tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8086977564266494182024-03-15T12:35:48.371-05:00The Christian FreethinkerThinking Rationally and Christianly About Philosophy, Theology, Science, Culture, Politics, and Everything ElseMark Hausamhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07371790103414979060noreply@blogger.comBlogger330125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-808697756426649418.post-28029653589569177932023-05-05T22:36:00.004-05:002023-05-13T21:52:04.622-05:00Why Righteousness Cannot Be Merely Legal<div style="text-align: center;"><i>The thing which makes sin hateful, is that by which it deserves punishment; which is but the expression of hatred. And that which renders virtue lovely, is the same with that on the account of which it is fit to receive praise and reward; which are but the expressions of esteem and love. But that which makes vice hateful, is its hateful nature; and that which renders virtue lovely, is its amiable nature. It is a certain beauty or deformity that are inherent in that good or evil will, which is the soul of virtue and vice (and not in the occasion of it), which is their worthiness of esteem or disesteem, praise, or dispraise, according to the common sense of mankind.</i></div><div style="text-align: center;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: right;"><i>- Jonathan Edwards (</i><a href="https://www.ccel.org/ccel/edwards/will.v.i.html">Freedom of the Will</a><i>, Part IV, Section 1)</i></div><p>The Augustinian doctrine of justification sees <i>righteousness</i> as something that is possessed as an internal character trait (which is also manifested by outward actions that display and express that inward character). The Anti-Augustinian Protestant doctrine of justification treats <i>righteousness</i> as something that can be possessed in a purely legal way, as a status imputed to a person which does not necessarily flow from or correspond to an internal character. (For more on these two doctrines of justification and arguments relating to them, see <a href="http://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2015/07/the-augustinian-and-protestant.html">here</a>.)</p><p>I want to argue briefly here that <i>righteousness</i> is something that must be understood in connection to an internal character trait and cannot be understood in purely legal terms.</p><p>Both in the Bible as well as in general human discourse, <i>righteousness</i> is something that is good. It is a positive trait, something that deserves to be praised and rewarded. It contrasts with <i>unrighteousness</i> or <i>wickedness</i>, which is a negative trait deserving of condemnation and punishment. Righteousness is something that is pleasing to God, and which he rewards with good things - ultimately with an eternal life of joy. This all means that we must understand righteousness to be something that is logically and intrinsically connected to happiness. It is <i>fit</i> for happiness. That is really just another way of saying that it is <i>good</i>, for the idea of the <i>good</i> is the idea of something that is pleasing or desirable, something that brings happiness to those who experience it. (And, of course, the opposite of all of this can be said for the idea of <i>badness</i>.) The Supreme Good is God, for God loves and delights in himself supremely and is the source of all delight, and the happiness of all beings in general can only be found ultimately in the enjoyment of God. The natural consequence of loving God supremely is to attain supreme happiness, and the natural consequence of turning away from supreme love to God is to attain supreme misery. When God contemplates a being who loves him supremely, he sees a being whose disposition is one that is naturally fit for happiness, and so he loves that disposition and desires it to achieve what it is fit for, and he rewards it with happiness. When God contemplates a being who does not love him supremely, he sees a being whose disposition is one that is naturally fit for misery, and so he hates that disposition and desires it to achieve what it is fit for, and he punishes it with misery. (Since God is a simple, indivisible being, his knowledge and will are ultimately one. God's ultimate desires are identical with what ultimately is, and, when we speak of God, there is no ultimate distinction between moral rewards and punishments and natural or logical good or bad consequences.)</p><p>If all of the above is true, then <i>righteousness</i> can be nothing other than the disposition of a being who loves God supremely, and <i>wickedness</i> is the disposition of a being who doesn't. Righteousness is the orientation of the will of a being towards God as the Supreme Good, and wickedness is the orientation of the will of a being away from God as the Supreme Good. This is what both reason and revelation teach (see, for example, Luke 10:27; Matthew 22:36–40; Mark 12:28–31; James 3:9-12; Romans 13:8-10; Galatians 5:13-14). But such a disposition of the will is, by definition, an internal character trait within a being. It cannot be possessed merely legally or be a merely legal trait. For God to see a person as righteous is for him to be pleased with a person and see that person as fit for the reward of happiness, but the only thing in a person that could be thus pleasing to God is the orientation of the being's will towards God, for that is the only thing that naturally attains and is fit for that reward and which God therefore sees as something ultimately good and delightful. To imagine righteousness as being possessed by a person in a merely legal way, without reference to the actual internal state of the will, is like imagining that a person could be physically beautiful merely by legal imputation. Righteousness is the beauty of a good will, and the only thing that can possess that kind of beauty is a good will. If a person has that kind of will, God will be pleased with its beauty; if he has a wicked will, God will find that will morally ugly. Just as a person who is physically beautiful will give the pleasure of physical beauty to onlookers. A person who is physically ugly cannot become pleasing to onlookers merely by having beauty legally imputed to him, or vice versa. Or, for another analogy, we can think of a person enjoying the taste of a certain food. If I eat something that is tasty, I will experience pleasure in the taste of it. This is because there is a logical connection between a food being tasty and that food giving the pleasure of taste to those who taste it. Good taste cannot be possessed by a food in merely a legal way. A substance or object with a disgusting taste cannot come to be enjoyed merely by having tastiness imputed to it. It will produce the sensation natural to its nature. I cannot take a lump of dirt, legally count it as possessing the tastiness of chocolate cake, and then enjoy it as if it is chocolate cake. The only way it will taste like chocolate cake is if it actually possesses the taste of chocolate cake.</p><p>So the Anti-Augustinian Protestant doctrine of justification makes a fundamental error when it tries to separate <i>righteousness</i> and <i>wickedness</i> from the good or bad dispositions of the will which are the natural source of these ideas and turn them into qualities which can exist purely legally. This makes no sense on biblical grounds, on the ground of ordinary human discourse, or on the ground of sound theology and philosophy.</p><p><b>ADDENDUM 5/5/23:</b> But can't righteousness and wickedness be possessed in terms of one's past record? Isn't one guilty not only for what one now is, but for what one has done in the past, and likewise with desert of reward?</p><p>If we keep in mind what we already established above, we can see that a record is only important as a way of keeping track of the specific manifestations of a being's will which help us to identify what the state of that will is. This is why we treat moral subjects differently from non-moral subjects even when they "commit" similar acts. For example, imagine a tornado destroying someone's house vs. an arson destroying someone's house. The outward act and the result are similar in both cases, but we don't set out to apprehend and punish the tornado as we do the arson. Why? Because the acts of a tornado do not manifest any evil will, whereas the acts of an arson do. We see the act of the arson as a manifestation of an evil will, and we seek to apprehend the being who has that will so that he can receive his proper punishment. We punish the man not ultimately because of the outward act itself but because of the internal disposition of will that was manifested in the outward act.</p><p>"But," it might be objected, "if a person commits an evil act but then later repents and changes, so that his will no longer possesses the evil orientation it previously had, we still want to punish him. Doesn't that indicate that we are wanting to punish something other than the evil will?" No, I don't think it does. If that were the case, again, we would want to punish a tornado just as much. I think what we are recognizing in such a case as this is that evil deeds have negative consequences that have to be faced. A person cannot commit an evil deed and escape the consequences of that deed by repenting. In fact, the repentance of an evil will inherently involves a facing up to those consequences and accepting them and choosing to do what one can to make up for the damage done. That is why repentance involves feelings of guilt and sorrow and is often accompanied by an attempt to repair the damage caused by the previous evil act (helping to rebuild the destroyed house, giving back what was stolen, etc.). (In Catholic theology, it is explicitly recognized that <i>repentance</i> involves deeds of <i>penance</i>. This is something we all recognize but Catholicism gives a theological name to. In the Bible, this is expressed by saying that in order to rise to a new life of righteousness, we must die to sin. We must deny ourselves, crucify our old lives, put to death the deeds of the flesh, suffer with Christ so that we might be glorified with him, etc. - Romans 6; Romans 8; Romans 8:17; Galatians 2:19-20; John 12:24; Matthew 16:24-25; etc.) So we naturally have an aversion to the idea of an evil will escaping from having to face up to the consequences of what it has done. But this does not imply that we find anything morally ugly ultimately other than a wicked will. (And, again, the same can be said in reverse with regard to a good will and acts of that good will.) It is simply a recognition that the transition from an evil will to a good will - repentance - involves dealing with all that the evil will entailed, or the consequences of that evil will and its acts. (For more, see <a href="https://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2021/07/suffering-dying-and-rising-with-christ.html">here</a>.)</p>Mark Hausamhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07371790103414979060noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-808697756426649418.post-7563884228487879362023-04-01T15:05:00.001-05:002023-07-21T14:07:01.838-05:00Can a Pope Teach Heresy? And What Should the Church Do If That Were to Happen?<p>I want to make some comments on a topic that has been much discussed in Church history among Catholic theologians: the question of in what ways a Pope might be able to believe or teach error or even heresy, and what the Church should do about it if that should happen.</p><p>Let me start with a selection from St. Francis de Sales, who I think lays out the prevailing view on this subject that has been mostly followed by theologians throughout the history of the discussion of this topic. St. Francis is one of the Church's great theologians, a Doctor of the Church. He is writing towards the end of the sixteenth century, responding to the positions and arguments of the Protestant Reformation. My text is taken from the full and plain text version of <i>The Catholic Controversy</i> as found <a href="https://archive.org/details/catholiccontrove00sain/page/n6">here</a> on the Internet Archive website. This version was published originally in 1909 (Third Edition, Revised and Augmented) in London by Burns and Oates, translated by Rev. H. B. Mackey, under the direction of Rev. John Cuthbert Hedley, Bishop of Newport.</p><p></p><blockquote>Under the ancient law the High Priest did not wear the Rational except when he was vested in the pontifical robes and was entering before the Lord. Thus we do not say that the Pope cannot err in his private opinions, as did John XXII; or be altogether a heretic as perhaps Honorius was. Now when he is explicitly a heretic, he falls <i>ipso facto</i> from his dignity and out of the Church, and the Church must either deprive him, or, as some say, declare him deprived, of his Apostolic See, and must say as S. Peter did: <i>Let another take his bishopric.</i> When he errs in his private opinion he must be instructed, advised, convinced; as happened with John XXII, who was so far from dying obstinate or from determining anything during his life concerning his opinion, that he died whilst he was making the examination which is necessary for determining in a matter of faith, as his successor declared in the <i>Extrazagantes</i> which begins <i>Benedictus Deus</i>. But when he is clothed with the pontifical garments, I mean when he teaches the whole Church as shepherd, in general matters of faith and morals, then there is nothing but doctrine and truth. And in fact everything a king says is not a law or an edict, but that only which a king says as king and as a legislator. So everything the Pope says is not canon law or of legal obligation; he must mean to define and to lay down the law for the sheep, and he must keep the due order and form. Thus we say that we must appeal to him not as to a learned man, for in this he is ordinarily surpassed by some others, but as to the general head and pastor of the Church: and as such we must honour, follow, and firmly embrace his doctrine, for then he carries on his breast the Urim and Thummim, doctrine and truth. And again we must not think that in everything and everywhere his judgment is infallible, but then only when he gives judgment on a matter of faith in questions necessary to the whole Church; for in particular cases which depend on human fact he can err, there is no doubt, though it is not for us to control him in these cases save with all reverence, submission, and discretion. Theologians have said, in a word, that he can err in questions of fact, not in questions of right; that he can err <i>extra cathedram</i>, outside the chair of Peter, that is, as a private individual, by writings and bad example.<br /><br />But he cannot err when he is <i>in cathedra</i>, that is, when he intends to make an instruction and decree for the guidance of the whole Church, when he means to confirm his brethren as supreme pastor, and to conduct them into the pastures of the faith.</blockquote><p></p><p>First of all, it should be noted that St. Francis lays out the teaching of the Church with regard to the indefectibility (inability to fall away) and infallibility of the See of St. Peter. This is a crucial foundation for everything else. In the Catholic epistemology, the Church is infallible. The Magisterium of the Church cannot fall away into error or teach error authoritatively and bindingly upon the Church. And the See of St. Peter, the Pope, in particular, is protected from error and cannot lead the Church into error in his official and authoritative teaching. I would encourage readers to read the larger context of St. Francis's comments <a href="https://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2019/03/st-francis-de-sales-on-pope-as.html">here</a>, in which he makes crystal clear the indefectibility and unfailing reliability of the See of St. Peter. Also, see <a href="https://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2015/07/the-infallibility-of-church.html">here</a> and <a href="http://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2018/12/the-infallibility-of-ordinary.html">here</a> for a more complete explanation of the Catholic view and all the nuances involved in it and citations for it from the sources of Catholic doctrine. I won't repeat all of that here, but it is a crucial foundation for understanding what we are going to discuss.</p><p style="text-align: center;"><b>Can a Pope Err or Teach Heresy in His Private Capacity?</b></p><p>St. Francis articulates that Popes cannot err in their official, authoritative teaching. But he allows that they might be able to err as private individuals, when they are not teaching a doctrine authoritatively and bindingly to the Church. They might be able to err in their private opinions. They might even be able to be heretics in their private opinions (that is, their opinions might contradict the foundational doctrines of the faith). They might even articulate their errors or heresies explicitly and manifestly - that is, they might tell them to others or teach them. Is it true that a Pope might do that? Is that something that God might allow to happen? That is something upon which there has not been universal consensus among Catholic theologians, and there is no official teaching on this matter by the Church. There is a range of opinions that can be held here, within the boundaries laid down by what the Church <i>has</i> taught (and especially with regard to the Church's teachings on the indefectibility and infallibility of the Church, the Church's Magisterium, and the Roman See). St. Robert Bellarmine, another Doctor of the Church, is famous for holding the position that it is most probable that God would not allow a Pope to fall into manifest heresy even as a private person. (See <i>De Controversiis: Tomus I: On the Roman Pontiff</i>, Book IV, VI). It seems to me that the doctrine of the indefectibility and infallibility of the Roman See does not absolutely or conclusively rule out the possibility of a Pope believing or teaching error or even heresy in his private capacity, since such teaching, by its very nature, would not bind the Church to error or enter into her official teaching.</p><p style="text-align: center;"><b>What Would Happen If a Pope Taught Error or Heresy in His Private Capacity?</b></p><p>So what would happen if a Pope taught error or heresy in his private capacity? St. Francis de Sales, in the quotation above, gives the common opinion on this among Catholic theologians through history: "Now when he is explicitly a heretic, he falls <i>ipso facto</i> from his dignity and out of the Church, and the Church must either deprive him, or, as some say, declare him deprived, of his Apostolic See, and must say as S. Peter did: <i>Let another take his bishopric.</i> When he errs in his private opinion he must be instructed, advised, convinced." If the Pope has kept his opinions to himself, of course, since there is no public knowledge of them, nothing can be publicly done about them. If he is known to err in some lesser matter, he can be instructed and corrected. But if he errs more fundamentally, by holding to heretical opinions (again, opinions that contradict the foundational doctrines of the Church), and has manifested those opinions publicly, St. Francis says that, by that act, he has basically cast himself out of both the papal office and the Church itself, and the Church can recognize this and depose him or declare him deposed. This opinion has been common among Catholic theologians.</p><p>The Church has not issued any official teaching about this possibility in recent times, nor is there anything at all about this in current canon law. However, as I've said, what St. Francis has laid out has been the common opinion among theologians. Also, there have been statements made about this subject in the past in collections of canon law and by Popes. The reader can see some of these statements and some statements by important theologians of the past on this matter in <a href="https://erickybarra.wordpress.com/2017/03/05/loss-of-papal-office-through-heresy-abridged/">this very brief and helpful article</a> by Erick Ybarra. For example, in the <i><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Decretum_Gratiani">Decretum Gratiani</a></i>, which was a collection of Church rules from earlier days and was a central source of canon law in the 12th and 13th centuries and significantly informed much later canon law, we find the principle articulated that "No mortal shall presume to rebuke his [the Pope’s] faults, for he who is to judge all is to be judged by no one, unless he is found straying from the faith" (Decretum Gratiani, Dist. 40, c. 6; translation in Patrick Granfield, <i>The Limits of the Papacy</i> [New York: Crossroad Publishing Company, 1987], 71, found <a href="https://erickybarra.wordpress.com/2017/03/05/loss-of-papal-office-through-heresy-abridged/">here</a>). Pope Innocent III (who was Pope from 1198-1216) is famous for laying out more commentary on what this meant, saying that "only on account of sin committed against the faith can I be judged by the church" (Patrologia Latina 217, 656; Translation in Jaroslav Pelikan, <i>Reformation of the Church and Dogma (1300-1700), The Christian Tradition: A History of the Development of Doctrine, vol. 4</i> [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984], found <a href="https://erickybarra.wordpress.com/2017/03/05/loss-of-papal-office-through-heresy-abridged/">here</a>). Pope Innocent III elaborated further on this concept:</p><p></p><blockquote>Nevertheless he [the pope] should not mistakenly flatter himself about his power, nor rashly glory in his eminence or honor, for the less he is judged by man, the more is he judged by God. I say "less" because he can be judged by men, or rather shown to be judged, if he clearly <i>loses his savor to heresy</i>, since he "who does not believe, is <i>already judged</i>." It is <i>only in this case</i> that it should be understood of him that, "<i>If the salt loses its savor, it is good for nothing anymore, except to be thrown out and to be trodden on by men</i>." (Pope Innocent III, <i>Between God and Man: Six Sermons on the Priestly Office</i>, trans. Corinne J. Vause and Frank C. Gardiner [Washington, DC, Catholic University of American Press, 2004), 48-49, found in Erick Ybarra, <i>The Papacy: Revisiting the Debate between Catholics and Orthodox</i> [Steubenville, OH: Emmaus Road Publishing, 2022], 534)</blockquote><p></p><p>Innocent III here indicates the same nuance we see in other theologians - namely, that if the Church should judge a Pope for his heresy, it is not so much that the Church is judging the Pope herself as that she is officially recognizing a judgment already passed on the Pope by God. It has been frequently stated by many Popes and theologians and has always been and currently is stated in canon law (<a href="https://www.vatican.va/archive/cod-iuris-canonici/eng/documents/cic_lib7-cann1400-1500_en.html">see canon 1404</a>) that "the First See is judged by no one." There is no higher human authority in the Church than the Pope, who thus cannot be judged by equal or lower levels of authority in the Church. But the Pope is obviously subject to God, and the Church can recognize the judgment of God.</p><p>So it has been acknowledged in the past that if a Pope were to fall into manifest heresy, he might be judged by the Church in this way. But, as I said earlier, this teaching is not currently a part of canon law. Could this be because such a thing could not happen, as Bellarmine and others have thought? Perhaps, but, so far as I can tell at this point based on what I've seen, I don't think there is enough evidence to say for sure.</p><p>Since we are dealing here with something as extreme as the deposition of a reigning Pope from office, we have to proceed here with extreme caution, making very sure that we don't jeopardize the indefectibility of the Church or the unfailing reliability and supreme jurisdiction of the Magisterium and the Roman See in our opinions. As Bellarmine points out, this has never happened in the two-thousand-year history of the Church. (He points this fact out partly to use it to argue that such a thing probably could never happen.) There is one case in Church history where a Pope was condemned for heresy: Pope Honorius was condemned as a heretic by the Sixth Ecumenical Council in 681. But, in this case, the condemnation occurred decades after Honorius's death, and the condemnation was ratified by the Pope who was reigning at that time, Leo II (without whose ratification the council's condemnation could have had no validity). (The Honorius affair is complex and filled with all sorts of nuances, so I will refer readers <a href="http://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2019/07/historical-challenges-to-infallibility_30.html">here</a> for more on this. For one thing, it is not clear that Honorius was actually a heretic in the sense of actually believing or teaching false doctrine; his condemnation can be interpreted as due not so much to his actual opinion as to his failing to be careful enough in his words to avoid aiding and abetting a heretical movement that actually really got going only after his death.) There has never been a case where a currently-reigning Pope has been legitimately deposed from office by the Church. So as we consider this hypothetical possibility (which may or may not be actually possible), we have to make sure our thoughts are consistent with Catholic teaching and Catholic epistemology.</p><p>If a Pope were to be deposed from office for heresy, the proceedings of the Church against the Pope would have to be done with full Magisterial authority. This could not be a matter of one group of theologians (even if they are priests or bishops) arguing against other groups, with no official sanction, that some teaching of the Pope was heretical. For example, some people argue that Pope Francis's teaching on the death penalty is at least something like heretical because it contradicts earlier definitive Church teaching on this subject. But this is not at all clear and certain, and in fact I think it is evidently wrong (see <a href="https://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2018/08/the-death-penalty-in-catholic-teaching.html">here</a> for more on this), and in any case they cannot cite their opinion as the authoritative position of the universal Magisterium. Going along with this, the proceedings would have to be done according to clear and recognized rules, so that everyone would be able to recognize them as a legitimate Magisterial act. Personally, I'm not sure how that could be done without there being some clear procedure laid out in canon law, which there currently is not. If this scenario is at all a real possibility, my recommendation is that theologians and Church officials should work hard and give some real thought to trying to figure out how we should think about these things so that we can perhaps come to some conclusive and officially-recognized theological position on these matters, and I would also recommend that, if the Church decides that, yes, this could happen, she would consider laying out very clear and explicit procedures for such an eventuality in canon law. In that way, if this ever happened, hopefully there would be no reasonable doubt as to how to proceed. The procedures followed would have the clear imprint of Magisterial and papal authority. The situation, in that case, would be much like what happens when a reigning Pope dies. In the time between the death of the last Pope and the election of the new Pope, chaos does not ensue because the Church has clear procedures to follow in such a case. Of course, God can protect the Church from falling apart even without such clear procedural rules, and he has many times in the past, and we know he will because that is his fundamental promise to the Church, yet the Church is morally obligated to do her due diligence in trying to avoid the negative consequences of her own negligence. It would be to the Church's detriment if God has to protect her over and against her own negligence. And even if we can be sure the Church would not fundamentally fall away, yet still the Church's negligence could lead to many bad results and schisms.</p><p>If there was a clear procedure laid out in canon law as described above, ratified by Magisterial (including papal) authority, then it could be carried out without violation of that authority. But what if the Pope protests that he is not a heretic, or that the judgment against him is incorrect or without authority? If he protests in his private capacity, simply as a member of the Church, this would not seem to be a problem. But what if he were to protest in his official capacity as Pope? As we have noted, the Pope has supreme jurisdiction in the Church and is also incapable of leading the Church into error in his official, authoritative teaching. The Pope's authority and protection from error in these matters is precisely on the same level as that of the whole episcopate (for the episcopate necessarily includes the Pope and the Pope necessarily speaks authoritatively for the whole episcopate), so there is no possibility for the Church to contradict or overrule the Magisterial authority of the Pope. If the Pope were to give an authoritative teaching declaring his own teaching orthodox, or if he were to declare the whole procedure against him void, the Church would have to submit to that. So there could be no declaring the Pope a heretic or deprived from office if the Pope were to oppose this in his official capacity. (But see the next section for another possible twist on this point.)</p><p style="text-align: center;"><b>Could a Pope Teach Error or Heresy in an "Official" Form but Ultra Vires?</b></p><p>I want to throw out a hypothetical scenario for discussion that I have not heard anyone address before. Perhaps this has been addressed and I am not aware of it, but it seems worth discussing. Could it ever happen that a Pope might attempt to issue not a private but an authoritative teaching, whether definitively or non-definitively, but fail to do so due to the teaching being <i>ultra vires</i> - that is, beyond his competent authority? For example, imagine that a Pope issues a statement claiming, in an <i>ex cathedra</i> manner, that the doctrine of the Trinity is incorrect and that there is instead a divine Quaternity. Could this ever happen? Of course, Church teaching is crystal clear that there could never be any <i>real</i> <i>ex cathedra</i> teaching from a Pope that is heretical, for here papal infallibility is in effect at its highest degree. But perhaps, in such a scenario as I've laid out, the teaching might be considered a <i>false</i> claim of <i>ex cathedra</i> teaching. We know that the Pope has supreme human jurisdiction in the Church, including in the teaching of doctrine. But we also know that the Popes are servants of God and his revelation. They have no authority to contradict God. If a Pope attempted to give an <i>ex cathedra</i> teaching that contradicted divine revelation, then, that attempt would be <i>ultra vires</i> - beyond the authority he has been granted by God. It would be like the governor of Idaho attempting to make an executive order for the State of Missouri. In such a case, then, although the outward form of the teaching is <i>ex cathedra</i> and the Pope is attempting to give an <i>ex cathedra</i> teaching, the teaching would in reality have no papal or Magisterial authority at all. It would be, in authority, equivalent to a private teaching of the Pope.</p><p>Could such a scenario ever happen? I don't know. I currently cannot think of any reason to consider it inherently impossible, because it would not threaten the indefectibility of the Church or contradict Magisterial or papal infallibility. Of course, in order not to threaten the indefectibility of the Church and the Pope, God would only allow this to happen in cases where the "papal" teaching is so obviously heretical as to leave no room for reasonable doubt on the subject. There would have to be absolutely manifest, clear heresy, recognized as such clearly and universally by the Church. An example of a clear and clearly-and-universally-recognized heretical teaching would be an explicit and clear denial of the doctrine of the Trinity, or the clear and explicit affirmation of some other contrary doctrine (like a divine Quaternity or something like that). There would be no reasonable doubt in such a case that the Pope had expressed heresy and had contradicted previously-given definitive Magisterial teaching. Since we are obligated to follow the judgment of the Pope as of supreme authority on earth, as he exercises his office as the Vicar of Christ, we would only be authorized to reject a teaching coming from him if that teaching were so clearly heretical that there could be no doubt, and it would be basically universally recognized in the Catholic Church, that that teaching is not a true papal teaching but is <i>ultra vires</i>. All the things I said in earlier sections about this not being able to happen with disputable teachings, or judged by private theologians or groups of theologians or bishops, etc., would apply here in the same way as they applied to the earlier scenarios we considered. If the Pope were to be judged and even possibly deposed in such a scenario, it would have to be by means of clearly-recognized Magisterial authority operating with clearly-recognized procedural rules.</p><p style="text-align: center;"><b>Brief Excursus on the Possibility of Other Forms of Ecclesiastical or Other Judgments Being Enacted against Popes</b></p><p style="text-align: left;">The Church has made it clear that "the First See is judged by no one," and statements by Popes and in canon law collections in the past have limited the possibility of the Church judging the Pope to cases of heresy, but is it possible to consider that there might be ways in which Popes, as human persons subject like all of us to sin, imprudence, incompetence, negligence, etc., could be judged for other things by the Church? There is a lot of discussion in the Church today about keeping priests and bishops accountable (such as with regard to sexual sins and crimes and other things). Must the Pope remain unaccountable in all of these areas? Or could papal authority be consistent with some forms of papal accountability?</p><p style="text-align: left;">It is clear that, in the Catholic Church, the Pope has supreme jurisdictional and doctrinal authority. So there can never be the kind of papal accountability that would threaten those things. We have to trust that God will keep the Popes adequately accountable, since they are ultimately subject to his judgment. But what if the Magisterium, including the Pope, were to put procedures into canon law for papal accountability, much as there are procedures for accountability of other persons in the Church? In such a case, the laws would be legitimate, because established with legitimate Magisterial and papal authority. Of course, there would always be the possibility that a Pope could overrule such procedures, since to deny this possibility would be to remove the supreme jurisdiction of the Pope, but at least there would be procedures in place that Popes would be ordinarily expected to follow, imposed upon them with papal authority. There would be some moral force to these laws, even if that force is not jurisdictionally superior to papal jurisdiction, for if a Pope were to refuse to submit to such laws he would be going against established norms in the Church and against what his predecessors in the papacy or even he himself had previously established as important for the good of the Church, and this would reflect very badly on him. Unless he had very good and clear reasons to refuse to submit to those laws, he would be publicly highlighting what would at least appear to be an unreasonable flaunting of his personal moral responsibility and thus would bring significant dishonor and perhaps even scandal upon himself, on the papal office, and on the Catholic Church. Perhaps there could even be decrees or rules passed regarding papal accountability that would be definitive in nature, so that it would be <i>ultra vires</i> for a Pope to overturn them in the future. I think there are some things at least worth considering here.</p>Mark Hausamhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07371790103414979060noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-808697756426649418.post-24390406669740971892023-03-03T20:38:00.000-06:002023-03-03T20:38:28.621-06:00St. Thomas Aquinas on Predestination<p><i>St. Thomas Aquinas discussed his view of predestination in a number of places, including his famous </i>Summa Theologica<i> and his </i>Summa Contra Gentiles<i>. Below, I have selected some key portions from both of these works which lay out St. Thomas's views on this subject. The section on predestination from the </i>Summa Theologica<i> can be found </i><a href="https://www.newadvent.org/summa/1023.htm" style="font-style: italic;">here</a><i>. My selections from the </i>Summa Contra Gentiles<i> can be found </i><a href="https://isidore.co/aquinas/english/ContraGentiles3b.htm" style="font-style: italic;">here</a><i> (#159-163 - though this source uses a different translation from the one in my text below). My texts below come from public domain versions of both works, such as can be found </i><a href="https://www.ccel.org/ccel/a/aquinas/summa/cache/summa.txt" style="font-style: italic;">here</a><i> and </i><a href="https://ccel.org/ccel/a/aquinas/gentiles/cache/gentiles.txt" style="font-style: italic;">here</a><i>.</i></p><p><b><i>First, from the </i>Summa Theologica<i>:</i></b></p><p>It is fitting that God should predestine men. For all things are subject to His providence, as was shown above (I:22:2). Now it belongs to providence to direct things towards their end, as was also said (I:22:1 and I:22:2). The end towards which created things are directed by God is twofold; one which exceeds all proportion and faculty of created nature; and this end is life eternal, that consists in seeing God which is above the nature of every creature, as shown above (I:12:4). The other end, however, is proportionate to created nature, to which end created being can attain according to the power of its nature. Now if a thing cannot attain to something by the power of its nature, it must be directed thereto by another; thus, an arrow is directed by the archer towards a mark. Hence, properly speaking, a rational creature, capable of eternal life, is led towards it, directed, as it were, by God. The reason of that direction pre-exists in God; as in Him is the type of the order of all things towards an end, which we proved above to be providence. Now the type in the mind of the doer of something to be done, is a kind of pre-existence in him of the thing to be done. Hence the type of the aforesaid direction of a rational creature towards the end of life eternal is called predestination. For to destine, is to direct or send. Thus it is clear that predestination, as regards its objects, is a part of providence. (I:23:1)</p><p>God does reprobate some. For it was said above (Article 1) that predestination is a part of providence. To providence, however, it belongs to permit certain defects in those things which are subject to providence, as was said above (I:22:2). Thus, as men are ordained to eternal life through the providence of God, it likewise is part of that providence to permit some to fall away from that end; this is called reprobation. Thus, as predestination is a part of providence, in regard to those ordained to eternal salvation, so reprobation is a part of providence in regard to those who turn aside from that end. Hence reprobation implies not only foreknowledge, but also something more, as does providence, as was said above (I:22:1). Therefore, as predestination includes the will to confer grace and glory; so also reprobation includes the will to permit a person to fall into sin, and to impose the punishment of damnation on account of that sin. (I:23:3)</p><p>Since predestination includes will, as was said above (Article 4), the reason of predestination must be sought for in the same way as was the reason of the will of God. Now it was shown above (I:19:5), that we cannot assign any cause of the divine will on the part of the act of willing; but a reason can be found on the part of the things willed; inasmuch as God wills one thing on account of something else. Wherefore nobody has been so insane as to say that merit is the cause of divine predestination as regards the act of the predestinator. But this is the question, whether, as regards the effect, predestination has any cause; or what comes to the same thing, whether God pre-ordained that He would give the effect of predestination to anyone on account of any merits.</p><p>Accordingly there were some who held that the effect of predestination was pre-ordained for some on account of pre-existing merits in a former life. This was the opinion of Origen, who thought that the souls of men were created in the beginning, and according to the diversity of their works different states were assigned to them in this world when united with the body. The Apostle, however, rebuts this opinion where he says (Romans 9:11-12): "For when they were not yet born, nor had done any good or evil . . . not of works, but of Him that calleth, it was said of her: The elder shall serve the younger."</p><p>Others said that pre-existing merits in this life are the reason and cause of the effect of predestination. For the Pelagians taught that the beginning of doing well came from us; and the consummation from God: so that it came about that the effect of predestination was granted to one, and not to another, because the one made a beginning by preparing, whereas the other did not. But against this we have the saying of the Apostle (2 Corinthians 3:5), that "we are not sufficient to think anything of ourselves as of ourselves." Now no principle of action can be imagined previous to the act of thinking. Wherefore it cannot be said that anything begun in us can be the reason of the effect of predestination.</p><p>And so others said that merits following the effect of predestination are the reason of predestination; giving us to understand that God gives grace to a person, and pre-ordains that He will give it, because He knows beforehand that He will make good use of that grace, as if a king were to give a horse to a soldier because he knows he will make good use of it. But these seem to have drawn a distinction between that which flows from grace, and that which flows from free will, as if the same thing cannot come from both. It is, however, manifest that what is of grace is the effect of predestination; and this cannot be considered as the reason of predestination, since it is contained in the notion of predestination. Therefore, if anything else in us be the reason of predestination, it will outside the effect of predestination. Now there is no distinction between what flows from free will, and what is of predestination; as there is not distinction between what flows from a secondary cause and from a first cause. For the providence of God produces effects through the operation of secondary causes, as was above shown (I:22:3. Wherefore, that which flows from free-will is also of predestination. We must say, therefore, that the effect of predestination may be considered in a twofold light—in one way, in particular; and thus there is no reason why one effect of predestination should not be the reason or cause of another; a subsequent effect being the reason of a previous effect, as its final cause; and the previous effect being the reason of the subsequent as its meritorious cause, which is reduced to the disposition of the matter. Thus we might say that God pre-ordained to give glory on account of merit, and that He pre-ordained to give grace to merit glory. In another way, the effect of predestination may be considered in general. Thus, it is impossible that the whole of the effect of predestination in general should have any cause as coming from us; because whatsoever is in man disposing him towards salvation, is all included under the effect of predestination; even the preparation for grace. For neither does this happen otherwise than by divine help, according to the prophet Jeremias (Lamentations 5:21): "convert us, O Lord, to Thee, and we shall be converted." Yet predestination has in this way, in regard to its effect, the goodness of God for its reason; towards which the whole effect of predestination is directed as to an end; and from which it proceeds, as from its first moving principle. (I:23:5)</p><p>The reason for the predestination of some, and reprobation of others, must be sought for in the goodness of God. Thus He is said to have made all things through His goodness, so that the divine goodness might be represented in things. Now it is necessary that God's goodness, which in itself is one and undivided, should be manifested in many ways in His creation; because creatures in themselves cannot attain to the simplicity of God. Thus it is that for the completion of the universe there are required different grades of being; some of which hold a high and some a low place in the universe. That this multiformity of grades may be preserved in things, God allows some evils, lest many good things should never happen, as was said above (I:22:2). Let us then consider the whole of the human race, as we consider the whole universe. God wills to manifest His goodness in men; in respect to those whom He predestines, by means of His mercy, as sparing them; and in respect of others, whom he reprobates, by means of His justice, in punishing them. This is the reason why God elects some and rejects others. To this the Apostle refers, saying (Romans 9:22-23): "What if God, willing to show His wrath [that is, the vengeance of His justice], and to make His power known, endured [that is, permitted] with much patience vessels of wrath, fitted for destruction; that He might show the riches of His glory on the vessels of mercy, which He hath prepared unto glory" and (2 Timothy 2:20): "But in a great house there are not only vessels of gold and silver; but also of wood and of earth; and some, indeed, unto honor, but some unto dishonor." Yet why He chooses some for glory, and reprobates others, has no reason, except the divine will. Whence Augustine says (Tract. xxvi. in Joan.): "Why He draws one, and another He draws not, seek not to judge, if thou dost not wish to err." Thus too, in the things of nature, a reason can be assigned, since primary matter is altogether uniform, why one part of it was fashioned by God from the beginning under the form of fire, another under the form of earth, that there might be a diversity of species in things of nature. Yet why this particular part of matter is under this particular form, and that under another, depends upon the simple will of God; as from the simple will of the artificer it depends that this stone is in part of the wall, and that in another; although the plan requires that some stones should be in this place, and some in that place. Neither on this account can there be said to be injustice in God, if He prepares unequal lots for not unequal things. This would be altogether contrary to the notion of justice, if the effect of predestination were granted as a debt, and not gratuitously. In things which are given gratuitously, a person can give more or less, just as he pleases (provided he deprives nobody of his due), without any infringement of justice. This is what the master of the house said: "Take what is thine, and go thy way. Is it not lawful for me to do what I will?" (Matthew 20:14-15). (I:23:5)</p><p><b><i>Second, from the </i>Summa Contra Gentiles<i> (Book III, #160-164):</i></b></p><p style="text-align: center;">160</p><p>SINCE no one can be set on the way to his last end without the aid of divine grace, or without it have the necessary means of reaching that end, as are faith, hope, love and perseverance, some might think that man is not to blame for being destitute of these gifts, especially seeing that he cannot merit the assistance of divine grace, nor be converted to God unless God convert him: for none is responsible for that which depends on another. But allow this, and many absurdities follow. It follows that the man who has neither faith nor hope nor love of God, nor perseverance in good, still does not deserve punishment: whereas it is expressly said: "He that believeth not the Son shall not see life, but the wrath of God abideth on him" (John iii, 36). And since none reaches the end of happiness without the aforesaid endowments, it would follow further that there are some who neither attain to happiness nor yet suffer punishment of God: the contrary whereof is shown from what will be said to all present at the judgement of God: "Come . . . . possess ye the kingdom prepared for you, or, Depart . . . . into everlasting fire" (Matt. xxv, 34-41).</p><p>To solve this doubt, we must observe that though one can neither merit divine grace beforehand, nor acquire it by movement of his free will, still he can hinder himself from receiving it: for it is said of some: "They have said unto God, ‘Depart from us, we will not have the knowledge of thy ways’" (Job xxi, 14). And since it is in the power of free will to hinder the reception of divine grace or not to hinder it, not undeservedly may it be reckoned a man’s own fault, if he puts an obstacle in the way of the reception of grace. For God on His part is ready to give grace to all men: "He wills all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth" (1 Tim. ii, 4). But they alone are deprived of grace, who in themselves raise an obstacle to grace. So when the sun lights up the world, any evil that comes to a man who shuts his eyes is counted his own fault, although he could not see unless the sunlight first came in upon him.</p><p style="text-align: center;">161</p><p>WHEN it is said that it is in the power of free will to avoid putting obstacles to grace, that saying is to be understood of those in whom the natural faculty is unimpaired by sin. But if the will has fallen into evil courses by some previous inordinate act, it will not be altogether in its power to avoid putting obstacles in the way of grace. For though for some momentary occasion it may abstain from some particular act of sin by its own power, nevertheless, if left long to itself, it will fall into sin; and by sin an obstacle is put to grace. For when the mind of man turns aside from the state of righteousness, it clearly puts itself out of relation with its due end. Thus what ought to be the prime object of its affections, as being its last end, comes to be less loved than that other object to which it has inordinately turned, making of it another last end. Whatever in such a posture of the mind occurs to fit in with the inordinate end, however inconsistent with the due end, will be chosen, unless the will be brought back to due order, so as to prefer the due end to all others, and that is an effect of grace. But the choice of anything inconsistent with the last end puts an obstacle in the way of grace, as grace goes to turn one in the direction of the end. Hence after sin a man cannot abstain from all further sin before by grace he is brought back to due order.</p><p>Moreover, when the mind is inclined to a thing, it is no longer impartial between two alternatives. And that to which the mind is more inclined it chooses, unless by a rational discussion, not unattended with trouble, it is withdrawn from taking that side: hence sudden emergencies afford the best sign of the inward bent of the mind. But it is impossible for the mind of man to be so continually watchful as rationally to discuss whatever it ought to do or not to do. Consequently the mind will at times choose that to which it is inclined by the present inclination: so, if the inclination be to sin, it will not stand long clear of sin, thereby putting an obstacle in the way of grace, unless it be brought back to the state of righteousness.</p><p>Further we must consider the assaults of passion, the allurements of sense, the endless occasions of evil-doing, the ready incitements of sin, sure to prevail, unless the will be withheld from them by a firm adherence to the last end, which is the work of grace.</p><p>Hence appears the folly of the Pelagian view, that a man in sin can go on avoiding further sins without grace. On the contrary the Lord bids us pray: "Lead us not into temptation, but deliver us from evil."</p><p>But though persons in sin cannot of their own power help putting obstacles in the way of grace, unless they be forestalled by some aid of grace, still this lack of power is imputable to them for a fault, because it is left behind in them by a fault going before; as a drunken man is not excused from murder, committed in drunkenness, when he gets drunk by fault of his own. Besides, though this person in sin has it not in his unaided power altogether to avoid sin, still he has power here and now to avoid this or that sin: hence whatever he commits, he voluntarily commits, and the fault is imputed to him not undeservedly.</p><p style="text-align: center;">162</p><p>THOUGH the sinner raises an obstacle to grace, and by the exigence of the order of things ought not to receive grace, nevertheless, inasmuch as God can work setting aside the connatural order of things, as when He gives sight to the blind, or raises the dead, He sometimes out of the abundance of His goodness forestalls by the assistance of His grace even those who raise an obstacle to it, turning them away from evil and converting them to good. And as He does not give sight to all the blind, nor heal all the sick, that in those whom He heals the work of His power may appear, and in the others the order of nature may be observed, so He does not forestall by His aid all who hinder grace, to their turning away from evil and conversion to good, but some He so forestalls, wishing in them His mercy to appear, while in others He would have the order of justice made manifest. Hence the Apostle says: "God, though willing to show his wrath, and to make his power known, endured with much longsuffering vessels of wrath, fitted for destruction, that he might show forth the riches of his glory upon the vessels of mercy, which he hath prepared unto glory" (Rom. ix, 22, 23).</p><p>But when, of men who are enthralled in the same sins, God forestalls and converts some, and endures, or permits, others to go their way according to the order of things, we should not enquire the reason why He converts these and not those: for that depends on His sheer will, just as from His sheer will it proceeded that, when all things were made out of nothing, some things were made in a position of greater advantage than others (digniora). Hence again the apostle says: "Hath not the potter power over the clay, to make of the same lump one vessel unto honour and another unto dishonour?" (Rom. ix, 21.)</p><p>Hereby is refuted the error of Origen, who said that the reason why some were converted to God, and not others, was to be sought in divers works that their souls had done before they were united with their bodies, a theory already set aside (B. II, Chapp. XLIV, LXXXIII).</p><p style="text-align: center;">163</p><p>THOUGH there are some sinners whom God does not convert to Himself, but leaves them in their sins according to their deserts, still He does not induce them to sin.</p><p>1. Men sin by deviating from God their last end. But as every agent acts to its own proper and befitting end, it is impossible for God’s action to avert any from their ultimate end in God.</p><p>2. Good cannot be the cause of evil, nor God the cause of sin.</p><p>3. All the wisdom and goodness of man is derived from the wisdom and goodness of God, being a likeness thereof. But it is repugnant to the wisdom and goodness of man to make any one to sin: therefore much more to divine wisdom and goodness.</p><p>4. A fault always arises from some defect of the proximate agent, not from any defect of the prime agent. Thus the fault of limping comes from some defect of the shin-bone, not from the locomotor power, from which power however is whatever perfection of movement appears in the limping. But the proximate agent of human sin is the will. The sinful defect then is from the will of man, not from God, who is the prime agent, of whom however is whatever point of perfect action appears in the act of sin.</p><p>Hence it is said: "Say not, He himself hath led me astray: for he hath no use for sinful men: He hath commanded none to do impiously, and he hath not given to any man license to sin" (Ecclus xv, 12, 21): "Let none, when he is tempted, say that he is tempted by God: for God tempteth no man to evil" (James i, 13).</p><p>Still there are passages of Scripture, from which it might seem that God is to some men the cause of sin. Thus it is said: "I have hardened the heart of Pharaoh and his servants" (Exod. x, 1): "Blind the heart of this people, and make its ears dull, and close its eyes, lest perchance it see with its eyes, and be converted, and I heal it: Thou hast made us wander from thy ways: Thou hast hardened our heart, that we should not fear thee" (Isai. vi, 10: lxiii, 17): "God delivered them over to a reprobate sense, to do those things which are not seemly" (Rom. i, 28). All these passages are to be understood as meaning that God does not bestow on some the help for avoiding sin which He bestows on others. This help is not merely the infusion of grace, but also an exterior guardianship, whereby the occasions of sin are providentially removed from a man’s path. God also aids man against sin by the natural light of reason, and other natural goods that He bestows on man. When then He withdraws these aids from some, as their conduct deserves that he should, according to the exigency of His justice, He is said to harden them, or to blind them.</p><p style="text-align: center;">164</p><p>SINCE it has been shown that by the action of God some are guided to their last end with the aid of grace, while others, bereft of that same aid of grace, fall away from their last end; and at the same time all things that are done by God are from eternity foreseen and ordained by His wisdom, as has also been shown, it needs must be that the aforesaid distinction of men has been from eternity ordained of God. Inasmuch therefore as He has from eternity pre-ordained some to be guided to the last end, He is said to have ‘predestined’ them. Hence the Apostle says: "Who hath predestined us to the adoption of sons, according to the purpose of his will" (Eph. i, 5). But those to whom from eternity He has arranged not to give grace, He is said to have ‘reprobated,’ or ‘hated,’ according to the text: "I have loved Jacob, and hated Esau" (Malach. i, 2). In point of this distinction, inasmuch as some He has reprobated and some He has predestined, we speak of the divine ‘election,’ of which it is said: "He hath elected us in him before the constitution of the world" (Eph. i, 4). Thus it appears that predestination and election and reprobation is a part of divine providence, according as by the said providence men are guided to their last end. And it may be shown that predestination and election do not induce necessity, by the same arguments whereby it was shown that divine providence does not take away contingency from creation (Chap. LXXII).</p><p>But that predestination and election have no cause in any human merits may be shown, not only by the fact that the grace of God, an effect of predestination, is not preceded by any merits, but precedes all merit, but also by this further fact, that the divine will and providence is the first cause of all things that are made. Nothing can be cause of the will and providence of God; although of the effects of providence, and of the effects of predestination, one effect may be cause of another. "For who hath first given to him, and recompense shall be made him? For of him and by him and in him are all things: to him be glory forever, Amen" (Rom. xi, 35, 36).</p><p><i>For more, see <a href="https://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2019/02/predestination-grace-and-free-will-in.html">here</a>.</i></p><p><i>Published on the feast of St. Katherine Drexel.</i></p>Mark Hausamhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07371790103414979060noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-808697756426649418.post-89865658029383887642022-06-30T11:23:00.001-05:002022-06-30T11:23:37.191-05:00Documentation of My Attempt to Bridge the Augustinian-Reformed Gap in 2003<div>A few days ago, I found an old CD which turned out to contain, among other things, a collection of documents I wrote up while I was coming to the conclusion that the gap between the Augustinian and the Reformed doctrines of justification could be bridged. The writings document my attempt to process this question from the beginning, where I seem skeptical that the gap could be bridged, to the end, where I was just about ready to conclude that it could be.</div><div><br /></div><div>You can read more about the context of all of this <a href="http://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2021/09/a-narrative-of-history-of-my-thinking.html">here</a>, where I lay out a narrative of the history of my thinking on the doctrine of justification. In short, I started with what I called an Augustinian doctrine of justification. I came to believe, back in 2000, that this view was in conflict with the Reformed view. I wrote <a href="http://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2015/07/the-augustinian-and-protestant.html">this paper</a> at that time arguing for the Augustinian view and against the Reformed view. But, in 2003, as documented below, I began to wonder if the gap between these two views might be bridged. You can see that thought process played out below. In the end, in the Summer of 2003, I concluded that the gap could be bridged, and for over a decade after that I publicly articulated my doctrine of justification in Reformed language - an example of which you can find <a href="http://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2016/05/a-sermon-on-justification-and.html">here</a> (I say "publicly," because in my own private thoughts I felt freer to think in Augustinian terms sometimes). (See also <a href="https://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2019/04/justification-and-mortal-and-venial-sin.html">here</a>, in ADDENDUM 1/18/22 towards the bottom, some emails from this time period illustrating my thinking as I articulated it to a Catholic correspondent.) I continued to be optimistic about the gap being bridged between Augustinian and Reformed thought for a few years after becoming Catholic (back in 2015), and I wrote some articles (see <a href="http://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2015/10/do-catholics-believe-in-justification.html">here</a> and <a href="http://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2018/01/what-exactly-is-protestant-doctrine-of.html">here</a>) in which I've tried to articulate two different ways (a pro-Augustinian way and an anti-Augustinian way) the Reformed doctrine might be understood, but over the past three years or so I've once again begun to be suspicious of whether the gap can be bridged after all (though I'm not feeling conclusive on this point at this time).</div><div><br /></div><div>In some of the documents, I appear to be addressing a Reformed person in correspondence. In one document, I explicitly mention "Pastor Wallace." He's the pastor of <a href="http://www.gospelutah.org/">Christ OPC</a> in Salt Lake City, UT, which was our church for fourteen years. Back at the time these documents were written, I was hoping to persuade him that my Augustinian view was OK. He may be the person all the documents that are addressed to someone were addressed to, but I did correspond with some other Reformed people about this as well at this time, so I'm not sure. It's been a long time (about 19 years!), and I didn't even remember that these documents existed until the day before yesterday.</div><div><br /></div><div>At any rate, enjoy! (I've left my writing as it was when I wrote it, even leaving in typos. I did, at a few points, remove an extra space between paragraphs.)</div><div><br /></div><div><div><i><b>This document is dated 4/14/2003. I'm pretty much rearticulating my Augustinian position which I argued for in <a href="http://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2015/07/the-augustinian-and-protestant.html">my earlier paper</a>. As in that paper, I acknowledge the idea that we are justified--made right with God--by the righteousness of Christ, and by that righteousness imputed to us in the sense of "counted as ours," but I also affirm that this has no reality or actualization in our life or experience unless that righteousness is also infused into us, changing us and making us actually righteous, because a state of unrighteousness in our lives inherently brings God's displeasure and punishment, while a state of righteousness in our nature inherently brings God's pleasure and reward.</b></i></div><div><i><b><br /></b></i></div><div><i><b>Obviously I wrote this piece as a brainstorming document to myself, not intended for public view. Sorry for all the typos!</b></i></div><div><br /></div><div>We are sinners by nature, evil and guilty. Therefore, we cannot be justified, or be accepted by God as righteous, by our works. The law cannot justify us because we cannot obey it; rather, it condemns us. Solution: Christ took our sin upon himself and died for it, destroying it, and rise from the dead, producing the righteousness we need to be acceptable to God, or justified. This gift belongs to all who receive it by faith. If faith is present, Christ’s righteousness is counted to the person on account of it. They are declared and considered one with Christ; his death to sin is theirs, and thus his righteousness is theirs. This person thus has a new identity or status as a righteous person. This new status comes to be actualized in the person’s life as they are set free from sin and become slaves of righteousness, dying to that which is odious to God and brings death and rising to new life in the Spirit, living a life that is pleasing and acceptable to God and that fulfills the law and thus brings the reward of eternal life. Being a slave to sin in its own nature brings death and such a person cannot please God. Being a slave to righteousness in the Spirit in its own nature brings life and acceptance by God because it pleases him. </div><div>The transition between talking about the gift of righteousness as a status or identity to talking about its fruit in us comes in 6:2. Paul’s statement here reveals some things about his theology of justification: 1. There is an assumption that what is true of our status must also be true of our actual lives. We have been declared dead to sin. We have been given the status, “dead to sin.” Obviously, therefore, we must really be dead to sin, so how can we live in it any longer? Putting this question in the context of the rest of the chapter as well as the rest of Paul’s discussion, we can say that not only is there a necessary connection and even an identity between the status change and the nature change, but that the status change is actualized and realized in the nature change. This follows from Paul’s teaching that being sinful necessarily brings wrath and death and that being holy necessarily brings acceptance and life. Paul connects the reward of eternal life and our acceptance before God, as well as our fulfilling the law, with the nature change and speaks of corruption as being what is reaped when we sow to the flesh and eternal life being what is reaped when we sow to the Spirit. This is many places. We are to be judged according to our works, good and bad, and rewarded accordingly. We fulfill the law by living in the Spirit. This teaching beyond Paul as well. Also, the purpose of the status change is so that the nature change can happen, because this is what God is after – its pleases him and brings us eternal life instead of death. 2. Obviously, also implied here is that the nature change is equivalent to the status change. If we must be in our actual lives what we are in our status, as I showed above, obviously our actual lives cannot be less than our status. We cannot remain sinful with regard to our actual lives if our status is changed. We become in our actual lives what we are in status. We are righteous before God in our status; we must be righteous before God in our actual lives.</div><div><br /></div><div>Explore this: Perhaps not identity and actualization; perhaps owning and using. In this case, the difference becomes, how does Christ’s righteousness make us acceptable to God? By changing our status, or by changing our nature?</div><div><br /></div><div>Explore this: Perhaps “to whom God counts righteousness” means whom God considers righteous because Christ’s righteousness has made them righteous intrinsically. Thus, similar to “gains acceptability”.</div><div><br /></div><div>2. Two Problems: 1. Evil in our record or acts does not make either all bad; rather, it makes them a mix. There is both good and bad. This does not lesson the seriousness of the bad; it merely states the existence of both. The Law does not demand perfection in the sense that one never has been a sinner; it requires perfection of will – Love the Lord with you whole heart, etc. We experience a mix of good and bad wills, or moral centers and principles of choice and action. Also, the Law is only concerned about records as evidences and expressions of a good or evil will. It is the will alone that is under obligation and that is rewarded or punished; the act in the record is charged to our account because we – that is, our personal self or will or identity – was responsible. Our will either hated or loved God, and the preference expressed itself in the act. It is this preference that alone justifies or condemns the will, and thus the self. The goal of the Law is a good will, which will express itself in good works. The thing the Law hates is an evil will, which expresses itself in evil works. Our record provides evidence of who we are. 2. We cannot be justified except by being personally righteous and we cannot be condemned except by being personally sinful. This is because the thing that calls forth God’s wrath is an evil will. God’s wrath cannot be removed unless the thing that calls it forth is removed, and the removal of the will entails the removal of the wrath. Similarly, God’s acceptance is elicited by nothing but a good and acceptable will, and God’s acceptance cannot be elicited therefore unless there is a good will which must be there in order for it to be elicited.</div><div><br /></div><div>P. 94 of Hughes’ <i>Paul’s Second Epistle to the Corinthians</i>. Great quite on law being fulfilled in us, the New Covenant.</div></div><div><br /></div><div><b><i>This document is dated 4/25/2003. I'm still trying to find rapport with the Reformed by emphasizing that it is the imputation (the counting ours by God) of Christ's righteousness which gives us a right to that righteousness and so to eternal life which is its reward. But I feel there are two points of difference between myself and the Reformed: 1. I think that the infused righteousness of sanctification truly fulfills the moral requirements of God's moral law and thus truly merits eternal life, while the Reformed think the righteousness of sanctification is inherently defective, doesn't meet the law's requirements adequately, and thus does not merit God's favor such as to bring the reward of eternal life. 2. Although I grant that the imputation of Christ's righteousness is what gives us a </i>right<i> to Christ's righteousness, and thus to the eternal life which is its reward, yet if we are talking about what actually, immediately, causes God to be pleased with us and actually view us as righteous, it is not imputation but Christ's righteousness </i>within<i> us--the fruit of imputation. Because the Reformed don't see the righteousness of sanctification to be good enough to merit God's favor, they have to look elsewhere for an immediate ground of God's viewing us as righteous and being pleased with us, and they find that ground solely in imputation apart from a consideration of infusion or inward change.</i></b></div><div><br /></div><div><div>1. We are sinful and have done sinful things, and are therefore guilty in God’s sight. Christ becomes a propitiatory sacrifice, thus fully paying the penalty for our sins. He also merits for us by his holy life righteousness that is acceptable to God for eternal life. He does these things for us. It is our sins he destroys on the cross and it is our merit he earns. Thus, because of Christ’s atonement and obedience alone, we who have no righteousness of our own become guiltless and righteous. We add nothing at all to this: Christ’s work is the sole foundation and source of our righteousness before God. Christ thus earns for us the status of completely new creatures in Christ.</div><div><br /></div><div>2. We experience the fruits of Christ’s work on our behalf, which are imputed to us, as they are applied to us subjectively by the Holy Spirit. By his power, we begin to experience the status of new creatures in our lives as we begin to live as new creatures, our sinful natures being transformed into the image of Christ in holiness. Thus, the break from our old lives that Christ earned for us comes alive in us as we begin to change from being sinful and thus displeasing to God and become conformed to Christ’s holiness, living a life that pleases him and glorifies him, thus fulfilling the law and the purpose for which we were made. This process of the subjective application of Christ’s work to our lives, which is never perfect in this life, begins in regeneration, continues through a life of sanctification and is completed in our glorification, when our old nature will be completely done away with and we will be perfect in holiness.</div><div><br /></div><div>The differences between us concern certain aspects of number 2 above. In my view, as the imputed righteousness of Christ comes alive in us, we come to be conformed personally and in our experience to our new status that Christ earned for us and imputed to us. This means that this righteousness within us fulfills the law. While the Reformed tradition has viewed our internal regeneration and sanctification as unable to meet the law’s requirements, I see it as capable of doing so. Note that this does not mean that WE merit by virtue of this internal righteousness. Our sanctification is God’s work in us, rather than being from us. We did not produce it; it is the application to us of Christ’s imputed righteousness. Therefore we cannot merit from it. If it were ours inherently or intrinsically, we could merit from it, but it is not. It is ours simply by gift. Just as our righteousness is given to us graciously at first, so it remains ours only by God’s grace to all eternity. Also, it adds nothing in terms of merit to the right we have to eternal life by Christ’s imputed righteousness. Christ’s righteousness imputed to us gives us our full right to eternal life; our sanctification is simply the application of it to us. It <i>realizes</i> or <i>brings us into the experience of</i> this right in our lives and experience, but it does not <i>add</i> to it, as if Christ’s righteousness imputed is not complete or sufficient. It is like the difference between buying a house and moving into it. The house is yours from the moment the purchase is completed. Your moving into it doesn’t add to your possession of it as a right, but it is the fruit of your possession of it. It is your coming into what you have been given. It realizes your new possession. I view our sanctification as bringing home to us and actualizing in us and in our experience the conformity to the law Christ has merited for us. Christ earned for us the satisfaction of our sin; we come into the experience of that in our repentance and crucifying of the flesh, which kill our sins and separate us from them. Christ earned for us righteousness which is pleasing and acceptable to God and which merits the reward of eternal life; we come into the experience of that in our sanctification and good works, which please God and thus merit the promised reward. In this sense, our sanctification is the fruit or realization or actualization in our lives of our justification by Christ’s imputed righteousness. Related to this, another difference between this view and the Reformed view that I see revolves around what is sometimes called the ‘formal cause’ of justification, by which I mean the immediate basis for us being pleasing to God and attaining a moral fitness, or merit, for the reward of eternal life. While as I said above, our sanctification doesn’t add to Christ’s work as it is imputed to us, but rather actualizes it, it does indeed actualize it. Thus the immediate basis for God’s moral approbation of us is Christ’s righteousness as it exists<i> in</i> us, as it has been infused into us by the Holy Spirit. Our sanctification doesn’t add to our right to eternal life, but that right is only realized by the righteousness being <i>in</i> us. To return to the house analogy mentioned above, your right to your new house is not added to by your moving into the house, but until you do so, your life is still the same experientially as it was before you gained a right to the house. In the Reformed view, since sanctification is not seen as matching up to Christ’s imputed righteousness but as being essentially defective as to moral fitness to reward, the immediate ground of our change of relationship to God cannot be Christ’s righteousness being in us, but must remain Christ’s righteousness outside of us. We might express this, as long as it is understood the way I have expressed it here, by saying that the ultimate cause of our acceptance with God in both views is the righteousness of Christ imputed to us, but the immediate cause of our acceptance, or the immediate basis of our change of status experientially or as actualized, is Christ’s righteousness imputed in the Reformed view and Christ’s righteousness infused in my view. That is, the right to eternal life <i>works</i> or comes into effect for us simply by being imputed in the Reformed view; it <i>works</i> or comes into effect for us by being <i>infused</i> into us in my view.</div></div><div><br /></div><div><b><i>This document is dated 4/27/2003. In looking for points of agreement with the Reformed position, I emphasize again that we are justified by Christ's righteousness imputed to us. I also strongly affirm the Calvinistic doctrines regarding election and free will. (Though I don't have time here to go into this, I should note that, while my comments on election and free will will sound harsh to Catholic ears to some degree, really I was not affirming anything here substantially that I would deny today as a Catholic. For example, here I deny the cooperation of the will with grace, but if you look closely you will see that what I am denying is a kind of cooperation where there is thought to be an </i>independent<i> contribution of the will--that is, the will contributes something of its own which is not itself also a product of grace. I would not have denied that the will, moved by grace, cooperates with grace, but my language reflects Calvinist rather than Catholic terminology. This is a good example of how Calvinists and Catholics can talk past each other. When Calvinists hear "the will cooperating with grace," they think of the Semipelagian idea that the will contributes some saving good of its own apart from grace, and so they deny this. But when they deny it, Catholics hear a denial of free will's involvement altogether, while, in reality, Calvinists do affirm the involvement of free will moved by grace. See <a href="http://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2019/02/predestination-grace-and-free-will-in.html">here</a> and <a href="http://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2017/03/catholicism-and-tulip.html">here</a> for more on these subjects.)</i></b></div><div><b><i><br /></i></b></div><div><b><i>In my points of disagreement, as with the previous document, I state that Reformed and Augustinians disagree in that Augustinians hold sanctification to be the immediate ground of God's acceptance of us in terms of actual experience (while imputation is fully sufficient to give us a right to that experience because it is God's declaring this experience to belong to us), while the Reformed hold that imputation alone is the immediate ground of God's being pleased with us and accepting us as actually righteous. I also again state that the Reformed believe that sanctification, even when completed after this life, is inadequate to meet the law's standards and so cannot provide the immediate ground for God's acceptance of us, whereas Augustinians hold the opposite.</i></b></div><div><b><i><br /></i></b></div><div><b><i>I make use of Francis Turretin (the great seventeenth-century Reformed theologian) in my attempt to bridge my gap with the Reformed view. Particularly, I cite his five reasons why sanctification cannot be meritorious, and I show where I agree and disagree with Turretin. One note here: I argue with Turretin about whether a work has to be "undue" in order to be meritorious. As I will note in another document later on, Turretin's statement confused me here because it seemed too "commercial"--as if we were talking about "merit" as a kind of transaction where I am giving one thing to buy something else. In my view, "merit" is more about moral fitness--that is, that something is either pleasing or displeasing to God and so attains God's reward or punishment. I eventually come to understand Turretin to be saying that we cannot give God something of our own which is not his gift in order to intrinsically, without grace, deserve God to give us eternal life. Interpreted that way, I would agree with Turretin, for all our goodness is a product and gift of God's grace. We can only "buy" God's pleasure with the gifts he has freely given us. At any rate, I am attempting here to use Turretin's arguments to show that my own view, even on Turretin's Reformed terms, cannot be considered to amount to a denial of justification by Christ's righteousness in favor of a doctrine of justification by our own merit.</i></b></div><div><b><i><br /></i></b></div><div><div><b>POINTS OF AGREEMENT</b>:</div><div>1. Out of the mass of corruption and evil that fallen man has become, God has elected a certain number to eternal life out of his free grace alone, without foresight of faith or any good works in anyone. We all deserve nothing but hell, but God has chosen to save some out of his mercy alone.</div><div>2. God sent Christ to purchase redemption for his elect by taking upon himself our sins, suffering for them and satisfying God’s justice for them, and meriting for us by his holy life, sacrifice, and resurrection righteousness. By virtue of his satisfaction and righteousness, which he imputes to us, we come to be forgiven of our sins and to possess a righteousness which is acceptable to God and his law and which merits eternal life. Thus, Christ’s sacrifice and righteousness imputed to us is the meritorious cause of our justification.</div><div>3. God applies the benefits of Christ’s atonement to us by uniting us to Christ through the Holy Spirit.</div><div>4. Because we are only justified by Christ’s righteousness and not by our own, we in ourselves always have deserved and always will deserve nothing but hell and can never merit anything good from God. All our merit is God’s gift, and we rely on him for it completely and give him all the glory. We are thus justified by grace alone through faith alone and not by works to any degree.</div><div>5. When God regenerates us, he works through his Spirit with effectual and irresistible power, so that our conversion is accomplished not by grace cooperating with our free will, but by grace alone, without any contribution from our free will. Our good will is entirely a product of grace. Likewise, the preservation and growth of holiness in us is by God’s grace alone, without contribution from our free will in such a way that free will contributes something not itself given it by grace, and thus God assures that by his grace alone we will never fall away but will persevere to the end.</div><div><br /></div><div><b>POINTS OF DISAGREEMENT</b>:</div><div>1. While we both agree that Christ’s righteousness imputed to us gives us the full right to a status of righteousness before God and thus to eternal life, because it is the meritorious cause of our justification, and that nothing can ever be or need ever be added to that merit, we disagree over how we actually come <i>into</i> our possession of Christ’s righteousness, how it becomes <i>actualized</i> as ours or how it is <i>applied</i> to us. The difference between these two things can be compared to the difference between purchasing a house and moving into it. In the classic Reformed view, our possession of Christ’s righteousness is actualized by means of an external actualization which in itself does not involve any internal change (although internal change is inseparable from it and always accompanies it). In the Augustinian view, our ownership of Christ’s righteousness is actualized by means of its being <i>imparted</i> to us and becoming our character internally. This imparted righteousness is identical with our regeneration and sanctification. Thus, in the Reformed view, the immediate ground of our becoming morally acceptable to God and his law is Christ’s righteousness considered only as imputed or as external to us and our character. In the Augustinian view, the immediate ground of our becoming morally acceptable to God and his law is Christ’s righteousness as it exists within us and has become our character.</div><div>2. In accordance with the difference just mentioned, the Reformed and Augustinian positions differ also on the value of our inherent righteousness, or the righteousness we have by virtue of being new creatures in Christ. In the Reformed view, this righteousness is considered inadequate to fulfill the requirements of God’s law, which points out the need for another <i>external</i> righteousness to accomplish that task so that we might be justified. In the Augustinian view, Christ’s righteousness imparted is considered adequate to fulfill the requirements of the law (though we recognize and point out that we have not come into a full possession of it yet and thus that there is a remnant of sin in us which still draws God’s disapproval – and yet our dominant character is in accordance with the law because grace reigns in us. Eventually, after this life, we will be made perfectly conformable to the law by virtue of internal righteousness.). There is thus no need for any other righteousness besides Christ’s righteousness imparted to us in regeneration and sanctification.</div><div><br /></div><div>In order to clear some of the understanding of the Augustinian view with regard to the issue of merit, it is helpful to examine typical Reformed explanations for why we cannot merit by virtue of our sanctification. What we will see is that although I disagree about some of these points, I agree on at least one of them and thus, by typical Reformed standards, my view does not claim that we merit anything with God and is not a doctrine of justification by works but one of justification by grace (which I have always affirmed anyway).</div><div>Francis Turretin can express the standard approach to this in Reformed literature. According to Turretin, these five conditions are demanded for “true merit’:</div><div>1. It must be undue. That is, it cannot be owed to God as a debt.</div><div>2. It must be our own. It cannot be the gift of God.</div><div>3. It must be absolutely perfect.</div><div>4. It must be proportionate to the reward.</div><div>5. A reward must be due to it by justice.</div><div>My (very brief and partial) response to these is as follows:</div><div>1. I do not think merit must be undue to be true merit. In this case, there could be no true merit in all of reality, since the nature of obedience is that it is fulfilling a requirement. Certainly, our obedience which we render to God in sanctification is a debt and is not undue, but it is still true merit nonetheless. I define merit not as “giving someone what is not due to them” but as “moral fitness to a reward.”</div><div>2. I agree with Turretin here. We cannot merit by virtue of something that is a gift. If our sanctification is a gift of grace, then it is not our merit in the sense Turretin is discussing here. <i>We</i> merit nothing by it. It is ours not intrinsically but simply because it is given to us.</div><div>3. I understand the relationship between our imperfections and our obedience differently from Turretin, so I do not think this requirement successfully disqualifies our sanctification from being meritorious. But I cannot explain further now.</div><div>4. I believe our sanctification is proportionate to the reward of eternal life, in the same way our sin is proportionate to eternal death.</div><div>5. I believe that our sanctification has eternal life due to it as a matter of justice (although I understand this not in the sense that it is undue or not a debt but in the sense that it has a “moral fitness” to the reward).</div><div><br /></div><div>Obviously, this brings up much to discuss. What I have endeavored to show here is simply that by Turretin’s requirements,who is representative of typical Reformed requirements generally, my view excludes human merit from justification, and I accept that judgment and indeed affirm it strongly. My view is justification by grace through faith and not justification by works.</div></div><div><br /></div><div><b><i>This document is dated 5/8/2003. Here I attempt, briefly, to restate my own position in language amenable to Reformed people. I do so by defining "merit" in the sense of "personal merit, what belongs to me apart from it being a gift of grace," and in that sense I affirm that we have no personal merit. Our merit is solely a gift, meaning it can only be imputed to us (declared ours by God as a free gift), and sanctification does not add to that but is nothing more than the fruit of that imputation worked out in our actual experience. Sanctification, being a gift from God, gives us no personal merit, though it does please God. If we had imputation without sanctification, we would have a right to please God and be acceptable to him in actuality and experience but we would never actually attain to this. If we had sanctification without imputation, we would, in our experience, be pleasing to God, but we would not have a </i>right<i> to be pleasing to God.</i></b></div><div><br /></div><div><div>Pastor Wallace,</div><div><br /></div><div>Here’s another attempt at a perspective on my position to add to our progress in clarifying my ideas:</div><div><br /></div><div>As sinners, we cannot meet the law’s demands and so are condemned by it. However, Christ has satisfied the law and merited righteousness for us. Those who by God’s grace have faith have their sins pardoned and Christ’s righteousness imputed to them, and by this and this alone they are justified, or declared right before God and his law. This righteous status is not based on our works or even on God’s work in us, but solely on the basis of Christ’s imputed righteousness. Inseparably accompanying this new status is our sanctification, whereby we are conformed in our inner character and experience to what we already have by status. This sanctification is the inworking in our experience of our outward status, and therefore presupposes the status and doesn’t add anything to it and is not the basis of it. Justification by imputed righteousness gives us all we need with regard to merit and right to God’s favor and acceptance. Sanctification makes us inwardly pleasing to God and fit to dwell with his holiness, and brings us to experience what we have been given by right of imputation. These are inseparable aspects of salvation and our union with Christ (as Calvin said, “Is Christ divided?”) and indeed are interwoven and imply each other. Insofar as we must distinguish, we must attribute the merit to the imputed righteousness, which the internal righteousness forms no part of the basis of, and the experience to the internal righteousness. If we were to ask what would happen if we could have one without the other, we must first answer, it cannot be, since they are intrinsically inseparable and imply each other and are absurd without each other. But if we try to make the division, we must say that if we were to have the imputed righteousness without the inward, we would never come to experience what we have by right; we would never please God, though we would merit his acceptance. If we were to have the inward sanctification without the outward status, we would be pleasing to God and experience his pleasure without having any merit before the law making us acceptable to God, and on the contrary would merit rejection and wrath from God by his law.</div></div><div><br /></div><div><i><b>This document is dated 5/12/2003. Here I succinctly state what I perceive to be the most fundamental points of difference between my own Augustinian view and the Reformed view. It is similar to what I've stated in previous documents. I add here that even if we say that sanctification is a fruit of imputation and is therefore grounded in imputation rather than the other way around (because our receiving righteousness in our actual lives and experience is a fruit of God's deciding to grant us ownership of that righteousness and thereby make it legally ours), yet there is a very real sense in which imputation is grounded in sanctification. Imputation only gives us a right to be acceptable as righteous before God because it anticipates sanctification which is what, in actuality, makes us righteous before God. Imputation is a promise that we will be sanctified and thus be acceptable to God. The substance and fulfillment of imputation is sanctification.</b></i></div><div><br /></div><div><div>Points of disagreement:</div><div>1. In my view, Christ’s righteousness within us (especially considered as completed after our death and resurrection) truly matches the righteous status given us. That is, it truly conforms to the law and thus truly merits eternal life. In the Protestant view, it is considered imperfect (even when sanctification is completed, due to past sin) and thus never conforms to the law and merits eternal life.</div><div>2. In my view, while our status comes before our sanctification and thus our sanctification is in a real sense based on our status rather than the other way around, still our status finds its grounding in our sanctification in that without that it would be an inappropriate status. To use an analogy, if a frog is declared by an act of omnipotent law to be a human being and given that status, it is necessary that the frog then actually become a human being. If he did not, the status would be inappropriate and in fact a lie, seeing it never has any correspondence with any reality. The declaration only makes sense if the frog then becomes in reality what it has been declared to be. So the reality that makes appropriate and truthful the declaration that the ungodly are now godly, or righteous, is that the ungodly then become godly, and in that sense the status is grounded in it. The status goes before, but still has reference to the subsequent change. In the Protestant view, no one ever becomes actually righteous (in the sense of “conformed to the law so as to fulfill it and merit eternal life”), and so the reality which grounds the status must be found in something other than the subsequent change. It seems to me it is rooted, in the classic Protestant view, in the declaration and status itself, so that imputed righteousness refers only to itself and has no reference to the subsequent change (although the subsequent change inseparably and infallibly accompanies it).</div></div><div><br /></div><div><b><i>This document is dated 5/13/2003. Once again, I articulate my own view using the language of imputation and sanctification. In my version of this, "imputation" means that God has promised us Christ's righteousness and legally transferred ownership of it to us, making it ours by a legal declaration. As a result of this, he actually gives us Christ's righteousness, and all its benefits, when he sanctifies us. Really, we could say that, in my view, what is promised in imputation is "that Christ's righteousness will be given to us, infused into us, making us righteous, and in that way make us actually morally pleasing and acceptable to God and thus fit for the reward of eternal life which is the natural and appropriate fruit of his being pleased with us." Really, what is imputed is sanctification, and then, obviously, receiving sanctification fulfills the promise of imputation and actualizes it. It is like buying a book on Amazon.com. Once you've paid for the book it is legally yours, but you don't get anything out of that until the book actually arrives in the mail. In the Reformed view, on the other hand, because they hold that the righteousness of sanctification never really meets the standards of God's law so as to be morally acceptable to him and thus merit the reward of eternal life, they have to look for another way in which imputation is actualized, and they look just to the imputation itself apart from sanctification. Merely by imputation alone, not only are we given a </i>right<i> to be made acceptable to God, but we are </i>actually<i>, in reality and in our experience, made right with God, and he is wholly pleased with us and thus rewards us with eternal life. This would be like getting the "your order has been received" email from Amazon.com and finding in that the complete fulfillment of buying the book, without any consideration of the book itself ever being received (and, in fact, the book is never really received--that is, our sanctification, in the Reformed view, never meets the standards of "acceptable righteousness" in God's law). This is how I viewed the Reformed view at this time and thus why I considered my Augustinian view to differ from it. But, as you can see, I'm working hard to see if I can understand the Reformed language in a better way, a way that would reconcile it with Augustinianism, and if I can state my Augustinian view in a way that would be true to it but would also pass the acceptability test among the Reformed.</i></b></div><div><b><i><br /></i></b></div><div><b><i>My frog story, I think, helps to bring out what I'm trying to say here. I'm still using that analogy to this day to talk about this.</i></b></div><div><br /></div><div><div>Justification: We are sinful and have done sinful things, and are therefore guilty in God’s sight. Christ becomes a propitiatory sacrifice, thus fully paying the penalty for our sins. He also merits for us by his holy life righteousness that is acceptable to God for eternal life. He does these things for us. It is our sins he destroys on the cross and it is our merit he earns. Thus, because of Christ’s atonement and obedience alone, we who have no righteousness of our own become guiltless and righteous. We add nothing at all to this: Christ’s work is the sole foundation and source of our righteousness before God. Christ thus earns for us the status of completely new creatures in Christ.</div><div><br /></div><div>Sanctification: We experience the fruits of Christ’s work on our behalf as they are applied to us subjectively by the Holy Spirit. By his power, we begin to experience the status of new creatures in our lives as we begin to live as new creatures, our sinful natures being transformed into the image of Christ in holiness. Thus, the break from our old lives that Christ earned for us comes alive in us as we begin to change from being sinful and thus displeasing to God and become conformed to Christ’s holiness, living a life that pleases him and glorifies him, thus fulfilling the law and the purpose for which we were made. This process of the subjective application of Christ’s work to our lives, which is never perfect in this life, begins in regeneration, continues through a life of sanctification and is completed in our glorification, when our old nature will be completely done away with and we will be perfect in holiness.</div><div><br /></div><div>We can see from the above that sanctification is the fruit of justification, as these terms are defined above. Christ’s work on our behalf is legally declared to be ours, both for pardon and for merit. God says, in effect, “I legally declare Christ’s satisfaction for sin and his righteousness to belong to Mark Hausam, with all the implications and benefits thereof.” And the result of this legal declaration is that I now own Christ’s righteousness and thus come to experience (partly in this life, wholly in eternity) the benefits of being righteous like Christ: Christ has friendship with the Father; so do I. Christ has a true vision of the ugliness of sin; so do I. Christ recognizes his Father as supremely valuable and praiseworthy, and he loves him and delights in him with his whole heart; so do I. Christ lives a life that is pleasing to his Father and thus gains his Father’s approval and reward; so do I. All that Christ has because of who he is as a righteous Son, I have as well because God has given it to me and declared it legally mine. Thus, sanctification is the fruit of justification. When someone buys a house, once the house is legally declared to belong to him, he then receives all of the benefits of the house, including getting to move into it and live in it.</div><div><br /></div><div>Let me illustrate thus with a story: Once upon a time, there was a frog who wanted to be a prince. Specifically, he admired the handsomeness of princes and was painfully aware that frogs do not usually get high marks in this department. So he went to the local governor (who was a very magical person) and asked him to make him a prince. The governor made up a contract which declared that the identity of prince was now legally granted to the frog with all the benefits thereof, especially handsomeness. The governor asked the frog to sign on the dotted line, telling him that once he did so, the legal transaction would be complete. So, excitedly, the frog signed his name (don’t ask me how) on the dotted line. As soon as he had done so, he was magically transformed into a handsome prince, and ended up marrying some princess and ruling over some kingdom somewhere, living, of course, happily ever after.</div><div><br /></div><div>What I want to point out in this story is the unbreakable connection between the legal declaration that the frog is now a prince and his immediate transformation into a prince, with all the handsomeness thereof. If the legal contract was not going to be a fake, the frog had to have the transformation. If he remained a frog, the contract would prove false and broken, because what was “deeded over” to the frog was, among other things, handsomeness. He wanted to look like a prince, probably to please a princess or something. The contract was fulfilled in the transformation. The transformation was the fruit of the contract. Similarly, when Christ’s righteousness is “deeded over” to us, the fruits of that transaction include becoming personally righteous and pleasing to God. If we are not sanctified, then we remain loathsome to God and never experience the benefits of being righteous like Christ, and the legal imputation of Christ’s righteousness is broken because we do not actually get to experience what was legally declared to be ours. So sanctification is coming to experience in our state what we have been legally given with regard to our status. It is the imputation bearing its fruits and effects and therefore being fulfilled.</div><div><br /></div><div>It is important to note in all of this that we are justified solely by the righteousness of another, of Christ, and not at all by our own righteousness. When we had no righteousness of our own, God declared Christ’s righteousness ours, and this is the sole basis for our right to forgiveness of sins and eternal life as God’s children. This imputed righteousness brings us in itself, before God’s law, the status of being forgiven and righteous, logically prior to its bearing its fruit in us. Indeed, this imputed righteousness comes alive in us and in our experience in sanctification, but this doesn’t add to Christ’s merit imputed to us, but is the outworking and fruit of it. This sanctification, at least when it is finished, will match up fully to the status, and thus will be truly acceptable to the law, or meritorious. But <i>we</i> will never merit anything by it, it will never be meritorious to us, because it is not <i>our</i> righteousness but is the outworking of <i>Christ’s</i> righteousness imputed to us. It does not add to Christ’s righteousness imputed, but is its fruit, or outworking, in our lives and experience. We have never had, we don’t have now, and we never will have any merit of our own, but our only merit is that of Christ imputed to us graciously, which imputation bears the fruit of holiness in our lives by the grace of God.</div></div><div><br /></div><div><b><i>This document is dated 5/13/2003. It continues along the same lines as the previous documents, and shows me continuing to try to figure out how to articulate my position in a Reformed-friendly way. Again, I light on the distinction between sanctification meriting God's acceptance and favor and eternal life vs. </i>us <i>meriting God's favor by our own personal merit as if we contributed something of our own apart from grace. If the Reformed mean the latter when they reject the concept of "merit," then I can agree with them, but not if they mean the former (that is, not if they mean that </i>sanctification itself<i>, in itself, considered in its own nature, is not good enough to be acceptable to God.)</i></b></div><div><br /></div><div><div>1. As creatures, we are incapable of merit. God can never owe anything good to us as a matter of justice, though he can owe evil to us. Even without saving grace, everything we have is purely a gift, and if we receive any blessing, it is simply that God has freely chosen to bless us. We are nothing in ourselves, and God owes nothing good to nothing. But when we corrupt his gifts, he truly, and in strict justice, owes us condemnation.</div><div>2. However, God is bound by his goodness to bless his own works and image, since he is bound to favor himself and his glory which his works and image reflect. So when God freely chose to give us being, he bound himself to bless us in proportion to the value he put upon us in his grace. He is therefore bound to respect his image in us, to delight in our happiness and to hate our suffering, but only in proportion to our worth as those made in God's image. However, since our worth even as endowed with temporal life is nothing compared to God, God is never bound to give eternal blessings to us as creatures.</div><div>3. This is compounded by our sinful condition. Being sinners, we not only do not deserve eternal blessings, but we, in strict justice, deserve eternal condemnation under the eternal wrath of God. In ourselves, we are only sinful creatures, and so we can never deserve anything except God's wrath.</div><div>4. God has chosen to save his elect people out of the world through Jesus Christ, and to give us eternal blessings in him. Christ accomplished this redemption and eternal life for us by taking upon himself our sins and suffering for them, and by his obedient life producing for us a righteousness, or merit, which deserves eternal life in strict justice, because it is an infinite righteousness, being God's. God is bound to reward this righteousness by his goodness. In salvation, God gives this righteousness to us. Thus, we who have no merit of our own and could never have any merit, being nothing but sinful creatures in ourselves without grace, gain merit purely as a gift through Christ, and thus strict justice comes to demand not our death but our life. The unrighteous receive the righteousness of another as a gift and through this righteousness alone are saved from hell and rewarded with eternal life. Though there are many aspects and descriptions of this redemption, there are two main components, or steps, which are spelled out that concern us now:</div><div>a. First, we are declared righteous. We are declared to be free from the guilt of sin and fully in accord with God's law. This declaration is on the basis of Christ's righteousness as it is counted to us, credited to our account, or imputed to us. Considered as having no righteousness in us, or as ungodly, we are declared righteous, or conformed to the law, on the basis of the imputed righteousness of Christ. We thus come to have the status of righteousness before God and his law based on Christ's righteousness imputed to us.</div><div>b. Having this new status, we become conformed inwardly to it by Christ's righteousness coming to live in us. Our character, life, and experience come to match the status given to us. We come to be in reality, in our character and our lives, what we have been declared to be in our status. As we have been declared righteous and conformed to the law by imputation, so we now become internally righteous and conformed to the law by the impartation of Christ's righteousness within us, or by participation in Christ's righteousness, resulting in good works. While this change has occured qualitatively and substantially at the moment of conversion, it is not perfect in this life, and awaits its completion until death and the resurrection. Until then there is a constant struggle against the old nature, the remnant of sin that is still in us. This sanctification adds nothing to our status, which is complete logically prior to it. It is simply the fruit and outworking of imputed righteousness in our lives. Though it is acceptable to the law and therefore by the law merits God’s favor and pleasure, we merit nothing by it, since it is not our righteousness but only the outworking of Christ’s imputed righteousness in us through the agency of the Holy Spirit, and thus does not meet the requirement for a human meritorious work.</div></div><div><br /></div><div><b><i>This document is dated 5/28/2003. I try to distinguish in what way sanctification is meritorious and in what way it is not, and in doing so I again state how I understand the relationship between imputation (which gives us a </i>right<i> to Christ's righteousness and all its benefits) and sanctification (which delivers to us in actualization and in our experience Christ's righteousness and all its benefits). I also here bring in David Brainerd, the famous Puritan missionary, whose biography was written by Jonathan Edwards, as an ally, showing from quotations how he, too, understood sanctification to be inherently meritorious (though, unlike me, he doesn't actually use that word). I also appeal to William Perkins, another famous Puritan theologian. Quotes like these helped me to come to the conclusion that I could understand Reformed language in a more Augustinian way and articulate my own Augustinianism in Reformed language, thus bridging the gap between my view and the Reformed.</i></b></div><div><b><i><br /></i></b></div><div><b><i>The Brainerd quotes and the Perkins quote are in documents that are quite old and in the public domain. I had ready access to these because at this time I was working full-time on a PhD thesis which involved reading a ton of Puritan and Edwardsian literature. You can see the Brainerd quotations <a href="https://quod.lib.umich.edu/cgi/t/text/text-idx?c=evans;cc=evans;q1=Indians%20of%20North%20America%20--%20Missions;rgn=div1;view=text;idno=N05034.0001.001;node=N05034.0001.001:6">here</a>.</i></b></div><div><br /></div><div><div>Justification by imputed righteousness gives us the right to eternal life, because it gives us the satisfaction and merit we need to fulfill the law’s requirements. Sanctification is the working out in our experience of the righteousness we have been given a right to in justification. The satisfaction of Christ comes alive in our experience as we suffer with Christ, see the full heinousness of sin, and die to sin and put it to death throughout our life. The righteousness of Christ comes alive in our experience as we become holy and morally pleasing to God.</div><div><br /></div><div>What is merit? I define merit as a moral fitness to a reward. When there is a moral beauty which necessarily calls forth God’s favor and thus a favorable response from him, there is merit. Likewise, demerit is a moral ugliness which warrants God’s displeasure and an unfavorable reaction from him.</div><div><br /></div><div>In what way is sanctification not meritorious?</div><div>1. Sanctification is not meritorious in that it does not give us the right to Christ’s merit and thus to eternal life. This is accomplished antecedently in the imputation of righteousness. Even after sanctification is accomplished, we still have a right to Christ’s righteousness and thus to eternal life through it only by imputation. The relationship between the two is like the difference between having a piece of software given to you and installing it on your computer (right and experience). If it is given to you by a friend but you don’t install it, you have a right to it and to what it can do, but you don’t get to experience it. If you were to install it without it having been given to you, you would get the benefit of it but you wouldn’t have a right to it. This is the same as justification and sanctification. The imputation gives us a right to Christ’s righteousness; sanctification is the “installation,” as it were, of Christ’s righteousness in our experience. In this sense, the merit is wholly in the imputation and not in the sanctification. This is what Augustine was pointing to (though his articulation was different) when he said that when God rewards us, he is merely crowning his own gifts.</div><div><br /></div><div>In what way is sanctification meritorious?</div><div>1. Sanctification is meritorious in the sense that it truly makes us morally pleasing, or beautiful, to God. That is to say, God truly delights in his image in us when he remakes us in it in sanctification. God cannot but delight in a heart that loves him, since he loves love to himself. God finds us morally repulsive in an unsanctified, unrepentant state, which is why we can’t be in his presence in that condition, since no unclean thing can be in his presence. He cannot even look on sin. So when we die to sin with Christ, when our flesh is crucified with Christ, we are cleansed of this impurity and God no longer is repulsed morally by us, and when we are reborn or resurrected with Christ to a new life of holiness, like a phoenix rising out of its own ashes, we become morally beautiful and delightful to him, and he cannot but delight in his work and image in us. In this way, sanctification makes it fitting that we should be delighted in by God, and this is what I mean when I call sanctification meritorious.</div><div><br /></div><div>David Brainerd seems to express the same thing I mean when I say that sanctification is meritorious in these two quotes from his diary (published by Jonathan Edwards):</div><div>444 – “The exercise of these Godlike tempers, wherein the soul acts in a kind of concert with God, and would be and do everything that is pleasing to God; this, I saw, would stand by the soul in a dying hour; for God must, I think, ‘deny himself’ [II Tim. 2:13] if he casts away ‘his own image’ [Gen. 1:27], even the soul that is one in desires with himself.”</div><div>449 – “I saw further that as this divine temper, whereby the soul exalts God and treads self in the dust, is wrought in the soul by God’s discovering his own glorious perfections ‘in the face of Jesus Christ’ [II Cor. 4:6] to it, by the special influences of the Holy Spirit, so he cannot but have regard to it, as his own work; and as it is his image in the soul, he cannot but take delight in it. Then I saw again that if God should slight and reject his own moral image, he must needs ‘deny himself’ [II Tim. 2:13]; which he cannot do. And thus I saw the stability and infallibility of this religion, and that those who are truly possessed of it have the most complete and satisfying evidence of their being interested in all the benefits of Christ’s redemption, having their hearts conformed to him; and that these and these only are qualified for the employments and entertainments of God’s kingdom of glory; as none but these have any relish for the business of heaven, which is to ascribe glory to God and not to themselves; and that God (though I would speak it with great reverence of his Name and perfections) cannot, without denying himself, finally cast such away.”</div><div><br /></div><div>William Perkins expresses something like part of what I mean by our dying with Christ to sin cleansing us from our moral repugnance to God in this quote:</div><div>442-443 – “In man wee must consider his estate by nature, and his estate by grace. In the first, hee and his flesh are all one, for they are as <i>man and wife</i>: therefore one is accessary to the doings of the other. When the flesh sinneth, the man also sinneth, that is in subjection to the flesh; yea when the flesh perisheth, the man likewise perisheth beeing in this estate, with the flesh: a louing couple, they are, they lieu and die together. But in the estate of grace though a man haue the flesh in him, yet hee and his flesh are diuorced asunder. This diuorcement is made, when a man beginnes to dislike and to hate his flesh, and the euill fruites of it: this separation beeing made, they are no more one, but twaine, and the one hath nothing to doe with the other. In this case though the flesh beget sinne and perish therefore, yet the Christian man shall not incurre damnation for it. To come more neere the matter; you say the flesh begets in you wauerings, doubtings, and distrustings: what then? it troubleth you, but feare not, remember your estate: you are diuorced from the flesh, and you are new married unto Christ: if these sinnes bee laide at your doore, account them not as your children, but renounce them as bastards: say with <i>Paul</i>, I doubt indeede, but I hate my doubtings, and I am no cause of these, but the flesh in me which shal perish, when I shall bee saued by Christ.”</div></div><div><br /></div><div><i><b>This document is dated 6/6/2003. A lot of interesting things here. I'm starting to think that I can reconcile with the Reformed position, but I'm not quite sure. I'm more and more feeling I can use the Reformed language in articulating my position. (Note that my Augustinian position hasn't changed a hair's breadth throughout any of this, nor will it change in what comes later. All that is changing is my sense of whether or not I can understand the Reformed view in a way consistent with my Augustinianism and thus whether or not I can express my Augustinianism, non-deceptively, in Reformed terms.)</b></i></div><div><i><b><br /></b></i></div><div><i><b>One interesting thing here is that I articulate what basically amounts to the Catholic doctrine of the "temporal consequences of sin," which is the root of things like penance, purgatory, indulgences, etc. (see <a href="http://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2016/01/a-fresh-look-at-catholic-doctrines-of.html">here</a> and <a href="https://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2021/07/suffering-dying-and-rising-with-christ.html">here</a> for more on this)--though, at this time, I don't think I even had any of these Catholic ideas on my radar screen. My own thinking, rooted in Scripture and reason, basically came to a Catholic point of view on satisfaction and penance without being brought there by the Catholic tradition itself.</b></i></div><div><i><b><br /></b></i></div><div><b><i>I've got quotes here from the great Puritan theologian and philosopher Jonathan Edwards that show that he viewed the meritoriousness of moral goodness in a way similar to how I did (though he would never have put it that way, and I would say now that other things he says elsewhere seem to critique the Augustinian view). Moral goodness, by its intrinsic nature, is pleasing to God and deserving of reward, just as moral evil is displeasing and deserving of punishment. It follows from this that inasmuch as a moral creature is morally good, he deserves happiness (in the sense of having a moral fitness to it), and the reverse. But this implies that unsanctification is intrinsically connected to being unacceptable to God and receiving punishment from him, while being in a perfectly sanctified state would imply being perfectly acceptable to God and rewarded by him with happiness. So, as with Brainerd and Perkins (and others), I found things in Reformed authors which are inconsistent with what I had thought to be the Reformed view, which makes sanctification not inherently pleasing to God such as to be acceptable to him. These authors seemed to suggest that the Reformed view could be understood in an Augustinian manner (despite the inability of these same Reformed authors to grasp that), and thus encouraged me to think I might be able to reconcile myself to the Reformed point of view.</i></b></div><div><b><i><br /></i></b></div><div><b><i>I give here what I think is a helpful way of distinguishing how sanctification is meritorious from how it is not and in this way express a possible difference and concern with the Reformed position: "Perhaps it might be appropriate to represent my belief here by saying that I believe that </i>if<i> sanctification were our work, we would merit by it (in the sense of being intrinsically worthy of praise eternally because of it), but since it is not, we don’t. This point, and the quote from the confession, seem to be saying that </i>even if<i> sanctification were our work intrinsically without grace, we would not be worthy of praise and eternal life for it. This seems to deny that God is ever truly pleased with his work in us." This gets at, I think, the key issue. Why is sanctification not meritorious? Is it because there is something inherently defective about it in its own nature, or is it defective only when it is considered as if it were an offering from us trying to earn something from it as if we had produced it ourselves by ourselves (rather than it being a product of God's grace)? To use an analogy, if my friend gives me $20, the $20, in its own nature, is sufficient to buy, say, a pair of gloves. On the other hand, we wouldn't say that </i>I<i> had earned a pair of gloves by using the $20 to pay for them, for the $20 was a gift. So we can talk about the $20 meriting the gloves in one way but not in another. I think a key point upon which this attempted reconciliation of Augustinianism and Reformed thought turns is going to be whether sanctification, in its own nature, meets the requirements of God's law to be acceptable to him, or whether it does not. If it does not, then there is an unavoidable breach between Augustinianism and the Reformed position. If it does, then there might be reconciliation. (At this time, I was starting to think that perhaps reconciliation was possible. Now, 16-19 years later, I've begun to reassess this and wonder if the gap might indeed be unbridgeable.)</i></b></div><div><br /></div><div><div>The state of things at this point:</div><div><br /></div><div>I can agree that all our merit is based in imputed righteousness. We do not merit by our works, or by our sanctification, but only by the imputation of Christ’s righteousness. I agree with the classic Reformed position that sanctification cannot be meritorious.</div><div><br /></div><div>I would insist, however, that sanctification is truly morally pleasing to God. God delights in it. I would also say that unholiness in our life, even given justification, is morally displeasing to God. In an unholy condition, we are morally repulsive to him, and he cannot accept us in that condition, even though justified. This seems allowable to the traditional Reformed explanation, as they assert that God will allow no unclean thing into his presence, and so we must be sanctified. Saying our sanctified state is truly pleasing to God seems agreeable to classic Reformed sentiment as well. I would also suggest that when we are sanctified, it is by a death to sin and by a rebirth in righteousness. It involves suffering, as we see our sins for what they really are, understand God’s wrath and hatred against them, and are truly repulsed by them ourselves and sorry for them. It also involves suffering as we endure the testimonies of God’s displeasure against sin in this world in the form of many temporal sufferings, and as we must struggle against sin and put it to death. I acknowledge that our sufferings, repentance, and dying to sin do not give us a right to pardon and that we do not satisfy by them, since pardon, like positive merit, is fully based in the imputation of Christ’s suffering and righteousness. However, there is an appropriateness to the fact that we must die in order to live, and there would be a moral unfitness if we were to be sanctified without the suffering that comes with the transition. It is appropriate, in other words, that we see our condition for what it truly is and that God manifest his displeasure against it before it is wholly eradicated in our lives.</div><div><br /></div><div>I anticipate that the above will be fully agreeable to you. We may also be able to come to terms with my agreement with David Brainerd’s comments (which can be found in one of the earlier documents I sent you). I would agree with Brainerd that when God recreates his image in us in sanctification, it is pleasing to him such that he cannot but delight in it and cannot finally cast those who possess it away without denying himself. God, loving himself and his glory supremely, necessarily loves his own image in us and it is appropriate therefore for him to crown it, though we merit nothing by it. Let me give a couple of quotes from Jonathan Edwards illustrating this a little more:</div><div><br /></div><div>“Worthiness is of the essence of moral goodness, and universally and necessarily attends it, as much as guilt or blame attends sin or moral evil. As all moral evil is blameworthy, and worthy of abhorrence and the fruits of abhorrence, so all moral goodness is praiseworthy, worthy of acceptance, approbation, and of the fruits of acceptance and approbation;”</div><div><br /></div><div>“The thing which makes sin hateful, is that by which it deserves punishment; which is but the expression of hatred. And that, which renders virtue lovely, is that on account of which it is fit to receive praise and reward; which are but the expressions of esteem and love. But that which makes vice hateful, is its hateful Nature; and that which renders virtue lovely, is its amiable Nature. It is a certain beauty or deformity that are <i>inherent</i> in that good or evil will, which is the <i>soul</i> of virtue and vice, . . . which is their worthiness of esteem or disesteem, praise or dispraise,”</div><div><br /></div><div>Thus, I understand Brainerd to be saying that there is a certain moral beauty in our sanctification which makes it morally appropriate for God to love it, be pleased with it, and accept it, (“Well done, good and faithful servant”) etc., just as there is a moral ugliness in our unholiness which makes it appropriate for God, in his holiness, not to accept it into his presence but to cast it out (“Without holiness no man shall see the Lord”). We may be able to agree on this, or at least you may be able to tolerate my position here, as long as I maintain, which I do, that we do not merit anything by this holiness in us, all our merit being based solely in the imputation of Christ’s righteousness to us. We possess a right to eternal life solely on the basis of imputation.</div><div><br /></div><div>Here is where I see some potential problems standing in the way of our agreement which I’m not sure how to resolve or if they are resolvable yet: I am going to, as I have before, invoke Turretin’s list of reasons why sanctification is not meritorious, and discuss my thoughts on each of them. As I have pointed out before, this is a common list in Reformed literature of the time, with some variations but very substantial agreement (even in form):</div><div><br /></div><div>According to Turretin, sanctification cannot be meritorious because these requirements are necessary for a meritorious work:</div><div>1. It must be undue. That is, it cannot be owed to God as a debt.</div><div>2. It must be our own. It cannot be the gift of God.</div><div>3. It must be absolutely perfect.</div><div>4. It must be proportionate to the reward.</div><div>5. A reward must be due to it by justice.</div><div>Before I go into an interaction with these points, I want to quote Turretin from a page before he enumerates these points: “Biel defines merit to be ‘a work imputable to praise’ (i.e., worthy of praise) . . . . If our opponents would be content with this meaning, there would be no controversy. For no one denies that the good works of the believer are worthy of praise.” This is all I want to affirm about our sanctification, as my previous discussion of the subject has hopefully made clear. Now, on to the points:</div><div>1. This point seems to be dealing with a different definition of merit from the one I hold. My idea of merit is a quality in something making it morally pleasing and thus worthy of praise or moral approbation, as I have said. This point seems to think of merit in a commercial sort of way, as if we to merit means to buy something from God, to give him some kind of “money” in order to get his favor. I don’t approve of this “money” image, nor when I speak of sanctification as being pleasing to God and worthy of praise do I mean to suggest that our sanctification buys God off. In fact, in my understanding of merit, something cannot be meritorious <i>unless</i> it is owed. Also, as creatures, God can never owe anything to us. Thus, our reward is purely grace. All our merit is in the imputation of Christ’s righteousness. So God owes us nothing.</div><div>2. As I have pointed out before, I wholly agree with this point. Surely we cannot merit anything with something that is not our own. This is the conclusive, key point, as I see it, which forever rules out human merit. We can never possess merit intrinsically. All our merit is in imputation, and this point explains why.</div><div>3. If we are defining merit as ‘being pleasing to God,’ this is not true, since even in our imperfect state God’s work in us is pleasing to him. And this is much more the case when it will be perfected in us, and God will wholly delight in his complete, perfected image in us. We will be completely morally pleasing to God. But if merit refers to the <i>right</i> to God’s favor, I agree that one sin forever eradicates our ability to merit, because, considered in ourselves without imputation, we would be forever guilty of that one sin, and all of God’s work in us would not be counted for us since it is not ours intrinsically but a gift.</div><div>4. This is one place where we may have some difficulty coming to agreement. Now, if we are talking about ourselves and our works <i>apart from imputation</i>, then I agree wholeheartedly that nothing we do from ourselves or which we have a claim to intrinsically can be proportionate to the reward. Rather, anything we as creatures can contribute, would always be an infinite distance removed from it. But it seems that more is implied here than simply this. The Westminster Confession says, “We cannot, by our best works, merit pardon of sin, or eternal life, at the hand of God, by reason of the great disproportion that is between them and the glory to come . . .” One of the things this seems to be saying is that God’s work in us is not proportionate to the reward. But I understand the reward to simply be God’s delight in us because of his work in us and the fruit of that (“Well done, good and faithful servant”). So this seems to suggest that there is nothing in our sanctification that truly delights God such that he praises and rewards it forever. I see our sanctification as possessing such moral beauty to God that he receives us into his presence and rewards his work in us with his eternal delight in us because we reflect him. If this is true, it seems that our sanctification would possess a proportion to the reward, although I would again state that this doesn’t imply that we merit anything by it, since all our merit can only be in imputation. Perhaps it might be appropriate to represent my belief here by saying that I believe that <i>if</i> sanctification were our work, we would merit by it (in the sense of being intrinsically worthy of praise eternally because of it), but since it is not, we don’t. This point, and the quote from the confession, seem to be saying that <i>even if</i> sanctification were our work intrinsically without grace, we would not be worthy of praise and eternal life for it. This seems to deny that God is ever truly pleased with his work in us.</div><div>5. If this refers to the concept of an undue work, my comments on point 1 apply here. If this simply means that the work must have a moral beauty which makes it appropriate necessarily for God to love and bless it, then I agree that our sanctification possesses that, though, of course, I do not believe that <i>we</i> merit by it.</div><div><br /></div><div>Summing all of this up, I can agree that our merit is wholly based in the imputation of Christ righteousness to us and not at all in our sanctification. We only merit, or have a right to eternal life or to God’s favor, by imputation. However, I believe that God’s work in us has such a morally beautiful character, and thus such a value to God, that he cannot but delight in it and cannot with moral appropriateness reject it, and that for eternity, and I believe that in this sense, it has a proportion to the reward, though it is not undue or merely optional, but owed to God, and required by him.</div></div><div><br /></div><div><b><i>This very short document is dated 6/10/2003. I don't really have anything to add here beyond what I've said earlier.</i></b></div><div><br /></div><div>Merit – When something has sufficient power within itself for the attaining of something else, so that it attains it necessarily, we say it <i>merits</i> that thing. <i>Merit</i> in a moral sense refers to the ability of righteousness, or moral beauty, to attain God’s favor and blessing.</div><div><br /></div><div><b><i>This document is dated 6/11/2003. Some of the above documents seem to be written as intended to be sent to someone. This one, however, seems to be simply my own personal brainstorming notes. I'm brainstorming how I might try to bridge the Augustinian-Reformed gap.</i></b></div><div><b><i><br /></i></b></div><div><b><i>What I'm saying about Arminians below in the first #2 is that Calvinists typically accuse Arminians of effectively bringing in a doctrine of personal merit because they hold that the choice of the will to follow Christ is something produced from the will itself apart from grace (thus making Arminianism a form of Semipelagianism - for more on this, see <a href="http://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2019/04/was-arminius-really-arminian-in-bad.html">here</a>). But this charge only holds up if the good choice of the will merits God's acceptance, which implies an Augustinian rather than a Reformed view. In the Reformed view, because of previous sin, the good choice of the will merits nothing from God, and so it doesn't matter in terms of merit whether it comes from us ultimately or is also a product of grace. I'm basically trying to argue that the classic Calvinist critique of Arminianism depends partly on an Augustinian understanding of good works and merit.</i></b></div><div><b><i><br /></i></b></div><div><b><i>Some interesting stuff in the "How to proceed" paragraph. I'm continuing to try to use Protestant authors as allies. I believed at that time that Luther was more of an Augustinian than in sync with the Reformed on the point of how justification relates to sanctification. I still think that Luther, at least earlier on, when he wrote </i>Bondage of the Will<i>, was very Augustinian (though he's got some nuances, particularly with regard to how he understands free will, that I still don't think I fully grasp yet.) He may still have been pretty Augustinian later in his life, though he starts talking about imputation more as he gets older. At any rate, I wanted to use him and others as allies--trying to find people Reformed people would respect saying the same things I was saying.</i></b></div><div><b><i><br /></i></b></div><div><b><i>We can see here also where I thought my version of Augustinianism differed from the Catholic view (the "Romanist" view, as I call it here, imitating Protestant language). I knew that the Catholic position is Augustinian, but I thought they had fudged on the doctrine of free will and grace, playing around with Semipelagianism to some degree. I saw (and still see) Semipelagianism as indeed implying a fatal doctrine of personal merit, so I felt severely critical of Rome on that point. (Since then, I've come to see Rome's view in a different light as I've come to understand it better, as you can see <a href="http://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2019/02/predestination-grace-and-free-will-in.html">here</a> and <a href="https://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2016/02/was-molina-actually-wrong.html">here</a>.)</i></b></div><div><b><i><br /></i></b></div><div><b><i>There is an interesting and helpful articulation of the "right vs. experience" distinction in here. Again, what I was trying to say was that imputation gives us a </i>legal right<i>, a </i>legal ownership<i>, of Christ's righteousness and its benefits, while sanctification gives us </i>actual, experiential possession<i> of Christ's righteousness and its benefits. Again, put another way (but a way I suspect would bug the Reformed significantly, but still a helpful way), imputation gives us a legal right to sanctification and its benefits, while sanctification, of course, delivers those benefits to us to actually enjoy. It actualizes what is promised to us in imputation. We're promised that we would love God and God would find us pleasing to him, and that comes about in sanctification. (That's why, earlier, I said that the substance and fulfillment of imputation, in this view, is sanctification.)</i></b></div><div><b><i><br /></i></b></div><div><b><i>The quotations are from Jonathan Edwards, from his works which are in the public domain, though these were quoted from the Yale edition of his works (though I have no idea from exactly where now, after all these years). I was reading Edwards's works systematically in connection with the PhD thesis I was working on that I mentioned earlier. One thing I note in Edwards below is that he said that "either an equivalent punishment, or an equivalent sorrow and repentance," could satisfy for our sins. I found this interesting because it pointed out that repentance and (what I would now call) penance could, in principle, satisfy for previous sins, which was my view (and I now recognize in the form of <a href="http://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2016/01/a-fresh-look-at-catholic-doctrines-of.html">the Catholic doctrine of penance or satisfaction</a>, though <a href="https://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2021/07/suffering-dying-and-rising-with-christ.html">the Catholic form of these ideas</a> wasn't really on my radar screen at that time). (See <a href="http://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2020/08/a-catholic-response-to-some-of.html">here</a> also for more on this.)</i></b></div><div><br /></div><div><div>1. Merit is of the essence of righteousness, so the degree of righteousness is proportionate to the degree of merit.</div><div>2. Aminians are accused of merit, because the soul contributing the determining factor of salvation leads to us being saved by a good act of the will. But if acceptance of Christ merits, then we merit by God’s grace, or Augustinianism.</div><div><br /></div><div>1. How to proceed: 1. State position in comparison with Reformed. Where we agree, where we disagree. State objective, first of all to show not salvation by works, secondly to defend position. Make sure to make use of the purchase-application idea, and perhaps quote Hodge p. 195 to help the conversation in this area. Adam’s sin purchased the right to sin and death for us all, as we had union with him and his sin was therefore imputed to us. Christ’s righteousness purchased the right to righteousness and eternal life for all who have union with him and therefore have his righteousness imputed to them. We can accept that. The only question is, does this imputation, both with Adam and with Christ, make use of or replace our own personal sinfulness and righteousness in the application of these purchased rights. 2. State history of issue, Augustine, Romanist perversion due to free will, Luther, Calvin. Perhaps my view can be thought of as a third option other than Rome or Calvin, but preserving Calvin’s concerns about grace and merit, and so with the Reformed against the Romanists. 3. Quote from Bondage intro and Luther’s stuff to indicate non-meritorious in bad sense, and in what sense it is meritorious. Perhaps quote Wright on Jansenism being a form of Calvinism and contradicting Romanist merit ideas.</div><div><br /></div><div>1. I feel that I could not present the record of my life before God and plead it for why I should go to heaven. It is full of evil and blemishes, and provides ample reason why I ought to go to hell. How can I explain this from an Augustinian perspective? Well, I think that guilt is intrinsically connected to sin, and what you are is what counts, evidenced by what you do. The only way for us to be in heaven is if we are truly righteous and morally fit for it. An enemy to God is not fit for it. When I look back on a day, I see my sins, and I don’t what God to judge me on the basis of them, but he won’t because I have been personally separated from them by repentance. But doesn’t the Bible say God judges us on our record? Yes, but he doesn’t judge the sin without also taking into account its death and our death to it and separation from it. So it is just for him to give us heaven. What am I really feeling when I feel like my life is inadequate for God to judge for good? Well, in this life, I have remnants of sin, and I am close to my past sins, so my guilt is present with me. They remind me I am a sinner in myself. I am only saved because God does not judge me for my sins, but pardons them. Our memory of our sins reminds us to look at ourselves as personally undeserving, and to see our good as God’s work in us.</div><div>2. God, looking at our record for judgment, sees two principles running through it: ourselves in ourselves, deserving hell, and grace, his work in us, deserving heaven. The question then becomes, which prevailed in the person, which overcame the other and took possession of the soul ultimately, and that is grace. So he rewards us with eternal life. So we don’t want him to judge us by OUR works, but by HIS work in us, which can only be done if it reigns in us.</div><div><br /></div><div>Right vs. Experience. Justification and Sanctification. We need both. Right without experience would be to have the right or status of being pleasing to God but in actual experience to be abominable and irritating to him. Experience without right would mean that God would in experience be pleased with us while we have no right to be pleasing to him but rather justice demands that we be condemned to hell as morally ugly and therefore under his wrath.</div><div><br /></div><div>“Sanctification is imperfect, mixed with our sins, and therefore cannot be the basis for justification” – That is true, but it understates the case. Not only will we have all our past sins still against us, which must be removed only by pardon, but the good works are God’s gift, so we don’t get credit for them. Therefore, judged by our works, God sees only our bad works, since they only are truly ours, and we deserve death. So we can’t be justified by our works, even our works done in grace. How can we be justified? Only by Christ’s merit given to us and none of our own. His merit is graciously imputed to us who have none, and this bears its fruit in our lives in our sanctification.</div><div><br /></div><div>1. 829 – “Worthiness is of the essence of moral goodness, and universally and necessarily attends it, as much as guilt or blame attends sin or moral evil. As all moral evil is blameworthy, and worthy of abhorrence and the fruits of abhorrence, so all moral goodness is praiseworthy, worthy of acceptance, approbation, and of the fruits of acceptance and approbation;”</div><div>2. 627 – Our works are rewarded with such a great reward only because they are seen in Christ, or our person’s are seen in Christ. “If we never had committed but one sin and at all other times had exercised perfect holiness and performed perfect obedience, yet looking upon us as we are by ourselves, with all that belongs to us, we should be in no degree lovely persons but hateful, though we had performed many lovely acts; and no one act of holiness is a lovely act in itself and without consideration of any relation to Christ, unless it be a perfect act.”</div><div>3. 679 – “Hence when the sense get to heaven they will [have] this to rejoice them and add to their blessedness, that God hath a real delight and joy in them, in their holiness and happiness.”</div><div>4. 779 – “THE NECESSITY OF SATISFACTION.” “All sin may be resolved into hatred of God and our neighbor, as all our duty may be resolved into love of God and our neighbor.” “When the majesty of God has such contempt cast upon it, and is trodden down in the dust by vile sinners, ‘tis not fit that this infinite and glorious majesty should be left under this contempt, but that it should be vindicated wholly from it; that it should be raised perfectly from the dust wherein it is trodden by something opposite to the contempt that it is equivalent to it, or of weight sufficient to balance it, either an equivalent punishment, or an equivalent sorrow and repentance, so that sin must be punished with an infinite punishment.” Fascinating discussion of satisfaction.</div><div>5. 341 – “not enough considering that they have nothing to boast of, seeing that ‘tis God that makes them to differ, and that . . . their beauty is not original to themselves.”</div><div>6. 341 – “If God should behold them as they are, with all their unworthiness, their filthiness and deformity, and did not overlook their deformity upon Christ’s account, God would have no delight in them at all for that little holiness they have, because their sin is of infinite demerit and their holiness is nothing put in the scale against it.”</div><div>7. 340-341 – And it must needs be so, for God necessarily takes delight in his own image and in his own beauty wherever he sees it. Indeed, the best saints in this world, they have more deformity than they have of this beauty, but all their deformity is overlooked; it is put upon Christ’s account, so that although there be so much filthiness and deformity in the saints, yet God sees none . . . he sees nothing but beauty in them . . . Not that there is no spot really in the church here upon earth, for how exceedingly defiled are the hearts of the saints, and how defiled and spotted are their services: but God beholds it not; he imputes it not to them; he sees nothing but beauty . . . [inherent righteousness] is Christ’s righteousness as well as imputed righteousness: imputed righteousness is Christ’s righteousness accepted for them, inherent holiness is Christ’s righteousness communicated to them . . . Now God takes delight in the saints for both these . . . though ‘tis the former only that avails anything to justification.”</div><div>8. 692-693 – “The new nature in a Christian is perfectly pure: there is nothing purer than the new nature in the saints. The new nature is [not] quite pure, for the saints ben’t quite pure. Yet ‘tis not because the new nature in them is not pure, but because there is a mixture of new nature and old. As the old nature is altogether corrupt, so the new nature is altogether pure: there is not the least defilement in it. So far as that goes, there is nothing but purity. The defilement that is in the soul don’t arise from any defilement in the new nature from a mixture of the old. The new nature is as pure as heaven itself is . . . And indeed the new nature in a saint can scarce itself be distinguished from the communication or participation he has of the Spirit of God, or that Spirit dwelling in him united to him, acting as a vital principle in his soul.”</div><div>9. Brainerd 444 – “The exercise of these Godlike tempers, wherein the soul acts in a kind of concert with God, and would be and do everything that is pleasing to God; this, I saw, would stand by the soul in a dying hour; for God must, I think, ‘deny himself’ [II Tim. 2:13] if he casts away ‘his own image’ [Gen. 1:27], even the soul that is one in desires with himself.”</div><div>10. Brainerd 449 – “I saw further that as this divine temper, whereby the soul exalts God and treads self in the dust, is wrought in the soul by God’s discovering his own glorious perfections ‘in the face of Jesus Christ’ [II Cor. 4:6] to it, by the special influences of the Holy Spirit, so he cannot but have regard to it, as his own work; and as it is his image in the soul, he cannot but take delight in it. Then I saw again that if God should slight and reject his own moral image, he must needs ‘deny himself’ [II Tim. 2:13]; which he cannot do. And thus I saw the stability and infallibility of this religion, and that those who are truly possessed of it have the most complete and satisfying evidence of their being interested in all the benefits of Christ’s redemption, having their hearts conformed to him; and that these and these only are qualified for the employments and entertainments of God’s kingdom of glory; as none but these have any relish for the business of heaven, which is to ascribe glory to God and not to themselves; and that God (though I would speak it with great reverence of his Name and perfections) cannot, without denying himself, finally cast such away.”</div><div><br /></div><div>The process of justification is the process by which a person who has no righteousness is given the righteousness of Christ by which he can stand before God’s judgment. It is by grace and faith rather than by works or merit. It can be divided into three parts: 1. Synthetic Justification—declaring righteousness to be ours who have none ourselves. 2. Sanctification—making us actually personally righteous by virtue of the infusion of the rightteousness given us in synthetic justification. 3. Analytical justification—declaring us to be actually and personally righteous, having been made righteous by Christ’s righteousness given to us and infused within us.</div><div><br /></div><div>If “It must be undue” means, it must be something that we give to God, coming from ourselves and adding to him, or profiting him, and we are thinking of sanctification as <i>our</i> work, then I agree that it is not undue. Relatedly, if “the disproportion between sanctification and the reward” refers to a disproportion coming from the work considered as coming from us, or as us giving to God what is his own gift to us, obviously, there is no proportion. Even if we give back to God all his own, we deserve no reward. And we don’t even do that, taking into account our sins and all the defects of our obedience. We cannot satisfy or merit by God’s work in us. Our satisfaction and merit is wholly by imputation, though given imputation, we can be said to have merit in some sense, or to attain the reward.</div></div><div><br /></div><div><i><b>This document is dated 6/16/2003. I'm trying here to use the term "justification" to refer to imputation--where Christ's righteousness is declared legally ours, giving us a right to it and its benefits--and the term "sanctification" to refer to the actual delivery to us of Christ's righteousness and our actual experience of it and its benefits in sanctification. By adopting this language, in contrast to the Augustinian language which would use the term "justification" to cover both of these things, I'm hoping to be able to articulate the substance of my Augustinian views in a way palatable to Reformed people (but without any deception, which is why I've spent so much time and effort trying to correctly understand and interpret what the Reformed are trying to say and how they might legitimately be understood).</b></i></div><div><br /></div><div><div>Justification: We can only be justified, or given a title and right to eternal life, by the imputed righteousness of Christ, by which he satisfied for our sins and merited eternal life for us. We cannot be justified by our own works, because we cannot merit by them. Even if we were without sin, as creatures we could never merit eternal life by our works, because of the infinite disproportion and distance between God and us, seeing that we are nothing in ourselves and we have all from him, and we are not only creatures, but sinners, who deserve therefore nothing but eternal wrath. We cannot satisfy for our sins or merit by works without grace, since we have no good apart from grace, and we cannot satisfy or merit by God’s work in us, since in all our good works, we are simply giving back to God his own gifts. If a person steals money from you, he cannot make it up by giving you money you loaned to him, which he already owed you anyway. We cannot satisfy by paying our debts. We cannot merit by our works, before or after conversion.</div><div>Sanctification: Although we cannot merit by God’s work in us, the holiness he works in us makes us fit for the receiving of eternal life. Justification removes the guilt of sin and gives us a right to eternal life, but God’s holiness demands that we be freed from the presence of sin in us as well. In an unsanctified state, it would be unfitting for God to delight in us and give us the blessings of his favor. Rather, our uncleanness would warrant the manifestations of his abhorrence. Sanctification cleanses us from sin and conforms us to the law inwardly and in our practice, making us pleasing and delightful to God, and thus worthy of his delight and the blessings of it.</div></div><div><br /></div><div><b><i>This document is dated 7/31/2003. In this document, I have, almost, come to terms with what I understand of the Reformed view. I've just about accepted that the gap between Augustinianism and Reformed thought can be bridged. I'm comfortable expressing my Augustinianism in what I take to be Reformed-friendly language. A very short time after this, as I recall, I concluded that the gap could be bridged, and that was my view for the next decade-and-a-half, even a number of years after I became Catholic. But since about three years ago or so, I've started to wonder whether <a href="http://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2018/01/what-exactly-is-protestant-doctrine-of.html">my pro-Augustinian understanding of the Reformed doctrine of justification</a> is really true to what the Reformed language was originally trying to say and what Reformed people in general have understood it to mean over the centuries. Is the gap really bridgable? I'm not entirely sure, but I'm growing more suspicious of it.</i></b></div><div><br /></div><div><div>A very brief statement of my position on justification and sanctification.</div><div><br /></div><div>Justification: Justification as a theological term refers to a state of acquittal and merit before the law of God. The “ground of justification” refers to that which gives us a right to pardon and to eternal life before that law. This is, and can only be, for sinful creatures, the imputed righteousness of Christ. Sinners cannot be justified by their own works or merit, either before regeneration or after—before, because they have no good works or righteousness at all before regeneration; after, because all the good they have in them is due simply to God’s grace and is his gift. We cannot satisfy for our sins or merit life at God’s hand by simply giving back to him what is his own. It would be like attempting to pay a debt, say $20.00, to someone by borrowing another $20.00 from him and then giving it back to him. If we owe a debt to God’s law, in order to pay it ourselves, we must pay it with what we have, not with what God gives us. Because all we have is from God, there is an infinite disproportion between what we are and have and what God is and has, and thus we cannot possibly make up for our sins or merit anything from God by any works of our own, regenerate or otherwise. Even without immediately considering sin, no creature righteousness at all, if there could be any, could merit anything from God, because of the before-mentioned disproportion; much less can we sinners hope to be justified by our works. The only possible ground of our justification, or our right to pardon and eternal life, is the imputation of Christ’s righteousness. What we can never produce ourselves, must be credited to us as a gift. We must forever stand only in the righteousness of God’s Son, credited to us merely as an act of God’s grace.</div><div><br /></div><div>Sanctification: If we have a right to pardon and eternal life entirely by the imputation of Christ’s righteousness, what does it matter whether or not we ever become personally or internally righteous, or undergo sanctification? The imputation is not all we need to actually receive the benefits of eternal life. It gives us a right to it, but it does not fit us for the reception of it. The job of making us fit for receiving what we have been given a right to falls to sanctification. In an unsanctified and unregenerate condition, we are enemies of God, full of all corruption, and are appropriately loathsome to him in a moral sense. We are fit only for God’s displeasure, and it would be inappropriate for God, in his righteousness and holiness, to treat us in any other way than as displeasing to him and worthy of his abhorrence and the fruit of this abhorrence, namely rejection. We may have a right to life, but we are fit only for destruction. In sanctification, the Holy Spirit applies the virtue of Christ’s righteousness inwardly, giving us a participation in Christ’s righteousness or holiness internally and experientially, changing us from being morally repulsive enemies of God to being bearers of his image, morally pleasing and delightful to him, loving him with all our hearts. This process begins in regeneration and is completed in our glorification, and is substantial, but not perfect, in this life. This change destroys the sin in us, putting it to death, enabling us to do good works, and gives us a fitness for the reception of eternal life. Now we are morally pleasing to God; he delights in us, as we reflect his character. We are fit for God’s delighting in us and rewarding us with the fruits of his delight, namely reception into his presence and eternal life, and we are now unfit for anything else but God’s delight and acceptance. It would be inappropriate for God to reject us in abhorrence, since we reflect him and live in loving obedience to him, just as it was unfitting for him to receive us without sanctification. So, with this change, we are fit to be received.</div><div><br /></div><div>It is impossible for justification to exist without sanctification, and vice versa. It would be a contradictory situation: If we were justified without sanctification, we would have a right to life but be fit only for death. If we were sanctified without justification and imputation, we would be have no right to life, and in fact deserve only death, and yet be unfit to receive death but only to be pleasing to God and receive the fruits of God’s delight. It would be as impossible as the idea of the unstoppable force meeting the immovable object; it cannot be in all of reality. Justification and sanctification can be distinguished, but they can never be separated.</div><div><br /></div><div>Another comment: Although without imputation, our best regenerate works can merit nothing from God, yet <i>with</i> imputation, in the context of being justified, God sees fit to reward us according to the righteousness he has created in us by the Holy Spirit. Justification by faith alone does not rule out a reward, even of eternal life, for our works, but it makes clear that such a reward is not inherently ours, but becomes ours only in the context of our having Christ’s righteousness imputed to us. God’s work in us is quite fit for reward, but we receive a right to that reward only by means of and with the assumption of our having Christ’s righteousness imputed to us.</div><div><br /></div><div>One final comment: The differences I thought I had with the historic Reformed articulation of justification seem to boil down to terminology. I was using the term ‘merit’ not only to refer to what gives us a right to life, but as including the idea of ‘moral fitness.’ The idea that our regenerate works have a moral fitness to the reward has always been acknowledged in Reformed theology, but using the term ‘merit’ to refer to this fitness has been anathema, since to say regenerate works can merit eternal life in the Reformed tradition means that <i>we</i> can gain merit with God by means of them. I was using the term simply to express this concept of ‘fitness.’ When I realized this, along with some other realizations, I came to hope that our differences could end up being basically terminological rather than substantial. I think that is likely. But I must wait for confirmation of this in the form of feedback on this statement and further conversation.</div></div><div><br /></div><div><i>Published on the feast of the First Martyrs of the Holy Roman Church.</i></div>Mark Hausamhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07371790103414979060noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-808697756426649418.post-31761128544727586032022-06-30T11:22:00.002-05:002022-06-30T11:22:59.660-05:00Will There Be Diversity in our Experience of the Essence of God in the Beatific Vision?<div style="text-align: center;"><i>By virtue of our apostolic authority, we define the following: According to the general disposition of God, the souls of all the saints . . . and other faithful who died after receiving Christ's holy Baptism (provided they were not in need of purification when they died, . . . or, if they then did need or will need some purification, when they have been purified after death, . . .) already before they take up their bodies again and before the general judgment - and this since the Ascension of our Lord and Savior Jesus Christ into heaven - have been, are and will be in heaven, in the heavenly Kingdom and celestial paradise with Christ, joined to the company of the holy angels. Since the Passion and death of our Lord Jesus Christ, these souls have seen and do see the divine essence with an intuitive vision, and even face to face, without the mediation of any creature.</i></div><div style="text-align: center;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: center;"><i>~ </i><a href="http://www.scborromeo.org/ccc/p123a12.htm#1023">Catechism of the Catholic Church</a><i><a href="http://www.scborromeo.org/ccc/p123a12.htm#1023"> #1023</a>, quoting </i>Benedictus Deus<i> by Pope Benedict XII (1336)</i></div><div style="text-align: center;"><i><br /></i></div><div><br /></div><div style="text-align: center;"><span style="text-align: left;">"It [The Council of Florence] has likewise defined . . . that the souls of those, who after the reception of baptism have incurred no stain of sin at all, and also those, who after the contraction of the stain of sin whether in their bodies, or when released from the same bodies, as we have said before, are purged, are immediately received into heaven, and see clearly the one and triune God Himself just as He is, yet according to the diversity of merits, one more perfectly than another."</span></div><div style="text-align: center;"><span style="text-align: left;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: center;"><span style="text-align: left;">~ The Ecumenical Council of Florence (f</span><span style="text-align: left;">rom the Bull "Laetentur coeli," July 6, 1439) </span><span style="text-align: left;">(Henry Denzinger, </span><i style="text-align: left;">The Sources of Catholic Dogma</i><span style="text-align: left;">, tr. Roy J. Deferrari [Fitzwilliam, NH: Loreto Publications, 2002], a translation of "the thirtieth edition of </span><i style="text-align: left;">Enchiridion Symbolorum</i><span style="text-align: left;"> by Henry Denzinger, revised by Karl Rahner, S.J., published in 1954, by Herder & Co., Freiburg", p. 219-220, #693)</span></div><div style="text-align: center;"><span style="text-align: left;"><br /></span></div><div><br /></div><div style="text-align: center;"><b>The Beatific Vision</b></div><div><br /></div><div>In 1336, Pope Benedict XII defined, as an official teaching of the Catholic Church, that the saved and purified after death and throughout eternity will actually see or experience God's own actual essence. In defining and articulating this teaching of divine revelation, Pope Benedict XII made a very bold move. God is infinitely above us. His essence transcends all space and time, and all limitation. That's why we can't perceive God's essence here and now. We are limited creatures, and our perceptions are always limited. Our vision and our ideas are always limited and partial, infinitely inferior to the divine essence. It is infinitely above creaturely capacity to truly, directly, see or experience God in his actual essence. Yet, since God is the one Supreme Good, and in the end there can be no lasting good outside of him, we must in the end either be brought to actually know God himself or be forever miserable, lacking the only thing that can satisfy the desire of rational beings. There is no such thing as definitive, substantial happiness outside of God. Therefore, although it was such a bold move, the Holy Spirit guided the Apostolic See of St. Peter to define for the people of God the truth that the Beatific Vision, in which is our full eternal happiness, consists in our direct experience of the essence of God.</div><div><br /></div><div>But this affirmation raises difficult and complex questions about how this could be possible. Again, God is infinitely above us as creatures. How could it ever be possible for a mere creature to attain to the height of truly knowing the infinite God? The glorious answer is that, in salvation, we are adopted as children of God and actually come to share in his divine life. The theologians of the Church from the earliest times have therefore described our salvation as our <i>divinization</i>. </div><div><br /></div><div><blockquote>The Word became flesh to make us "<i>partakers of the divine nature</i>": "For this is why the Word became man, and the Son of God became the Son of man: so that man, by entering into communion with the Word and thus receiving divine sonship, might become a son of God." "For the Son of God became man so that we might become God." "The only-begotten Son of God, wanting to make us sharers in his divinity, assumed our nature, so that he, made man, might make men gods." (<a href="http://www.scborromeo.org/ccc/p122a3p1.htm#460">CCC #460</a>, footnotes removed)</blockquote></div><div><br /></div><div>Not only is this doctrine consonant with and indeed demanded by reason, it is woven throughout the Scriptures. Our salvation makes us children of God, "heirs of God and co-heirs with Christ" (Romans 8:17), "partakers of the divine nature" (2 Peter 1:4). Although now we see "as in a glass darkly," yet in the end, when our salvation is complete, we shall see "face to face," and although for now we know in part, then we shall know even as we ourselves are known (1 Corinthians 13:12). "Beloved, now we are the sons of God, and it doth not yet appear what we shall be; but we know that, when He shall appear, we shall be like Him; for we shall see Him as He is" (1 John 3:2). "Eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither have entered into the heart of man, the things which God hath prepared for them that love him" (1 Corinthians 2:9).</div><div><br /></div><div>Now none of this means, of course, that we will ever cease to be creatures, or that we will become God, so that we will be ourselves worthy of worship. Our union with Christ makes us sharers of the divine life, but only by grace. God enjoys his own divine life, the life and love of the Blessed Trinity, by nature, as belonging properly to himself. We participate in that divine life only as a free, undeserved gift of grace, as creatures lifted by God's free gift infinitely beyond what we could ever deserve or achieve by our own merits or nature. We will indeed enjoy the divine life, but always only as creatures lifted to that joy by a sheer, undeserved gift of grace.</div><div><br /></div><div style="text-align: center;"><b>The Indivisible Unity of the Experience of the Beatific Vision</b></div><div><br /></div><div>But this is still a very deep and complex subject theologically. What will it be like for a creature to directly experience the divine essence? Of course, we can't imagine it subjectively until we are actually brought into the experience of it. Although we can understand the idea of it, the actual envisioning of it in an experiential sense is beyond our abilities in this life. But even looking at the subject intellectually and philosophically, lots of questions are raised as to what it means for a creature to experience the divine essence. I would like to discuss a couple of these questions throughout the rest of this post. The two questions are related: 1. Can a creature be brought by grace to directly experience the divine essence without being brought to know everything there is to know? 2. Are there any differences in the experience of different human individuals brought to experience the Beatific Vision, seeing that they are all brought to experience the very same divine essence and that that essence is not complex but simple (indivisible, without parts)?</div><div><br /></div><div>Both of these questions relate to the doctrine of divine simplicity. In Catholic teaching (and according to reason), God is a simple being. He is not complex. He is not made up of parts or pieces. Therefore, it would seem, to experience God's essence must be an all-or-nothing affair. One cannot experience only a part of God's essence, for God's essence does not have parts. If one sees God, one sees all of God. One either sees God or one does not. There is no in-between, and there are no degrees. So it would seem that the answer to both questions posed above must be no. All that exists in reality is rooted in God, flowing from his divine will, either by participation in his being or by divine permission (in the case of limitation or evil). It is a commonplace in Catholic theology to note that God knows everything that happens in the history of the world without looking outside of himself simply by knowing his own divine essence, for it all logically flows from there. It would seem to follow, therefore, that if the Beatific Vision involves the direct experience of the essence of God, it must bring with it a complete knowledge of everything in the universe. And, with regard to question #2, if all the saved are experiencing the same, simple divine essence, their experiences must all be the same. No one can know God more or less, for, again, one either sees a simple essence or one does not; there can be no degrees or partiality.</div><div><br /></div><div>It might be argued that, although one cannot see parts of an essence that has no parts, one could see a simple essence with greater or lesser clarity, and this could result in some seeing "more" of that divine essence than others. To use a space-time analogy, Dave and Joan might both experience a tree, but Dave might see more of the tree than Joan. One way that might happen is if Dave can see more branches than Joan can. But another way would be if Joan is not wearing her glasses and so, while seeing the same parts of the tree that Dave does, she sees them less clearly. Perhaps one person might see the essence of God more clearly than someone else. But I don't think this clears up the problem, for when two people see an object, one person with greater clarity than another, it is still the case that what this ultimately means is that one person is seeing parts of the object that the other person isn't seeing. For Dave to see the tree more clearly than Joan is for Dave to see more details in the tree and thus more parts of the tree. Whereas, perhaps, Joan can see the trunk of the tree, but only as a kind of blurry, vague brown shape, Dave can see a good bit of the texture and details of the bark, etc. Joan isn't seeing those details, so Dave is seeing parts of the tree that Joan is not seeing. It's really no different essentially than if Dave could see a particular tree branch that Joan couldn't see. So I don't see how this difference is going to help in terms of explaining how one person can see the divine essence more than someone else. The only way that there can be two people experiencing an object where one of them can see parts, or pieces, or aspects of the object that another person can't see is if the object is complex rather than simple, made of distinguishable, truly distinct parts. But the divine essence is simple. So it would seem that seeing the essence of God must be an all-or-nothing affair and not one that could admit of degrees.</div><div><br /></div><div>Another problem with the idea of some people experiencing more of God than others is that God is the Supreme Good. God himself in his fullness is the source of happiness. It follows, then, that those who experience less of God experience less of the source of happiness and thus less happiness. Some people have tried to account for this by comparing it to two cups of different sizes but both full of water. Both cups are full--that is, both individuals are full of God and thus, presumably, fully happy, even though one person experiences less of God than the other. But then do we want to say that it is no disadvantage or misfortune at all for a person to experience less of God? This doesn't make sense, because, again, if God in his fullness is the source of happiness objectively, for all rational creatures, then less of God implies less happiness. If there is more of God to be had than I am getting, therefore, as a rational being, I should want that. I should be motivated to get more if I can, which implies some degree of dissatisfaction if I cannot. Also, if we say that it is no misfortunate or cause of dissatisfaction at all to have less of God, then we are saying it is not better in any way, objectively, to have more of God. How little of God is enough to fully satisfy a rational being? How little of God can you get and still have "God"? This whole line of questioning is, of course, absurd when we are talking about a simple essence, and yet this is what we are in for as soon as we admit of degrees of knowing the essence of God. Another problem with this line of reasoning is that, I think, most people who would argue it would hold that even the human being who attains to the most clear vision of God is infinitely far from experiencing God <i>with full clarity</i>, or <i>all of God</i>. That is, they would not say that it is a matter of being <i>almost there</i>, as if Fred just needs, say, a 5-degree increase to experience God fully, George needs a 7-degree increase, etc. They would say that even the highest achiever in this regard is <i>infinitely</i> distant from knowing God fully and with perfect clarity. (One of my favorite philosophers, Jonathan Edwards, expressed this by picturing the heavenly state as one where the saved are forever approaching closer and closer to a complete experience of God, gaining more and more of him throughout eternity, and yet always at an infinite distance from attaining that fullness.) But if this is the case, then even the highest attainer of the vision of God is actually getting only an <i>infinitesimal </i>amount of God or an <i>infinitesimal</i> degree of clarity in their vision of God. But how is this really any different from saying that he really gets nothing of God at all? If I only experience creatures and miss the Beatific Vision entirely, I'm getting <i>infinitely less</i> than the fullness of God, so looking at things this way would seem to effectively gut the Beatific Vision essentially, making our experience of the essence of God really no different qualitatively than a person not experiencing it. If our happiness is in God, this would imply that even the highest attainer of the divine vision must be infinitely miserable. Heaven has become hell.</div><div><br /></div><div>To say that we cannot experience the fullness of God because we are creatures, so that there will always be infinitely more of God beyond our capacity to experience, even in the Beatific Vision, is to say that what we do experience will always be only on the level of creaturely capacity and therefore, really, only a creaturely kind of experience. We will not really experience the divine essence at all, but only whatever of himself he can manifest to a creaturely capacity. But that's what our experience is like now, before the Beatific Vision, and it is precisely why we are not satisfied and are looking forward to something more in heaven. God manifests himself in his creation, and we can experience that in many ways, but it always leaves us longing for more, because it is only on a creaturely level. We want to move beyond that level and be brought to experience God himself in his own essence, which is infinitely beyond creaturely capacity. If our experience will be limited to creaturely capacity--to time and space--then our experience will never be qualitatively different from what it is now. We will ever only experience temporal-spatial, limited realities (albeit God manifesting himself in those realities to the level creaturely capacity will allow). To be invited to experience the essence of God itself so that we can be fully satisfied with that which is infinite and not finite, requires us to be taken up infinitely beyond our creaturely capacities. That is exactly what the Beatific Vision promises us. But that promise is gutted by limiting that Vision to only creaturely capacity.</div><div><br /></div><div style="text-align: center;"><b>Degrees of Glory</b></div><div><br /></div><div>So it would seem, as I said, that experiencing God's essence must be an all-or-nothing affair, not admitting of degrees. And yet, as you can see from the second quote at the top of this article, the Ecumenical Council of Florence, in 1439, taught as official doctrine that the saints, either right after death or after being purged in purgatory, "are immediately received into heaven, and see clearly the one and triune God Himself just as He is, <i>yet according to the diversity of merits, one more perfectly than another</i>" (emphasis added). Florence confirms what Pope Benedict XII had earlier defined, but it has added a statement that seems to contradict everything I've been saying in my last few paragraphs. The Council seems to be affirming that there are degrees of experiencing the Beatific Vision based on the diversity of merits of different individuals.</div><div><br /></div><div>And this has been a doctrine commonly taught by the theologians of the Church. St. Thomas Aquinas teaches it in his <i>Summa Theologica</i>:</div><div><br /></div><div></div><blockquote><div>Of those who see the essence of God, one sees Him more perfectly than another. This, indeed, does not take place as if one had a more perfect similitude of God than another, since that vision will not spring from any similitude; but it will take place because one intellect will have a greater power or faculty to see God than another. The faculty of seeing God, however, does not belong to the created intellect naturally, but is given to it by the light of glory, which establishes the intellect in a kind of "deiformity," as appears from what is said above, in the preceding article.</div><div><div><br /></div><div>Hence the intellect which has more of the light of glory will see God the more perfectly; and he will have a fuller participation of the light of glory who has more charity; because where there is the greater charity, there is the more desire; and desire in a certain degree makes the one desiring apt and prepared to receive the object desired. Hence he who possesses the more charity, will see God the more perfectly, and will be the more beatified. (Thomas Aquinas, <i>Summa Theologica</i>, <a href="https://www.newadvent.org/summa/1012.htm">First Part, Question 12</a>, Article 6, from <i>The Summa Theologiæ of St. Thomas Aquinas</i>, Second and Revised Edition, 1920. Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Online Edition Copyright © 2017 by Kevin Knight. Embedded links removed, here and in the quotations below.)</div></div><div><br /></div><div>But no created intellect can attain to that perfect mode of the knowledge of the Divine intellect whereof it is intrinsically capable. Which thus appears—Everything is knowable according to its actuality. But God, whose being is infinite, as was shown above (Article 7) is infinitely knowable. Now no created intellect can know God infinitely. For the created intellect knows the Divine essence more or less perfectly in proportion as it receives a greater or lesser light of glory. Since therefore the created light of glory received into any created intellect cannot be infinite, it is clearly impossible for any created intellect to know God in an infinite degree. Hence it is impossible that it should comprehend God. (Ibid., Article 7)</div></blockquote><div></div><div><br /></div><div>St. Thomas has even anticipated my objection to this idea from the doctrine of divine simplicity, and has responded to this objection:</div><div><br /></div><div><b></b></div><blockquote><div><b>Objection 2</b>. Further, Augustine says (De Vid. Deum, Ep. cxlvii): "That is comprehended which is so seen as a whole, that nothing of it is hidden from the seer." But if God is seen in His essence, He is seen whole, and nothing of Him is hidden from the seer, since God is simple. Therefore whoever sees His essence, comprehends Him. (Ibid., Article 7)</div><div><br /></div><div><b>Reply to Objection 2.</b> God is called incomprehensible not because anything of Him is not seen; but because He is not seen as perfectly as He is capable of being seen; thus when any demonstrable proposition is known by probable reason only, it does not follow that any part of it is unknown, either the subject, or the predicate, or the composition; but that it is not as perfectly known as it is capable of being known. (Ibid., Article 7)</div></blockquote><div></div><div><br /></div><div>St. Thomas has also answered my other question: "Can a creature be brought by grace to directly experience the divine essence without being brought to know everything there is to know?" He answers that those who attain the Beatific Vision do not know everything because, while they experience God's essence, they do not <i>comprehend</i> (that is, experience fully or with perfect clarity) God's essence. So while all knowledge can indeed, in principle, be seen in the divine essence (and God himself knows all things by knowing his own essence), yet, because we do not fully know God, we do not gain all knowledge from the Beatific Vision:</div><div><br /></div><div><blockquote>The created intellect, in seeing the divine essence, does not see in it all that God does or can do. For it is manifest that things are seen in God as they are in Him. But all other things are in God as effects are in the power of their cause. Therefore all things are seen in God as an effect is seen in its cause. Now it is clear that the more perfectly a cause is seen, the more of its effects can be seen in it. For whoever has a lofty understanding, as soon as one demonstrative principle is put before him can gather the knowledge of many conclusions; but this is beyond one of a weaker intellect, for he needs things to be explained to him separately. And so an intellect can know all the effects of a cause and the reasons for those effects in the cause itself, if it comprehends the cause wholly. Now no created intellect can comprehend God wholly, as shown above (Article 7). Therefore no created intellect in seeing God can know all that God does or can do, for this would be to comprehend His power; but of what God does or can do any intellect can know the more, the more perfectly it sees God. (Ibid., Article 8)</blockquote></div><div><br /></div><div>He raises an objection to this, which also touches another of my earlier concerns:</div><div><br /></div><div><b></b><blockquote><b>Objection 4. </b>Further, the rational creature naturally desires to know all things. Therefore if in seeing God it does not know all things, its natural desire will not rest satisfied; thus, in seeing God it will not be fully happy; which is incongruous. Therefore he who sees God knows all things. (Ibid., Article 8)</blockquote></div><div><br /></div><div>And his reply:</div><div><br /></div><div><b></b><blockquote><b>Reply to Objection 4.</b> The natural desire of the rational creature is to know everything that belongs to the perfection of the intellect, namely, the species and the genera of things and their types, and these everyone who sees the Divine essence will see in God. But to know other singulars, their thoughts and their deeds does not belong to the perfection of the created intellect nor does its natural desire go out to these things; neither, again, does it desire to know things that exist not as yet, but which God can call into being. Yet if God alone were seen, Who is the fount and principle of all being and of all truth, He would so fill the natural desire of knowledge that nothing else would be desired, and the seer would be completely beatified. Hence Augustine says (Confess. v): "Unhappy the man who knoweth all these" (i.e. all creatures) "and knoweth not Thee! but happy whoso knoweth Thee although he know not these. And whoso knoweth both Thee and them is not the happier for them, but for Thee alone." (Ibid., Article 8)</blockquote></div><div><br /></div><div>I confess I am not entirely satisfied with St. Thomas's defenses of the "degrees of glory" point of view or his responses to the objections to it. I still do not see how he can avoid gutting the simplicity of God. St. Thomas recognizes the problem here--that seeing God in "parts" would seem to contradict the divine simplicity. But I don't find his solution--that God has no parts, it's simply a matter of some people seeing him "more clearly" than others--to solve the problem, because, as I argued earlier, to see something with greater or lesser degrees of clarity is really just a subspecies of seeing some but not all parts of a divisible or complex object.</div><div><br /></div><div>I also find his response to the "people won't be happy if they don't know everything" objection unsatisfying. His response seems to miss the point, nor do I find it to be true to human psychology. It is obvious that human beings are full of curiosity. We are explorers by nature. We always want to know more and more about reality. The reason for this is that we were made for God. Only God is the Supreme Good, and God is the Fullness of Reality, the Supreme Being. If happiness objectively consists in knowing the Supreme Being who is the Supreme Good, then anything other than that will be fundamentally dissatisfying. That is why we cannot find final satisfaction in the experience of any creature. As St. Augustine famously put it, "Thou hast made us for thyself, O Lord, and our heart is restless until it finds its rest in thee." Or, <a href="https://itsjustme.wordpress.com/2011/04/19/the-correct-quote-of-blaise-pascal/">as Pascal put it</a>:</div><div><br /></div><div><div></div><blockquote><div>What else does this craving, and this helplessness, proclaim but that there was once in man a true happiness, of which all that now remains is the empty print and trace?</div><div><br /></div><div>This he tries in vain to fill with everything around him, seeking in things that are not there the help he cannot find in those that are, though none can help, since this infinite abyss can be filled only with an infinite and immutable object; in other words by God himself.</div></blockquote><div></div></div><div><br /></div><div>St. Thomas's response to the objection is that it won't matter that we won't know everything because we will know God, and that will be enough. But, in his view, it seems, we <i>won't</i> know all of God, but only part of him--an <i>infinitesimal</i> part of him, infinitely removed from full <i>comprehension</i> of God. So how can we be satisfied? Also, St. Thomas suggests that people don't really care to know the details of everything. Really? It seems to me that human nature is just the opposite. Just imagine a human being who knew almost everything, but they became aware that there was <i>just one thing</i> they didn't know. Wouldn't that human being find it to forever gnaw at him until he could learn about that one thing? Again, the reason for this is because we are made to be filled only by the Supreme Being, the <i>Fullness of Reality</i>, in whose essence is seen and known all of reality.</div><div><br /></div><div>I am very loath to disagree with St. Thomas on anything, since he is the premier theologian of 2,000 years of Catholic Church history. However, St. Thomas's opinions are not, <i>per se</i>, the official doctrine of the Church. Yes, the Church has endorsed St. Thomas's overall theological methodology, but not every single thing that St. Thomas taught. For example, St. Thomas famously rejected the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception of Mary and argues against it in the <i>Summa</i> (though, of course, this was centuries before it was a defined and required doctrine--and he did acknowledge Mary's total freedom from actual sin, which had been the universal position of the Church for centuries before him). He also taught that heretics ought generally to be executed, which went beyond the official position of the Church on this point, even in the Middle Ages. So, if the evidence drives me to it, I'm willing to argue with St. Thomas on certain points. I'll come back to this later. But I have a bigger problem in the Council of Florence, for this was an ecumenical council of the Church and, as such, its teachings are indeed authoritative and binding on the entire Church.</div><div><br /></div><div>But I'll go further than that. Not only is the doctrine of the "degrees of glory" binding and official per the Council of Florence, it actually has the support of reason as well, despite all I've said above. So even if the Council of Florence hadn't taught this, I would be compelled by reason to acknowledge it and fit it into my system. St. Thomas gets at this reason in what I quoted earlier (from the First Part, Question 12, Article 6, of the <i>Summa</i>):</div><div><br /></div><div><blockquote>Hence the intellect which has more of the light of glory will see God the more perfectly; and he will have a fuller participation of the light of glory who has more charity; because where there is the greater charity, there is the more desire; and desire in a certain degree makes the one desiring apt and prepared to receive the object desired. Hence he who possesses the more charity, will see God the more perfectly, and will be the more beatified.</blockquote></div><div><br /></div><div>Every one of us, as an individual, is unique. Our life experiences are unique. But it's through our life experiences that God prepares us by grace to experience the Beatific Vision. Our experience of anything is necessarily colored by our perspective, and our perspective is shaped by our beliefs, our values, our memories, our previous experiences, etc. Two individuals may experience the same present situation, and yet their experience of that situation will be different because of the different life trajectories that have brought them to that point.</div><div><br /></div><div>Imagine two individuals: Bob and Sam. Bob's life has been much more difficult than Sam's in some ways. He has faced greater challenges in his life than Sam has. He has had to make a greater number of harder choices. Both Bob and Sam die in a state of grace, but Bob has had to suffer much more to be faithful to Christ than Sam has. And his sufferings have strengthened him in virtue in a way that Sam has not experienced. His awareness and experience of God, accordingly, is overall richer than Sam's is. (I'm not saying, by the way, that it is always the case that those who suffer more have a greater experience of God. There is an enormous amount of complexity in such things. My intent here is simply to give one particular example in order to address the theological issue under consideration.) Both Bob and Sam eventually die, and they both attain to the Beatific Vision. Will it not necessarily be the case that Bob's and Sam's experiences of that Vision will be different? They must be different, because their life trajectories that have led them to that Vision have been so different. In this case, it so happens that Bob has had a deeper preparation than Sam has for that Vision, and so his experience of the Vision is deeper. In the language of the Council of Florence, both Bob and Sam "see clearly the one and triune God Himself just as He is, yet according to the diversity of merits, one more perfectly than another." Or, to use St. Thomas's language, Bob, because of his experiences, his choices, and his deeper virtue and merits, when he reaches God, will have "more of the light of glory [and thus] will see God the more perfectly; and he will have a fuller participation of the light of glory [because he] has more charity; because where there is the greater charity, there is the more desire; and desire in a certain degree makes the one desiring apt and prepared to receive the object desired. Hence he who possesses the more charity, will see God the more perfectly, and will be the more beatified."</div><div><br /></div><div>And this diversity in our experience of the Beatific Vision is not limited to a comparison of the degree of merit. Even apart from the question of greater or lesser merit, every individual's life experiences and trajectory are very different, and so each person's experience of the Beatific Vision must be different since that experience will be the culmination of a particular life trajectory different from that experienced by other people.</div><div><br /></div><div style="text-align: center;"><b>Reconciling the Simplicity of the Divine Essence with Degrees of Glory: The Communion of Saints</b></div><div><br /></div><div>So now comes the big question: How can reconcile the two things I've been arguing throughout this article? How can we reconcile, on the one hand, the idea that all those who attain the Beatific Vision will experience the very essence of God, when that essence is absolutely simple and so cannot admit of experience by degree or by parts, and, on the other hand, the idea that it must be so that different individuals will experience the Beatific Vision differently because of their diverse life experiences and trajectories?</div><div><br /></div><div>I propose that an answer to this question can be found in the fact that, when we get to heaven, we will be unified not only with God but also with each other. It is not just communion with God that will be perfected in heaven, but the communion of the saints as well. Because of the communion of saints, we are not on our own as individuals. It's not just "me and God." It's "<i>us</i> and God." We are enriched not only directly by our own personal fellowship with God, but also through the communion of all the saints. As the <i>Catechism of the Catholic Church</i> puts it <a href="http://www.scborromeo.org/ccc/p123a9p5.htm">(#947)</a>:</div><div><br /></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><b style="background-color: #fbfaf8; color: #202020;"><a style="color: #94805c;"></a></b><blockquote><b style="background-color: #fbfaf8; color: #202020;"><a style="color: #94805c;">947</a></b><span style="background-color: #fbfaf8; color: #202020;"> "Since all the faithful form one body, the good of each is communicated to the others. . . . We must therefore believe that there exists a communion of goods in the Church. But the most important member is Christ, since he is the head. . . . Therefore, the riches of Christ are communicated to all the members, through the sacraments."</span><sup style="background-color: #fbfaf8; color: #202020;">480</sup><span style="background-color: #fbfaf8; color: #202020;"> "As this Church is governed by one and the same Spirit, all the goods she has received necessarily become a common fund."</span><sup style="background-color: #fbfaf8; color: #202020;">481</sup></blockquote><sup style="background-color: #fbfaf8; color: #202020;"></sup></span></div><div><br /></div><div>This, of, course, has many manifestations and implications in the life of the Church. It's the basis for the sacramental system, the intercession of the saints, our own prayers for each other on earth and for those who have died, indulgences, etc. In general, it's a central part of our life as Christians and how God relates to his people.</div><div><br /></div><div>And I think it has crucial ramifications for our current topic as well. Think back to Bob and Sam. When they get to heaven, their different life experience, levels of virtue and merit, etc., will necessarily give them different experiences of the Beatific Vision--at least, when we are considering what they themselves, by themselves, bring to the table. But Bob and Sam will not only find perfect unity with God in heaven, but with each other as well. They will share with each other all that they have and be enriched by each other. Everyone else's life experiences and trajectories will enrich me when we get to heaven, and my experiences will enrich everyone else as well. This allows us to talk about our experience of the Beatific Vision in two ways. We can talk about each of our individual, unique experiences of the Beatific Vision that flow from our own peculiar life trajectories. We can talk about the Beatific Vision from <i>Bob's </i>unique point of view as opposed to <i>Sam's</i> unique point of view. And when we do that, we will note the differences, the diversity. But then we must remember that Bob's and Sam's points of view will be enriched by each other's. Bob's and Sam's experience of God will not be limited only to what they themselves, individually, bring to the table, as if the other person never existed. Sam's contribution, in our scenario, will be, overall, less than Bob's (though that doesn't mean that Sam's unique perspective will not enrich Bob as well in some ways). His reward in the Beatific Vision will be less. But Sam's experience of the Beatific Vision will not be limited to what his individual reward would entail by itself, because his experience will be enriched by Bob's sharing his merits and reward with him. What Sam may lack because of his own life trajectory, he will share in by grace in the communion of the saints in virtue of Bob's life trajectory. And therefore, when all the sharing has been taken into account and everyone's individual perspective and experience have been enriched by that sharing, together they will all experience the single, indivisible divine essence which is one and which admits of no diversity.</div><div><br /></div><div>As an analogy, think of a rainbow. There are many colors in a rainbow, and yet the white light that makes the rainbow is only one. All the colors individually are diverse, but when they are united, they become one. And yet the individual frequencies and wavelengths of the colors remain in the white light. As <a href="https://study.com/learn/lesson/what-is-white-light.html">this article on study.com</a> puts it, "White light is made up of all the colors and frequencies of the visible light spectrum on the electromagnetic spectrum." Bob will still be Bob and Sam will still be Sam. There will always be a fundamental difference between what Sam experiences from himself and what he gains from Bob, and we can always talk about the different perspectives of Bob and Sam (even when, through sharing, they are experiencing something together, still there will be the difference of Bob experiencing it as the fruit of his own life and Sam experiencing it as the fruit of Bob's life), just as we can always say that, while Christ shares his own divine life and Sonship with us, yet it will always be the case that Christ enjoys that divine life as a fruit of his own nature and merits while we will enjoy it only as a gift of grace through Christ. In both cases, the unity of experience will not cancel out the different trajectories that create the different perspectives that arrive at that unity of experience. Both sides of the equation will always remain true. Sam's reward will always be greater, because, although he shares all that he has with Bob, who is enriched by the sharing, yet there is a greater merit and reward when one reaps the fruits of one's own labors (recognizing, of course, that even this is ultimately a gift of grace) than when one shares in the fruits of another's labors. And yet, through the sharing, both will reap the benefits of each other's experiences and rewards, and will rejoice in the other. Bob, though his personal reward is less and he has less merit, yet will rejoice fully in not only what he has achieved but what Sam has received and achieved as well, recognizing that God has given to all as he sees fit and his plan is fully and perfectly accomplished. "God hath tempered the body together, having given more abundant honour to that part which lacked. That there should be no schism in the body; but that the members should have the same care one for another. And whether one member suffer, all the members suffer with it; or one member be honoured, all the members rejoice with it. Now ye are the body of Christ, and members in particular" (1 Corinthians 12:24-27).</div><div><br /></div><div>But let's return briefly, before we end, to St. Thomas's claim that we won't know everything because we won't comprehend God. Is that the case? In light of what we've seen, I think we can answer this by saying that, considering our own unique points of view rooted in our unique life trajectories, none of us by ourselves will have the complete picture. However, if we factor in the communion of saints, what each of us as an individual lacks will be complemented by what others share, so that, in the end, we will gain a complete picture together. I think we have to say this in order to preserve the fundamental unity of the divine essence and the intrinsic all-or-nothing nature of experiencing a simple essence. To know the divine essence must necessarily involve an experience of the complete picture. As creatures, of course we cannot comprehend God. We are at an infinite distance from God. And yet the whole point of our salvation is that we are raised beyond our creaturely capacities to experience the divine life and essence itself. We truly get to experience God himself. However, again, we will still remain creatures. Even though we will share in God's experience of his own life, yet, considering the distinction of who we are and who God is and the different pathways by which we have arrived at the experience of the divine life (God by eternal nature and we through a temporal process of salvation by grace), we will always be able to speak of different perspectives as we experience the divine life. There will always be a fundamental distinction between God experiencing his own life as his own life and we glorified creatures experiencing God's life, not as our own intrinsically, but as God's, shared with us freely and graciously. Thus, for all eternity, we will rely wholly on God's grace and give him all the glory and recognize his infinite distance from us as creatures, even as we partake in the divine nature by grace and see God as he is, face to face, sharing in the Trinitarian life. I don't know what St. Thomas would say to every point of this, but, again, even if he would disagree with some of it, it is permissible to disagree with him if the evidence calls for it. But I'm not sure he ever considered the question from this point of view, so it is difficult to know how he would have responded to this line of reasoning. We'll have to ask him that when we get to heaven!</div><div><br /></div><div>So, in conclusion, by means of the communion of the saints we can reconcile these two teachings of the Church that appear, on the surface, to be in tension with each other. We can preserve the unity and simplicity of the divine essence on the one hand, and thus the unity of all of our experiences of the Beatific Vision without creating a situation where we would have only partial experience of the divine essence or multiple, fundamentally different divine essences. And, on the other hand, we can preserve the true diversity that must exist in the different perspectives of all those who attain to the Beatific Vision due to their different life experiences and trajectories.</div><div><br /></div><div><i>Published on the feast of the First Martyrs of the Holy Roman Church.</i></div>Mark Hausamhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07371790103414979060noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-808697756426649418.post-62720533899019671282022-06-30T11:22:00.001-05:002022-06-30T11:22:37.680-05:00Against First-Causal Libertarian Free Will<p>Catholics have always defended the existence of true free will in human beings against any who would deny it. But whenever one is attacking any error in defense of a truth, one is always prone to falling into the opposite error, the error on the other side. Occasionally some Catholics talk about free will in such a way as to give the impression that they have fallen a bit into an error I am calling First-Causal Libertarian Free Will (let's call it the FCL view of free will for short).</p><p>The idea of "libertarian" free will is often defined as the idea that a free choice is one where the chooser is truly able to make a choice other than the one he in fact ends up making. So, for example, I choose to eat a salad for dinner rather than a hamburger, but I <i>could have chosen</i> to eat the hamburger. The ability to choose otherwise must always be in my power, or I do not have true free will.</p><p>So far so good. But this libertarian formulation has the potential to be interpreted in different ways. The correct and harmless way to interpret it is that it is recognizing that a true choice is the settling of a preference between multiple options. I have a rational mind that can deliberate on my options and then make a decision based on that deliberation. In choosing option A, I have the faculty of mind and will to have chosen option B as well. I was not determined to go with option A by any kind of force or influence that would have obliterated or circumvented the deliberation and decision-making of my mind and will, so that my act of going with A rather than B was truly a product of my use of those faculties. This idea is not only harmless and consistent with truth and with orthodox Catholic faith, it is essential to a true understanding of free will and to orthodox Catholic faith. To deny this idea would be heretical, because it would contradict the essential nature of human personhood, moral responsibility, etc.</p><p>But sometimes people take libertarianism a step further and posit a kind of absolute independence in the choice of the will. In reality, a free choice is part of a nexus of causes and explanations that are subject to the providence of God and to the characteristics of human psychology. Going back to my salad and hamburger example, if we ask why I chose the salad, there are sufficient explanations to be had. I chose the salad because, all things considered, I wanted it more than I wanted the hamburger. When I was deliberating on my options, I weighed all the factors involved and how they related to my desires. Those desires were the product of all sorts of causal influences, including my genetics, my upbringing, my previous experiences (both remote and recent), all the myriad specific circumstances of my present situation, etc. I found after weighing all of this that, overall, I preferred the salad. That act of concluding my deliberations and settling on a preference we call "making a choice." So, according to human psychology, there is going to be a kind of causal connection (in a broad sense) between the state of my desires and what I choose. If you knew absolutely everything about me and my thoughts and desires at the moment of my choice, you could predict with 100% accuracy what I would choose. And thus my choices are also included in the nexus of divine providence. For it was God who brought everything into existence and thus set the parameters of all that would be and would happen. In creating the world, he couldn't but create a history for that world down to its smallest detail, for he knew 100% all the effects of everything he chose to do. This is why historic Catholic thought has never had a problem holding both free will and divine foreknowledge and <a href="https://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2019/02/predestination-grace-and-free-will-in.html">predestination</a>.</p><p>The FCL position, however, holds that for a choice to be free, it must be absolutely undetermined in any way by any causal influences of any sort. This position takes the idea of "ability to choose otherwise" and blows it up to something much grander metaphysically than the more modest libertarianism. In addition to saying, rightly, that, in order to make a free choice, I must have faculties of mind and will capable of deliberating and choosing between options, the FCL view says there must be an absolute metaphysical possibility of any choice being made regardless of any causal influences acting on the one making the choice. In this view, my choices are viewed as truly random events, not the product of my mind settling on preferences rooted in my desires. Regardless of what I most want overall, it must be possible for it to happen that I might choose something different. So if, upon deliberation, I decide that, overall, I prefer the salad to the hamburger, it has to be that it might actually happen that I might totally randomly, for no reason, decide to choose the hamburger instead. (I say that choice would be "for no reason" because any psychological reason for the choice would amount to something in my desires influencing my overall preference.) Critics of this view have rightly pointed out that, while on the surface sounding grand ("Not only can I choose what I <i>want</i>, I can even choose what I <i>don't want</i>! Look how free I am!"), this idea actually obliterates the very nature of free choice and makes "choosing" something that happens to one without one's will. It's more like getting struck by lightning, from a psychological point of view. If you try to picture it, it leads to absurd sorts of scenarios like this one:</p><p><i>I am at a party, and I have a choice between eating chocolate ice cream and eating rice pudding. I happen to utterly detest rice pudding, but I love chocolate ice cream. There is absolutely no reason why I should choose anything other than the chocolate ice cream, let's suppose. There are no bad consequences for choosing what I most prefer. As one who holds the FCL view, I know that since I am free, it must be possible that I should choose against my strongest motives and strongest preferences, and that my choices are ultimately not determined by or inseparably tied to my preferences. I begin to get nervous, hoping that I won't choose against my preferences this time and get stuck with eating rice pudding. It has been known to happen. I warily and quickly approach the dessert table, reaching for the chocolate ice cream. But then, right before I can get my hand around the serving spoon, it happens! My FCL free will kicks in and I find myself, to my dismay, choosing the rice pudding! "Aarrgh," I think to myself, "I hate it when this happens. I would really love to be eating the chocolate ice cream, but my accursed FCL freedom is once again going against my strongest and deepest preferences!" So I spend the next ten minutes freely eating my rice pudding while staring longingly at the ice cream.</i></p><p>FCL, while trying to defend free will, thus ends up destroying it.</p><p>This doctrine of free will is also incompatible with the sovereign providence of God over the creation--which is a part of Catholic dogma. If my free choices are truly random--not the product of anything logically preceding them at all--then we have being in the world that is not ultimately traceable to God, contrary to God being the First Cause of all reality. And since the choices are random, God can't control them, and he can't even know about them apart from actually seeing them happen. This is why the most logical proponents of this view often end up denying not only God's sovereign providence but also God's complete foreknowledge of the future. History is the result of a mix of what God has decreed in his providence on the one hand and what random chance has added to the mix on the other. There are really two gods operating in this view--God and Random Chance. The very foundations of monotheism are destroyed.</p><p>So this view makes nonsense out of human psychology, destroys the very nature of free choice it is supposed to be protecting, and obliterates classical monotheism itself. It is obviously imperative, then, that Catholics avoid this view just as much as they avoid the opposite error of denying free will. Sometimes, though, I hear Catholics saying things that make me think that this view might be influencing their thinking to some degree--though, usually, it is more of a vague, unconscious, confused influence which hasn't really been thought through much at all. Oftentimes these kinds of statements come out in connection with trying to explain why bad things happen in the world. For example:</p><p>"God chose to create a world of free creatures. But there was a price. Once you create free creatures, you can't control what they do. You can't guarantee they will choose what you would like them to choose. You have relinquished some control over what happens. That's why sin exists in the world. God would like it if there was no sin, but, without overriding and destroying free will, there's nothing he can do about it. He can't make a person choose good or evil. He can <i>invite</i>, he can <i>encourage</i>, but he can't guarantee what they will choose. He has to take what he gets."</p><p>This is seriously problematic, because it seems to be denying the absolute sovereignty of God over all creation--as if, in creating free creatures, God has given up control over the outcome of events, so that how things turn out is not in accordance with his overall providential plan. But, as I've pointed out, this is <a href="https://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2019/02/predestination-grace-and-free-will-in.html">contrary to Catholic doctrine</a> and even to monotheism itself. Also, in taking the will, and the choice of good or evil, out of the control of God, this statement undermines the idea of salvation by grace. It is Catholic dogma that, when we choose what is good, and particularly when we choose God as our Supreme Good and thus move ourselves into a right relationship with him, this good choice is both our choice and is also a product of God's grace. The good will itself is a gift of God. But in the view of this statement, God can't give us a good will. All he can do is try to encourage us to make good choices, but he can't actually cause us to do so. He just has to sit back and watch to see if we will make a good choice or a bad choice. He cannot exercise any kind of causal power there. But this makes any good choices we make ours in an exclusive sense, excluding those choices also being gifts of God. Sure, the <i>ability</i> to choose is still a gift of God (though how God can give the ability to someone to produce uncaused, random events is a serious question), but not the <i>good choice itself</i>, contrary to Catholic teaching.</p><p>Now, there is certainly truth in the statement. It is true that, in making us free, God has given us space to choose. He respects our freedom and doesn't override it or destroy it. He does not use coercion upon us or cause us to choose in any way that would invalidate or circumvent our minds and wills. He does not cause my good choices in the same way he causes water to fall from the sky in rain. In the latter case, the causation is physical and involuntary. In the case of my good choices, the causation is of a sort suitable to the nature of the will. It moves and influences me to choose in a <i>persuasionary</i> sort of way, not in a mechanistic sort of way. We can understand this difference even from looking at how we humans influence things. I use one kind of causality when I'm moving a rock from one place to another. I use a very different kind of causality when I persuade a friend to watch a movie with me. Usually the latter sort of causality is less than 100% guaranteed, but that is only because I do not have full control of all the factors of influence. If I knew everything about my friend, and not only that but I was also the ultimate determiner of all the influences that affected his desires (as God is for us), I could have 100% certainty of effectively persuading him to watch the movie without any violation of or circumvention of his free will. So the essential difference between these two kinds of causality does not, in principle, lie in how guaranteed their effectiveness is, but in the nature and kind of the causation itself. (With regard to bad choices, Catholic doctrine says that God does not actively bring these about as he does with good choices, but rather he allows them to occur. That is, knowing that if he sets things up in certain ways, we will make certain bad choices, he chooses to allow that to happen in some cases based on the sovereign, overall purposes of his providence.) So our statement above is right in pointing out that God does not coerce, or violate, or circumvent our freedom which he himself has given to us. And it also rightly points out that our freedom is what makes evil possible. There could be no creaturely good or evil without creaturely free will, for free will is what makes moral acts and moral responsibility possible. But the statement is wrong in then concluding from this that God has <i>no guaranteed influence</i> over our choices. (Of course, recognizing that God is still in control over his creation does bring to the forefront the question of why sin and evil--and their consequences--exist in the world. For more on this, see <a href="https://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2022/01/philosophical-thoughts-on-free-will.html">here</a> and <a href="http://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2021/12/the-problem-of-evil.html">here</a>.)</p><p>So, in conclusion, while Catholics should be zealous in defending free will, they should avoid the FCL definition of free will as contrary to the truth and to Catholic faith.</p><p>For more, see <a href="https://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2019/02/predestination-grace-and-free-will-in.html">here</a> and <a href="https://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2022/01/philosophical-thoughts-on-free-will.html">here</a>.</p><p><i>Published on the feast of the First Martyrs of the Holy Roman Church.</i></p>Mark Hausamhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07371790103414979060noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-808697756426649418.post-24462039985456548352022-06-30T11:21:00.001-05:002024-01-24T11:55:47.527-06:00Some Thoughts on Male and Female, the Body, and Human Sexuality<div>What I want to do here is lay out some thoughts, informally, about male and female, the body, and human sexuality. I'm not attempting to give a thorough treatise of everything that must be said about these complex issues, just jotting down some important ideas. My thinking draws from the teaching of the Catholic Church (such as can be found <a href="http://www.scborromeo.org/ccc/p3s2c2a6.htm">here</a> and <a href="http://www.scborromeo.org/ccc/p2s2c3a7.htm">here</a>, and which was famously expounded upon in Pope St. John Paul II's well-known lectures on the Theology of the Body), combined with some ideas and observations of my own.</div><div><br /></div><div style="text-align: center;"><b>Male-Female Complementarity, Sexuality, and Marriage</b></div><div><br /></div><div>God designed the human race to exist in two complementary forms--male and female. He did this because relationality is a central part of reality. God himself is a unity, but not simply a unity. His Being also involves relationality, as <a href="https://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2015/01/a-couple-of-analogies-for-trinity-and.html">he is a Trinity</a>--one God in three Persons. The very center and pinnacle of reality is the life and love of the Triune God, and creation is simply a spilling over of that love as God manifests his glorious life in the created world and we are brought to share in it. The complementary nature of males and females in the human race highlights relationality. Relationships involve the giving and receiving of selves, and the male-female complementarity of humanity allows for an abundance of this sharing of selves. Of course, this sharing doesn't happen only between males and females, but it happens (at least within the human race) in one of its deepest ways in male-female relationships.</div><div><br /></div><div>This sharing of selves in male-female relationships is seen most profoundly in marriage--and especially in sacramental marriage. Marriage (in the Catholic view) is supposed to be a stable, permanent, committed relationship between a man and a woman in which one of the greatest examples of the sharing of selves can happen in the human race. When we talk about "sharing of selves," we're talking about giving and receiving. Husbands and wives give themselves in a deeply profound way to each other in the marriage relationship.</div><div><br /></div><div>The human self involves both body and soul. These cannot be separated from each other, for we humans are not simply bodies, or souls in bodies, but we are a unit of body-and-soul. In the marriage relationship, husbands and wives give themselves body and soul to each other. They give their whole selves to each other in a uniquely profound way.</div><div><br /></div><div>The body plays an essential role in this. When husbands and wives give their bodies to each other, this is both a part of and also symbolizes the complete gift to each other of their entire selves. An essential component of maleness and femaleness is the unique bodily characteristics of males and females. The bodies of males and females are designed for each other. There is a physical, biological, sexual attraction that exists between males and females. Men (generally) delight in the female body, and women delight in the male body. In the marriage relationship, husbands give their bodies to their wives and wives give their bodies to their husbands, and both husband and wife are fulfilled as they delight in each other's bodies and also delight in the enjoyment their spouse finds in their own body. This delight and enjoyment are manifested in many ways--enjoying the beauty of each other's bodies, acts of physical affection and intimacy, etc.--culminating in the sexual act itself. (That's not to say that the sexual act must be the immediate end of every expression of affection, etc. It's just to say that the sexual act is the pinnacle of all the various ways in which spouses enjoy each other's bodies. Spouses should find the fulfillment of their sexual attraction to each other in the sexual act, since God designed the sexual act--with its functions of bonding and procreation, which we'll talk about further below--to be the place where sexual enjoyment reaches its fulfillment and climax.)</div><div><br /></div><div>How does nakedness fit in? The showing of the whole body is part of and symbolic of the revealing and giving of the whole self. Being naked in front of someone implies being vulnerable, letting one's inner/deeper self be seen and accessed. (When the whole body is seen, our private bodily parts are seen, and this is part of and symbolic of our inner selves being seen. That's why physical nakedness is so often used as a metaphor for other kinds of general exposure of self. "He could read my thoughts. I felt naked.") This is why we wear clothes in general public life. Trust is required when we bare ourselves, but trust cannot be taken for granted in a fallen, corrupt, sinful world. If we bare ourselves, we subject ourselves to possible objectification, scorn, contempt, ridicule, abuses, etc., which can damage our inner selves which we want to protect from such things. People can disrespect our bodies and their private parts, and they can disrespect our inner selves. This is why Adam and Eve were naked--there was unfallenness, so there was no lack of trust, no possibility of abuse. And that's why clothes were introduced after the Fall. So when husbands and wives get naked in front of each other, they are being vulnerable, exercising trust, baring themselves--their private body parts and their inner selves--to each other, giving themselves to each other as a gift, and they want to enjoy and be enjoyed--but as persons, not as disrespected objects.</div><div><br /></div><div>Also, sexuality is a deeply intimate part of a person's self and life. In sex, we bare ourselves body and soul in a uniquely profound way. Our passions are intense and play a more central role in our experience than they do in much of ordinary life, where a more objective reason (hopefully!) tends to have greater influence, and this makes us vulnerable. (How many times do people do things in the heat of sexual passion they would find absurdly irrational at any other time?) Sex inclines us body and soul to each other. Physically, we bond. Spiritually and personally and in every way, we bond. Love of that sort creates vulnerability, because when we love, when we bond, we can be hurt. When we share and unify, we can be hurt. In many ways, in sex, some of our deepest desires, longings, and concerns are expressed, as we enter into an intimate relationship which bonds us to another human being--what we want, what we love, but which makes us vulnerable. We keep people at greater distance generally, because it is such a commitment of self to break down those barriers and engage in the intimacy of sex. (That's one reason why promiscuity is often so painful emotionally, and why casual dating often leads to much heartache. We are treating as casual something that is wired to be something deep, profound, and permanent. We are giving our very selves in a way that lacks the protection required for such giving.) Therefore, the sharing of sex is part of and symbolic of the deep, intimate sharing of selves in general. It makes sense, then, that the parts of our body that we consider our "private parts" are those parts that have associations with sex to varying degrees. To be naked, then, is to share our private body parts and our private inner selves, especially those parts connected to sex which is itself an intimate sharing of selves.</div><div><br /></div><div>Of course, sex is also connected to procreation. That is its most obvious and immediate function, as is evident biologically. But procreation is not its only function. It is also an expression of affection and love, bonding, etc. But these all fit together, for the love and bonding is indeed designed for the good of the husband and the wife, but also for the making of a family structure in which new life will be brought into the world and raised and nurtured. Love and commitment lived out in life is the framework needed for the production and nurturing of new human life. God designed the most intimate and dramatic expression of love between two persons, a male and a female--the sexual act--to be the mechanism by which new life is brought into the world, showing that life and love are intimately bound up together. Love leads to life, and life is love. In the Trinity, there is one God in Three Persons. The relationship of the Father and Son produces the Holy Spirit. The love of the Trinity is the basis of creation, our very existence, as well as our final destiny as human beings and our salvation. We are destined to enjoy the Beatific Vision, which is sharing in the Trinitarian life and love. So human love in general, and especially love between males and females, and especially married love, and the sexual act in particular as a dramatic expression of this love, is made a metaphor and revelation of what reality is all about at the deepest level, what our human destiny is all about, and what salvation in Christ is all about. Hence, marriage is a created reality, but Christ raised it to a sacrament--a sign and means of grace.</div><div><br /></div><div>We can see from God's having made marriage a central creation ordinance and a sacrament that he has put a very high value and sacredness on romantic and sexual love and the sexual act. "Sacramentality" carries the idea of a kind of special communication of the divine. Of course, this manifests itself in many ways in the marriage relationship in general, but one of the ways it manifests itself is in the very nature of romantic and sexual love and the sexual act. There is a mystical quality to sexual relationality and the sexual act. Like many other things--music, art, nature--but in some ways even more profoundly, sexuality is a doorway to experience of the transcendent. That's one reason it has been so central in human experience and culture. Much of our poetry, music, stories, etc., are associated with it. In many cultures, it has even played a role in religious and mystical rituals and experiences. It has mind-altering effects in some ways similar to that which can be produced by certain drugs or medicinal substances (which have also often been used in religious experiences in various cultures) or by deep meditation and other forms of spiritual or religious experience. The connection between two persons experiencing sexual attraction or relationships or involved in sexual acts in some ways transcends any other relational connection possible to us in this life. In this way, it functions as a kind of special appetizer for the Beatific Vision. It is an immensely powerful experience. I would not say that sexual relationality is the closest overall we get to the Beatific Vision in this life. The Eucharist, for example, certainly takes a higher place. But purely in terms of the mystical experience of relationality, it is no doubt among the highest and most profound that we can have in this life.</div><div><br /></div><div>(Although my primary focus here is on the body and sexuality, it needs to be said that, of course, the total giving of selves in marriage that sex symbolizes goes far beyond sex itself. It involves the hard work of loving throughout life, sacrificing one's self for the good of the other, dealing with the ongoing, daily, and sometimes "mundane" aspect of living together--maintaining a household, raising children, comforting in affliction, easing burdens, practicing patience and forgiveness, learning the art of compromise and unselfishness, being faithful through adversity, etc. The joy of marriage is not just physical, but also spiritual and personal, and marriage involves not only joy in an ecstatic sort of sense but also commitment, sacrifice, penance, hard work, etc., and the fruits and satisfactions these bring. In all of these things together the love of married couples is fully lived out.)</div><div><br /></div><div>All of this is why God designed sex to happen only in committed, protected relationships. It requires the protection and trust of commitment. To avoid harm, it requires stability--for the sake of the two persons themselves and also for the sake of the family structure that is the context of the procreation and raising of children. It requires a stable, protected place for love and life to be kept safe and nourished. And the relationship God designed for this purpose is marriage--which involves the coming together of a male and a female. Sex in any other context is forbidden, for any other context robs sex of some of its essential elements. Masturbation, for example, robs it of its association with relationships and the giving of selves. It becomes simply an activity for personal self-gratification. <a href="https://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2021/06/a-catholic-and-agnostic-debate.html">Homosexual acts</a> remove it from its divinely-designed context of male-female relationships. As we've mentioned, God designed sex for the bonding and support of husband and wife and also for procreation. It should not be intentionally removed from this context, or it is misused, even if some elements of good sexual relationships--a great degree of affectionate bonding, for example--are present. Sex between males and females but outside of a marriage relationship lacks the necessary support and commitment both for the safe bonding of the partners and also for the procreation and raising of children--a task which requires a great degree of commitment and permanency. Adultery breaks the commitment of marriage and harms the bonding between spouses and the stable family structure for the raising of children. And so on.</div><div><br /></div><div>Sometimes people these days criticize the Christian doctrine of sexuality--particularly the idea that sex is to happen only in heterosexual marriage relationships--as condemning other expressions of sexuality arbitrarily and for no purpose. "What's the big deal about sex between unmarried people, or homosexual sex, or masturbation, etc.?" But this objection ignores all the reasons discussed in the previous paragraph, and it also ignores the deep sacredness of the sexual act. Contrary to the way it seems often to be treated in our culture, sex is not simply a hobby or a fun extra-curricular activity or a nice way to pass the time. It is profoundly sacred. And, like all things, it belongs ultimately to God and not to us. God designed it for particular purposes and to be used in particular ways, and he puts very high value on it, so when we take it and twist it away from the divine intentions for it and use it however we see fit, we commit a serious act of sacrilege. We take something holy that belongs to God and treat it as if it is ours to do with as we will, according to our desires and regardless of God's. Imagine someone coming into your bedroom and, upon seeing some memento of great value to you up on a shelf, after being told by you how important it is to you and how you want it to be treated, declares that all your concerns are "silly" and "arbitrary," takes it down from the shelf, and decides to use it for his own purposes--perhaps as a doorstop, or even in a more serious way but a way contrary to your deep desires for how it should be treated. Perhaps that can give a bit of a hint of God's point of view when we misuse sexuality.</div><div><br /></div><div style="text-align: center;"><b>Male-Female Complementarity Outside of Marriage</b></div><div><br /></div><div>But what about male-female relationships outside of marriage? Does the male-female complementarity of humanity have any function or role in other human relationships or in human society more broadly? Yes, it does. There are many ways in which this complementarity plays and can play a role. It plays a role in the broader society, as men and women contribute their unique points of view, interests, and abilities to the general goal of furthering the good of society. Men and women can be friends, and, while such friendships partake of the same general nature as friendships between members of the same sex, there are often elements of the male-female complementarity involved. For example, men often tend to be more empathetic towards women than towards other men, or they feel a greater desire to protect and support them. Men and women, even outside of marriage, find each other attractive and are drawn to each other's beauty. (This includes both visible, physical beauty, and also things we might not think of, such as the enjoyment of the sound of the other sex's voice in speaking or singing.) This can manifest itself in art, such as in the enjoyment of paintings that express the beauty of human beings, both male and female. Men and women also find the male-female relationship itself beautiful, and they often naturally enjoy illustrations of it, whether drawn from real-life (just think of the excitement of bridesmaids as they help the bride get ready to be married) or from imaginative portrayals (think, for example, romantic comedies).</div><div><br /></div><div>But what about nudity? Can it ever be licit for men or women to enjoy any portrayal of the nude body of the opposite sex outside of marriage? Pope St. John Paul II, in his Theology of the Body, answered yes to this question (though with great caution). Nudity is not inherently an evil. The Book of Genesis seems to make this pretty clear, as it portrays the idyllic state of unfallen humanity in the Garden of Eden as a state of nudity. The danger of nudity in our world comes not from any inherent problem with nudity <i>per se</i> but with the fact that nakedness, in a fallen world, inherently invites corruption--disrespect of the body and the person, and objectification, where a person's naked body is used by someone to gratify their own desires outside of the proper relational context. General nudity requires a kind of general assumption of righteousness and trust, and a general self-control, which can't be had in this world. However, in limited and very carefully-controlled contexts, Pope John Paul II said that the beauty of nudity can be enjoyed even outside of the marriage relationship--such as in certain forms of art. (Think of the nudes in the paintings of the Sistine Chapel.)</div><div><br /></div><div>All male-female relationships outside of marriage, however, are potentially dangerous, because male-female complementarity naturally tends towards the full gift of soul and body that ought to take place only in a marriage relationship. Men and women can be friends, but they must always be on their guard against their friendship evolving into a deeper kind of relationship of the sort that only belongs in marriage. Men and women can enjoy the beauty of the opposite sex, but they must constantly be on their guard against that enjoyment evolving into an attempt to find sexual fulfillment and gratification outside of marriage. We want to avoid two extremes here. We want to avoid simply condemning wholesale any male-female relationality of any sort outside of marriage, but we also want to avoid a laziness that does not take proper guard towards protecting such relations from corruption. We want to avoid a kind of paranoid fear on the one hand, and a kind of moral carelessness on the other. And relationships within marriage are not void of danger either. Objectification, abuse, neglect, and many other evils are just as possible within marriage as they are without--some forms even more possible.</div><div><br /></div><div>Considering these dangers and the extremes we must avoid, how do we draw the lines properly and maintain the proper balance? As in many areas of life, this requires the virtue of prudence. There are some clear rules given to us in the moral law, but the application of these rules requires the development of prudence. Prudence is a gift of God, but it is also a skill that must be learned, and we get better with practice and experience. In prudential matters, there is often not a one-size-fits-all, easy answer to all questions. The application of moral principles requires discernment. We must be aware of the complexities, details, and nuances of particular situations. We must be aware of ourselves--our personalities, our tendencies, our inclinations, our strengths, our weaknesses, our level of wisdom, etc. We must recognize relevant cultural issues. Think of drinking alcohol. There is nothing inherently wrong with drinking alcohol in moderation. But should everyone drink alcohol? No. Should children drink alcohol? No. Should everyone have exactly the same amount of alcohol, or drink it in all the same circumstances? No. (Does everyone even like alcohol? No. I myself can testify to that!) With regard to male-female relations, as with many, many other areas of life, we must learn the art of discernment as we prudentially apply moral principles to our lives. Such diversity of application can exist not only between individuals, but also between cultures, peoples, and ages. Different cultures often draw the lines somewhat differently. And different ages have their own emphases and concerns. (We can think of how a pope allowed Michaelangelo to paint nudes in the Sistine Chapel, later popes had them covered up, and then a later pope had the coverings removed.) We need to strike the proper balance between thinking for ourselves as we form our own consciences and following the spiritual advice and direction of those who are skilled in moral discernment. We must, of course, form our consciences by reason and by the revealed Word of God, and we must be guided by the application of God's revelation in the teaching of the Church. If we are young, we must listen to the counsel of our parents and obey them, and not seek to strike out on our own without them. We must avoid, on the one hand, an obsessive scrupulosity that is overly afraid of danger and which draws lines too narrowly, and on the other hand an overly lax attitude that does not sufficiently guard against corruption.</div><div><br /></div><div>Not all people are called to marriage. Some people are called to be single. There are those called to various forms of religious life, for example. There are those who are unable to get married for some reason or another. There are those who are elderly and who, if they were once married, will not marry again. Etc. Does male-female complementarity play any role for people in these callings and situations? Yes. I mentioned above that society in general benefits from the unique insights, points of view, sensitivities, and abilities of men and women. This certainly plays a role in something like religious life. Religious orders of women, and individual women in religious life, contribute something unique in addition to what is contributed by religious societies of men and men in religious life. Also, the relationship of single persons to God can tie in to the sacramental meaning of marriage. Marriage symbolizes the relationship between Christ and the Church, and points back in general to the relationship between God and his people and the relationships within the Blessed Trinity. Being called to singleness often involves a calling to be specially devoted to God in a more direct and focused way than is often possible in the married life (because the married life involves many worldly cares). Sometimes those called to the religious life will refer to this as being "married" to Christ. Priests are sometimes said to have forgone a family so that the whole congregation of God's people can be their family. We even call them "father." Those called to the religious life are called to be a witness to all people that there is something more important than the relationships that are a part of this world. Ultimately, it is our relationship with God that counts. So the religious life works hand in hand with the Sacrament of Matrimony to point the world to a relationship with God. (See <a href="https://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2016/01/what-are-evangelical-counsels.html">here</a> for more on religious life and the "evangelical counsels" in general.) And those who are single for other reasons can also complement those who are married as they live their lives with special devotion to God and in forms of service which are not as accessible to those in married life. Male-female complementarity, as we said at the beginning of this post, is one expression of the life of love and self-giving we are to practice in community in this world, and this life of love, of giving and receiving, is something that all people, whatever their state and calling, are called to participate in.</div><div><br /></div><div style="text-align: center;"><b>Some Practical Tips for Living a Chaste and Virtuous Life</b></div><div><br /></div><div>Living a virtuous life is not easy. As fallen creatures, the path to holiness <a href="https://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2021/07/suffering-dying-and-rising-with-christ.html">involves a lifelong struggle</a> to fight against our disordered fallen nature and its natural inclinations to sin and stupidity. But sometimes we make the journey harder than it needs to be by allowing our thoughts to get confused. So let me provide here just a few practical tips for a smoother journey towards holiness with regard to male-female relationality and sexuality. (In Catholic language, "chastity" is basically a condition of virtue with regard particularly to sexuality.)</div><div><br /></div><div>As Aristotle famously pointed out, a lot of times error and vice are found in the extremes, and virtue is found in the mean between the extremes. One set of extremes that is often a pitfall for those seeking to live a holy life involves, one the one hand, laziness and carelessness with regard to sin and bad habits, and, on the other hand, an excessive fear, obsession, or even paranoia about these things. Those inclined towards the former extreme need to be reminded that sin is a serious matter. The fundamental nature of sin is opposition to God and the moral law, and this attitude is the essence of all wickedness and the fount of all misery (because God is the Supreme Good). We need to take God with the utmost seriousness, and therefore sin needs to be our mortal enemy. This is why the Bible is always telling us to "fear" God--that is, to have a proper recognition of the gravity of who God is and to fear being against him as the greatest of all calamities. To be righteous is to love God above all things, so our ultimate goal in life should be to please him and enjoy him perfectly and eliminate all sin and all tendencies to wickedness in our life. The more virtuous a person becomes, the less such a person will come to tolerate even venial sin, for the clearer our vision is of the greatness and beauty of God, the more repulsive all sin will seem to us. This should be the chief aim of our entire life.</div><div><br /></div><div>But the other extreme--obsessive fear and obsession about sin--can also be a serious problem, especially for those particularly inclined towards it. Such people need to be reminded that what really matters is the fundamental choice of our life--are we choosing God as our chief good, or are we ejecting him out of that place in order to put something else there? Is God the one we choose above all else? This is not a matter of feelings or the strength of feelings, but of the will. What do we choose to put supreme value on? If we choose to follow God as our chief goal, and we orient our lives towards seeking him as our greatest value and ultimate end, then we can be sure that we are in a right relationship with him, a state of grace, and everything will come out fundamentally right in the end. The only thing that can put us out of the reach of God's salvation is mortal sin--and mortal sin doesn't mean all sin; it doesn't even mean all serious sin (objectively speaking). Mortal sin involves a deliberate, fully-informed, fully-aware, intentional choice to adopt an attitude or pursue a course of action which involves rejecting God as our supreme value and end in life, choosing instead to break from him fundamentally and go our own way. Mortal sin is defined by being incompatible with "charity"--that is, with supreme love to God as the choice of our will. Mortal sin is not the ways in which we regularly slip up and act inconsistently with our chief goal, the bad habits we have that tend to draw us into foolish and sinful actions, the difficulties we face in developing virtuous habits, how many times we tend to slide back into sinful tendencies, etc. These are all natural and ordinary parts of life in a state of grace as we pursue holiness in this fallen world. When we understand this, it will help us to relax a bit, to let go of obsessive fear. We will remember that "there is no fear in love; but perfect love casts out fear: because fear has torment. He that fears is not made perfect in love" (1 John 4:18). To "fear" God in the biblical sense is not to be obsessively afraid of him, but to recognize his supreme value and importance and therefore to take holiness with the utmost seriousness. If we love God, and trust God, we need not live in obsessive fear, but can rest confidently in the help of his grace as we grow in holiness. If we fall into sin from time to time, well, that is to be expected of fallen creatures struggling to be holy. <a href="https://history.hanover.edu/texts/trent/ct06.html">The Council of Trent actually condemns</a> as false doctrine the idea that people can avoid all sins throughout their entire life. "If any one saith . . . that he is able, during his whole life, to avoid all sins, even those that are venial,-except by a special privilege from God, as the Church holds in regard of the Blessed Virgin; let him be anathema" (Sixth Session, Canon 23). When we sin, we don't need to dwell on it. We can learn what we need to learn from it, get back up, repent, go to confession if appropriate, and then move on--like a gymnast who doesn't fall into despair every time she falls onto the mat, but just keeps getting back up and resuming her practice. (In fact, overly obsessing about sin often has the effect of making it worse rather than better. There's hardly a better way to ensure that something will have a strong presence in one's mind than to continually be worrying about how strong a presence it has.)</div><div><br /></div><div>Another practical tip to make our path to holiness smoother is to recognize the difference between concupiscence and sin. <i>Concupiscence</i> is the Catholic theological term for our fallen, disordered desires that have a tendency to lead us into sin. But concupiscence, while it tends towards sin, is not itself personal sin. Acts of sin involve the consent of the will. Insofar as our desires happen to us without such consent, they are not sin. So stop feeling guilty for having such desires. You can't just banish them away with some strong act of the will. We will all struggle against concupiscence throughout our entire lives, for that struggle is the pathway to holiness. Holiness isn't only about avoiding sinful acts of will; it is also about developing virtuous habits and unlearning vicious (that is, un-virtuous) ones. We are trying to learn not only to avoid individual sinful acts of will in particular cases, but also to develop habits such that we will become more and more naturally inclined towards virtuous attitudes and actions in general and away from vicious or sinful ones. So even when you are avoiding particular acts of sin, you will still have plenty to work on in terms of building habits of virtue. Don't be paranoid about that, but just go forward, like the gymnast I mentioned in the previous paragraph. Keep practicing. Don't worry if you mess up, or you haven't got a particular skill down yet very well. Just keep going forward. You'll keep getting better (but don't get paranoid about your rate of progress!). You won't get fully where you want to be until after this life, though, so don't be impatient. Be diligent, but also be tolerant of yourself and where you are.</div><div><br /></div><div>Another, really important practical tip, one which I think a lot of people struggle with: Don't make things to be sins that aren't. There are enough actions in the world that <i>are</i> actually sinful that we don't need to be adding to them. Reason, Scripture, and Church teaching, understood in light of each other, applied with prudence and wisdom by an informed conscience, will help us know what is sinful and what is not. What we don't want to do is go beyond these or ignore these and let an overactive imagination add non-sinful things to the category of sin. With regard to male-female relationality and sexuality, here are some things that <i>are</i> sins (I'm sure I'm not going to think of <i>everything</i>, but here are some things that come to mind):</div><div><br /></div><div>1. Engaging in sexual acts outside the proper context of such acts--an established, legitimate marriage between a man and a woman. This includes actions such as masturbation (the deliberate self-stimulation of oneself in order to achieve sexual fulfillment and gratification by oneself), homosexual sexual acts, sexual acts between unmarried men and women, etc.</div><div><br /></div><div>2. Seeking sexual fulfillment and gratification outside of sex that takes place within a legitimate marriage relationship.</div><div><br /></div><div>3. Within a legitimate marriage relationship, seeking complete sexual fulfillment apart from a fully complete sex act. Romantic and sexual affection can certainly be enjoyed outside of sex or the final culminating act of sex, and romantic and sexual activity can and should involve more than just that final culminating act, but there should not be a culmination of the sexual act that hinders, blocks off, or leaves out essential elements of the sexual act--such as by <a href="https://jenniferfulwiler.com/catholic-teaching-on-openness-to-life/">using artificial contraception</a> to block any natural procreative tendencies in a particular sexual act, by engaging in forms of sexual activity that complete the sexual act outside of the body, etc.</div><div><br /></div><div>4. Reducing the body of another person, or onself, to the level of an object to be used to achieve personal sexual gratification. While, of course, sexual pleasure and the enjoyment of that pleasure is a valid and good part of sexuality, legitimate sexuality should never be reduced to that, but should always involve love between two persons as persons. This can be a sinful attitude within or without a legitimate marriage relationship. This would also include seeking sexual relations apart from the consent of both parties.</div><div><br /></div><div>5. Intentionally failing to practice adequate modesty. Modesty means acting, dressing, etc., in such a way as to reasonably attempt to avoid creating an occasion in which one might become objectified by others or tempt others (or oneself) to illegitimate or harmful sexual desires, attitudes, or actions. Now, don't get obsessive here. There is no list of black-and-white rules about modesty. Use prudence and wisdom, and do the best you reasonably can without getting paranoid.</div><div><br /></div><div>6. Being wilfully careless about sin or bad habits in these areas. We should do our due diligence--again, without needing to get obsessive.</div><div><br /></div><div>Now, here are some things that <i>aren't</i> sins (again, of course, this is not an exhaustive list):</div><div><br /></div><div>1. Engaging in sex and seeking sexual gratification and fulfillment in its proper context (a legitimate, valid marriage between a man and a woman), with moderation and balance, without objectification, with love and care between the spouses, with consent of both parties, etc., with proper caution.</div><div><br /></div><div>2. Proper enjoyment of the beauty of the human body, and the beauty of human relationships, romance, sexuality, etc., both within and sometimes even outside of marriage to a degree (going along with our discussion of these subjects earlier in this article)--without engaging in sex or seeking sexual fulfillment outside of marriage, without objectification, with consent, etc. with proper caution. This is an area where people often go to unhealthy extremes in both directions, I think. Sometimes people are too careless here. Other times people are too paranoid. I talked about this quite a bit earlier in this article. It is not a sin necessarily to enjoy, to a degree, the beauty of the physical characteristics of another person, even outside of marriage. It is not necessarily a sin to enjoy the human body portrayed in art. It is not necessarily a sin to enjoy artistic portrayals of human relationships, including even romantic relationships, to a degree (think romantic comedies, etc.). It is not even necessarily a sin to gain some enjoyment vicariously from other people's relationships (think of friends enjoying watching other friends "fall in love," get married, etc.). To what degree, and in what form, such enjoyment can be legitimate, is going to be a matter of prudence and won't necessarily be the same for every person. There is a clear, objective line, however, at the point at which this kind of enjoyment turns into an attempt at sexual gratification or fulfillment (or, of course, actually engaging in sexual acts). There is a difficult balance here. On the one hand, we should recognize that all enjoyment related to male-female relationality and sexuality has a natural tendency towards evolving into sexual gratification and fulfillment and actual sexual acts. There is a real slippery slope here we must be aware of and consciously guard against. On the other hand, we should not equate all enjoyment rooted in male-female relationality, or the beauty of the human body or human relationships or sexuality, outside of marriage with an attempt to gain sexual gratification or fulfillment. For example, there is a point at which the enjoyment of the beauty of the opposite sex turns into an attempt to gain sexual gratification through such enjoyment, and yet it is also true that not all enjoyment of such beauty is, <i>per se</i>, such an attempt. Enjoyment of beauty in this area, though intrinsically related to the desire for sexual fulfillment, is yet broader than an attempt at such fulfillment. If this wasn't the case, we would have to equate, for example, someone seeking to gratify sexual desire by means of pornography with a person enjoying a romantic comedy--which seems absurd, and I think it is in fact absurd. So, again, caution is called for here, but not paranoia.</div><div><br /></div><div>3. Having and enjoying friendships with members of the opposite sex, with proper balance and caution. I would also include here, particularly for those with homosexual tendencies and inclinations, the enjoyment of relationships with members of the same sex. While homosexual sexual acts are invalid, along with attempts at homosexual marriage, or seeking sexual fulfillment in a homosexual relationship, yet there can be friendships and relationships between members of the same sex which can involve elements of love, enjoyment of beauty, etc., short of sexual acts or sexual gratification (just as there can be between members of the opposite sex). For a biblical example, think of the relationship between David and Jonathan portrayed in the Book of 1 Samuel. I don't think this kind of thing is much on the radar in modern American culture, but it has been recognized at various times and places in human cultures. (This is probably one reason why people today are always trying to turn David's and Jonathan's relationship in the Bible into a homosexual relationship. They recognize elements in that relationship which seem to go beyond the sort of male-male friendship common in our culture, and they don't have any category in which to put such a thing except the category of homosexual sexual relationships. Perhaps we need a greater dose of imagination here.)</div><div><br /></div><div>4. Desires, thoughts, images in the mind, dreams, acts in dreams, etc., which do not involve the consent of the will. Again, without the consent of the will, there might be harmful or undesirable thoughts, tendencies, acts, etc., but there is no sin (in the strict sense of a personal sinful act engaging personal culpability). In some cases, it might be sinful to consent to or willingly cultivate certain thoughts or images in the mind, certain acts, etc., and we can sometimes be guilty of wilful negligence in terms of trying to avoid sin and harm, but the mere existence of such things without the consent of the will is not sin. Dreams are an interesting example here. In some cases, a person might be so conscious in a dream that they really do have consent of the will. But this is not true for everyone. I don't know how common it is. In my own personal experience, I never find myself with that level of consciousness. My dreams go on without ever bothering to ask my will if it consents. My mind just plays out random scenarios on automatic, without my having any say in the matter. Of course, one can learn to cultivate habits which can help to some degree to control one's automatic tendencies, but I'm sure no one can ever gain complete control over such things in this life. In general, again, remember to distuinguish between acts of the will and other acts, and that personal moral guilt can only exist in connection to acts of the will.</div><div><br /></div><div>Well, much more could be said, but that's enough for now.</div><div><br /></div><div>For more in general, see the <i>Catechism of the Catholic Church</i>, particularly <a href="http://www.scborromeo.org/ccc/p3s2c2a6.htm">here</a> and <a href="http://www.scborromeo.org/ccc/p2s2c3a7.htm">here</a>. Also see my fictional dialogue on sexuality and gender <a href="https://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2019/06/dialogue-on-sexuality-and-gender.html">here</a>.</div><div><br /></div><div><i>Published on the feast of the First Martyrs of the Holy Roman Church.</i></div>Mark Hausamhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07371790103414979060noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-808697756426649418.post-43723181001396064092022-04-22T16:00:00.006-05:002024-01-23T09:41:12.888-06:00Some Musings on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity<p>Below are some musings regarding sexual and gender identity and how we tend to think about these issues these days. I'm not really interested here in trying to provide a complete philosophical or scientific case for my ideas, though I think what I'm saying is philosophically sound and consistent with what we really know from science. I just want to plant some thoughts and suggestions that might provide an impetus for thinking through some of these things more deeply.</p><p>Until recently, the mainstream "liberal" or "progressive" party line on homosexuality was to portray it as a kind of inevitable genetic/biological binary. There are two sorts of people one can be born as - "gay" or "straight." One is pretty much either one or the other, for the most part. And if you are born one of these, that's what you are. It's determined by your biology and not at all a product of cultural influence, and it is unchangeable and clear. Once one figures out which one is, one will be determined by this identity and unable to escape from it. I'm oversimplifying a little bit, but not much. This is, by and large, pretty much how most liberal or progressive people tended to think about it. Many promoters of the ethicality of homosexual acts have tried to bolster their case by arguing that people don't choose to be "gay" or "straight." They are just "born that way," and what can anybody do about it? It's just who they are.</p><p>My own take on this view is that it is unrealistic and too simplistic. I'm sure that there are biological and genetic factors that influence sexual orientation, but I think that a much larger role is probably played by cultural factors than people have wanted to admit. To think about this, it helps if one has a good degree of self-awareness about one's own sexual psychology and potentialities and is aware of how human psychology in general works in this area. Sexuality in human psychology is very flexible and can naturally be drawn in lots of different directions. I think that a large number of people are quite capable of being drawn to lots of different kinds of sexual practices and expressions--including sexual experiences with both males and females. A lot of this, I think, depends on the cultural and moral expectations and values one has imbibed, as well as one's personality and how inclined it is to stick within cultural norms. Within Western history, until recently, anything other than monogamous heterosexual sex has been considered morally abhorrent and even repulsive, and this has no doubt influenced a lot of people over the centuries. Most people would have felt a strong sense of inappropriateness, guilt, and even revulsion if they found themselves contemplating sexual acts with a member of their own sex. They would have tended to close off such pathways in their minds and viewed themselves as in accord with the heterosexual norm. In recent times, this has changed, as homosexuality has been mainstreamed to a great degree, as well as other sexual practices frowned upon in previous generations. Young people today do not carry the same cultural antipathy to such things, and they are even encouraged by the culture to explore these areas of their psychology, to look inside themselves and ask questions like, "Am I attracted to men, or to women, or to both?", etc. They are encouraged also more and more to experiment in various ways with these kinds of things. They are therefore finding that they are capable of finding pleasure and attraction within same-sex sexual relationships or experiences or in other forms of what historically would have been considered "sexually deviant behavior." But I don't think that these modern people are, for the most part, all that different in their psychological sexual potentialities than people in the past. I think that a great many people through history have had similar sexual potentialities. The difference is that, because of changing cultural views and norms, modern people feel more comfortable allowing themselves to explore these potentialities, and so they have been able to find and admit these things in themselves in a way most people in the past would have found unthinkable. Again, I don't deny that there are probably significant biological/genetic factors involved in same-sex attraction. I'm sure that some people are more naturally drawn to and satisfied with same-sex sexual acts and relationships than others. But I think that this potentiality is more widespread than those who explicitly identify as gay or lesbian or who practice homosexual acts. It is probably a matter of degree rather than "you have it or you don't."</p><p>In recent times, up until just the past few years, the "liberal" party line was to look at sexual orientation as a deterministic biological binary for the most part, and this, I think, influenced how people identified themselves. Most people felt that they must be either "gay" or "straight," and they eventually locked themselves into one identity or the other. I'm sure some of the reasons for why some identified one way and some another had to do with biological/genetic tendencies, but I'm pretty sure a lot of it had to do with quirks of individual personality and cultural development as well. That is, I think it highly likely that a lot of people have had the capability of finidng pleasure and attraction in same-sex acts and relationships, to varying degrees, but different people have developed these potentialities differently based on a whole host of personal and cultural influences, with some of them ending up identifying as "gay" while others identified as "straight." Over the past few years, however, the lines of the gay-straight binary have been blurred, and people have more and more started to think of sexual orientation as manifesting itself in a wider variety of ways, often along a kind of spectrum. I think this is why we've seen a growth in people identifying as "bisexual," "pansexual," etc. I think that a lot of these people would have identified simply as "gay" or "straight" if they had come of age a few years earlier when the "progressive" viewpoint was different. But now they are encouraged to explore their sexual potentialities more widely, and so they are discovering that they are capable of sexual excitement and attraction in a whole lot more ways than they probably previously would have realized. The cultural norms have changed so as to allow and encourage them to explore their psychology and to experiment in more directions. (I'm not saying that there weren't recognized "bisexuals," etc., in the past, but it was less frequent. There was more of a binary and less of a spectrum kind of view, and sexual orientation was viewed more rigidly and less fluidly.) People are typically highly influenced by prevailing cultural trends and ideas, and this cultural "zeitgeist" can influence and even determine to a great degree what people are able and willing to find in themselves and how they interpret their characteristics and experiences.</p><p>I think a lot of these same kinds of observations are also relevant with regard to the modern "trans" movement. Males and females (using these terms in the classic way as referring to biological and anatomical characteristics oriented towards playing certain roles in reproduction) have a lot of diversity within their ranks. The spectrum of attitudes, interests, behaviors, ways of thinking, etc., within the broad categories of "male" and "female" is a vast one. In the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, the feminist movement worked hard to break down stereotypes regarding alleged general differences between males and females. They attacked ideas such as that women are fit only for certain social roles, or that they are more emotional than men, or that their minds work in fundamentally different ways, or that they must have certain interests (like women being attracted to makeup, dresses, dolls, etc., while men are supposed to be attracted to cars and trucks, beer, sports, etc.). In this regard, I often think of a line from the 1989 made-for-TV movie, <i>A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur's Court</i>, in which Keisha Knight-Pulliam played the main character, Sir Boss, who had come to medieval Camelot from the future (1980s) United States. At one point, when Queen Guenivere is trying to give King Arthur governing advice, Arthur says to her, "These are things for a man's mind." Guenevere replies, "But Sir Boss says there is no difference between a man's and a woman's mind." From the perspective of 1980s liberalism, this was a very progressive thing to say. Guenevere was challenging Arthur's quaint, sexist medieval view (as the show-writers obviously saw it) by means of wisdom coming from the more-enlightened future. Today, however, with the rise of the trans movement, Guenevere's statement seems almost as antiquated and offensive as the medieval view she was challenging. The party line has changed, becoming, in some ways, almost the reverse of what it was before. Trans ideology has to insist that there are meaningful differences between men and women other than the traditional biological, anatomical, and reproductive differences, for otherwise trans ideology is dead. A lot of trans ideologists frequently appeal to differences in the mind to justify the currently-popular attempt to divorce "gender" from "biological sex." They also, ironically, often try to bring back stereotypes that earlier feminists worked hard to root out. If a young boy is found wanting to play with dolls, or to do other "girly" sorts of things, or to associate with girls, or if a young girl is found wanting to play with cars or trucks, be "tom-boyish," etc., the progressives today often want to use these as grounds for suspecting that the young boy might actually, in reality, be a young girl (in identity and in the mind, even if not in biology or anatomy).</p><p>There has been a significant increase in young people identifying as "trans" or as "gender-fluid" or "non-binary" when it comes to gender identification. As with homosexuality, the current party line is that these people have found in themselves--or have had found in them by others--a kind of clear, absolute, unchangeable trans identity which they have to acknowledge as objective reality and which will determine their destiny. Modern progressives take this so seriously that <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Irreversible-Damage-Transgender-Seducing-Daughters-ebook/dp/B07YL6XK55">they are often pushing for dramatic and permanant surigical and hormonal treatments</a> even for young children in order to try to allow them as much as possible, and as soon as possible, to "turn into" the gender they have decided to identify with. What is the cause of this trend towards more and more young people identifying as trans? Is it because being trans is a clear, objective state of being and there are more objectively trans people these days? Is it that there have always been this large a number of trans people but in the past (due to the unenlightened state of the culture) they have not been able as easily to identify themselves? I suspect, rather, that what we have here is similar to what I described above with regard to homosexuality. While I'm sure there are, at least sometimes, biological/genetic factors that cause people to find themselves prone to identifying with the opposite gender, I think it highly likely that cultural influences are playing a large role as well. In the 80s, or 90s, or 2000s, a young person who found themselves drawn to actions or interests associated with the opposite gender would simply have been viewed, and would have viewed themselves, as an example of the large amount of diversity that exists within the boundaries of being male or female. Feminist ideologists would have made (and in fact did make) use of such persons and such experiences as arguments against stereotypical gender norms. That's how the cultural ideology of the day would have led them to perceive and interpret these kinds of characteristics and experiences. Today, however, the cultural "zeitgeist" has changed. Now, among the most "progressive" segment of society, these same sorts of experiences tend to be taken as indicating that the young people who have them actually belong to the gender opposite the one historically associated with their biological sex. If Johnny likes to play with dolls, or acts in more "girlish" kinds of ways, etc., instead of seeing this as an evidence of the diversity inherent in "maleness," the tendency now is to see it as evidence that Johnny, in the deepest sense, is not really male at all. Objectively speaking, "Johnny" is the same now as he would have been if he had been born in the 1980s. What has changed is the prevailing cultural ideology, which has caused Johnny's chraracteristics and experiences to be seen and interpreted in light of a different set of expectations and norms.</p><p>One really interesting dynamic all of this has caused is the conflict we are seeing now between trans ideologists and people still holding to the older gay or feminist ideologies. We are seeing splits within the "liberal" or "progressive" ranks. Some gay activists are opposing trans ideology partly on the grounds that it is seen as threatening gay identity. <a href="https://andrewsullivan.substack.com/p/who-is-looking-out-for-gay-kids-a19?s=r">This article</a> by gay activist Andrew Sullivan, for example, argues that trans ideology is dangerous to gay kids because it encourages them and their caregivers, with regard to signs that previously might have been taken as indicating that a child is gay or lesbian, to instead read those same signs as indicating that the child might be trans. If my analysis above is correct, this of course makes perfect sense. Is a young person attracted to members of the same biological sex? In the past, that probably meant they were gay or lesbian. It showed the breadth of sexual orentation possible within the categories of "male" and "female." Now, however, such attraction is increasingly taken to indicate that the young person actually belongs to the opposite gender, regardless of their biological sex. After all, girls like boys and boys like girls, right? So if I like girls, I'm probably a boy, and vice versa. Instead of seeing homosexual attractions as indicators of just how broad and unstereotypical males and females can be, now the trend is to <i>assume</i> those previous stereotypes and use them to argue that the young person may be or even is likely to be the opposite gender. (Of course, if one wanted to irritate pretty much everyone, one might suggest, as I have done above, that <i>both</i> the homosexual <i>and</i> the trans intepretation of same-sex attraction is an attempt to force something more fluid into artifically rigid categories. Perhaps what we really have are simply a bunch of human beings with the potential to experience a great deal of sexual diversity depending on beliefs, values, cultural influences, personal background and experiences, genetic/biological traits, etc. A spectrum, rather than a strict "gay-straight" binary. And a greater diversity within the categories of "male" and "female" rather than rigid, more simplistic definitions of "male" and "female" requiring us to assign a person to the other gender if they don't fit into such stereotypes.)</p><p>We are also seeing more traditional feminist ideologists reacting against the trans movement for similar reasons. (Think of J. K. Rowling's recent run-ins with the guardians of ultra-progressive orthodoxy.) Trans activists are trying to restore gender stereotypes that feminists worked for decades to break down. Those stereotypes were an obstacle to feminist ideology, which wanted to recognize variety inherent in males and females in order to break down differences between the sexes, but those same stereotypes are beneficial to trans idelogy, which wants to find ways to define "male" and "female" that are not dependent on biological sex.</p><p>One important implication of these musings is that thinking along these lines can challenge both homosexual and trans ideologists in terms of their tendency to see homosexual or trans identities as clear, objective, absolute, and unquestionable or unchangeable. If sexual potentialities and proclivities are not necessarily the result of rigid, clear, objective forms within particular people but can be manifestations of the elasticity of human sexual psychology and potentiality, influenced by both biological and various cultural factors, then people who find in themselves these sorts of attractions, tendencies, characteristics, etc., need not be forced by these observations to choose some clear and rigid identity--like "gay" or "trans"--and to feel a need to commit themselves irrevocably and firmly to it. They might find that they have the sexual elasticity to allow a greater role for their own choice in terms of what sort of sexual or gender orientation they will conform to, practice, experience, and enjoy in their lives. They might not need to cut themselves off from the possibility of enjoying more ordinary, classical, heterosexual relationships, or of identifying with the gender historically associated with their biological sex. They need not regard their sexual proclivities as necessarily inevitable or unchangeable or uninfluenceable. Of course, this will be different from person to person. I'm not saying everyone will or must take the same route. There will probably be some people who, because of biological/genetic traits, cultural influences, or a combination of factors, may never be able to be attracted to or succeed in a classical heterosexual relationship, or be entirely comfortable with their own native gender. What I'm doing is simply challenging the rigid, fatalistic categorizations that pretty much all modern "progressives" seem determined to apply to sexual orientation and gender-identity and to suggest that human psychology and potentialities may be more fluid and flexible than most people these days feel they can allow themselves to believe. (And perhaps, ironically, the recent push to widen the spectrum in these areas--as manifested by increasing emphasis on categories like "pan-sexual" and "gender-fluid"--might end up having the effect of helping to make this same point in the end. If there is more variety, fludity, and flexibility in human sexual psychology than our culture has previously tended to believe, then perhaps people who experience "sexually-deviant" desires or who find themselves at odds with gender stereotypes or expectations may not have to conclude from these things that they cannot live according to the gender associated with their biological sex or allow their beliefs and values to influence the direction in which their sexual orientations and proclivities develop. They need not necessarily be slaves to the rigid identities the culture has tried to force them into.)</p><p>For more, see <a href="https://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2019/06/dialogue-on-sexuality-and-gender.html">here</a>, <a href="https://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2019/03/some-provisional-thoughts-on.html">here</a>, <a href="http://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2022/01/the-unverifiability-of-claims-based-on.html">here</a>, and <a href="http://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2021/06/toxic-aspects-of-woke-culture-1.html">here</a>.</p><p><b>ADDENDUM 11/21/22</b>: I recently came across <a href="https://www.sydney.edu.au/news-opinion/news/2021/08/20/do-you-think-you-re-exclusively-straight-.html">an article from the University of Sydney</a> which indicates that research is starting to come out on sexual orientation as something more fluid and versatile, and sexual flexibility more common, than people have recently been inclined to think. This is exactly what I'm talking about in this article. I predict we will see more and more of this sort of research being released. I think we could have seen such research earlier, but it's only more recently that people in mainstream culture have been willing to consider that the old, strict, gay-straight binary is not as strict and rigid as has been assumed in recent decades. We often cause ourselves to only be able to see what we think we should see, especially when it comes to highly-charged social issues like homosexuality. But now the culture's growing interest in "pansexuality" and seeing more fluidity and diversity in sexual expression, and the growing sense among people that it is good and healthy (and perhaps a source of social acceptance and popularity?) to find evidence of "sexual deviance" within oneself, is creating a platform where the culture is more and more allowing itself to see human sexual proclivities more realistically. I think we are going to come more and more to realize and admit that what has locked people into rigid "straight" or "gay" categories has not been so much biological necessity but rather social structures that lock people into certain modes in terms of what they feel themselves allowed to find in themselves.</p>Mark Hausamhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07371790103414979060noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-808697756426649418.post-77362339109930406052022-02-17T14:34:00.001-06:002022-02-17T14:53:54.255-06:00The Relationship between Pantheism and Theism<p><i>I wrote the following paper back in 2008 as an attempt to explore with greater metaphysical precision the relationship between theism and "pantheism." A careful, metaphysical look at the nature of God in classical theism raises the issue of how classical theism relates to pantheism and to religions that have often been labeled “pantheistic,” such as eastern religions like Hinduism, Buddhism, and Taoism. The paper was written with a philosophical audience in mind.</i></p><p dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.2; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"> The relationship between pantheism and theism is of immense importance philosophically and religiously, and the two are often compared and contrasted with each other. However, in my experience, these comparisons and contrasts typically tend to leave the definitions and analyses on a metaphysically superficial and imprecise level. I would like to attempt to help remedy this situation by providing a metaphysically deeper analysis of the similarities and differences between theism and pantheism. I will then show how this deeper analysis helps to elucidate the nature of theism in such a way as to help theists respond to certain philosophical objections to theism that have frequently been proposed by pantheist and atheist thinkers and to articulate a better critique of the pantheistic worldview.</p><p dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.2; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"><br /></p><p dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.2; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt; text-align: center;"><b>Where Pantheism and Theism Agree</b></p><p dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.2; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"><br /> The form of theism I will be discussing is classical theism, which is the form that has been articulated and defended (with more or less consistency) by all the major branches of historic Christianity--Roman Catholic, Eastern Orthodox, and most Protestant traditions. This is the form of theism that has given rise to the classical arguments for the existence of God (such as the cosmological and ontological arguments).<br /><br /> The word “pantheism” has been applied to more than simply one monolithic philosophical perspective. For the purposes of this paper, “pantheism” can be defined as “the belief that all reality is one metaphysically simple unified being and that all distinctions between particulars are ultimately illusory.” This definition accords well with central strands of prominent Eastern religions, such as Hinduism and Buddhism, which are usually considered to be “pantheistic.” “Theism,” on the other hand, as I am using it in this paper, can be defined as “the belief that there is one metaphysically simple unified being (God) who is the source and ground of all created reality but that the created particulars are not identical with but are truly distinct from the simple divine being.” So the question is, “Where do these two philosophical/religious perspectives agree, and where do they disagree?” My contention is that classical theism, when examined with metaphysical strictness and developed to its full logical conclusion, will be found to agree with the first half of the definition of pantheism but to disagree with the second half. Thus, classical theism agrees that “all reality is one metaphysically simple unified being” but disagrees with the claim that “all distinctions between particulars are ultimately illusory.”<br /><br /> I suspect that the way I have gone about delineating the line of agreement/disagreement between theism and pantheism will seem very strange to many theists, many of whom might wonder how I can say that theism agrees that “all reality is one metaphysically simple unified being.” But the fact of the matter is that classical theism requires such a view in light of its assumptions, beliefs, and arguments. Classical theism has always taught that God is an absolutely unified, simple being who is the foundation and source and explanation for all of reality and who is outside of all space and time, not subject to change, not affected by anything ultimately distinct from him or independent from him. One of the most comprehensive statements on the nature of God in classical theism (from a Christian perspective) can be found in John the Damascene’s book,<i> An Exposition of the Orthodox Faith</i>, written in the eighth century AD:<br /><br /></p><blockquote style="border: none; margin: 0px 0px 0px 40px; padding: 0px;"><p style="line-height: 1.2; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt; text-align: left;">We believe, then, in One God, one beginning, having no beginning, uncreate, unbegotten, imperishable and immortal, everlasting, infinite, uncircumscribed, boundless, of infinite power, simple, uncompound, incorporeal, without flux, passionless, unchangeable, unalterable, unseen, the fountain of goodness and justice, the light of the mind, inaccessible; a power known by no measure, measurable only by His own will alone (for all things that He wills He can ), creator of all created things, seen or unseen, of all the maintainer and preserver, for all the provider, master and lord and king over all, with an endless and immortal kingdom: having no contrary, filling all, by nothing encompassed, but rather Himself the encompasser and maintainer and original possessor of the universe, occupying all essences intact and extending beyond all things, and being separate from all essence as being super-essential and above all things and absolute God, absolute goodness, and absolute fulness : determining all sovereignties and ranks, being placed above all sovereignty and rank, above essence and life and word and thought: being Himself very light and goodness and life and essence, inasmuch as He does not derive His being from another, that is to say, of those things that exist: but being Himself the fountain of being to all that is, of life to the living, of reason to those that have reason; to all the cause of all good: perceiving all things even before they have become: one essence, one divinity, one power, one will, one energy, one beginning, one authority, one dominion, one sovereignty, made known in three perfect subsistences and adored with one adoration, believed in and ministered to by all rational creation , united without confusion and divided without separation (which indeed transcends thought). (1)</p></blockquote><p dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.2; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"><br /> The logic of the classical theistic view of the universe and the nature of God implies that all things exist in God, by participation in the being of God. This has frequently been recognized by classical theologians. Once again, John of Damascus makes this quite explicitly clear:<br /><br /></p><blockquote style="border: none; margin: 0px 0px 0px 40px; padding: 0px;"><p style="line-height: 1.2; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt; text-align: left;">That which is comprehended in place or time or apprehension is circumscribed: while that which is contained by none of these is uncircumscribed. Wherefore the Deity alone is uncircumscribed, being without beginning and without end, and containing all things, and in no wise apprehended. (2)</p></blockquote><p dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.2; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"><br />Thomas Aquinas provides us with another example of this way of thinking:<br /><br /></p><blockquote style="border: none; margin: 0px 0px 0px 40px; padding: 0px;"><p style="line-height: 1.2; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt; text-align: left;">It must be said that every being in any way existing is from God. For whatever is found in anything by participation, must be caused in it by that to which it belongs essentially, as iron becomes ignited by fire. Now it has been shown above (Question 3, Article 4) when treating of the divine simplicity that God is the essentially self-subsisting Being; and also it was shown (11, 3,4) that subsisting being must be one; as, if whiteness were self-subsisting, it would be one, since whiteness is multiplied by its recipients. Therefore all beings apart from God are not their own being, but are beings by participation. Therefore it must be that all things which are diversified by the diverse participation of being, so as to be more or less perfect, are caused by one First Being, Who possesses being most perfectly. (3)</p></blockquote><p dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.2; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"><br />Since in classical theism there is only one God, who is the fullness and source of all of reality and who explains all of reality, there can never be any more being added to reality than there is to begin with. To suggest that created beings, by being created, add more being to reality than there was before is to make God a finite being, circumscribed by a greater common reality that contains both him and the created beings. If the “stuff” we are made of is truly separate from God and in addition to his substance, then it cannot ultimately be explained as having come from God and been created by him. God can only give what he has; he cannot give what he has not. The concept of creation ex nihilo is not the idea that new being can come from absolutely nothing, which is logically absurd. To describe creation as God increasing the overall “substance content” of reality is to make it an irrational, magical concept. It is a principle of logic that one cannot get more than one has to begin with without adding something in from outside, but when we are talking about God and ultimate reality, there is no outside, nothing to add from. Rather, creation ex nihilo is the idea that created beings are not made from a preexisting substance, which would make them to some degree independent from God, but are entirely derived from God, so that they are entirely and utterly dependent on God for the beginning and the continuation of their being.<br /><br /> If we were to think of created beings as adding to the substance of the universe and actually existing “outside” of God, rather than existing in him and by means of a participation in his being, then we would be turning God into one particular among other particulars in a greater common reality. One of the most compelling arguments for God is the need for a common, unifying reality to explain the diversity of the universe. To put it another way, what is it that puts the “uni” in “universe”? Theists have often argued that the existence of a universe implies that there must be a simple, uncompounded being who is the source of all reality. If there were no common source or ground for the particulars in the universe, they would be utterly independent of each other and could share no common reality at all, which would be impossible and logically meaningless. If their common source and ground was a compounded being, a being with parts, that common ground would itself be made up of particulars that would need a common unifying reality to explain them. So we need a simple being as the foundation of all reality. But if created beings are truly, ultimately distinct from God, so that, in metaphysical strictness of language, they exist as an entirely distinct and additional substance (or substances), then God can no longer be the simple, common reality that unifies all things. If created things are not rooted in participation in the being of God, then they are independent entities, and the common reality that includes both God and his creatures would not be an uncompounded, simple reality. This would leave us either with no simple, common reality at all, which would be logically absurd, or we would have to look back further for another simple being that could explain both God and created beings, and that would be the real God.<br /><br /> Also, if we are truly, ultimately, metaphysically separate from God and are additions to the basic substance content of reality, then it seems that we must inevitably bring into our conception of our relationship with God the concept of space. If we are not in God, nor exist by participation in his being, how can we be distinguished from God except by being in a separate location, not taking up the same space? We must inevitably picture God and created beings as existing side by side, both having to move over, so to speak, to make room for the other. But it is absurd to think of God as existing in space, as classical theologians have always recognized, because a spatial object cannot be the common reality that explains all the particulars. A spatial object is inherently a finite being, divisible into parts.<br /><br /> If we are created by God and derive our being from him, as all classical theists believe, then this implies that we must exist “in God,” as in some sense an aspect of his being. If God is a simple entity, then it is impossible to participate in him without somehow being an aspect of his simple being. The only alternative would be to have some spatial picture involving created beings taking some of God’s being and then moving off with it to some alternate location where God is not, as if God could give us pieces of himself, or as if God were like an extended flow of electricity that we could somehow feed on as an appliance feeds on electricity through an electrical outlet, or as if God’s being were like sap flowing through a tree which we as branches could “suck out” and live on. These analogies are not necessarily bad in every respect--indeed, the latter is biblical--but we are interested in developing a metaphysically strict account of things, and we need to be precise. Therefore, we are left with no other conclusion but that classical theism requires that created entities derive their being from God, exist in him and by participation in his being, and thus in a very real sense exist as aspects of God’s being.<br /><br /> While describing created entities as “aspects of God’s being” is very odd-sounding in a theistic context, I want to stress that it does not really add anything to the notion that we exist “in God” and “by participation in God.” As I am going to argue below, saying that we are aspects of God’s being is very different from claiming that we are God, or claiming that God and created beings are identical, or any such thing. This is where the fundamental difference between theism and pantheism comes into the picture. But what I have said so far, though in the interests of being metaphysically precise I have opted to use somewhat daring language to express it, is no more than has always been at least implicit, and sometimes explicit, in classical theistic thought. It is expressed in the very language of the Bible, as well as being implied in everything it says on the nature of God. (4) Speaking of God to the Athenian philosophers on Mars Hill (and quoting, approvingly, their own poets) in Acts 17:27-28, Paul says that God “is not far from each one of us; for in him we live and move and have our being.” In Colossians 1:16-17, Paul says of Christ (as God the Son), “All things were created by him, and for him: And he is before all things, and in him all things consist.” I have already quoted John of Damascus, who could be said to represent Eastern Orthodoxy, and Thomas Aquinas, who could be said to represent Roman Catholicism. Let me add to these quotations a couple from Jonathan Edwards, who, as a prominent Reformed theologian, will suffice (at least for the purposes of this paper) to show the presence of these ideas in historic Protestantism as well. In <i>The Nature of True Virtue</i>, Edwards argues that there can be no true virtue without love to God:<br /><br /></p><blockquote style="border: none; margin: 0px 0px 0px 40px; padding: 0px;"><p style="line-height: 1.2; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt; text-align: left;">Therefore, he that has true virtue, consisting in benevolence to <i>being</i> in gen<span style="font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; vertical-align: baseline;">eral, and in benevolence to <i>virtuous</i> be</span>ing, must necessarily have a supreme love to God, both of benevolence and complacence. And all true virtue must radically and essentially, and, as it were, summarily, consist in this. Because God is not only infinitely greater and more excellent than all other being, but he is the head of the universal system of existence; the foundation and fountain of all being and all beauty; from whom all is perfectly derived, and on whom all is most absolutely and perfectly dependent; <i>of whom</i>, and <i>through whom</i>, and <i>to whom</i> is all being and all perfection; and whose being and beauty are, as it were, the sum and comprehension of all existence and excellence: much more than the sun is the fountain and summary comprehension of all the light and brightness of the day. (5)</p></blockquote><p dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.2; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"><br />Edwards explicitly acknowledges, in the same book, that “God himself is in effect being in general.” (6)<br /><br /></p><div style="text-align: center;"><b>Where Pantheism and Theism Disagree</b></div><p></p><p dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.2; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"> Now, having shown that classical theistic doctrine entails the conclusion that all created entities are aspects of God’s being, rather than something strictly metaphysically separated from him--which is the claim of the first half of the definition of pantheism--I will now show that this fact does not at all imply the second half of the definition, namely, that “all distinctions between particulars are ultimately illusory.” In other words, I am going to argue that the fact that all created beings exist in God and are aspects of his being does not imply at all that human beings are God, that God is human beings, that flowers and rocks are God, that flowers and rocks are human beings, that God is flowers and rocks, etc. There is a true distinction between God and the creation, and there are true distinctions between the various created entities. Furthermore, these distinctions are crucial for understanding the nature of God, the nature of created entities, and the relationships between God and the creation and between created entities and each other.<br /><br /> First of all, we can observe the simple, obvious fact of these distinctions. I can reason to the existence of God, and I can reason from the existence of God to the fact that I must exist in God as an aspect of his being; but it is equally evident to my reason that I am not God. God and I have very different characteristics that distinguish us quite conclusively. For example, God is omnipotent; I am not. God knows all things; I do not. I stubbed my toe a few days ago; God has never stubbed his toe, not having a toe to stub. I am guilty of sin; God is not. I have a body which physically limits me; God does not. And so on.<br /><br /> It is also evident to my reason that I am different from, say, a rock. A rock has no consciousness (at least as far as I can see); I do have consciousness. A rock does not feel pain; I do (as I was reminded of when I stubbed my toe, not God’s toe, the other day). Rocks and I are made up of different substances combined in different ways. And so on. I could go on to show that God is different from rocks, but I suspect this is not necessary.<br /><br /> So reason leads me to believe both that I am an aspect of God’s being and that I am emphatically <i>not </i>God. How can this be? Let’s consider an analogy: Let’s say I were to write a novel. In writing this novel, I invent an entire fictional world. This world is real enough in its own sphere, and my thinking of it gives it some reality, but not a reality external to myself. In creating this fictional world, I invent various characters with different personalities who engage in various activities within the flow of the novel. Let’s look at one of these characters--we can call him Bob. Now, what is the relationship between Bob and myself? Well, Bob is a very dependent being. He is entirely derived from me, from my thinking, and is entirely dependent on me for his initial as well as his continued existence. Bob exists “in me,” in my thoughts. He exists by participation in me and my thoughts. We could say that “in me Bob lives and moves and has his being” and that “in me all things in Bob’s universe consist.” Bob is not metaphysically separate from me. His thoughts and feelings exist as participations in my thoughts and feelings. Bob therefore could accurately be described as an aspect of my being. And yet it would be absurd to equate Bob with myself. Bob and I are very different. Bob is a character; I am the author. Bob is dependent upon me for existence; I am not dependent upon Bob for existence. Bob likes cauliflower; I hate cauliflower. Bob is an accountant; I am a philosopher. And of course I could go on and on. In fact, not only are Bob and I truly distinct, and our distinctions are very important with regard to understanding the two of us, but I can even enter into a relationship with Bob. I could write into my novel a section in which I, the author, speak to Bob and strike up a conversation with him. Bob, upon learning about me, might wonder how we are related. He might reason that he is in some sense an aspect of my being. However, if he concluded from this that therefore he was the author, or that he was not dependent on anyone else but himself for his existence, Bob would be very seriously mistaken.<br /><br /> Classical theists of all stripes have commonly understood God’s purpose for creating the world to have been God’s desire to express and manifest his glorious perfections. Thomas Aquinas had this to say about God’s goal in creating the world:<br /><br /></p><blockquote style="border: none; margin: 0px 0px 0px 40px; padding: 0px;"><p style="line-height: 1.2; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt; text-align: left;">Every agent acts for an end: otherwise one thing would not follow more than another from the action of the agent, unless it were by chance. Now the end of the agent and of the patient considered as such is the same, but in a different way respectively. For the impression which the agent intends to produce, and which the patient intends to receive, are one and the same. Some things, however, are both agent and patient at the same time: these are imperfect agents, and to these it belongs to intend, even while acting, the acquisition of something. But it does not belong to the First Agent, Who is agent only, to act for the acquisition of some end; He intends only to communicate His perfection, which is His goodness; while every creature intends to acquire its own perfection, which is the likeness of the divine perfection and goodness. Therefore the divine goodness is the end of all things. (7)</p></blockquote><p dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.2; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"><br />With this doctrine traditional Eastern Orthodoxy and most historic Protestants would agree. Calvin, for example, called the world a theater for God’s glory. The Westminster Confession, a classic Reformed statement of faith, has this to say about God’s end in creation and providence:<br /><br /></p><blockquote style="border: none; margin: 0px 0px 0px 40px; padding: 0px; text-align: left;"><p style="line-height: 1.2; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">It pleased God the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, for the manifestation of the glory of his eternal power, wisdom, and goodness, in the beginning, to create, or make of nothing, the world, and all things therein whether visible or invisible, in the space of six days; and all very good. (8)</p></blockquote><p style="line-height: 1.2; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt; text-align: left;"><br /></p><blockquote style="border: none; margin: 0px 0px 0px 40px; padding: 0px;"><p style="line-height: 1.2; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt; text-align: left;">God the great Creator of all things doth uphold, direct, dispose, and govern all creatures, actions, and things, from the greatest even to the least, by his most wise and holy providence, according to his infallible foreknowledge, and the free and immutable counsel of his own will, to the praise of the glory of his wisdom, power, justice, goodness, and mercy. (9)</p></blockquote><p style="line-height: 1.2; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt; text-align: left;"><br />This doctrine leads us to a very natural understanding as to why the created world, and the created entities in it, exist as aspects of God’s being. The created world is an aspect of God’s knowledge of himself. God delights in the manifestations of his own perfections as he exercises them in his works of creation, providence, and redemption. In the Westminster Confession’s language, “the glory of [God’s] wisdom, power, justice, goodness, and mercy” are displayed in the creation and history of the created universe. Part of God’s display of his glory to himself and his delight in that glory takes the form of God’s authoring a world, a world dependent on him and existing by participation in him, and yet not identified with him. In this world, he displays his attributes. He displays his power in creating, upholding and sustaining this world. He displays his wisdom in its vast and incomprehensible coherence. He displays his justice as a response to the evil rebellions of his creations. He displays his wisdom in his using their evil for his own good purposes. He displays his mercy in the salvation of his chosen people. He displays his power, wisdom, and goodness, by contrasting it with man’s weakness, foolishness, and wickedness, and by causing his creatures to go to him and to him alone as the ultimate supplier of power, wisdom, and goodness. Those who cut themselves off from the all-sufficient source of life die. Those who, by his grace, come to him live through him and through him alone. So we can see that it is crucial to understanding the very purpose for our existence that we understand both our participation in God and also our distinction from him. In fact, these two are inseparable and merge together to describe our true character as creatures--beings who are utterly dependent on God. The concept of “dependence” includes both the idea of our participation in God and of our distinction from God.<br /><br /> One possible misconception needs to be addressed before we move on. If we are aspects of God’s being in some sense, does that make us “part” of God, and therefore in some sense partly divine? No, it does not. We have already seen that created beings are not God. Nor is it possible that they should be “part” of God in the sense that they could be 10% of God, 1%, .0001%, or any other percentage. The God of classical theism is a simple, uncompounded being; he has no “parts” or “pieces.” He is inherently indivisible. Therefore it makes no sense to speak of anything as constituting a certain percentage of him. If I were to say that I am, say, .0000000001% of God, that would imply that if one keeps on adding more and more beings like me to the equation, enough of us would eventually add up to 100% God. But this is absurd. God is not the sum of all the particulars in the universe. No amount of addition of particular entities can even begin to add up to a simple, infinite being. God is the undivided being who is the foundation of the being of the particulars, but he is not the particulars themselves. The particulars exist in him and by participation in him, but he must be considered distinct from them all, even as a group. Therefore, not only are we not God, but we are not even partly divine. In God we live and move and have our being, but that being that we have must be considered to be nothing in comparison to the being of God (much as Bob in my novel, while adding up to something in his own sphere--the world of the novel--yet is nothing in comparison to me, and you can never even begin to add up to me simply by adding more and more Bobs). One could continue to add more and more Mark Hausams together forever and one would never come any closer to adding up to God than with only one of me or none of me. This makes sense in the context of God’s goal of displaying his glory in the creation. God displays his all-sufficiency by virtue of the entire dependence of the created beings on him, which involves the understanding that the created beings are in themselves nothing and therefore must look outside of themselves to God for all their needs. The role we play in God’s display of his glory, which is an aspect of his knowledge of himself and love of himself, is that of those whose lack contrasts with God’s fullness--we are the backdrop, so to speak, for God’s fullness--and also those whose inherent nothingness is filled up by God’s inherent fullness by his grace alone, and therefore to his glory alone. We provide the emptiness which allows God’s all-sufficient fullness to be seen in all its glory and power. Therefore, although our being is in God, our identity as creatures is characterized by our nothingness in comparison to God’s fullness. (10)</p><p style="line-height: 1.2; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt; text-align: left;"><br /></p><p style="line-height: 1.2; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt; text-align: left;"></p><div><div style="text-align: center;"><b>Analysis of Buddhism from a Metaphysically-Sophisticated Classical Theistic Point of View</b></div><br /> Having now established that classical theism agrees with the first half but disagrees with the second half of the definition of pantheism, and having shown to some degree the importance of this for understanding our identity in relationship to God, I now want to show how a proper and precise understanding of theistic metaphysics in this area helps theists to launch a successful criticism of the pantheistic worldview, and also to respond to some common philosophical objections to theism coming from both pantheists and atheists.</div><br /> Most theistic arguments against pantheism are on the right track, I believe, but having a more precise understanding of theistic metaphysics and how they relate to pantheistic metaphysics can significantly boost the theist’s articulation of his case. As we have seen, pantheists are in a way half right. Significant portions of their belief system are quite true and accurate. When theists can recognize where pantheism goes right, they can use this as a platform for making a convincing argument as to where pantheism goes wrong. Let me give a concrete example of this. In Buddhism, there is a strong emphasis on “getting away from one’s self.” The big problem human beings have, according to Buddhism, is that we don’t recognize the reality of the Undying, Unborn, Unchanging behind the flux and flow of our spatio-temporal universe, and so we come to identify ourselves with ourselves alone and to become attached to our selves and to the objects of the self’s desires. But the reality is that the self is ultimately only an illusion, and so are all the particular objects we become attached to, and therefore they cannot satisfy--this is the cause of human suffering. The reality behind the illusion is the Unchanging Infinite. What we need to do is to come to see things in the right way and to learn to think and live accordingly. We need to see that the Unborn, Undying is the reality and attach ourselves to that, recognizing ourselves and the particulars as illusions and giving up our attachments to these. If we can identify not just with ourselves but with Infinite Being, we can find that which is truly real, permanent and satisfying, and therefore find true happiness. Theists ought to recognize a lot of truth in this--that God is the ultimate reality, and that we should look outside of ourselves to him for our happiness. We should learn to get beyond ourselves and our petty desires and try to adopt an “eternal perspective.” However, in calling the self and the spatio-temporal universe an “illusion,” and in talking about “identifying oneself with the Infinite,” Buddhism lets in some fundamental ambiguity that clouds Buddhists’ understanding of the truths that they have in their system. Although there is some truth in calling this world an illusion, in the sense that it is nothing compared to God and does not represent the ultimate level of reality (or anything remotely close to it), yet it is a misleading term. The world is not unreal--it may not be ultimate reality, but it is real in its own right. And we are real as well, although we are infinitesimal when compared to God. I do indeed need to learn to “identify with God” in the sense of seeing things from his eternal, objective perspective, but I must never forget that I am not myself God. Buddhism (and other Eastern religions) tend to get confused here, thinking that since I am not ultimate reality while the Infinite Being is, and since I am an illusion, therefore I should think of myself <i>as</i> the Inf<span style="font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; vertical-align: baseline;">inite Being. But this contradicts the good start these religions have when they begin with telling us to move beyond ourselves. If I am really nothing and must move beyond myself towards God, this realization and goal are contradicted by subsequently telling me that in fact I<i> am</i> God and I must look wi</span>thin. Here is an example of how the murkiness of Buddhism in this area leads to some erroneous conclusions, from an introductory book on Buddhism written by a Zen Buddhist monk and teacher, Rev. Daizui MacPhillamy:<br /><br /><p></p><blockquote style="border: none; margin: 0px 0px 0px 40px; padding: 0px; text-align: left;"><p style="line-height: 1.2; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt; text-align: left;"> The principle of there being no soul is actually so fundamental to Buddhism that it is given a name (‘anatta’), and placed on the same level of importance as the principle of universal change (‘anicca’). It is regarded, in other words, as a basic property of how the universe works. Although the first thing that we tend to think of when confronted with the concept of there being no soul is its implications for death and the afterlife, it actually has consequences that are more far-reaching than that.</p></blockquote><p style="line-height: 1.2; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt; text-align: left;"><br /></p><blockquote style="border: none; margin: 0px 0px 0px 40px; padding: 0px;"><p style="line-height: 1.2; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt; text-align: left;"> One of these consequences has to do with just how much ‘at one’ we really are with the flow. A soul, being inherently a separate sort of a thing, would actually place a limit upon that oneness. No soul and no self, no limit. If neither self nor soul is ultimately real, then in truth we are, right at this very moment, completely one with the unborn, undying, unformed nature of reality, whether we recognize and experience this or not. Now, various schools of Buddhism do different things with this fact of absolute oneness. Some simply observe that it exists, while others give it a name and a prominent place in their teaching, using words such as, “we are all Buddha”, or “all people have Buddha Nature.” . . .</p></blockquote><p style="line-height: 1.2; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt; text-align: left;"><br /></p><blockquote style="border: none; margin: 0px 0px 0px 40px; padding: 0px;"><p style="line-height: 1.2; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt; text-align: left;"> As a guide to practice, the understanding that we all have Buddha Nature influences practice away from trying to get something (to achieve a goal of nirvana, for instance) and towards removing the obstacles to realizing what we already have. This is an important but subtle shift. So long as one is doing Buddhist practice as a means to a goal, the effort is inevitably tainted with some degree of desire: a very noble desire, but a desire nonetheless. . . . When an individual adopts the view that he or she is already innately Buddha, all of this can be dropped and practice can be done simply for the sake of practice. . . . This gets back to the ‘goal of goallessness’ that was mentioned in the section on right effort.</p></blockquote><p style="line-height: 1.2; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt; text-align: left;"><br /></p><blockquote style="border: none; margin: 0px 0px 0px 40px; padding: 0px;"><p style="line-height: 1.2; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt; text-align: left;"> Another consequence of the principle of no soul is that where there is no soul there can be no sin. Many religions define sin as the deliberate turning of the soul away from God, but if there is no soul, that can’t happen. And if we are inherently one with everything and we are Buddha by nature, what can be turned away from? The absence of a sense of sin is another major difference between Buddhism and most other great religions of the world, and it has many implications. If there is no sin and no soul, there can be no guilt, no judgement, no atonement, no absolution, no damnation, no salvation. There really can’t even be any such thing as evil, in the way it is normally thought of. (11) </p></blockquote><p style="line-height: 1.2; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt; text-align: left;"><br /> We can see a number of problematic conclusions in this selection from Rev. MacPhillamy’s book. First, it does not follow from the fact that there is an ultimate reality that is infinitely greater than the soul, in which the soul lives, and compared to which the soul is nothing, that there is no soul or self at all. Whatever I may be in relation to God, I still exist. Otherwise, there would be no “I” to be involved in this conversation. Rev. MacPhillamy’s erroneous conclusion here, which is common in pantheistic systems, leads him to other false conclusions. He concludes that because the self is an illusion, therefore the real “me” is the Buddha Nature itself (a Buddhist term for the Infinite Reality). Therefore, since I am myself already Buddha, I need really have no goals at all. I already have all that I seek. Of course, despite Rev. MacPhillamy’s attempt to salvage it, this concept makes nonsense out of Buddhist practice, since nothing at all can be done, including Buddhist practice, without some goal in mind. If I truly have all that I seek, why am I still seeking? More importantly, Rev. MacPhillamy’s reasoning leads to the conclusion that there really are no goals whatsoever we should have. If everything is an illusion except the present reality of the Buddha Nature, then as Rev. MacPhillamy himself points out, there is really no such thing as evil. Everything is ultimately as it should be. Calling one’s self and all the spatio-temporal world an illusion undercuts the importance of the reality of this world and the particulars in it. It clouds our recognition of the reality of evil and suffering in this world, and therefore guts our motivation for service in trying to do good. Yes, everything exists by participation in God, but everything is not God. Yes, everything is ultimately under the control of God and a part of his plan, but everything is not in itself pleasing to him, and therefore there are things we should fight against and ideals we should strive after. It is because the biblical worldview recognizes both our participation in God and also our distinction from God that it is able to recognize evil in the world and exhort us to do good.<br /><br /> Related to this issue is Rev. MacPhillamy’s reasoning that since the soul or self is an illusion, therefore there can be no sin. If sin is turning away from God, and I am God, obviously there can be no sin. But the problem here is that <i>I am not God</i>. Yes, I exist “in God,” and am an aspect of his being in some sense, but my identity and characteristics are fundamentally distinct from his. Therefore, there can be real relationship between myself and God (and between myself and other people), and that relationship can go wrong in the sense that I can turn against God and make him my enemy. In fact, Christianity recognizes that this is exactly what has happened, and therefore my salvation does not consist in my realizing that I am God and don’t need to be saved; it consists in my recognizing my sin, looking outside of myself to God for my salvation, and being saved by his grace through the redemption of Christ. If the soul is real, there can be sin; and if there is sin, there is wrath and justice, a need for an atonement and forgiveness, a need for cleansing, a need for reconciliation, etc. By confusing our metaphysical participation in God with the idea that we<i> are</i> God in our identity, Buddhism makes itself unable to recognize and deal with certain fundamental truths about God, about ourselves and our relationship with God, and about the universe in general.<br /><br /> A theist who understands the metaphysical implications of theism can say to a Buddhist, “You are right about a number of things--about the reality of an Infinite realm of Ultimate Reality behind the spatio-temporal world we inhabit, about the fact that we all exist by participation in that Reality, about the fact that I am nothing compared to that Reality and that I must move beyond myself to relate rightly to it. But you then forget all this and identify yourself with the Infinite and turn your focus back into yourself for your happiness. This makes no sense <i>upon your own principles</i>. If I am nothing, how can I be identified with the Infinite? If my basic problem is that I am ultimately attached to myself and not to the Infinite--I worship and serve the creature rather than the Creator, to put it in Christian terms--and my hope is in getting beyond myself, why do you then move away from the solution and compound the problem by telling me I have the Buddha Nature within and therefore causing me to think that the source of my happiness can be found within myself?” The theist can agree with the arguments for a metaphysical unity grounding all things, and yet point out that this fact does not lead to an ignoring of the reality of the distinctions that exist. Thus the theist, by recognizing the truths in the Buddhist pantheistic system, is able, on the very basis of those truths, to expose the errors in Buddhist thinking, errors that not only put Buddhism out of touch with reality but out of touch with many of its own accurate observations as well. The theist therefore has a point of contact from which he/she can offer a critique of Buddhist pantheistic thought from within, in a sense, and therefore better understand and be better understood. (12)</p><p style="line-height: 1.2; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt; text-align: left;"><br /></p><p style="line-height: 1.2; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt; text-align: left;"></p><div><div style="text-align: center;"><b>A Metaphysically-Sophisticated Classical Theism Responds to Objections</b></div><br /> A clearer understanding of the relationship between theism and pantheism can also help to answer certain criticisms and objections against theism raised by pantheists and atheists. Pantheists have often accused theism of being metaphysically naïve. Theism is pictured as belief in some super-entity sitting in the sky somewhere who may be more powerful than human beings but who is still a particular within the spatio-temporal universe, and this deity is thus seen by pantheists as something that needs to be transcended just like every other particular. Since theists never transcend their God or seem aware of the need to do so, they strike many pantheists as being metaphysically naïve, not recognizing the reality of an Infinite behind the particular entities of the universe. Theists fuel this objection when they convey the impression that they perceive God as entirely metaphysically distinct from the creation and fail to acknowledge the metaphysical unity that binds all things together in the being of God (without obliterating the importance of the distinctions). To the extent that theists do not recognize this metaphysical unity, they are indeed metaphysically naïve, and although their naiveté is not warranted by the classical theistic tradition or by biblical revelation, they bring both into disrepute through their associating them with such naiveté. Being more metaphysically precise can help avoid this criticism and reason for rejection of theism among pantheists or those attracted to pantheism.</div><br /> Some philosophers have criticized the doctrine of creation ex nihilo as logically absurd. It seems to violate the principle of the conservation of matter/energy/substance. This is not merely a scientific principle but a logical one as well. If one starts out with a certain amount of something, one cannot increase that amount without adding to the system from without. If this is so, how can God increase the amount of substance in reality? Also, theists say that God is infinite and unbounded. How can an infinite and unbounded being be bounded by the existence of other entities/substances in reality? If God is not all there is, then he is not infinite. Theists say that God fills all things, being omnipresent; and yet if there are other substances, they can only be conceived to exist by imagining that God is not where they are--in other words, God does not fill them and therefore does not fill all things. And where would the additional substance come from, if there were other substances? It couldn’t have come from God, contrary to the idea of creation, since it is in addition to all that God is and has. There is nowhere it can have come from. All of these very rational objections can be answered only by pointing out that, according to a metaphysically sophisticated theism, created entities do not add to the overall substance of reality because they exist in God and are an aspect of his being, without themselves being identified with God. The very real and very important Creator-creature distinction does not require a naïve, disunified metaphysical view of reality.<p></p><p></p> In this paper I have tried to develop a more coherent, precise and thorough understanding of the metaphysics of classical theism in the context of its relation to pantheism. While I have therefore adopted some language that is a little unusual for typical theistic articulation and have made explicit certain metaphysical implications of classical theism that have often been left hazy, I want to stress again the fact that all that I have said is really nothing new; these elements have always been inherent in classical theism. I think that one of the reasons the development of some of these points has been a bit hazy in theistic thought is a fear common among theists of getting too close to pantheism. Theists have always recognized something wrong with pantheism, and have often defined themselves and their views in the context of a strong motivation to make sure they are adequately distanced from pantheism. There has been some fear that developing certain lines of thought tends to lead in pantheistic-sounding directions, and so those lines of thought have been under-emphasized. Another reason for this metaphysical haziness has been simply a lack of awareness on the part of some theistic theologians of the need for more metaphysical precision in these areas. Yet another reason is that there has been a strong movement among many theistic theologians over the past couple of centuries away from classical theism and towards non-classical forms of theism that advocate entirely different metaphysical views of reality. Some of these non-classical theologians have accused classical theism of being pantheistic or at least of tending towards pantheism, and this in turn has helped to fuel the fear of getting too close to pantheism among classical theologians. But this fear is unjustified. In becoming more metaphysically precise in these areas, classical theists can indeed avoid pantheism; and they are able to advocate a more consistent philosophical theistic perspective, understand pantheistic systems better, and better show why theism, and not pantheism (or atheism), is rational and true.<div><br /></div><div>_______________________________________________</div><div><br /></div><div>1 <span style="font-size: 11pt; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"><span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span></span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"> John of Damascus, </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">An Exposition of the Orthodox Faith</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">, Book I, Chapter VIII (http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/33041.htm - accessed on 6/3/08).</span></div><div><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">2 </span><span style="font-size: 12pt; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"> </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">Ibid., Book I, Chapter XIII.</span></div><div><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">3 <span> </span></span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">Thomas Aquinas, </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">Summa Theologica, </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">Question 44, Article 1 (http://www.newadvent.org/summa/1044.htm - accessed on 6/3/08).</span></div><div><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">4 </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; white-space: pre-wrap;"> I am assuming here that the correct interpretation of the Bible is the classical theist interpretation. I am, of course, aware that this is a controversial assumption, but it is beyond my scope to argue for it here.</span></div><div><span style="font-size: 11pt; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-size: 11pt; white-space: pre-wrap;">5 </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"> Jonathan Edwards, from “The Nature of True Virtue,” in </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">The Works of Jonathan Edwards, Volume One, </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">revised and corrected by Edward Hickman (Edinburgh: The Banner of Truth Trust, 1974), 125.</span></div><div><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">6 </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; white-space: pre-wrap;"> Ibid., 141.</span></div><div><span style="font-size: 11pt; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-size: 11pt; white-space: pre-wrap;">7 </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"> Thomas Aquinas, </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">Summa Theologica, </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">Question 44, Article 4 (http://www.newadvent.org/summa/1044.htm - accessed on 6/4/08).</span></div><div><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">8 </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; white-space: pre-wrap;"> Westminster Confession, Chapter 4, Section 1 (http://opc.org/wcf.html - accessed 6/4/08).</span></div><span id="docs-internal-guid-1761404e-7fff-d919-d237-b53cf5c301b7"><br /></span><div><span>9 </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; white-space: pre-wrap;"> Ibid., Chapter 5, Section 1.</span></div><div><span style="font-size: 11pt; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-size: 11pt; white-space: pre-wrap;">10 </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; white-space: pre-wrap;"> Besides the terms “pantheism” and “theism,” the term “panentheism” has been used to describe views that do not want to equate God and the created universe but want to affirm that the created universe exists “in God” in some way. Is the view that I am advocating here a form of panentheism? If we take the word itself, in its bare etymological meaning--”everything in God”--my view could be seen as a form of panentheism. However, this word is usually used in much more specific ways; it is usually associated with non-classical forms of theism such as process theism which are diametrically opposed to my classical metaphysical views. So while the word itself might not be a bad description of what I am advocating, the word in its actual common usage I reject as referring to ideas that are fundamentally different from and fundamentally opposed to my own. My views do not involve a rejection of classical theism but rather a following through of certain logical implications of classical theism.</span></div><span id="docs-internal-guid-968082b5-7fff-4267-1a37-ec5bbf70c52b"><br /></span><div><span>11 </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"> Rev. Dazui MacPhillamy, </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">Buddhism From Within: An Intuitive Introduction to Buddhism</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"> (Mount Shasta, CA: Shasta Abbey Press, 2003), 79-80.</span></div><div><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">12 </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"> I should note that although I have characterized Buddhism as pantheistic, it would be more precise to say that Buddhism and other Eastern “pantheistic” religions, such as Hinduism, often vacillate between pantheism and theism. They are not always consistently pantheistic. The extent to which the Eastern religions really differ from theism and are truly pantheistic is a complicated subject that is very much worthy of more thorough study. I think that this issue should be a focus in dialogues between theists and practitioners of Eastern religions. For an example of this vacillating, see “Zen is a Religion,” by Zen Master Rev. Jiyu-Kennett. It can be found online at </span><a href="https://berkeleybuddhistpriory.org/2020/02/26/zen-is-a-religion/" style="text-decoration-line: none;"><span style="color: navy; font-size: 11pt; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; text-decoration-line: underline; text-decoration-skip-ink: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">https://berkeleybuddhistpriory.org/2020/02/26/zen-is-a-religion/</span></a><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">. The essay is from a collection of oral teachings published as </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">Roar of the Tigress</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"> by Shasta Abbey Press. Here is a sample from the essay: “And do not suffer from the notion that Zen training will make you anything other than a human being. Accepting our own humanity is one of the hardest tests of all-acceptance. There is a great difference, you know, between thinking you </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">are</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"> God and knowing that what is in you is </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">of</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"> God. ‘I am not God, and there is nothing in me that is not of God,’ is the way in which one has to think about it. The reason for Zen practice is to find the Eternal. On finding the Eternal, we call it ‘enlightenment’. To know the Eternal (and you really do know It once you have had this experience) is to know how infinitesimal you are in the scheme of things: to know that you are ‘no-thing’: even a grain of sand is miles too big. When you forsake self in this way, then you </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">are</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"> the universe, and, if you’ve done it right, you might behave like it.”</span></div>Mark Hausamhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07371790103414979060noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-808697756426649418.post-73749073500661769142022-01-11T13:37:00.003-06:002024-01-23T09:42:18.220-06:00The Unverifiability of Claims Based on Personal Experience<p style="text-align: center;"><b>The Unverifiability of Claims Based on Unreplicable Personal Experience</b></p><p>Sometimes arguments are made for particular points of view by means of appeal to personal, unsharable experiences, or "personal testimonies." One example of this I've run across a lot comes from the Latter-day Saint community. "I know that the Book of Mormon is true and I testify to you that it is true." How do you know that? "I prayed about it, and God has testified it to me by the Holy Ghost in my heart." How did that happen? What was that like? How did you know it was the Holy Ghost? "I can't explain it. It was so clear, so real . . . I just <i>knew</i> it was the Holy Ghost!" Well, how do you know it wasn't just your feelings? Perhaps your praying worked on your emotions so that you got a powerful feeling, maybe even had something like a mystical experience of some sort, but it had nothing to do with the truth of the Book of Mormon but was simply a subjective experience. "No, no, I know it wasn't that." How do you know? ". . . I can't explain it. I just <i>know</i>. There is no way for me to communicate my experience to you. You'll just have to have the experience for yourself." (I've had conversations very much like this in the past with Latter-day Saints.)</p><p>This kind of conversation seems to leave things at a bit of an impasse. I have no way of proving directly that the person I'm talking to did not have a personal, revelatory experience of some kind that proved, conclusively, that the Book of Mormon is true. I have no access to that personal experience to prove or disprove it. Nor can my Latter-day Saint friend prove to me the verity of her personal experience. So where can we go from here? Actually, the Latter-day Saint way of thinking provides a way out of the impasse, at least to some degree. I can replicate the experiment, so to speak. I can pray about the Book of Mormon too, and see if I get the same experience. If I don't, my Latter-day Saint friend will often suggest possible reasons for the failure--perhaps I was not sincere enough, or I didn't pray in quite the right way, or something like that. I can then check my procedures, my motives, etc., and if I determine that I was indeed acting with honesty, integrity, and sincerity, that I was praying in the appropriate way, etc., then I can probably conclude from that that my friend's testimony has been falsified. So there is a way forward there.</p><p>It becomes harder when the emphasis is placed on the personal experience and no way is provided by means of which I could replicate it. If, upon reporting to my Latter-day Saint friend that the Holy Ghost did not testify to me of the truth of the Book of Mormon, she continues to insist that, nonetheless, her personal experience was real and proves the Book of Mormon to be true, despite our ignorance as to why I was not able to receive the same testimony, we are again back at an impasse. She can't prove her experience true, and I can't prove it false.</p><p>This impasse is even more at the forefront in other conversations. In recent years, a "personal experience" sort of argument has been made use of quite a bit in the areas of homosexuality and transgenderism. The conversation often goes a bit like this (I'm simplifying to focus in on the point at hand, of course):</p><p></p><blockquote><p>ALBERT: You Christians are wrong to tell gay people they can't live the gay lifestyle.</p><p>RICK: How do you know that?</p><p>ALBERT: Because it is cruel. Gay people are wired to be attracted to members of the same sex. It is hard and cruel to tell them they have to suppress this part of themselves.</p><p>RICK: Well, it all comes down to whether or not Christianity is true, doesn't it? If Christianity really is true, then the all-powerful, all-knowing, all-good Creator of the universe and author of the objective moral law has told us that homosexual acts are unethical and we should not engage in them. He would know, wouldn't he? So if there is good reason to conclude that this worldview is true, then it follows that homosexual acts are unethical, doesn't it?</p><p>ALBERT: But that is cruel! You are telling people they can't be themselves! It is unjust to ask this of anybody!</p><p>RICK: I understand and sympathize. I don't doubt that following the objective moral law in this area is very hard for those attracted to the same sex. Perhaps it can be a comfort to them to realize that following the objective moral law tends to be hard for everyone, though the "hardness" manifests itself in different ways. Ethics asks hard things of people. It calls some to be martyrs, to endure death and torture rather than follow the crowd. It calls us all to learn self-control, to suppress natural desires and bring them under the control of reason, which is an incredibly difficult thing to do. Restraining sexual desires in particular is notoriously difficult, and yet we are all called to self-control. It takes little imagination or empathy to consider all the ways in which, not just homosexuals, but lots of people have to struggle hard to control and redirect sexual desires that would lead them down paths most of us would recognize as harmful or unethical. It is notoriously hard to "do the right thing" sometimes. We should sympathize with each other, but we have no rational basis to conclude that something must be OK to do simply because it is very hard not to do it.</p><p>ALBERT: All your answers are glib and cold and meaningless. You can't possibly understand what homosexuals go through because you aren't a homosexual.</p><p>RICK: I may not be a homosexual, but I am a human being, and I do have some idea of how hard life can be. I recognize though, certainly, that I cannot really know, experientially, fully what it is like to walk in someone else's shoes. But that doesn't prove that my ethical beliefs are incorrect.</p><p>ALBERT: Yes, it does! Since you can't know what it's like to be me, you can't tell me my feelings are invalid. I'm telling you that I know, from personal experience, that a good God could never demand that homosexuals suppress their homosexual impulses. It would be too cruel. You can't understand that, but you have to believe it, because I am telling you from my own personal experience.</p><p>RICK: But how do I evaluate your personal experience? You claim to have experience that proves that homosexual acts cannot be unethical. But I cannot have that same experience, so how can I verify whether or not it shows what you think and claim it shows?</p><p>ALBERT: You don't have to verify it! You just have to accept it! I'm me, so I get to testify to my own personal experience! You don't get to say anything about it! You just have to accept what I'm telling you.</p><p>RICK: But that would be irrational. Just because you have personal experiences and have interpreted them in a certain way, that doesn't prove that you might not be interpreting them wrongly. I can't just accept your point of view without critical analysis. That would be to believe things without sufficient evidence, which would be dishonest.</p><p>ALBERT: No, it would not be dishonest. It is the only just, the only compassionate thing to do. If you respect me, you will accept my personal testimony about myself without question.</p></blockquote><p></p><p>(Again, this is a hugely oversimplified and unrealistic conversation, of course. For a somewhat closer approximation to a real conversation, though still fictional, see <a href="https://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2019/06/dialogue-on-sexuality-and-gender.html">here</a>.)</p><p>Rick is right not to accept Albert's personal testimony uncritically, despite Albert's attempts to persuade him that compassion requires him to do so. While we ought to be compassionate and empathetic towards people and the personal difficulties they struggle with, if we are interested in truth, we cannot accept conclusions without adequate grounding in the evidence. As Rick noted, just because a person claims to have had some particular experience, it doesn't prove that they've really had that experience or that they've interpreted their experience correctly. The simple fact that I am me doesn't make me infallible in the interpretations of my own experiences. We all know that, if we are sufficiently self-aware. People can often be misled by false interpretations of their own subjective experiences, especially if those experiences are tied to deeply-felt emotions or desires. Again, just because my Latter-day Saint friend had some "religious experience," that doesn't by itself prove to me that they have rightly interpreted their experience to have given them infallible proof that the Book of Mormon is a revelation from God. Very few of us, rightly, are going to become Latter-day Saints simply on the basis of such personal-testimony claims, which is why Latter-day Saints typically go on to tell people how to replicate that experience in their own lives.</p><p>Another example of an area where, today, we often run into the "personal experience proves everything" kind of argument is transgenderism. "I'm a boy." But you're a biological girl. "I don't care. I know I'm a boy." On what basis do you claim to be a boy? "I feel that I am a boy." How do your feelings show that you are a boy? What is your linguistic and philosophical justification for redefining the word "boy" to mean something different than it has meant in the past history of the English language, in Christian theology, etc.? And what do you even mean by "boy" now that you've divorced the word from its original objective meaning? "Look, I feel that I am a boy! So if you will be compassionate and respectful toward me, you will simply accept that I am a boy and not ask any further questions! I'm me, so I get to define myself, and you simply have to accept it, or you're a hateful bigot!" (Of course, not all advocates of transgender ideology are so belligerent, but the belligerence is common enough in such circles that I do no injustice in making it a part of what a standard conversation of this sort often looks like.) The problem with this, of course, is that this appeal to personal testimony provides no real evidence--or, rather, no evidence that is sufficiently accessible to people in general. Just because I testify that I feel strongly that I should be identified as the gender opposite my biological sex, it does not follow that that feeling is correct. It takes little imagination to understand how one could misinterpret one's feelings in such an area. Personal experiences and feelings are interpreted in light of beliefs and assumptions a person has, and so those interpretations may only be as true as the truth of those beliefs and assumptions. Therefore, a claim of personal feelings cannot be used to trump critical questioning of beliefs and assumptions that may underlie the interpretations.</p><p>So a claim based on unreplicable personal experience cannot, by itself, prove a belief to be true. However, it is also true that, because the personal experience is unreplicable and out of the reach of the experience of others, claims based solely and completely on such experiences are impossible to directly disprove. Sometimes the argument is made that because they cannot be disproved, that amounts to a good reason to accept them as true. "I claim to have seen God! You can't prove that I haven't seen God, so you have to accept that I have!" But not being able to disprove something is simply not the same as proving something to be true. If I can't disprove that elves exist, it doesn't follow that that in itself gives me good reason to believe that they do. Again, testimonies of personal experience, when this is all we have, leave us not with proof or disproof but at an impasse. We simply cannot know whether the claims based on the experience are valid or not. The only rational position, then, is to be agnostic on those claims.</p><p>So does that mean that we must always be agnostic with regard to anyone's claims based on personal experience? No. If <i>all</i> we have is personal experience to go on, we would have to be agnostic, but we very often have more than that to go on. With regard to Latter-day Saint claims, for example, we can investigate those claims at many points, as the claims touch on history, philosophy, theology, etc. My primary reason for rejecting the claims of the Latter-day Saint worldview is because I have found them to fail philosophically and theologically. I believe Latter-day Saint claims about God and other matters are falsified philosophically; they fail to stand up to logic. Also, <a href="https://www.lulu.com/en/us/shop/mark-hausam/why-christianity-is-true/ebook/product-23661762.html?page=1&pageSize=4">I believe I have positive reasons to believe in the truth of historic, Catholic Christianity</a>, which entails the falsehood of the foundation of the Latter-day Saint worldview (the conviction that Joseph Smith was a true prophet, etc.). If, having concluded that Catholic Christianity is true on the grounds of various solid evidences, I am confronted with an argument based on Latter-day Saint personal testimony, I will simply respond that, while I can't <i>directly</i> disprove claims based in such personal testimony, yet the mere claims do not prove themselves, and I can <i>indirectly</i> disprove them based on their incompatibility with other things I have reason to believe to be true. If the Latter-day Saint protests that he <i>knows</i> his personal experience proves the Latter-day Saint worldview, and that I have to just accept that because I can't possibly know what he's experienced, I will reply that I have no good reason to think that he cannot have misinterpreted his own personal experience, and I have good, positive reasons coming from other sources to believe that, in fact, in this case, he has done precisely that. If he insists that it is disrespectful of me not to accept claims based on his personal experience, I will reply that it is not a matter of respect or disrespect; it is a matter of intellectual honesty. If a person believes he is being disrespected simply because his claims, even claims based on unreplicable personal experience, are not uncritically accepted, he needs to reconsider whether his requirements for "being respected" are actually reasonable ones or not. We deserve to be respected as human beings, but no human being can justly claim to deserve to have everyone accept his own ideas without critical analysis. This is not a genuine requirement for the respect we are owed as human beings.</p><p>With regard to homosexuality and transgenderism, I think the same analysis holds. A homosexual may claim to have personal experiences that prove, beyond a shadow of a doubt, that homosexual acts are not unethical. If I question this claim, he may object that I am in no position to judge his subjective, personal experience. I must reply that while it is true that I cannot directly disprove his claim, the mere fact that he claims it falls short of proving it true, for I have no reason to believe that he is an infallible interpreter of his own personal experience, and it is clear to me that there are many ways a person might be mistaken about the real meaning of their own personal experiences. Ironically, there are plenty of personal testimonies from people out there who admit to having interpreted their own personal experiences wrongly at various points. So it would be intellectually irresponsible for me to accept claims based merely on such personal experience as if they proved themselves. And, in the case of homosexuality, I believe I have good, solid reasons to believe that Catholic Christianity is true, and Catholic Christianity tells me, among many other things, that homosexual acts are unethical. Therefore, I have good reason to believe they are unethical, and this evidence is not trumped by mere claims based on unreplicable personal experiences. With regard to claims based on transgender experiences, again, I am not going to accept claims simply because they are made, without any good reason to think they are actually true, and the mere fact that a claim is rooted in someone's unreplicable personal experience does not constitute sufficient reason to believe that it is true. I am going to evaluate that claim in light of everything that I know from history, science, philosophy, theology, etc.</p><p style="text-align: center;"><b>What About the Lucy Argument?</b></p><p style="text-align: left;">An argument for trust in claimed personal experience might be made based on the sort of reasoning famously laid out in C. S. Lewis's <i>Chronicles of Narnia</i>. In <i>The Lion, the Witch, and the Wardrobe</i>, four children--two brothers and two sisters--go to stay for a while at the home of an old professor. The youngest sister, Lucy, stumbles through a doorway into another world inside an old wardrobe. When she comes back and tells her siblings about the experience, they don't believe her. They are very uncomfortable, because Lucy has always been honest before, and they begin to fear that she might be developing some kind of insanity. They finally decide to go and talk to the professor about her, but he surprises them by suggesting that they accept her word along with the existence of the other world she claims to have discovered. He points out that everyone accepts that she is an honest girl, and he rules out insanity by observation of her behavior, and so he deduces that the most likely explanation is that she is telling the truth. (You can find this conversation in <i>The Lion, the Witch, and the Wardrobe</i>, chapter 5.)</p><p style="text-align: left;">Lewis makes a fascinating argument here, and one that, I think, has a lot of value and validity. In the story, Lucy's siblings suffer under a preconceived bias without any real foundation--that there cannot be other worlds occasionally accessible through things like old wardrobes--and they use that bias as a basis to reject an exceedingly credible eyewitness testimony. The professor points out the absurdity of calling into question the honesty or the sanity of a person well known to them merely on the basis of a felt need to preserve unwarranted assumptions about reality. It is very easy for us to let our preconceived biases affect our objectivity in analyzing arguments and evidence. Instead of letting our prejudices determine which evidence we will allow to have its say, we should instead allow the evidence to stand judge over our prejudices--even if that means questioning deeply- and long-held, and even fundamental, assumptions about the nature of reality.</p><p style="text-align: left;">But saying that we should allow even deeply-held assumptions to be questioned by credible evidence, including credible evidence from eyewitnesses, is not the same as saying we should give an uncritical pass to all claims based on personal experience. Some claims based on personal experience are going to be more reliable than others. We have to look at the specifics. In the case of Lucy, we have an honest girl, with signs of sanity, telling a very detailed story about specific incidents involving specific individuals that occurred in a specific world with a specific name which she got into by going into a specific wardrobe, etc. Lucy's siblings really had no reason to disbelieve her story, for they had no basis for their assumption that such a thing was impossible. Given the incredible specificity of Lucy's story, there was no plausible explanation for her account beyond the possibility that she was deliberately lying, subject to some form of insanity (vivid, detailed hallucinations, etc.), or that she really had the specific experiences she related. Given that her siblings knew her well and had strong reasons to believe her an honest person and not insane, and given that they had no real reason to disbelieve her story, no matter how counter-intuitive it was, the professor was right in pointing out that the best conclusion was to accept her story as legitimate. (Of course, there might still be a question about how to interpret her experiences, but there was good reason to accept that, whatever the explanation, she actually had the experiences she claimed to have had.)</p><p style="text-align: left;">This is far different from the situation of the Latter-day Saint testimony I described above. In that case, we would need to ask some further questions. How well do I know the Latter-day Saint I am talking to? Although it is charitable to assume honesty when reasonably possible, it would be foolish to ignore the fact that people often lie. I can't just discount that possibility out of hand if I do not know how trustworthy a particular person is. And there are degrees of lying. Sometimes people lie outright, fully consciously and calculatingly. Other times, there is a fair amount of self-deception going on, more or less consciously. With a relative stranger (like a missionary coming to my door), I don't typically have the personal background necessary to evaluate levels of trustworthiness. Also, in the case of the Latter-day Saint testimony, as well as lots of other kinds of "religious experience," there is often quite a lot of interpretation going on between the actual experience and a person's conclusions or beliefs based on that experience. With Lucy, there was hardly any. She either had those experiences or she didn't. But a Latter-day Saint might really have a kind of deep, emotional experience when praying, and she might honestly and with strong conviction be persuaded, for whatever reason (background biases, expectations, etc.), that that experience means that the Book of Mormon is true, and yet she might quite easily be wrong in that interpretation. It would be good to know more details about the exact nature of the particular experience a particular person is telling us about. With Latter-day Saints, in my experience, it often comes down to a kind of feeling of joy or peace, perhaps accompanied by a strong sense of conviction that the Book of Mormon is true. It is easy to see that an experience like that is highly ambiguous in itself and could be due to any number of factors, and that the leap from such an experience to a specific propositional claim like "The Book of Mormon is a revelation from God" is quite a large one, and not necessarily well warranted. It is easy to imagine how people around the world might have similar experiences but interpret them differently based on different religious backgrounds, etc. A person need not be insane or dishonest to be fooled by such an experience into thinking they know more than they actually do. So it makes sense to take claims in this kind of context, generally speaking, with much, much more of a grain of salt than Lucy's siblings should have taken her eyewitness testimony. Although both cases involve claims based on unreplicable personal experiences, the specifics of the cases are vastly diverse and the responses called for are very diverse as well.</p><p style="text-align: left;">The same can be said with regard to personal-experience-based claims connected to homosexuality or transgenderism. If a person tells me that, as a homosexual, they can tell from their feelings that being asked to control and redirect homosexual desires is too much to ask for, so that it is impossible that there could be a God who would ask that, this claim seems to be based on very subjective and ambiguous evidence. How difficult does a task have to feel like in order to constitute objective evidence that an objective moral law from God would not require it? I find it interesting that people who would not balk at being asked to die, and even possibly to endure torture, in order to defend their values and do what they think is right, think that the difficulty involved in being asked not to engage in homosexual acts is "too much" to such an extent that they think that constitutes objective proof that such an ethical requirement cannot exist. I am not aware of any objective argument that can show me the upper limit of what the objective moral law of God might ask of a particular person. If, upon receiving such a reply as that, the homosexual responds by saying, "Well, of course you can't understand, you're not homosexual! No one can understand me but me! You'll just have to take my word for it that my experience constitutes a valid basis for such an objective argument," I'm going to have to answer that I cannot accept that claim as constituting sufficient evidence to abandon my entire Christian worldview and adopt their view on the ethicality of homosexual acts. There is far too much subjectivity and room for error here. Even if the person I am talking to is being perfectly honest, how do I know he is not leaping to his conclusion in a way similar to my Latter-day Saint friend--taking an ambiguous, though deeply-felt, emotional experience and jumping to an unwarranted conclusion based on it, a conclusion lacking in an objectively solid foundation and perhaps influenced by preconceived biases, assumptions, strong desires, etc.? So I really have no basis to agree with my homosexual friend's conclusion based simply on what he perceives his personal experience to be telling him. And, also similarly to the Latter-day Saint case, I have strong evidence coming from other sources telling me that his interpretation of his personal experience is incorrect. I have good reason to believe that Catholic Christianity is true, and that worldview tells me that homosexual acts are unethical. The personal-evidence-based claim of the homosexual can no more overturn that than can the personal-evidence-based claim of the Latter-day Saint.</p><p style="text-align: center;"><b>Intellectual, Emotional, and Pastoral Considerations Regarding Personal Testimonies about the Ethicality of Homosexual Acts</b></p><p style="text-align: left;">I am going to conclude all of this by pasting a portion of a conversation I had with someone recently regarding these sorts of issues, and specifically regarding claims of personal experience having to do with homosexuality. The conversation was useful, I thought, in bringing out some important points on these topics both on the intellectual level and on the emotional/psychological/pastoral level.</p><p></p><blockquote><p>This is very interesting and crucially important, I think. My conversations with you and with others expressing similar convictions has made me think about this a great deal in recent times. . . . A couple of thoughts: </p><p>1. It is very understandable that our emotions will accompany our reason as we think about these sorts of issues, issues which deeply impact our worldviews, our practical lives, our sense of identity, our feelings about social justice, etc. It’s wholly appropriate for our emotions to be involved; it would be un-human to exclude them or assume they would be excluded. In dealing with these issues, both the emotional side and the intellectual side have to be addressed. . . . It’s a hard balance to properly respect and respond to the emotional aspects while at the same time not allowing those aspects to cripple the ability to deal with the intellectual issues thoroughly and effectively (or vice versa). It’s something we think about a lot.</p><p>2. An important question is what role emotions have to play in informing or making intellectual arguments. What weight should emotion have in our reasons for believing things? There are pitfalls to avoid here. On the one hand, we want to take the concerns arising from our emotions seriously and not neglect important things they have to say to us. On the other hand, we don’t want to allow our emotions to give us an excuse not to deal honestly and thoroughly with the intellectual issues. Sometimes reality might be painful and difficult, and I might need to choose to endure some pain in order to truly question my beliefs and assumptions and allow myself to be challenged by reality. I might have to come to conclusions that are greatly painful and hard for me. But if I care about reality and don’t want to try to escape into a false fantasy world where I feel safer, I have to learn to take that journey despite the difficulties--at least as much as I can.</p><p>3. Following #2, emotions cannot be regarded as immune from questioning or criticism. I think there is a temptation that some people give in to these days (I think it is a bit of a fad these days) to think that if they feel very, very strongly about something, and that something is very deeply personal to them, that that exempts them from having to question those emotions, or to allow others to challenge them. Questioning beliefs tied up with those emotions is often seen as a kind of personal attack and offense, and that sense of offense functions as a kind of screen against questioning and criticism. This is dangerous, because it makes people feel a kind of justification for exempting themselves from questioning deep-seated, strongly-felt, and strongly-held-and-valued assumptions. But this is a sure recipe for maintaining unjustified beliefs and prejudices. If we want reality, we cannot exempt even our deepest beliefs and feelings from critical questioning. These days, it has become popular in some circles to feel this way especially about moral issues and feelings. A lot of people feel that if they have beliefs or feelings about moral and social issues they care deeply about, that somehow the depth of those feelings and the importance of the concerns justifies exempting those assumptions from critical questioning or challenge, as if allowing those assumptions to be questioned is a kind of betrayal of the moral convictions. But moral convictions are only valid if they are based on truth, on reality. They must be well-founded in the evidence before we have reason to take them as valid moral convictions. So they cannot be exempt from questioning--at least not if we care about truth and reality.</p><p>4. So simply feeling strongly that homosexual acts should be OK, or being greatly concerned for social justice for homosexuals, do not in themselves prove that homosexual acts are ethical. We also have to keep distinct different questions. For example, it could possibly be true BOTH that homosexual acts are unethical AND that homosexuals have been treated unjustly and unlovingly in society. If homosexuals have been treated unjustly, it does not necessarily follow that homosexual acts are ethical, and we cannot use the former as an argument for the latter (or at least I don’t see how the former actually proves the latter). We can’t let our feelings about social justice cloud our judgment about the actual merits of arguments and evidence. Also, being personally involved in this question does not, in itself, provide a reason for coming to a certain conclusion. If I am homosexual, much might be at stake for me personally in the quesiton of whether or not homosexual acts are unethical. This shouldn’t be minimized on an emotional level, but, at the same time, it cannot be used to provide a shield against crtitical questions.</p><p>5. One possible intellectually-meritorious argument that I could see arising out of the strong, personal emotions regarding homosexuality would be the one you have alluded to--the concern, as you put it, that “it’s wrong to suppress a natural part of life.” I’ve addressed that in some of my earlier responses . . . but it’s an important objection that shouldn’t be dismissed too quickly. I think the argument, if we articulate it out, goes something like this: “God would not have made the world such that some people have a natural proclivity towards homosexuality and then also have forbidden homosexual acts in his moral law. His moral commands would be at odds with what he created, and it would be inherently wrong for there to be a moral requirement to suppress a natural part of our created identity.”</p><p>I’ve addressed some of this in earlier responses. For one thing, the situation we are currently in, where people are required by morality to suppress their desires in a painful way, is not the ideal state of creation, but is rather a part of the world in a fallen state. As to why God would allow the Fall to occur, or in general to allow evil and suffering to happen in the world, this leads to the discussion of <a href="http://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2021/12/the-problem-of-evil.html">the problem of evil which we’ve looked at elsewhere</a>. In this fallen state of things, morality and our desires often conflict, and doing the right thing is often very difficult. Most people recognize and accept this fact, that morality often asks hard things of people, and we often praise people for doing the right thing at great personal cost to themselves.</p><p>Can any objective argument be made showing that an all-powerful, all-knowing, all-wise, and all-good God would not have done what the Catholic worldview says he has done, in creating this world, allowing the Fall, commanding what he has commanded, etc.? Can it be shown that it could not be the case that the objective moral law of God might require people with homosexual orientation to have to work to redirect their desires in the area of sexuality and not do what comes most naturally to them? Perhaps an objective argument can be made here which rises above only the protests of feelings (which aren’t to be taken lightly, but also don’t necessarily constitute an objective argument) or is not mired in subjectivity and unquestioned assumptions, but I have not yet seen such an argument so far as I can tell. But I’m open to such an argument being shown to me.</p><p>In making such an argument, we must also keep in mind the complexity of the issue and all the many factors involved. We must recognize and give full credit to the great practical, psychological, and emotional difficulties of following Catholic teaching (in the area of homosexuality, but also in many other areas), but there are many other factors to remember as well. We should note, for example, that while sexuality is often bound up with other aspects of human relationships, relationships can exist without sexuality, and there might be ways in which many of the needs of homosexuals and others can be at least partially met by other kinds of relationships that don’t involve sexual acts. There is much to think about in that area. While we don’t want to underestimate the difficulties of living Catholic teaching, for homosexuals and others, we also don’t want to overestimate them, in the sense of painting a more dire picture than is actually the case or overlooking ways in which the difficulties can be assuaged to some degree.</p><p>At any rate, there is much to think about here. It can be very difficult to ask these kinds of critical questions, and we must do so with great care and sensitivity and empathy. At the same time, again, if we are concerned not only with validating our feelings but also with making sure our beliefs are in accord with reality, we have to ask these questions. We cannot consider such questions off limits on the grounds that they are too personal, too painful, offensive to a person’s sense of identity, etc.</p></blockquote><p></p><p>And one more short snippet:</p><p></p><blockquote>This is another form of the objection we discussed above, and, again, I think it is a very important one that can’t be easily dismissed. But it must be looked at with all the complexity it truly involves. Again, most people recognize that morality, or even just prudence, tends to ask us to suppress or redirect natural desires, to deny ourselves things we have a natural inclination towards. Take dieting, for example. It’s a very hard thing to do, because in order to eat right and healthily we often have to fight against our natural inclinations, and this is a very difficult thing to do, especially for people who really enjoy eating and get a lot out of it. I take that very seriously, being a person myself who really enjoys eating and looks forward to it. Eating for me is kind of an oasis that eases the difficulties of life, and it really means a lot to me (even though that might sound kind of strange to someone who doesn’t feel this way, I am quite serious). A friend of mine has a child who was recently diagnosed with celiac disease. And the child has Down’s Syndrome, to make it worse. She has to avoid her favorite foods now, and her parents will enforce this. If I had that happen to me, it would be very, very difficult. But that doesn’t mean that it can’t be the right thing to do, and that’s my point. We can’t necessarily easily reason from “this will be really, really difficult and asks me to suppress and redirect strong and important natural desires, leading to great difficulties in life” to “I can’t possibly be required by morality or prudence to go down this path.” And I could add a ton of other examples of all sorts, as I know you could as well with your creativity, intelligence, and empathy. We could write a large series of books just listing the situations in which we would both agree that people are morally or prudentially required to suppress or redirect natural desires in a way that is very painful and difficult. So why, then, should we think it so easy to assume that homosexuality must get a pass on this, must be exempt from all these other examples? It is not evident to me that that case can be made objectively. Another thought: Even if, in some cases, we have to suppress or redirect our natural desires, there are more or less healthy ways of doing that. I’m sure there are plenty of very ineffective and unhealthy ways of trying to suppress homosexual desires. I’m sure there are plenty of ways of suppressing or redirecting other kinds of desires as well that are unhealthy and ineffective. I’m sure there are different ways of dieting that are more or less psychologically healthy or unhealthy. We should obviously pursue the most healthy ways possible when we are called on to deny ourselves something we want very much. And we have to be careful to define words like “healthy” too. Does “healthy” mean “living happily, feeling fulfilled, etc.”? Perhaps, in that case, sometimes morality and prudence require us to live less-than-fully-healthy lives. We might have to sacrifice some goods and sources of contentment in order to pursue things of greater value--like forgoing an adulterous relationship to respect spouses, or controlling not eating the things we want in order to take care of our bodies. On the other hand, if we define “unhealthy” to acknowledge we might have stress from living life, and we focus more on more specific kinds of unhealthy states of mind, we might find we can redirect our desires to a great degree without being “unhealthy.” In short, we have to ask specific questions and look at definitions, nuances, and complexities in these kinds of things if we will avoid making question-begging arguments.</blockquote><p></p><p>For a larger dialogue on homosexuality and transgenderism, see <a href="https://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2019/06/dialogue-on-sexuality-and-gender.html">here</a>. For a short article discussing how current "woke" culture tends to commit the error discussed in this article, while also making some positive and valid points, see <a href="http://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2021/06/toxic-aspects-of-woke-culture-1.html">here</a>.</p><p><b>ADDENDUM 2/24/22</b>: Someone might argue, against my argument above, that we are required by justice and charity towards others to have a "judgment of charity" with regard to the personal testimonies and actions of others, meaning that we should give the best interpretation possible to what a person says and does--we should assume good motives like honesty, compassion, etc., rather than bad motives like selfishness or dishonesty. And going along with that, it might be argued, we should have a kind of "judgment of respect" regarding what other people say about their own lives. Since I am me, surely I have the right to define myself. If I decide that I want my name to be Horace, that's my call, not anyone else's. You don't have the right to say, "I don't like the name Horace, so I'll name you Frank instead." I get to choose my name, not you, because I'm me. Similarly, if I make some kind of personal-testimony sort of claim, such as those discussed in the article above, everyone has an obligation to take my word for it and believe it simply because I'm me and other people are not.</p><p>I agree that it is right, practically speaking, to adopt a "judgment of charity" about people. But we must distinguish between a practical stance and an actual intellectual opinion. It might be charitable for me to assume you are an honest person until I have clear evidence to the contrary, but that doesn't mean I really know that you are an honest person or have a basis for an intellectual claim about that. If I don't know you very well, I may have no basis to have any clear opinion regarding your tendencies towards honesty or deception. I will have to be agnostic on that as a propositional claim. My "judgment of charity" is not so much an intellectual opinion or propositional claim about you as simply a practical attitude. That is, I will treat you practically as if you are an honest person until contrary evidence arises. (And even in terms of a practical stance, this will be limited. For example, if I don't know someone, I'm not going to decide suddenly to let them babysit my kids simply on the basis of a practical "judgment of charity." That would be foolish, because, intellectually speaking, I really don't know how trustworthy they are.) So a "judgment of charity" of this sort, while it might make me inclined not to raise questions about the validity of your personal-experience-based claims unless I have a need to, will not give me any basis to avoid such questions if something important hinges on the trustworthiness of your claims. Certainly, I'm not going to adopt a whole system of views on things like the ethicality of homosexual acts or the truth of the Latter-day Saint worldview simply on the basis of practical trust rooted in a "judgment of charity."</p><p>It's similar with a "judgment of respect." It's one thing to allow you to decide your name. Surely you have that right because you are you, and I shouldn't try to usurp it. But you don't therefore have a right to demand that I believe whatever you want me to believe or do whatever you want me to do, no matter the seriousness of the consequences or the intellectual merits of your claims, simply on the basis that your claims are rooted in your own personal experience. Certainly you should be considered an important witness, and even a primary witness, to your own personal experience. But it doesn't follow from that that respect for you requires me to accept claims based on dubious evidence or ignore evidence to the contrary, or make seriously important decisions without asking further questions or looking for further evidence or analyzing your claims more closely. Again, practically speaking, when I can I should defer to your own statements about yourself and not adopt a challenging attitude to them unnecessarily. But that doesn't mean I should adopt an intellectual position that goes beyond what is truly warranted by the evidence.</p>Mark Hausamhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07371790103414979060noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-808697756426649418.post-58597190269977189722022-01-07T13:18:00.001-06:002023-01-25T19:58:25.631-06:00Philosophical Thoughts on Free Will, Foreknowledge, and Predestination<p style="text-align: left;"><i>This article follows up on <a href="https://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2019/02/predestination-grace-and-free-will-in.html">my article</a> outlining Catholic teaching on free will, grace, and predestination</i>.</p><p style="text-align: center;"><b>The Nature of Free Will</b></p><p>There are two areas of philosophical confusion which, in my observation, tend to make it difficult for people to understand Catholic teaching regarding issues surrounding free will, grace, and predestination. The first area of confusion has to do with the idea of free will itself. There is a tendency sometimes for people to focus so much on the freedom of the will that they forget that the will is not completely unpredictable and uncontrollable. They cannot see how the idea of free will is compatible with the idea that God knows the future and even plans the future. In Catholic theology, the entire future unfolds, down to its last detail, exactly according to God's foreknowledge and plan (the plan of "predestination"). If that is so, many wonder, how in the world can we really have free will? For (it would seem) if God infallibly knows everything I am going to do in the future and even has planned everything I am going to do in the future in some way, then it is impossible for anything to happen differently than God knows and has planned, and so I can't make any different choices than the ones God knows and has planned for me to make. So I would seem to have no free will at all. So how can Catholic theology hold together free will, foreknowledge, and predestination?</p><p>At least part of the answer is that while, of course, coercion, force, certain psychological conditions, etc., can override or circumvent the will and so limit or remove its freedom, there are ways in which the will can be moved and directed which don't override or destroy freedom. It can be helpful here to distinguish between "necessity" and "certainty." As with many words adapted to abstract, philosophical use, people don't always use these words in the same way, so we don't want to be so rigid in our use of these words that we can't recognize differences of meaning in how we and others use them and so end up getting into meaningless, semantic fights. Nevertheless, in some philosophical/theological circles, these words have been used in a way that can be helpful at capturing an important distinction. We can think of the will being moved "necessarily" or "with certainty but not necessarily." For the will to be moved necessarily is for the will really to be obliterated by having its options removed, so that the person willing can really only do one thing and it is impossible for him to do otherwise. For example, say you want me to eat a cucumber. It so happens that I hate cucumbers, so it is not going to be easy to get me to eat one. You might attempt to get me to eat a cucumber by forcing me to eat one necessarily, removing my options and so circumventing my will. You could tie me down and force the cucumber down my throat. Or you could use a supercomputer to take over my brain and force my body to eat the cucumber. Etc.</p><p>On the other hand, it is possible to move the will with certainty but without necessity, without removing legitimate options and thus circumventing and destroying the act of free choice. Going back to the cucumber example, you might get me to certainly, yet freely, eat the cucumber by using persuasion, which involves appealing to my motives so that I freely alter my choice. You might offer me $1,000 to eat the cucumber. If you did that, I would certainly eat it (all other things being equal). I would still hate the taste of the cucumber, but my distaste for cucumber would lose the battle with my desire to win $1,000. If I <i>really</i> hated cucumbers and wouldn't do it even for $1,000, you could offer me $1,000,000, if you happened to have that kind of money on hand (and were that bizarrely obsessed with getting me to eat a cucumber for some reason). In a case like this, you have performed an action that caused me to do something you wanted me to do, and made it certain I would do it, but without any overwhelming or circumventing of my will.</p><p>This can happen because acts of will, while free in some ways, are not arbitrary or groundless. This is evident both from the law of causality as well as from a simple psychological examination of how the will actually works. The law of causality does not allow that something can come from nothing. If an effect occurs, it must have a cause sufficient to explain the effect. The only alternative to this would be to have something coming from nothing. But "nothing" is nothing and so does nothing. It has no reality, and so cannot originate anything or exert any energy or activity to cause anything to happen. It cannot be the explanation for why anything happens. So if anything happens, if anything in reality undergoes change, some cause must have effected that change. If there is anything in the universe that cannot explain itself, it must be explained by something outside of itself and not by "nothing."</p><p>And with regard to the psychology of willing, consider for yourself how you make choices. When I examine the activity of my own will, I see this basic pattern: 1. I am aware of various states of affairs that could come about or be brought about. I call these my "options." 2. My mind begins to examine its own desires. What do I like? What do I dislike? What do I want to happen? What do I not want to happen? 3. As this process continues, I recognize that, among the things I have some desire for, there are things I want more than other things. In other words, I find that I have "preferences." I prefer some states of affairs to other states of affairs. Out of the complexity of my views, ideas, and desires, my mind attempts to sort out what I truly prefer to have come about or to bring about, all things considered, in that moment. 4. Finally, I am successful at determining my true preference in the current situation, and I settle on that preference. This act of my mind settling on a preference is what I call the act of "choice." 5. Then, if what I have chosen is to perform some action, my body (or my mind) responds to the act of choice by performing the action (or at least attempts to do so).</p><p>Is this not how the action of choosing goes for all of us? We can see, then, by looking at it, that the act of choice is not arbitrary or outside a nexus of causation. My choice flows from my preference. My preference is what I most desire or value in that moment. (And I would add that, when I am thinking of "desire" here, I don't mean mere non-rational instinct, but what my rational mind values.) And what I desire is a product of many, many things--my personality, my beliefs and values, all the circumstances that exist around me and inside of me at the time of my choice, the earlier circumstances that led to <i>those</i> circumstances, all my previous experiences, the entire previous history of my life, my DNA, the choices of my parents, the choices of <i>their</i> parents, the entire history of the universe, etc. At the moment of my choice, I choose what I prefer, and the desires, values, beliefs, ideas, etc., that determine what I prefer do not spring out of nowhere. They are what they are because of prior causes. This is why you can cause with certainty, but without will-circumventing necessity, that I will choose to eat that cucumber. This is why, if you happened to know everything about me and all the circumstances affecting my choice at any given moment, you could always predict with 100% accuracy what I would choose. This is why, if you happened to have control of all the causal factors in the entire universe, you could ensure that I would always choose what you wanted me to choose.</p><p>Now consider God's relationship to the creation. God is the First Cause, the Source of all reality. There is no being in the universe that does not derive from him. There are no chains of causes in the universe which do not ultimately trace back to his action. And God is also omniscient, or all-knowing. There is nothing in all of reality which he does not know thoroughly. If that is the case, then it cannot be otherwise than that the history of creation will unfold according to God's perfect foreknowledge and plan. When God created the universe, he knew exactly what he was creating, and he created exactly what he wanted. And he knew everything that would result from that creation down through the entire chain of universal history from beginning to end. He knew all the free choices that all creatures would make. He knew all the free choices he himself would make as he would continue to interact with creation as its history continued to unfold, for he knew himself and his own preferential tendencies perfectly as well. So God could not have created the universe without, at the same time, perfectly knowing and planning its entire history, down to the smallest detail. As the <i>Catechism of the Catholic Church</i> puts it (<a href="http://www.scborromeo.org/ccc/p1s2c1p4.htm">#308</a>), "[t]he truth that God is at work in all the actions of his creatures is inseparable from faith in God the Creator."</p><p>And none of this is in any way inconsistent with free will, for God's foreknowledge and predestination, understood in this way, do not at all overwhelm, obliterate, or circumvent anyone's free choices. Just as you did not obliterate my free will when you offered me money to eat the cucumber, neither does God obliterate free will when he creates a universe and ordains a history in which he knows I will choose all the things I will choose in my life. (See <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_Hli1fo1p2s&ab_channel=BishopRobertBarron">here</a>--and particularly time index 17:00-20:53--for a helpful discussion of this same issue by Bishop Robert Barron.)</p><p style="text-align: center;"><b>The Problem of Evil</b></p><p>All of this leads us to the second major problem a lot of people have with Catholic teaching in this area. Even if I can see how God's foreknowledge and predestination are consistent with the freedom of my choices, yet if all of this is so, why does God's plan involve so much evil? Why did he choose to create a world in which so much sin and suffering happen? Why not create one where everyone makes only right choices and is always happy? When we think of the will as outside of God's control, this can provide a kind of smokescreen, to an extent, against this second objection. Why all the sin and suffering? Well, God can't really do anything about it, because he can't control free will. (Of course, this gets God off the hook from responsibility for evil only by removing his sovereignty as God, but people often don't press these sorts of things to their logical conclusions.) But if God <i>can</i> control free will, if it is not outside the effects of his plan and foreknowledge, then how could God justifiably create a world in which all this sin and suffering happen?</p><p>I won't attempt to give a complete answer to this question here, because I have already dealt with it in <a href="http://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2021/12/the-problem-of-evil.html">a separate article</a> to which I will refer you. Sometimes this objection is expressed in terms of feeling like God is somehow still violating my freedom by exercising such absolute control over the history of my life. I think this thought partly stems from a failure to fully recognize how different God's relationship with us is from our relationship with other creatures. If you were to somehow gain absolute control over my life such that my entire life history became subject to your knowledge and plans, I would complain that you had violated my "free space," for no creature from outside of myself should have that kind of control over me, and you could only have gotten that kind of control by somehow conquering me from without and subjugating me illicitly. But I make a mistake if I then transfer that feeling to my relationship with God. God is my Creator. His control over my life does not result from any kind of illicit conquest or manipulation or invasion of my "space." His control arises from the fundamental fact of who he is and who I am. The one who creates my fundamental essence and my entire world cannot but be the source of all that I am and cannot fail to exercise a kind of ownership and control over my life and my world that no mere creature could ever have. It is his prerogative, and no one else's, to know fully and to determine the course of the universe's history and my history. To complain about God's plan governing my life is like complaining against my mother for giving birth to me. "If my next-door neighbor tried to give birth to me, I should be very upset! So how I can tolerate you having given birth to me, Mom?" Well, by the very nature of our relationship, my mother has a kind of role in bringing me into existence that my next-door neighbor can never have (unless, of course, my next-door neighbor happens to be my mother). My mother's unique role is not a usurpation, but a natural and fully appropriate relationship. And so is God's unique role in my life as my Creator and the one whose plan governs my life history. </p><p>I talked above about how God's complete knowledge of and control over the factors that determine my choices make it so that I will choose precisely and only what God wants me to choose. But does that mean that God wants me to choose to sin? If a person should choose to commit a mortal sin, rejecting fundamentally a right relationship with God, and end up in hell as a result of this, was it God's will for this to happen? The answer is: yes and no. God hates sin and suffering. He does not take delight in either of these things. But he sees that the overall good of the universe, that which brings about the greatest overall goodness and happiness, is best achieved by allowing certain evils to occur. So his design for the history of the universe was not set simply on stopping me from committing any sin or experiencing any suffering. He saw that the best way to set up the universe was to ordain a set of circumstances such that it would come about that I would, at times, commit sin and experience suffering. He did not produce sin in me (for sin is a negative thing, like darkness, rather than a positive being, like light), but he set up the world such that he knew the result would be that I would sin and that suffering would come to me--not because he delighted in the idea of my sin and suffering, but because he knew that allowing these things would bring about a greater good. And this extends to all the sin and suffering in the universe, even to mortal sin and hell. So God did not want me to sin, per se, but he wanted to create a universe in which I would be freely permitted by him to sin because he knew that this universe would be the one suited to accomplish his perfect purposes.</p><p style="text-align: center;"><b>A Brief Note on Various Philosophical and Theological Schools of Thought</b></p><p>How does what I've said above relate to different philosophical schools of thought regarding the nature of free will? There are two positions, broadly speaking, which are typically discussed--<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Libertarianism_(metaphysics)">libertarianism</a> and <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Compatibilism">compatibilism</a>. I often find that there are ambiguities in terms of how these positions are defined that make it difficult to identify with either of the labels. For example, sometimes the libertarian view of free will is defined as the idea that "it is possible to choose otherwise at the moment of a choice," and compatibilism is defined as the idea that "the will is free if, at the moment of choice, a choice is made according to one's own mind and will, voluntarily, even if it is impossible to choose otherwise because the will is determined by the strongest desires of the person." But the phrase "able to choose otherwise" is ambiguous. Are we talking about the ability of my mind to actually make choices between various options--that is, my ability to use my rational mind to settle on preferences? Or does "able to choose otherwise" imply the idea that there is no certainty in choosing--that, at any given moment of choice, there is an absolute possibility that various choices might happen such that there can be no knowledge in principle about what choice will actually be made until the choice is actually made? "Ability to choose otherwise" in the former sense is an idea that makes perfect sense and is an essential component of what it means to make an act of will. "Ability to choose otherwise" in the latter sense is logically absurd (because it implies that totally uncaused events happen for no reason, thus denying the law of causality) and, far from being an essential component of the idea of a free act of the will, it is completely incompatible with how willing actually takes place. It turns an act of will, which is really the act of a rational mind settling on a preference, and turns it into something fundamentally different--a totally random event which is independent of everything that comes before it (and therefore, absurdly, independent even of the person making the choice and any act of that person) but which produces actions and events in the world.</p><p>If we define "ability to choose otherwise" in the former, rational sense, then I could identify my position as libertarian. But if we define "ability to choose otherwise" in the latter, absurd sense, then I would be inclined to say I am a compatibilist. The libertarian view, taken in the absurd sense, is incompatible with Catholic faith, because it implies a fundamental incompatibility between the Catholic doctrine of free will and the Catholic doctrines of divine foreknowledge and predestination (not to mention that by obliterating the law of causality it destroys the very rational fabric of reality itself).</p><p>What about the various Catholic schools of thought pertaining to free will, grace, and predestination--in particular, Bañezian Thomism and Molinism? I think that my account of free will above is consistent with any of the accepted Catholic schools of thought. It doesn't take sides in the details of the disputes between these schools. For more on my views regarding the Bañezian-Molinist dispute, and in particular how I understand Molinism, see <a href="http://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2016/02/was-molina-actually-wrong.html">here</a>, <a href="http://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2016/05/clearing-up-some-concerns-about-molinism.html">here</a>, and <a href="https://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2018/08/clearing-up-another-concern-about.html">here</a>. All the historic, approved Catholic schools of thought agree on the fundamental theological points of Catholic doctrine regarding free will, grace, and predestination. <a href="https://www3.nd.edu/~afreddos/papers/molina.htm">Here is how</a> Catholic philosopher Alfred J. Freddoso describes the traditional Catholic teaching on free will and predestination and how both Bañezian Thomism and Molinism agree on this teaching:</p><p></p><blockquote><p>According to the traditional doctrine of divine providence, God freely and knowingly plans, orders and provides for all the effects that constitute the created universe with its entire history, and he executes his chosen plan by playing an active causal role that ensures its exact realization. Since God is the perfect craftsman, not even trivial details escape his providential decrees. Whatever occurs is specifically decreed by God; more precisely, each effect produced in the created universe is either specifically and knowingly intended by him or, in concession to creaturely defectiveness, specifically and knowingly permitted by him. Divine providence thus has both a cognitive and a volitional aspect. By his pre-volitional knowledge God infallibly knows which effects would result, directly or indirectly, from any causal contribution he might choose to make to the created sphere. By his free will God chooses one from among the infinity of total sequences of created effects that are within his power to bring about and, concomitantly, wills to make a causal contribution that he knows with certainty will result in his chosen plan's being effected down to the last detail. </p><p>This much is accepted by both Molina and the Bañezians. They further agree that it is because he is perfectly provident that God has comprehensive foreknowledge of what will occur in the created world. That is, God's speculative post-volitional knowledge of the created world -- his so-called <i>free knowledge</i> or <i>knowledge of vision</i> -- derives wholly from his pre-volitional knowledge and his knowledge of what he himself has willed to do. Unlike human knowers, God need not be acted upon by outside causes in order for his cognitive potentialities to be fully actualized; he does not have to, as it were, look outside himself in order to find out what his creative act has wrought. Rather, he knows 'in himself' what will happen precisely because he knows just what causal role he has freely chosen to play within the created order and because he knows just what will result given this causal contribution. In short, no contingent truth grasped by the knowledge of vision can be true prior to God's specifically intending or permitting it to be true or to his specifically willing to make the appropriate causal contribution toward its truth.</p></blockquote><p></p><p>For more, see <a href="http://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2021/12/the-problem-of-evil.html">my problem of evil article</a>, and <a href="https://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2019/02/predestination-grace-and-free-will-in.html">my predestination article</a> this article follows up on. To see arguments relative to the deeper, most fundamental philosophical issues involved in all of this, see my case for the existence of God and the truth of Christianity in general <a href="http://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2020/07/why-christianity-brief-philosophical.html">here</a> and <a href="https://www.lulu.com/en/us/shop/mark-hausam/why-christianity-is-true/ebook/product-23661762.html?page=1&pageSize=4">here</a>.</p><p><i>Published on the feast of St. Raymond of Peñafort.</i></p>Mark Hausamhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07371790103414979060noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-808697756426649418.post-557324535538286302021-12-22T17:16:00.002-06:002022-12-09T07:44:59.806-06:00The Bible and Slavery<p>In another context, I recently addressed some questions about the Bible and slavery, and I wanted to post those answers here in an article as well.</p><p dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">1. <i>“The Bible is inconsistent with the modern teaching of the Catholic Church in various areas, such as slavery and the death penalty. Therefore Catholicism is internally inconsistent, because it claims that the Bible is the Word of God while at the same time claiming other teachings to be true which contradict it.”</i></p><p dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"><i><br /></i>I don’t think that the Bible contradicts modern Catholic teaching, if we understand both properly. Let’s look briefly at the two alleged examples--slavery and the death penalty. Again, though, as I said in my response to earlier drafts, if you want to make an objection like this, you ought to make your case yourself rather than simply hinting at it. To simply say “The Bible contradicts modern Church teaching on slavery” is insufficient as an argument. No evidence is presented. It is merely an assertion. I might just as well respond by simply saying “The Bible does <i>not</i> contradict modern Church teaching on slavery.” If I said that, I would be doing as much as you have done. You have to present your argument clearly and specifically and then show me the specific evidence that supports that argument. Otherwise, you put too much burden on the person responding to you, who could justly simply ignore your un-backed-up assertion. Their only alternative is to do your homework for you by doing all the research and pointing out all the specifics themself.</p><br />Nevertheless, let’s look at the claims. We’ll start with slavery. What does the modern Catholic Church say about slavery? Here is the <a href="http://www.scborromeo.org/ccc/p3s2c2a7.htm#2414"><i>Catechism of the Catholic Church</i> #2414</a>:<br /><blockquote>The seventh commandment forbids acts or enterprises that for any reason - selfish or ideological, commercial, or totalitarian - lead to the <i>enslavement of human beings</i>, to their being bought, sold and exchanged like merchandise, in disregard for their personal dignity. It is a sin against the dignity of persons and their fundamental rights to reduce them by violence to their productive value or to a source of profit. St. Paul directed a Christian master to treat his Christian slave "no longer as a slave but more than a slave, as a beloved brother, . . . both in the flesh and in the Lord." </blockquote><div>So “slavery,” as condemned by the Catholic Church, is to treat a human being as if they had no human dignity, as if they were simply merchandise, to reduce them by violence to being nothing more than a source of profit.</div><div><br /></div>Does the Bible endorse slavery, defined in this way? No. It repudiates that idea. Let’s look at “slavery” as it exists in the Bible. Some key passages are Exodus 21:2, 16, 20-21, 26-27; 22:1-2; 23:12; 25:39-55; Deuteronomy 15:12-18; 16:11, 15; 23:25-16; Ephesians 6:5-9; 1 Corinthians 7:17-24; Philemon 1. All but the last three here are from the Law of Moses as that law lays out rules relating to slavery.<div><br />Here’s my attempt to summarize the picture of “slavery” found in the Law of Moses:<blockquote>Often a person becomes a “slave” (or “servant”--see my note on terminology further down) by finding himself in a situation where he needs or owes money. A person may offer himself and his labor to another person in order to pay off a debt. A person could also become a slave by being a captive of a just war. Or a thief may be required to work to pay off the debt of what he has stolen. Also, parents are allowed to give their daughter in marriage to a person who has agreed to marry her and treat her as a wife and to receive monetary compensation for doing so. (However, if this happens, she must have full marriage rights. She cannot be given to others for money and required to work as a general servant, and if the person decides not to marry her, he must allow her to be taken back by her family. He might also have arranged for her to marry his son, in which case she must be treated as a daughter. If he won’t do any of these things, she must be released from the contract freely.) If the person who becomes a slave is an Israelite, he can only be a slave for six years. After that, he must be released. (This would apply to female servants as well as male servants.) All debts in general to Israelites are to be canceled every seventh year. If the Israelite male slave is set free before the end of the six years, he can leave with his wife and children if he was already married when he became a slave; but if the master had himself given the servant a wife, so that the wife also belongs to the master as a slave, she is not necessarily let go with her husband. The husband might choose to stay in that case. He might even choose to stay as a permanent slave. It is permissible to buy slaves from non-Israelites, and they can be made permanent servants. However, any slave who runs away from his master is not to be returned to his master (which seems to imply that the benefit of the doubt goes to the slave, that he has run away because he has been mistreated, etc.). Slaves have the right to fair treatment and respect for their rights in general. A slave can be corporally disciplined, but not severely. If any serious or permanent damage is done to a slave, that slave is set free. (Since slaves can simply run away and be free as well, perhaps the “setting free” in this case also implies the canceling of the debt that is being paid off in many cases.) If the master kills his servant, he is to be punished with death, as with other intentional homicides. (However, the homicide must be proven. If a slave dies, but his death is not clearly related to a beating received, the master is not to be blamed.) Slaves are to be allowed to rest on the Sabbath, and to participate in the holidays and festivals of Israel. No one is allowed to kidnap anyone and make him a slave. There has to be a just cause for someone to come to owe their labor to another person.</blockquote><p>Sometimes we find words like “buy” and “sell” associated with servanthood in the Law of Moses. We have to be careful to define terms here, for today the use of words like “buy” or “sell” to apply to people and their services has the connotation of treating people like merchandise instead of like people, stripping away all their natural human rights, etc. But this connotation is not present in the biblical use of such language, which merely indicates that monetary transactions are sometimes involved in transferring a person’s service from one “master” to another. If Floyd works for me (say, he is working as a requirement to pay off a debt), and John wants to give me money so that I will assign Floyd to work for him instead, one could say that I have “sold” Floyd to John, but this would not necessarily imply that I have stripped Floyd of his human rights or am treating him as dehumanized property. As I mentioned, and as can be seen from the passages I cited above the Bible is quite clear in its opposition to any “slavery” that dehumanizes persons. Even when master-servant relationships are recognized, there is always an exhortation to remember justice and human dignity in the midst of it, as, for example, in Ephesians 6:5-9:</p><blockquote>Servants, be obedient to them that are your masters according to the flesh, with fear and trembling, in singleness of your heart, as unto Christ; not with eyeservice, as menpleasers; but as the servants of Christ, doing the will of God from the heart; with good will doing service, as to the Lord, and not to men: Knowing that whatsoever good thing any man doeth, the same shall he receive of the Lord, whether he be bond or free. And, ye masters, do the same things unto them, forbearing threatening: knowing that your Master also is in heaven; neither is there respect of persons with him.</blockquote><p>Also, the idea of a particular race being enslaved because that race is inferior is a concept completely alien to the Bible. The concept of an “inferior race” itself is completely foreign to biblical categories. In the Bible, all human beings are said to be descended from Adam and Eve, as well as more recently from Noah, and they are all equal in fundamental worth. In Acts 17:26, St. Paul said that God “hath made of one blood all nations of men for to dwell on all the face of the earth.” It is certainly true that certain groups of people, such as the Canaanites and the Amalekites, become particularly wicked and are punished in extraordinary ways; but this has nothing to do with their race but with their wickedness. When Rahab the harlot chose to do the right thing and follow God, she was spared even though she was a Canaanite (Joshua 2:1-21). When Israel became wicked, God threatened to punish them with precisely the same punishments with which he punished the Canaanites. God, through the prophet Amos (in Amos 9:7), said this to Israel during one of their wicked periods:</p><blockquote>"Are ye not as children of the Ethiopians unto me, O children of Israel?" saith the Lord. "Have not I brought up Israel out of the land of Egypt? and the Philistines from Caphtor, and the Syrians from Kir?"</blockquote><p>In other words, Israel shouldn’t think they are better than others because of something intrinsic to their nature. “If I brought you up from Egypt,” says God, “well, I bring lots of people up from lots of places. So what?” In the context, the point God is making is that they should not expect special treatment merely because they are Israelites.</p>In the New Testament, in Acts 10:34-35, the Apostle Peter said, “Of a truth I perceive that God is no respecter of persons: But in every nation he that feareth him, and worketh righteousness, is accepted with him.” The Apostle Paul, speaking of the unity that exists in the Christian church, said, “There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither bond nor free, there is neither male nor female: for ye are all one in Christ Jesus” (Galatians 3:28). To the Colossians, he wrote that in Christ “there is neither Greek nor Jew, circumcision nor uncircumcision, Barbarian, Scythian, bond nor free: but Christ is all, and in all” (Colossians 3:11).</div><div><br />So I see nothing in the biblical teaching regarding slavery that contradicts modern Catholic Church teaching on this subject. The appearance of discrepancy is to a great degree dispelled simply by defining our terms more carefully and not equivocating over the meaning of words like “slavery.” With regard to the general question of the ethicality of slavery in the Bible, we must remember to keep in mind a few things:</div><div><br />We must remember to question our assumptions. This is especially an important thing to remember when we are dealing with moral issues, because moral positions are so often based not on rational evidence but on intuition and feelings, and they tend to be held very strongly and deeply and with great passion and zealousness by people, which makes them easy subjects of prejudice and bias and unquestioned assumptions. It is easy and natural for people, when discussing these sorts of subjects, to cling zealously to assumptions, to resent their being questioned, to get angry when another position is advocated or when objective questions are asked, and to refuse to listen to or think through or be teachable to alternative arguments or points of view. All of this is a great recipe for erroneous thinking based on unwarranted assumptions, so we must be very careful here to balance our passion for justice with an openness to rational inquiry and evidence.</div><div><br />We must be specific, nuanced, and thorough. As we have seen above, it is easy, with issues like this, to oversimplify our evaluation of the issue--such as by declaring the Bible contrary to modern Church ethics simply on the basis of the fact that the word “slavery” is condemned by the Catholic Church but is used in a positive way in some translations of the Bible, without asking more specific questions about the meaning of the word in different instances. Or it is easy--especially when influenced by passion and bias--to read the worst possible meaning into biblical texts rather than trying to give them as much benefit of doubt as is reasonably possible, which must be done if we will avoid question-begging in our argument against the Bible.</div><div><br />We should remember that, although the Bible is the Word of God, and so whatever it approves or advocates is advocated by God, yet sometimes God’s laws for humans are less than ideal. What I mean is that when moral ideas are translated into laws for particular human beings and particular human societies, those laws will be a mix between moral ideals and realistic conditions. Human lawmakers understand this. Sometimes an imperfect or corrupt system is in place that cannot be immediately abolished by legislation. In such a case, laws may be passed to bring conditions as close to the ideal as is reasonably possible. Situations or actions may be regulated without necessarily being approved as ideal. God sometimes does the same thing. Recognizing that they are not always ready to understand a full ideal, he leads his people slowly and gently, guiding them incrementally towards the full ideal. His commands might regulate what, in more ideal conditions, might be entirely abolished. This is true throughout Scripture. It is especially true when we are talking about the Law of Moses, which was an application of the moral law adapted to a particular people at a particular time in particular circumstances, and one of the purposes of which was to lead the people of Israel slowly and gently to a greater recognition of sin, salvation, and moral truths. Jesus himself explicitly acknowledges this about the Law of Moses in reference to divorce (see Matthew 19:3-9). Upon telling the people that divorce is unethical, he is challenged by the Pharisees who point out, rightly, that the Law of Moses permits and regulates divorce in some cases. He responds that Moses allowed this “because of the hardness of your hearts,” even though this was not the ideal from the beginning. Even though divorce is contrary to the ideal of God’s design for marriage, yet the people of Israel weren’t at a point where they could attain that ideal, and so the Law of Moses regulated divorce in non-ideal circumstances, trying to mitigate the harms and bring the situation as close to the ideal as was possible in that time and place. With regard to slavery, this means that we should not necessarily infer that just because God regulates certain relations between masters and servants that that implies that these relations represent what is ideal. In some cases, God may have been leading his people slowly over time to eventually overhaul their understanding of human relations more fundamentally, teaching them values incrementally, in ways that would be effective for them, so that those values would eventually bear fruit in them by bringing their hearts and their societies into conformity with the greater ideal.</div><div><br />So in order to make an argument against the Bible based on the moral issue of slavery, first we have to make sure our understanding of the facts are accurate, thorough, and nuanced, and not biased, incomplete, inaccurate, or oversimplified. Secondly, we have to show how a proper understanding of all the relevant facts leads necessarily to the conclusion that the Bible violates true morality. We will have to show that we know what true morality is, and that we can prove that our ideas about morality are correct without question-begging (such as by assuming Atheist assumptions without argument), and that we can truly and specifically show a contradiction between what is clearly in Scripture and what is clearly taught by the true moral law. This kind of argument is certainly possible, but it is a whole lot harder than most people realize who make attempts at it. Most people are content simply with vague, intuitive, feelings-based, oversimplified generalizations.</div><div><br />For more on biblical slavery, see <a href="https://www.christian-thinktank.com/qnoslave.html">this fascinating and well-researched article</a>. For more on the Catholic Church and slavery, see <a href="https://www.catholicnewsagency.com/resource/56007/slavery-and-the-catholic-church">here</a>.</div><div><br />Now what about the death penalty? Much of what I’ve said above in terms of how we should go about evaluating these sorts of questions applies to the death penalty as well as to slavery. Since my answer here is already very long, I will refer you to another article which addresses the death penalty objection. The article can be found <a href="http://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2018/08/the-death-penalty-in-catholic-teaching.html">here</a>.<br /><br />2. <i>“In Exodus 21:7-11, the Law of Moses allows parents to sell their daughter into slavery! How in the world could this ever be deemed ethical?! Obviously the Bible promotes moral monstrosities!”</i></div><div><i><br /></i>Here is the passage in question:<blockquote><blockquote>And if a man sell his daughter to be a maidservant, she shall not go out as the menservants do. If she please not her master, who hath betrothed her to himself, then shall he let her be redeemed: to sell her unto a strange nation he shall have no power, seeing he hath dealt deceitfully with her. And if he have betrothed her unto his son, he shall deal with her after the manner of daughters. If he take him another wife; her food, her raiment, and her duty of marriage, shall he not diminish. And if he do not these three unto her, then shall she go out free without money.</blockquote></blockquote><p>I summarized the basic idea here in my summary of the Law of Moses on slavery in #1 above. I’ll paste the relevant portion here:</p><blockquote>Also, parents are allowed to give their daughter in marriage to a person who has agreed to marry her and treat her as a wife and to receive monetary compensation for doing so. (However, if this happens, she must have full marriage rights. She cannot be given to others for money and required to work as a general servant, and if the person decides not to marry her, he must allow her to be taken back by her family. He might also have arranged for her to marry his son, in which case she must be treated as a daughter. If he won’t do any of these things, she must be released from the contract freely.)</blockquote><p>What moral objections could be raised against this? Perhaps the objection could be raised that this scenario violates the right of consent the daughter ought to have. The text says nothing about the daughter’s consent. The subject is simply not addressed. So we must be careful not to make unwarranted inferences and read ideas into the text that aren’t there. Does the Bible elsewhere address the question of consent in situations like this? I am not aware of a lot of places where this is addressed, but one passage does come to mind--the story of how Abraham’s servant found a wife for Isaac in Genesis 24. I won’t paste it all here, but go and read through it This is an interesting story in many ways, but one interesting thing about it is that it gives a rare glimpse into how the wife-to-be’s consent was thought of by the people involved in this scenario (see especially v. 8 and v. 57-58). It seems that her consent was considered essential to the whole affair. Does this mean that consent should be assumed in Exodus 21:7-11? The text simply doesn’t tell us. The law as written simply doesn’t address the subject. In Catholic marriage law, the consent of both parties is required for the marriage to be valid. What about Jewish law? Interestingly, it seems that Jewish law in the Talmud (a repository of Jewish traditions of interpretation of biblical law compiled not far from the time of Christ) requires consent for a marriage to be valid as well. (See the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jewish_views_on_marriage#Consent">Wikipedia article</a> on this.) So why assume that consent would not be a part of the equation in the scenario envisioned in Exodus 21? I am not aware of any good reason to make that assumption.</p>Perhaps it might be argued that the culture of the Ancient Near East in general treated women in ways that did not grant them the full rights and freedoms they ought to have. In such a context, it might be argued, there is not adequate protection for these rights in the Law of Moses or in biblical revelation in general. There might not be adequate protection for consent, for example, even if it is assumed to be necessary. It is true that in any human society--including both the societies of the Ancient Near East and our own modern American society--there are many imperfections. There is no human society where the full ideals of the moral law are fully lived up to and protected in such a way as to make it impossible for violations of those ideals to happen. I mentioned in my response to #1 above that the Law of Moses sometimes regulates things in the context of less-than-ideal circumstances. Moral violations and crimes happened in ancient Israel, despite God’s moral law and the Law of Moses. As we know from <a href="https://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2021/12/the-problem-of-evil.html">our overall answer to the problem of evil</a>, God allows evils to happen in this world and refrains from always preventing them because he sees it is for the greater overall good. This includes allowing human societies to exhibit the imperfections of the fallen human condition even to the point that no legislation can fully close off all the loopholes clever human sinners can find in order to engage in unethical acts and treat people unjustly. Different societies will be prone to different vices, as they will have different cultural personalities, different levels of knowledge, different moral sensibilities, etc. God, in his infinite wisdom, decides what to allow to happen, what to prevent, what to command, what to permit, what to regulate, what to legislate, what not to legislate, what to suggest or exhort to rather than to command or legislate, etc. Since he is omniscient and omnibenevolent, it makes sense for us to trust his judgment in such matters--that he is running the universe in the best way possible according to what is truly good and important overall.<br /><br />Perhaps it might be argued that it is inappropriate for the parents to receive money in return for agreeing to allow their daughter to marry the person. Why is this inappropriate? So long as it does not involve the dehumanizing of the daughter or the reducing of her to merchandise, why could not monetary compensation be involved in such an affair--especially if the family is in great need of money? The man who is marrying the daughter is receiving something very valuable, and the family is losing a beloved daughter (in the sense that she will no longer be living at home, etc.). Why should not this transaction involve some compensation? Can a clear, objective case against this be argued? If so, I am not yet able to formulate it. But even if someone believes that this is inappropriate, or at least subject to possible abuse and so a dangerous allowance, we must remember again that these laws are not only applications of pure moral ideals but are also attempts at realistic regulations within the particular circumstances of this particular society. As such, they might regulate a practice that is not ideal but which could not realistically be entirely abolished at that time. The law could mitigate a non-ideal situation in order to move the people of Israel closer to a more adequate manifestation of the greater ideal over time.</div><div><br />If other objections are raised, we must keep in mind the rules of good, thorough, nuanced, and objective reasoning that we’ve outlined and tried to apply above and to remember to try to avoid oversimplification, bias rooted in highly charged emotions, etc.<br /><br />3. <i>“But all of your reasoning above is simply an attempt to justify the unjustifiable. You seek to whitewash what is plainly unethical by overcomplicating the matter.”</i><br /><br />No, that’s not what I’m doing at all. I am pointing out genuine complexities and nuances that are relevant to the evaluation of this issue, particularly as the issue is raised in order to function as an objection to the claim that the Bible is the Word of God.</div><div><br />It is certainly true that one fallacious way of reasoning that people often employ is to whitewash the clear apprehension of truth by means of introducing unnecessary confusion and obscurity. That is something to watch out for. Whether anyone is doing this in any particular case has to be evaluated on the basis of a careful look at the evidence. However, it should also be remembered that there is an opposite fallacy to watch out for as well. People can sometimes try to avoid criticism and questioning of their own views and arguments by portraying the other side’s arguments as “unnecessary and confusing complications,” thus making people ignore important nuances and complexities and instead simply accept a biased and feelings-based assessment of the issue without serious questioning. This is especially effective when an opponent’s argument goes against the grain of common intuitions and prejudices within a certain culture. In such a case, people are already inclined to be suspicious of the argument, and so they are easily led to dismiss it as false without adequate and serious consideration. (And, of course, it should be remembered too that people sometimes resort to these sorts of fallacies without necessarily intending to do so consciously and deceptively. The users of these fallacious ways of reasoning are sometimes the victims of their own fallaciousness. As always, the antidote is to keep practicing the four “skills of the class”: 1. Define terms, and have clear and distinct ideas. 2. Be self-aware and other-aware. 3. Question all assumptions. 4. Have a proper balance between teachability and tenacity of belief.)</div><div><br /></div><div>For more general apologetics for Christianity, see <a href="http://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2020/07/why-christianity-brief-philosophical.html">here</a>, <a href="http://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2020/08/the-heart-of-christianity-and-reality.html">here</a>, and <a href="https://www.lulu.com/en/us/shop/mark-hausam/why-christianity-is-true/ebook/product-23661762.html">here</a>.</div>Mark Hausamhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07371790103414979060noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-808697756426649418.post-73201553165302641772021-12-22T16:23:00.002-06:002022-12-14T10:18:42.480-06:00The Problem of Evil<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Why the Problem of Evil Is Difficult to Answer</b></p><p>The problem of evil is one of the classic concerns/arguments raised against the existence of God. "If God is all-powerful and all-good, how could there be evil and suffering in the world? If God is all-powerful, he can eliminate the evil. If he is all-good, he would want to. So there should be no evil." Personally, I do not find it to be a terribly difficult objection to deal with on an intellectual level, but it is very tough to respond to overall. I think perhaps that one of the reasons for this is because it strikes hard on the emotional level. The sufferings caused by the evils in this world are felt very deeply, and evil, as the hymn says, seems "oft so strong." It is difficult, when one is the midst of experiencing great evil or suffering, to imagine how the allowance of such evils could be justified, or to see how any good could possibly counterbalance them. Consider a novel as an analogy. The characters in the novel, while in the midst of the apparent victory of evil (it is typical in a story for the power of evil to reach its greatest height, its victory apparently assured, right before the climactic "eucatastrophe"--as Tolkien called it--where good finally defeats evil), cannot imagine how evil could be defeated and good could possibly win. (I think of Sam's great speech to this effect in <i>The Two Towers</i> movie.) The end of the story is very difficult to conceive of from the vantage point of the middle of the story.</p><p>Because pain and wickedness are felt deeply, and because of the difficulty of envisioning the end from the middle, it is difficult for people oftentimes to give an unbiased intellectual hearing to answers to the problem of evil. It feels like a betrayal or a trivialization of the greatness of the pain to hear someone make an argument for how the allowance of such evils in the world could be justified, or how the allowance of evil leads to a greater good. No matter how intellectually convincing such arguments are, on an intuitive and emotional level, they <i>feel</i> woefully inadequate to the reality.</p><p>That is all very understandable, and yet, if we wish to get reality right, we must try to approach even this topic with sound, objective reason. We must distinguish between what our feelings tell us and the intellectual merits of the arguments. This is one place where the virtue of faith comes in. Faith is believing to be true what one has good reason to believe to be true even when the appearances are against it. I once heard the concept of faith illustrated by means of the idea of an airplane pilot flying through thick clouds. The pilot's intuition, judging from the appearances out his window, keeps telling him that he is about to crash into a mountain, but his instruments tell him he is nowhere near the mountains and there is no danger on his current trajectory. The pilot has to suppress his instincts and intuitions and trust his instruments. (I have no idea if pilots actually experience situations like this, not having any experience with flying anything, but the analogy is still useful either way.) That is how the virtue of faith works. Our reason leads us to certain conclusions, and yet our instincts make these conclusions seem false. We have to trust our reason over our intuitions and over the appearances. But this can be very difficult, and we must be careful to give ourselves and other people what we and they need at the time. The existence of evil poses intellectual challenges to the idea of God. These challenges must be met by rational arguments. But when people are in the midst of evil, they often need comfort, encouragement, pastoral care, and other kinds of personal and emotional support as much as or more than they need intellectual answers. We cannot respond to the legitimate intellectual challenges by expressions of emotion or platitudes, nor can we properly comfort and encourage people simply by giving them intellectual answers to arguments. Both of these have an essential role, but they must recognize their proper place.</p><p style="text-align: center;"><b>A Response to the Problem of Evil</b></p><p>So here is how I think the Christian worldview can provide an intellectually-satisfying answer to the problem of evil:</p><p>God is the Supreme Being, the Creator. He is also the Supreme Good. He embodies the fullness of being, goodness, knowledge, wisdom, life, happiness, etc. To know God is to know the fullness of joy and to be completely satisfied. God himself exists as a Trinity of persons who delight in knowing and loving each other eternally.</p><p>God created the world in order to display and share his glorious perfections, to fill up the emptiness of the world with the joy of who he is. As God's creatures, our ultimate happiness can come only from finally achieving the Beatific Vision - the joy of fully knowing God in eternal life, of which we only have a foretaste in this life.</p><p>But to know God fully, and to reach the joy of knowing God fully, one has to understand the nature of what God is not as well as what God is. God is the fullness of being, life, goodness, wisdom, happiness, etc., so the absence of God, the opposite of God, entails emptiness, death, evil, foolishness, misery, etc. That is why the opposite of God is hell, and hell is the destiny of beings who intentionally, with full understanding of what they are doing, cut themselves off from God (what Catholics call "mortal sin"). Hell is the natural as well as the just consequence of rejecting and opposing God, of not giving him the love that is due to him or finding our happiness ultimately in him.</p><p>In order for God to display and share his supreme goodness in and with the world, he has seen fit to allow evil and suffering to exist in the world. Only by experiencing and understanding evil and suffering can we truly come to know God fully. Evil and suffering are hateful to God, and yet he allows them to happen in the world to bring about the greater good of sharing the joy of who he is. God is all-knowing and all-wise, so he knows what is best, and he only allows evil and suffering in the way and to the degree necessary to bring about the greatest good. His plan for history, both in terms of the good he brings about and the evils he allows, is best suited to accomplish that greatest good. The Supreme Good of who God is infinitely outweighs the worst evils that can happen in the universe, for while the evils and sufferings of this world are very great, God is infinitely greater. We can understand this idea in general and see the reason behind it, but, with our limited knowledge, we rarely understand why God does or allows the particular things he does. In fact, our own ignorance of the full meaning of what is happening is one of the things God allows in the world as part of his overall good plan.</p><p>God is not unjust in allowing the evils and sufferings he does. None of us deserve any good from God, for everything we have, every aspect of our existence and life, is a free gift from him. We are nothing in comparison to God or without God. God is the supreme source of all being and goodness. These things belong to him and to no one else. God does not owe it to any being to bring it into existence, or to keep it from falling into evil or suffering when it does exist. And not only that, but we are sinners. Left to ourselves without his grace (the help that comes to us when God shares with us his own life and power), we inevitably fall into foolishness, weakness, wickedness, and misery. Our first parents fell into mortal sin against God, and all their descendants come into this world following in their footsteps. Only God's grace can turn us from mortal sin to supreme love to God. God sent his Son--the Second Person of the Trinity--into the world in order to share with us his divine life and give us the means of deliverance from evil. God the Son became a sharer in our humanity, uniting himself to us, so that he could absorb into himself all our emptiness, foolishness, weakness, sinfulness, and misery, sharing with us the fullness of his divine life, wisdom, power, goodness, and joy. He has thus provided deliverance from our fallen condition, though the process of that deliverance takes place over a lifetime (and sometimes longer) and is usually painful (much like healing from a serious disease in a hospital is often a painful experience, though it leads to the revival of life rather than to death). Left to ourselves, we are rebels against God and on the path to hell, but God in his grace gives us another path--the path back to him and to happiness. Thus God is not unjust in allowing the evils to come upon us that he does, and we must remember that he only allows those evils that are best for the overall good. If we trust him in these things and follow him, though our way may be very painful, in the end it will lead us to what is best.</p><p>I think the picture of reality described above shows how the existence of evil is not incompatible with the existence of an all-powerful and all-good God, and so answers the problem of evil. The various points of this picture derive from the existence of the classical theistic God, and so if that God is shown to exist, these points all logically follow, as I have shown <a href="http://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2020/07/why-christianity-brief-philosophical.html">here</a> (briefly) and <a href="https://www.lulu.com/en/us/shop/mark-hausam/why-christianity-is-true/ebook/product-23661762.html?page=1&pageSize=4">here</a> (more fully).</p><p style="text-align: center;"><b>A Response to a Follow-Up Question</b></p><p>In order to shed further light on the problem of evil, I would like to follow up the above summary with my answer to a specific question regarding biblical morality which was asked of me in a different context. Below is that question and my response to it.</p><p><i>“What about the killing of infants and animals in the Bible as they are swept up in God’s punishments. For example, in response to the Amalekites’ attack on Israel a few hundred years earlier, God tells King Saul to wipe out all the Amalekites. 1 Samuel 15:1-3: ‘Samuel also said unto Saul, "The Lord sent me to anoint thee to be king over his people, over Israel: now therefore hearken thou unto the voice of the words of the Lord.</i><i> Thus saith the Lord of hosts, 'I remember that which Amalek did to Israel, how he laid wait for him in the way, when he came up from Egypt.</i><i> Now go and smite Amalek, and utterly destroy all that they have, and spare them not; but slay both man and woman, infant and suckling, ox and sheep, camel and ass.’ "' How can this be just?”</i></p><p>It is easier to see why God brings strong punishments on wilful sinners, particularly those who commit mortal sins (which involve a knowing and willing rejection of God as one’s supreme good and a turning away fundamentally from him). If God is the Supreme Being, he is the Supreme Good, the source of all being and goodness, and so he is supremely valuable (as I argued in <a href="http://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2020/07/why-christianity-brief-philosophical.html">my case for the existence of God and my case for Christianity</a> which I wrote up with Robert). Therefore, rejection of him or opposition to him or contempt for him will be supremely bad and will naturally and justly reap supremely bad consequences (in other words, hell). It is not surprising, in light of this, that God brings strong penalties on sinners in the Bible. When God punishes sin, his punishments are not arbitrary. With God, there is no ultimate distinction between a punishment or a reward and a natural consequence, for nature itself comes from God and his will. God’s punishments are not arbitrary, but are logical and rational, in accordance with his divine nature and the very nature of reality itself. He simply allows the sin to reap what it truly and naturally deserves and brings upon itself. And his punishments are not unjustly harsh. An Atheist or an Agnostic might see God’s punishments (whether in nature, in Christian theology, or in the Bible) as harsh, but that, I think, is partly owing to their assumption that God doesn’t exist. If God doesn’t exist, he is of no importance, and so sin against him is no big deal, and so it doesn’t deserve or warrant any serious punishment or consequences. But if God exists, as I said above, he is supremely important, and so sin against him is supremely serious, and the consequences of sin supremely dire.</p><p>But what about when God brings serious negative consequences on those who do not commit mortal sin or are incapable of mortal sin--like infants and animals? Is this just? We have to keep in mind that God is the Supreme Being and the Supreme Good. He possesses all being, goodness, value, and happiness. They belong to him. They are a part of his divine life. No one possesses these things other than him. Apart from him, they do not exist. Apart from God, there is only non-being, emptiness, death, evil, and misery, as I argued in my case for Christianity. If any being who is not God experiences happiness, it is only as an unmerited gift from God. We have nothing of our own that naturally attains or merits or warrants the happiness that is part of God’s own life. Everything we have is a gift of God, and what we have as mere creatures is infinitely inferior to God. Without the unmerited gift of God’s own life (which is what theologians call “grace”), we are doomed to evil and misery. Although infants and animals are not capable of personal sin, they are part of the created and fallen world. They do not naturally possess happiness or a right to happiness. They are naturally prone to suffering. When our first parents fell into sin, they brought the whole human race along with them, and, as St. Paul says (Romans 8), the creation itself is subject to the bondage to decay until it shares in the liberation of the children of God which comes through Christ. Although infants do not commit personal sin, they are fallen creatures who do not deserve happiness, and, not being God, they are naturally subject to evil and misery. God, for good and just reasons in his overall plan, has allowed the consequences of the Fall of our first parents to come to them and cause them to be born into the world without the grace of what Catholics call “original justice”--that condition in which grace kept our first parents holy and happy before they rejected it. As a result of this, they share in the misery of their first parents to the extent they are capable of it, even as infants. But they are also sinners in embryo. When they grow up and develop the capacity for moral action, they will, without grace, grow up into mortal sinners themselves. So, being part of fallen humanity, they share in their own way in the lot of fallen humanity. Their suffering, however, cannot be the same or at the same level with the suffering of those who commit personal mortal sin, for God punishes no one for that which they do not deserve.</p><p>In the case of the adult Amalekites in the text, they had not lived at the time the Israelites came out of Egypt, so why are they punished for what their ancestors did? As with the infants, I don’t think we should think of what happened to them as a “punishment” in the strict sense--as if God were blaming them personally for something they didn’t do. Rather, he was simply bringing the consequences of their ancestors’ behavior upon them. These Amalekites were fallen human sinners. As such, they were already subject to death and the sufferings of this life. If God, in his providential plan of history, chose to allow that to manifest itself by means of a link between generations--so that one generation reaped the failures of an earlier generation--there is nothing that can be shown to be unjust about that. It is very similar to the case of the infants mentioned in the previous paragraph, but with the added element that these were adults who were personal sinners themselves. And there is no evidence that they had repented of their ancestors’ actions or regretted them at all, or had changed in their basic approach to life (attacking innocent people and killing them, etc.). For this reason as well it was not inappropriate for God to bring upon them the consequences of their ancestors’ sins. In general, God often allows our actions to affect others and their actions to affect us. Human beings are often the recipients of the consequences of other human beings’ good or bad actions. The ultimate examples of this are all of us inheriting original sin from Adam and Eve, and those who are saved receiving the benefits of Christ’s atonement. But in everyday, ordinary life, we often see less dramatic versions of the same basic principle, especially with parents and children (as children often receive great harm or great good from the actions of their parents).</p><p>What about animals? They, too, are creatures and are part of this fallen world, though, unlike human infants, they are not sinners in embryo. They will never be capable of moral action. That capacity is contrary to their nature. Still, they are not God, and so they do not deserve happiness, and they are justly subject to share in the consequences of being part of a fallen world, though they cannot suffer the same way that those guilty of personal mortal sin can suffer. If God. for good and just reasons, has chosen to allow them to share in the calamities of being part of our fallen world, we have no basis to declare this to be wrong or unjust.</p><p>We can even think of adult humans who committed no personal mortal sin. Of course, there are not many of those. We can think of Jesus <a href="https://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2018/01/john-baptist-immaculate-conception-of.html">and Mary</a>. They could not suffer exactly the same way that those guilty of personal mortal sin can suffer, but they did suffer. They could suffer because they were human and so were finite creatures, and also because they lived in the context of a fallen world. (Jesus was, of course, God as well as human, but he was [and is] fully human. He took upon himself the fullness of our humanity along with its weaknesses and frailties and sufferings, though in him that humanity was united to the divine nature.) In the case of Jesus and Mary, and indeed any of us fallen sinners who, by grace, have repented and chosen to turn to God, our suffering can take on a voluntary and redemptive quality. That is, we can willingly accept the suffering God providentially brings into our lives and choose to embrace the good that it leads to for ourselves, for others, and for the glory of God. Christ voluntarily accepted suffering in order to overcome it and liberate others from sin and its consequences, and we who are in Christ are given the privilege likewise of offering up for the good of others our suffering and the virtues that are involved in suffering in pursuit of God. God can use our suffering to help others in many ways, and we can be a willing part of that.</p><p>A closing note in general on this whole discussion of God’s punishments and negative consequences in Scripture. When we discuss these things, we must be careful not to give an unbalanced emphasis to some things in the Bible over others. This is especially something to watch out for when we do not really know the Bible very well. There are lots of Atheists, I suspect, who know virtually nothing about the Bible except the “harsh” passages Atheists like to throw around. But anyone who knows the Bible holistically is well aware that to think of the Bible as if it solely consisted of these “harsh” passages is to grossly misrepresent it. In fact, the emphasis of the Bible, and of the Christian worldview grounded in it, is quite the opposite. God is love (1 John 4:8). Love is the chief characteristic of his life. The members of the Trinity delight in their love for each other. Love is what created the world, as God chose to let that Trinitarian love overflow into creation. We are saved by love. Our salvation from sin and misery has come about because God the Son died on the cross to save us. He gave his life out of love for us and love for his Father. God is “merciful and gracious, slow to anger, and plenteous in mercy” (Psalm 103:8). And when God allows evil and suffering to happen in the world, and when he allows and ordains in his providence that evil reap its just and natural consequences, he is not acting contrary to love, but according to it. When we love someone or something, we hate that which would destroy or defame what we love and value. God’s punishment of evil is simply the flip-side of the coin of his love. (Again, Atheists and some others see God’s punishments as arbitrary and cruel because they do not interpret them in their proper context, taking seriously that God is the Supreme Good so that sin against him is the supreme evil and calamity.) God only allows evil when he knows it will bring about a greater overall happiness in the ultimate view, as it allows his divine life to be experienced fully and so loved and delighted in to the happiness of all who choose to embrace it. The Bible is full of beautiful exhortations to love our neighbors, to love our enemies, calls to social justice (think of Jesus and the Old Testament prophets), calls to fairness and equity among all, etc. Some of the most beautiful passages advocating compassion are in the Law of Moses (Exodus 22:21-25; 23:1-12; Leviticus 19:9-18, for example), and many more in the prophets, in the New Testament, etc. So let’s remember to keep a balanced view of the whole context of Scripture and the Christian worldview when discussing these matters.</p><p>For more general apologetics for Christianity, see <a href="http://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2020/07/why-christianity-brief-philosophical.html">here</a>, <a href="http://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2020/08/the-heart-of-christianity-and-reality.html">here</a>, and <a href="https://www.lulu.com/en/us/shop/mark-hausam/why-christianity-is-true/ebook/product-23661762.html">here</a>.</p>Mark Hausamhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07371790103414979060noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-808697756426649418.post-87143866175147585422021-09-06T15:58:00.003-05:002022-06-30T11:35:32.412-05:00A Narrative of the History of My Thinking Regarding the Doctrine of Justification<p>My views on the doctrine of justification, <i>per se</i>, have actually remained pretty consistent since at least 2000 or 2001, around twenty years ago. During my earlier Christian years, back during high school (early to mid 90s), I know I held a basically Augustinian doctrine of justification, which is basically the doctrine of the Catholic Church (as can be seen <a href="http://www.scborromeo.org/ccc/p3s1c3a2.htm">here</a> and <a href="https://history.hanover.edu/texts/trent/ct06.html">here</a>). During college (1996-2000), after I became significantly influenced by Calvinism, I thought a lot about the doctrine of justification. I remember holding a view that I thought was faithful to <a href="https://christiantruth.com/articles/articles-roman-catholicism/justification/">the Reformed doctrine of justification</a> but which took seriously the concerns of the Augustinian view, but I don't remember precisely what that view was or to what extent it really differed in substance from my earlier or my later Augustinianism.</p><p>But in 2000 or 2001, I remember very clearly coming to realize that the Augustinian view of justification was correct, and that this would bring me into conflict with the Reformed doctrine. At that time, we (my wife and first child) had recently moved to Utah and had joined the Orthodox Presbyterian Church. I was a gung-ho Calvinist (at least in terms of the <a href="https://www.desiringgod.org/articles/what-we-believe-about-the-five-points-of-calvinism">"doctrines of grace,"</a> though I disagreed with some other aspects of the Reformed system) and a staunch enemy of <a href="https://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2019/04/was-arminius-really-arminian-in-bad.html">Arminianism</a>. As I very strongly identified as a Calvinist and considered the Calvinist doctrines of grace to be expressive of what I felt was at the core of my theology and worldview, I was not particularly interested in disagreeing with Calvinists over the doctrine of justification, which is a very important doctrine and one which Calvinists often see as a lynchpin of their whole worldview (so much so as to basically consider any theology that doesn't hold to their doctrine on the subject not really fully Christian at all). Nevertheless, I was strongly convinced that the Augustinian view was correct and the Reformed doctrine wrong, and I was not going to pretend otherwise. I informed our pastor of my position, and he made some weak attempts to persuade me out of it, but no real conflict or rift arose out of the matter. I was a great fan of Martin Luther's book <i>The Bondage of the Will</i>, and I had noticed that Luther seemed to hold an Augustinian view of justification rather than the later merely-forensic Protestant view that later Lutherans and Reformed would accept. I read some other places in Luther which seemed to confirm me in this impression, so I was very interested to make use of Luther (and, of course, of St. Augustine) as an ally in my attempts to defend my position to my pastor as truly Christian and biblical and not inimical to the heart of the Reformed worldview overall (and even as a position more consistent with that very heart). During this time period, which lasted from 2000 or 2001 to 2003, I wrote a paper defending the Augustinian view and critiquing the Reformed view. I wrote the paper either in 2001 or 2002. I know it was completed by April of 2002. I gave it to my pastor to read. I am very grateful that I kept track of that paper, which <a href="http://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2015/07/the-augustinian-and-protestant.html">I also published on my blog</a> much later in 2015.</p><p>As I mentioned, I was very interested in avoiding a rift between myself and the Reformed world over such an important doctrine, and so I tried very hard to think of how I might make my position seem more palatable to Reformed sensibilities or even to reconcile the two positions. In the summer of 2003, I thought of a way to reconcile the positions. The Reformed view says that we are justified--made righteous before God--only by the righteousness of Christ imputed to us (credited to our account), while the Augustinian view says that we are justified by the righteousness of Christ being infused into us by the Holy Spirit, making us actually internally righteous. In the Reformed view, Christ satisfies for our sins and merits righteousness for us, and his satisfaction and righteousness become ours by a legal imputation which is complete and sufficient for justification apart from any internal moral transformation of the sinner (though the Reformed say that a person who is justified will be internally transformed as an accompaniment of justification). In the Catholic view, Christ satisfies for our sins and merits righteousness for us, and that satisfaction and righteousness become ours by the Holy Spirit infusing their virtue into our hearts, causing us to repent and turn from our sins and to love God and our neighbors. But I figured out a way that I could interpret the Reformed view to be consistent with the Augustinian view: I could think of "imputation" as Christ's righteousness being, as it were, "deeded over to us," made ours (much as one might sign a contract and thus come into possession of a house, or a car, etc.). Then, that righteousness is infused into us, making us actually righteous. Since the righteousness by which we are justified is Christ's originally and not ours, and becomes ours only by a gift of grace, we can only come into possession of it if God graciously transfers it to our ownership. So I took "imputation" to be God's transferring Christ's righteousness to our ownership, while I took internal sanctification by the Spirit to be God's applying that transferred righteousness to our lives and thus making us experientially what imputation makes us legally. Justification and sanctification, in this way of thinking, would be like the difference between coming to own a house and coming to actually move into the house. Or, to use a better analogy, it is as if, in order to get into some fancy club, one were required to wear a tuxedo. I don't own a tuxedo, but a friend gives me one freely. His decision to transfer the tuxedo to my possession would be the equivalent of justification, while my actually putting on the tuxedo would be the equivalent of sanctification. If I want to get into the club, I cannot simply legally own a tuxedo; I must be wearing it. But I can only wear it because it was "imputed" to me; that is, its ownership was legally transferred to me.</p><p>I felt that this way of reading the Reformed view was faithful to that view while also reconciling it with the Augustinian view. As I had previously interpreted the Reformed view, it seemed there was a rift because the Augustinians held that one becomes right before God by an actual inward transformation of the moral character while the Reformed held that one becomes right before God merely and solely by a legal imputation exclusive of inward moral transformation. But in this new interpretation, the gap seemed to be bridged. We could be said to have the legal basis to be right before God by mere imputation, because by imputation alone Christ's righteousness comes to be legally ours; but, in actual experience, we require that righteousness to be infused within us and transform us before we will be acceptable to God's moral view. The legal is not enough, because the legal would be merely a dead fiction unless what is legal also becomes experientially real. And yet the legal is fully sufficient, not experientially, but <i>legally</i>. The house does me no good experientially until I actually move into it, and yet the house is legally mine purely by the legal contract that deeds it over to me. Thus the Reformed concern that legal imputation alone be the legal basis of justification is preserved, and so is the Augustinian concern that our actually, experientially, being righteous in the sight of God be a product of our actual moral transformation.</p><p>So I felt from this time forward that I could consider the Reformed view my own and use the Reformed language to express it. I went on to become a ruling elder in the Orthodox Presbyterian Church. Occasionally, I would preach or lecture on the doctrine of justification, and in such sermons and lectures I would express my own theology on the subject (as I did, for example, in <a href="http://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2016/05/a-sermon-on-justification-and.html">this sermon from somewhere around 2010</a>). I always felt less hostile towards the Catholic doctrine of justification than most of my Reformed companions, because I knew that I myself could express my own doctrine in their Augustinian terms, even though I could also express it in Reformed terms. My reconciliation with the Reformed position did not come from any doctrinal change on my part from my Augustinian views, but only from my ability to interpret the Reformed view as consistent with the Augustinian view. (You can see <a href="https://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2019/04/justification-and-mortal-and-venial-sin.html">here</a> some documentation that illustrates what I thought about the Catholic doctrine of justification during this time period.) For most of this time period (2003-2015), I felt I totally agreed both with the substance and with the form of expression of the Catholic Augustinian view of justification <i>per se</i> (while disagreeing on some other matters related to the doctrine), and I sometimes felt annoyed that the Reformed had such an antipathy to the Catholic view that I could not freely express myself in Augustinian terms without setting off unnecessary alarm bells. Towards the very end of this period, perhaps from about 2014 to 2015, I began to think that maybe the Reformed had a point in objecting to the Augustinian terminology (but not the substance of the Augustinian view). Perhaps St. Augustine's language, by not clearly distinguishing between imputation and infusion, led to a misunderstanding in which people might think that they gained justification, not by a sheer act of God's mercy granting to us what is not our own, but by somehow earning it by cooperating with God's grace and doing good works. But I never thought that that was what St. Augustine or the faithful Augustinians who followed him, including many Catholics, really believed.<br /></p><p>In 2015, I become convinced of the truth of Catholicism over against Protestantism. (You can read my whole narrative on this <a href="http://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2015/06/a-trajectory-of-doctrinal-progression.html">here</a>.) Obviously, this led to a significant revival of my interest in the relationship between the Augustinian and the Protestant doctrines of justification. I found my old Augustinian paper and published it on my blog. Over the past few years, <a href="https://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/search/label/Justification%20%2F%20Merit">I've written several articles</a> on the doctrine of justification. Justification posed no problem for me in becoming Catholic, for obvious reasons. I had already had for decades an Augustinian view on the subject. My views on the nature of justification, <i>per se</i>, didn't have to change at all in substance. And now I could speak with less constraint about my views regarding the Augustinian form of the doctrine and examine more publicly and directly in writing and dialogue the compatibility or lack thereof between the Catholic and the Reformed doctrines. I began to put forward two different interpretations of the Protestant doctrine of justification--the one I held to before I learned how I might reconcile the two positions, and the one that enabled me to find such a reconciliation. I eventually started calling the former interpretation the <i>Anti-Augustinian</i> view and the latter the <i>Pro-Augustinian</i> view. (I laid out the two positions and introduced this terminology for categorizing them in <a href="https://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2018/01/what-exactly-is-protestant-doctrine-of.html">this article</a>.) And I have been trying for some time to get my Reformed friends and acquaintances to dialogue with me about these subjects, wanting to see what they have to say about these two different interpretations of their doctrine, although, for some reason, I have found generally what appears to be a lack of interest in doing so. I do not know if this comes from their thinking me disingenuous in raising the issue, as if I was pretending to want to dialogue only in order to try to convert them to Catholicism (this is false), if they are reluctant to engage with this subject because they are unsure themselves what to think about it, if they are simply very busy (which is understandable!), etc.</p><p>My interest in dialoguing with Reformed people on this subject has increased over the past year or so, because I have increasingly been coming to suspect that my so-called <i>Pro-Augustinian</i> interpretation of the Protestant position is not really consistent with the original meaning of the Protestant language and with how Reformed poeple have typically understood their own position. I am beginning to think that, when I developed this interpretation back in 2003, rather than coming up with a legitimate interpretation of the Reformed view that allowed me to reconcile it with the Augustinian view as I thought I was doing, all I did was figure out how to express the Augustinian view--which, in substance, is contrary to the Reformed view, as I had previously thought--in Reformed language, thus hiding what would be fundamentally objectionable to the Reformed mind if it was understood what I really meant by what I was saying. But I am still uncertain on this point. I also suspect that there is perhaps some greater nuance here: While the Augustinian view might be at odds in substance with the Reformed view, perhaps Reformed people hold a genuine mix of Augustinian and Reformed ideas in their thinking--not taking the Reformed view fully to its logical conclusion but watering it down a bit with Augustinian ways of thinking. Perhaps it is this Augustinian element in the Reformed psyche that has made it easier for me to see the Reformed view and the Augustinian view as reconcilable, even if, strictly speaking in terms of the doctrines themselves taken to their logical conclusions, they are not. But, again, I am not entirely certain on these points. I feel I would benefit greatly from some real, substantial dialogue with Reformed people on this subject.</p><p><b>ADDENDUM 1/13/22</b>: I recently came across an email conversation I had back in 2001 with a Latter-day Saint friend in which I was trying to explain to him certain aspects of classical Christian theology. In that email, among other things, I articulate my view at that time of the doctrine of justification and the difference between the Protestant and the Augustinian doctrines. Here is a snippet from that email, dated 4/29/01:</p><p></p><blockquote>Let me explain a little more cleary how works fit into salvation in my theology and in the theology of most Evangelicals (including BSF'ers). First of all, you mention that you know Christians have some concept of reward that nobody has as yet been able to quantify for you. Well, let me do a little long-needed quantifying :). There are two different understandings of the reward issue which are connected with two different doctrines of justification, the Augustinian doctrine and the Protestant doctrine. I am an Augustinian, while almost all Evangelicals hold the Protestant view. The Protestant view is this: We cannot earn God's favor by our works, either before or after being converted by God's grace, for two reasons: 1. Our works in this life are mixed with sin and therefore are judged insufficient by God's standards and merit his condemnation rather than his favor, and 2. Even if we could do perfect works (and we will in heaven), they would not pass God's judgement for reward because they are judged in the context of all of our works. So if you sin once, you have forever lost all possibility of earning God's reward by your works, because the sin destroys the perfection of your slate, and perfection is the only thing God accepts. So how do works fit in? Well, those who are regenerated by God's grace have a new heart put within them which causes them to do good works. That doesn't mean that good works just "happen" to us without our will, because the new heart produces good works in us by giving us a new will which desires to do good works and therefore does them. The impartation of a holy character within us which drives us to obey God always accompanies the forgiveness of our sins; you never have one without the other. Not only this, but God, having forgiven our sins, now gives our good works a gratuitous estimate. In otherwords, while truly speaking, our good works do not deserve God's reward, yet they are seen outside of the context of our sins (because they are forgiven) and thus they are gratuitously estimated and granted the reward due to perfectly good works. This is how works fit in in traditional Protestantism. </blockquote><blockquote>Now for Augustinianism (my view): Augustinians hold, like the Protestants, that we can do nothing to earn God's favor, because we are sinners by nature. However, Augustinians equate justification with sanctification. That is, we believe that God justifies us, makes us worthy of God's favor, not by simply gratuitously estmating our works in light of forgiveness, but by giving us a new heart which truly is worthy of God's favor. We believe that, by God's grace, we are given new hearts to do God's will (in this we say the same as the Protestant view), and that the righteousness which flows from our new heart IN FACT does merit God's approval and favor (in this we are different). This does not give us a ground for boasting, because while we do gain God's approval by our righteousness, yet this righteousness was not produced from us or from our will but is totally the gift of God's unmerited favor. It is like if someone puts their money in your bankrupt account, you really do have money in your account, it is your money, you can really buy things with it, and yet it is not there because you produced it by earning it but because someone gave it to you as a gift. So ultimately it is not your money but your friends, and you do not attribute it to yourself but to your friend. Also, while the regenerate do have a new, righteous heart, yet our nature is not perfectly renewed in this life. We still have the remnant of the old sinful nature with which we wrestle all of our lives, so we cry out in groaning like Paul in Romans 7. But the God who began his work in us when we were yet dead in sin will not be stopped by remaining imperfections (however ugly, and they are that!) but will complete what he has begun, and this is our hope. We do not please God perfectly in this life, but we are going in the right direction and this pleases him, and he will someday complete his work in us and make us spotless images of his perfect Son. And he will then have a perfect delight in his reflection in us to all eternity as we delight perfectly in him. If this discussion raises any more questions, do not hesitate to ask. It is hard to be thorough and completely clear in this context.</blockquote><p></p><p>My father was also involved in this conversation, and in a reply email to me (same date) he had this to say about my comments on justification:</p><p></p><blockquote>That's a really good response. One thing that I haven't been quite aware of, though, I guess, is the distinction that you are making with the "Augustinian" vs. "Protestant" positions on justification. The "Augustinian" position, as you describe it, sounds a lot like the traditional Catholic position, as I understand it. I thought you probably did not agree with that, or at least didn't agree completely. And in this context, I assume that Calvin probably held the "Protestant" position, or at least something close to it. Correct me if I'm wrong.</blockquote><p><b>ADDENDUM 6/30/22:</b> A few days ago, I found an old CD which turned out to contain, among other things, a collection of documents I wrote up back in 2003 while I was coming to the conclusion that the gap between the Augustinian and the Reformed doctrines of justification could be bridged. The writings document my attempt to process this question from the beginning, where I seem skeptical that the gap could be bridged, to the end, where I was just about ready to conclude that it could be. See <a href="http://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2022/06/documentation-of-my-attempt-to-bridge.html">here</a> for those documents and my commentary on them.</p><p></p>Mark Hausamhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07371790103414979060noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-808697756426649418.post-36118847998074899652021-08-02T17:40:00.006-05:002022-06-04T09:59:17.406-05:00Is "Legal Righteousness" Something Ultimately Distinct from "Moral Goodness"? A Response to Charles Hodge's Defense of the Protestant Doctrine of Justification<p>Charles Hodge was one of the best Reformed theologians of the past couple of centuries. He was brilliant and perceptive, and his ideas often have nuances and insights that are unique and very helpful. Therefore, it is not surprising that one of the most interesting defenses, in my view, of the Protestant doctrine of justification should be found in his writings. Catholics have historically criticized the Protestant doctrine of justification (understood in an <a href="https://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2018/01/what-exactly-is-protestant-doctrine-of.html">"anti-Augustinian" way</a>) as being absurd because it teaches that, in justification, God regards us as righteous not because we are actually righteous, but because Christ is righteous for us and his righteousness is counted ours by a legal imputation. Catholics have typically regarded this view as a kind of "legal fiction," for it seems to involve God pretending that we are something we're not. God can see that we're not righteous, and that our moral character is actually hateful to him and deserving of his displeasure, but, by a kind of legal trick, he decides to treat us as if we were perfectly righteous, completely morally pleasing, and worthy of pleasure and acceptance. To get a sense of this, picture, for example, someone trying to pretend that Adolf Hitler was Mother Teresa and treating him as if he were. This doctrine seems to involve God acting as if he is blind, playing games with the truth, etc.</p><p>Well, here is one of Hodge's responses to this objection:</p><p></p><blockquote>Another standing objection to the Protestant doctrine has been so often met, that nothing but its constant repetition justifies a repetition of the answer. It is said to be absurd that one man should be righteous with the righteousness of another; that for God to pronounce the unjust just is a contradiction. This is a mere play on words. It is, however, very serious play; for it is caricaturing truth. It is indeed certain that the subjective, inherent quality of one person or thing cannot by imputation become the inherent characteristic of any other person or thing. Wax cannot become hard by the imputation of the hardness of a stone, nor can a brute become rational by the imputation of the intelligence of a man; nor the wicked become good by the imputation of the goodness of other men. But what has this to do with one man’s assuming the responsibility of another man? If among men the bankrupt can become solvent by a rich man’s assuming his responsibilities, why in the court of God may not the guilty become righteous by the Son of God’s assuming their responsibilities? If He was made sin for us, why may we not be made the righteousness of God in Him? The objection assumes that the word “just” or “righteous” in this connection, expresses moral character; whereas in the Bible, when used in relation to this subject, it is always used in a judicial sense, <i>i.e.</i>, it expresses the relation of the person spoken of to justice. Δίκαιος is antithetical to ὑπόδικος. The man with regard to whom justice is unsatisfied, is ὑπόδικος, “guilty.” He with regard to whom justice is satisfied, is δίκαιος, “righteous.” To declare righteous, therefore, is not to declare holy; and to impute righteousness is not to impute goodness; but simply to regard and pronounce chose <i>[sic]</i> who receive the gift of Christ’s righteousness, free from condemnation and entitled to eternal life for his sake. (Charles Hodge, <i>Systematic Theology: Volume III</i> [Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1940], 175, found <a href="https://ccel.org/ccel/hodge/theology3/theology3.iii.iii.ix.html">here</a> on the website of the Christian Classics Ethereal Library.)</blockquote><p></p><p>The fundamental problem with Hodge's response is that he tries--with a good degree of rhetorical effectiveness, certainly--to separate and distinguish what cannot be distinguished: "legal righteousness" and "moral goodness." But, while it is true that one can look at moral goodness from the vantage point of different aspects of it, sometimes emphasizing its intrinsic nature, sometimes emphasizing its evaluation according to a standard of law, ultimately "legal righteousness" and "moral goodness" are the same thing. There's no reasonable way to construe them to be something ultimately or fundamentally distinct. This can be shown by looking both at Scripture and at reason.</p><p>If we look at Scripture, we find that God has a moral law which is the ultimate standard of "righteousness" and "sin." We also find that the righteousness which meets the demands of God's moral law boils down to love--love of God supremely, and then following from that love of one's neighbor. Christ himself, of course, sums up the law in these two greatest commandments (Matthew 22:35-40). St. Paul, likewise, makes love the summary of the law (Romans 13:9-10). And this idea, of course, is rooted in the Old Testament (see, for example, Micah 6:8). And this makes perfect sense if we look at how righteousness and sin are viewed throughout Scripture. The moral law determines what brings God's wrath and what brings God's pleasure and acceptance (Ephesians 5:1-10, and throughout Scripture). And the subject matter of the moral law is obviously of supreme importance to God, since it determines whether a person receives eternal life or eternal death. Righteousness is that of which the moral law approves and to which it pronounces the reward of eternal life. Sin is that of which the moral law disapproves and to which it pronounces the punishment of eternal death. And the moral law reveals what God loves (what pleases him) and what he hates (what brings his wrath). So what is righteousness? What is it that God loves so much as to make it the determining factor between eternal life and eternal death? It is an attitude of love to God and neighbor. It involves outward actions (works), but the outward acts are important only as an indicator of inward attitude. For ignorance diminishes culpability (Luke 12:47-48; John 9:41; etc.) Why? Because ignorance implies less evil will involved. And bad actions that involve no will at all (like simple accidents) have no culpability. Actions done by inanimate objects are not subject to the moral law--because there is no will. So it is the attitude of the will that matters. At the judgment, we will be judged according to our works. It is not our outward actions that are being judged by themselves; it is <i>we</i> who are being judged for doing them. If I commit murder, it is not the event of someone being killed which is judged--for a tornado can kill a man, but this is not a matter of moral guilt--but it is evil will manifested which is being judged (which is why, for example, the Law of Moses does not condemn a person who kills purely accidentally). This is why, when we repent of our sins, put them to death, and turn to God, seeking to make up for what we have done and restore our right relationship with him, he takes that into account in his judgment of us. Repentant sinners are fundamentally different from unrepentant sinners, because the former have renounced sin and embraced supreme love to God, and this fundamentally changes God's judgment of them. (See Ezekiel 18:26-30, for example.)</p><p>But if the righteousness that is the concern of the moral law--which is what justification is all about--is an attitude of love to God, this is indistinguishable from moral goodness. Scripture nowhere makes any distinction between "righteousness" and "moral goodness." This is simply a fiction of Hodge's imagination. All that Scripture describes is a kind of attitude--leading to actions--that pleases God, that he considers good and worthy of reward, and a kind of attitude--leading to actions--that displeases him, that he considers bad and worthy of censure or punishment. Justification, in Scripture, is all about getting out from under the wrath of God and becoming morally acceptable to him. But this involves moving from being in a condition that he finds displeasing to being in a condition he finds pleasing. And what conditions are these? They are attitudes of the will--supreme love to God, or lack of supreme love to God (and loving something else supremely instead, which is idolatry).</p><p>This is how Scripture talks about "righteousness" or "moral goodness." And reason agrees. Remember, when we talk about righteousness, we're talking about something that is of the utmost importance to God, since it results in eternal life or eternal death. Well, what could be that important to God? God loves himself supremely, since he is the Supreme Being. He is the fullness and source of all goodness and happiness. Therefore, he is going to love love to himself supremely and see that attitude as fit and worthy to receive ultimate happiness, and a lack of supreme love to himself, which involves loving something else supremely, he is going to see as fit and worthy to receive ultimate misery. This fits with what Scripture says--supreme love to God is the heart of the moral law, of what truly pleases God.</p><p>And reason also points out to us that, while we can talk about legal categories, ultimately nothing exists besides that which is real. If a legal category is going to have any ultimate reality or meaning, it must be rooted in something real. Hodge talks about money as something that can be transferred from one person to another, and he asks why we can't just impute someone's righteousness to someone else just like we impute money from one person's bank account to another person's bank account. But this ignores the crucial difference between money and righteousness (or moral goodness). Money in a bank account may be a mere conceptual reality--a sort of practical decision to say that a person can make purchases of a certain amount. When money is transferred from my bank account to someone else's, the reality is the conceptual transfer itself. Nothing physical is necessarily actually being moved. The reality is simply the conceptual number attached to my bank account and the other person's. A transfer of money means simply that we've transferred the abstract number from one account to the other. So there's the reality in that case. (Although, even here, the abstraction is rooted in the reality of what the society will allow a person to buy or not buy--the social interaction is the true reality.) But other things are more concrete and less abstract. If I have brown hair and someone else has blond hair, I can't "impute" my brown hair to the other person simply by changing things on a sheet of paper (or in a computer spreadsheet). The only way for someone to get brown hair <i>is by their actually coming to have brown hair</i>. Mere "imputation" won't cut it. It would be simply a legal fiction. But righteousness is like hair color in this sense. As we've seen, it is an attitude of the will, an attitude of love to God, as both Scripture and reason testify. So we can't simply "legally impute" one person's righteousness to another person. The only way for God to see me as righteous is if <i>I am actually righteous</i>--that is, if I have an attitude of supreme love to God. That's what God loves most, and the only thing he sees as warranting eternal life. The will, good or bad, is the ultimate reality that legal categories of "sin" and "righteousness" are getting at. In a financial judgment, the reality that the judgment is interested in is simply the number that occurs in our bank account (and the social meaning such a number has). In moral judgment, the reality the judgment is interested in is the attitude of will that we have inside (and which is manifested by the course of our lives, by the record of our works--and not just individual works by themselves but the whole trajectory of our lives, including our repentance from sin and restoration to goodness, moving from an evil attitude at odds with God to a loving attitude which seeks supremely to please him).</p><p>The great Reformed theologian Jonathan Edwards understood this:</p><p></p><blockquote>The thing which makes sin hateful, is that by which it deserves punishment; which is but the expression of hatred. And that which renders virtue lovely, is the same with that on the account of which it is fit to receive praise and reward; which are but the expressions of esteem and love. But that which makes vice hateful, is its hateful nature; and that which renders virtue lovely, is its amiable nature. It is a certain beauty or deformity that are inherent in that good or evil will, which is the soul of virtue and vice (and not in the occasion of it), which is their worthiness of esteem or disesteem, praise, or dispraise, according to the common sense of mankind. (Jonathan Edwards, <a href="https://www.ccel.org/ccel/edwards/will.v.i.html"><i>Freedom of the Will</i>, Part IV, Section 1</a>)</blockquote><p></p><p>If Edwards is right, then there is no real distinction, ultimately, between "righteousness" and "moral goodness." But Edwards's view is the view of both Scripture and reason.</p><p>So Hodge's argument here fails because he tries to distinguish what cannot be distinguished. Scripture, reason, as well as the general concept of "morality" as the idea occurs in the general discourse of the human race, do not allow any kind of real, ultimate distinction between "righteousness" and "moral goodness." And they agree that moral goodness is not simply a legal abstraction like money in a bank account, but is ultimately an attitude inherent in the will of a person and therefore an inward moral character trait.</p><p>For more thoughts on why we can't separate the legal from the real when it comes to righteousness and justification, see <a href="https://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2016/06/is-gods-work-in-us-nothing-but-filthy.html">here</a>. For a couple of articles addressing further how our repentance from sin plays a positive role in God's judgment of us according to his moral law, see <a href="https://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2020/08/a-catholic-response-to-some-of.html">here</a> and <a href="https://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2021/07/suffering-dying-and-rising-with-christ.html">here</a>. For more arguments for the Catholic, Augustinian doctrine of justification in general and against the anti-Augustinian Protestant view, see <a href="http://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2015/07/the-augustinian-and-protestant.html">here</a> and <a href="http://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2016/05/is-imputation-really-fully-sufficient.html">here</a>.</p><p><i>Published on the feast of St. Eusebius of Vercelli and St. Peter Julian Eymard</i></p><p><b>ADDENDUM 8/30/21:</b> A couple more thoughts to add:</p><p>1. Hodge's attempt to distinguish between "legal righteousness," which has to do with our justification, and "moral goodness" as an internal trait, which has to do with our sanctification, is problematic for the Anti-Augustinian doctrine of justification. According to that doctrine, the thing which makes us right with God is fully and only the imputed righteousness of Christ--the "legal righteousness" Hodge describes above. We're supposed to be fully acceptable to God and to merit heaven by means only of imputed righteousness. But if this is the only thing that makes us right with God and his moral law, then what is the point of this other thing, "moral goodness," which Hodge distinguishes from legal righteousness? Does God have two moral laws, one of which is concerned with "legal righteousness," and the other of which is concerned with internal moral goodness? If that is the case, then it seems to call into question the idea that imputed righteousness is all we need to be right with God. Apparently, being right with God involves two parts and two different kinds of righteousness--one legal and imputed and the other internal. Or is imputed righteousness indeed <i>all</i> we need to be fully right with God? If so, then internal moral goodness would seem to have no moral point. If the moral law doesn't care about it, then it's not really a moral entity at all.</p><p>2. Hodge might respond to some of my comments in the article by pointing out that, in terms of the moral evaluation of one's moral status, one's internal moral condition is not enough. One cannot commit a crime in the past, causing great harm, and get out of paying up on the consequences of that act simply by having an internal moral conversion. Thus, there is a real distinction between "legal righteousness"--which includes what we owe to the moral law for things we've done in the past--and "internal moral goodness." The latter category doesn't fully cover the former one.</p><p>It is true that, in the moral system God has created, there is a need to "satisfy" for previous offenses and acts. This is evident to human moral intuition as well. If I did something to hurt someone by my past acts, when I come to repent of the evil will that led to those acts, I also feel myself responsible to try to fix and make up for the harm I previously caused. And we wouldn't think my repentance genuine if I wasn't concerned to fix the harm of my previous acts. And God has designed things so that repentance and internal conversion involve a facing up to what one was previously and one's previous acts. In the Catholic system, an essential part of repentance is the <a href="https://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2020/08/a-catholic-response-to-some-of.html">willingness to make "satisfaction" for one's past sins</a>. However, this does not imply that "legal righteousness" is something ultimately distinct from "internal moral goodness" in the way Hodge envisions. While God takes into account my attempts to satisfy for or make up for or fix my previous evil acts, it is still the internal will that he is evaluating, not something external to the will. "Satisfaction" is simply part of the process of conversion that turns a previous evil will into a good will. God's design requires that that conversion involve a facing of what went before (which makes sense, since we are temporal beings whose lives are a narrative). But, in terms of God's moral evaluation of us, it is our <i>will</i> to satisfy for our past acts that matters, not <i>how successful</i> we are in actually making up for particular things. We reject our sins and put them to death, hating our previous life and choosing a new life. This involves trying to fix the particular harms caused by past acts, but these acts are not always fixable. We can't restore a life taken, or always recover a lost friendship or a destroyed reputation, or pay back all that was stolen. But, reason says, if we choose to do what we can, our moral status is the same, regardless of what we are able to successfully accomplish. I am not a worse moral person if I try to restore a ruined reputation and fail than if I try equally to do so and succeed. And Scripture nowhere indicates that success at repairing past harms is, in addition to the conversion of the will, a requirement for making us right before God's moral law. Scripture rather focuses on the conversion of the will, our sorrow for past sins, our choice and effort to put our previous evil life to death and be reborn to new life, our repentant heart, as that which matters. (Again, see, for example, Ezekiel 18:26-30.) It is always the will which is the dwelling-place of moral guilt or virtue. Again, even though tornadoes are often more destructive than people, we don't say that therefore there is more moral blame. There is no blame at all, because blame lies only in the will. And it's the same with moral virtue. Even if a tornado could somehow fix all the destruction it caused, there would be no moral satisfaction or virtue, because there is no will. When a person makes up for past errors, it's in the repentant will that the moral virtue lies. The moral evaluation is entirely concerned with the condition of the will, and outward acts are only important insofar as they manifest that.</p><p>So, again, there is no basis for the idea of "legal righteousness" as something fundamentally distinct from the internal moral character of the will.</p><p><b>ADDENDUM 3/11/22:</b> Following up with #2 in the previous addendum, I would note that Catholic theology gives us a perfect system for combining the two observations we've been discussing--that 1. there is no ultimate distinction between "legal righteousness" and "moral beauty of will," and 2. that there is a kind of satisfaction required even for converted beings who did evil previously. It's the Catholic distinction between the eternal consequences of sin and the temporal consequences of sin. When you are in a state of mortal sin, you are at enmity with God. Your will is evil fundamentally. You've rejected the Supreme Good. This condition puts one on a road to hell, and hell will be the destination unless there is repentance. The will is evil, and in that state it is morally ugly to God and deserving of punishment and misery (both the moral and the natural or logical consequence of a will that has rejected and opposed the Supreme Good). And it will remain that way until it is converted and ceases to be morally ugly. Mortal sin deserves and leads to eternal punishment. But when a will is converted to a state of friendship with God, the moral ugliness is removed. God now finds the will pleasing, and thus deserving of reward and happiness. It no longer belongs in hell but in heaven, for it is full of God's goodness. Nevertheless, there is a narrative continuity between the converted will and the previous unconverted will; the same person used to be at enmity with God and is now in friendship with God. And therefore the converted will must own up to and face the consequences of that narrative continuity. The will must sorrow for its previous sins and repent of them, putting them to death. Only through that death can it rise into its new life. The person must acknowledge his previous sins, ask forgiveness for them, and seek to satisfy for them, to make up for them, as best he can. (And, although I'm oversimplifying here and imagining the converted will as if it were perfect in every way, in reality conversion is a lifelong process where the person, now in friendship with God, must unlearn bad habits, learn new good habits, grow in the practice of the virtues, and in general learn to overcome the effects of sin and the Fall upon himself, and this is all part of learning to live a holy life.) Catholic theology calls these remaining consequences of sin and the need to face up to and work to satisfy for them the <a href="https://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2016/01/a-fresh-look-at-catholic-doctrines-of.html">"temporal consequences of sin."</a></p><p>There is a fundamental difference between the temporal consequences and the eternal consequences of sin, or between temporal "punishments" and satisfactions and being out of friendship with God and under condemnation of eternal punishment. The temporal consequences of sin do not indicate that God still finds the will morally ugly, as being under a sentence of eternal punishment does. Nor is God treating the converted will as if it itself is evil. Rather, these temporal consequences and the need to satisfy for them are simply an expression of the narrative continuity between the old state of the will and the new state of the will and are necessary for the new will to come into its own. They do not indicate that there is some kind of righteousness or unrighteousness distinct from the actual moral beauty or ugliness of the will. There is a parallel here to the concept of original sin. The whole human race inherits the consequences of Adam's sin, and yet no one but Adam is actually blamed for Adam's particular sin. God does not view my will as responsible for Adam's sin as if it was the source of it. As a descendent of Adam, I simply inherit the consequences of his choice because of the narrative continuity between Adam and myself as I am a descendent of Adam. (And this sort of thing manifests itself all over the place in human life, as we see people receiving the good or bad consequences of what other people have done--especially children inheriting good or bad from their parents or ancestors.) The parallel breaks down somewhat in that there is an even stronger narrative connection between my later life and my earlier life, since both parts of my life are part of the narrative of me personally and are thus part of my larger identity, and yet the parallel is instructive, for it shows how a person can carry the baggage of previous choices and actions without being seen as the morally ugly source of those choices and actions. My later converted will (especially when perfected in heaven) is not morally ugly but morally beautiful, and God does not attribute the moral ugliness of my unconverted will to my converted will, and yet my converted will carries baggage from its previous state of being and must deal with that.</p><p>In short, while eternal punishment for mortal sin involves God seeing fundamental moral ugliness in the will and treating it accordingly, temporal consequences and satisfaction for sin imply no such thing, but only a need to deal with baggage due to the narrative continuity between the old state of the will and the new state of the will. Thus, the concept of temporal consequences and satisfaction for sin does not imply any ultimate distinction between "legal righteousness" and "moral beauty of the will." In the (Anti-Augustinian) Protestant view, however, even the will in heaven perfected by grace is seen as still meriting eternal punishment in hell in itself apart from an additional legal, imputed righteousness. This does imply that God still finds even the perfected will morally ugly--unless, as Hodge tries to do, we will make an ultimately meaningless and incoherent, and rationally and biblically groundless, distinction between "legal righteousness" and "moral beauty of will." But this is meaningless, since both the biblical and the rational and intuitive concept of "righteousness" simply means nothing other than "moral beauty of will." An ultimate distinction between "legal righteousness" and "moral beauty of will" is just as absurd as trying to make some ultimate distinction between being legally accounted physically beautiful and actually being physically beautiful. Being legally accounted physically beautiful can have no real meaning apart from a reference to actual physical beauty, and so, if the former is separated entirely from the latter, it becomes nothing but a meaningless and absurd legal fiction.</p><p><b>ADDENDUM 6/4/22:</b> Another problem is that if we owe something to justice in terms of being sorry for and trying to make up for (repair the damage of) our past sins, this debt, by its very nature, is something that cannot be paid by someone other than ourselves. It is not something someone else can do for us in place of our personally doing it. If I have an obligation in justice to be sorry for my sins and to try as best I can to make up for them, precisely because they are <i>my past sins personally</i>, this is not going to be satisfied by someone else being sorry for my sins and trying to make up for them for me. Imagine if I were to get to the seat of God's judgment, and God were to say, "Well, he wasn't himself actually sorry for his sins, nor did he try to make up for them, but Jesus did these things in his place, so that's OK. His debt is fully paid." This is absurd, because we recognize that the whole point is that <i>my will</i>--the actual will of the person who actually committed the crimes--has the obligation to face up to what it has done, be sorry, and try to make amends. This is all about me, personally, acknowledging and facing up to the consequences of my actions and the harm I've done, personally hating and being sorry for those actions as my own past actions, and trying to fix what I have messed up precisely because I was the one who messed them up in the first place. It's that attitude in my will that is important, because it is an essential part of moral goodness that we hate our past sins and try to distance ourselves from them and fix them. Again, as we pointed out above, this is not really about what we can fix objectively, since we cannot always repair all the damage we've caused and this is not fully under our control. What this is about is an attitude required in a converted will that has an evil past. Jesus cannot have this attitude for me, because the whole point is that <i>the person who committed the crimes must own up to them and take responsibility</i>. If I myself don't have this attitude, I'm not paying the debt I owe in justice. So the aspect of "satisfaction" that comes along with conversion can no more be transferred from one person to another purely legally than can the moral goodness of the will in general.</p>Mark Hausamhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07371790103414979060noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-808697756426649418.post-4384069078657474092021-08-02T12:37:00.000-05:002021-08-02T12:37:40.114-05:00Why Do Protestants Think the Catholic Doctrine of Justification Is So Terrible?<p>One thing I've never been able fully to understand is the typical Protestant (especially Reformed and Lutheran) antipathy to the Catholic doctrine of justification. The big question between these two views is whether or not we are justified by Christ's righteousness merely <i>imputed</i> to us (legally counted ours), or whether we are justified by its being <i>infused</i> within us (actually changing us inwardly and making us righteous). (I am assuming, here, an <a href="https://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2018/01/what-exactly-is-protestant-doctrine-of.html">anti-Augustinian understanding</a> of the Protestant view.)</p><p>Even granting that these two views are really different from each other, and that if one is right the other must be wrong, and that the Catholic view is wrong, I still don't see why Protestants think that this error Catholics supposedly make is so great that it overturns the very gospel itself. Many Protestants historically have seen the Catholic error on this subject as so fundamental that they say it means that Catholics don't have the gospel at all. They say that the very gospel of salvation by grace through Christ and his merits requires the imputation view, and that without the Protestant view of imputation there is no gospel at all, but merely a damning substitute that puts man's righteousness in place of God's. But why see this difference in so extreme a manner? Even if Catholics are wrong that we are justified by Christ's righteousness infused and not merely imputed, they are still saying that we are justified not by our own native righteousness but by the righteousness of Christ given to us as a free gift. It is still salvation by grace through the righteousness of Christ. How does the mere fact that it is <i>infused</i> righteousness rather than merely <i>imputed</i> righteousness mean that we've switched entirely from salvation by grace through Christ's righteousness to a system of salvation by personal merit through one's own righteousness?</p><p>I am concerned that Protestants are operating here under a prejudice that doesn't even make sense granting their own view of justification. Is this something that modern Protestants have simply inherited from the past and keep up without any real, substantial reason? If so, perhaps it's time to reconsider it in the interest of truth and justice.</p><p>To see some of my own views on the Catholic doctrine when I was a Protestant, see <a href="http://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2019/04/justification-and-mortal-and-venial-sin.html">here</a>. (I always thought that if there was any fundamental or soul-endangering doctrine in Catholicism relative to justification, it was related to the issue of free will rather than to the infusion doctrine of justification. But I've come to see that <a href="http://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2019/02/predestination-grace-and-free-will-in.html">Catholicism doesn't have a free will problem</a>. Of course, I should add that I've never held to <a href="https://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2018/01/what-exactly-is-protestant-doctrine-of.html">an anti-Augustinian reading</a> of the Protestant doctrine of justification, as can be seen by <a href="http://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2016/05/a-sermon-on-justification-and.html">a sermon on justification</a> I wrote up and preached while a Presbyterian elder. But even if I did hold to an anti-Augustinian interpretation of justification, I don't see why that would have entailed the kind of extreme antipathy to the Catholic view that a lot of Protestants hold.)</p><p>Could it be that the Protestant antipathy to the Catholic view of justification comes from the antinomian roots of the Protestant view, flowing from <a href="https://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2016/07/commentary-on-martin-luthers-freedom-of.html">Luther's views</a>? Luther seems to have been very concerned about any doctrine that would make internal righteousness and good works to have any bearing on one's standing before God, or even any view that would say that internal righteousness and good works are required by God of us. He wanted to say that God requires nothing of us but faith alone (not even faith plus charity, or love of God, but faith alone). Could the Protestant antipathy to the Catholic view be flowing from a distaste for any idea that smacks of righteousness actually being required of us in order for us to be in favor with God? (Even though the Reformed, in particular, have tried to distance themselves from antinomianism.)</p><p>Perhaps the Protestant antipathy to the Catholic view flows from the genuine and right feeling that no matter how righteous God's grace makes us, even when we are perfected in heaven, we will never have a foundation to boast before God as if we deserved his favor. All our righteousness is a free gift to sinners and not something we have produced on our own, and so we will always stand before God with the consciousness that we are there by grace rather than by our own personal deserving. Are Protestants concerned that the Catholic view is that we should be boastful before God, demanding of him by right that he accept us because of our internal righteousness? If that is their concern, they can lay it to rest, for Catholics agree with them completely that all our salvation is nothing but a free gift which we cannot boast of. When we stand before God, we will be fully aware that, although Christ blood applied to us by the Holy Spirit has truly made us morally pleasing to God, yet all this is a gift of grace, and that we can stand before God only by his mercy in Christ and have no basis to demand or boast of anything. If God gave us what we personally deserve and have a right to, we would deserve hell and not eternal life. We are sinners saved by grace. And yet God's grace in us <i>does</i> truly make us pleasing to God. Christ's merits have a powerful efficacy when applied within us by the Holy Spirit. Catholics are concerned that the Protestant doctrine loses sight of that. The Council of Trent put these two ideas together beautifully in this sentence:</p><p></p><blockquote>Neither is this to be omitted,-that although, in the sacred writings, so much is attributed to good works, that Christ promises, that even he that shall give a drink of cold water to one of his least ones, shall not lose his reward; and the Apostle testifies that, That which is at present momentary and light of our tribulation, worketh for us above measure exceedingly an eternal weight of glory; nevertheless God forbid that a Christian should either trust or glory in himself, and not in the Lord, whose bounty towards all men is so great, that He will have the things which are His own gifts be their merits. (<a href="https://history.hanover.edu/texts/trent/ct06.html">Council of Trent, Sixth Session</a>, Hanover College website, page number removed)</blockquote><p></p><p>In general, you can see the Catholic view spelled out in the Sixth Session of the Council of Trent, as well as in the <a href="http://www.scborromeo.org/ccc/p3s1c3a2.htm"><i>Catechism of the Catholic Church</i> #1987-2029</a>.</p><p>For a critique of the Protestant doctrine of justification (understood in an anti-Augustinian way) and a defense of the Augustinian view (which is the doctrine of the Catholic Church), see <a href="http://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2015/07/the-augustinian-and-protestant.html">here</a>. For another good statement of how Catholics find the extreme Protestant reaction to the Catholic view baffling, see <a href="http://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2021/04/is-catholic-doctrine-of-justification.html">here</a>. For a fictional dialogue between a Catholic and a Protestant on the doctrine of justification, see <a href="http://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2019/05/justification-reformed-catholic-dialogue.html">here</a>.</p><p><i>Published on the feast of St. Eusebius of Vercelli and St. Peter Julian Eymard</i></p>Mark Hausamhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07371790103414979060noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-808697756426649418.post-29003308705221480922021-07-21T15:38:00.002-05:002021-08-14T11:03:38.653-05:00Suffering, Dying, and Rising with Christ: Between Protestantism and Pelagianism<p style="text-align: center;"><i>What shall we say then? Shall we continue in sin, that grace may abound? God forbid. How shall we, that are dead to sin, live any longer therein? Know ye not, that so many of us as were baptized into Jesus Christ were baptized into his death? Therefore we are buried with him by baptism into death: that like as Christ was raised up from the dead by the glory of the Father, even so we also should walk in newness of life. For if we have been planted together in the likeness of his death, we shall be also in the likeness of his resurrection: Knowing this, that our old man is crucified with him, that the body of sin might be destroyed, that henceforth we should not serve sin. For he that is dead is justified from sin. Now if we be dead with Christ, we believe that we shall also live with him: Knowing that Christ being raised from the dead dieth no more; death hath no more dominion over him. For in that he died, he died unto sin once: but in that he liveth, he liveth unto God. Likewise reckon ye also yourselves to be dead indeed unto sin, but alive unto God through Jesus Christ our Lord. Let not sin therefore reign in your mortal body, that ye should obey it in the lusts thereof. Neither yield ye your members as instruments of unrighteousness unto sin: but yield yourselves unto God, as those that are alive from the dead, and your members as instruments of righteousness unto God. For sin shall not have dominion over you: for ye are not under the law, but under grace. What then? shall we sin, because we are not under the law, but under grace? God forbid. Know ye not, that to whom ye yield yourselves servants to obey, his servants ye are to whom ye obey; whether of sin unto death, or of obedience unto righteousness? But God be thanked, that ye were the servants of sin, but ye have obeyed from the heart that form of doctrine which was delivered you. Being then made free from sin, ye became the servants of righteousness. I speak after the manner of men because of the infirmity of your flesh: for as ye have yielded your members servants to uncleanness and to iniquity unto iniquity; even so now yield your members servants to righteousness unto holiness. For when ye were the servants of sin, ye were free from righteousness. What fruit had ye then in those things whereof ye are now ashamed? for the end of those things is death. But now being made free from sin, and become servants to God, ye have your fruit unto holiness, and the end everlasting life. For the wages of sin is death; but the gift of God is eternal life through Jesus Christ our Lord.</i></p><p style="text-align: right;"><i><span> </span><span> </span>~ St. Paul (Romans 6)</i></p><p style="text-align: center;"><i>There is therefore now no condemnation to them which are in Christ Jesus, who walk not after the flesh, but after the Spirit. For the law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus hath made me free from the law of sin and death. For what the law could not do, in that it was weak through the flesh, God sending his own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh, and for sin, condemned sin in the flesh: That the righteousness of the law might be fulfilled in us, who walk not after the flesh, but after the Spirit. For they that are after the flesh do mind the things of the flesh; but they that are after the Spirit the things of the Spirit. For to be carnally minded is death; but to be spiritually minded is life and peace. Because the carnal mind is enmity against God: for it is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can be. So then they that are in the flesh cannot please God. But ye are not in the flesh, but in the Spirit, if so be that the Spirit of God dwell in you. Now if any man have not the Spirit of Christ, he is none of his. And if Christ be in you, the body is dead because of sin; but the Spirit is life because of righteousness. But if the Spirit of him that raised up Jesus from the dead dwell in you, he that raised up Christ from the dead shall also quicken your mortal bodies by his Spirit that dwelleth in you. Therefore, brethren, we are debtors, not to the flesh, to live after the flesh. For if ye live after the flesh, ye shall die: but if ye through the Spirit do mortify the deeds of the body, ye shall live. For as many as are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God. For ye have not received the spirit of bondage again to fear; but ye have received the Spirit of adoption, whereby we cry, Abba, Father. The Spirit itself beareth witness with our spirit, that we are the children of God: And if children, then heirs; heirs of God, and joint-heirs with Christ; if so be that we suffer with him, that we may be also glorified together.</i></p><p style="text-align: right;"><i>St. Paul (Romans 8:1-17)</i></p><p>The Catholic doctrine of salvation lies in between the two extremes of Protestantism on the one hand and Pelagianism on the other. (When I talk about Protestantism here, I am primarily thinking of the classic "magisterial" Protestant traditions, and especially the classic Lutheran and Reformed traditions. And I am interpreting the Protestant position in an <a href="https://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2018/01/what-exactly-is-protestant-doctrine-of.html">Anti-Augustinian way</a>.)</p><p>To put it very simply, without getting into the complexities and nuances of the various positions, Pelagianism holds that we don't need Christ and his supernatural grace in order to be righteous. God has given us free will, and so we are able to choose good or evil. To choose good is to be righteous. Therefore, since we have free will and can choose good, we can be righteous. We don't need any more help than this. For the Pelagians, to say that we need extra-added supernatural grace from God to be righteous or to choose the good is to deny the truth of universal human free will. So, at least when it comes to becoming the kind of righteous person we should be, it's all entirely up to us. Christ does nothing (in terms of any added supernatural grace).</p><p>The Protestant view is the polar opposite. The historic Protestant (that is, the historic Lutheran and Reformed) view is that, in salvation, we are never made personally righteous--at least not enough to meet the standards of God's law and be declared righteous by that law. But Christ lived a life of righteousness for us, and by his death he paid the penalty for our sin. When we trust in Christ (which trust is itself a gift of God), Christ's payment of our penalty (his satisfaction of justice for our sins) and his positive righteousness that he worked out in his life are imputed to us (legally credited to our account), and on account of that righteousness we are declared by God to be righteous and become acceptable to his moral law. Nothing we actually are or do adds anything to this; it is entirely a matter of imputation. Protestants will go on to add that if we have real faith and are really justified by imputed righteousness we will indeed be inwardly changed, begin to do good works in this life, and be perfected in holiness after this life, but they insist that this inward righteousness, even when it is perfected in heaven, will never add up to enough to warrant a declaration of righteousness by God's law and so can never be the basis of our acceptance before God as righteous. This basis will forever be nothing but the imputation of Christ's righteousness. So, to put it simply, in the Protestant view, we do nothing to be righteous. Christ does everything. We don't have to be righteous and we never will be righteous; Christ is righteous for us.</p><p>The Catholic view steers right through the middle of these two extremes, preserving what is good in both. It preserves Protestantism's conviction that our justification is entirely gracious in character, something that is not earned by us or produced by our own natural merits or resources but which comes to us rather as a free gift of grace through the redemption of Christ. But it also preserves Pelagianism's belief that we ourselves must be righteous by choosing what is right with our free will.</p><p>How does the Catholic view fit these two strands together harmoniously? The answer is right there in the Bible. You can see it in the two quotations from St. Paul at the beginning of this article. The truth is not that we must be righteous on our own without Christ. Nor is it that Christ is righteous for us so that we don't have to be righteous. The truth is that Christ lived a life of righteousness for us and died for our sins <i>so that, his merits being applied to our lives by the grace of the Holy Spirit, we ourselves might become actually righteous.</i></p><p>We can see this in terms of satisfaction for sin as well as in terms of positive righteousness and good works. Let's look first at satisfaction for sin. In the Pelagian view, at least taken to its logical conclusion (not claiming necessarily that the historic Pelagius had so little room for Christ's death in his system), if we've sinned, only we can fix it. We have to use our unaided free will to repent of our sins, to make satisfaction to God's justice, to repair the damage caused by sin. In the Protestant view, on the other hand, only Christ can make satisfaction for our sins, and everything we can do is entirely worthless in this regard. Christ paid for our sins by his death on the cross. We don't need to do anything at all in terms of satisfying for our sins--repenting, doing penance, etc. (Again, Protestants say we will in fact repent and turn away from our sins if we have true faith in Christ, but they say this has no efficacy whatsoever in satisfying God's justice for those sins or making us any more acceptable to God's moral law.) Christ does it all for us, and we don't have to do anything nor can we do anything.</p><p>In the Catholic view, however, Christ made satisfaction for our sins by dying on the cross, but he applies that perfect and sufficient satisfaction to us by working it out within us through the Holy Spirit. Christ suffered and died for us not so that we would not suffer and die but so that we <i>can</i> suffer and die to sin with him and rise to new life in the Holy Spirit. It is not that our suffering and dying to sin adds anything to what Christ has done, as if his satisfaction was insufficient and we must shore it up by adding our own. Rather, our suffering and dying with Christ is the way in which his perfect satisfaction is applied to us and accomplishes its purpose--severing us from sin. Christ faced our sin, took it upon himself, endured its consequences, overcame it and destroyed it. He did this so that, through the application of his Passion to us by the Holy Spirit, we might face our sin, own up to its consequences, definitively reject it and repent of it, endure the healing sufferings that come from being weaned from sin and being restored to a right relationship with God, and rebuild and restore that relationship through our own life of penance. This is why the Catholic Church speaks in terms of penance and satisfaction when she talks about how we turn away from sin and restore our relationship with God. Protestants have historically hated this kind of language and accused Catholics of "works righteousness" and not trusting fully in Christ because of it, but this is because they are looking at the Catholic viewpoint from their own skewed perspective which places Christ's works and our works in competition with each other rather than seeing our works as the application of Christ's work in our lives. If the restoration of our relationship with God that has been broken by sin consists solely in what Christ does for us to the exclusion of what we do in him, then any talk of penances or satisfactions will seem to take away from the work of Christ. But if we see what Christ does in us as an application and fruit of what Christ has done outside of us, then there is no competition. It is precisely <i>because</i> Christ's satisfaction was so perfect that we are able, in our actual lives and experience, to repent of our sins, wean ourselves from them, put them to death, and rebuild a right relationship with God. In the Catholic view, when we truly repent and turn back to true love to God, our relationship with God is fundamentally restored, but the full rebuilding of that relationship is not yet complete, as there are still imperfections that hinder the full realization of that relationship which we must strive against by the grace of the Holy Spirit for the rest of our lives, until God brings to completion in us what he has begun after this life is over.</p><p>With regard to positive righteousness, we see the same dynamic. In the Pelagian view, we are righteous because we produce our own righteousness by our own natural efforts and free choices apart from any supernatural grace from God. In the Protestant view, Christ lived a righteous life for us, and that is imputed to us, so we don't need to live a righteous life ourselves in order to be righteous before God (though, again, Protestants will say that we will in fact live righteously if we have true faith, but this righteousness does not meet the standard to be considered "righteous" by God's moral law nor is it necessary to make us right with God, since Christ's imputed righteousness is fully sufficient on that score). In the Catholic view, Christ lived a righteous life for us so that his merits could be applied to our lives by the Holy Spirit, causing us to become righteous and live righteous lives ourselves and thus be pleasing to God and his moral law. At the end of our lives, say the Scriptures, we will be judged according to our works, and rewarded or punished accordingly. And yet justification is a totally free gift which we receive by faith in Christ. How can both of these things be true? Because all our righteousness and good works (and this includes our repentance and getting back up again when we fall into sin--so a righteous life is not necessarily a perfect life, but it is a life lived fundamentally, ultimately, and with final perseverance in honor of God) are not something we've produced from ourselves by our own free will and natural resources without supernatural grace, as the Pelagians say, but they are the fruit of the gracious work of the Holy Spirit in our lives applying the all-sufficient merits of Christ to us. So it is all grace, and yet that grace does not exclude but rather is the ground of our own works.</p><p>To put it all simply, when it comes to being freed from sin and becoming righteous before God, for the Pelagians (again, looking at the logical consequences of their position) it is "We can and must do it all and therefore Christ does nothing." For the Protestants, it's "Christ does everything, and so we do nothing." In the Catholic view, it's "Christ does everything, and so we do it too in him." To close with an analogy, imagine a person sick with a fatal illness. Another person comes along who has something special in his blood that can cure the illness. But in order for the cure to be operative, he must take the sickness into himself so that his blood can do the work of curing it. So he joins himself to the sick man, mingling their blood. He gets the sickness from the sick man's blood so that they are both sick, but the the special element in his blood cures the blood of both of them. This would be the Catholic view (though it's not a perfect analogy, of course--for example, Christ doesn't become personally sinful himself when he takes upon himself our sins, though he does suffer under their weight and consequences). The Pelagian view would be as if the sick man needed no help. His own blood has everything he needs. The Protestant view would be as if the healthy man could simply inject himself with the sickness and allow his blood to cure it in himself, and then, without actually doing anything inside the sick man to make the sick man's blood actually clean, he simply declares by legal imputation that his wellness now legally belongs to the sick man. In the Catholic version of the analogy, the fact that the healthy man had to take the sickness upon himself and overcome it in himself does not rule out the need to have that cure applied within the sick man as well. The two men are united together, so that both receive the sickness and the cure is worked out within each of them. And yet the cure of the sick man is entirely an act of grace, for the blood of the healthy man which cures the illness is given to him entirely gratuitously. The sick man has no natural claim on it at all. It is a gift to him. But the fact that it is a gift does not rule out that the path of healing might be long and painful, nor does it exempt the sick man from undergoing those healing pains. But there is a fundamental, night-and-day difference between the pains of a fatal illness leading to death and the healing pains of a person being cured of that illness. And so, as St Paul said, we must "suffer with Christ that we may be also glorified together with him." Or as Jesus himself said, "Verily, verily, I say unto you, Except a corn of wheat fall into the ground and die, it abideth alone: but if it die, it bringeth forth much fruit. He that loveth his life shall lose it; and he that hateth his life in this world shall keep it unto life eternal. If any man serve me, let him follow me; and where I am, there shall also my servant be" (John 12:24-26).</p><p>For more, see <a href="http://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2015/07/the-augustinian-and-protestant.html">here</a> and <a href="http://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2016/01/a-fresh-look-at-catholic-doctrines-of.html">here</a>. For more examples of the Protestant tendency to come to error by exaggerating true and important things or by holding them in an unbalanced way, see <a href="https://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2017/06/the-role-of-hyper-pietistic.html">here</a>. See also the sections in the <i>Catechism of the Catholic Church</i> which treat of <a href="http://www.scborromeo.org/ccc/p3s1c3a2.htm">grace and justification</a> and <a href="http://www.scborromeo.org/ccc/p2s2c2a4.htm">the sacrament of penance</a>.</p><p><i>Published on the feast of St. Lawrence of Brindisi</i></p>Mark Hausamhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07371790103414979060noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-808697756426649418.post-61278141350231352021-06-24T13:42:00.002-05:002024-01-23T09:42:53.026-06:00Toxic Aspects of Woke Culture #2: "Believe the Accusers Without Question."<p>I am going to comment in this and in several other posts about "woke" culture and some things I find problematic about it. Like many words, the word <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Woke">"woke"</a> has a complex history, but I am using it in the sense in which it is coming commonly to be used in modern American social-political discourse, where it basically refers to an ideology of social justice coming from the "far left" of the political spectrum (but which has entered more and more into the mainstream in recent years). It's hard to describe in a nutshell, but if you've been paying attention to American culture and politics in recent years you'll recognize it from the descriptions in these posts.</p><p>In my opinion, woke ideology is a mixture of good and bad. That's true of a lot of ideologies, but with woke culture the good and the bad are usually related. There is typically some good and valuable point that is made, but then that point is taken to an extreme that turns it into something harmful and irrational while other, balancing concerns are pushed aside, ignored, or rejected.</p><p>These posts will be informal, just musings based on my own observations and experience. And it should be remembered, of course, that I am commenting on general trends of a culture. Not everyone who identifies or thinks of themself as "woke" or who promotes certain aspects of woke ideology necessarily embraces all the good or all the bad elements I will be calling attention to.</p><p style="text-align: left;"><i>For the whole series, see <a href="https://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/search/label/Toxic%20Aspects%20of%20Woke%20Culture%20Series">here</a>.</i></p><p style="text-align: center;"><b>Believing Accusers Without Question</b></p><p style="text-align: left;">Consciously or unconsciously, human societies and institutions tend to develop mechanisms that protect members of the group from attacks from both those in the group and those outside it. It is notoriously difficult to challenge members of the in-group and those in power in any human society. When a leader or a member of a group is well-known, well-respected, feared, and/or has a lot of power and influence, the tendency is to respond to challenges or accusations against such a person with suspicion, incredulity, scorn, ridicule, and instant dismissal. There is a tendency to put so much trust in the known and respected figure that evidence of wrongdoing is ignored and dismissed out of hand, especially when it comes from someone who is not as well-known or well-liked, who does not have the political leverage of the person being accused, or who is not part of the "in-group." Thus, in human history, it has been very difficult for women to make successful accusations against powerful men. It has been difficult for racial and cultural minorities to make accusations against those in the majority group. Accusations against people in established positions of power and influence have typically not been taken as seriously as they deserve.</p><p style="text-align: left;">Sometimes there is an outright refusal to listen to a claim or to examine the evidence to see if the claim has any validity. Other times the dismissal of the claim is more subtle--such as when the bar of evidence is set so high as to be unreasonable, so that the claim is ignored even when there is plenty of evidence to take it seriously and consider it substantiated. If a significant number of witnesses come forward and make independent accusations that confirm each other, for example, this can be a good basis for determining the evidence to support at least some of these accusations, provided due diligence has been done to check out the testimony and independence of the witnesses, etc., even if more concrete proof is not forthcoming.</p><p style="text-align: left;">Woke culture calls attention to this problem and exhorts us to listen to the stories and claims of those who make accusations of wrongdoing against people of power and influence, and to get over our tendency to just dismiss such accusations as absurd or to under-value them or explain them away, especially when the accusers lack social-political clout. This is an exhortation we need to hear. We need to take this problem seriously and work diligently to reform our thinking, our practices, our policies, and our institutions, in order to make sure we are listening and taking seriously all claims and evaluating them objectively according to the evidence and not according to our natural biases, prejudices, what is comfortable to us, what "party" we affiliate with, etc.</p><p style="text-align: left;">But then, characteristically, woke culture goes on to turn this valid concern into an irrational extreme. We are not only called to give special care to taking seriously accusations against the influential, but we are required to give unquestioning trust to the accusers. If the accuser is a member of a "protected" group with victimhood status (and provided they are in line with woke ideology), we must believe this accuser's claims without question, regardless of whether there is any actual evidence to support the claims. For example, I had a friend once who said that if we are dealing with a conflict between a black man and a police officer, we should always believe the black man's account and condemn the police officer as guilty even if we have no evidence to support this, because the black man is part of a minority group that has a tendency to be unfairly treated by police officers. We have seen in recent years a tendency in some circles to say that if a woman accuses a man of rape, we should always believe the account of the woman and immediately condemn the man who is accused, even if there is insufficient evidence to back up the woman's account. We have seen a tendency to vilify people simply because they are accused of rape, abuse, sexual harassment, etc., even before there is sufficient evidence to draw an objective conclusion. The accused are fired from their jobs, blacklisted, drummed out of the public square, etc., simply because we must "believe the victims" (even before they can prove themselves to be victims).</p><p style="text-align: left;">But this is a very, very dangerous direction to go in. It amounts to an undermining of the fundamental principles of justice in society, for one of the most foundational pillars of social justice is "innocent until proven guilty." Until just a few years ago, pretty much everyone would have agreed with this. I would have been shocked to find someone who would have denied it ten years ago, and yet, today, woke culture seems to be increasingly encroaching upon it and calling it into question. "Innocent until proven guilty" gives the benefit of the doubt to the accused and puts the burden of proof on the accuser--no matter their level of power, their victimhood status, their minority status, or whatever. Some balk at this. If X accuses Y, and there is no evidence to tell who is right either way, we should assume the innocence of Y? But doesn't this amount to assuming that X is lying? What it amounts to is assuming that we don't have enough objective evidence to determine the case. We do not say that X is lying, but we cannot, in practice, endorse X's claim unless X can prove that claim. This is not because we trust Y more than X, but because justice requires the practical assumption of the innocence of the accused, no matter who the accused is and no matter who their accuser is. If you think about it just a little bit, it is not hard to see why this must be so. If we deferred to the accuser rather than the accused, then anybody could accuse anyone of anything for any reason and destroy that person's reputation, call down civil or legal penalties on the person, etc. None of us would be safe. If someone doesn't like me, he could destroy me in an instant simply by making up a false charge. (Or, if we don't give everyone this unlimited power but only women, or racial minorities, or woke ideologues, or whomever, then we are putting everyone else in society at the mercy of people in those groups, without any recourse for defense.) No, if we are to be protected in society from these kinds of arbitrary accusations, proof must be demanded upon accusations of wrongdoing. Now, again, we don't want to go to the other extreme of setting the standard of evidence unreasonably high so as to protect people from well-substantiated charges; but we must require an objectively reasonable standard of proof before accepting the claims of accusers.</p><p style="text-align: left;">"But that means that there will be people who will get away with horrible things like rape, child abuse, etc.! Some victims will be telling the truth but won't be able to provide substantial evidence to back up their claims! The only way we can be sure that all abusers are punished is by always believing the accusers!" Yes, that's true. "Innocent until proven guilty" will inevitably amount to some people sometimes getting away with crimes. We should acknowledge this. It is terrible that this is the case. But it doesn't change the fact that "innocent until proven guilty" is the right way to go, for the harm done to innocent people if we abandon this principle will be far, far worse, than any harm that comes from following it.</p><p style="text-align: left;">So we should reject the woke call to simply "believe the victims" (at least when that means we should accept the claims of accusers with or without evidence) as a way to decide guilt. But we must not make a knee-jerk reaction in the other direction either, and use our rejection of woke extremism here to ignore the legitimate call to reform ourselves and our institutions to do a much better job at listening to the weak and the underprivileged and those with little influence, and allowing even the well-liked, well-established, and powerful to be called to justice if the evidence truly warrants it. We must be sure to take into account how individuals (including ourselves) may be biased and institutions may be unjustly skewed to give more weight to the testimony of some people than to others, simply because of the accuser's (or the accused's) race, social status, gender, worldview, etc., so that we can be sure that all people in our society can get a fair, equal, and objective hearing. "Ye shall do no unrighteousness in judgment: thou shalt not respect the person of the poor, nor honor the person of the mighty: but in righteousness shalt thou judge thy neighbour" (Leviticus 19:5; see also Exodus 23:3, 6).</p><p style="text-align: left;"><i>Published on the feast of the Nativity of St. John the Baptist</i></p>Mark Hausamhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07371790103414979060noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-808697756426649418.post-2055645396711006922021-06-14T16:00:00.005-05:002024-01-24T11:56:20.918-06:00A Catholic and an Agnostic Debate the Ethicality of Homosexual Acts<p><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"> In my high school apologetics class (in a Catholic school), I have students write a paper on the topic, "Can homosexual acts be ethical?" I role-play several fictional characters in the class, including a Catholic (George Stewart) and an Agnostic (Robert Merryweather). Students have to write their paper to either George or Robert, depending on which one answers the question the opposite way they do (George answers no and Robert answers yes). Whoever they write to then writes back and responds to their arguments, and a dialogue ensues, which continues over four drafts.</span></i></p><p><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">I value this paper very highly because of the skills I think it is well-suited to build. Here is something I say about that in a document explaining the paper:</span></i></p><p><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"></span></i></p><blockquote><p><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">By engaging in the dialogue with their interlocutor (the person they're writing to), they are enabled to have a conversation which will require them to learn better to recognize their own assumptions and their interlocutor's assumptions. "What do I really think? Why do I think what I think? How have I arrived at my conclusions? What assumptions or beliefs do I have that I may not even have previously noticed on a conscious level? Do I really have a good basis for my opinions and convictions? Why does my interlocutor think the way he does? Why does he come to the conclusions he does? Why do I not arrive at those same conclusions? Where do we diverge in our beliefs in such a way that we are led to these different conclusions? What merit is there in my interlocutor's point of view? Does he have good arguments? If so, why don't I agree with him? If I don't find his arguments finally convincing, where do I think his reasoning goes wrong?" And so on.</span></i></p><p><span style="font-family: inherit;"><i></i></span></p><p><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">By practicing and getting better at these skills, students will learn to better understand themselves and others, to recognize why people think differently about various subjects, to understand why different people do different things, to be better able to examine questions about what is really true and to come to reasonable and warranted conclusions, to have good reasons for their beliefs and to recognize better what those reasons are, to be more empathetic with others who think differently while at the same time being able to hold on to what they really think to be true, and to more effectively dialogue with people they disagree with. This leads to an "iron sharpening iron" sort of situation where everyone is able more effectively to reach truth, and it also leads to a more peaceful and compassionate society where people are able better to interact with and live alongside those they disagree with.</span></i></p></blockquote><p><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"></span></i></p><div><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">And why this topic in particular?</span></i></div><div><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><blockquote>I picked it because it is a controversial topic in our culture today. I picked it because it is a topic upon which most people have pretty strong opinions, and which is important to a lot of people. I picked it because it is a topic where a particular point of view has, very recently, become very entrenched and dominant in our culture, and the alternative point of view has come to be seen more and more as obviously wrong, outrageous, and even evil. I picked it because it is an area where the Catholic point of view is at odds, in some ways, with the dominant point of view in our surrounding culture. All of these things make this topic an ideal one for the practice of a dialogue designed to really challenge students to grow in the skills of self-awareness, other-awareness, the questioning of assumptions, and effective dialogue, especially in a Catholic school setting. High school seniors are at a point in life, typically, where they are learning to think for themselves and form their own opinions and identity relative to the culture of their upbringing as well as the surrounding culture. Teenagers raised Catholic are in a fascinating position, as they are heirs of a culture that, while it agrees with the broader, surrounding culture in many areas, yet is out of step with that culture in some crucial and important areas. This creates a serious tension, as these teenagers often experience a strong pull in opposite directions. Serious and critical engagement on a topic like this can be ideal as a practice ground for learning to think critically about the conflicting points of view they are trying to navigate through. And non-Catholic students, similarly, gain much by exploring and dialoguing about this subject.</blockquote></span></i></div><div><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">Below, I have posted the initial paper the students read outlining George's and Robert's positions which starts the dialogue. Enjoy!</span></i></div><div><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></i></div><div><p align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: center;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><b><span style="line-height: 107%;"><span style="font-size: large;">Robert
Merryweather’s Answer to the Question</span></span></b></span><span style="font-family: inherit; text-align: left;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="line-height: 107%;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">I’ve been asked to
comment upon the question, “Can it be ethical to engage in homosexual
acts?”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>My answer to that question is
yes, it can be ethical.</span></span><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></p>
<p align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: center;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><b><span style="line-height: 107%;">Foundation</span></b></span><span style="font-family: inherit; text-align: left;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">My views on homosexuality
are, of course, rooted in my broader worldview assumptions. I am an agnostic. I
believe that, at this time, we humans do not possess knowledge of anything
beyond the natural, empirical world that we inhabit and experience with our
senses. I do not assert that such knowledge could never be had in principle. I
won't even assert dogmatically that absolutely <i>no one at all</i> has
such knowledge now, but I claim that if anyone <i>does</i> have such
knowledge, it does not seem to be generally available to us. So perhaps I
should say that there seems to be no <i>publicly verifiable </i>knowledge
available to the human race at present of anything beyond the natural world. Of
course, unlike George, as an agnostic I do not have “official documents” I can
refer you to to find out more about agnosticism. Agnosticism is a substantial
view regarding what we know and what we don't know, and it greatly affects how
we view the world we live in, but in a sense it is a much more “negative”
worldview than George's—not “negative” in the sense of “bad” but rather in the
sense that it is more an affirmation of what we <i>don't</i> know
than a list of things we <i>do </i>know. This makes it much easier to
define. If you want to see more descriptions and definitions of agnosticism, I
would recommend </span><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agnosticism"><span style="line-height: 107%;">the
Wikipedia article on “Agnosticism”</span></a><span style="line-height: 107%;"> as a good basic
overview, as well as Bertrand Russel's essay </span><a href="http://www.webcitation.org/6N57z5djS"><i><span style="line-height: 107%;">What is an Agnostic?</span></i></a></span><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="line-height: 107%;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Of course, not everyone
agrees with me about agnosticism, and many non-agnostic holders of other
worldviews have claimed that their worldview can indeed be known to be true and
have presented arguments attempting to show this. If I wish to avoid begging
the question, then, in my claims regarding homosexuality which are rooted in my
agnosticism—and I do!—I must do something to respond to these arguments. George
and I have written up a debate document (found on Google Classroom) in which we
have argued for our respective worldviews. I will not repeat my arguments here,
but simply refer you to those documents.</span></span><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">It may be that there is
more to reality than the natural, empirical world, but if there is, we don't
know about it. No doubt there is much about the natural, empirical world even
that we don't know. But in constructing a system of ethics and deciding how
practically to live our lives, we cannot build on what we <i>don't</i> know
but only on what we <i>do</i> know. If someone suggests that we ought
to follow the commands of the Christian God <i>just in case</i> Christianity
might turn out to be true, well, what if <i>Islam</i>, or <i>Hinduism</i>,
or for that matter the ancient <i>Aztec</i> or <i>Norse</i> religion
turns out to be true? We will simply have dug ourselves into a deeper hole,
perhaps, by trying to be Christian. Of course, the religions overlap to a great
extent in terms of practical advice, but then in most of the areas of
overlap—such as prohibitions against murder, theft, etc.—one can reach the same
conclusions on naturalistic grounds as well and so one doesn't need to know
anything about the supernatural to establish such things. When we go beyond
these basic ethical principles, however, and begin to get into more specific
practical commands and prohibitions of the various religions, we find that the
religions differ greatly. Is it a sin to eat pork? Christianity says yes, Islam
and Judaism say no, etc. Also, there are times when the historic religions of
the world mostly agree on certain particular principles, but that agreement
seems to be rooted more in custom and prejudice than rational consideration. Homosexuality
is, I think, one of those cases. Many religions have been against it in human
history, but I don't think they can show that they have had good reasons to be
against it (barring belief in the supernatural claims of the religions). If
human antiquity nearly agrees on something, that should give us pause and make
us consider the matter carefully, but it should not determine the matter for us
if the position seems to be without or contrary to reason. After all, there are
many things—slavery, for instance, or lack of religious freedom, or belief in
magical cures for diseases—which have been nearly unanimously thought to be OK
by most human cultures in history which we now reject as irrational and not
conducive to human thriving. Homosexuality has been objected to by many
historic religions, but that doesn't prove they had (or have) a good reason to
be against it.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>And not all cultures have
been against it.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In fact, it has been
widely practiced in various forms throughout the world’s cultures (the </span><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Homosexuality"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Wikipedia article on “Homosexuality”</span></a><span style="line-height: 107%;">
documents some of this).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Research has
shown that it is even present sometimes in the non-human animal world!</span></span><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">At any rate, we can only
work with what we have, and all we have, agnostics claim, is what we know of
the natural, empirical world. This includes our knowledge of the external,
physical world as well as our knowledge of our own inner thoughts, desires,
etc. George's Catholic worldview claims that there is an “objective moral law”
rooted in the will of God. We were created by God and belong to him, and
therefore there is a purpose for which we were made and to which we have a duty
to conform. But I see no basis to claim the existence of any such “objective
moral law.” What I <i>do</i> see is that we all have desires. We all
want to be happy. There are certain things that are more conducive to making us
happy, other things less conducive. Since we all want to be happy, we will want
to live in such a way as to be as happy as we can be. It is out of this fact, I
believe, that ethics arises. Ethics, in my view, is the art of recognizing both
our desires and the relevant facts of the universe in order to find a way to
live that brings about happiness and contentment. I would argue that the sorts
of motivations that are natural to us include motives of self-interest, by
which we seek our own personal happiness and well-being, and also motivations
which embrace a concern for others—such as love, empathy, sympathy, compassion.
As beings who have evolved in a social context, we are not only naturally concerned
for ourselves, but we are also naturally concerned for other beings around us
who we can see are like us in their capacity to experience pleasure and pain.
Therefore, I would argue that, ordinarily, the best way to live the happiest
life we can is to live in a way that balances self-interest with other-focused
motivations. We don't want to be too selfish, and on the other hand we don't
want to live as slaves to the desires of others to the point of our own misery.
I could go further on this point, but instead I will refer you to an excellent
little essay by Fred Edwords, </span><a href="http://americanhumanist.org/humanism/The_Human_Basis_of_Laws_and_Ethics"><i><span style="line-height: 107%;">The
Human Basis of Laws and Ethics</span></i></a><span style="line-height: 107%;">, which I think has
argued </span></span>for these points in a very compelling way. Here's <a href="https://secularhumanism.org/2014/07/cont-how-morality-has-the-objectivity-that-matterswithout-god/">another good one from Ronald Lindsay</a>.<br /><br />As social beings, we tend to live in groups and therefore require rules by which we can all attain happiness in harmonious societies. Since there is no moral law that transcends human desires, or at least none that we have any knowledge of, there is no basis for one person to have any intrinsic authority over anyone else. That is, there is no basis for me to say to you, “Because I am me, and you are you, it is inherently the case that you ought to do what I want you to do or what I tell you to do.” And vice versa. I am my own boss, and you are yours. I want my personal autonomy to be respected by others, and I'm sure you do as well. If, then, all of us want to live together in society, and we are properly motivated both by self-interest and by compassion for others, we will want to create a society that respects the autonomy of all individuals, treats all individuals equally, etc. We will want our laws and policies to be based on the consent of all the governed, and to be based on principles, ideals, and beliefs that all of us can reasonably be expected to share. We will not want to impose our own peculiar, un-objectively-verified opinions, values, and desires on each other.<br /><br />John Locke, the great 17th century British philosopher, was one of the historic pioneers of the viewpoint that governmental authority must be based on the consent of the governed—usually called the social contract theory of government. Here is how he describes this position in his <i><a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/files/7370/7370-h/7370-h.htm#CHAPTER_VIII">Second </a>Treatise of Civil <a href="http://www.constitution.org/jl/2ndtr08.htm">Government, chapter 8</a></i>:<br /><br /></p><blockquote>Sec. 95. MEN being, as has been said, by nature, all free, equal, and independent, no one can be put out of this estate, and subjected to the political power of another, without his own consent. The only way whereby any one divests himself of his natural liberty, and puts on the bonds of civil society, is by agreeing with other men to join and unite into a community for their comfortable, safe, and peaceable living one amongst another, in a secure enjoyment of their properties, and a greater security against any, that are not of it. This any number of men may do, because it injures not the freedom of the rest; they are left as they were in the liberty of the state of nature. When any number of men have so consented to make one community or government, they are thereby presently incorporated, and make one body politic, wherein the majority have a right to act and conclude the rest.</blockquote><p></p><p dir="ltr" style="line-height: 1.2; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"><span style="font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; vertical-align: baseline;"><br />Of course, we don't want to fall into a philosophy of “mob rule,” where the majority has the power to tyrannize over minorities. We want the laws and policies of society to be based on principles all people, both majorities and minorities, can share. Here is how the great twentieth-century moral philosopher John Rawls put it in his book, <i>Political Liberalism</i> (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), p. 137:<br /><br /></span></p><blockquote>Our exercise of political power is fully proper only when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens as free and equal may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to their common human reason.</blockquote><br />Therefore, we will want to avoid restricting the behavior of others except insofar as it is necessary to achieve the basic goals for society that we all share—such as the preservation of our lives from being taken away by others, preservation of personal property, and other such basic liberties and rights. This is the basis for the ideal of freedom of religion and conscience, such as is expressed in the First Amendment--”Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . .”--and in the <a href="https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights">Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 18</a>--”Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.” It is inappropriate for a person to impose his/her religious values on other people through public laws and policies, for this would be to impose on other people without their consent, thus violating the very foundation of the social contract theory of government. Laws and policies should be based only on public reasons, not private ones—that is, reasons that are accessible to all through common human reason, not reasons that are believed only by a few because they are not fully objectively verifiable. Religious beliefs cannot be fully objectively verified, and therefore they fall into the private and not the public realm in this sense. They should not be made the basis of public laws and policies. The behavior of citizens thus should not be restricted on the basis of only private reasons, such as religious reasons. Leif Wenar shows how this would apply, for example, in the case of same-sex marriage:<br /><br /><blockquote>To take a straightforward example: a Supreme Court justice deciding on a gay marriage law would violate public reason were she to base her opinion on God's forbidding gay sex in the book of Leviticus, or on a presentiment that upholding such a law would hasten the end of days. Not all members of society can reasonably be expected to accept Leviticus as stating an authoritative set of political values, nor can a religious premonition be a common standard for evaluating public policy. These values and standards are not public. (Leif Wenar, "John Rawls", <i>The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy [Fall 2008 Edition]</i>, Edward N. Zalta [ed.], URL = <<a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/rawls/">http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/rawls/</a>>) </blockquote><br /><div style="text-align: center;"><b>Homosexual Acts Can Be Ethical</b></div><br />It can be ethical to engage in homosexual acts. Why? Because it makes the people who engage in them happy. Of course, I’m speaking generally. It would not make everyone in the world happy to engage in homosexual acts at any time, in any circumstances, etc. Probably the large majority of the world’s population has no desire to engage in homosexual acts and would find no pleasure in doing so, and would probably find the practice very undesirable. And even those who are inclined towards homosexuality would, of course, need to use prudence in terms of how, when, with whom, etc., to engage in homosexual acts. So, as with any human activity, there are a lot of prudential questions to answer in terms of the specifics of when and how homosexual acts should be engaged in. All I’m saying is that homosexual activity, like heterosexual activity, is not off the map in terms of ethical activities some humans might reasonably choose to engage in.
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="line-height: 107%;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Why would homosexual
activity be unethical?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Some might argue
that it is unethical because it spreads disease.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But homosexual activity does not in itself,
inherently, spread disease.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Sure, there
are imprudent ways in which one might engage in homosexual activity that might
spread disease, just as is the case with heterosexual activity.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Random and unthinking promiscuity—whether
heterosexual or homosexual—runs a high risk for disease, both for oneself and
for one’s sexual partners.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Perhaps
certain forms of homosexual activity might be prone to the spread of disease or
to other physical harm.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But this is all
irrelevant to the real point here.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>I
like the way the original question is framed.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>The question is not, “Is it ethical at any time and in any way to engage
in homosexual acts?”, but “<i>Can it be ethical</i> to engage in homosexual acts?”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>My answer is yes, it can be ethical, if done
reasonably and prudently.</span></span><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="line-height: 107%;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Some might argue that
homosexual activity is unethical because it can cause psychological harm, or
harm to families (such as when a person leaves his/her spouse to get involved in
a homosexual relationship).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Well, yes,
again, of course there are ways of engaging in homosexual acts that can cause
psychological harm, or can harm families.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>If Bob is strongly convinced that homosexual activity is wrong, or
dangerous, or whatever, and he engages in it anyway, he may experience great
psychological discomfort.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Again, I am
not saying that <i>everyone</i> in any situation ought to engage in homosexual
activity.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Bob might want to abstain, at
least until perhaps someday he has a change in his beliefs about
homosexuality.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>And if a person leaves a
spouse or some other committed relationship to form a homosexual relationship,
this can cause harm to the former spouse or partner.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But, again, this is irrelevant to the point
of the original question.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>We’re talking
here about questions of adultery and other questions extraneous to the pure
question of the ethicalness of homosexual acts <i>per se</i>.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Sexuality is a big deal in human life and
society.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>One’s sexual behavior can have
a great impact on oneself and others.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>So, again, one must proceed prudently, as well as compassionately, when
one is considering engaging in some specific sexual act.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>All of this has to be evaluated on a
case-by-case basis.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It’s exactly the
same with heterosexual activity.</span></span><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Some might argue that
homosexuality used to be considered a psychological disorder.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This is true.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>But this is no longer the case.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>The basic medical consensus today is that the earlier designation of
homosexuality as a mental disorder was based on lack of data, stereotypes,
false cultural assumptions, etc.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The
Wikipedia article on homosexuality discusses this </span><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Homosexuality#Psychology"><span style="line-height: 107%;">here</span></a><span style="line-height: 107%;">.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Based on our current level of scientific and
medical knowledge, there is simply no reason to classify homosexuality as a
mental or psychological disorder.</span></span><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="line-height: 107%;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Another popular objection
is that homosexuality is “unnatural”.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Sexuality, so the argument goes, is obviously designed with reference to
procreation.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It is obviously designed as
an act that is to take place between a male and a female.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>To take it out of that context, then, is to
misuse it by using it “unnaturally”.</span></span><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="line-height: 107%;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Of course, there is truth
in this objection.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It is obvious that
sexuality is something that has been “designed” by evolution for the primary
function of allowing males and females to procreate.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Who could deny this?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It’s one of the most obvious facts of the
biological world.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But it is also
completely irrelevant to this discussion.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>This objection seems to take the idea of “nature” and give it
quasi-personal properties, as if “nature” were some kind of god who creates
things for some purpose and has ownership over them, demanding that they be
used in certain ways.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It’s as if the
objector is picturing nature as looking down (from somewhere) and saying, “Hey
you!<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Don’t you go using sexuality
outside of male-female relationships and for purposes other than procreation!<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>That’s not what I made it for!”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But this is to endow “nature” with something
like religious qualities.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>From a
scientific standpoint, “nature” is nothing more than the processes by which
things in the natural world function.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>So
far as the scientific evidence goes, there is no reason to believe that any
person designed sexuality or any other aspect of the natural world.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Sexuality, like living systems in general,
evolved over millions of years by means of random mutations and natural
selection.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Organisms reproduce and make
copies of themselves.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>These copies make
their own copies, and so on.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Sometimes
the copies aren’t exactly the same as the versions they came from.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Sometimes the differences hurt the survival
of the copy, sometimes they help.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>“Natural selection” simply refers to the fact that some organisms
survive better than others.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In the
evolutionary history of life, sexuality probably developed because the mixing
of DNA from multiple parents increased diversity in the offspring, and diversity
helps a species survive and thrive.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>There is no actual design, no intentional purpose, in this process of
evolution.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>So far as our scientific
knowledge goes, sexuality was not created by any person for any specific
purpose.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It is not owned by some god,
who gets to dictate by some objective moral law how it is to be used.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>As I said earlier, ethics is not rooted in
some objective moral law of God, but in our own human desires as we navigate
the realities of the world around us, trying to be happy.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>So it is completely irrelevant to the
ethicalness of an action whether that action is “natural” or “unnatural” in the
senses under consideration.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>All that
matters is whether it promotes happiness.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>And, of course, homosexual activity, engaged in rationally and prudently
in the proper circumstances, does promote happiness.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>So the fact that it is “unnatural” does not
at all make it unethical.</span></span><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="line-height: 107%;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">The “It’s unnatural”
argument seems to me to be a bit question-begging as well, in that the users of
this argument don’t actually seem to believe their own argument.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>They merely use it to support a position
they’ve already reached on other grounds.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Why do I say that?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Because they
use the argument selectively.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Sexuality
is not the only thing we humans have taken out of its original or primary
context to make different uses of.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>We do
this all the time with the things we find in the world.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Is it “natural” to cut down a tree and build
a house out of it?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Surely the original
and primary role of a tree is to live and grow as a tree.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But we cut it down and use the wood to build
all sorts of things.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Is it “natural” to
shave a sheep and use its wool to make clothes?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Is it “natural” to cook food?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Is
it “natural” to build canals, or irrigate fields?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Is it natural to build machines so that
humans can fly through the air to distant places, or even to go into space and
walk on the moon?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>After all, as the old
saying goes, “If man were meant to fly, he’d have been born with wings!”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>I don’t see any way in which all of these
things can be declared to be “natural” that will preclude homosexuality from
being declared “natural” as well.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>If I
can cut down a tree and use its wood to build a house, why can’t I take the
sexual act and make use of it in a homosexual relationship for enjoyment, to
create bonding in a relationship that brings joy or security, etc.?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>If the latter is unnatural, so is the
former.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>If we say the former is natural
because it is natural for humans to use their brains to find new uses for
things that had a different original use, then isn’t that exactly what those
who engage in homosexual acts are doing with sexuality?</span></span><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Some might argue that
homosexuality is a choice rather than a condition people are born with.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But this does not seem to be true.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>(Again, see </span><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Homosexuality#Causes"><span style="line-height: 107%;">the
Wikipedia article</span></a><span style="line-height: 107%;"> for a helpful discussion and some
resources on this.)<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But, even more
importantly, I think it is irrelevant.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>What if it were true that homosexuality was a choice rather than having
any deeper inherent roots in biology, etc.?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Why would that make it unethical?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Do I have to prove that an inclination to some activity is rooted in my
genes or my basic biology in order for it to be ethical for me to engage in
that activity?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Do I have to prove that I
am hard-wired to play video games in order to justify playing them?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Do I have to prove that I have some kind of
gene for world travel in order to justify enjoying traveling around the
world?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Do I have to prove that I have a
built-in genetic basis to be attracted to brunettes before I can be justified
in marrying a brunette?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In all of these
things, is it not enough to say that I have chosen to do these things because
they make me happy?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>So why would it be
otherwise with homosexual activity?</span></span><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="line-height: 107%;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Some might argue that
homosexual acts are contrary to the law of God.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Well, prove to me that that is the case, and we’ll see where it takes
us.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But, for now, I’m an agnostic, so
this argument doesn’t have much weight with me.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>If religion is something that is unprovable, then it should be a
personal matter.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>If you choose to
practice a religion that is opposed to homosexuality, more power to you.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But you can’t judge others on the basis of
your religion as if that religion constituted some objective norm for the whole
human race.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>That would be contrary to
reason.</span></span><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="line-height: 107%;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">I think I’ve pretty much
established my case to my satisfaction, so I’ll draw this essay to a close.</span></span><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="line-height: 107%;"><o:p><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></o:p></span></p>
<p align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: center;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><b><span style="line-height: 107%;"><span style="font-size: large;">George
Stewart’s Answer to the Question</span></span></b></span><span style="font-family: inherit; text-align: left;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="line-height: 107%;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">“Can it be ethical to
engage in homosexual acts?”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>No, I don’t
think it can be.</span></span><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></p>
<p align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: center;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><b><span style="line-height: 107%;">Foundation</span></b></span><span style="font-family: inherit; text-align: left;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">I am a Catholic, and so I
hold to the Catholic worldview. The Catholic worldview is described in great
detail in the </span><a href="http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/_INDEX.HTM"><i><span style="line-height: 107%;">Catechism
of the Catholic Church</span></i></a><span style="line-height: 107%;">, and in a more condensed form in
the </span><a href="http://www.vatican.va/archive/compendium_ccc/documents/archive_2005_compendium-ccc_en.html"><i><span style="line-height: 107%;">Compendium
of the Catechism of the Catholic Church</span></i></a><span style="line-height: 107%;">. It is summarized
in </span><a href="http://www.usccb.org/beliefs-and-teachings/what-we-believe/"><span style="line-height: 107%;">the
Nicene Creed</span></a><span style="line-height: 107%;">. The </span><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Catholic_Church"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Wikipedia article
on the Catholic Church</span></a><span style="line-height: 107%;"> is also helpful. We believe
that there are two fundamental sources of knowledge-- <i>reason</i> (which
refers to what God has made known to us by means of our senses and reasoning ability)
and <i>revelation</i> (which refers to what God has made known
through special messages and messengers, culminating in Jesus Christ and the
revelation he has entrusted to his Church). The Catholic Church, being the
church founded by Jesus Christ, has been entrusted with God's revelation and is
the authoritative interpreter of it. This revelation has been preserved and
expounded by the Church in two forms—in <i>Scripture</i> (the
revelation of God written and infallible) and in <i>Tradition</i> (the
revelation of God handed down infallibly through preaching and practice, with
the interpretation of that revelation the Church is led into through the
infallible guidance of the Holy Spirit). Two documents of the Second Vatican
Council, </span><a href="http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_const_19651118_dei-verbum_en.html"><i><span style="line-height: 107%;">Dei
Verbum</span></i></a><span style="line-height: 107%;"> (especially Chapter II) and </span><a href="http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_const_19641121_lumen-gentium_en.html"><i><span style="line-height: 107%;">Lumen
Gentium</span></i></a><span style="line-height: 107%;"> (especially #25) describe this in
greater detail.</span></span><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;">Since my answer to the question is rooted in the assumption of the truth of the Catholic worldview, it is my responsibility, to avoid begging the question, to make a case for the truth of that worldview. I will not attempt to do so here, however, as I have already done this in the debate document Robert and I have written up and which you can find on Google Classroom. I will simply refer you to that document. <br /><br />God, being the Supreme Being and the Author of all creation, is the ultimate moral authority of the universe. Since God defines reality, his viewpoint is identical to objective reality. For me, who am not the Author of reality, a distinction can be drawn between my subjective viewpoint and objective reality. That is why I am capable of being wrong. To be wrong is to have one’s subjective view come into conflict with objective reality (and when that happens, reality always wins, of course!) But for God, there is no distinction between his subjective viewpoint and objective reality, because his subjective viewpoint defines reality itself–it simply is reality. So God cannot be wrong, not only because he is omniscient (he knows everything), but because there can be no conflict between his subjective viewpoint and objective reality, these being the same thing. (To use an analogy, think of an author and a novel. If I am a character in the novel, my subjective view could be out of accord with the objective reality of the novel, because there is a distinction between these two things. But the author cannot be wrong, because the author’s viewpoint defines the reality of the novel, since the novel flows from that viewpoint.)<br /><br />This has huge implications for morality. If I see something as good, or bad, or as valuable, that is only my subjective opinion; it may or may not correspond to objective reality. But if <i>God</i> sees<span style="color: black;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="white-space: pre-wrap;"> </span></span></span>something as good, or as bad, or as valuable, then that thing truly is, objectively, good, or bad, or valuable. It is good, or bad, or valuable, not only to the subjective desires of individual creatures in the universe, but it has an absolute goodness, or badness, or value to Ultimate Reality itself. Therefore, if we view something as worthless which God sees as valuable, or if we view something as bad which God sees as good, or vice versa, our subjective opinion is objectively incorrect. And it is also displeasing to God, for when a being loves something, he hates to see others hating it, or vice versa. When a being values something, he hates to see it treated as valueless by others. This is because such an erroneous attitude is not fitting to the reality and doesn’t do it justice. We hate to see contempt shown for that which is good or love shown for that which is evil. By its very own nature, goodness is connected to happiness, and evil to unhappiness. God is the Supreme Good, and so to experience him is to experience the fullness of happiness; to lose him is to lose happiness. Therefore both the natural and the just consequence of turning away from the good, from God, is misery, while the natural and just consequence of loving goodness, loving God, is happiness. It is natural, and it is also God’s will, that justice be done–that goodness and evil receive the rewards that are fitting to them. Therefore we can be sure that what is good and right according to God’s viewpoint, which is the objective moral law of all reality, is indeed objectively good and right and also leads to happiness (at least ultimately, if not always in the short term), and that what is evil and wrong according to God’s viewpoint is indeed objectively evil and wrong and will lead ultimately to misery.<br /><br />The objective moral law of God is known to us both through reason and through revelation, as the Catechism discusses further <a href="https://www.blogger.com/#">here</a>.<br /><br />Human laws derive their legitimacy from God's moral law. These include all the laws and rules by which we govern ourselves as individuals, as well as those by which we govern each other within human societies. God has created human beings and the universe in such a way that human nature naturally calls for certain forms of organization among human individuals with certain authority structures that go along with them--such as organizations of family and civil society (the state). Since God is the author of the human nature that gives rise to these institutions, these institutions are ordained by God and therefore have his authority behind them. Thus, in St. Paul's language (Romans 13:1-7), the "powers that be" are ordained of God and are thus ministers of God whom we are commanded by God's moral law to obey. Since these institutions are "ministers of God," they do not have unlimited authority. They only have authority when they are legitimately fulfilling their essential functions in a manner consistent with the objective moral law of God. Essential human governments, then, are a sort of limited microcosm of God's government of the cosmos. Just as God seeks to promote the good and condemn the evil in his government of the world, so human governments ought to rule according to God's moral law, promoting what is good and hindering or opposing that which is evil in order to further the common good and the glory of God. For more, see the <i>Catechism</i>'s <a href="https://www.blogger.com/#">discussion of civil authority</a>.</p>
<p align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: center;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><b><span style="line-height: 107%;">Homosexual
Acts Cannot Be Ethical</span></b></span><span style="font-family: inherit; text-align: left;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="line-height: 107%;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Homosexual acts cannot be
ethical because they are contrary to the moral law of God.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>God created the human race.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>He created us male and female.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>He created human males and females to join
with each other in a special covenant called marriage, in order to support each
other and to create a household for the procreation and upbringing of children.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Sexuality was designed by God to be a means
of bonding between spouses and an expression of their love, as well as for the
purpose of procreation.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It is contrary
to the moral law of God to take sexuality out of that context and to turn it
into something fundamentally different.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>From this foundation arises moral prohibitions on various forms of
illicit sexual activity—such as pre-marital sex, masturbation, adultery,
prostitution, artificial contraception, and homosexual activity.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>These illicit forms of sexual activity are
gravely immoral because sexuality is a very special and sacred thing, seeing
that it is the God-appointed means for the creation of new human life and is an
important aspect of human love and relationships.</span></span><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">The <i>Catechism of the
Catholic Church</i> addresses these issues primarily </span><a href="http://www.vatican.va/archive/ccc_css/archive/catechism/p2s2c3a7.htm"><span style="line-height: 107%;">here</span></a><span style="line-height: 107%;">
and </span><a href="https://www.vatican.va/archive/ccc_css/archive/catechism/p3s2c2a6.htm"><span style="line-height: 107%;">here</span></a><span style="line-height: 107%;">.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Here is the <i>Catechism</i>’s direct
teaching on homosexuality:<o:p></o:p></span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="line-height: 107%;"><o:p><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 0in 0in 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><b><span style="line-height: 107%;">2357</span></b><span style="line-height: 107%;"> Homosexuality
refers to relations between men or between women who experience an exclusive or
predominant sexual attraction toward persons of the same sex. It has taken a
great variety of forms through the centuries and in different cultures. Its
psychological genesis remains largely unexplained. Basing itself on Sacred
Scripture, which presents homosexual acts as acts of grave depravity, tradition
has always declared that "homosexual acts are intrinsically disordered."
They are contrary to the natural law. They close the sexual act to the gift of
life. They do not proceed from a genuine affective and sexual complementarity.
Under no circumstances can they be approved. <o:p></o:p></span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 0in 0in 0.5in;"><span style="line-height: 107%;"><o:p><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 0in 0in 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><b><span style="line-height: 107%;">2358</span></b><span style="line-height: 107%;"> The number of men
and women who have deep-seated homosexual tendencies is not negligible. This
inclination, which is objectively disordered, constitutes for most of them a
trial. They must be accepted with respect, compassion, and sensitivity. Every
sign of unjust discrimination in their regard should be avoided. These persons
are called to fulfill God's will in their lives and, if they are Christians, to
unite to the sacrifice of the Lord's Cross the difficulties they may encounter
from their condition. <o:p></o:p></span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 0in 0in 0.5in;"><span style="line-height: 107%;"><o:p><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 0in 0in 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><b><span style="line-height: 107%;">2359</span></b><span style="line-height: 107%;"> Homosexual persons
are called to chastity. By the virtues of self-mastery that teach them inner
freedom, at times by the support of disinterested friendship, by prayer and
sacramental grace, they can and should gradually and resolutely approach
Christian perfection.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>(</span><a href="https://www.vatican.va/archive/ccc_css/archive/catechism/p3s2c2a6.htm"><span style="line-height: 107%;">CCC
#2357-2359</span></a><span style="line-height: 107%;">, footnotes removed)</span></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 0in 0in 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="line-height: 107%;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">We need to make a
distinction between objective sin and subjective guilt.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The Catholic faith teaches that homosexual
acts are objectively sinful, but that does not imply that every person who
engages in such acts has the same level of guilt.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The subjective moral state of a person
involves more than merely the objective gravity of the sin.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It involves the level of knowledge and
awareness a person has, the extent of the consent of their will, the level of
difficulty involved in avoiding the sin, and many other factors.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It is relatively easy (in some cases) to
judge the objective wrongness of an act, but judging the subjective guilt of a
person is often immensely more complex.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>In fact, usually we do not have enough knowledge, and nor is it our
place, to attempt such a subjective judgment.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>So when I claim here that homosexual acts are unethical, I am referring
only to the objective immorality of the act.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>I am not making any judgment whatsoever regarding the subjective guilt
of any particular person engaging in such acts.</span></span><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="line-height: 107%;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Having now made my
fundamental case, I’ll spend the rest of my time responding to objections and
making clarifications.</span></span><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></p>
<p align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: center;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><b><span style="line-height: 107%;">Responses
to Objections</span></b></span><span style="font-family: inherit; text-align: left;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><i><span style="line-height: 107%;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">“Isn’t your view
inconsistent?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>You consider infertile
couples to have a valid marriage and to be able to engage in sexual acts.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Why is OK for them but not for gays and
lesbians, seeing that in both cases there is an impossibility of procreation?”</span></span></i><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="line-height: 107%;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">The difference is that in
the case of an infertile couple, there is no intentional act of divorcing
sexuality from openness to procreation.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>The failure of the sexual act to result in procreation is accidental and
unintended.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>There is no attempt to
deliberately remove sexuality out of its proper context and function.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Sexuality is still being used properly, with
an openness to its fundamental purposes.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>With homosexual acts, however, there is such a deliberate attempt to
misuse sexuality.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The sexual act is
being intentionally removed from its God-ordained context and put into a
fundamentally different context.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>To use
an analogy, one might compare a person unintentionally being born with only one
arm vs. a situation where a person has only one arm because he has
intentionally severed it.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>So there is no
inconsistency in the Catholic position at this point.</span></span><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><i><span style="line-height: 107%;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">“Don’t you Catholics
approve of the practice of NFP, where couples make use of natural feminine
cycles in order to avoid pregnancy?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Why
is this OK, considering that it is a deliberate attempt to separate sexual acts
from procreation?”</span></span></i><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="line-height: 107%;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">The Catholic teaching is
that it is immoral to divorce the sexual act from its natural tendency towards
procreation.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This is why the Church
opposes artificial contraception.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But
NFP is a fundamentally different thing.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>There
are natural periods of fertility and infertility built into the female sexual
cycle.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It is not contrary to the law of
God to use prudence in order to regulate births.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>There should be a recognition that children
are ordinarily a natural blessing in a marriage, and there should be an
inclination to allow procreation to occur, all other things being equal.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>However, there can be licit reasons to avoid
pregnancy—lack of ability or resources to raise children, health concerns,
circumstances that require a smaller family size, and other things.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It is also licit to make use of the natural
cycles of fertility in order to regulate births.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Couples are, in general, free to abstain from
sexual relations for various reasons, for various lengths of time—it can be a
good form of penance, for example.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>If couples
choose to make use of “sexual fasting” during times of fertility in order to
regulate births, this is perfectly acceptable according to the moral law of
God.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This is not to divorce sexuality
from its natural tendency to procreation, or to take sexuality out of its
proper context, but it is consistent with the God-ordained purpose and
functions of sexuality.</span></span><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="line-height: 107%;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">It might be asked why God
allows couples to engage in “sexual fasting” and to space births, but he does
not allow them to use contraceptives or other means to divorce the sexual act
from procreation.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>We have already
pointed out the difference between these two things.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But the question is, why does God allow the
one and not the other?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Ultimately, if we
pursue many of these sorts of questions, we end up eventually at the brute fact
of what God has created and commanded.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>We know from reason and from revelation that God has designed the human
race a certain way and has designed sexuality to function in a certain way.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>While reason can take us some part of the way
in seeing the reasons for aspects of God’s design, reason cannot give us all
the answers.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Why did God make humans
with two arms rather than three?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Why do
we not reproduce by means of asexual reproduction instead of sexual
reproduction? <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Why is grass green rather
than blue?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Things are the way they are
because that is how God made them.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>If we
have good reason to believe that God has indeed made them that way, our lack of
knowing why in some particular case is not an argument against the truth of the
fact.</span></span><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><i><span style="line-height: 107%;">“Your view is contrary to
science.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Modern medical science has
shown that homosexuality is not a disorder, but is a natural condition for some
people.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Some people are, as they say,
‘born that way.’”</span></i></span><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="line-height: 107%;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">We could debate whether
or not homosexuality could or should be classified as some kind of
physiological or psychological "disorder". But it's not
important, because the Catholic position is not dependent on this issue.
There are aspects of human life that are completely "natural", in the
sense that they are a normal part of human nature as it currently exists, and
yet are still "disordered" in a deeper, metaphysical sense.
Take death, for example. What could be more natural than death?
Obviously, it is not a disorder when people die. It is the normal,
universal experience of all (or almost all, if you take a Catholic point of
view) human beings. But yet at a deeper metaphysical level, one that
takes into account not only the empirical sciences but the fundamental divine
purpose and design of human beings, death is a terrible disorder. Humans
were not created originally to die. Death entered the human race as a
result of the Fall. It is now a "natural" thing, but, at the
deepest level, it is fundamentally unnatural. The Fall not only brought
death, but it led to a widespread disordering of human nature. We are now
subject to all kinds of disadvantages and corruptions we would not have been
subject to before the Fall. Catholic theology talks about
"concupiscence"--the disordered desires of fallen human beings.
These are the desires that lead us into sin. These desires are, on the
biological level, quite normal, but they are anything but normal when we are
talking about the original design and purpose of human beings. We
Catholics would put homosexuality into this category. Whether or not it
should be classified as a "disorder" in the sense intended by the
modern scientific and psychological community, it is an expression of
concupiscence. Now please note that concupiscence in itself is not
personal sin. One is not responsible for one's disordered desires.
One can only be morally responsible for what is under the control of one's
will. It is <i>choosing to act</i> on a disordered desire and
to therefore do something ethically wrong that involves personal sin and
guilt. So being homosexual, in the sense of having homosexual
inclinations, is not a personal sin. But <i>acting</i> on those
inclinations and engaging in sexual activity outside of heterosexual marriage
is a sin, at least objectively speaking.<br />
<br />
So I do not see any basis for the claim that the Catholic view of sexuality is
contrary to anything we know from the natural sciences. The natural
sciences can determine lots of things about human sexuality, but it is not
within the domain of the natural, empirical sciences to determine more
fundamental metaphysical and philosophical truths about human nature and the
divine design of that nature, or to determine which actions are ethical and
which are not. These are philosophical questions that transcend the
natural sciences and can only be answered within the domains of philosophy
and theology.</span></span><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><i><span style="line-height: 107%;">“But if
homosexuality--and other forms of non-traditional sexual inclinations--are
built into human nature, at least as it currently exists (in what you call a
"fallen" state), then isn't it unethical for the Catholic Church to
condemn such sexual activity? The Church is asking for the
impossible! It's asking for people to suppress or even to throw away who
they really are. It is unjust to ask this of anybody. And it's
harmful. The LGBTQ+ community tends to have a high rate of suicide,
precisely, at least in part, because of these kinds of inhuman demands.
You can't ask people to reject their real selves.”</span></i></span><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="line-height: 107%;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">I think this is perhaps
the most important objection against my position.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>I understand the very real concerns it is
expressing, and my first response is compassion. We should certainly not
underestimate how hard it is to live according to some of the Church's
teachings. And we should never underestimate the pain of those who do
experience real disrespect, hatred, and bullying for being who they are.
We should help and love and support such people, and all people. We do
such a terrible job of understanding, loving, and respecting those who are
different from us! No doubt a substantial portion of the backlash the
Church is experiencing from the LGBTQ+ community is justly deserved, as
Catholics, and most others as well, have failed to live up to the love and
respect required by the humanity of those who have struggled with things that
have put them at odds with the larger society.<br />
<br />
However, I cannot agree with the objector that Church teaching is unjust in
this area. In a sense, our entire human civilization is built upon the
foundation of denial. We are all fallen creatures. Our desires are
continually driving us to do things we know in our reason we ought not to
do. That's one reason life is so hard. We must be constantly
restraining ourselves from doing what we want, making ourselves do what we
don't want to do, and in general going against and disciplining our human
inclinations. Different people struggle more with different things,
whether because of their peculiar circumstances, their peculiar personality and
psychological make-up, their particular physiology, or whatever. It is
notoriously difficult to get the mastery over our impulses and desires and to
bring them into conformity with right reason. That is precisely what
ethics is all about.<br />
<br />
Ethics asks hard things of all of us. Sometimes it asks particularly hard
things of some. It calls some to be martyrs. What could be more
unnatural than allowing oneself to be killed, when simply saying a few words or
performing a few external actions (denying the faith, burning some incense to
the emperor) could preserve one's life? I just watched <i>A Man for
All Seasons</i> the other day, a movie about the life of Thomas More, who
allowed himself to be beheaded simply because he would not agree to King Henry
VIII being head of the Church of England and to his marriage to Anne
Boleyn. So many people tried so hard to get him to capitulate.
"All you have to do is just sign this piece of paper, no big
deal." But he allowed his head to get chopped off rather than do
it. I can't imagine what that was like, nor, I'm pretty sure, could
anyone else who has not been in that situation.<br />
<br />
Sometimes people have been called to endure torture, or long, cruel
imprisonments, or other horrors, in order to preserve their ethical
integrity. Alcoholics have to go through a hard and painful process to
avoid capitulating to their addiction to drink. Some people are naturally
belligerent, or get angry easily, or lack compassion, and they have to work
hard to correct for these biases that would lead them into unjust
actions. Some married people find themselves attracted to another person,
and they have to work hard to suppress their desires, which would lead them to
do something that would harm their spouses and their children.<br />
<br />
The challenge to "do the right thing" is surely the biggest and
hardest challenge human beings face in this life. The Church—or, to be
more accurate, God—calls on those inclined towards homosexual acts, and other
forms of unethical sexual expression, to live in a way contrary to their
natural tendencies. We mustn't underestimate how hard this can be.
And yet I see no objective reason to conclude that this is something a good God
would not ask of his creatures. God is the chief good. All other
goods shrivel into nothing in comparison to him, or they resolve into
him. Being with him forever is an infinite treasure that is worth all the
hardship this life can bring on us and far more. God has allowed evil to
exist in this universe, not because he likes evil or because he cannot stop it,
but because he knows that allowing it will lead to a greater good. He has
allowed sin and death, and all that follow them, to enter into this
world. He has allowed his creatures to suffer. But he is not only
all-powerful, but all-good and all-benevolent. He knows that the way of
suffering is ultimately the way of eternal life and happiness. He blazed
that path himself before us. In order to open the path to heaven for us,
Christ himself, the Second Person of the Holy Trinity, lived a human life,
endured human hardships, and suffered and died. Then he rose from the
dead and ascended into heaven. He calls us to follow him, both into his
death and into his resurrection. This is what we are all called to,
though it takes different forms for different people. For those inclined
to homosexuality, part of this calling may involve a hard and painful struggle
against what seems so good and natural. It may lead to a lifestyle which
can be very difficult and lonely. But it is worth it. God is worth
it. It will pay off in the end. All God asks of any of us is that
we choose to follow him. We may not always do it very well, but he keeps
offering us his grace. We simply have to choose to keep getting up and
trying to go forward, knowing that he is with us and that it is worth it.
And, of course, there are consolations along the way, but these will take
different forms with different people.<br />
<br />
People with an inclination to homosexuality are not called to deny who they
truly are. They are called, like all of us, to discipline their passions
and their actions in order to learn how to better become who they were truly
created to be. And they will succeed in the end if they keep choosing to
go forward. And even along the way, for many of them, there may be ways
to make life go more smoothly. All of us, as their brothers and sisters,
should strive to help them along their journey, to help them make that journey
successfully and to help make the journey itself as smooth as possible.</span></span><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><i><span style="line-height: 107%;">“But how can you know it
is right to ask LGBTQ+ people to live according to these difficult Catholic
standards?”</span></i></span><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="line-height: 107%;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Well, it all comes down
to the question of truth, doesn't it? Is Catholicism true or not?
If it is, then the teachings of the Church are not just human teachings, but
they come from God himself, our Creator, the one who knows and understands
everything, who is all-good and benevolent, and who is the source of the
objective moral law. So if Catholicism is true, if we want to get reality
right and live our lives appropriately and successfully, we have to look at
things from the Catholic point of view and live according to that. On the
other hand, if Catholicism is not true, then it is not from God. Its
teachings are merely the teachings of some human beings, and so there is no
reason why we should take them as normative for us.</span></span><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="line-height: 107%;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Well, I think I’ve gone
on long enough. I’ve made my basic
case. Let the dialogue begin!</span><span style="font-family: Times New Roman, serif; font-size: 12pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="line-height: 107%;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><i>For more, see <a href="https://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2019/06/dialogue-on-sexuality-and-gender.html">here</a>.</i></span></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="line-height: 107%;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><b>ADDENDUM 6/14/21:</b> I recently read <a href="https://wherepeteris.com/untangling-sex-from-same-sex-love/">an article</a> encouraging people in the Church to get over simply condemning as unethical homosexual sexual relationships and instead focus attention on creatively thinking about how those with same-sex attraction might go forward positively in their life in the Church, particularly how those who cannot find fulfillment by entering into heterosexual marriage might develop other kinds of relationships. Thinking creatively and positively about these things seems to be a very worthy and much-needed endeavor. I also listened recently to <a href="https://www.americamagazine.org/faith/2021/06/04/jesuitical-podcast-conversion-therapy-lgbt-catholics-240796">a podcast from <i>Jesuitical</i></a> in which Catholic author Eve Tushnet was interviewed. She spoke about how same-sex attraction need not be seen as purely a negative thing--a difficulty to bear up under--but also as something put into one's life by God that can lead to positive blessings. This is true of all things in our lives, for all aspects of life are under the providence of God, and even those things that we do not want serve a purpose in our lives and can be a means of our growth and an aid to our service and living out of our callings in the world. If this is true with every other aspect of life, why not with same-sex attraction as well? Some very worthwhile things to think about here.</span></span></p><i></i></div>Mark Hausamhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07371790103414979060noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-808697756426649418.post-75523805047879060132021-06-14T15:01:00.007-05:002023-01-18T15:18:41.953-06:00Protestant vs. Catholic Debate<p><i>In my high school apologetics class (in a Catholic school), one of the things I do is have a dialogue and debate in class between two fictional characters—a Catholic (George Stewart) and a Presbyterian (Norman McTavish)—over a Protestant (Sola Scriptura) vs. a Catholic (Scripture/Tradition/Magisterium) epistemology, both of whom try to convince students of their position. Both of my characters have written up cases for their position as well, which I have posted below. Enjoy!</i><br /><br /><br /><span style="font-family: inherit;"><b><span style="font-size: large;">Norman McTavish </span></b><br /><br />I am <span style="line-height: 107%;">a Protestant. More particularly, I am a Presbyterian. Our theology is summed up in the Westminster
Confession of Faith (</span><a href="https://opc.org/wcf.html"><span style="line-height: 107%;">here</span></a><span style="line-height: 107%;">
is the version from my particular denomination, the Orthodox Presbyterian
Church).</span><span> </span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">George Stewart and I have
far more that we agree upon than we disagree over.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>We both advocate historic Christianity, in
terms of central, core doctrines like the existence of God, the Trinity, the
Fall of man, the Incarnation of Christ, etc.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>However, we do have some areas of significant disagreement which I would
like to address.</span><span> </span></span></p>
<p align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: center;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><b><span style="line-height: 107%;">Sola
Scriptura</span></b><span style="text-align: left;"> </span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">One of our most
fundamental areas of disagreement is in the area of <i>epistemology</i>—that
is, in how we gain knowledge.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Particularly, our disagreement has to do with the question of the
sources of divine revelation and the proper way to interpret divine
revelation.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>George’s Catholic view holds
that there is a three-legged</span><span style="line-height: 107%;"> stool of Scripture, Tradition, and Magisterium,
and that all three are protected from error by the Holy Spirit.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><i>Scriptu<span>re</span></i><span> refers to the Bible, the Old
and New Testaments.</span><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><span>This is the
revelation of God written down in inspired writings.</span><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><i>Tradition</i><span> refers to the revelation of
God as it has been passed down and expounded upon in other ways—in the
teaching, preaching, practice, and worship of the Church—over the
centuries.</span><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><span>The </span><i>Magisterium</i><span> is the
teaching office and authority of the Church, consisting of the college of
bishops in union with the Pope (it can refer to the teaching of all the bishops
together along with the Pope, or the teaching of the Pope as he represents all
the bishops as the head bishop of the Church).</span><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span><span>Since these three legs of the three-legged stool are held to be protected
from error by the Holy Spirit, and they all come stamped with the authority of
Christ himself, they are all to be accepted together as parts of a package
deal.</span><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><span>They must be read in light of each
other and no leg can be pitted in opposition against any of the other
legs.</span><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><span>In practice, this means that
Scripture will be interpreted in the light of the Tradition of the Church, and
the authorized version and interpretation of Tradition is that of the
Magisterium of the Church.</span></span><span> </span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">By contrast, as a Protestant,
I hold to the doctrine of <i>Sola Scriptura</i>.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Basically, this doctrine teaches that God’s
revelation is found with ultimate authority and with infallibility only in
Scripture.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Of course, the content of
that revelation can be communicated in different ways, such as through the
teaching, preaching, practice, and worship of the Church—what Catholics call <i>Tradition</i>—but
we Protestants maintain that Tradition is not infallible.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It is not protected from error the way
Scripture is.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This is because the Church
is not infallible in her teaching.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Certainly, God guides the Church and helps her understand the
Scripture.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Certainly, the Church’s
history and Tradition are extremely helpful to us as we seek to understand,
interpret, and apply the Scripture.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Tradition, history, learned scholarship, and many other things are
extremely useful guides to us as we attempt to interpret and apply Scripture,
and we ignore them at our peril, but they are not infallible.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>We can learn a lot from them, and we must
have great deference towards them, but we must not put the kind of implicit
trust in them that we put in the Scriptures.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>In practice, this means that when, after diligent study, prayer, and
listening to the counsel of others (especially those well-versed in the
relevant scholarship and the great historic teachers and teachings of the faith
through the centuries), it is apparent to us that Scripture disagrees with any
other opinion—no matter how old or respected that opinion might be—we must
follow Scripture.</span><span> </span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">The Westminster
Confession of Faith defines Sola Scriptura well in </span><a href="https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/The_Confession_of_Faith_of_the_Assembly_of_Divines_at_Westminster"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Chapter
1</span></a><span style="line-height: 107%;">,
particularly in section 6 and section 10:</span><span> </span></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 0in 0in 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 107%;">VI. The whole counsel of God concerning all things
necessary for His own glory, man’s salvation, faith and life, is either
expressly set down in Scripture, or by good and necessary consequence may be
deduced from Scripture: unto which nothing at any time is to be added, whether
by new revelations of the Spirit or traditions of men. Nevertheless, we
acknowledge the inward illumination of the Spirit of God to be necessary for
the saving understanding of such things as are revealed in the Word: and that
there are some circumstances concerning the worship of God, and government of
the Church, common to human actions and societies, which are to be ordered by
the light of nature, and Christian prudence, according to the general rules of
the Word, which are always to be observed.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 0in 0in 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 107%;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 0in 0in 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">X. The supreme judge by which all controversies of
religion are to be determined, and all decrees of councils, opinions of ancient
writers, doctrines of men, and private spirits, are to be examined, and in
whose sentence we are to rest, can be no other but the Holy Spirit speaking in
the Scripture.</span><span> </span></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 0in 0in 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">So why do I believe in
Sola Scriptura?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>I think it’s best to
start with history.</span><span> </span></span></p>
<p align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: center;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><b><span style="line-height: 107%;">A
Brief Look at History</span></b><span style="text-align: left;"> </span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Christianity is a
revelation from God.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Although it is
consistent with reason, and some of its teachings can be learned from reason,
yet it surpasses reason, in that it contains many teachings that cannot be
attained to by reason alone.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The only
ordinary way we can have access to this revelation in its entirety is to
receive it as it is handed down to us in history.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>God gave this revelation over a long period
of time, culminating in the teaching passed on to the world through Christ and
his apostles.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The apostles transmitted
this teaching to the people of God (the early Christian Church), and they
appointed elders/bishops to safeguard that teaching after they were gone.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This historic Christian Church continued to
pass this teaching down through time, until we reach our own day.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>So we have received the revelation of God
that is the Christian religion through a process of historical succession.</span><span> </span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">If we want to know what
this revelation says, then, we must look at what history has handed down to
us.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>We must look at the historical
record as we have access to it.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>And we
can be confident that a careful look at that historical record will lead us to
a correct understanding of God’s revelation, for if God has given us a
revelation, it follows that he wants us to actually be able to know what it
says.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The only way we can do that is if
we can trust the historical record to communicate and transmit that revelation
to us accurately.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>If we have reason to
believe that Christianity is indeed a divine revelation, then, we have reason
to believe that God has protected the historical transmission of that
revelation so that we can have access to it in an accurate and reliable way.</span><span> </span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">So what do we see when we
look at the historical record of the transmission of Christianity from its
beginnings down to our own day? <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>There
are different streams in the Christian tradition as we go back to the earliest
records.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>There is a mainstream,
“catholic” tradition (as it called itself); and there are streams that were
labeled “heretical” by the mainstream tradition.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The mainstream, catholic group held to the
traditional Christian doctrines we associate with Christianity today, and which
I would argue (as George has in his debate with Robert Merryweather) that we
have good reason to believe to be true.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>The heretical groups frequently disagreed with the catholic tradition on
some of these doctrines.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The catholic
group was, by far, the largest and best-established group historically.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>They could trace themselves back to the
apostles in a well-established line.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The
heretical groups were divided into many sects and did not possess the same sort
of historical pedigree as the catholic group did, and also their doctrines were
frequently out of accord with the mainstream Christian tradition (and with
reason).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>For example, the heretic
Marcion, in the second century A.D., didn’t like the Jewish elements in
Christianity, and so he accepted only the New Testament, and only portions of
it--namely, the “less Jewish” portions.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>He accepted the letters of Paul, part of the Gospel of Luke (with the
more “Jewish” portions excised), etc.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>His position clearly is based on an alteration of an earlier
tradition.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Many of the Gnostic heretical
sects produced gospels that were not known by the Christian churches of the
time, and which were frequently full of esoteric philosophy and metaphysics
that were markedly different from the Jewish atmosphere of the traditional
canonical New Testament (and, of course, the Old Testament).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Early catholic Fathers like Irenaeus (writing
towards the end of the 2<sup>nd</sup> century, only a hundred years after the
time of the apostles) well argued that, if we want the authentic teachings of
Christ, it makes sense to receive the teachings that he handed down to his own
hand-picked apostles, and which those apostles handed on to their own
hand-picked bishops/elders, in a clear line of succession to the present day
(that is, to the time of Irenaeus).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It
makes no sense to receive as authoritative teachings and alleged Scriptural
writings that other sects produced out of nowhere, with no historical pedigree,
un-heard-of in the earlier Christian tradition.</span><span> </span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">In conclusion, then, since
the catholic tradition holds the best historical pedigree, as far as we can
tell, and its doctrines are the doctrines of historic Christianity (which has
the mark of divine revelation, as George well established in his debate with
Robert Merryweather), while many of the teachings of the heretical sects are
not, it makes sense to assume that the catholic tradition maintained the most
reliable passing-down of the teaching of Jesus and the apostles.</span><span> </span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">So what did the historic
Church have to say about where the revelation of God is to be found?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The catholic church, and most of the
heretical groups I mentioned above, accepted that God has provided revelation
to his people in the form of authoritative Scriptures.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Such an idea was already established, of course,
in the Judaism that preceded the Christian era, and the vast majority of
Christians accepted the Jewish Scriptures (the Old Testament) as the Word of
God (though there was some dispute over the status of some books, primarily
what has come to be known as the Apocrypha, that were included in the famous
Greek Septuagint translation of the Jewish Scriptures).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Very early on, there is evidence that
Christians had another body of literature that was on par with the Jewish
Scriptures, a body of literature that would later be called the “New
Testament.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Both catholics and heretics
tended to accept such a body of literature.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Since the catholic tradition holds the best historical pedigree, it
makes sense to view their ideas about which books constitute the canonical
Scriptures as far more reliable than the canons put forward by various
heretical sects, especially when we consider in addition that most of the
canonical books accepted by the catholic tradition were accepted by many of the
heretical sects as well, but not vice versa.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>There was dispute in the catholic tradition about the authority of some
of the traditional books, but these disputes were temporary and were eventually
resolved into a pretty much universal consensus.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Thus, historical investigation, combined with
a reasonable confidence that God has preserved his revelation to us so that we
can know what it is, leads us to look to the traditional catholic canon as
delineating the books we should look to as the true Scriptures.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>There are no other writings that we have good
reason to accept besides the traditional canonical books which we have come to
think of as “the Bible.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The Gnostic
gospels, for instance, are of doubtful historical pedigree, being accepted only
by certain relatively small sects and universally rejected by the catholic
tradition.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>There were some books, such
as the Shepherd of Hermas, which were looked at in an authoritative manner by
some in the catholic tradition, but only by limited groups and only
temporarily.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Any claimed work of
Scripture coming from within the Christian tradition in more recent times, such
as the revelations of Joseph Smith (the founder of the Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter-day Saints), do not have any clear evidence supporting their being
divine revelations, and usually they have internal evidence against them, as
they contradict the canonical Scriptures as well as reason.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Smith’s revelations, for example, teach that
God was once a man, and that God did not create the basic elements of the
universe.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This teaching is clearly out
of accord with the Bible as well as with the sort of sound reasoning George
exhibited in his earlier debate.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The
mainstream, catholic tradition has never claimed to produce any further Scripture.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Therefore, it makes sense to accept the
traditional Bible as the only Scripture we have from God.</span><span> </span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">(Let me just briefly
illustrate what I’ve said above with regard to one book of the Bible, the Book
of Jude.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>How do we know this book
belongs in the canon of Scripture? We didn't make that decision; it was
made long before we were born. This decision was made by the leaders of
the early Christian Church. How do we know they got it right? We
can go back and look at their reasons and try to see if we think they made a
good choice. But this will only take us so far, unless we are also
willing to trust in God's providential guidance of the preservation of his Word
through history. Even if, through historical investigation, we can show
that the Book of Jude is probably a very early book, very likely written close
to the times of the apostles, even if we can show that it has doctrine that
agrees with the rest of the Bible, etc., how do we really know that it belongs
in the Bible? There are lots of good books that no one thinks belong in the
Bible. How do we know that Jude was not written very early, perhaps
during the times of the apostles, perhaps even by Jude himself, but that God
did not intend it to be inspired Scripture? Perhaps the Church really
liked the book, and very quickly it became common belief that it is one of
those books that should be in the canon. [Actually, the entire Church did
not agree that the Book of Jude should be in the Bible until a few hundred
years after the time of the apostles—it was always a well-respected book, and
many thought it belonged in the Bible, but this was disputed among the churches
in the earliest days of the Church.] How can we go back and figure out,
by purely historical research, whether or not Jude should be in the
Bible? We can't. The only way we can know that it's supposed to be
there is by trusting that God guided the Church to make the right
decision. We must trust God's providential handing down of his Word
through history. We all recognize that it would be foolish and sinful to
throw the Book of Jude out of the Bible simply because we can't provide our own
independent proof that it should be there. We would be arbitrarily
altering the faith as it has been handed down to us. We have no more
ability to decide by ourselves that Jude <i>should not</i> be in the
Bible than we have to decide that it <i>should</i> be there.
Either choice, made solely on our own independent judgment, would be arbitrary
and without reason. Therefore, since in order to follow God's Word we
must know what it is, the reasonable thing is for us to trust that God has
handed down his faith to us in the way he wanted us to receive it. Our
job is to receive it humbly and live by it, not to arbitrarily alter it.)</span><span> </span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Thus far, I think George
would agree with my analysis.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Catholics,
Eastern Orthodox, and Protestants can all agree with everything I’ve been
saying above in this section.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>We all
agree that the historical record (which we have reason to believe has been
guided and protected by the providence of God) points to the catholic tradition
as the true custodian of the faith as Jesus handed it down to his apostles, and
that the catholic tradition has always pointed to the Bible as an authoritative
locus of the divine revelation.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But now we
come to a point of divergence, for Catholics and Orthodox claim that, in
addition to the Bible, we have an infallible Tradition as an additional locus
of divine revelation, and that we have an infallible Church Magisterium to
interpret God’s revelation for us.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Protestants, on the other hand, claim that only Scripture is infallible.</span><span> </span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">So what does the
historical record have to say that could help us resolve this dispute?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Well, when we look back to the tradition of
the early Church, we find that while the early Christians were quite clear on
Scripture as the locus of divine revelation, they were not clear in their
support of anything else claiming to function as such a locus, nor of anything
outside of Scripture constituting an infallible interpreter of divine
revelation.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In short, the position of
the Fathers, overall, is closer to the Protestant position than to the Catholic
or the Orthodox position.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>I’ll grant
that the early Fathers were not as clear on Sola Scriptura as Protestants later
would be, but that is the direction they pointed in.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Let me provide a few examples to illustrate
this.</span><span> </span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 107%;">Cyril of Jerusalem was
the Bishop of the Church of Jerusalem in the mid-300s.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In the context of his catechetical lectures
which he would use to teach those who were preparing to be baptized into the
Christian Church, he had this to say about the uniqueness of Scripture:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 107%;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 0in 0in 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">For concerning the divine and holy mysteries of the
Faith, not even a casual statement must be delivered without the Holy
Scriptures; nor must we be drawn aside by mere plausibility and artifices of
speech. Even to me, who tell you these things, give not absolute credence,
unless thou receive the proof of the things which I announce from the Divine
Scriptures. For this salvation which we believe depends not on ingenious
reasoning, but on demonstration of the Holy Scriptures.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>(Cyril of Jerusalem, <i>Catechetical Lectures</i>,
Lecture 4, section 17, translated by Edwin Hamilton Gifford. From <u>Nicene
and Post-Nicene Fathers, Second Series</u>, Vol. 7. Edited by Philip
Schaff and Henry Wace. [Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing
Co., 1894.] Revised and edited for New Advent by Kevin Knight. <</span><a href="http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/310104.htm"><span style="line-height: 107%;">http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/310104.htm</span></a><span style="line-height: 107%;">>.)</span></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 0in 0in 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span>“Don’t believe anything,”
says Cyril, “unless it can shown to you from Scripture!</span><span> </span><span>Scripture alone is the foundation of our
faith!”</span><span> </span><span>It doesn’t get much clearer than
that.</span><span> </span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 107%;">One of the greatest
Christian teachers of all time was Augustine of Hippo, a bishop from North
Africa who lived in the 4<sup>th</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> centuries.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Here is what he had to say about the
uniqueness of the Scriptures:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 107%;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 0in 0in 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">But who can fail to be aware that the sacred canon of
Scripture, both of the Old and New Testament, is confined within its own
limits, and that it stands so absolutely in a superior position to all later
letters of the bishops, that about it we can hold no manner of doubt or
disputation whether what is confessedly contained in it is right and true; but
that all the letters of bishops which have been written, or are being written,
since the closing of the canon, are liable to be refuted if there be anything
contained in them which strays from the truth, either by the discourse of some
one who happens to be wiser in the matter than themselves, or by the weightier
authority and more learned experience of other bishops, by the authority of
Councils; and further, that the Councils themselves, which are held in the
several districts and provinces, must yield, beyond all possibility of doubt,
to the authority of plenary Councils which are formed for the whole Christian
world; and that even of the plenary Councils, the earlier are often corrected
by those which follow them, when, by some actual experiment, things are brought
to light which were before concealed, and that is known which previously lay
hid, and this without any whirlwind of sacrilegious pride, without any puffing
of the neck through arrogance, without any strife of envious hatred, simply
with holy humility, catholic peace, and Christian charity? (</span><a href="https://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/npnf104.txt"><i><span style="line-height: 107%;">On Baptism,
Against the Donatists, Book 2, Chapter 3</span></i></a><i><span style="line-height: 107%;">, </span></i><span style="line-height: 107%;">ca.
AD 400)</span></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 0in 0in 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 107%;">Here is the great Bishop
Augustine telling us plainly that Scripture alone is infallible and is the
ultimate rule of our faith.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Nothing said
later by bishops or church councils has that same degree of infallible
authority.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Everyone can be wrong but the
Scriptures.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Therefore, in them alone we
find the sure locus of divine revelation.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Augustine’s words would later be echoed by none other than Martin
Luther, as the latter explained to his persecutors in the Roman Catholic Church
why he must stick with Scripture alone even against the teachings of popes and
councils:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 107%;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 0in 0in 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Unless I am convinced by Scripture and plain reason -
I do not accept the authority of the popes and councils, for they have
contradicted each other - my conscience is captive to the Word of God. I cannot
and I will not recant anything for to go against conscience is neither right
nor safe. God help me. Amen. (Retrieved from </span><a href="http://www.luther.de/en/worms.html"><span style="line-height: 107%;">http://www.luther.de/en/worms.html</span></a><span style="line-height: 107%;">)</span></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 0in 0in 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">In such a short piece as
this, I can’t provide a whole lot more evidence without it becoming
overwhelming, but let me refer you to a couple of articles (</span><a href="https://christiantruth.com/scripture-and-church-fathers/"><span style="line-height: 107%;">here</span></a><span style="line-height: 107%;">
and </span><a href="https://christiantruth.com/articles/articles-roman-catholicism/formalsufficiencyofscripturefinal/"><span style="line-height: 107%;">here</span></a><span style="line-height: 107%;">)
by Protestant apologist William Webster which lay out a lot more evidence for
what I’m saying here.</span><span> </span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Catholics claim that the
Pope, as the Successor of St. Peter, has been in particular granted infallible
authority from God to expound God’s revelation.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>In the Catholic view, the Pope has the same authority by himself that all
the bishops (including him) have put together.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>But this view cannot be sustained from Church history any more than the
Catholic view of Tradition and Magisterial authority in general can.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It does seem that the Roman bishops began
fairly early to make extravagant claims about their own authority, but they are
frequently challenged by others in the early Church with regard to these
claims.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In the 3<sup>rd</sup> century,
the great bishop Cyprian of Carthage famously disagreed with Pope Stephen over
whether the baptism of heretics was valid.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>A century earlier, when Pope Victor tried to excommunicate all the
churches of Asia over a disagreement regarding the date of Easter, he was
rebuked by other bishops, including the great Irenaeus.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Bishops and church councils often disagreed
with or refused to go along with the decrees and commands of the bishops of
Rome.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>At the Council of Chalcedon in
451, the council famously passed a canon making Constantinople the second
highest church after the Church of Rome over the protests of Leo, Bishop of
Rome.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>At the Third Council of
Constantinople (680-681), Pope Honorius was actually excommunicated by the
council for teaching heresy!<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>So much for
the supreme authority and infallibility of the Pope!<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Again, in a short piece such as this, I can
only barely touch on the evidence, but see </span><a href="https://christiantruth.com/articles/articles-roman-catholicism/papacy-and-the-facts-of-history/"><span style="line-height: 107%;">another
article</span></a><span style="line-height: 107%;"> from William Webster well documenting the early
Church’s view of papal power and authority.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>In the early Church, the Bishops of Rome were very well-respected and
the Church of Rome had a high place, but the universal Church never accepted
the doctrine of the supremacy and infallibility of the Pope that modern Roman
Catholics believe in.</span><span> </span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Another important
testimony against the Roman view of papal power and authority comes from the
Eastern Orthodox churches.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Papal power
grew very strong in the Western part of the Church over the centuries of the
First Millennium, but it was not accepted in the same way in the Eastern part
of the Church, and the Easterners eventually broke with Rome over their refusal
to accept Rome’s increasingly-aggressive claims of universal jurisdiction over
the whole Church.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The Eastern Orthodox
also, historically, have objected to a number of Roman innovations in
doctrine.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>As her power grew, the Roman
bishops tried more and more to alter the faith according to their desires and
beliefs, but the Easterners resisted this.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span></span><a href="http://orthodoxinfo.com/ecumenism/encyc_1895.aspx"><span style="line-height: 107%;">This
document</span></a><span style="line-height: 107%;">, to provide one example, is a letter from the
Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople, written in 1895 in response to a letter
from Pope Leo XIII calling the Eastern Orthodox churches to unify with Rome by
submitting to papal authority.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In it, we
find a typical list of doctrinal innovations of the Roman church objected to by
the Easterns, including such things as adding words to the historic Nicene
Creed, changing the traditional forms of celebrating the Lord’s Supper,
withholding the cup from the laity during communion (I’ll come back to this one
a little later), and teaching new doctrines such as purgatory and the
Immaculate Conception.</span><span> </span></span></p>
<p align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: center;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><b><span style="line-height: 107%;">Historical
Contradictions</span></b><span style="text-align: left;"> </span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Another argument against
the infallibility of the Roman Catholic Church arises from the observation that
the Roman church has contradicted herself in her teachings many times
throughout her history.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>I’ll content
myself with two examples for the present—religious freedom and the salvation of
non-Catholics.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>If the Church has
contradicted herself in her own teachings over the years, she has shown herself
not to be an infallibly reliable interpreter of the divine revelation, as she
claims herself to be.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Rather, since
contradictory claims exclude each other and thus cannot all be true, it must be
that she has taught error and led her people astray at various times in her
history.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>And Protestants, therefore,
were right to refuse to accept her supposedly infallible authority over the
proper interpretation of Scripture.</span><span> </span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">The Roman Catholic Church
has contradicted herself over the centuries with regard to religious
liberty.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>I will content myself to
illustrate this by means of two quotations, one from the encyclical </span><a href="https://www.papalencyclicals.net/pius09/p9quanta.htm"><i><span style="line-height: 107%;">Quanta
Cura</span></i></a><span style="line-height: 107%;">, written in 1864 by Pope Pius IX, and the other from </span><a href="http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_decl_19651207_dignitatis-humanae_en.html"><i><span style="line-height: 107%;">Dignitatis
Humanae</span></i></a><span style="line-height: 107%;">, a document from the Second Vatican
Council published in 1965:<o:p></o:p></span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 107%;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 0in 0in 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 107%;">From which totally false idea of social government
they do not fear to foster that erroneous opinion, most fatal in its effects on
the Catholic Church and the salvation of souls, called by Our Predecessor,
Gregory XVI, an “insanity,” viz., that “liberty of conscience and worship is
each man’s personal right, which ought to be legally proclaimed and asserted in
every rightly constituted society; and that a right resides in the citizens to
an absolute liberty, which should be restrained by no authority whether ecclesiastical
or civil, whereby they may be able openly and publicly to manifest and declare
any of their ideas whatever, either by word of mouth, by the press, or in any
other way.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>(<i>Quanta Cura</i>,
footnote removed)<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 0in 0in 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 107%;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 0in 0in 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 107%;">This Vatican Council declares that the human person
has a right to religious freedom. This freedom means that all men are to be
immune from coercion on the part of individuals or of social groups and of any
human power, in such wise that no one is to be forced to act in a manner
contrary to his own beliefs, whether privately or publicly, whether alone or in
association with others, within due limits.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 0in 0in 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 107%;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 0in 0in 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 107%;">The council further declares that the right to
religious freedom has its foundation in the very dignity of the human person as
this dignity is known through the revealed word of God and by reason itself.
This right of the human person to religious freedom is to be recognized in the
constitutional law whereby society is governed and thus it is to become a civil
right. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>(<i>Dignitatis Humanae</i>,
footnote removed)</span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 0in 0in 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">As you can see, what 19<sup>th</sup>
century (and earlier) Popes called an “insanity”, an “erroneous opinion,” “most
fatal in its effects on the Catholic Church and the salvation of souls”, has by
the 20<sup>th</sup> century, become a “right”, founded in the “very dignity of
the human person.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In the 19<sup>th</sup>
century, it was an “insanity” that liberty of conscience “ought to be legally
proclaimed and asserted in every rightly constituted society,” but in the 20<sup>th</sup>
century, “religious freedom is to be recognized in the constitutional law
whereby society is governed and thus it is to become a civil right.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Pretty much the exact opposite in every way!</span><span> </span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">The Roman Catholic Church
has also contradicted herself with regard to whether or not non-Catholics can
be saved.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>I will illustrate this by
quoting from two Ecumenical councils—the </span><a href="https://www.ewtn.com/catholicism/library/ecumenical-council-of-florence-1438-1445-1461"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Council
of Florence</span></a><span style="line-height: 107%;"> in the 15<sup>th</sup> century, and the </span><a href="http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_const_19641121_lumen-gentium_en.html"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Second
Vatican Council (<i>Lumen Gentium</i>)</span></a><span style="line-height: 107%;"> in the 20<sup>th</sup>
century.<o:p></o:p></span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 107%;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 0in 0in 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 107%;">[The Roman Church] firmly believes, professes and
preaches that all those who are outside the catholic church, not only pagans
but also Jews or heretics and schismatics, cannot share in eternal life and
will go into the everlasting fire which was prepared for the devil and his
angels, unless they are joined to the catholic church before the end of their
lives; that the unity of the ecclesiastical body is of such importance that
only for those who abide in it do the church's sacraments contribute to
salvation and do fasts, almsgiving and other works of piety and practices of
the Christian militia produce eternal rewards; and that nobody can be saved, no
matter how much he has given away in alms and even if he has shed his blood in
the name of Christ, unless he has persevered in the bosom and the unity of the
catholic church.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>(<i>Council of Florence</i>)<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 0in 0in 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 107%;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 0in 0in 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 107%;">Finally, those who have not yet received the Gospel
are related in various ways to the people of God. In the first place we must
recall the people to whom the testament and the promises were given and from
whom Christ was born according to the flesh. On account of their fathers this
people remains most dear to God, for God does not repent of the gifts He makes
nor of the calls He issues. But the plan of salvation also includes those who
acknowledge the Creator. In the first place amongst these there are the
Muslims, who, professing to hold the faith of Abraham, along with us adore the
one and merciful God, who on the last day will judge mankind. Nor is God far
distant from those who in shadows and images seek the unknown God, for it is He
who gives to all men life and breath and all things, and as Saviour wills that
all men be saved. Those also can attain to salvation who through no fault of their
own do not know the Gospel of Christ or His Church, yet sincerely seek God and
moved by grace strive by their deeds to do His will as it is known to them
through the dictates of conscience. Nor does Divine Providence deny the helps
necessary for salvation to those who, without blame on their part, have not yet
arrived at an explicit knowledge of God and with His grace strive to live a
good life. Whatever good or truth is found amongst them is looked upon by the
Church as a preparation for the Gospel. She knows that it is given by Him who
enlightens all men so that they may finally have life. But often men, deceived
by the Evil One, have become vain in their reasonings and have exchanged the
truth of God for a lie, serving the creature rather than the Creator. Or some
there are who, living and dying in this world without God, are exposed to final
despair. Wherefore to promote the glory of God and procure the salvation of all
of these, and mindful of the command of the Lord, "Preach the Gospel to
every creature", the Church fosters the missions with care and attention.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>(<i>Vatican II</i>, footnotes removed)</span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 0in 0in 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">So in the 15<sup>th</sup>
century, you can’t be saved unless you are joined to the Roman Catholic Church
before you die and remain in her; but in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, non-Catholics
and even non-Christians, and even atheists (“those who . . . have not yet
arrived at an explicit knowledge of God”), can be saved!<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Pretty important point of doctrine for the
Church to have misled her people on at one time or another!</span><span> </span></span></p>
<p align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: center;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><b><span style="line-height: 107%;">Scriptural
Evidence</span></b><span style="text-align: left;"> </span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 107%;">When we look at the Bible
itself, we find that it gives no support to the claims and teachings of the
Roman Catholic Church.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The Bible is very
clear that Scripture is the locus of divine revelation, and is fully sufficient
for all our doctrinal needs.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 107%;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 0in 0in 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 107%;">All scripture is given by inspiration of God, and is
profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in
righteousness, that the man of God may be perfect, thoroughly furnished unto
all good works.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>(2 Timothy 2:16-17)</span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 0in 0in 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 107%;">But the Bible never
points to any other infallible locus of divine revelation.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In sharp contrast to Roman Catholic teaching,
it warns us away from the idea of “tradition” as an additional locus of divine
revelation.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 107%;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 0in 0in 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 107%;">Then came together unto him the Pharisees, and certain
of the scribes, which came from Jerusalem.<b><sup> </sup></b>And when they
saw some of his disciples eat bread with defiled, that is to say, with
unwashen, hands, they found fault. For the Pharisees, and all the Jews, except
they wash their hands oft, eat not, holding the tradition of the elders.<b><sup> </sup></b>And
when they come from the market, except they wash, they eat not. And many other
things there be, which they have received to hold, as the washing of cups, and
pots, brasen vessels, and of tables.<b><sup> </sup></b>Then the Pharisees
and scribes asked him, “Why walk not thy disciples according to the tradition
of the elders, but eat bread with unwashen hands?”<b><sup> </sup></b>He
answered and said unto them, “Well hath Esaias prophesied of you hypocrites, as
it is written, ‘This people honoureth me with their lips, but their heart is
far from me.<b><sup> </sup></b>Howbeit in vain do they worship me,
teaching for doctrines the commandments of men.’<b><sup> </sup></b>For
laying aside the commandment of God, ye hold the tradition of men, as the
washing of pots and cups: and many other such like things ye do.”<b><sup> </sup></b>And
he said unto them, “Full well ye reject the commandment of God, that ye may
keep your own tradition.<b><sup> </sup></b>For Moses said, ‘Honour thy
father and thy mother’; and, ‘Whoso curseth father or mother, let him die the
death’:<b><sup> </sup></b>But ye say, ‘If a man shall say to his father or
mother, “It is Corban”, that is to say, a gift, “by whatsoever thou mightest be
profited by me”; he shall be free.’<b><sup> </sup></b>And ye suffer him no
more to do ought for his father or his mother;<b><sup> </sup></b>making
the word of God of none effect through your tradition, which ye have delivered:
and many such like things do ye.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>(Mark
7:1-13)</span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 0in 0in 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">The official teachers of
the people of God in Old Testament times were clearly not infallible, since we
see that they could err.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The most dramatic
example of their error is their rejection of Jesus as the Messiah.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>And there is no evidence that the official
teachers of the people of God in New Testament or Christian times will be
infallible either.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In fact, the apostles
warn of errors being taught by some of the elders of the church (3 John 9-10;
Acts 20:29-31).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Even the apostles
themselves can be in error.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Paul had to
rebuke Peter at one point for allowing his actions to speak against the
inclusion of the Gentiles in the people of God (Galatians 2:11-14).</span><span> </span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">In short, there is no
evidence in Scripture for the existence of any locus of revelation or
infallible authority outside of Scripture.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>This fits with what we saw from Church history as well.</span><span> </span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 107%;">Not only this, but Roman
Catholic doctrine contradicts the Bible in many places.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>For example, in the institution of the Lord’s
Supper, we find Jesus saying to his disciples regarding the cup containing the
wine representing his blood, “Drink ye all of it” (Matthew 26:27).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>And every time the Lord’s Supper is mentioned
in Scripture the cup is included alongside the bread (such as in 1 Corinthians
10:16).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In John 6, in a passage
Catholics rightly recognize as alluding to the practice of communion, Jesus
says this:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 107%;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 0in 0in 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 107%;">Then Jesus said unto them, “Verily, verily, I say unto
you, except ye eat the flesh of the Son of man, and drink his blood, ye have no
life in you.<b><sup> </sup></b>Whoso eateth my flesh, and drinketh my
blood, hath eternal life; and I will raise him up at the last day.<b><sup> </sup></b>For
my flesh is meat indeed, and my blood is drink indeed.<b><sup> </sup></b>He
that eateth my flesh, and drinketh my blood, dwelleth in me, and I in him.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>(John 6:53-56)</span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 0in 0in 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">And yet the Roman
Catholic Church withheld the cup from the laity for hundreds of years, from
sometime in the high Middle Ages until after the Second Vatican Council in the
1960s.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Even now, the cup is sometimes
withheld from the laity, in clear contradiction to the commands of Christ
recorded in Scripture.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It might be said
with equal force what Jesus said to the Pharisees: <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>“Howbeit in vain do they worship me, teaching
for doctrines the commandments of men. <b><sup> </sup></b>For laying aside
the commandment of God, ye hold the tradition of men. . . .<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Full well ye reject the commandment of God,
that ye may keep your own tradition!”</span><span> </span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Another example is
Catholic teaching regarding the sinlessness of Mary.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The Bible clearly teaches that “all have
sinned, and come short of the glory of God” (Romans 3:23).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>“For there is not a just man upon earth, that
doeth good, and sinneth not” (Ecclesiastes 7:20).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>“There is none righteous, no, not one”
(Romans 3:10).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>And yet the Roman church
teaches that Mary was without sin.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Again, “Full well ye reject the commandment of God, that ye may keep
your own tradition!”</span><span> </span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">The Bible forbids images
of God to be made and used in worship.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>“Thou
shalt not make unto thee any graven image, or any likeness of any thing that is
in heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the water under
the earth. <b><sup> </sup></b>Thou shalt not bow down thyself to them, nor
serve them” (Exodus 20:4-5).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>“Take ye
therefore good heed unto yourselves; for ye saw no manner of similitude on the
day that the Lord spake unto you in Horeb out of the midst of the
fire:<b><sup> </sup></b>Lest ye corrupt yourselves, and make you a graven
image, the similitude of any figure, the likeness of male or female,<b><sup> </sup></b>the
likeness of any beast that is on the earth, the likeness of any winged fowl
that flieth in the air,<b><sup> </sup></b>the likeness of any thing that
creepeth on the ground, the likeness of any fish that is in the waters beneath
the earth” (Deuteronomy 4:15-18).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>And
yet Roman Catholic churches are full of images of God.</span><span> </span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 107%;">The Roman Catholic Church
teaches that we are justified by our own righteousness (albeit a righteousness
we attain to with the help of God’s grace).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>But Scripture teaches that we are justified not by our own righteousness
but by the righteousness of Christ alone imputed to us, or credited to our
account.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 107%;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 0in 0in 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 107%;">For what saith the scripture? “Abraham believed God,
and it was counted unto him for righteousness.”<b><sup> </sup></b>Now to
him that worketh is the reward not reckoned of grace, but of debt.<b><sup> </sup></b>But
to him that worketh not, but believeth on him that justifieth the ungodly, his
faith is counted for righteousness.<b><sup> </sup></b>Even as David also
describeth the blessedness of the man, unto whom God imputeth righteousness
without works,<b><sup> </sup></b>saying, “Blessed are they whose iniquities are
forgiven, and whose sins are covered.<b><sup> </sup></b>Blessed is the man
to whom the Lord will not impute sin.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>(Romans 4:3-8)</span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 0in 0in 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">I could go on and
on.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The Roman church has added many
doctrines that are not found in Scripture, such as the doctrine of purgatory,
the doctrine of the intercession of the saints and praying to saints, the
papacy, indulgences, and many other things, “teaching for doctrines the
commandments of men.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>(Protestants have
historically had great difficulties with all of these doctrines.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>I won’t go into those difficulties here, but
I will refer you </span><a href="https://christiantruth.com/articles/articles-roman-catholicism/justification/"><span style="line-height: 107%;">here</span></a><span style="line-height: 107%;">
and </span><a href="https://christiantruth.com/articles/articles-roman-catholicism/rcjustification/"><span style="line-height: 107%;">here</span></a><span style="line-height: 107%;">
to a couple more articles by William Webster which well address many of the
issues.)</span><span> </span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">In conclusion, then, I
submit that the evidence from Church history and from Scripture support the
Protestant position over against the Roman Catholic position.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>As I said at the start, there is a great deal
Protestants and Catholics agree on.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But
where we diverge, it is the Protestant view which has the </span><br />support of the evidence. </span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /><b><span style="font-size: large;">George Stewart</span></b><br /> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">I am a Catholic.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>A handy compendium of the teachings of the
Catholic Church can be found in the authoritative </span><a href="https://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/_INDEX.HTM"><i><span style="line-height: 107%;">Catechism
of the Catholic Church</span></i></a><span style="line-height: 107%;">.</span><span> </span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">I agree with Norman that
Protestants (especially historic, mainstream Protestants like Norman) and
Catholics have a great deal in common.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>I
would say we share the same fundamental worldview overall, and our teachings
overlap extensively.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But I also agree
that there are significant differences, and I agree that one of the biggest
areas of divergence is in our epistemology.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>I think that Norman has well summarized the Catholic view of the
three-legged stool of Scripture, Tradition, and Magisterium, as well as the
contrasting Protestant doctrine of Sola Scriptura.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>I would like to defend the Catholic position.</span><span> </span></span></p>
<p align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: center;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><b><span style="line-height: 107%;">The
Catholic Church as the Custodian of the Divine Revelation</span></b><span style="text-align: left;"> </span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">I agree with Norman’s
fundamental approach to investigating the epistemological claims of Catholicism
vs. Protestantism.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Christianity is
indeed a historical revelation, and we receive it as it is passed down to us
through history.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Therefore, if we are to
find the authentic version of Christianity, we must look at the historical
record of Christian history with confidence that God has preserved his
revelation in that record so that we can find it.</span><span> </span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 107%;">I also agree with Norman
that the historical record points us to the Catholic Church and to the Catholic
tradition of the early Church Fathers as the authentic successor to Christ and
his apostles.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>As Norman has well
observed, the Catholic tradition has by far the best historical pedigree.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>We must look, then, to the Catholic Church as
the authorized custodian of the revelation of God in the early days of
Christianity.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Norman observed how the
Catholic Church was able to trace its historical succession from the apostles,
whereas competing sects, like the Gnostics, sprang out of nowhere with no
historical pedigree.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Norman mentioned
the great Church Father St. Irenaeus of Lyons of the 2<sup>nd</sup> century and
his famous arguments in this regard.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>I
would like to augment Norman’s argument at this point by providing an extended
quotation from St. Irenaeus.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Around the
year 180, less than one hundred years after the death of the Apostle John,
Irenaeus, bishop of the Church of Lyons in Gaul (now France), wrote a document
entitled <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Against Heresies</i> in which he
combatted a group of heretics known as the Gnostics.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>These Gnostics were various teachers who
arose at the end of the first century and during the second century and tried
to subvert the teaching of the Church by claiming to have new knowledge, secretly
given to them by the apostles but not known to the churches the apostles
founded.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Irenaeus combatted these
Gnostics by pointing to the teachings given publicly to the Church by the
apostles.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>He pointed out the absurdity
of accepting these later claims of secret teachings.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Why should we trust some new teacher who
rises up and tries to sell us doctrine before unheard-of, unsupported by any
evidence, when we have the teaching of the apostles already handed down to their
successors in the very churches they founded?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Here are the words of Irenaeus himself:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 107%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 0in 0in 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">It is within the power of all, therefore, in every
Church, who may wish to see the truth, to contemplate clearly the tradition of
the apostles manifested throughout the whole world; and we are in a position to
reckon up those who were by the apostles instituted bishops in the Churches,
and [to demonstrate] the succession of these men to our own times; those who
neither taught nor knew of anything like what these [heretics] rave about. For
if the apostles had known hidden mysteries, which they were in the habit of
imparting to "the perfect" apart and privily from the rest, they
would have delivered them especially to those to whom they were also committing
the Churches themselves. For they were desirous that these men should be very
perfect and blameless in all things, whom also they were leaving behind as
their successors, delivering up their own place of government to these men;
which men, if they discharged their functions honestly, would be a great boon
[to the Church], but if they should fall away, the direst calamity.<br />
<br />
Since, however, it would be very tedious, in such a volume as this, to reckon
up the successions of all the Churches, we do put to confusion all those who,
in whatever manner, whether by an evil self-pleasing, by vainglory, or by
blindness and perverse opinion, assemble in unauthorized meetings; [we do
this, I say,] by indicating that tradition derived from the apostles, of the
very great, the very ancient, and universally known Church founded and
organized at Rome by the two most glorious apostles, Peter and Paul; as also
[by pointing out] the faith preached to men, which comes down to our time by
means of the successions of the bishops. For it is a matter of necessity that
every Church should agree with this Church, on account of its pre-eminent
authority, that is, the faithful everywhere, inasmuch as the apostolical
tradition has been preserved continuously by those [faithful men] who exist
everywhere.<br />
<br />
The blessed apostles, then, having founded and built up the Church, committed
into the hands of Linus the office of the episcopate. Of this Linus, Paul makes
mention in the Epistles to Timothy. To him succeeded Anacletus; and after him,
in the third place from the apostles, Clement was allotted the bishopric. This
man, as he had seen the blessed apostles, and had been conversant with them,
might be said to have the preaching of the apostles still echoing [in his
ears], and their traditions before his eyes. Nor was he alone [in this], for there
were many still remaining who had received instructions from the apostles. In
the time of this Clement, no small dissension having occurred among the
brethren at Corinth, the Church in Rome despatched a most powerful letter to
the Corinthians, exhorting them to peace, renewing their faith, and declaring
the tradition which it had lately received from the apostles, proclaiming the
one God, omnipotent, the Maker of heaven and earth, the Creator of man, who
brought on the deluge, and called Abraham, who led the people from the land of
Egypt, spake with Moses, set forth the law, sent the prophets, and who has
prepared fire for the devil and his angels. From this document,
whosoever chooses to do so, may learn that He, the Father of our Lord Jesus
Christ, was preached by the Churches, and may also understand the apostolical
tradition of the Church, since this Epistle is of older date than these men who
are now propagating falsehood, and who conjure into existence another god
beyond the Creator and the Maker of all existing things. To this Clement
there succeeded Evaristus. Alexander followed Evaristus; then, sixth from the
apostles, Sixtus was appointed; after him, Telesphorus, who was gloriously
martyred; then Hyginus; after him, Pius; then after him, Anicetus. Soter having
succeeded Anicetus, Eleutherius does now, in the twelfth place from the
apostles, hold the inheritance of the episcopate. In this order, and by this
succession, the ecclesiastical tradition from the apostles, and the preaching
of the truth, have come down to us. And this is most abundant proof
that there is one and the same vivifying faith, which has been preserved in the
Church from the apostles until now, and handed down in truth.<br />
<br />
But Polycarp also was not only instructed by apostles, and conversed with many
who had seen Christ, but was also, by apostles in Asia, appointed bishop of the
Church in Smyrna, whom I also saw in my early youth, for he tarried [on earth]
a very long time, and, when a very old man, gloriously and most nobly suffering
martyrdom, departed this life, having always taught the things which he had
learned from the apostles, and which the Church has handed down, and which
alone are true. To these things all the Asiatic Churches testify, as
do also those men who have succeeded Polycarp down to the present time,--a man
who was of much greater weight, and a more stedfast witness of truth,
than Valentinus, and Marcion, and the rest of the heretics. He it was
who, coming to Rome in the time of Anicetus caused many to turn away from the
aforesaid heretics to the Church of God, proclaiming that he had received this
one and sole truth from the apostles,--that, namely, which is handed down by
the Church. There are also those who heard from him that John, the disciple of
the Lord, going to bathe at Ephesus, and perceiving Cerinthus within, rushed
out of the bath-house without bathing, exclaiming, "Let us fly, lest even
the bath-house fall down, because Cerinthus, the enemy of the truth, is
within." And Polycarp himself replied to Marcion, who met him on one
occasion, and said, "Dost thou know me?" "I do know thee, the
first-born of Satan." Such was the horror which the apostles and their
disciples had against holding even verbal communication with any corrupters of
the truth; as Paul also says, "A man that is an heretic, after the
first and second admonition, reject; knowing that he that is such is subverted,
and sinneth, being condemned of himself." There is also a very
powerful Epistle of Polycarp written to the Philippians, from which those
who choose to do so, and are anxious about their salvation, can learn the
character of his faith, and the preaching of the truth. Then, again, the Church
in Ephesus, founded by Paul, and having John remaining among them permanently
until the times of Trajan, is a true witness of the tradition of the apostles.<sup><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></sup>(St. Irenaeus, <i>Against Heresies</i>,
Book III, Chapter 3, taken from the plain text version at the Christian
Classics Ethereal Library [</span><a href="https://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/anf01"><span style="line-height: 107%;">https://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/anf01</span></a><span style="line-height: 107%;">]
but also found on the New Advent website at </span><a href="http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/0103.htm"><span style="line-height: 107%;">http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/0103.htm</span></a><span style="line-height: 107%;">.)</span></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 0in 0in 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">St. Irenaeus, here,
articulates what would later be called the doctrine of "apostolic
succession"--that the Church's authority is rooted in the organic
succession of bishops from the apostles. This is still the claim of the
Catholic Church today. It is a powerful claim. Just as Irenaeus
argued in response to the Gnostics, so ever since then it has continued to be
true that any group which claims to represent the authentic teaching of
Christianity but which wishes to establish this in opposition to the teachings
of the Catholic Church has the burden of proof to show why we should abandon
the very Church handed down from Christ and his apostles themselves in order to
follow them.</span><span> </span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">(Note also Irenaeus's
appeal to the Church of Rome in particular, founded by Peter and Paul, as
having "pre-eminent authority". "It is a matter of
necessity," he says, "that every Church should agree with this
Church." So our touchstone for unity and orthodoxy is the apostolic
succession of the bishops in general, and this touchstone is made even more
tangible by the special succession of the bishops of Rome, who, in a special
way, function as guarantors of unity and orthodoxy for the entire Church.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But I’ll come back to this later.)</span><span> </span></span></p>
<p align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: center;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><b><span style="line-height: 107%;">Sola
Scriptura or Three-Legged Stool?</span></b><span style="text-align: left;"> </span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">So Norman and I agree
that we must look to the history of Christianity to determine where the locus
of divine revelation is to be found and to learn how we are to interpret and
apply that revelation.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>We agree that the
historical record indicates that Jesus handed on his authority and his teaching
to his apostles, who handed it on to the bishops of the Catholic Church, and
that therefore the Catholic Church is the authoritative custodian of the divine
revelation.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>So what has the Catholic
Church handed down to us?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Has she handed
down Catholicism or Protestantism?</span><span> </span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">I agree with Norman that the
early Catholic Church—and the Catholic Church ever since—taught that
Scripture—consisting of the Old and New Testaments—is the locus of divine
revelation.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It is the inspired and
infallible Word of God.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But, as Norman
indicates, at this point there is a divergence between our positions.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Norman tries to make a historical case that
the early Catholic Church held to, or at least pointed to, Sola Scriptura—the
doctrine that Scripture alone is infallible and there is no infallible
Tradition or infallible Church.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>To
someone not-so-well-versed in Church history, he makes some arguments that
might sound persuasive.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But his
arguments fundamentally misrepresent the evidence we have from the early
Church.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>With regard to the early
Church’s view of Scripture, Tradition, and the Magisterium, he provides quotations
that show well the enthusiasm the early Fathers had for Scripture.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>They did indeed accept Scripture as the
inspired, infallible Word of God.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But he
represents the Fathers as, at best, unclear in their support for the infallible
reliability of Tradition and the Magisterium.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Yet this is a false representation, for the Fathers were very clear in
their support for these things.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>They
were just as clear in their support for Tradition and the Magisterium as they
were in their support for Scripture.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In
a moment, I’ll provide some quotations to illustrate this.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But first, I want to make an important point.</span><span> </span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Even if we were to grant
that the early Church Fathers were, at best, unclear with regard to Sola
Scriptura, as Norman claims, this would not justify Norman’s conclusion that
Sola Scriptura is actually true.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Norman
points out that the only way we can know what the locus of divine revelation is
is to follow the historical passing-down of the faith in the providence of God,
and that the historical evidence points to the Catholic Church and her
Tradition (at least in the days of the early Church) as what we must follow to
receive what God has passed down.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>We
cannot arbitrarily break from the continuity of the faith as it has been handed
down within the Tradition and communion of the Catholic Church.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>He illustrated this point well with regard to
the Book of Jude.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>We cannot go back and
purely independently figure out if Jude should be in the Bible.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>We have to trust what the Church and her
Tradition have handed down.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But here’s
the thing:<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>We can’t go back and
independently establish Sola Scriptura either, for there is no clear basis in
the Scriptural or the historical evidence to determine that Sola Scriptura is
true (as I will illustrate by further argumentation below).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>So if the early Church was unclear about Sola
Scriptura, then, if we had lived at that time, we would have had no basis to
conclusively affirm Sola Scriptura.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>We
would have had no choice but to wait for the Church to decide for or against
it, just as had to happen with the canonicity of the Book of Jude as well.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Norman’s view basically amounts to this:<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>We must trust the Tradition of the Catholic
Church in order to find out whether or not Sola Scriptura is true.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Note that Norman, then, says we start with
basically the Catholic epistemology of the three-legged stool—Scripture,
Tradition, and Magisterium—at the beginning, for we must look to the Church and
her Tradition just as much as to Scripture as our highest authority.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Eventually, if the Church were to decide in
favor of Sola Scriptura, we would then have a basis to accept it and start
acting like a Protestant—being ready, in principle, if necessary, to pit
Scripture against the rest of the Church’s teaching and Tradition.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But at that time before the Church sided with
Sola Scriptura, we would have had no basis to know for sure whether or not it
was true.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>We could not simply conclude,
as Norman erroneously does, that Sola Scriptura is true merely on the grounds
that the early Church was unclear or unsure about it—in other words, that she
had not yet settled the question.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>So
Norman’s conclusion that Sola Scriptura is true, even granting his own view
that the early Church was unclear about it, is unwarranted.</span><span> </span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">But it gets worse for
Norman, for even he must and would grant that the Church, at least eventually,
sided not <i>with</i> Sola Scriptura but <i>against</i> it, for certainly by
the time of the Protestant Reformation (and, of course, much earlier) she had
clearly rejected Sola Scriptura and embraced the three-legged stool idea.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>At the very least, when the Protestants
proposed the idea of Sola Scriptura, the Catholic Church emphatically and
definitively rejected it.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>So, again,
even if the earlier Church was unclear on Sola Scriptura, the later Church
clearly rejected it, so this should be the position Christians should adopt,
just as we should accept the Book of Jude as being in the Scriptural canon
because the Church eventually universally and conclusively accepted it even
though, in the earliest centuries, as a whole she had been unsure about it.</span><span> </span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">So Sola Scriptura loses
to the Catholic epistemology even if the early Church was unclear about
it.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But, in fact, the early Church was
not unclear about it.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>She never hovered
between the three-legged stool idea and Sola Scriptura.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>So far as we can tell from the evidence, she
always embraced the three-legged stool view.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Let me illustrate this with some quotations.</span><span> </span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 107%;">The first is from the
great Church Father St. Basil of Caesaria (4<sup>th</sup> century), speaking of
the importance of the unwritten Tradition of the Church:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 107%;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 0in 0in 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Of the beliefs and practices whether generally
accepted or publicly enjoined which are preserved in the Church some we possess
derived from written teaching; others we have received delivered to us "<i>in
a mystery</i>" by the tradition of the apostles; and both of these in
relation to true religion have the same force. And these no one will gainsay—no
one, at all events, who is even moderately versed in the institutions of the
Church. For were we to attempt to reject such customs as have no written
authority, on the ground that the importance they possess is small, we should
unintentionally injure the Gospel in its very vitals; or, rather, should make
our public definition a mere phrase and nothing more. For instance, to take the
first and most general example, who is thence who has taught us in writing to
sign with the sign of the cross those who have trusted in the name of our Lord
Jesus Christ? What writing has taught us to turn to the East at the prayer?
Which of the saints has left us in writing the words of the invocation at the
displaying of the bread of the Eucharist and the cup of blessing? For we are
not, as is well known, content with what the apostle or the Gospel has recorded,
but both in preface and conclusion we add other words as being of great
importance to the validity of the ministry, and these we derive from unwritten
teaching. Moreover we bless the water of baptism and the oil of the chrism, and
besides this the catechumen who is being baptized. On what written authority do
we do this? Is not our authority silent and mystical tradition? Nay, by what
written word is the anointing of oil itself taught? And whence comes the custom
of baptizing thrice? And as to the other customs of baptism from what Scripture
do we derive the renunciation of Satan and his angels? Does not this come from
that unpublished and secret teaching which our fathers guarded in a silence out
of the reach of curious meddling and inquisitive investigation?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>(St. Basil, <i>On the Holy Spirit</i>,
section 66. Translated by Blomfield Jackson, from <i>Nicene and
Post-Nicene Fathers, Second Series</i>, Vol. 8, edited by Philip Schaff
and Henry Wace [Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing
Co., 1895], revised and edited for New Advent by Kevin Knight.
Retrieved from the New Advent website [embedded links removed] at </span><a href="http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/3203.htm"><span style="line-height: 107%;">http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/3203.htm</span></a><span style="line-height: 107%;">
at 2:46 PM on 2/19/18.)</span></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 0in 0in 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 107%;">The second quotation is
from St. Vincent of Lerins, another Father from the 5<sup>th</sup> century, who
articulates why we must interpret Scripture not against but always in
accordance with the official interpretations of the Church:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 107%;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 0in 0in 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">But here some one perhaps will ask, Since the canon of
Scripture is complete, and sufficient of itself for everything, and more than
sufficient, what need is there to join with it the authority of the Church's
interpretation? For this reason—because, owing to the depth of Holy Scripture,
all do not accept it in one and the same sense, but one understands its words
in one way, another in another; so that it seems to be capable of as many
interpretations as there are interpreters. For Novatian expounds it one way,
Sabellius another, Donatus another, Arius, Eunomius, Macedonius, another,
Photinus, Apollinaris, Priscillian, another, Iovinian, Pelagius, Celestius,
another, lastly, Nestorius another. Therefore, it is very necessary, on account
of so great intricacies of such various error, that the rule for the right understanding
of the prophets and apostles should be framed in accordance with the standard
of Ecclesiastical and Catholic interpretation.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>(St. Vincent of Lerins, <i>Commonitory</i>, section 5. Translated by
C.A. Heurtley, from <i>Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Second Series</i>, Vol.
11, edited by Philip Schaff and Henry Wace [Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature
Publishing Co., 1894], revised and edited for New Advent by Kevin Knight. Retrieved
from the New Advent website [embedded links removed] at </span><a href="http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/3506.htm"><span style="line-height: 107%;">http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/3506.htm</span></a><span style="line-height: 107%;">
at 2:53 PM on 2/19/18.)</span></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 0in 0in 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">So according to these
Fathers—and they are representative of what we find in general among all the
Fathers of the Catholic Church in these early days and throughout Church
history—we do not look to Scripture alone as our locus of divine revelation,
nor do we consider Scripture alone to be infallible.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Scripture, Tradition, and the Church’s
teaching authority function as a three-legged stool.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>They are a package deal, and we cannot pit
one against the others.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This, of course,
is the Catholic view, and it completely contradicts Sola Scriptura.</span><span> </span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 107%;">Norman provided some
quotations from a few Fathers which he alleged to be teaching Sola
Scriptura.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Particularly, he quoted St.
Cyril of Jerusalem and St. Augustine of Hippo.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>But his use of these quotations is misleading.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>If you read the quotations carefully, you’ll
see that, while they certainly give Scripture high praise and a high position
of authority in the Church, they fall short of teaching Sola Scriptura.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>I’ll grant that, without any further context,
these quotations <i>could</i> be read in a way that supports Sola
Scriptura.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But they don’t actually teach
that doctrine.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>St. Cyril’s quotation
makes it clear that Scripture is the locus of divine revelation and the
foundation of the faith.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>He points out
that Scripture is the fount from which the Church derives her doctrines.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>He points out that he himself is not
infallible, and he exhorts his hearers to check what he is saying against the
Scriptures rather than to just trust him as if he were an infallible
oracle.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>And all of this is quite true.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Catholics do not disagree with any of it.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But he does not say that Scripture is to be
read and interpreted apart from the authoritative interpretations of the Church
and her Magisterium.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Although he affirms
that Scripture is the fount of the doctrines of the Church, he does not say
that there is not important information handed down in the Church’s Tradition
that is necessary to properly understand and interpret what the Scriptures are
saying.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>He simply doesn’t address these
questions at all in the quotation Norman has provided.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Norman has read Protestant ideas into what
Cyril has said, but Cyril himself falls short of teaching them.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But if we read more of Cyril’s writings, we
will find that he looks to the Church’s Tradition as authoritative along with
the Scripture.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>For example, listen to
how he puts forward the importance of the name “Catholic” for recognizing the
true Church in this quote from another place in the same book:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 107%;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 0in 0in 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">But since the word Ecclesia is applied to different
things (as also it is written of the multitude in the theatre of the Ephesians,
And when he had thus spoken, he dismissed the Assembly), and since one might
properly and truly say that there is a Church of evil doers, I mean the
meetings of the heretics, the Marcionists and Manichees, and the rest, for this
cause the Faith has securely delivered to thee now the Article, "And in
one Holy Catholic Church;" that thou mayest avoid their wretched meetings,
and ever abide with the Holy Church Catholic in which thou wast regenerated.
And if ever thou art sojourning in cities, inquire not simply where the Lord's
House is (for the other sects of the profane also attempt to call their own
dens houses of the Lord), nor merely where the Church is, but where is the
Catholic Church. For this is the peculiar name of this Holy Church, the mother
of us all, which is the spouse of our Lord Jesus Christ, the Only-begotten Son
of God (for it is written, As Christ also loved the Church and gave Himself for
it, and all the rest,) and is a figure and copy of Jerusalem which is above,
which is free, and the mother of us all; which before was barren, but now has
many children. (St. Cyril of Jerusalem, <i>Catechetical Lectures</i> 18:26,
taken from the plain text version at the website of the Christian Classics
Ethereal Library [</span><a href="https://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/npnf207"><span style="line-height: 107%;">https://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/npnf207</span></a><span style="line-height: 107%;">],
but also found on the New Advent website at </span><a href="http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/3101.htm"><span style="line-height: 107%;">http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/3101.htm</span></a><span style="line-height: 107%;">)</span></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 0in 0in 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Cyril teaches here that
if his hearers want to be sure that they are worshiping with a true church
rather than a false one, they should look not just for the word “church” but
for the name “Catholic”.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This, he says,
is the proper name of the true Church.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>And how do we know this?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Because
“the Faith has securely delivered to thee now the Article, ‘And in one Holy
Catholic Church.’”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Where has the Faith
securely delivered this?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It is a
quotation from the creed of the Church (the Apostles’ Creed, the Nicene Creed,
or some other related early creed).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The
creeds of the Church, which are a part of the Church’s Tradition outside of
Scripture, are authoritative and foundational for recognizing a true Church
from a false one.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This does not sound
like Sola Scriptura.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>(And, by the way,
this is why I capitalize the name “Catholic”.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>It is the proper name for the true Church and has been such since nearly
the beginning of the Church.)</span><span> </span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 107%;">Norman has also distorted
the teaching of St. Augustine.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>He
provided a quotation from St. Augustine which he alleged to teach Sola
Scriptura.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But, again, if we look at
that quotation, we can see that, while there is high praise and a high place of
authority for Scripture, Augustine falls short of teaching Sola Scriptura.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>He points out that Scripture is infallible,
but that the later writings of bishops are not.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>That is true.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Catholics do not
hold that individual bishops in general are infallible.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Augustine also points out that church
councils are not infallible.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>That is
true.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Local and regional councils can
err and often have erred.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Even plenary
councils (that is, councils representing the whole Church) can and have erred.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>(They cannot err when all the bishops
together, including the Bishop of Rome, teach a doctrine in a definitive way,
but they can make mistakes when they are teaching non-definitively or
provisionally, in light of some current level of knowledge that might change in
the future.)<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In contrast to these,
Scripture has a unique infallibility.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>But Augustine does not say that there is no infallible Tradition
possessed by the Church.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>He does not say
that a truly ecumenical council, truly representing the whole Church as she
exercises the highest capacity of her teaching office, can err.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>I grant that Augustine’s words in the above
quotation <i>could</i> be taken to imply these things.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But I deny that his words clearly or
necessarily imply these things.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Sola
Scriptura is simply not there in his words.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Norman has read it into those words.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>And if we look at other things Augustine has said, it becomes abundantly
clear that St. Augustine was no believer in Sola Scriptura.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>I will give you a few snippets to illustrate
this:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 107%;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 0in 0in 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">"The apostles," indeed, "gave no
injunctions on the point;" but the custom, which is opposed to Cyprian,
may be supposed to have had its origin in apostolic tradition, just as there
are many things which are observed by the whole Church, and therefore are
fairly held to have been enjoined by the apostles, which yet are not mentioned
in their writings. (</span><a href="https://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/npnf104.txt"><i><span style="line-height: 107%;">On Baptism,
Against the Donatists, Book 5, Chapter 23</span></i></a><i><span style="line-height: 107%;">, </span></i><span style="line-height: 107%;">ca.
AD 400)<o:p></o:p></span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 0in 0in 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 107%;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 0in 0in 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">As to those other things which we hold on the
authority, not of Scripture, but of tradition, and which are observed
throughout the whole world, it may be understood that they are held as approved
and instituted either by the apostles themselves, or by plenary Councils, whose
authority in the Church is most useful, e.g. the annual commemoration, by
special solemnities, of the Lord's passion, resurrection, and ascension, and of
the descent of the Holy Spirit from heaven, and whatever else is in like manner
observed by the whole Church wherever it has been established. (</span><a href="https://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/npnf101.txt"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Letter to
Januarius</span></a><span style="line-height: 107%;">, AD 400) <o:p></o:p></span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 0in 0in 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 107%;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 0in 0in 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">To be sure, although on this matter, we cannot quote a
clear example taken from the canonical Scriptures, at any rate, on this
question, we are following the true thought of Scriptures when we observe what
has appeared good to the universal Church which the authority of these same
Scriptures recommends to you; thus, since Holy Scripture cannot be mistaken,
anyone fearing to be misled by the obscurity of this question has only to
consult on this same subject this very Church which the Holy Scriptures point
out without ambiguity. (<i>Against Cresconius</i>, found </span><a href="http://www.patheos.com/blogs/davearmstrong/2016/04/st-augustine-was-catholic-not-proto-protestant.html"><span style="line-height: 107%;">here</span></a><span style="line-height: 107%;">,
taken from Robert B. Eno, <i>Teaching Authority in the Early Church</i> [Wilmington:
Michael Glazier, 1984], p. 134)<o:p></o:p></span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 0in 0in 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 107%;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 0in 0in 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">On the question of baptism, then, I think that I have
argued at sufficient length; and since this is a most manifest schism which is
called by the name of the Donatists, it only remains that on the subject of
baptism we should believe with pious faith what the universal Church maintains,
apart from the sacrilege of schism. And yet, if within the Church different men
still held different opinions on the point, without meanwhile violating peace,
then till some one clear and simple decree should have been passed by an
universal Council, it would have been right for the charity which seeks for
unity to throw a veil over the error of human infirmity, as it is written
"For charity shall cover the multitude of sins." . . . <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>There are great proofs of this existing on the
part of the blessed martyr Cyprian, in his letters . . .<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>For at that time, before the consent of the
whole Church had declared authoritatively, by the decree of a plenary Council,
what practice should be followed in this matter, it seemed to him, in common
with about eighty of his fellow bishops of the African churches, that every man
who had been baptized outside the communion of the Catholic Church should, on
joining the Church, be baptized anew. . . .<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>For when a bishop of so important a Church, himself a man of so great
merit and virtue, endowed with such excellence of heart and power of eloquence,
entertained an opinion about baptism different from that which was to be
confirmed by a more diligent searching into the truth; though many of his
colleagues held what was not yet made manifest by authority, but was sanctioned
by the past custom of the Church, and afterwards embraced by the whole Catholic
world; yet under these circumstances he did not sever himself, by refusal of
communion, from the others who thought differently, and indeed never ceased to
urge on the others that they should "forbear one another in love,
endeavoring to keep the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace." <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>(</span><a href="https://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/npnf104.txt"><i><span style="line-height: 107%;">On Baptism,
Against the Donatists, Book 1, Chapter 18</span></i></a><span style="line-height: 107%;">, AD 400)</span></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 0in 0in 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 107%;">In these quotations, we
see St. Augustine teaching the authoritative reliability of the Church herself
and her Tradition, against the Protestant idea of Sola Scriptura.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Before I finish with Augustine, though, I
would like to add one more quotation.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In
this selection, St. Augustine is writing to (and against) the Manichaeans, a
heretical sect which he himself had been a part of before he joined the
Catholic Church.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Listen carefully to his
argument:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 107%;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 0in 0in 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Let us see then what Manichæus teaches me; and
particularly let us examine that treatise which he calls the Fundamental
Epistle, in which almost all that you believe is contained. For in that unhappy
time when we read it we were in your opinion enlightened. The epistle begins
thus:--"Manichæus, an apostle of Jesus Christ, by the providence of God
the Father. These are wholesome words from the perennial and living
fountain." Now, if you please, patiently give heed to my inquiry. I do not
believe Manichæus to be an apostle of Christ. Do not, I beg of you, be enraged
and begin to curse. For you know that it is my rule to believe none of your
statements without consideration. Therefore I ask, who is this Manichæus? You
will reply, An apostle of Christ. I do not believe it. Now you are at a loss
what to say or do; for you promised to give knowledge of the truth, and here
you are forcing me to believe what I have no knowledge of. Perhaps you will read
the gospel to me, and will attempt to find there a testimony to Manichæus. But
should you meet with a person not yet believing the gospel, how would you reply
to him were he to say, I do not believe? For my part, I should not believe the
gospel except as moved by the authority of the Catholic Church. So when those
on whose authority I have consented to believe in the gospel tell me not to
believe in Manichæus, how can I but consent? Take your choice. If you say,
Believe the Catholics: their advice to me is to put no faith in you; so that,
believing them, I am precluded from believing you;--If you say, Do not believe
the Catholics: you cannot fairly use the gospel in bringing me to faith in
Manichæus; for it was at the command of the Catholics that I believed the
gospel;--Again, if you say, You were right in believing the Catholics when they
praised the gospel, but wrong in believing their vituperation of Manichæus: do
you think me such a fool as to believe or not to believe as you like or
dislike, without any reason? It is therefore fairer and safer by far for me,
having in one instance put faith in the Catholics, not to go over to you, till,
instead of bidding me believe, you make me understand something in the clearest
and most open manner. To convince me, then, you must put aside the gospel. If
you keep to the gospel, I will keep to those who commanded me to believe the
gospel; and, in obedience to them, I will not believe you at all. But if haply
you should succeed in finding in the gospel an incontrovertible testimony to
the apostleship of Manichæus, you will weaken my regard for the authority of
the Catholics who bid me not to believe you; and the effect of that will be,
that I shall no longer be able to believe the gospel either, for it was through
the Catholics that I got my faith in it; and so, whatever you bring from the
gospel will no longer have any weight with me. Wherefore, if no clear proof of
the apostleship of Manichæus is found in the gospel, I will believe the
Catholics rather than you. But if you read thence some passage clearly in favor
of Manichæus, I will believe neither them nor you: not them, for they lied to
me about you; nor you, for you quote to me that Scripture which I had believed
on the authority of those liars. But far be it that I should not believe the
gospel; for believing it, I find no way of believing you too. For the names of
the apostles, as there recorded, do not include the name of Manichæus. And who
the successor of Christ's betrayer was we read in the Acts of the Apostles;
which book I must needs believe if I believe the gospel, since both writings
alike Catholic authority commends to me. The same book contains the well-known
narrative of the calling and apostleship of Paul. Read me now, if you can, in
the gospel where Manichæus is called an apostle, or in any other book in which
I have professed to believe. Will you read the passage where the Lord promised
the Holy Spirit as a Paraclete, to the apostles? Concerning which passage,
behold how many and how great are the things that restrain and deter me from
believing in Manichæus. (St. Augustine, </span><a href="http://newadvent.org/fathers/1405.htm"><i><span style="line-height: 107%;">Against the Epistle of
Manichæus Called Fundamental</span></i></a><span style="line-height: 107%;">, Chapter 5, text
from </span><a href="https://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/npnf104.txt"><span style="line-height: 107%;">here</span></a><span style="line-height: 107%;">)</span></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 0in 0in 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">The argument goes
basically like this: "You claim that the books of the gospels
support Manichaeus (the prophet of Manicheanism). But the Catholic Church
rejects Manichaeus. If I accept that the gospels support Manichaeus, I will no
longer have any basis to believe in the gospels, because my reason for
believing those books to be divine is because the Catholic Church teaches me
so. But that same Catholic Church teaches me that you are wrong. So if I
believe the Catholic Church about the gospels, I will have to also believe that
you are wrong. But if I believe you are right because the gospels support you,
then I lose my reason for believing the gospels, for I can no longer trust the
Catholic Church, which is the authority behind why I believe in the
gospels."<br />
<br />
What Augustine is saying is that the only way we know that the gospel books are
from God is because this is taught by the Catholic Church. If we trust
the Catholic Church on that point, logically we have to trust them on all other
points as well. So if the Catholic Church tells us that the Manichean
heresy is wrong, we have to believe that. If the Manichean heresy
is <i>not</i> wrong, then the Catholic Church is wrong, and so we
would have no basis to believe the gospel books to be from God. For
Augustine, our trust in the gospels is part and parcel of our confidence that
the Tradition of the Catholic Church in general is divinely guided and so
authoritative and reliable. It is therefore inconsistent to accept that
Tradition regarding the status of the gospels but to reject other things that
Tradition teaches.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>So much for Sola
Scriptura!</span><span> </span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Norman, like many
Protestant apologists, argues his case from the Church Fathers by making
selective use of quotations in which the Fathers praise the Scriptures or give
them a high place, reading into these quotations Protestant ideas which are not
actually there, while not providing adequate context to see all the positive
things the Fathers have to say about Tradition and Magisterial authority.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Once we’ve got a clearer and more complete
picture of what the Fathers actually held and taught, we can see that the
consensus picture from the early Church is thoroughly Catholic and not
Protestant at all.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Of course, as Norman
said, it is impossible to do full justice to all of the evidence in such a
short piece as this.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>So I’ll refer you
to some additional sources.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></span><a href="https://conservativecolloquium.wordpress.com/2013/11/13/the-most-catholic-quotes-of-the-early-church-fathers-on-correct-scriptural-interpretation-authority/"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Here</span></a><span style="line-height: 107%;">
is a short piece, and <a href="https://www.patheos.com/blogs/davearmstrong/2021/12/church-fathers-vs-sola-scriptura-compendium.html">here</a> and </span><a href="http://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2018/07/the-church-fathers-sola-scriptura-or.html"><span style="line-height: 107%;">here</span></a><span style="line-height: 107%;"> are a couple of larger ones.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>I’ll end this section
with a couple of quotations from one of the great modern scholars of Church
history, well-respected by all sides, the great Protestant (Anglican) scholar
J. N. D. Kelly, as he sums up the evidence from the period of the Church
Fathers:<o:p></o:p></span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 107%;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 0in 0in 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 107%;">It should be unnecessary to accumulate further
evidence. Throughout the whole period Scripture and tradition ranked as complementary
authorities, media different in form but coincident in content. To inquire
which counted as superior or more ultimate is to pose the question in
misleading terms. If Scripture was abundantly sufficient in principle,
tradition was recognized as the surest clue to its interpretation, for in
tradition the Church retained, as a legacy from the apostles which was embedded
in all the organs of her institutional life, an unerring grasp of the real
purport and meaning of the revelation to which Scripture and tradition alike
bore witness. (J.N.D. Kelly, <i>Early Christian Doctrines</i> [San
Francisco: Harper & Row, 5th ed., 1978], 47-48) <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 0in 0in 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 107%;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 0in 0in 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 107%;">Thus in the end the Christian must, like Timothy,
‘guard the deposit’, i.e., the revelation enshrined in its completeness in Holy
Scripture and correctly interpreted in the Church’s unerring tradition. (Ibid.,
50-51)</span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 0in 0in 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></p>
<p align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: center;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><b><span style="line-height: 107%;">The
Papacy in the Early Church</span></b><span style="text-align: left;"> </span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Norman argued that the
early Church did not hold a Catholic view of papal authority and
infallibility.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>His arguments here
function by a similar method to his historical arguments for Sola
Scriptura.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>He makes some references and
mentions some events from Church history, but puts them forward in an
incomplete and misleading way.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The more
one knows Church history, the more one sees how universal and strong was the
early Church’s belief in papal supremacy and infallibility.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>I’ll provide a few illustrations to show this.</span><span> </span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">But, first of all, it
must be noted that even if the early Church was unclear about the papacy, this
would not warrant Norman’s conclusion that the Catholic view of the papacy is
false.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This is very much like the
question of Sola Scriptura we looked at earlier.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>We have to look to the Tradition of the
Church to determine how we should view the papacy, just as we had to for the
canonicity of the Book of Jude and for Sola Scriptura.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>If the early Church was unclear about the
papacy, if we had lived at that time, we would have had to have waited to see
what the Church would eventually decide.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>We could not simply decide against the papacy on our own authority, for
that would have been an arbitrary decision based on nothing.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>So, if we want to reject the papacy, unless
there is conclusive and non-question-begging evidence against it from some
source—Scripture, history, or whatever—we will have to show that the Church
eventually rejected it.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But we can’t
show that.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The Catholic Church, at least
eventually, clearly accepted it, since we see that she accepts it today (and
did at the time of the Reformation, obviously, and much earlier).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>And if we look at groups that separated from
the Roman Catholic Church at some point, like the Eastern Orthodox (or
Protestants), we find that they did not have any non-question-begging basis for
their own position or their separation.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Their break from the Catholic Church, therefore, was unwarranted and
arbitrary, and so they should not be followed in it.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>(I’ve already been proving that above with
regard to Protestants, and I will continue to do so below.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>I will also discuss Eastern Orthodoxy below.)<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>So, even granting that the early Church did
not clearly support the papacy, we will not have a basis to reject it but will
have to accept it, unless we will depart arbitrarily from what God has handed
down.</span><span> </span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">But, in fact, I don’t
think the early Church was all that unclear on the doctrine of the papacy.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The evidence points to the conclusion that
this doctrine was well-established very early in the history of the
Church.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Let me illustrate this with some
quotations.</span><span> </span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 107%;">The great Church Father St.
Jerome, writing in the year 393, articulated the central importance of Peter
among the apostles as a remedy for schism:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 107%;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 0in 0in 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">[T]he Church was founded upon Peter: although
elsewhere the same is attributed to all the Apostles, and they all receive the
keys of the kingdom of heaven, and the strength of the Church depends upon them
all alike, yet one among the twelve is chosen so that when a head has been
appointed, there may be no occasion for schism.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>(St. Jerome, <i>Against Jovinianus [Book I]</i>, section 26. Translated
by W.H. Fremantle, G. Lewis and W.G. Martley, from <i>Nicene and Post-Nicene
Fathers, Second Series</i>, Vol. 6, edited by Philip Schaff and Henry Wace [Buffalo,
NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1893], revised and edited for New
Advent by Kevin Knight. Retrieved from the New Advent website at </span><a href="http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/30091.htm"><span style="line-height: 107%;">http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/30091.htm</span></a><span style="line-height: 107%;">
at 10:55 PM on 2/19/18.)</span></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 0in 0in 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 107%;">When there were rival
contenders for the position of Patriarch of Antioch, St. Jerome wrote to Rome
to find a resolution to the conflict, at least with regard to the position he
himself should take.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>His comments
regarding the authority of the Bishop of Rome are very revealing.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>He is writing in the year 376 or 377.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 107%;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 0in 0in 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Yet, though your greatness terrifies me, your kindness
attracts me. From the priest I demand the safe-keeping of the victim, from the
shepherd the protection due to the sheep. Away with all that is overweening;
let the state of Roman majesty withdraw. My words are spoken to the successor
of the fisherman, to the disciple of the cross. As I follow no leader save
Christ, so I communicate with none but your blessedness, that is with the chair
of Peter. For this, I know, is the rock on which the church is built! This is
the house where alone the paschal lamb can be rightly eaten. This is the ark of
Noah, and he who is not found in it shall perish when the flood prevails.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>(St. Jerome, <i>Letter 15</i>, section 2.
Translated by W.H. Fremantle, G. Lewis and W.G. Martley, from <i>Nicene and
Post-Nicene Fathers, Second Series</i>, Vol. 6, edited by Philip Schaff and
Henry Wace [Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1893], revised
and edited for New Advent by Kevin Knight. Retrieved from the New Advent
website [added biblical references and hyperlinks removed] at </span><a href="http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/3001015.htm"><span style="line-height: 107%;">http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/3001015.htm</span></a><span style="line-height: 107%;">
at 11:01 PM on 2/19/18.)</span></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 0in 0in 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 107%;">Since Norman made the
claim that the Eastern Fathers in particular did not hold as high a view of the
papacy, let me quote St. Maximus the Confessor, one of the greatest of the
Eastern Church Fathers, revered as a saint and as a theologian by both
Catholics and Orthodox to this day, who had some interesting things to say
about the Church of Rome, writing in the 7th century:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 107%;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 0in 0in 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 107%;">All the ends of the inhabited world, and those who
anywhere on earth confess the Lord with a pure and orthodox faith, look
directly to the most holy Church of the Romans and her confession and faith as
to a sun of eternal light, receiving from her the radiant beam of the patristic
and holy doctrines, just as the holy six synods, inspired and sacred, purely
and with all devotion set them forth, uttering most clearly the symbol of
faith. For, from the time of the descent to us of the incarnate Word of God,
all the Churches of the Christians everywhere have held and possess this most great
Church as the sole base and foundation, since, according to the very promise of
the Saviour, it will never be overpowered by the gates of hell, but rather has
the keys of the orthodox faith and confession in him, and to those who approach
it with reverence it opens the genuine and unique piety, but shuts and stops
every heretical mouth that speaks utter wickedness.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>(St. Maximus the Confessor, taken from Andrew
Louth, "The Ecclesiology of St. Maximos the Confessor," published in
the <i>International Journal for the Study of the Christian Church</i>, Vol. 4,
No. 2, July 2004, p. 116.)</span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 0in 0in 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 107%;">Between the years of 484
and 519, the Church of Rome (along with the rest of the Western churches) were
out of communion with the Eastern churches during what was later called the “Acacian
schism.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The short of it is that the
Eastern churches had signed on to a formula that compromised a clear commitment
to the earlier-affirmed Council of Chalcedon.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Rome, in defense of Chalcedon, therefore broke communion with those
churches until the issue could be resolved.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>The issue was finally resolved as the Eastern churches (led by the
Byzantine Emperor Justin I) eventually rejected the ambiguous formula,
reaffirmed Chalcedon, and returned to communion with Rome and the West.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But Rome would not receive the Eastern
churches back into communion until they signed a statement Pope Hormisdas had
written up for that purpose.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The Eastern
churches signed the statement and thus returned to communion with Rome.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Here is the pertinent portion of the statement
they signed:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 107%;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 0in 0in 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 107%;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The first
condition of salvation is to keep the norm of the true faith and in no way to
deviate from the established doctrine of the Fathers.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>For it is impossible that the words of our
Lord Jesus Christ who said, "Thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will
build my Church" <i>(Matt. 16:18)</i>, should not be verified.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>And their truth has been proved by the course
of history, for in the Apostolic See the Catholic religion has always been kept
unsullied.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>From this hope and faith we
by no means desire to be separated and, following the doctrine of the Fathers,
we declare anathema all heresies . . .<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 0in 0in 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 107%;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Following,
as we have said before, the Apostolic See in all things and proclaiming all its
decisions, we endorse and approve all the letters which Pope St. Leo wrote
concerning the Christian religion.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>And
so I hope I may deserve to be associated with you in the one communion which
the Apostolic See proclaims, in which the whole, true, and perfect security of
the Christian religion resides.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>I
promise that from now on those who are separated from the communion of the
Catholic Church, that is, who are not in agreement with the Apostolic See, will
not have their names read during the sacred mysteries.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But if I attempt even the least deviation
from my profession, I admit that, according to my own declaration, I am an
accomplice to those whom I have condemned.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>I have signed this my profession with my own hand and have directed it
to you, Hormisdas, the holy and venerable pope of Rome.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>(Jesuit Fathers of St. Mary's College, St.
Mary's, Kansas, <i>The Church Teaches: Documents of the Church in English
Translation</i>, tr. John F. Clarkson, et al. [Tan, 2009].)</span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 0in 0in 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">It is very interesting
that although there was some haggling by some Eastern leaders over aspects of
the formula that was agreed upon, not a single soul (so far as we have any
record of) voiced the least hint of disagreement regarding the claims in the
statement about the authority and centrality of “the Apostolic See” (a common
name used in both East and West in the early Church for the See of Rome).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Nor was the formula protested against or
rescinded for centuries afterwards.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It
was again signed by the Eastern and Western Fathers in the year 869 at the
Fourth Council of Constantinople.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>For
those who do not know the history of early Church views of the papacy, the fact
that the Eastern Churches could sign such a statement without protest multiple
times probably seems very surprising, but those who are more familiar with this
history know that a high view of the papacy was common in both East and West
throughout the days of the early Church and that this formula of Pope Hormisdas
did not spring out of nowhere.</span><span> </span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Of course, the study of
views of the papacy in the early Church is vast.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>For those who wish to go further, </span><a href="http://www.calledtocommunion.com/2011/02/the-chair-of-st-peter/"><span style="line-height: 107%;">here</span></a><span style="line-height: 107%;">,
</span><a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=lzM_AAAAYAAJ&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false"><span style="line-height: 107%;">here</span></a><span style="line-height: 107%;">,
and </span><a href="https://archive.org/details/DocumentsIllustratingPapalAuthorityAd96-454Giles"><span style="line-height: 107%;">here</span></a><span style="line-height: 107%;">
are a few more resources.</span><span> </span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Norman referred to some
incidents in the early Church where there was conflict between Popes and
others.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Since he only alluded to these
briefly, I will give a very brief response.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>In the 2<sup>nd</sup> century, Pope Victor excommunicated the churches
of Asia for refusing to accept the Church’s decree on the date of Easter.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Norman mentions that several bishops argued
with him about this, including St. Irenaeus.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>That is true.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>They advised and
exhorted him not to do it.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Interestingly, however, we have no record of anyone saying he did not
have the authority to do it.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>So there is
no challenge here to the Catholic doctrine of papal authority or
infallibility.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In fact, the incident
supports the Catholic claim.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>We can see
that Victor, the Bishop of Rome, believed himself to have authority over the
churches of Asia, including the power to excommunicate them.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>We don’t see anyone arguing against that
claim or disputing it.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Indeed, the fact
that the bishops feel a need to exhort him not to do it suggests rather that
they accepted that he had the authority.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>They did not refute his authority, but argued with him as to how he
should best use that authority.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>(We
should note that the Catholic Church teaches that while Popes are protected by
the Holy Spirit so that their teaching will not lead the Church into error,
they are not protected from falling into personal sin, acting foolishly, making
imprudent decisions, etc., nor is it against Catholic teaching for other
people, especially brother bishops, to respectfully call the Pope out for such
behavior if the occasion calls for it.)</span><span> </span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">In the third century, St.
Cyprian of Carthage and some others disputed with Pope St. Stephen about the
validity of baptism by heretics.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In the
Catholic view, this dispute should probably never have taken place.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Indeed, eventually the whole Church came to
agree with Pope Stephen, and Cyprian’s position was seen as a blot on his
otherwise saintly career (see Augustine discussing this in one of my quotations
from him above).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>We can see from
elsewhere in Cyprian’s writings that he had a very high view of papal authority,
but it seems that his zeal in this case led him to act inconsistently with his
general attitude.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Is this a problem for
the Catholic view?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>No, not unless it is
Catholic teaching that Catholics never act inconsistently with Catholic
teaching.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But, of course, there is no
such teaching.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Church history is replete
with lay Catholics, bishops, and even saints at times acting wrongly, including
disobeying papal authority.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>There are
plenty of Catholics today who chafe against certain teachings of Pope Francis.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The fact that such things happen does not
disprove Catholic claims regarding the papacy.</span><span> </span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Norman mentions that the
Council of Chalcedon passed a decree concerning the Church of Constantinople
that Pope Leo disagreed with.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>What he
doesn’t mention is that this decree is deferred by the council for Pope Leo’s
confirmation, that the Patriarch of Constantinople basically apologizes to the
Pope about the matter in a later letter, and several other nuances of the
incident.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>(All of these incidents, by
the way, are discussed in </span><a href="https://archive.org/details/DocumentsIllustratingPapalAuthorityAd96-454Giles"><span style="line-height: 107%;">this
very helpful book</span></a><span style="line-height: 107%;"> in great detail, with primary source
quotations, if you want to look into them further.)<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Again, it is quite true that sometimes in
Church history people in the Church act out of accord with the Pope’s
wishes.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But this proves nothing to the
point and certainly does not provide any serious evidence for the Protestant
position.</span><span> </span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Norman mentions that the
Third Council of Constantinople excommunicated Pope Honorius for heresy.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This is a fascinating incident, and I will
refer you </span><a href="https://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2019/07/historical-challenges-to-infallibility_30.html"><span style="line-height: 107%;">here</span></a><span style="line-height: 107%;">
for a detailed look at it, and you will see how far short it comes from
disproving Catholic claims.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It seems to
me that the closer one examines the alleged evidence from Church history for
Protestant or other anti-Catholic views, the more one comes to appreciate how
rich the evidence for the Catholic claims is throughout that very history.</span><span> </span></span></p>
<p align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: center;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><b><span style="line-height: 107%;">Eastern
Orthodoxy</span></b><span style="text-align: left;"> </span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Norman alleges that the
history and tradition of Eastern Orthodoxy provides some significant ammunition
against the Catholic position.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>He claims
that the Eastern Fathers did not hold a high view of the papacy.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In refutation of that, I would point to what
I have already quoted above from St. Maximus the Confessor and from the Formula
of Hormisdas, and the other resources I have linked to, and I would refer you
to </span><a href="https://www.fisheaters.com/easternfathers.html"><span style="line-height: 107%;">this
collection</span></a><span style="line-height: 107%;"> of sayings from Eastern Fathers regarding the papacy.</span><span> </span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 107%;">It is interesting that
ever since the Eastern Orthodox broke off from the Catholic Church in the
Middle Ages, they have never been able to replace the essential role played by
the Chair of St. Peter in the authority and epistemology of the Church.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The Church has always taught that St. Peter
and his successors in the bishops of Rome have the headship of the Church and
the keys of the kingdom in a unique way in order to guarantee the unity and
orthodoxy of the Church.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Just as the
universal episcopate (the whole body of bishops) provides the authoritative
voice of doctrine for the whole Church, so the Bishops of Rome function as a
voice of authority when there is dissention among bishops.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The Bishop of Rome functions as a sure guide
to know where to go in doctrinal disputes and divisions.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Since the Eastern Orthodox cut themselves off
from Rome, they have never been able to replace this function, and the result
is that they have no clear answer as to how one should resolve divisions and
disputes in the Church.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>They believe in
the infallibility of Scripture, Tradition, and the Church, but they do not have
any official or universal view on how to access the infallibility of Tradition
or of the Church.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>I’ll let one of the
great Eastern Orthodox bishops of modern times, Bishop Kallistos Ware, describe
this problem himself:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 107%;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 0in 0in 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 107%;"> But councils of bishops can err and
be deceived. How then can one be certain that a particular gathering is
truly an Ecumenical Council and therefore that its decrees are infallible?
Many councils have considered themselves ecumenical and have claimed to
speak in the name of the whole Church, and yet the Church has rejected them as
heretical: Ephesus in 449, for example, or the Iconoclast Council of Hieria in
754, or Florence in 1438-9. Yet these councils seem in no way different
in outward appearance from the Ecumenical Councils. What, then, is the
criterion for determining whether a council is ecumenical?<br />
This is a more difficult question to answer than might at
first appear, and though it has been much discussed by Orthodox during the past
hundred years, it cannot be said that the solutions suggested are entirely
satisfactory. All Orthodox know which are the seven councils that their
Church accepts as ecumenical, but precisely what it is that makes a council
ecumenical is not so clear. There are, so it must be admitted, certain
points in the Orthodox theology of councils which remain obscure and which call
for further thinking on the part of theologians. (Bishop Kallistos Ware, <i>The
Orthodox Church</i> [London: Penguin Books, 1997], pp. 251-252).</span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 0in 0in 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 107%;">The Orthodox sometimes
argue against the Catholic Church by pointing out areas where Catholic doctrine
has changed since the earlier days of the Church.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Now, if they could show a clear contradiction
between the definitive teachings of the Church in earlier times and the
definitive teachings of the Church in later times, this would be a powerful
argument.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But it is not enough to simply
show that Church teachings have grown or developed over time.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It is part of the Catholic faith that
doctrine develops.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In Christ, and
through his teaching and the teaching of his apostles, the revelation of God
has been brought to completion. The Church has received from her
beginning the fullness of the Word which God has desired to reveal.
However, we are creatures of time and space, and God's interaction with us
takes the form of a story. The Church possesses the fullness of the
divine revelation, but her recognition, gathering, preserving, understanding,
interpreting, and applying of divine revelation takes place, under the guidance
of the Holy Spirit who "guides her into all truth," over her entire
history. Thus, the Tradition of the Church grows, not by things being
added from without, but by an unpacking from within, as the Church grows in her
understanding and application of divine revelation and all its implications
over time in light of the new circumstances she faces in her
experience--external events, new cultural situations, heresies,
newly-encountered philosophical ideas, dialogue with the world, etc. The
Church's growth is analogous in many ways to the growth of individuals as we
gain wisdom to understand the nuances of things through our experience gained
as we go through life. St. Vincent of Lerins, from whom I quoted earlier,
provides the classic description from the early Church of this process of
doctrinal development. Note (in the quotation below) the two things he
emphasizes: The Church's doctrine grows through time, analogous to the
growth of an embryo into an adult, but that growth is a logical growth--not
mere arbitrary mutation, like a cancer, but a flowering into maturity of what
was there at least in seed form from the beginning. There can be great
growth in recognizing nuances, in seeing patterns and implications previously
unnoticed, in articulating the specificities and depths of what God has
revealed, and all of this can greatly alter in some ways the "shape and
form" of the Church's doctrine, but there cannot be contradiction.
The Church's later doctrine will not turn around and attack what she had
previously established, or the divine revelation that is at the foundation of
all her teaching.<br style="mso-special-character: line-break;" />
<!--[if !supportLineBreakNewLine]--><br style="mso-special-character: line-break;" />
<!--[endif]--><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 0in 0in 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 107%;">The growth of religion in the soul must be analogous
to the growth of the body, which, though in process of years it is developed
and attains its full size, yet remains still the same. There is a wide
difference between the flower of youth and the maturity of age; yet they who
were once young are still the same now that they have become old, insomuch that
though the stature and outward form of the individual are changed, yet his
nature is one and the same, his person is one and the same. An infant's limbs
are small, a young man's large, yet the infant and the young man are the same.
Men when full grown have the same number of joints that they had when children;
and if there be any to which maturer age has given birth these were already
present in embryo, so that nothing new is produced in them when old which was
not already latent in them when children. This, then, is undoubtedly the true
and legitimate rule of progress, this the established and most beautiful order
of growth, that mature age ever develops in the man those parts and forms which
the wisdom of the Creator had already framed beforehand in the infant. Whereas,
if the human form were changed into some shape belonging to another kind, or at
any rate, if the number of its limbs were increased or diminished, the result
would be that the whole body would become either a wreck or a monster, or, at
the least, would be impaired and enfeebled. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 0in 0in 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 107%;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 0in 0in 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 107%;">In like manner, it behooves Christian doctrine to
follow the same laws of progress, so as to be consolidated by years, enlarged
by time, refined by age, and yet, withal, to continue uncorrupt and
unadulterate, complete and perfect in all the measurement of its parts, and, so
to speak, in all its proper members and senses, admitting no change, no waste
of its distinctive property, no variation in its limits. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 0in 0in 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 107%;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 0in 0in 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 107%;">For example: Our forefathers in the old time sowed
wheat in the Church's field. It would be most unmeet and iniquitous if we,
their descendants, instead of the genuine truth of grain, should reap the
counterfeit error of tares. This rather should be the result—there should be no
discrepancy between the first and the last. From doctrine which was sown as wheat,
we should reap, in the increase, doctrine of the same kind— wheat also; so that
when in process of time any of the original seed is developed, and now
flourishes under cultivation, no change may ensue in the character of the
plant. There may supervene shape, form, variation in outward appearance, but
the nature of each kind must remain the same. God forbid that those rose-beds
of Catholic interpretation should be converted into thorns and thistles. God
forbid that in that spiritual paradise from plants of cinnamon and balsam,
darnel and wolfsbane should of a sudden shoot forth. (St. Vincent of
Lerins, Ibid., section 55)</span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 0in 0in 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Some Eastern theologians
suggest that we might judge the truth or falsity of doctrines by means of
comparing modern doctrines to those held by the earlier, unified Church.
Some of them then argue that Catholics fail this test, because the Catholic
Church has changed practices that the early Church kept and has added doctrines
not believed by the early Church--such as the use of unleavened bread in the
Eucharist, or the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception. But this
argument is question-begging, since it ignores the fact of doctrinal
development. Everyone must acknowledge that the Church has changed over
the centuries. She doesn't do everything today exactly as she did it in
the first centuries of the Church. Her doctrine has progressed, so that
she is more aware of certain things today than she was in the past. To
justify a claim of inconsistency between the modern Catholic Church and the
earlier Catholic Church it is necessary to do more than simply point out
changes or differences; one must show that those differences are contradictions
or illegitimate mutations and not legitimate examples of growth or adaptation
or doctrinal development. And since it is the Tradition of the Church,
divinely-guided by the Holy Spirit, which must be the ultimate judge of which
developments are legitimate and which are not (unless, of course, an
unavoidable contradiction can be proved to reason), this poses a serious
problem for the Eastern argument, since, again, they have no way of knowing how
to determine what the Tradition of the Church is saying.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>We must conclude, then, that the modern
Eastern Orthodox position, where it diverges from that of Rome, is arbitrary
and unwarranted, having no adequate grounding in the Tradition of the historic
Church or in any other evidence.</span><span> </span></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span>(While the Protestant and the Eastern Orthodox positions are self-refuting, unable to support their own positions using the evidence their own systems make available to them, the Catholic Church has a workable epistemology because of the doctrine of the papacy. As I mentioned, the Catholic view is that God protects the Bishop of Rome from error so that he and his teaching can function as a rallying point for unity and orthodoxy in the Church. Thus, the Catholic system can support its own claims in a way the other systems can’t, so that even if the Catholic view did not have a superior historical claim, it would still have a superior claim because it is the only system with a workable epistemology. The Protestant and Orthodox epistemologies are self-refuting and thus dead-ends, while the Catholic epistemology is not.)</span></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span></span></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;">In addition to the Eastern Orthodox Church, there are two or three other bodies of Eastern churches that are not in communion with Rome (or with each other)—the Oriental Orthodox and the Churches of the East. The Churches of the East broke with Rome and the other churches after the Council of Ephesus in the year 431. The Oriental Orthodox separated after the Council of Chalcedon in the year 451. These churches are in no better epistemological or historical position than the Eastern Orthodox.</p><div><span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 107%;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 107%;">For more on Eastern
Orthodoxy, see </span><a href="http://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2016/06/dialogue-on-claims-of-eastern-orthodoxy.html" style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">here</span></a><span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 107%;">
and </span><a href="http://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2015/07/why-not-eastern-orthodoxy.html" style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">here</span></a><span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 107%;">.</span><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></div>
<p align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: center;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><b><span style="line-height: 107%;">Alleged
Historical Contradictions</span></b><span style="text-align: left;"> </span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Norman claims that the
Catholic Church has contradicted herself in her teaching over the
centuries.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>He mentions two specific
examples—religious liberty, and the salvation of non-Catholics.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>He provides quotations that he says
illustrate the contradictions clearly.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>But a more careful look at these documents can, I think, clear up the
alleged contradictions fairly quickly.</span><span> </span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 107%;">The 19<sup>th</sup>
century encyclical <i>Quanta Cura</i> objects to a certain idea of “liberty of
conscience”.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Here, specifically, is the
idea it objects to:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 107%;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 0in 0in 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 107%;">[L]iberty of conscience and worship is each man’s
personal right, which ought to be legally proclaimed and asserted in every
rightly constituted society; and that a right resides in the citizens to an
absolute liberty, which should be restrained by no authority whether
ecclesiastical or civil, whereby they may be able openly and publicly to
manifest and declare any of their ideas whatever, either by word of mouth, by
the press, or in any other way.</span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 0in 0in 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 107%;">So what is this
idea?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>That people have a right to an absolute
liberty, restrained by no authority, to openly and publicly declare any of
their ideas whatsoever, in any way.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Pope
Pius IX, in this document, rejects this idea as false.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Norman claims that the Second Vatican
Council, in <i>Dignitatis Humanae</i>, a century later, contradicted this
document by affirming this idea of liberty of conscience.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But did they?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Here’s the idea Vatican II affirmed:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 107%;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 0in 0in 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 107%;">This Vatican Council declares that the human person
has a right to religious freedom. This freedom means that all men are to be
immune from coercion on the part of individuals or of social groups and of any
human power, in such wise that no one is to be forced to act in a manner
contrary to his own beliefs, whether privately or publicly, whether alone or in
association with others, within due limits.</span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 0in 0in 0.5in;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 107%;"><o:p> </o:p></span></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Is this the same idea as
the one rejected in <i>Quanta Cura</i>?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>I don’t think so.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>There is a
superficial similarity, but I think the two ideas are fundamentally
different.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><i>Quanta Cura</i> rejected
the idea of an “absolute” liberty to preach whatever one likes.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><i>Dignitatis Humanae</i> did not affirm such
an absolute liberty, but a liberty of religious freedom “within due
limits”.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>So I don’t see a contradiction
here.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>We could put the teaching of both
these documents together harmoniously in this way:<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>“People have a right to religious freedom
within due limits, but not an absolute liberty to say and do whatever they
like.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>So it appears the alleged
contradiction is an illusion that fades away when one looks a little
closer.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But I do grant that this is a
complicated subject.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>For those who would
like to explore it further, </span><a href="http://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2015/10/gods-law-civil-law-and-liberty-of.html"><span style="line-height: 107%;">here</span></a><span style="line-height: 107%;">
is another resource.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Also see </span><a href="https://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2020/06/church-history-companion-unit-6.html"><span style="line-height: 107%;">here</span></a><span style="line-height: 107%;">
and </span><a href="https://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2020/06/church-history-companion-unit-8.html"><span style="line-height: 107%;">here</span></a><span style="line-height: 107%;">
for some historical articles that look at this subject from a historical point
of view.</span><span> </span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 107%;">What about the alleged
contradiction regarding the salvation of non-Catholics?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Again, I think we have a tempest in a teapot,
as they say.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The Council of Florence
said that no one can be saved outside of the Catholic Church.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Vatican II said that non-Catholics can be
saved.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Is this a contradiction?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Only if we assume that the only way to be in
the Catholic Church is to be fully, visibly, and formally a part of the
external structure of the Church.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But why
assume that?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This is not the Catholic
view now, and it never has been.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Here is
how the <i>Catechism of the Catholic Church </i>addresses this:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 107%;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 0in 0in 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 107%;">846 How are we to understand this affirmation [that
outside the Church there is no salvation], often repeated by the Church
Fathers? Re-formulated positively, it means that all salvation comes from
Christ the Head through the Church which is his Body:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 0in 0in 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 107%;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 1.0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 0in 0in 1in;"><span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 107%;">Basing itself on Scripture and Tradition, the Council
teaches that the Church, a pilgrim now on earth, is necessary for salvation:
the one Christ is the mediator and the way of salvation; he is present to us in
his body which is the Church. He himself explicitly asserted the necessity of
faith and Baptism, and thereby affirmed at the same time the necessity of the
Church which men enter through Baptism as through a door. Hence they could not
be saved who, knowing that the Catholic Church was founded as necessary by God
through Christ, would refuse either to enter it or to remain in it. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 0in 0in 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 107%;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 0in 0in 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 107%;">847 This affirmation is not aimed at those who,
through no fault of their own, do not know Christ and his Church:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 0in 0in 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 107%;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 1.0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 0in 0in 1in;"><span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 107%;">Those who, through no fault of their own, do not know
the Gospel of Christ or his Church, but who nevertheless seek God with a
sincere heart, and, moved by grace, try in their actions to do his will as they
know it through the dictates of their conscience - those too may achieve
eternal salvation. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 0in 0in 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 107%;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 0in 0in 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">848 "Although in ways known to himself God can
lead those who, through no fault of their own, are ignorant of the Gospel, to
that faith without which it is impossible to please him, the Church still has
the obligation and also the sacred right to evangelize all men."<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>(</span><a href="http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/__P29.HTM"><i><span style="line-height: 107%;">Catechism
of the Catholic Church</span></i><span style="line-height: 107%;">, #846-848</span></a><span style="line-height: 107%;">,
footnotes removed)</span></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 0in 0in 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">The statement in the
Council of Florence, and similar statements, are intended to emphasize the
necessity of Christ and the Church for salvation.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>One cannot reject Christ or the Church and be
saved, for salvation comes only through Christ and his Church.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But there are people who are not outwardly
and formally members of the visible Catholic Church not because they have
rejected her, but because they do not know about her or are unable to enter her
for some other non-malicious reason.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Such people, if they are seeking God by his grace, are implicitly
connected to Christ and to his Church by their desire to follow the truth and
they receive saving grace through Christ and his Church.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>So there is no contradiction here.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>For more on this subject, see, again, the two
history articles I linked to just above, found </span><a href="https://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2020/06/church-history-companion-unit-6.html"><span style="line-height: 107%;">here</span></a><span style="line-height: 107%;">
and </span><a href="https://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2020/06/church-history-companion-unit-8.html"><span style="line-height: 107%;">here</span></a><span style="line-height: 107%;">.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>And </span><a href="http://shamelesspopery.com/salvation-outside-of-the-church/"><span style="line-height: 107%;">here</span></a><span style="line-height: 107%;">
is a very helpful article on this subject from the <i>Shameless Popery</i>
blog.</span><span> </span></span></p>
<p align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: center;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><b><span style="line-height: 107%;">Biblical
Arguments</span></b><span style="text-align: left;"> </span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Norman attempts to argue
for Sola Scriptura and the Protestant position from Scripture.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Before we even get to specifics, I want to
say that my fundamental answer to Norman’s biblical arguments is that they are
question-begging.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Begging the question
is a fallacy where one simply assumes something that needs to be proved in
order to establish an argument.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>I say
that Norman’s Scriptural arguments are question-begging because he is using the
Bible in a Protestant sort of way.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>That
is, Norman is interpreting Scripture using Sola Scriptura as a method.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But he cannot do this, for Sola Scriptura is
precisely what he is supposed to be proving.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>It is illicit for Norman to use Sola Scriptura to interpret Scripture in
order to make Scriptural arguments intending to prove Sola Scriptura.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Catholics, of course, don’t believe that Sola
Scriptura is the right method to use in interpreting Scripture.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>We believe that Scripture is rightly interpreted
only in light of the Church’s authoritative Tradition under the guidance of her
Magisterium.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>So unless Norman can make a
biblical argument so plain that it must be accepted no matter what interpretive
framework is used to interpret it, he’s not going to be able to establish his
position.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Let’s take a look briefly at
what he’s come up with.</span><span> </span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Norman argues that there
is no biblical evidence for an infallible Tradition and an infallible
Church.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>I don’t agree, but I will grant
that I don’t think a conclusive argument could be made for the Catholic point
of view on these points merely from the Bible alone, without any infallible
interpretive framework.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But that’s not a
problem from the Catholic point of view.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Catholics don’t believe that all doctrine must be proved solely from
Scripture without the use of an infallible interpretive framework.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>So this observation doesn’t help establish
Norman’s position.</span><span> </span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 107%;">Norman cites 2 Timothy
3:16-17:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 107%;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 0in 0in 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 107%;">All scripture is given by inspiration of God, and is
profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in
righteousness: That the man of God may be perfect, thoroughly furnished unto
all good works.</span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 0in 0in 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Does this passage say
that Scripture alone is infallible? Does it say that Church Tradition is
not infallible, or that the bishops of the Church are not infallible?
Does it say that Scripture is rightly used by being interpreted by individuals
even sometimes in contradiction to the interpretations of the bishops of the
Church or against the Tradition of the Church? No, it doesn't say any of
these things. It simply says that Scripture is inspired and is from God,
and that it is useful if we want to be able to do all that God commands us to
do. Both Catholics and Protestants agree with this. This passage
doesn't teach Sola Scriptura. Rather, Protestants have to read this
into the text.</span><span> </span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Norman appeals to Jesus’s
controversy with the Pharisees in Mark 7, where Jesus reprimands the Pharisees
for following their own man-made traditions in preference to the commands of
God.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Does Jesus teach Sola
Scriptura there in any plain way? No. He does teach that the
Pharisees had added man-made traditions to the Word of God, and that this was a
bad thing to do. So we can infer from this that we shouldn't do anything
like that, and that this is a danger we should watch out for. But
Catholics don't believe that we are adding man-made traditions to the Word of
God. By teaching Catholic Tradition, we are not teaching man-made
traditions but <i>divine</i> Tradition. Does Jesus anywhere say
there is no such thing as <i>divine</i> Tradition, or that Tradition
in any sense should never be put together with the written form of the Word of
God? No. One can try to <i>infer</i> that idea, but it is
not plainly there. The Catholic view is not ruled out; it is not even
addressed. In 2 Thessalonians 2:15, St. Paul says, "Therefore,
brethren, stand fast, and hold the traditions which ye have been taught,
whether by word, or our epistle." There is an example of the idea
of <i>tradition</i> used in a positive way. St. Paul says,
"Follow what you have been taught, both what is written and what has been
handed down in other ways." So clearly not <i>all</i> unwritten
tradition is always bad. Sometimes it is authoritative and reliable just
like that which is written. And if one want to say, "But you're
misinterpreting St. Paul there!", well, I say it is <i>you</i> who are
misinterpreting the Scriptures on this subject.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Again, I will grant that there is probably no way to decide between us
merely on the basis of these kinds of biblical arguments alone, without an
infallible interpreter.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But it is question-begging
for Protestants to simply <i>assume</i> that we have no such interpreter and
proceed to interpret these passages by themselves without one.</span><span> </span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Norman points out that
the leaders of the people of God at the time of Christ erred in rejecting the
Messiah.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>He seems to infer from this
that, perhaps, there was no infallibility granted to the leaders of the people
of God in Old Testament times, and that there would be no authority granted to
the leaders of the people of God in New Testament times either.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But these are unwarranted leaps.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Perhaps God gave infallible reliability to
the leaders of the people before Christ came, but once Christ came and clearly
established his identity, by not submitting to him those leaders lost this
infallibility.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>And even if we were to
grant that the Old Testament leaders had no infallible authority, it would not
follow from this that the official teachers of the Christian Church in
Christian times would have no infallible authority.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>(After all, Jesus’s parable of the tenants—Matthew
21:33-46—seems to imply that the Church would be kept from failing in ways Old
Testament Israel was not.)<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>There is
simply insufficient evidence here to warrant Norman’s specific conclusions.</span><span> [Ed. See <a href="http://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2021/06/sola-scriptura-in-old-testament.html">this article</a> for more on the question of Sola Scriptura in Old Testament times.]</span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Norman alleges several
cases where he claims Scripture contradicts the teachings of the Catholic
Church.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>He mentions the withholding of
the cup from laity at communion, the sinlessness of Mary, images of God in the
Church, and the doctrine of justification.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>But I submit, again, that all of his arguments here are
question-begging, because he has reached his interpretive conclusions by means
of using Sola Scriptura, which is a distinctly Protestant way of using the
Bible.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Let’s look very briefly at the
examples of contradictions he alleges.</span><span> </span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Jesus tells all the
apostles to drink of the cup at the Last Supper, and in John 6 he tells the
people that they must eat his flesh and drink his blood.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Is this contrary to Catholic teaching, which
holds that the laity are not required, and can sometimes be forbidden, to drink
of the cup?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>No, it isn’t.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>There are interpretations that are consistent
with Catholic teaching.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>At the Last
Supper, Jesus was speaking to his apostles when he told them all to drink of
it.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>He wasn’t speaking to every
Christian.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In John 6, Jesus is simply
pointing out that all people are called to receive salvation by feeding on
Christ in the Eucharist.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>He mentions
both body and blood because both of these are always involved at every
Eucharist.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The priest always receives
both.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But that doesn’t necessarily mean
that all Christians must always receive both by means of eating and drinking.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Perhaps Christians, by receiving at least one
element, are participating in the whole.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Just as one does not have to eat every kind of food at a potluck supper
in order to say that one has participated fully in the meal.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>So which interpretation here is correct,
Norman’s or mine?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Norman can make
inferences, but the fact is that the Bible simply does not clearly address our
question here or give us a clear answer.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Norman is going to infer as best he can using Sola Scriptura, and I am
going to follow the interpretive guidance given by the Church’s Tradition and
Magisterium.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Which way is correct?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It depends on whether Protestantism or
Catholicism is true.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It is therefore
question-begging for Norman to simply assume a Protestant method of answering
this question in order to establish his argument intending to prove
Protestantism.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It is just as illicit as
if I were to cite the official Catholic interpretation on this point in order
to prove Catholicism.</span><span> </span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">What about the
sinlessness of Mary?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The Bible says that
all have sinned.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But is this statement meant
to include Mary, or to say that everyone is subject to sin in exactly the same
way?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>What about Jesus?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Did he sin?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Norman would agree with me that he did not.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Well, what has become of the argument from
the “all” in “<i>all</i> have sinned”?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>“Jesus is an exception, of course!”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>But the verses Norman quoted don’t mention him as an exception.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>“Other passages of Scripture shed light on
these verses by telling us that Jesus never sinned.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Granted.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>And I would say that Catholic Tradition sheds further light on these
verses by telling us that Mary never sinned as well.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>(Of course, Mary was saved from sin by her
Son Jesus just as much as everyone else is.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>It’s just that she was saved in an extraordinary way.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Whereas most of us are rescued by God’s grace
from sin <i>after</i> we’ve fallen into it, Mary was preserved by grace from
ever falling into it in the first place.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>So Jesus is Mary’s Savior in an extraordinary way.)<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Paul says that "all have sinned,"
but this is clearly not meant to be an exhaustive literal statement in the
strictest sense because we both agree that Christ is exempted, even though St.
Paul doesn't say so in the passage. St. Paul is making a general
comment about the fallenness of humanity and its need for salvation.
The issue of whether there might be any unique person out there who is
saved from sin in a different way is simply beyond his purview in the passage.
Similarly, Paul makes the general comment elsewhere that "the wages
of sin is death," but any reader of the Bible knows that some people—like
Elijah—didn’t die like everyone else. They were exempted in a unique way.
There is nothing in what St. Paul says that would preclude the
possibility that, if he was asked specifically, he would have agreed that Mary
was sinless: "What is that? Did Mary, the mother of Christ,
commit sins personally? Oh, well, no, I guess she did not. I didn't
bring that up here because I was focused on a different issue."
Granted that there is nothing in St. Paul's text to indicate that Mary
was a unique exception, but his statement does not plainly take the opposite
view either.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Again, Norman’s argument is
question-begging.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Using Sola Scriptura,
a Protestant method of interpreting Scripture, he answers a specific question
the text of Scripture doesn’t address by reading into it what isn’t actually
there, and then he uses his inference as an argument against the Catholic
faith.</span><span> </span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">If we were to use
Norman’s method of proving contradictions between Scripture and Catholic
teaching in other areas, we could prove contradictions between different
passages of Scripture as well.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>For example,
in John 1:19-23, John the Baptist denies that he is the Elijah who was
prophesied to come.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But in Matthew
17:10-13, Jesus says that John the Baptist <i>was</i> in fact the Elijah who
was to come.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Is this a
contradiction?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>On the surface, it sounds
like one.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But there is an easy
solution.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>John the Baptist was not <i>literally</i>
Elijah, but he was the one to come in the <i>spirit and power</i> of Elijah as
prophesied by Malachi 4:5-6.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>So a
contradiction cannot be proved here.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Norman would agree with me.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But
then I would make the same kind of argument with regard to many attempts to
prove contradictions between Scripture and Catholic teaching.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Again, on the surface, “all have sinned”
sounds like it contradicts the doctrine of the sinlessness of Mary.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But it need not be understood as a
contradiction, and one will only take it that way if one is already convinced
that one need not understand Scripture and Catholic Tradition in harmony with
each other.</span><span> </span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">The same sorts of things
could be said in response to the other alleged contradictions Norman brings up,
so I’m not going to go into them any further, seeing that this document is long
enough already.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>(With regard to
Protestant concerns about justification, penance, purgatory, indulgences, etc.,
I’ll refer you </span><a href="http://www.vatican.va/archive/ccc_css/archive/catechism/p3s1c3a2.htm"><span style="line-height: 107%;">here</span></a><span style="line-height: 107%;">,
</span><a href="https://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2015/07/the-augustinian-and-protestant.html"><span style="line-height: 107%;">here</span></a><span style="line-height: 107%;">,
and </span><a href="https://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2016/01/a-fresh-look-at-catholic-doctrines-of.html"><span style="line-height: 107%;">here</span></a><span style="line-height: 107%;">
for more.)</span><span> </span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 107%;">In conclusion, then, I
submit that the evidence from Church history and from Scripture, and all the available
evidence in general, supports the Catholic point of view rather than the
Protestant point of view.</span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 107%;"><i>For more, see <a href="http://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2016/06/dialogue-concerning-claims-of.html">here</a> and <a href="https://www.lulu.com/en/us/shop/mark-hausam/no-grounds-for-divorce-why-protestants-and-everyone-else-should-return-to-the-unity-of-the-catholic-church/ebook/product-23973051.html?page=1&pageSize=4">here</a>. On the question of the doctrine of justification, see <a href="https://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2019/05/justification-reformed-catholic-dialogue.html">here</a>.</i></span></p><p></p>Mark Hausamhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07371790103414979060noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-808697756426649418.post-28620175276094463502021-06-14T13:24:00.007-05:002023-06-21T22:17:11.121-05:00Sola Scriptura in the Old Testament?<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Sola Scriptura in the Old Testament?</b></p><p>Sometimes Protestants will argue that the Old Testament presents, or at least implies, a Sola Scriptura epistemology. We know that there were Scriptures in Old Testament times (like the Law of Moses), but we have no evidence, they say, of any infallible Tradition or infallible Magisterium. When Jesus presented himself as the Messiah, and when the early Christians argued that Jesus was the Messiah, they appealed to the Old Testament Scriptures without any reference to any authoritative Tradition or Magisterium. So it would seem, they say, that Sola Scriptura was the rule up to the time of Christ.</p><p>But this argument falls apart pretty quickly once we begin to look at it more closely. For one thing, even if it were true that Sola Scriptura was the rule in Old Testament times, this would not prove that Sola Scriptura is meant to be the rule in Christian times. There are many changes between the Old Testament and the New Testament dispensations. This is an important observation because, usually, the argument that the OT practiced Sola Scriptura is meant as part of a larger argument trying to establish that Sola Scriptura is the practice we should have today rather than the Catholic three-legged stool view of Scripture/Tradition/Magisterium. But even if the Sola Scripturist could prove his case regarding the entire subject of this article, this would fall short of establishing the Protestant epistemology vs. the Catholic epistemology as being correct.</p><p>But another problem with the argument is that there is simply no evidence that Sola Scriptura was the rule in OT times, and there is a good deal of significant evidence pointing to the opposite conclusion. Old Testament Judaism existed a very long time ago, and there is a lot we don't know about it historically. This can make it difficult to work out precisely how Scripture, Tradition, and authority worked in Old Testament times (or even in later times, such as during the days of Jesus). Also, I am not an expert on ancient Judaism, so I have a lot to learn myself about what we do know about this subject. But over the past few years, I have become impressed with some of the evidence pointing to a richer view of Tradition and Magisterium in ancient Judaism than I had ever thought about previously. Perhaps one of the best ways to convey some of this is to construct a story illustrating a theory of authority from the earliest times of Judaism through the times of the early Church based on the evidence available (or at least the relevant evidence that I am aware of). Some of this story seems pretty clear from the facts; other parts of it are a bit speculative and hypothetical, but plausible. If someone wants to argue that Sola Scriptura was practiced in OT times, they will need to show that this rendition of events (as well as others which could be given) is not plausible or possible, and that they can construct a Sola-Scripturish account of OT epistemology that adequately accounts for all the facts.</p><p>So here's my narration:</p><p style="text-align: center;"><b>Old Testament Times</b></p><p>In the earliest days of human history, judging from the early books of the Old Testament, there was no Scripture at all. The laws of God, the truths of the faith, and the stories of God's interaction with the human race and with his people in history were passed down by means of unwritten Tradition. This would apply to the whole period from the creation of the world, through the Fall, the Flood of Noah, the Tower of Babel, the lives of the patriarchs (Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Jacob's sons, etc.) through the days of Moses and the giving of the Law on Mt. Sinai. The giving of the Law appears to be the earliest example of God's Word being given by means of Scripture.</p><p>The Law was written, but it required interpretation and application. God appointed a Magisterium to authoritatively interpret and apply the Law.</p><p></p><blockquote>If there arise a matter too hard for thee in judgment, between blood and blood, between plea and plea, and between stroke and stroke, being matters of controversy within thy gates: then shalt thou arise, and get thee up into the place which the Lord thy God shall choose; and thou shalt come unto the priests the Levites, and unto the judge that shall be in those days, and enquire; and they shall shew thee the sentence of judgment: And thou shalt do according to the sentence, which they of that place which the Lord shall choose shall shew thee; and thou shalt observe to do according to all that they inform thee: According to the sentence of the law which they shall teach thee, and according to the judgment which they shall tell thee, thou shalt do: thou shalt not decline from the sentence which they shall shew thee, to the right hand, nor to the left. And the man that will do presumptuously, and will not hearken unto the priest that standeth to minister there before the Lord thy God, or unto the judge, even that man shall die: and thou shalt put away the evil from Israel. And all the people shall hear, and fear, and do no more presumptuously. (Deuteronomy 17:8-13; see also 31:9; 33:10; Jeremiah 18:18; Malachi 2:7; II Chronicles 19:8, 11; 31:4; etc.)</blockquote><p></p><p>God appointed Moses, of course, as a prophet to teach his Word to the people. And he also appointed regular interpreters and appliers of his Law to authoritatively interpret and apply it - a court made up of priests, Levites, and judges. It is not up to the individual Israelite to interpret the Law for himself. He must follow the authoritative Magisterium. The rulings of the Magisterium will thus become a Tradition to be passed down alongside the written Law to provide an authoritative context for understanding and applying that Law.</p><p>God did not simply give his people in the Old Testament a single revelation at one time, but he continually sent new revelation to his people (Hebrews 1:1). He did this through several means. He gave Israel the Urim and the Thummim, which seem to have been some kind of supernatural means by which God would sometimes communicate with Israel (see <a href="https://www.jewishencyclopedia.com/articles/14609-urim-and-thummim">here</a> for more on this). Especially, he sent prophets regularly who would give new revelation to his people. Sometimes these prophets would add new information as to how Israel was to worship God. (For example, David, as a prophet, revealed much about the plan for the Temple in Jerusalem and about the worship of the Temple, including lots of information about music that the Law of Moses said nothing about.) These prophets seem to have been extraordinary, occasional messengers from God, in addition to the regular, ongoing interpreters of God's Law in the court of Levites, priests, and judges I mentioned earlier. Israel was required to listen to both the ordinary and the extraordinary messengers of God.</p><p></p><blockquote><p>I will raise them up a Prophet from among their brethren, like unto thee, and will put my words in his mouth; and he shall speak unto them all that I shall command him. And it shall come to pass, that whosoever will not hearken unto my words which he shall speak in my name, I will require it of him. But the prophet, which shall presume to speak a word in my name, which I have not commanded him to speak, or that shall speak in the name of other gods, even that prophet shall die. And if thou say in thine heart, How shall we know the word which the Lord hath not spoken? When a prophet speaketh in the name of the Lord, if the thing follow not, nor come to pass, that is the thing which the Lord hath not spoken, but the prophet hath spoken it presumptuously: thou shalt not be afraid of him. (Deuteronomy 18:18-22)</p><p>If there arise among you a prophet, or a dreamer of dreams, and giveth thee a sign or a wonder, And the sign or the wonder come to pass, whereof he spake unto thee, saying, Let us go after other gods, which thou hast not known, and let us serve them; Thou shalt not hearken unto the words of that prophet, or that dreamer of dreams: for the Lord your God proveth you, to know whether ye love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul. Ye shall walk after the Lord your God, and fear him, and keep his commandments, and obey his voice, and ye shall serve him, and cleave unto him. And that prophet, or that dreamer of dreams, shall be put to death; because he hath spoken to turn you away from the Lord your God, which brought you out of the land of Egypt, and redeemed you out of the house of bondage, to thrust thee out of the way which the Lord thy God commanded thee to walk in. So shalt thou put the evil away from the midst of thee. (Deuteronomy 13:1-5)</p></blockquote><p></p><p>God will send prophets regularly. If they are true prophets, they are authoritative and must be followed. If they are false prophets--that is, they claim to be messengers from God but aren't--they should be rejected. But how are the people of God to know whether or not someone is a true prophet or a false prophet? There are two tests. If the prophet gives some supernatural sign, like foretelling the future, and his sign is proven false, he's a false prophet. However, even if his sign comes true, it does not necessarily follow that he is a true prophet. He must also not lead people astray to false religion. A false prophet can have deceptive signs, at least to some degree. (cf. Exodus 7:11, 22, etc.; Matthew 24:24; 2 Thessalonians 2:1-12; Revelation 13:11-15.) But if a person comes, claiming to be a prophet, and he both has supernatural signs that are fulfilled and also encourages the people to continue in the true religion, that person is to be accepted and followed as a prophet.</p><p>So there is this interplay between the ordinary interpreters of God's law and the extraordinary messengers of God. The Old Testament is replete with condemnations for Israelite ordinary leaders who would not listen to the words of the prophets. Sometimes the people of God will await prophets to tell them things the ordinary leaders cannot tell them. (See, for example, 1 Maccabees 4:44-46.)</p><p style="text-align: center;"><b>New Testament Times and the Pharisaic Tradition</b></p><p>This state of affairs continues throughout Old Testament history, all the way up to the time of Christ. It is well known that during the time of Christ, the Jews are split into a few competing traditions--Pharisees, Sadducees, Essenes, etc. These disagreed with each other on a number of points, including authority. Pharisees and Sadducees, for example, seem to have disagreed with each other concerning the canon of Scripture, the nature of the afterlife, the existence of angels, the resurrection, and apparently the authority of the Pharisaic Tradition. The Pharisaic Tradition emphasized a three-legged stool of authority, including Scripture, Tradition, and Magisterium. They held that, in addition to the written Word of God, there was an unwritten Tradition that was passed down from Moses to their own time, consisting of some things from Moses's time, as well as elements of interpretation of the Law that had been added authoritatively by the later teachers of the Law. This Tradition was equal in authority to the written Scripture, because it was authorized by God and guided by him. As for who the official, authoritative Magisterium is, they looked to the court made up of priests, Levites, and judges we mentioned earlier. After the return from the Babylonian Captivity, we see this court renewed in the tradition of the scribes and rabbis starting with Ezra, who was priest and scribe. (We can see Ezra acting as official interpreter of the Law in Nehemiah 8.) The Pharisees saw their own Tradition as faithfully maintaining this authoritative Magisterial tradition. In their view, then, Scripture is infallible, but there is also an infallibility granted by God to the authoritative Magisterium as they interpret and apply the Word of God in the unwritten Tradition.</p><p>Jesus seems to have accepted the Pharisaic Tradition. There are lots of reasons to think this is the case. For one thing, he seems to say so pretty much straight out in Matthew 23:1-3:</p><p></p><blockquote>Then spake Jesus to the multitude, and to his disciples, saying "The scribes and the Pharisees sit in Moses' seat: All therefore whatsoever they bid you observe, that observe and do; but do not ye after their works: for they say, and do not."</blockquote><p></p><p>The scribes and the Pharisees sit in Moses's seat. That is, they are heirs of Moses's authority. Therefore, the people of God are obliged to follow their teachings. Their teaching is authoritative. And we see that wherever the Pharisaic Tradition disagrees with, for example, the Sadducees, Jesus and the early Christians go with the Pharisaic Tradition. They agree with that Tradition about the canon of Scripture, the resurrection and the afterlife, the existence of angels, etc. St. Paul calls himself a Pharisee both before and after becoming an apostle of Christ (Philippians 3:5; Acts 23:6). The early Christians seem to have accepted some of the unwritten traditions of Judaism handed down outside of Scripture, such as the tradition of the rock following the people of Israel in the desert, Jannes and Jambres as the names of two of the Egyptian magicians of Pharaoh, stories about Moses's death and burial, prophecies from Enoch, etc. (see, for example, John 4:5-6; Luke 11:47; 1 Corinthians 10:4; Jude 1:14-16; Jude 1:9; 2 Timothy 3:8).</p><p>A question might arise at this point: How can Jesus and his disciples have arisen within the Pharisaic Tradition, when Jesus spent so much time criticizing, attacking, and arguing with the Pharisees? They seem like "bad guys" in the gospels. Well, in-family disputes can often be more intense than out-of-family disputes. When groups are more closely-related, oftentimes their conflicts are intensified. The Pharisaic Tradition seems to have been a somewhat large tradition that wasn't entirely monolithic. There was agreement on some core things, but there were lots of disagreements as well and different Pharisaic schools of thought and practice. After the destruction of the Temple in 70 AD, all forms of Judaism pretty much died out except for two--the Christians and the more mainstream Pharisaic Tradition, which evolved into Rabbinic Judaism, or historic Orthodox Judaism. Within Rabbinic literature, which itself arose out of the Pharisaic Tradition, we see criticisms of certain groups of Pharisees. There is a well-known passage in the Mishnah which describes a "plague of Pharisees" who help bring destruction to Israel. (See <a href="https://judaism.stackexchange.com/questions/44419/do-the-seven-types-of-perushim-described-at-sotah-22b-refer-to-the-essenes">here</a> and <a href="https://halakhah.com/sotah/sotah_22.html">here</a>.) The commentary on this passage in the Talmud talks about seven different groups of Pharisees. There are a couple different lists of these seven, and in both of these lists all or all but a couple of the types of Pharisees are criticized. The criticisms in some cases echo criticisms Jesus made in the gospels--like accusations of avoiding doing good deeds by making up an excuse that some other commandment needs to be done, and doing good deeds ostentatiously in order to be praised by men. So it seems that criticism of "Pharisees" is not something uncommon in the Pharisaic Tradition.</p><p>But didn't Jesus specifically criticize the Pharisees for passing down "traditions of men" without authority by means of which they would undercut obedience to the genuine Word of God? Doesn't this imply that he rejected the whole Pharisaic concept of an authoritative Tradition outside of Scripture? No, it doesn't necessarily imply that. For one thing, Jesus did not make an argument rejecting Tradition as such in his arguments with the Pharisees. He only objected to "traditions of men" put in opposition to the Word of God. This does not rule out the possibility that he accepted a more fundamental concept of "Tradition" as having authority for interpreting the written Word. It should also be noted that, in the Pharisaic Tradition, it seems that not all traditions were of equal weight. The Jewish Encyclopedia's <a href="https://www.jewishencyclopedia.com/articles/11750-oral-law">article on the "Oral Law"</a> (in the section entitled "Contents of Oral Law") lays out eight different categories of traditions in the "oral" (that is, the unwritten) Tradition. The first five of these categories have authority equal to the written Law, but the last three do not. And there were arguments among schools of rabbis about some of the traditions. It is quite natural, then, to see Jesus as opposing some of the Pharisees who were inventing man-made traditions and using them to trump the Word of God. In doing this, Jesus was doing only what others in the Pharisaic Tradition commonly did as well. So there is no need to read any of this as implying that Jesus rejected the whole, fundamental idea of "Tradition" in the Pharisaic Tradition. Well then, why didn't Jesus refer to that Tradition in his teaching? Why did he quote only the written Word? Well, why should he have quoted traditional sources? The main purpose of the unwritten Tradition--and this is true both for traditional Judaism as well as for later Catholic Christianity--is not to provide a host of new doctrines not found in Scripture. Its purpose is primarily interpretive in nature. It is not intended so much to add to the Scriptures as to provide an authoritative interpretive context for them. So, in later Catholic tradition (from the early Church up to the present day), we find Catholic theologians often appealing to Scripture to show the foundation of their doctrines, but they understand the Scripture to be properly interpreted in the context of the Church's Tradition (rather than by means of individuals interpreting it for themselves in opposition to the Church's Tradition). This sometimes confuses Protestants reading the Church Fathers. The Fathers will say things that sound, to Protestant ears, somewhat Sola-Scripturish. Protestants read their own epistemology into these quotations from the Fathers, because they are not used to thinking about an appeal to Scripture involving a broader trust in an interpretative tradition surrounding and contextualizing the Scriptures. The same can be said for why Protestants tend to read Jesus as affirming Sola Scriptura in his arguments with the Pharisees, even though Jesus never articulates such a position. (And the same thing happens with other parts of the New Testament as well. See <a href="https://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2015/07/a-refutation-of-greg-bahsens-argument.html">here</a> for more on this.) And in telling the people to follow the teachings of the Pharisees (Matthew 23:1-3), Jesus was in fact telling them to follow the ordinary Magisterial authority and Tradition along with the Scriptures. Also, Jesus seems to have wanted to make a point of speaking in such a way as to indicate that he himself had the highest authority to interpret the will and the Word of God, even above the ordinary teachers appointed by God. He was not simply another scribe or rabbi, but the very Word of God himself. (Matthew 7:28-29: "And it came to pass, when Jesus had ended these sayings, the people were astonished at his doctrine: For he taught them as one having authority, and not as the scribes.") Therefore it is not surprising that he tended to use his own authority as his warrant for his teachings rather than appealing to the ordinary interpretive Magisterial authority. He assumed the validity of that authority and explicitly commanded people to follow it, but he also emphasized his own transcendence of it.</p><p style="text-align: center;"><b>The Transition from the Old Testament to the New Testament Dispensation</b></p><p>So, during the times of the Old Testament before Jesus came, there was an infallible Scripture (frequently being added to), and there was an infallible Tradition of interpretation and application of Scripture handed down by a God-guided and thus infallible Magisterium--the Levites, priests, judges, scribes, and rabbis, supplemented frequently by occasional prophets, rulings from the Urim and Thummim, etc. The fundamental Tradition was infallible (and necessary to understand how to implement aspects of the written Law, how to understand various teachings, how to know which books were in the canon, etc.), but underneath that fundamental Tradition there were human traditions which were not infallible, and which could be erroneous and even contrary to the Word of God and which thus required opposition.</p><p>How do we understand the transition from this Old Testament system to the New Testament system of Jesus as the Messiah, head of the people of God, and under him apostles who represent him, who later appoint bishops to succeed them, headed by the Bishop of Rome, the Successor of St. Peter, etc.? There is certainly a break that occurs here. Jesus himself indicates a rough transition here in his <a href="https://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2015/11/protestantism-and-parable-of-tenants.html">Parable of the Tenants</a> (Matthew 21:33-46). If the Old Testament people of God had leaders with infallible Magisterial authority, how could the early Christians have been justified in breaking away from this Magisterium and forming a new Magisterium under Christ? Perhaps the answer is built into the very Old Testament system itself. We've seen that the Magisterium of the Old Testament had two components to it--an ordinary component consisting of the regular court of interpretation of the Law, and an extraordinary and occasional component consisting of God's occasional messages to individuals, especially to prophets who would then speak the Word of the Lord to the people. Both components were authoritative, and neither had authority to negate the other. A prophet who negated the Law would be rejected as a false prophet by the very criteria of the Law. Priests, Levites, judges, scribes, etc., who would reject the word of a proven prophet are condemned as well. Also, we remember that, according to the Pharisaic Tradition, there was full authoritativeness and infallibility only with regard to the fundamental Tradition of the oral law; there was not infallibility or full authoritativeness with regard to all the traditions of the different groups and schools.</p><p>When Jesus came, he fulfilled the Old Testament signs for being a true prophet and, indeed, the Messiah. He gave supernatural signs which came true and which showed he had supernatural power, and his message did not lead to provably false religion (that is, to anything that could be proved to be contrary to the previously-given Word of God). There were those who accused him of false teaching and of blasphemy, but they could not prove their charges by reference to the Old Testament or to the fundamental, unanimous Tradition of the people of God. So Jesus comes, providing sufficient evidence to warrant acceptance of himself and his message. Some follow him, some don't. From this point on, the Jewish people are divided over Christ, and the Pharasaic Tradition itself is divided over him, for many among the Pharisees follow Christ, while many others don't. The Sanhedrin--which seems to have been something like the Jewish Supreme Court--rejected Christ, condemning him to death as a blasphemer. But the decision was not unanimous, even though a majority of the Jewish leaders rejected Christ. Nor could they justify their rejection of him, considering the signs he had done to show himself a true messenger from God whom they were thus bound to accept and follow. And this was before his death. After his death and resurrection, more and more evidence for Jesus's claims continued to be added. So the rejection of Jesus by the majority of Jewish leaders cannot be established as having had infallible and authoritative Magisterial authority, even by Old Testament or Pharisaic standards. Therefore, he should have been followed as a true prophet and as the Messiah, and he was fully authorized as such to judge the Jewish leaders and transfer authority from the Synagogue to the Church. Just as God had the authority to institute the Law and to add to it and change it from time to time by means of his messengers (during Old Testament times), so God had authority to make the overall transition from the Old Testament to the New Testament dispensation, with all that that entailed, by means of his Son and his Son's apostles.</p><p style="text-align: center;"><b>Conclusion</b></p><p>So there is no basis for claiming that a Sola Scriptura epistemology was operative in Old Testament times. There is simply no evidence that requires such a position, and the existing evidence seems to point plausibly and with a significant degree of probability in the opposite direction. There is also no basis for claiming that a Sola Scriptura epistemology was operative in New Testament times. The New Testament never teaches Sola Scriptura, but instead presents a picture including authoritative Scripture, authoritative traditions passed down, and an authoritative Magisterium. And the early as well as subsequent Christian (Catholic) Church after the time of the apostles did not teach Sola Scriptura either, but rather the same three-legged-stool epistemology of Scripture/Tradition/Magisterium. (However, I cannot go into making further arguments for these things here, as it would take me beyond the scope of this particular article. For some arguments relative to claims of Sola Scriptura in the New Testament, see <a href="https://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2015/07/a-refutation-of-greg-bahsens-argument.html">here</a> and <a href="http://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2016/06/dialogue-concerning-claims-of.html">here</a>. For relevant information having to do with the Church Fathers, see <a href="https://conservativecolloquium.wordpress.com/2013/11/13/the-most-catholic-quotes-of-the-early-church-fathers-on-correct-scriptural-interpretation-authority/">here</a>, <a href="https://www.patheos.com/blogs/davearmstrong/2021/12/church-fathers-vs-sola-scriptura-compendium.html">here</a>, and <a href="http://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2018/07/the-church-fathers-sola-scriptura-or.html">here</a>. See <a href="https://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2021/06/protestant-vs-catholic-debate.html">here</a> for a more general fictional debate between a Catholic and a Protestant on the merits of the two positions overall, involving a lot of discussion over the merits of the Catholic vs. the Protestant epistemology in Scripture and in Church history. Also see <a href="http://www.calledtocommunion.com/2012/02/taking-a-stand-on-the-scriptures-against-the-traditions-of-men/">here</a> for a short, humorous, fictional dialogue showing what things would have been like if Sola Scriptura <i>had</i> been the practice of the Church during the time of the Book of Acts.)</p><p>For further reading (in addition to sites linked to in the midst of the article above), see <a href="https://www.patheos.com/blogs/davearmstrong/2017/02/sola-scriptura-old-testament-ancient-jewish-practice.html">here</a> and <a href="https://www.jewishencyclopedia.com/articles/2154-authority-rabbinical">here</a>.</p>Mark Hausamhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07371790103414979060noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-808697756426649418.post-33079677552624144122021-04-25T20:07:00.000-05:002021-04-25T20:07:04.460-05:00A Frog, a Prince, and the Doctrine of Justification<p>In my attempts to find good analogies for the doctrine of justification, I have sometimes made use of something akin to the classic story of the prince who was turned into a frog and then back into a prince. The prince being turned into a frog is something analogous to the Fall which turned human beings into sinners. As sinners, we have no righteousness with which to please God and meet the standards of his moral law, and we have no ability of ourselves to attain to a state of righteousness. <a href="http://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2018/01/a-look-at-pauls-doctrine-of.html">As St. Paul discusses in Romans 1-8</a>, Christ saves us from this state by making a propitiatory sacrifice for our sins, by means of which he procures a righteousness which he gives us as a free gift and which reconciles us to God and his moral law. This would be analogous to the frog being turned back into a prince.</p><p>In the context of trying to compare the classic Protestant doctrine of justification (interpreted in an <a href="http://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2018/01/a-look-at-pauls-doctrine-of.html">Anti-Augustinian way</a>) with the <a href="http://www.vatican.va/archive/ccc_css/archive/catechism/p3s1c3a2.htm">Catholic and Augustinian doctrine</a>, I thought it might be useful to paint pictures of each of these doctrines making use of the analogy of the frog-prince story.</p><p>Briefly, in the Catholic view, we are justified because Christ has given to us as a free gift his own righteousness in place of our lack of righteousness. That righteousness is both imputed to us (made ours by God's decree) and infused into us, causing us to be transformed to become truly righteous. The righteousness which God works in us by his Holy Spirit truly satisfies the demands of God's law and pleases God. In the Protestant view, it is also true that we receive Christ's righteousness as a free gift in place of our own lack of righteousness, but this righteousness is only imputed to us and is not infused within us. We thus become righteous solely and completely by imputation and not at all by an infusion of righteousness or any moral transformation. Protestants believe that we do come to be morally transformed (in a process they usually call <i>sanctification</i>), but they hold that this is a completely different process from <i>justification</i> (being made acceptable to God's moral law), and that, although we are morally transformed and even, in the end, are made perfectly internally holy, yet the holiness of sanctification is and always will be polluted by our past sins so that it never meets the standards of God's law. From the perspective of true justice, therefore, even the perfectly sanctified are no more satisfactory to God's moral law than the completely unsanctified.</p><p>So this would be the Catholic view of the frog-prince story: The prince, having been turned into a frog, is, of course, in that state, completely unsuited to fulfill the qualifications to function as a prince. Let's say his two main functions as prince would be to marry the princess and to rule the kingdom. Obviously, a frog is suited to neither of these tasks. So, according to the rules of the kingdom, the prince-turned-frog cannot meet the qualifications to be accepted in the role of prince of the kingdom. However, another prince shows up--say, from a neighboring kingdom--and reveals that he has the power to turn the frog back into a prince. He has the magical ability to bond with the frog-prince, and, when he does so, he will take upon himself the frog-curse. But, because of unique properties in his blood, the frog-curse is incapable of gaining a firm hold on him, and so, after temporarily turning into a frog, he will very quickly turn permanently back into a prince. Because of his bond with the frog-prince, when the neighbor-prince turns back into a prince, the frog-prince will also turn back into a prince and be able to remain in that condition. The curse will be broken because the neighbor-prince will, in effect, pay the debt of the frog-prince's frog-curse as well as share with the frog-prince his own "princeness". The neighboring prince makes this offer, and it is accepted. The king declares the neighbor-prince and the frog-prince bonded, and he declares the curse to belong to the neighbor-prince and the neighbor-prince's "princeness" to belong to the frog-prince. Once this declaration has been made, the bonding is complete, and, after a very brief time of the neighbor-prince being a frog, both he and the frog-prince turn back into princes. The frog now being a prince again, he is declared worthy to take upon himself the role of prince by the rules of the kingdom. He marries the princess, governs the kingdom well for many years, and they all live happily ever after.</p><p>This would be the Protestant version of the story: The first part is the same. The prince has been turned into a frog and thus cannot meet the kingdom's requirements for fulfilling the role of prince of the kingdom. The neighboring prince comes over and offers to bond with the frog-prince, thus taking upon himself the curse and sharing with the frog-prince the cure for the curse and his own "princeness". The offer is accepted, and the king declares the bond and the transaction complete. But from here on out, things go a bit differently. The neighbor-prince's magic does not produce any actual transformation that turns the frog back into a prince. It works on a purely legal and declaratory (or forensic, if you will) level. The neighbor-prince's "princeness" is declared to belong to the frog-prince and so he is now legally declared to be a prince while remaining a frog in terms of his actual condition. He is simultaneously both frog and prince from that point on--a frog by actual condition and a prince by legal status. The magic does have the effect of causing a little transformation on the side. The frog turns into a slightly bigger frog and prince-clothing and a crown grow onto him. But, for the most part, he remains just as frog-like as ever. Looking only at his actual condition, he is still completely incapable of meeting the requirements of the rules of the kingdom for fulfilling the role of prince. However, this is not a problem, because the legal declaration of his legal prince-ness is held to be completely sufficient. On the basis of this legal declaration alone, the frog-prince is declared worthy of being the prince of the kingdom. He marries the princess and rules the kingdom for many years--though whether or not he rules it well, and whether or not he and the princess enjoy a fulfilling married life, I shall leave to your imagination.</p><p>If you can see the problems with this second version of the frog-prince story, you will perhaps be in a position to understand some of the things that Catholics find problematic about the Protestant doctrine of justification.</p><p>For more, see <a href="https://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2019/05/justification-reformed-catholic-dialogue.html">here</a> and <a href="http://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2015/07/the-augustinian-and-protestant.html">here</a>.</p><p><i>Published on the Fourth Sunday of Easter</i></p>Mark Hausamhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07371790103414979060noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-808697756426649418.post-43896979923324147422021-04-24T17:06:00.001-05:002021-04-27T14:16:20.759-05:00Is the Catholic Doctrine of Justification a Form of "Justification by Works"?<p><i>Catholics believe that we are justified entirely by the righteousness of Christ and not by our own righteousness, but they believe that we receive this righteousness not only by means of its being imputed to us but also by means of its being infused within us and actually transforming us. Protestants often complain that this destroys the gracious character of justification and amounts to a form of "justification by works". Catholics are often baffled by this characterization, for reasons well articulated by Francis Patrick Kenrick, the Bishop of Arath and Coadjutor of the Bishop of Philadelphia, back in 1841, in this selection from his book, </i>The Catholic Doctrine of Justification: Explained and Vindicated<i>:</i></p><p>I cannot persuade myself that those who appear horror-stricken at the idea of inherent justice, have an accurate conception of its meaning. When they represent it as "a doctrine of <i>merits</i> in opposition to <i>grace</i>, of <i>works</i> in opposition to <i>faith</i>," when they brand it as "the abomination of desolation," they surely mistake altogether its nature and character. It is loudly proclaimed by us to be the gift of God, not merited by any effort of man: we have nothing which we have not received. To God essentially belongs the glory of his gift, the excellence whereof serves only to his greater praise. It is his Spirit that dwelleth in us, and that pours forth his charity into our hearts. He "hath blessed us with spiritual blessings in Christ, as he chose us in him before the foundation of the world, that we should be holy and unspotted in charity. Who hath predestinated us unto the adoption of children through Jesus Christ unto himself; according to the purpose of his will: unto the praise of the glory of his grace, in which he hath graced us (<i>made us grateful and acceptable</i>) in his beloved Son, in whom we have redemption through his blood, the remission of sins, according to the riches of his grace, which hath super-abounded in us." The soul in the state of grace is invested with a certain celestial beauty and dignity: the virtues which she exercises externally, but faintly reflect the internal splendor with which the sun of justice invests her: she is the spouse of Jesus Christ, whom he has loved, and for whom he has delivered himself: she has been washed from the stains of sin in his blood. She is in reality, as she is styled, the beloved child of God. What is there in this conception which detracts in the least degree from the divine glory, and from the merits of Jesus Christ? Is it more glorious of God to cover sins, than to cancel them; to regard the sinner as just, than to make him so in reality? Is the merit and efficacy of the price of our ransom less apparent when the stains of sin are washed away by the current of atoning blood, than when they are supposed to be merely passed over in reference to its effusion? Shall we have a less sublime idea of this mystery of mercy, when we believe it to have merited for us the regeneration and sanctification of our souls, by an intimate operation of grace, a new creation, than in regarding it as leaving us in our original condition, and changing only our external relations? If those who reject the idea of inherent justice would ponder well the force of the terms as used in the Church, they would, doubtless, find that the divine goodness in the wondrous work of human justification and sanctification is more admirably displayed, when conceived in the communication of actual justice and sanctity, than in any way merely extrinsic. . . .</p><p> The Jews "not knowing the justice of God, and seeking to establish their own, have not submitted themselves to the justice of God; for the end of the law is Christ, unto justice to every one that believeth." Their own justice is that which they sought to establish on account of their fidelity in ceremonial observances, whilst they rejected Christ, whom all the ancient types prefigured, and who was the end of the law. Thus they forfeited that justice which is the peculiar privilege of believers. How unjust is it to apply passages like these, which have an obvious reference to the unbelieving Jews, and to legal justice, to Catholics who believe in Christ, as the Lord and Redeemer of men, who rest on him all hopes of grace and salvation, and who claim no legal or natural justice, but ascribe wholly to the gift of God, and the merits of Christ, that supernatural justice, no otherwise ours, than as the alms belongs to the beggar who has received it from the bounty of a benefactor! Bishop M'Ilvaine says that faith "holds out the empty hand of a poor, miserable, worthless beggar." Catholics cannot object to this comparison; but does it not detract from Divine goodness to say, that the poor beggar receives nothing? We consider the justified man as a beggar clothed with a robe of justice, which divine bounty has bestowed on him. There is surely no room left for pride, "for who distinguisheth thee? Or what has thou that thou hast not received? And if thou has received; why dost thou glory, as if thou hadst not received it!" (Francis Patrick Kenrick, <i>The Catholic Doctrine of Justification: Explained and Vindicated</i> [Philadelphia: Eugene Cummiskey, 1841], 90-92, footnotes removed.)<br /></p><p><i>For more, see <a href="https://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2019/05/justification-reformed-catholic-dialogue.html">here</a> and <a href="http://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2015/07/the-augustinian-and-protestant.html">here</a>.</i></p><p><i>Published on the feast of St. Fidelis of Sigmaringen</i></p>Mark Hausamhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07371790103414979060noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-808697756426649418.post-11730065165050049802021-04-24T15:51:00.004-05:002023-12-04T15:31:29.159-06:00Why Did I Err in My Earlier Reasoning Regarding Sola Scriptura?<div>In the various accounts I have written up describing my conversion to Catholicism (see <a href="http://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2015/06/a-trajectory-of-doctrinal-progression.html">here</a> and <a href="https://chnetwork.org/story/more-than-the-bible/">here</a>, especially), I mention that I used to believe in Sola Scriptura--the doctrine that Scripture alone is infallible--because I took that doctrine to be the logical default position over and against the Catholic point of view that Scripture must be interpreted in the context of an infallible Tradition and an infallible Magisterium. I describe <a href="http://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2015/06/a-trajectory-of-doctrinal-progression.html">here</a> my prior Protestant reasoning as well as my recognition of my error and switchover to a Catholic position:</div><div><br /></div><div><blockquote>I came to see that I had some unquestioned assumptions at the foundation of my belief in <i>Sola Scriptura</i>. <i>Sola Scriptura</i> had seemed like the "default" option to me, because I knew I had good reasons to think the Bible is the Word of God, and the Catholic and Eastern Orthodox agreed with me on that, but I didn't think I had any good reason to trust the claims of the Orthodox or the Catholics to have an infallible tradition or an infallible teaching authority. Since Scripture alone is all that we need, I thought, there is no good reason to accept such claims for further infallibility. The fallacy here, of course, is that I was simply <i>assuming</i> that Scripture could function alone, without having the context of an infallible tradition or teaching authority. But I had no basis for that assumption. I had simply been used to using the Bible in that way as a Protestant, and it hadn't yet occurred to me that I needed to show that this was not <i>misusing </i>the Bible. It may seem superficially to be safe to stick with <i>Sola Scriptura</i>, but what if God <i>intends</i> for Scripture to be interpreted and applied in the context of an authoritative and infallible tradition? In that case, a person using the Bible in a <i>Sola Scriptura </i>fashion is likely to go very wrong. He would be attempting to use the Bible in a way in which it is not supposed to be used, and ignoring crucial aids given to him for the purpose of enabling him to get it right. Once I realized that I had been working on the basis of an unquestioned Protestant assumption about the sufficiency of Scripture, it became clear that the "default" is actually not with <i>Sola Scriptura</i> but with the "infallible tradition" paradigm held by the Catholic and Orthodox Churches. Christ founded a church, and he commanded his people to obey its shepherds and preserve its unity. Therefore, our default should be obedience to the historic church and communion with her. Not unless we can prove that we have a good reason to defy those leaders or rupture that unity should we do so. But I saw that <i>Sola Scriptura</i>, and all other Protestant distinctives, could not actually be proved from Scripture or from reason or anything else, and so to embrace the Protestant views at the expense of obedience to and unity within the historic church would be inherently schismatic.</blockquote></div><div><br /></div><div>Since this time, I have often pondered the question, Why did I make this error in reasoning? I go on in the account quoted from (and in most of my other accounts of my conversion) to note that my error stemmed ultimately from a lack of historical awareness. But how did this work, exactly? How did a lack of historical awareness lead me to make an error in reasoning regarding the sufficiency of Scripture?</div><div><br /></div><div>Before 2012, I didn't have a great deal of interest in learning much about Church history. My focus was more on abstract questions of theology, philosophy, Scriptural interpretation, etc. In my theological thinking, I consulted Church history only mainly when it became involved in some other topic I was currently considering. I didn't think of a deeper study of Church history as being terribly important <i>per se</i> in terms of analyzing the truth claims of Christianity or matters of Christian doctrine. Because of this, I didn't know much about the doctrine of the early Church Fathers on matters regarding Scripture, Tradition, Magisterial authority, and the relationship between these. The little history I did know had given me the impression that the early Church, at the very least, did not oppose the doctrine that Protestants would later call Sola Scriptura.</div><div><br /></div><div>Due to this lack of historical awareness, when I came to consider the question of the Protestant position of Sola Scriptura vs. the Catholic or Orthodox position of Scripture/Tradition/Magisterium, I didn't consider this question from a historical point of view but rather more abstractly and logically. I saw Scripture, Tradition, and Magisterial authority as independent elements that had to be independently evaluated. Since Christianity is a divine revelation, I knew that it was important to ascertain what the <i>locus</i> of that revelation is. That is, we must know where we should look to find the Christian revelation. Protestants proposed Scripture alone. Catholics and Orthodox proposed Scripture plus Tradition plus an infallible Magisterium to interpret Scripture and Tradition. I knew enough Church history to see that Scripture had always been affirmed by pretty much all Christians to be at least <i>one</i> primary locus of Christian revelation. Also, I knew that Catholics, Orthodox, and Protestants all agree today that it is such a locus. So I knew that if there was any locus at all--which there must be, if we are going to be able to follow the Christian revelation--Scripture must be at least one of them. But I didn't know of any good reason to accept Tradition or the Magisterium as additional loci. And I thought that, in order to accept these additional loci, I needed additional positive evidence to support them.</div><div><br /></div><div>To understand my point of view at the time, consider this scenario: You are a Christian. You are trying to follow the Christian revelation. You know you have the Scriptures as the Word of God and therefore as a locus of that revelation. But then someone knocks on your door. When you open it, the person at the door introduces himself as Bob and announces that he is an additional locus of divine revelation. "What you need," he says, "is not just Scripture, but Scripture <i>plus me</i>." Bob claims to have been given by God the gift of being an infallible interpreter of Scripture. "You just can't get Scripture right without following my teaching," says Bob. Now, why should you pay any attention to Bob? You've never heard of him before. He has just shown up at your door out of nowhere and made his claim. What if you find that you can't directly prove Bob's claim wrong? Bob argues that if you can't prove his claim wrong, you have no basis to reject his claim and rely on Scripture alone. "After all," he says, "if Scripture really is meant to be interpreted in light of my teaching, as I claim, you are likely to go seriously wrong if you ignore me and try to interpret Scripture without me."</div><div><br /></div><div>So what are you going to do? It seems evident, doesn't it, that you will reject Bob's claim? Sure, you can't directly prove him wrong, but it seems foolish to add Bob in as an additional locus of divine revelation merely because you can't prove him wrong. You know that Scripture is the Word of God, but Bob has just come out of nowhere. It makes more sense to stick to Scripture alone until Bob can provide some further positive evidence for his claim. If you accept Bob's claim, you must do so arbitrarily. Bob argues that if you <i>reject</i> his claim, you are also acting arbitrarily. But you must go one way or the other. At least for the present, until further evidence arises, you have to either accept or reject Bob's claim, for it makes an important difference in terms of how you should use the Scriptures. But, given your options and the available information, surely it makes more sense to stick to the Scriptures alone, since you know that they are reliable, and not to add Bob on as an additional locus of revelation until he can provide further evidence for his position.</div><div><br /></div><div>That was basically my reasoning for rejecting the Catholic point of view and embracing Sola Scriptura. Of course, the analogy is not perfect. I knew that the claims of Tradition and the Magisterium to be additional loci of divine revelation had a better historical pedigree than Bob's claim has in my imaginary scenario. But I did not think they had enough of a better pedigree to give them the leverage needed to oust Sola Scriptura. I knew that Scripture was God's Word. But I could not verify the claims of Tradition and the Magisterium. Therefore, it seemed to me to make the most sense to stick to Scripture alone rather than to randomly and arbitrarily admit the claims of Tradition and Magisterium and add them on as additional loci of revelation. Without additional evidence, I wasn't just going to start trusting the Catholic Church implicitly to tell me how to interpret Scripture. I would listen to what Catholics had to say, but I would evaluate it myself in light of what I could find in reason and in Scripture. I would make use of what I knew until I was provided with evidence to add something else.</div><div><br /></div><div>This position was overturned as I learned more Church history and eventually came to realize that the Catholic view was the view of the historic Church. Protestants had to break from the Church's earlier established position in order to advocate for Sola Scriptura. They had to break with the continuity of the faith as handed down through history, and they had to break the unity and defy the established authorities of Christ's Church. As I've argued elsewhere, since Christianity is a divine revelation handed down to us in history, and since Christ established a community to which he gave leaders and which he commanded to preserve unity, we must default to the continuity, unity, and authority of the Christian faith and the Christian Church. We cannot break from these without positive and conclusive justification. So the default is actually on the other side from what I previously thought. The question is not, "Do I have a justification to add Tradition and the Magisterium as loci of revelation additional to Scripture?" The question is, "Do I have a justification to take Scripture out of its original context within the threefold package deal of Scripture/Tradition/Magisterium in order to establish Sola Scriptura?" It wasn't a matter of <i>adding</i> Tradition and the Magisterium. They were already there. It was a matter of <i>retaining</i> or<i> rejecting</i> them. To refer back to my earlier analogy, it is as if Bob did not come out of nowhere, but rather had been the original, official conveyer of the divine Scriptures to me in the first place, and from the beginning the Scriptures had been bound together with Bob's role as official interpreter.</div><div><br /></div><div>For more, see <a href="http://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2016/06/dialogue-concerning-claims-of.html">here</a>, <a href="https://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2020/06/my-evolution-on-sola-scriptura.html">here</a>, and <a href="https://www.lulu.com/en/us/shop/mark-hausam/no-grounds-for-divorce-why-protestants-and-everyone-else-should-return-to-the-unity-of-the-catholic-church/ebook/product-23973051.html?page=1&pageSize=4">here</a>.</div><div><br /></div><div><i>Published on the feast of St. Fidelis of Sigmaringen</i></div>Mark Hausamhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07371790103414979060noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-808697756426649418.post-28897756014699995922021-02-27T15:39:00.002-06:002023-07-19T11:51:09.119-05:00The Difference Between Legitimate Disagreement and Illegitimate Dissent<div>It is clear in Catholic doctrine that Church teaching is authoritative, as it comes from Christ, and is reliable to lead to truth, as it is guided by the Holy Spirit, and that therefore Catholics are required to assent to it. The Church can teach in both a definitive manner and a non-definitive manner. When the Church teaches definitively, Catholics are obliged to accept the teaching definitively and absolutely. When the Church teaches with less than full definitiveness, Catholics are obliged to accept the teaching to the degree and in the form required by the intention of the teacher. The Church has spelled out this schema in many places, such as in the CDF (Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith) document <a href="http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_19900524_theologian-vocation_en.html"><i>Donum Veritatis</i> (1990)</a>:</div><div></div><blockquote><div>When the Magisterium of the Church makes an infallible pronouncement and solemnly declares that a teaching is found in Revelation, the assent called for is that of theological faith. This kind of adherence is to be given even to the teaching of the ordinary and universal Magisterium when it proposes for belief a teaching of faith as divinely revealed.</div><div><br /></div><div>When the Magisterium proposes "in a definitive way" truths concerning faith and morals, which, even if not divinely revealed, are nevertheless strictly and intimately connected with Revelation, these must be firmly accepted and held.</div><div><br /></div><div>When the Magisterium, not intending to act "definitively", teaches a doctrine to aid a better understanding of Revelation and make explicit its contents, or to recall how some teaching is in conformity with the truths of faith, or finally to guard against ideas that are incompatible with these truths, the response called for is that of the religious submission of will and intellect. This kind of response cannot be simply exterior or disciplinary but must be understood within the logic of faith and under the impulse of obedience to the faith. (#23, footnotes removed)</div></blockquote><div></div><div>The CDF, in its <a href="http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_1998_professio-fidei_en.html"><i>Doctrinal Commentary on the Concluding Formula of the Professio fidei</i> (1998)</a>, articulated that "teachings set forth by the authentic ordinary Magisterium in a non-definitive way . . . require degrees of adherence differentiated according to the mind and the will manifested; this is shown especially by the nature of the documents, by the frequent repetition of the same doctrine, or by the tenor of the verbal expression" (#11). This language was echoing the Vatican II document <i><a href="http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_const_19641121_lumen-gentium_en.html">Lumen Gentium</a></i>, #25, which said this:</div><div><blockquote>Bishops, teaching in communion with the Roman Pontiff, are to be respected by all as witnesses to divine and Catholic truth. In matters of faith and morals, the bishops speak in the name of Christ and the faithful are to accept their teaching and adhere to it with a religious assent. This religious submission of mind and will must be shown in a special way to the authentic magisterium of the Roman Pontiff, even when he is not speaking ex cathedra; that is, it must be shown in such a way that his supreme magisterium is acknowledged with reverence, the judgments made by him are sincerely adhered to, according to his manifest mind and will. His mind and will in the matter may be known either from the character of the documents, from his frequent repetition of the same doctrine, or from his manner of speaking.</blockquote></div><div>In modern times, those who have wished to dissent from some of the authoritative teachings of the Church in defiance of the Church's authority have sometimes attempted to justify their defiance by redefining "submission of mind and will" into something like "respectful consideration." In their view, one must consider seriously the Church's non-definitive teaching, but one must not trust it implicitly. One must use one's own private judgment to evaluate that teaching, and then one is justified in rejecting that teaching if it fails that private investigation. Thus, whereas, with definitive teaching, the rule of belief is the Church's teaching, the rule of belief with regard to non-definitive teaching is not the authority of the Church but the agreement of the Church's teaching with one's private, independent judgment and confirmation.</div><div><br /></div><div>A classic example of this kind of dissent is seen in the attitude of the Society of St. Pius X, which was founded by Archbishop Marcel Lefebvre in 1970 to continue what Lefrebre regarded as "authentic" Catholic faith and practice in opposition to what he considered to be the errors and deviations of the modern Church after Vatican II. Lefebvre and his followers wanted to reject portions of Vatican II on the grounds that the Council did not intend to affirm anything in the form of a solemn, definitive declaration, but only under the authority of the "ordinary" magisterium, which they held to be subject to their private judgment. But that loophole had already been cut off by the Council itself, as well as by Pope St. Paul VI, such as in his General Hearing of January 12, 1966:</div><div><blockquote>There are those who ask what authority, what theological qualification the Council intended to give to its teachings, knowing that it avoided issuing solemn dogmatic definitions engaging the infallibility of the ecclesiastical Magisterium. The answer is known by whoever remembers the conciliar declaration of March 6, 1964, repeated on November 16, 1964: given the Council’s pastoral character, it avoided pronouncing, in an extraordinary manner, dogmas endowed with the note of infallibility. But it has invested its teachings with the authority of the supreme ordinary magisterium, which ordinary magisterium is so obviously authentic that it must be accepted with docility and sincerity by all the faithful, according to the mind of the Council as expressed in the nature and aims of the individual documents. (Pope St. Paul VI, <a href="http://w2.vatican.va/content/paul-vi/it/audiences/1966/documents/hf_p-vi_aud_19660112.html">General Hearing</a>, Wednesday, January 12, 1966, following the translation found <a href="https://www.catholicculture.org/commentary/pope-paul-vi-on-vatican-ii/">here</a> by Dr. Jeff Mirus)</blockquote></div><div>Pope St. Paul VI, in a letter to Archbishop Lefebvre in 1976, reminded him of this fact:</div><div><blockquote>Again, you cannot appeal to the distinction between what is dogmatic and what is pastoral to accept certain texts of this Council and to refuse others. Indeed, not everything in the Council requires an assent of the same nature: only what is affirmed by definitive acts as an object of faith or as a truth related to faith requires an assent of faith. But the rest also forms part of the solemn magisterium of the Church to which each member of the faithful owes a confident acceptance and a sincere application. (<a href="https://www.wordonfire.org/paul-vi-lefebvre/">"Pope Paul VI's Letter to Archbishop Marcel Lefebvre"</a>, found on the Word on Fire website)</blockquote></div><div>Now, it is true that non-definitive magisterial teachings can contain in them elements of varying degrees of authority. The less formal, more "casual" (for lack of a better word) nature of the format of these teachings allows for such a mix. Sometimes there are elements of non-definitive teachings that are provisional in nature, tied to the circumstances of the times and therefore subject to change as circumstances change, and sometimes there are incidental observations that the mind and the will of the magisterial teacher does not intend to put forward as authoritative teachings binding the minds of the faithful. The Church tells us to use common sense, combined with good reading and listening skills--as well as asking for clarification if necessary--when we listen to non-definitive teachings and decide what response they call forth from us. Sometimes magisterial decisions, particularly practical or prudential decisions, involve elements that can even invite respectful criticism from the faithful. When the "mind and the will manifested" of the magisterial teacher allows such respectful criticism, it is legitimate and not a form of dissent from or defiance of the authority of the Church. The CDF made this point explicitly in <i><a href="http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_19900524_theologian-vocation_en.html">Donum Veritatis</a></i>: </div><div></div><blockquote><div>The willingness to submit loyally to the teaching of the Magisterium on matters per se not irreformable must be the rule. It can happen, however, that a theologian may, according to the case, raise questions regarding the timeliness, the form, or even the contents of magisterial interventions. Here the theologian will need, first of all, to assess accurately the authoritativeness of the interventions which becomes clear from the nature of the documents, the insistence with which a teaching is repeated, and the very way in which it is expressed. (#24, footnote removed)</div><div><br /></div><div>One must therefore take into account the proper character of every exercise of the Magisterium, considering the extent to which its authority is engaged. It is also to be borne in mind that all acts of the Magisterium derive from the same source, that is, from Christ who desires that His People walk in the entire truth. (#17)</div></blockquote><div></div><div>But there is a fine line between legitimate criticism, within the bounds the Church has allowed, and dissent from Church teaching that involves defiance of the Church's authority. Sometimes that line can be hard to see, and certain forms of expression can have the effect of obscuring that line. For example, in 1968, the Catholic bishops of the United States issued a pastoral letter entitled "Human Life in Our Day". Part of the impetus for this document was to defend Pope St. Paul VI's encyclical <i>Humanae Vitae</i>, which was very unpopular in "progressive" circles and was drawing a great deal of dissent. But in the course of this pastoral letter, the US bishops tried to lay out some boundaries for legitimate dissent and criticism. They said that professional theologians could, in limited circumstances, dissent from certain non-infallible magisterial teachings, provided they do so with great care and caution, respect for the consciences of others, in an appropriate manner, etc.</div><div><blockquote>When there is question of theological dissent from non-infallible doctrine, we must recall that there is always a presumption in favor of the magisterium. Even non-infallible authentic doctrine, though it may admit of development or call for clarification or revision, remains binding and carries with it a moral certitude, especially when it is addressed to the universal Church, without ambiguity in response to urgent questions bound up with faith and crucial to morals. The expression of theological dissent from the magisterium is in order only if the reasons are serious and wellfounded, if the manner of the dissent does not question or impugn the teaching authority of the Church and is such as not to give scandal. (Found <a href="https://www.ewtn.com/catholicism/library/human-life-in-our-day-3895">here</a> on the EWTN website, taken from <i>L'Osservatore Romano</i>, Weekly Edition in English, 12 December 1968, page 6 and 19 December 1968, page 5)</blockquote></div><div>It has been observed that this last sentence is very ambiguous and could lend itself to being made use of by dissenters who wish to dissent from teaching the Church intends to bind them to, dissenters like Archbishop Lefebvre and his SSPX movement. (Although, in the case of <i>Humanae Vitae</i>, the dissent was rather from the more liberal, "progressive" side of the Church.) Catholic apologist Jimmy Akin discusses this in his book <i>Teaching With Authority</i> (El Cajon, CA: Catholic Answers Press, 2018). He provides an interesting commentary from Cardinal Avery Dulles on the apparent subjectivity of the US bishops' criteria for legitimate dissent:</div><div><blockquote>Cardinal Avery Dulles remarked that these conditions "proved difficult to apply. Who was to say whether the reasons were well-founded? How could one establish that the authority of the Magisterium was not being impugned when its teaching was being denied? How could scandal be avoided when theologians were openly saying that the pope's teaching was wrong?" [The Dulles quote is from <i>The Craft of Theology: From Symbol to System</i>, 2nd ed. (New York: Crossroad, 1996), 113.]</blockquote></div><div>"Human Life in Our Day" was issued in 1968. Since that time, the Church has issued several documents clarifying further the assent required of non-definitive teachings, including the CDF document we've quoted from a few times now, <i>Donum Veritatis</i>, and also the CDF commentary on the <i>Professio Fidei</i>, also quoted from earlier. <i>Donum Veritatis</i> in particular focuses a good deal of attention on the illicitness of "dissent", while at the same time distinguishing it from legitimate dialogue and even criticisms that can sometimes be made with regard to magisterial pronouncements. The US bishops, in 1992, issued another document entitled <i><a href="https://www.usccb.org/resources/Teaching%20Ministry%20of%20the%20Diocesan%20Bishop_2.pdf">The Teaching Ministry of the Diocesan Bishops: A Pastoral Reflection</a></i> (Washington, D.C.: United States Catholic Conference, 1992). In this document, the bishops are much more careful to make clear that dissent to Church teaching is not acceptable and that the Catholic faithful are required to assent to the non-definitive teaching of the Church with "submission of will and intellect." They distinguish various forms of refusal of assent to non-definitive teachings--non-acceptance, private dissent, and public dissent--and they make it clear that all three are unacceptable.</div><div><span></span></div><blockquote><div><span> </span>Perhaps, a more common experience of nonacceptance in the Church today is the withholding of assent to what is identified as nondefinitive teaching. . . . While these manifestations of nonacceptance may fall short of outright rejection, nevertheless they remain nonacceptance, the withholding of the <i>religiosum voluntatis et intellectus obsequium</i> [religious submission of mind and will] due to the ordinary magisterium of the Church. . . .</div><div><br /></div><div><span> Quite distinct from the withholding of assent is the private, individual judgment that conclusively rejects the ordinary, nondefinitive teaching of the Church. Such a judgment constitutes private dissent and is not consistent with that </span><i>religiosum voluntatis et intellectus obsequium </i>due to church teaching. Even though dissent of this kind remains private, nevertheless it is unacceptable. . . .</div><div><br /></div><div><span> Sometimes the nonacceptance of nondefinitive teaching passes beyond the nature of a "difficulty" and becomes a judgment that an authoritative teaching is false. This, of course, is quite different from a critical judgment about the adequacy of expression or the conceptual limitations of a particular teaching. . . .</span></div><div><span><span> </span>Bishops cannot be indifferent to the public denial or the contradiction of church teaching, especially by those whose position confers public influence. Public dissent, especially in the form of advocacy for alternative positions, seriously impairs the Church as a communion of faith and witness. (</span><i>Teaching Ministry</i>, pp. 17-19, footnotes removed)</div></blockquote><div><span></span></div><div>The document recognizes that the "ordinary, nondefinitive teaching of individual popes and bishops may contain assertions that fall short of the full truth of the gospel and may be in need of development and amplification. Interventions in the prudential order may even be in need of correction" (p. 15). "At times . . . professional theologians or other competent persons may conclude that the search has not been completed or that what has been asserted is still imperfect, and their acceptance will be qualified accordingly" (p. 15). Scholars may discuss difficulties in professional journals, etc. However, "[t]these considerations presume that theologians and scholars are willing to take the necessary steps to overcome their difficulties and abide by an authoritative intervention on the part of the magisterium should it consider one necessary" (p. 18).</div><div><blockquote> Finally, the disposition toward the teaching authority of the bishop on the part of those who are dissenting must be taken into consideration. If an individual or group dissents, but retains the disposition to abide by a final judgment of the magisterium on an issue, the possibility of <i>obsequium religiosum</i> remains. On the other hand, if dissent is expressed in absolute terms and there are no signs of docility toward the Church, that possibility may well be foreclosed. In that case, the bishop may initiate the process leading to the possible imposition of a canonical penalty (cf. c. 1371.1). (p. 19).</blockquote></div><div>(I should mention that this document, as well as <i>Donum Veritatis</i> and many of the other documents I've mentioned, are rich with pastoral suggestions regarding how to deal with people who struggle with certain Church teachings, sometimes in good conscience. I cannot do justice to this aspect of the documents, or other important nuances, as well as the significant amount of good practical wisdom these documents contain, in such a short article as this.)</div><div><br /></div><div>In conclusion, as we said earlier, we can indeed, at times, criticize and even disagree with some of the things the bishops and the Pope say. But the real question is, Who determines the degree and form of assent required in any particular case? The erroneous dissenters make themselves and their own judgment the determining factor in deciding what they are required to assent to and to what degree they are required to assent. But the Church teaches that it is <i>the bishops and the Pope</i> who make that determination. This is the fundamental point and the fundamental difference between legitimate diversity and criticism and illegitimate dissent and defiance. We don't get to subject the teachings of the bishops and the Pope to our own judgment and decide, even against their intentions and requirements, what we will agree with and what we will disagree with. We must assent to their teaching according to their manifest mind and will. We must accept even non-definitive magisterial teaching as inherently reliable, so that we will not subject it to our judgment and disagree with it if the "validity of the given teaching is not evident or upon the opinion that the opposite position would be the more probable" (<i>Donum Veritatis</i>, #28) So while there can sometimes legitimately be disagreement with some things the Pope or bishops say, there can never be <i>dissent</i> from magisterial teaching, in the sense of refusal to accept magisterial teaching to the extent that it is intended as authoritative and binding. Whenever and to the extent that the bishops and/or the Pope make use of their magisterial authority with the intention to give to the Church an authentic, official teaching, leading the people of God into truth or showing them how to stay faithful to the truth, that teaching must be assented to.</div><div><br /></div><div>For more, see <a href="https://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2018/08/when-are-we-allowed-to-dissent-from.html">here</a>, <a href="http://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2018/12/the-infallibility-of-ordinary.html">here</a>, and <a href="http://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2021/01/why-traditionalists-are-wrong.html">here</a>.</div><div></div>Mark Hausamhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07371790103414979060noreply@blogger.com0