sin." This I have testified with sufficient clearness, in a certain disputation concerning the Righteousness and Efficacy of Divine Providence concerning things that are evil, which was discussed at Leyden on two different occasions, as a divinity-act, at which I presided. In that disputation, I endeavoured to ascribe to God whatever actions concerning sin I could possibly conclude from the scriptures to belong to him; and I proceeded to such a length in my attempt, that some persons thought proper on that account to charge me with having made God the author of sin. The same serious allegation has likewise been often produced against me, from the pulpit, in the city of Amsterdam, on account of those very theses; but with what show of justice such a charge was made, may be evident to any one, from the contents of my written answer to those Thirty-one Articles formerly mentioned, which have been falsely imputed to me, and of which this was one. (On the Providence of God, p. 173)
This is my opinion concerning the free-will of man: In his primitive condition as he came out of the hands of his creator, man was endowed with such a portion of knowledge, holiness and power, as enabled him to understand, esteem, consider, will, and to perform the true good, according to the commandment delivered to him. Yet none of these acts could he do, except through the assistance of Divine Grace. But in his lapsed and sinful state, man is not capable, of and by himself, either to think, to will, or to do that which is really good; but it is necessary for him to be regenerated and renewed in his intellect, affections or will, and in all his powers, by God in Christ through the Holy Spirit, that he may be qualified rightly to understand, esteem, consider, will, and perform whatever is truly good. When he is made a partaker of this regeneration or renovation, I consider that, since he is delivered from sin, he is capable of thinking, willing and doing that which is good, but yet not without the continued aids of Divine Grace. (One the Free Will of Man, p. 174)
In reference to Divine Grace, I believe, 1. It is a gratuitous affection by which God is kindly affected towards a miserable sinner, and according to which he, in the first place, gives his Son, "that whosoever believes in him might have eternal life," and, afterward, he justifies him in Christ Jesus and for his sake, and adopts him into the right of sons, unto salvation. 2. It is an infusion (both into the human understanding and into the will and affections,) of all those gifts of the Holy Spirit which appertain to the regeneration and renewing of man--such as faith, hope, charity, &c.; for, without these gracious gifts, man is not sufficient to think, will, or do any thing that is good. 3. It is that perpetual assistance and continued aid of the Holy Spirit, according to which He acts upon and excites to good the man who has been already renewed, by infusing into him salutary cogitations, and by inspiring him with good desires, that he may thus actually will whatever is good; and according to which God may then will and work together with man, that man may perform whatever he wills.
In this manner, I ascribe to grace the commencement, the continuance and the consummation of all good, and to such an extent do I carry its influence, that a man, though already regenerate, can neither conceive, will, nor do any good at all, nor resist any evil temptation, without this preventing and exciting, this following and co-operating grace. From this statement it will clearly appear, that I by no means do injustice to grace, by attributing, as it is reported of me, too much to man's free-will. For the whole controversy reduces itself to the solution of this question, "is the grace of God a certain irresistible force?" That is, the controversy does not relate to those actions or operations which may be ascribed to grace, (for I acknowledge and inculcate as many of these actions or operations as any man ever did,) but it relates solely to the mode of operation, whether it be irresistible or not. With respect to which, I believe, according to the scriptures, that many persons resist the Holy Spirit and reject the grace that is offered. (On the Grace of God, p. 175)
Calvinists may jump on Arminius with regard to that last point, his denial of the irresistibility of grace. "Aha! You see? He denied that grace is irresistible! That shows that he doesn't really attribute conversion to God's grace. For if man can resist grace, then grace is not sufficient to bring a person to faith. It requires, in addition, an independent cooperation of the free will of man, a cooperation which is not itself the product of grace."
But this completely misunderstands Arminius. The confusion here is caused by the fact that Calvinists typically don't distinguish between irresistible and efficacious grace. They tend to use "irresistible" to mean "efficacious," and so they think that if someone denies irresistible grace they must be denying efficacious grace. But this is a point of terminology peculiar to the Calvinists, and one which every other theological school of thought tends to find baffling. Other schools of thought tend to make a distinction between irresistible and efficacious grace. By irresistible grace, they mean grace acting in such a way as to remove any option from the will to say yes or no. It would be a force which overpowers human willing, so that no real choice can be made. They therefore deny that grace is irresistible. But many non-Calvinist schools of thought acknowledge efficacious grace, by which they mean grace applied in such a way as to infallibly move the will to consent. Fr. John Hardon, a well-respected twentieth-century Catholic theologian, describes efficacious grace in this way:
By a truly efficacious grace is meant one that will be (is) infallibly followed by the act to which it tends, e.g. contrition. If you receive such a grace, even before your will consents to it, that grace is infallibly “sure of success;” it will infallibly procure your consent, produce that act – of contrition. But although it infallibly procures your consent, it does not necessitate you to consent: it leaves you free to dissent. Your will will infallibly say "yes" to it, but it is free to say “no.” (Fr. John Hardon, Course on Grace, Part IIB, chapter 15 [Inter Mirifica, 1998], retrieved here from the website of the Real Presence Eucharistic Education and Adoration Association)
You see the distinction between efficacious and irresistible grace? Arminius denies irresistible grace, but he affirms the efficaciousness of grace.
Here are some other quotations scattered throughout the corpus of his writings in which Arminius addresses this matter:
Concerning the expression, "By this grace they may believe, if they will." These words, when delivered in such a crude and undigested form, are capable of being brought to bear a very bad interpretation, and a meaning not at all agreeable to the scriptures, as though, after that power had been bestowed, the Holy Spirit and Divine Grace remain entirely quiescent, waiting to see whether the man will properly use the power which he has received, and will believe the gospel. When, on the contrary, he who wishes to entertain and to utter correct sentiments on this subject, will account it necessary to ascribe to Grace its own province, which, indeed, is the principal one, in persuading the human will that it may be inclined to yield assent to those truths which are preached. (The Apology Or Defense Of James Arminius, Article VIII, p. 215)
It is not only a rash saying, but a false and an ignorant one, "that a thing which, in regard to second causes, is done contingently is said to be done necessarily in regard to the divine decree." For the divine decree itself, being an internal action of God, is not immediately the cause of the thing; but, whatever effects it may produce, it performs them by power, according to the mode of which a thing will be said to be either necessarily or contingently. For if God resolve to use an irresistible power in the execution of his decree, or if he determine to employ such a quantum of power as nothing can resist or can hinder it from completing his purpose, it will follow that the thing will necessarily be brought into existence. Thus, "wicked men who persevere in their sins, will necessarily perish," for God will by an irresistible force, cast them down into the depths of hell. But if he resolve to use a force that is not irresistible, but that can be resisted by the creature, then that thing is said to be done, not necessarily but contingently, although its actual occurrence was certainly foreknown by God, according to the infinity of his understanding, by which he knows all results whatever, that will arise from certain causes which are laid down, and whether those causes produce a thing necessarily or contingently. From whence the school-men say that "all things are done by a necessity of infallibility," which phrase is used in a determinate sense, although the words in which its enunciation is expressed are ill-chosen. For infallibility is not an affection of a being, which exists from causes; but it is an affection of a Mind that sees or that foresees what will be the effect of certain causes. But I readily endure a catachrestic metalepsis, when it is evident concerning a thing, although it is my wish that our enunciations were always the best accommodated to the natures of the things themselves.
But the inventors of these articles try to prove by the examples which they produce, that "one and the same thing, which, with respect to second causes, is done contingently, is, in respect to the Divine Decree, done necessarily." They say "It was possible for the bones of Christ to be broken, or not to be broken. It was possible for them to be broken, if any person considers the nature of bones; for they were undoubtedly fragile. But they could not be broken, if the decree of God be taken into the account." In answer to this, I deny that in respect of the DIVINE DECREE, they could not be broken. For God did not decree that it was impossible for them to be broken, but that they should not be broken. This is apparent from the manner in which the transaction was actually conducted. For God did not employ an irresistible power by which he might prevent the bones of Christ from being broken by those who approached to break them; but by a mild kind of suasion, he caused that they should not will to break the bones of Christ, by an argument drawn from its inutility. For, since Christ had already given up the ghost, before those who broke the legs had arrived at the cross, they were not at all inclined to undertake a vain and fruitless labour in breaking the legs of our saviour. Because the breaking of legs, with the design to hasten death, was only done lest the bodies should remain suspended on the cross on a festival or sacred day, contrary to the divine law. Indeed, if the divine Wisdom knows how to effect that which it has decreed, by employing causes according to their nature and motion--whether their nature and motion be contingent or free, the praise due to such Wisdom is far greater than if it employ a power which no creature can possibly resist. Although God can employ such a power whensoever it may seem expedient to his Wisdom. I am therefore, of opinion that I committed no offense when I said, "No contingent thing--that is, nothing which is done or has been done CONTINGENTLY--can be said to be or have been done NECESSARILY, with regard to the divine decree." (The Apology Or Defense Of James Arminius, Article V, p. 207)
Through his own Will, and by means of his Power, God is the cause of all other things; (Lam. iii. 37, 38;) yet so that when he acts through second causes, either with them or in them, he does not take away their own peculiar mode of acting with which they have been divinely endued but he suffers them according to their own mode to produce their own effects, necessary things necessarily, contingent things contingently, free things freely: and this contingency and freedom of second causes does not prevent that from being certainly done, or coming to pass, which God in this manner works by them; and therefore, the certain futurition of an event does not include its necessity. (Isa. x. 5, 6, 7; Gen. xlv. 5, 28; Acts xxvii. 29, 31.) (Twenty-Five Public Disputations of James Arminius, Disputation 4, On the Nature of God, LIV, p. 332)
The will of God is also distinguished into that by which he wills to do or to prevent something, and which is called "the will of his good pleasure," or rather "of his pleasure;" (Psalm cxv. 3;) and into that by which he wills something to be done, or to be omitted, by creatures endued with understanding, and which is called "the will which is signified." The latter is revealed; the former is partly revealed, and partly hidden. (Mark iii. 35; 1 Thess. iv. 3; Deut. xxix, 29; 1 Cor. ii. 11, 12.) The former is efficacious, for it uses power, either so much as cannot be resisted, or such a kind as He certainly knows nothing will withstand: (Psalm xxxiii. 9; Rom. ix. 19.) The latter is called "inefficacious," and resistance is frequently made to it; yet so that, when the creature transgresses the order of this revealed Will, the creature by it may be reduced to order, and that the Will of God may be done on those by whom his Will has not been performed. (2 Sam. xvii. 14; Isa. v. 4, 5; Matt. xxi. 39-41; Acts v. 4; 1 Cor. vii. 28.) To this two-fold Will is opposed the Remission of the Will, which is called "Permission," and which is also two-fold. The one, which permits something to the power of a rational creature, by not circumscribing its act with a law; and this is opposed to "the revealed Will." The other is that by which God permits something to the capability and will of the creature, by not interposing an efficacious hindrance; and this is opposed to "the Will of God's pleasure" that is efficacious. (Acts xiv. 16; Psalm lxxxi. 13.) (Ibid., LVIII, p. 333)
We can understand from these quotations Arminius's actual understanding of how grace works, and how free will relates to God's providence and predestination. God's providence, and his grace, operate on things according to their natures. With regard to free will, it is not according to its nature that it be moved by necessity or an irresistible force, for these things would overpower and extinguish it. Free will must be moved by a persuasive force--that is, one that operates on it by persuading it to see things a certain way, have certain affections, and freely choose certain things. And God can indeed efficaciously (Arminius even uses the word "efficacious") move the will. In his providence, he moves the wills of his creatures by putting them in circumstances in which he knows they will be persuaded to act in certain ways. Arminius uses the example of Christ's bones not being broken. Being bones, they could have been broken. The Roman soldiers could have broken them if they had wanted to. But God ensured they would not want to by ordaining circumstances such that they would be effectually motivated not to. So it was certain they would not break Christ's bones, and yet no irresistible force, negating their own wills, was applied to them. In efficacious grace, God efficaciously moves the will to be persuaded to assent to Christ. He enlightens the hearts of his elect, moves their affections, and persuades their wills to embrace Christ. No creaturely power could do this. Only a divine power could overcome the darkness of sin and the slavery of our wills to it. Grace is God's divine power which efficaciously, certainly, and infallibly, but not irresistibly, moves the wills of his elect to faith. Thus, faith is entirely a gift of God's grace. With regard to those who are damned, God permits them to reject God's grace. He refrains from moving their wills efficaciously to faith.
Arminius's theological terminology is very Catholic and Molinistic. It contrasts significantly with the terminology that came to dominate the Reformed tradition.* For example, Arminius affirms strongly the terminology of sufficient grace, which even the Jansenists within the Catholic Church had trouble with.
"Can God, now, in his own right, demand from fallen man faith in Christ, which he cannot have of himself, though God neither bestows on him, nor is ready to bestow, sufficient grace by which he may believe?" This question will be answered by a direct negative. God cannot by any right demand from fallen man faith in Christ, which he cannot have of himself, except God has either bestowed, or is ready to bestow, sufficient grace by which he may believe if he will. Nor do I perceive what is false in that reply, or to what heresy it has affinity. It has no alliance with the Pelagian heresy: for Pelagius maintained, that with the exception of the preaching of the Gospel, no internal grace is required to produce faith in the minds of men. But what is of more consequence, this reply is not opposed to St. Augustine's doctrine of Predestination; "yet this doctrine of his, we do not account it necessary to establish," as Innocent, the Roman Pontiff, has observed. (Nine Questions, Question 5, p. 281)
Sufficient grace makes it possible for all to choose Christ, if they should want to. Efficacious grace, by contrast, actually moves the will to choose Christ. Sufficient grace gives ability; efficacious grace gives willingness.
Arminius even uses explicitly the terminology of middle knowledge, which is associated with Molinism and is typically objected to even by other legitimate Catholic schools of thought, such as the Dominicans.
The schoolmen say besides, that one kind of God's knowledge is natural and necessary, another free, and a third kind middle. (1.) Natural or necessary knowledge is that by which God understands himself and all things possible. (2.) Free knowledge is that by which he knows, all other beings. (3.) Middle knowledge is that by which he knows that "if This thing happens, That will take place." The first precedes every free act of the Divine will; the second follows the free act of God's will; and the last precedes indeed the free act of the Divine will, but hypothetically from this act it sees that some particular thing will occur. But, in strictness of speech, every kind of God's knowledge is necessary. For the free understanding of God does not arise from this circumstance, that a free act of His will exhibits or offers an object to the understanding; but when any object whatsoever is laid down, the Divine understanding knows it necessarily on account of the infinity of its own essence. In like manner, any object whatsoever being laid down hypothetically, God understands necessarily what will arise from that object. (Twenty-Five Public Disputations of James Arminius, Disputation 4, On the Nature of God, LIV, p. 329)
I would go so far as to say that I have not yet, in my reading, discerned any significant difference between either the substance or the terminology of Arminius's and Molina's theology. I'm sure there are plenty of differences in various places. Arminius was a Protestant, after all! But, in the areas under discussion in this article, I have not yet seen any clear difference. If I didn't know who Arminius was, and all I had was the text from him that I have read thus far, I would assume he was a Molinist Catholic theologian.
And this, of course, explains why the Calvinists didn't like him. And why they saw his theology as a dangerous "road to Rome." In a sense, they were right. He did provide a bridge between Reformed thought and Catholic thought. But he was too radical and too Molinist for Calvinist sensibilities. The Amyraldian school of thought (another school of thought arising from within the Reformed tradition, which I won't get into here) did a better job at doing some of the same things but being less dramatically offensive to Calvinist ears. But I have come to understand Molina better. I have been able to grasp the orthodoxy of his point of view. And so I have also come to appreciate the orthodoxy and the Augustinian nature of Arminius's views, so far as I have been able to understand and interpret them thus far.
For more on Molinism and its consistency with orthodox Augustinianism, see here, here, and here. For more on the Catholic doctrines of predestination, free will, and grace in general, see here. For more on the relationship between the Catholic and the Calvinist doctrines on these subjects, see here.
Published on the feast of St. Stanislaus
* Although the terminologies are not completely diverse. Calvinist theologians inherited many of the concepts and terms of medieval scholastic Catholic theology. See, for example, the Calvinist Westminster Confession of Faith (found here, provided by Wikisource under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License) 3:1 and 5:2, and compare with what Arminius says in the quotations above:
God, from all eternity, did, by the most wise and holy counsel of His own will, freely, and unchangeably ordain whatsoever comes to pass: yet so, as thereby neither is God the author of sin, nor is violence offered to the will of the creatures; nor is the liberty or contingency of second causes taken away, but rather established. (3:1)
Although, in relation to the fore-knowledge and decree of God, the first Cause, all things come to pass immutably, and infallibly; yet, by the same providence, He ordereth them to fall out, according to the nature of second causes, either necessarily, freely, or contingently. (5:2)
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