Showing posts with label St. Isidore of Seville. Show all posts
Showing posts with label St. Isidore of Seville. Show all posts

Friday, February 15, 2019

Predestination, Grace, and Free Will in Catholic Theology

This is Chapter Five from my new book, No Grounds for Divorce: Why Protestants (and Everyone Else) Should Return to the Unity of the Catholic Church.

Although many modern Protestants don't think a whole lot about predestination, efficacious grace, etc., some do—particularly self-styled Arminians or Calvinists.  Martin Luther himself considered these issues to be of central importance in the Reformation debate, as we can see from his comments to the Catholic scholar Erasmus, with whom he was having a debate over these matters:

Moreover, I give you hearty praise and commendation on this further account—that you alone, in contrast with all others, have attacked the real thing, that is, the essential issue.  You have not wearied me with those extraneous issues about the Papacy, purgatory, indulgences and such like—trifles, rather than issues—in respect of which almost all to date have sought my blood (though without success); you, and you alone, have seen the hinge on which all turns, and aimed at the vital spot.[1]

The average Catholic doesn't spend as much time thinking about these matters as the average Calvinist (speaking as a former Calvinist—albeit, admittedly, a Calvinist who was particularly interested in thinking about theology).  Catholic theology has less of a tendency to focus a lot of attention on these matters in formal statements of faith or public preaching.  But Catholic theology certainly has something to say about these issues, and through history Catholic theologians have said quite a bit.

It is especially Calvinists in particular who tend to have the most argument with Catholic theology over these matters, though I think that much of the conversation tends to involve both sides largely talking past each other.  Calvinists frequently allege that Catholic theology compromises the ideas of the sovereignty of God and salvation by grace alone.  Well, let's see if that's the case. 

Key Catholic Doctrines

Let me first state some key Catholic doctrines that have a bearing on ideas of predestination and efficacious (that is, effectual, or effective) grace.

1. God is absolutely sovereign.  Nothing can defeat his will or purposes for the world, and he attains all his goals and intentions in history.

The Holy Scriptures repeatedly confess the universal power of God. He is called the "Mighty One of Jacob", the "LORD of hosts", the "strong and mighty" one. If God is almighty "in heaven and on earth", it is because he made them. Nothing is impossible with God, who disposes his works according to his will. He is the Lord of the universe, whose order he established and which remains wholly subject to him and at his disposal. He is master of history, governing hearts and events in keeping with his will: "It is always in your power to show great strength, and who can withstand the strength of your arm?[2]

The witness of Scripture is unanimous that the solicitude of divine providence is concrete and immediate; God cares for all, from the least things to the great events of the world and its history. The sacred books powerfully affirm God's absolute sovereignty over the course of events: "Our God is in the heavens; he does whatever he pleases." And so it is with Christ, "who opens and no one shall shut, who shuts and no one opens". As the book of Proverbs states: "Many are the plans in the mind of a man, but it is the purpose of the LORD that will be established."[3]

The truth that God is at work in all the actions of his creatures is inseparable from faith in God the Creator. God is the first cause who operates in and through secondary causes: "For God is at work in you, both to will and to work for his good pleasure."[4]

St. Thomas More, shortly before his martyrdom, consoled his daughter: "Nothing can come but that that God wills. And I make me very sure that whatsoever that be, seem it never so bad in sight, it shall indeed be the best."[5]

2. God is not the creator of moral evil (sin), but only permits it to happen, according to his sovereign purposes in history.  This is because evil is a negative thing (like darkness) while good is a positive thing (like light).

God is in no way, directly or indirectly, the cause of moral evil. He permits it, however, because he respects the freedom of his creatures and, mysteriously, knows how to derive good from it: . . .

For almighty God. . ., because he is supremely good, would never allow any evil whatsoever to exist in his works if he were not so all-powerful and good as to cause good to emerge from evil itself. . . .[6]

3. God desires all men to be saved, sincerely offers salvation to all men, and gives to all sufficient grace to be saved.

In the Eucharistic liturgy and in the daily prayers of her faithful, the Church implores the mercy of God, who does not want "any to perish, but all to come to repentance":[7]

"Since Christ died for all, and since all men are in fact called to one and the same destiny, which is divine, we must hold that the Holy Spirit offers to all the possibility of being made partakers, in a way known to God, of the Paschal mystery."[8]

4. As creatures and as sinners through the Fall of Adam, all saving goodness that we have is entirely a gift of God's grace, merited for us by the sacrifice and righteousness of Christ, down to the very good will itself.

The holy Synod declares first, that, for the correct and sound understanding of the doctrine of Justification, it is necessary that each one recognise and confess, that, whereas all men had lost their innocence in the prevarication of Adam-having become unclean, and, as the apostle says, by nature children of wrath, as (this Synod) has set forth in the decree on original sin,-they were so far the servants of sin, and under the power of the devil and of death, that not the Gentiles only by the force of nature, but not even the Jews by the very letter itself of the law of Moses, were able to be liberated, or to arise, therefrom; although free will, attenuated as it was in its powers, and bent down, was by no means extinguished in them.[9]

Canon 5. If anyone says that not only the increase of faith but also its beginning and the very desire for faith, by which we believe in Him who justifies the ungodly and comes to the regeneration of holy baptism — if anyone says that this belongs to us by nature and not by a gift of grace, that is, by the inspiration of the Holy Spirit amending our will and turning it from unbelief to faith and from godlessness to godliness, it is proof that he is opposed to the teaching of the Apostles, for blessed Paul says, "And I am sure that he who began a good work in you will bring it to completion at the day of Jesus Christ" (Phil. 1:6). And again, "For by grace you have been saved through faith; and this is not your own doing, it is the gift of God" (Eph. 2:8). For those who state that the faith by which we believe in God is natural make all who are separated from the Church of Christ by definition in some measure believers.

Canon 6. If anyone says that God has mercy upon us when, apart from his grace, we believe, will, desire, strive, labor, pray, watch, study, seek, ask, or knock, but does not confess that it is by the infusion and inspiration of the Holy Spirit within us that we have the faith, the will, or the strength to do all these things as we ought; or if anyone makes the assistance of grace depend on the humility or obedience of man and does not agree that it is a gift of grace itself that we are obedient and humble, he contradicts the Apostle who says, "What have you that you did not receive?" (1 Cor. 4:7), and, "But by the grace of God I am what I am" (1 Cor. 15:10).

Canon 7. If anyone affirms that we can form any right opinion or make any right choice which relates to the salvation of eternal life, as is expedient for us, or that we can be saved, that is, assent to the preaching of the gospel through our natural powers without the illumination and inspiration of the Holy Spirit, who makes all men gladly assent to and believe in the truth, he is led astray by a heretical spirit, and does not understand the voice of God who says in the Gospel, "For apart from me you can do nothing" (John 15:5), and the word of the Apostle, "Not that we are competent of ourselves to claim anything as coming from us; our competence is from God" (2 Cor. 3:5).

Canon 12. Of what sort we are whom God loves. God loves us for what we shall be by his gift, and not by our own deserving.

Canon 22. Concerning those things that belong to man. No man has anything of his own but untruth and sin. But if a man has any truth or righteousness, it is from that fountain for which we must thirst in this desert, so that we may be refreshed from it as by drops of water and not faint on the way.[10]

The preparation of man for the reception of grace is already a work of grace. This latter is needed to arouse and sustain our collaboration in justification through faith, and in sanctification through charity. God brings to completion in us what he has begun, "since he who completes his work by cooperating with our will began by working so that we might will it:"[11]

Indeed we also work, but we are only collaborating with God who works, for his mercy has gone before us. It has gone before us so that we may be healed, and follows us so that once healed, we may be given life; it goes before us so that we may be called, and follows us so that we may be glorified; it goes before us so that we may live devoutly, and follows us so that we may always live with God: for without him we can do nothing.[12]

5. Human beings have free will.  They cannot be necessitated to choose good or evil.

God's free initiative demands man's free response, for God has created man in his image by conferring on him, along with freedom, the power to know him and love him. The soul only enters freely into the communion of love.[13]

God predestines no one to go to hell; for this, a willful turning away from God (a mortal sin) is necessary, and persistence in it until the end.[14]

When God touches man's heart through the illumination of the Holy Spirit, man himself is not inactive while receiving that inspiration, since he could reject it; and yet, without God's grace, he cannot by his own free will move himself toward justice in God's sight.[15]

Catholic Doctrine of Predestination and Efficacious Grace

The key doctrines outlined above are the ingredients that go into the Catholic doctrine of predestination and efficacious grace.  Here is my own summary of the overall picture:

Sarah and Suzie are both human and descendants of Adam and Eve, and so both are inheritors of original sin.  Both would therefore be doomed to hell apart from God's grace.  However, God has sent his Son Jesus Christ into the world to redeem it, and Christ has given the world grace through his sacrifice and merits, redeeming men from the curse of sin.  This salvation is made available and offered to all the world through the preaching of the gospel by the Church.  Thus, God has provided sufficient grace to both Sarah and Suzie, and both can freely avail themselves of it if they will.  There is no hindrance to the salvation of either of them outside the potential refusal of their own free will.  From all eternity, God has ordained everything that has come or will come to pass in time, including all events both good and evil.  Good (like light) is a positive thing, produced by God's positive power and working, while evil (like darkness) is a negative thing.  God positively brings about all good but permits or allows evil, as he has determined to use both to fulfill his glorious purposes in history.  Therefore, nothing happens which defeats his ultimate goals or purposes for the creation.  Evil is a thing displeasing to God in its own nature, but its presence in history is not a defeat of his sovereignty, for it only exists at his sufferance to the extent and in the form that he has wisely and freely determined to permit in every detail.  God's free ordination of all things includes who will and who will not be saved, as it includes every other detail of history.  From all eternity, God freely decided that, in addition to making sufficient grace available to both Sarah and Suzie, he would give Sarah a special efficacious grace that would move her will to accept the gospel and persevere in that acceptance to the end of her life and so arrive at ultimate salvation, while he determined not to give that particular gift to Suzie.  In other words, God chose to give Sarah a good will but not to give that gift to Suzie.  He predestined Sarah to salvation by his grace.  He did not predestine Suzie to damnation, in the sense of forcing her to reject the gospel or infusing into her evil that caused her to reject the gospel.  He simply refrained, of his own free and wise will, for his good purposes, from moving Suzie's will to accept the gospel, allowing her to continue to reject it of her own free will until her death.

Why would God do this?  He did not elect Sarah to salvation because she was any better than Suzie, for both were equally in need of grace due to original and actual sin.  He did not refrain from moving Suzie's will to salvation out of any malice or hatred or lack of compassion, but rather because he saw that it would be better, all things considered, to give a grace to Sarah that he did not give to Suzie.  (This issue, then, is simply part of the larger question of why God allows evil and suffering to exist in his creation.  He does not do so because he loves or approves of evil, or because he is incapable of keeping evil out of his creation, but because he sees, in his infinite wisdom, that it is ultimately better overall to allow certain evils to happen than to stop them from happening or to arrange things so they don't happen.  As Pope Leo XIII put it in his encyclical Libertas, "God Himself in His providence, though infinitely good and powerful, permits evil to exist in the world, partly that greater good may not be impeded, and partly that greater evil may not ensue."[16])  God did not do any injustice to Suzie in not granting her the same efficacious grace that he gave to Sarah, for he granted her sufficient grace for salvation which she could have availed herself of if she had wished to do so.  Nothing outside of her will was impeding her acceptance of salvation.  In rejecting it, she acted with full freedom of will—as did Sarah, who was moved and inspired but not forced to accept the gospel by God's efficacious grace.  Nor did Suzie (or Sarah) do anything to deserve or merit God's efficacious grace.  All human beings since the Fall deserve God's damnation rather than his grace, and any grace received is an unmerited gift rather than something owed to us.

The great Doctor of the Church, St. Isidore of Seville (c. 560-636), described the overall picture in this way:

Between the infusion of divine grace and the faculty of the human will there is the following element: the decision stemming from a human choice, which is capable of spontaneously desiring good or bad things. Grace is the free gift of divine mercy, through which we evidence the beginning of a good will and its fruits. Divine grace anticipates man, so that he may do what is good; human free will does not anticipate God's grace, but grace itself anticipates an unwilling person, so that he may want what is good. Because of the burden of the 'flesh,' man finds it easy to sin, though he is slow to repent. Man has within himself the seeds of corruption but not of spiritual growth, unless the Creator, in order to raise him up, stretched his merciful hand to man, who is prostrated as a result of the Fall. Thus, through God's grace human free will is restored, which the first man had lost; in fact, Adam had free will to do what is good, even though he did it with God's help. We obtain our will to do what is good and embrace God perfecting us, thanks to divine grace. We receive the power to begin and to perfect what is good from God, who gave us the gift of grace; as a result of that, our free will is restored in us. Whatever good we do, it is God's, thanks to his prevenient and subsequent grace; but it is also ours, thanks to the [God-made] obedient power of our wills. But if it isn't God's, why do we give him thanks? And if it isn't ours, why do we look forward to the reward of good works? Insofar as we are anticipated by God's grace, it is God's; insofar as we follow prevenient grace to do what is good, it is ours. Nobody anticipates God's grace with his merits, thus making him almost indebted to us. The just Creator chose in advance some people by predestining them, but justly abandoned the others to their evil ways. Thus, the truest gift of grace does not proceed from human nature, nor is the outcome of our free will, but is bestowed only in virtue of the goodness of God's mercy. In fact, some people are saved by a gift of God's mercy which anticipates them, and thus are made "vessels of mercy;" but the reprobates are damned, having been predestined and made "vessels of wrath." The example of Jacob and Esau comes to mind, who, before been [sic] born, and again, after being born as twins, shared the bond of original sin. The prevenient goodness of divine mercy drew one of them to itself through sheer grace, but condemned the other through the severity of divine justice. The latter was abandoned in the mass of perdition, being 'hated' by God; this is what the Lord says through the prophet: "I loved Jacob but hated Esau" (Mal 1:3). From this we learn that grace is not conferred on account of any pre-existing merits, but only because of divine calling; and that no one is either saved or damned, chosen or reprobated other than by decision of God's predestination, who is just towards the reprobates and merciful towards the elect ("All the paths of the Lord are faithful love" Ps 25:10).[17]

And here is a statement of the issues from the Council of Quiercy (also called Quierzy) (853):

    Almighty God created man without sin, righteous and endowed with free will.  He placed man in paradise, and wanted him to dwell in the sanctity of justice.  Man, by making bad use of his free will, sinned and fell (from this state of justice), becoming the 'mass of perdition' of the entire humankind.  However, the good and righteous God, according to his foreknowledge (secundum praescientiam suam), chose out of this mass of perdition those whom he predestined through grace (Rom 8:29 ff; Eph 1:11) to eternal life, and likewise, he predestined eternal life for them.  He foreknew that everybody else, whom he abandoned in the mass of perdition according to his just decree, was going to perish, though he did not predestine them to perish; rather, being just, he predestined eternal punishment for them.  Because of this, we speak of only one divine predestination, which pertains to either the gift of grace or to the retribution of justice. . . .

     We lost the freedom of will in the first man, but got it back through Christ our Lord.  We have free will to do what is good, which is preceded and helped by God's grace; we have free will to do what is evil, as it is abandoned by God's grace.  We [can say] we have free will because it is freed and healed from corruption by grace. . . .

     Almighty God wants "all men to be saved" (1 Tim 2:4) without exception (sine exceptione), even though not all will be saved.  The fact that some are saved, is the gift of the saving God; the fact that some perish, is their own fault.[18]

Further Clarifications and Responses to Objections

“How can it be that God desires all men to be saved, and at the same time he chooses to bring some to salvation through efficacious grace but not others?”

Catholic theologians distinguish between God's antecedent will and his consequent will.  God's antecedent will is his will towards something considered only in itself, apart from other circumstantial factors.  God's consequent will is his will towards something considered in light of all relevant factors.  The great Doctor of the Church St. Thomas Aquinas discusses this idea:

To understand this we must consider that everything, in so far as it is good, is willed by God. A thing taken in its primary sense, and absolutely considered, may be good or evil, and yet when some additional circumstances are taken into account, by a consequent consideration may be changed into the contrary. Thus that a man should live is good; and that a man should be killed is evil, absolutely considered. But if in a particular case we add that a man is a murderer or dangerous to society, to kill him is a good; that he live is an evil. Hence it may be said of a just judge, that antecedently he wills all men to live; but consequently wills the murderer to be hanged. In the same way God antecedently wills all men to be saved, but consequently wills some to be damned, as His justice exacts. Nor do we will simply, what we will antecedently, but rather we will it in a qualified manner; for the will is directed to things as they are in themselves, and in themselves they exist under particular qualifications. Hence we will a thing simply inasmuch as we will it when all particular circumstances are considered; and this is what is meant by willing consequently. Thus it may be said that a just judge wills simply the hanging of a murderer, but in a qualified manner he would will him to live, to wit, inasmuch as he is a man. Such a qualified will may be called a willingness rather than an absolute will. Thus it is clear that whatever God simply wills takes place; although what He wills antecedently may not take place.[19]

Because human beings are made in the image of God and are of value to him, in itself considered he desires them all to be saved.  However, all things considered, he sees that it is better to allow some to be lost than to bring all to salvation through efficacious grace.  He “wills antecedently that all men should be saved, although, in view of a greater good, of which He alone is the judge, He permits that some commit sin and are lost.”[20]  This is what is called the doctrine of reprobation.  Some are predestined by God to efficacious grace and to the eternal life that grace leads to, while others are permitted to remain in sin or to fall back into sin and be lost.  St. Thomas Aquinas discusses this:

God does reprobate some. For it was said above (Article 1) that predestination is a part of providence. To providence, however, it belongs to permit certain defects in those things which are subject to providence, as was said above (I:22:2). Thus, as men are ordained to eternal life through the providence of God, it likewise is part of that providence to permit some to fall away from that end; this is called reprobation. Thus, as predestination is a part of providence, in regard to those ordained to eternal salvation, so reprobation is a part of providence in regard to those who turn aside from that end. Hence reprobation implies not only foreknowledge, but also something more, as does providence, as was said above (I:22:1). Therefore, as predestination includes the will to confer grace and glory; so also reprobation includes the will to permit a person to fall into sin, and to impose the punishment of damnation on account of that sin.[21]

Catholic theologians typically refuse to speak of the reprobate as being “predestined to sin,” as the language seems to suggest that sin in infused into the heart the same way that righteousness is, while this is not the case, as sin is a negative rather than a positive thing.  God permits a person to fall into sin or to remain in sin, but he does not infuse sin into people as if he himself were a fountain of sin.  Also, Catholic theologians are wary of speaking of “predestination to hell,” lest that suggest the idea that, just as the elect are rewarded with eternal life graciously—since the righteousness to which eternal life is a reward is a gift of grace—so the reprobate are condemned to eternal death “anti-graciously” (for lack of a better word).  But sin and righteousness are not parallel, for while righteousness is a gift of grace and so eternal life is a gracious reward, sin is strictly our own fault and so in damnation we have no one to blame but ourselves.

As I mentioned in my earlier summary of these doctrines, God does not choose some to give efficacious grace to and some to permit to  remain in sin because of any natural merit on the part of the saved—for all saving goodness and merit is itself a gift of God's grace.  God chooses some and not others according to his own sovereign purpose and plan, and we do not usually know the reasons why God chooses one person over another.  The Catholic Encyclopedia article on “Predestination” puts this well:

In order to emphasize how mysterious and unapproachable is Divine election, the Council of Trent calls predestination "hidden mystery". That predestination is indeed a sublime mystery appears not only from the fact that the depths of the eternal counsel cannot be fathomed, it is even externally visible in the inequality of the Divine choice. The unequal standard by which baptismal grace is distributed among infants and efficacious graces among adults is hidden from our view by an impenetrable veil. Could we gain a glimpse at the reasons of this inequality, we should at once hold the key to the solution of the mystery itself. Why is it that this child is baptized, but not the child of the neighbour? Why is it that Peter the Apostle rose again after his fall and persevered till his death, while Judas Iscariot, his fellow-Apostle, hanged himself and thus frustrated his salvation? Though correct, the answer that Judas went to perdition of his own free will, while Peter faithfully co-operated with the grace of conversion offered him, does not clear up the enigma. For the question recurs: Why did not God give to Judas the same efficacious, infallibly successful grace of conversion as to St. Peter, whose blasphemous denial of the Lord was a sin no less grievous than that of the traitor Judas? To all these and similar questions the only reasonable reply is the word of St. Augustine (loc. cit., 21): "Inscrutabilia sunt judicia Dei" (the judgments of God are inscrutable).[22]

We must remember, however, that God gives his sufficient grace to all, not just to those whose will he also moves efficaciously to salvation.  Both Sarah and Suzie are given by God the ability to turn to God and be saved.  If Suzie does not avail herself of this opportunity, she takes that route of her own free will.  She is not forced to take that route by God.  And we should also remember that God's love for the non-elect is just as real as his love for the elect.  He truly desires all men to be saved.  If he allows some to be lost, it is not because he does not love the non-elect but because, in his infinite wisdom, he sees that the greater good of the universe requires that some be permitted to fall away and remain away of their own free will (and thus, in damning them, he respects their own free decision, just as he respects the free decision of the saved).  The issue of reprobation, then, is simply a part of the larger question of the existence of evil in general, as I discussed in my earlier summary.  Why does God allow evil to exist?  Why does he allow bad things to happen?  He does not do so because he likes or approves of the evil in itself, or because he is helpless and cannot prevent it, but because he sees that the just allowance of some evil brings about a greater good.  God uses even evil to ultimately accomplish his perfect and righteous will.

“How can human beings truly have free will if they cannot come to God without grace and if God's grace moves them to salvation efficaciously?  Does not the bondage of the will in sin imply the abolition of free will, and does not the efficaciousness of grace imply the irresistibility of grace?”

In answering this question, it is helpful to keep in mind the ideas in Catholic theology of sufficient and of efficacious grace.  Fr. John Hardon comments on this distinction:

It is a dogma of the Catholic faith that there exists a truly sufficient but inefficacious grace, and also that there exists a truly efficacious grace which, however, is not necessitating.

A truly sufficient grace is sufficient for placing a salutary act. It carries with it the power of producing such an act. . . .

By a truly efficacious grace is meant one that will be (is) infallibly followed by the act to which it tends, e.g. contrition. If you receive such a grace, even before your will consents to it, that grace is infallibly “sure of success;” it will infallibly procure your consent, produce that act – of contrition. But although it infallibly procures your consent, it does not necessitate you to consent: it leaves you free to dissent. Your will will infallibly say "yes" to it, but it is free to say “no.”[23]

The Fall of Adam rendered all human beings unable and unwilling to come to a state of righteousness—to love God above all things and to follow him.  Free will—that is, the basic human ability to make choices—was not destroyed in fallen man, but it became so bent towards sin that it was impossible that anyone, without grace, would ever return to a right relationship with God.  Christ on the cross merited for all human beings sufficient grace to make them able to follow him.  This grace is given to all, so that no one is lost because of an inability to be saved.  All can be saved by cooperating with God's sufficient grace if they will choose to do so.  However, to some, God gives not only a grace sufficient to make them able to choose to be saved, but also an efficacious grace that causes them to be willing to choose to be saved.  Sufficient grace gives ability, efficacious grace gives willingness.  Thus, both sides of the equation are preserved.  On the one hand, man cannot save himself without grace and grace itself is the source of all his saving good, down to the very good will itself.  On the other hand, moral responsibility and free will are preserved, for no one is forced to sin or to remain in sin, and all have the ability if they wish to turn back to God.  (It is true that no one will actually turn back to God unless God gives him efficacious grace, but all have the ability to do so if they choose.)

Catholic theological language sometimes talks about free will as if it was lost in the Fall of Adam.  Other times, the language insists that free will was never lost but only bent down towards sin.  These are simply two different ways of saying the same thing, and the difference depends on what we mean by “free will.”  Free will, in the sense of the basic human ability to will good or evil, is never lost, because God never leaves anyone in a state in which he is incapable of choosing the good (or evil).  Man retains the ability to choose after the Fall, and sufficient grace makes it possible for him to choose to return to God in reliance on God's grace.  But free will to good, in the sense of the actual will (not just the ability) to choose good, was lost in the Fall and is not restored except through efficacious grace.

With regard to the efficaciousness of grace, Catholic theology holds that the grace that actually moves the will to choose God is efficacious, but it is not irresistible.  That is why the Council of Trent emphasized that man “is able to reject” grace.  When God gives efficacious grace to a person, he is not forced against his will or without his will to accept that grace and turn to God.  He remains able to reject God.  However, the grace is effectual, because it results in the person being willing to accept rather than to reject God.  As Fr. Hardon said, “although it infallibly procures your consent, [efficacious grace] does not necessitate you to consent: it leaves you free to dissent. Your will will infallibly say 'yes' to it, but it is free to say 'no.'”  As when we were dealing with man's bondage to sin and God's sufficient grace, we must distinguish between ability and willingness.  Efficacious grace does not remove our ability to choose to reject God; it simply removes our willingness to do so.  As St. Augustine put it,

This grace, therefore, which is hiddenly bestowed in human hearts by the Divine gift, is rejected by no hard heart, because it is given for the sake of first taking away the hardness of the heart. When, therefore, the Father is heard within, and teaches, so that a man comes to the Son, He takes away the heart of stone and gives a heart of flesh, as in the declaration of the prophet He has promised. Because He thus makes them children and vessels of mercy which He has prepared for glory.[24]

So, again, both sides of the equation are preserved.  On the one hand, we preserve moral responsibility and free will, for no one is forced to accept grace and turn to God.  On the other hand, the graciousness of salvation is preserved, for all saving goodness, even down to the good will itself, is shown to be entirely a gift of God's grace.

And by the way, Calvinists may complain of the denial of “irresistible grace,” but, really, is the doctrine of the sounder Calvinists any different from what I have laid out in this regard?  Calvinists use the term “irresistible,” but the sounder ones really mean by this “effectual” or “efficacious.”  They recognize that the term “irresistible” isn't quite right.  Listen, for example, to Calvinist author Loraine Boettner:

The special grace which we refer to as efficacious is sometimes called irresistible grace. This latter term, however, is somewhat misleading since it does suggest that a certain overwhelming power is exerted upon the person, in consequence of which he is compelled to act contrary to his desires, whereas the meaning intended, as we have stated before, is that the elect are so influenced by divine power that their coming is an act of voluntary choice.[25]
           
“Catholic Theology teaches that human beings must cooperate with God's grace.  Thus, they make humans co-contributors to their own salvation, denying that salvation is by grace alone.”

I don't think I need to spend much time on this, since it is answered pretty thoroughly by what has already been said.  Yes, we must cooperate with God's grace.  Grace doesn't bring us to God as if we were an inanimate object like a stone, or control us like a puppet.  Grace works by inspiring within us a good will by which we willingly turn to God and follow him.  St. Augustine said it best:  “He who completes his work by cooperating with our will began by working so that we might will it.”[26]  The idea that we must cooperate with God's grace does not remove or lessen at all the complete graciousness of our salvation, for the good will that cooperates with grace is itself a gift of grace.

Perseverance and Assurance

“Catholic theology teaches that people can fall away from a state of grace and be damned.  This idea is  unbiblical, since God promises that 'he which hath begun a good work in you will perform it until the day of Jesus Christ' (Philippians 1:6).  The idea also imperils the utter graciousness of our salvation, because it says that grace is not enough.  Man can fall away from it, and so, in addition to grace, man's choice not to fall away is necessary for salvation.”

It is true that at this point, the Catholic doctrine differs from the Calvinist (and agrees with the Arminian).  People who are truly regenerated—brought into a state of grace in which they sincerely turn away from sin and choose to follow Christ—can fall away from this state back into a state of mortal sin, die in the state of sin, and be eternally lost.  Regeneration is no absolute guarantee of final perseverance.

Is this doctrine unbiblical?  We cannot conclude that without question-begging, for the Calvinist doctrine that all the regenerate will persevere to the end is not clearly taught in Scripture.  Calvinists put forward a few verses that might suggest that idea—like the one quoted above—but the passages do not actually clearly teach the Calvinist view.  For example, with Philippians 1:6, Calvinists understand St. Paul to be saying that anyone whom God regenerates he keeps regenerated until the end.  However, the verse could also be read as saying that God will not cease to carry on his good work in a person provided that that person does not reject him, without there being an implied promise that no one will ever reject him in such circumstances.  Consider Colossians 1:21-23:

And you, that were sometime alienated and enemies in your mind by wicked works, yet now hath he reconciled in the body of his flesh through death, to present you holy and unblameable and unreproveable in his sight: If ye continue in the faith grounded and settled, and be not moved away from the hope of the gospel, which ye have heard, and which was preached to every creature which is under heaven.  (Emphasis added.)

Once again, we see the Protestant tendency, following Sola Scriptura, to try to prove Protestant doctrine by tenuous inferences from obscure passages of Scripture.  We don't need to do this, because God has provided an infallible Tradition and an infallible Church to provide for us the correct and authoritative interpretation of God's Word when we need it.  And that Church and Tradition do not agree, in this case, with the Calvinist doctrine:

No one, moreover, so long as he is in this mortal life, ought so far to presume as regards the secret mystery of divine predestination, as to determine for certain that he is assuredly in the number of the predestinate; as if it were true, that he that is justified, either cannot sin any more, or, if he do sin, that he ought to promise himself an assured repentance; for except by special revelation, it cannot be known whom God hath chosen unto Himself. . . .

So also as regards the gift of perseverance, of which it is written, He that shall persevere to the end, he shall be saved:-which gift cannot be derived from any other but Him, who is able to establish him who standeth that he stand perseveringly, and to restore him who falleth:-let no one herein promise himself any thing as certain with an absolute certainty; though all ought to place and repose a most firm hope in God's help. For God, unless men be themselves wanting to His grace, as he has begun the good work, so will he perfect it, working (in them) to will and to accomplish. Nevertheless, let those who think themselves to stand, take heed lest they fall, and, with fear and trembling work out their salvation, in labours, in watchings, in almsdeeds, in prayers and oblations, in fastings and chastity: for, knowing that they are born again unto a hope of glory, but not as yet unto glory, they ought to fear for the combat which yet remains with the flesh, with the world, with the devil, wherein they cannot be victorious, unless they be with God's grace, obedient to the Apostle, who says; We are debtors, not to the flesh, to live according to the flesh; for if you live according to the flesh, you shall die; but if by the spirit you mortify the deeds of the flesh, you shall live.[27]

As these quotations from the Council of Trent illustrate, the doctrine of final perseverance is tied up with the doctrine of the assurance of salvation.  Calvinists, logically, link their doctrine of assurance to their doctrine of perseverance.  Since all the regenerate are elect, if one looks within oneself and perceives signs that one has real faith and repentance, one can know that one is among the elect and will persevere to the end.  Catholic theology, on the other hand, does not allow for this unbreakable connection, and so there can be no absolute assurance that one is among the elect.

The Calvinist concern here is that Catholic doctrine on these points jeopardizes the graciousness of salvation, and also that it does us a disservice by destroying our ability to have an absolute assurance of salvation.  With regard to the graciousness of salvation, the objection is easily answered.  The graciousness of salvation is in no way imperiled by the fact that God does not necessarily give the gift of final perseverance to all whom he brings at any time into a state of grace—or, in other words, that God brings some people temporarily to a state of grace but not permanently, while others he brings, at least in the end, permanently.  Whether God brings us temporarily or permanently, it is God who does the bringing.  Just as God decides, in his sovereign, eternal plan, to grant efficacious grace to some and not to others, so he decides in his plan to grant the gift of final perseverance to some and not to others.  Final perseverance is not merited by any natural desert of our own any more than the initial grace of conversion, for all our saving good, from beginning to end, is entirely a gift of grace.  So we can lay that concern to rest.

Admittedly, the issue of assurance is trickier, because, if one is accustomed to believing that one has an infallible certainty of one's eternal salvation, one may feel that something important is lost in the Catholic doctrine.  Of course, feelings do not necessarily imply truth.  If the idea of an infallible assurance of salvation for every regenerate believer is in fact false, the only thing one will have lost upon embracing the Catholic view is a false, groundless (albeit, perhaps, an attractive) hope.

But it must also be pointed out that assurance of salvation is not an all-or-nothing affair.  Final perseverance is a gift of grace, and it cannot be presumed on as if we have a right to it, but at the same time God's grace works in us in a natural and organic way in which early attainments in sanctification lead to later ones.  In this way, sanctification is much like every other area of human life.  The more we develop certain habits, the more we are likely to live in accordance with those habits in the future.  If I have spent a good deal of time and effort to train myself to avoid immoderate anger in my responses to the events of life, I am much less likely to have an outburst of such anger at any given time, all other things being equal, than a person undisciplined in this area.  Most of us do not go around nervously wondering if tomorrow we shall slit our neighbor's throat, not because it is absolutely impossible that we might do so or that we know infallibly that we shall not, but because we recognize that through the training of our habits, beliefs, and values throughout our lives, and because of other traits of our personalities that we have come to know, it is extremely unlikely that we will engage in that sort of activity.  Similarly, if, by God's grace, we have become the sort of people who truly love God, who have developed habits of living faithfully for him, of loving our neighbors, of living a life of charity, etc., we have good reason to believe that the growth in grace we have attained will have the effect of helping preserve us from much possible future sin, such that we are unlikely to spend a great deal of time (if any) in a state of mortal sin or to die and end up confirmed eternally in such a condition.

The Catechism makes this distinction between an absolute certainty and a probable hope:

Since it belongs to the supernatural order, grace escapes our experience and cannot be known except by faith. We cannot therefore rely on our feelings or our works to conclude that we are justified and saved. However, according to the Lord's words "Thus you will know them by their fruits" - reflection on God's blessings in our life and in the lives of the saints offers us a guarantee that grace is at work in us and spurs us on to an ever greater faith and an attitude of trustful poverty.[28]

We must also remember that God will never abandon a person who has not abandoned him first.  If we choose Christ, we are secure.  We cannot go to hell if we die in such a state.  If we end up in hell, it will only be because we have deliberately, with full knowledge and consent of our hearts, chosen to turn away from a relationship of love to Christ and from the way of life he has called us to in favor of living life according to our own desires.  To do this, we must resist the testimony and pleading of God to our consciences, calling us back to the good path of salvation.  We are not talking here about the venial sins we all commit throughout our lives—slips into sinful attitudes and behavior flowing from the fact that we have not yet been made perfect in grace—for these, though evil (and converted souls long to be rid of such evils), do not interrupt the overall commitment of our lives to God.  In Catholic language, they do not destroy the overall state of charity (that is, the state of love to God in the commitment of our lives).  If we are following Christ, however imperfectly, God will not abandon us.

In short, we cannot know with infallible certainty that we are truly converted or that we are among the elect who will receive eternal salvation.  But we can observe the fruits of God's grace in our lives and so know that we love God and choose to follow him just as we know other things about our internal desires and choices by self-observation, and so be comforted that we are in a state of grace.  And we can observe in ourselves the development and growth of our love towards God and our neighbors, and the strengthening of godly habits and desires, and so have a strong hope that we will not in the future finally abandon God but will continue to follow to the end, in reliance on the ever-present help of God who continues to build within us grace upon grace.

[Note: See here for some further thoughts on how Catholic theology might try to reach a greater rapport with Calvinism with regard to the doctrine of the Perseverance of the Saints.]

“But doesn't the denial that all regenerated people attain final salvation destroy the sufficiency of Christ's atonement?  After all, if Christ's atonement and righteousness are applied to a person, surely this would bring not just a temporary salvation but a permanent one!  Isn't Christ's righteousness enough to get us all the way home?”

Let me quote Calvinist author Loraine Boettner once again in answer to the concern here:

The meaning might be brought out more clearly if we used the phrase "Limited Redemption" rather than "Limited Atonement." The Atonement is, of course, strictly an infinite transaction; the limitation comes in, theologically, in the application of the benefits of the atonement, that is in redemption.[29]

Boettner is here responding to an objection to the Calvinist doctrine of limited atonement.  If the atonement is limited, are Calvinists saying that Christ's redemption was not of infinite value, and that it could not take away all sins?  No, says Boettner, the limitation is not in the atonement but in its application.  The benefits of the atonement are not applied equally to all.

Now, Catholics are not happy with the Calvinist language of “limited atonement,” since that seems to communicate the idea that Christ did not provide a sufficient atonement for the sins of all men or that the atonement is not sincerely offered to all men.  Catholic theology affirms the infinite sufficiency and universal offer and availability of Christ's atonement (and so do the soundest thinkers among the Calvinists, by the way).  My point here in quoting Boettner is simply to point out that everyone, including Catholics and Calvinists, recognize that the atonement, while infinitely sufficient to atone for the sins of all men, is not applied equally to all men, for all men do not receive it equally.  Christ's righteousness and his atonement are infinite.  They are certainly enough to get all people all the way home.  But God does not apply them efficaciously to all people in the same way.  He offers the full benefits of his atonement to all people, and all are given sufficient grace to receive them.  However, God does not apply the atonement to all people equally in such a way as to move them all efficaciously to turn to Christ and to persevere united to Christ until the end.  So far as we know, there are some whom God never brings to conversion.  There are others whom God brings to conversion temporarily but to whom he does not give the gift of final perseverance.  And there are others—the elect—to whom God applies Christ's atonement in such a way as to efficaciously bring them to conversion and to final perseverance.  In short, while Christ's atonement is unlimited, it is not applied unlimitedly to all in exactly the same way.  The atonement, applied in full, is sufficient to remove all sins.  But it is not applied to sins that are not repented of, and not all people repent of all their sins.

Conclusion

As I mentioned at the beginning of this article, Calvinists are concerned that Catholic doctrine in the areas of predestination and efficacious grace imperil the sovereignty of God and salvation by grace alone.  We have seen that this is not the case.  Therefore, these doctrines cannot provide any basis for Calvinists to continue to remain separated from the communion of the Catholic Church.  Calvinists are right to love the doctrines of grace, and they need not fear that returning to Catholic unity means the abandonment of those doctrines.  On the contrary, Calvinists derived these doctrines originally from Catholic Christianity.  Returning to the Catholic Church, therefore, means returning to the proper home and context of these wonderful doctrines.  The Catholic Church is the proper home of the Scriptures which teach these doctrines and of the Augustinian tradition which has developed and articulated them through history.

And Arminian Protestants or others who may be concerned about certain aspects of Calvinism as they perceive it—for example, its denial of the resistibility of grace—can find in the Catholic Church a more balanced theological articulation.  While they see the doctrines of free will, God's desire for all to be saved, and other key biblical ideas preserved, they may also learn to appreciate aspects of the Augustinian tradition that they may not have given enough credit to in their own traditions.  And they can join with the rest of God's people in following the Holy-Spirit-guided Tradition of Christ's Church.

For more on the relationship between the Catholic view on these matters in comparison and contrast with Calvinist views, see here.  For a more basic overview of the Catholic doctrine of salvation in general, see here.  For those who are wondering how the Catholic school of thought known as Molinism fits into all of this, see here, here, and here.  For a look at the heresy of Jansenism and the Catholic Church's response to it, which sheds further light on the issues discussed here, see here.  And for some follow-up philosophical thoughts on how free will works, how free will is consistent with God's foreknowledge and predestination, etc., see here.





[1]Martin Luther, The Bondage of the Will, tr. J. I. Packer and O. R. Johnston (Grand Rapids, MI: Fleming H. Revell, 1957), 319.
[2]Catholic Church, Catechism of the Catholic Church, #268-269 (footnotes removed), retrieved from the Vatican website at http://www.vatican.va/archive/ccc_css/archive/catechism/p1s2c1p3.htm at 7:39 PM on 3/4/18.
[3]Catholic Church, Catechism of the Catholic Church, #303 (footnotes removed), retrieved from the Vatican website at http://www.vatican.va/archive/ccc_css/archive/catechism/p1s2c1p4.htm at 7:41 PM on 3/4/18.
[4]Ibid., #308.
[5]Ibid., #313 (footnotes removed).
[6]Ibid., #311 (footnotes removed, the second quotation quoting St. Augustine).
[7]Catholic Church, Catechism of the Catholic Church, #1037 (footnote removed), retrieved at the Vatican website at http://www.vatican.va/archive/ccc_css/archive/catechism/p123a12.htm at 8:24 PM on 3/4/18.
[8]Catholic Church, Catechism of the Catholic Church, #1260 (footnote removed), retrieved at the Vatican website at http://www.vatican.va/archive/ccc_css/archive/catechism/p2s2c1a1.htm at 8:26 PM on 3/4/18.
[9]J. Waterworth, tr., The Canons and Decrees of the Sacred and  Oecumenical Council of Trent, Sixth Session (London: Dolman, 1848), pp. 30-31, "Scanned by Hanover College students in 1995," Hanover Historical Texts Project, Hanover College, retrieved at https://history.hanover.edu/texts/trent/ct06.html at 6:13 AM on 3/7/2018 (page number removed).
[10]Canons of the Second Council of Orange (529 AD), retrieved from the EWTN website at https://www.ewtn.com/library/COUNCILS/ORANGE.HTM at 9:21 PM on 3/4/18.  [The link here is now broken, but this one works:  https://www.ewtn.com/catholicism/library/local-council-history-and-text-1472)
[11]Catholic Church, Catechism of the Catholic Church, #2001 (footnotes removed), retrieved from the Vatican website at http://www.vatican.va/archive/ccc_css/archive/catechism/p3s1c3a2.htm at 9/24 PM on 3/4/18.
[12]Ibid., quoting St. Augustine.
[13]Ibid., #2002.
[14]Catholic Church, Catechism of the Catholic Church, #1037, retrieved from the Vatican website at http://www.vatican.va/archive/ccc_css/archive/catechism/p123a12.htm at 9:32 PM on 3/4/18.
[15]Catholic Church, Catechism of the Catholic Church, #1993 (footnote removed), quoting the Council of Trent, Sixth Session, Chapter 5, retrieved from the Vatican website at http://www.vatican.va/archive/ccc_css/archive/catechism/p3s1c3a2.htm at 9:36 PM on 3/4/18.
[16]Leo XIII, Libertas [Encyclical of Pope Leo XIII on the Nature of Human Liberty], Vatican Website, June 20, 1888, sec. 33, accessed at 3:15 PM on March 30, 2018, http://w2.vatican.va/content/leo-xiii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_l-xiii_enc_20061888_libertas.html.
[17]St. Isidore of Seville, Libri Duo Differentiarum, chapter XXII, found in Guido Stucco, God's Eternal Gift: A History of the Catholic Doctrine of Predestination from Augustine to the Renaissance (Xlibris, 2009), 317-319.
[18]Canons of the Council of Quiercy, found in Guido Stucco, God's Eternal Gift: A History of the Catholic Doctrine of Predestination from Augustine to the Renaissance (Xlibris, 2009), 350-351 (footnotes removed).
[19]St. Thomas Aquinas, The Summa Theologiae of St. Thomas Aquinas, Second and Revised Edition, tr. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (1920), Online Edition Copyright © 2017 by Kevin Knight, First Part, Question 19, Article 6, Reply to Objection 1, retrieved from the New Advent website at http://www.newadvent.org/summa/1019.htm at 6:25 AM on 3/7/18 (embedded links removed).
[20]Fr. Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, Predestination: The Meaning of Predestination in Scripture and the Church (Charlotte, NC: TAN Books, 2013), 75.
[21]St. Thomas Aquinas, The Summa Theologiae of St. Thomas Aquinas, Second and Revised Edition, tr. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (1920), Online Edition Copyright © 2017 by Kevin Knight, First Part, Question 23, Article 3, Answer, retrieved from the New Advent website at http://www.newadvent.org/summa/1023.htm at 3:19 PM on 4/7/18 (embedded links removed).
[22]Joseph Pohle, "Predestination," The Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. 12 (New York: Robert Appleton Company, 1911), April 7, 2018, retrieved from the New Advent website at http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/12378a.htm at 6:41 AM on 3/7/18.
[23]Fr. John Hardon, Course on Grace, Part IIB, chapter 15 (Inter Mirifica, 1998), retrieved from the website of the Real Presence Eucharistic Education and Adoration Association at http://www.therealpresence.org/archives/Grace/Grace_004.htm#15 at 6:56 AM on 3/7/18.
[24]St. Augustine, On the Predestination of the Saints (Book I), chapter 13. Translated by Peter Holmes and Robert Ernest Wallis, and revised by Benjamin B. Warfield. From Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, First Series, Vol. 5, edited by Philip Schaff (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1887), revised and edited for New Advent by Kevin Knight. Retrieved from the New Advent website at http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/15121.htm at 7:21 AM on 3/7/18 (embedded links removed).
[25]Loraine Boettner, The Reformed Doctrine of Predestination (Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company, 1932), 178.
[26]Catholic Church, Catechism of the Catholic Church, #2001, retrieved from the Vatican website at http://www.vatican.va/archive/ccc_css/archive/catechism/p3s1c3a2.htm at 3:53 PM on 4/7/18.
[27]J. Waterworth, tr., The Canons and Decrees of the Sacred and  Oecumenical Council of Trent, Sixth Session (London: Dolman, 1848), pp. 39-40, "Scanned by Hanover College students in 1995," Hanover Historical Texts Project, Hanover College, retrieved from https://history.hanover.edu/texts/trent/ct06.html at 4:20 PM on 3/7/18 (page number removed).
[28]Catholic Church, Catechism of the Catholic Church, #2005, retrieved from the Vatican website at http://www.vatican.va/archive/ccc_css/archive/catechism/p3s1c3a2.htm at 10:48 AM on 2/23/18 (footnotes removed).
[29]Loraine Boettner, The Reformed Doctrine of Predestination (Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company, 1932), 150.

ADDENDUM 5/10/21:  In the year 785, Pope Hadrian I articulated briefly and succinctly the Catholic teaching on predestination in a letter to the bishops of Spain, where there was apparently some confusion on the topic.  Some were asking what the point of doing anything is if everything is predestined, and others were asking what the point of asking God for help is if we can make our own choices.

    As for that, however, which some of these say, that predestination to life or to death is in the power of God and not in ours; they say: "Why do we try to live, because it is in the power of God?"; again others say: "Why do we ask God, that we may not be overcome by temptation, since it is in our power, as in the freedom of will?"  For truly they are able to render or to accept no plan, being ignorant . . . [of the words] of blessed Fulgentius [against a certain Pelagius]:  "Therefore, God in the eternity of His changelessness has prepared works of mercy and justice . . . but for men who are to be justified He has prepared merits; He has prepared rewards for those who are to be glorified; but for the wicked He has not prepared evil wills or evil works, but He has prepared for them just and eternal punishments.  This is the eternal predestination of the future works of God, which as we have always acknowledged to be taught to us by apostolic doctrine, so also faithfully we proclaim. . . ."  (Henry Denzinger, The Sources of Catholic Dogma, tr. Roy J. Deferrari [Fitzwilliam, NH: Loreto Publications, 2002], a translation of "the thirtieth edition of Enchiridion Symbolorum by Henry Denzinger, revised by Karl Rahner, S.J., published in 1954, by Herder & Co., Freiburg", p. 120, #300--ellipses and brackets in original)

In short, God is the source of the good works of the saints as well as of their eternal reward, but he is not the positive source of the evil works of the damned, though he ordains their eternal punishment.  God's predestination involves the choosing of certain people to bring, by grace, to a state of righteousness, while leaving others to continue in their sin.

In 520, during the years of the Semipelagian controversy, Pope St. Hormisdas, in a letter titled "Sicut rationi" written to Possessor, pointed to the later works of St. Augustine as containing the official teaching of the Church on grace and free will:

Yet what the Roman, that is the Catholic, Church follows and preserves concerning free will and the grace of God can be abundantly recognized both in the various books of the blessed Augustine, and especially [in those] to Hilary and Prosper, but the prominent chapters are contained in the ecclesiastical archives and if these are lacking there and you believe them necessary, we establish [them], although he who diligently considers the words of the apostle, should know clearly what he ought to follow.  (Ibid., p. 120, #173a--brackets in original)

Thursday, November 16, 2017

Predestination and Grace in Catholic Theology

Imagine two individuals: Sarah and Suzie.  Both of them are humans, descendants of Adam and Eve, inheritors both of human nature in general and of original sin in particular.  Of themselves, therefore, considered apart from the grace of God, they are in a state of mortal sin and can only end up in hell for all eternity in the righteous justice of God, for this is the condition original sin has brought all men into.  However, God has sent his Son Jesus Christ into the world to redeem it, and Christ has given the world grace through his sacrifice and merits, redeeming men from the curse of sin.  This salvation is made available and offered to all the world through the preaching of the gospel by the Church.  Sarah and Suzie, during their lives, both heard the message of salvation.  Sarah, at some point in her life, made a decision to gladly accept it and was baptized, taking Christ upon herself and washing away her sins in his blood.  She also chose to persevere to the end of her life in a state of grace, and then died and went to heaven, and she will be blessed in the presence of God for all eternity.  Suzie, however, refused to accept the gospel, and died in a state of mortal sin.  When she died, she went to hell, and she will suffer God's wrath and the privation of the blessed vision of God for all eternity.

Now I want to ask a very important question:  What, ultimately, made the difference between these two women?  Of course, the divergence of their ultimate courses came about because of the different decisions each of them made, particularly Sarah's decision to accept the gospel and continue in it until the end of her life (with all that that means and implies) and Suzie's decision to reject it.  But this is not the end of the matter.  What is it that made it so that Sarah would accept the gospel and Suzie would reject it?

SCENARIO 1

One answer might go something like this:  God in every way and sense equally willed the salvation of Sarah and Suzie, and to that end he gave them both in all relevant respects the same graces, but Sarah made a good use of her resources and Suzie made a bad use of them.  In this scenario, the ultimate source of the difference between Sarah and Suzie is within these two women themselves.  What God gave both of them was exactly the same in all relevant respects, but out of that same set of opportunities and graces Sarah produced a right response to God's grace and Suzie produced a wrong response.

SCENARIO 2

But there is another answer that could be given, and it goes like this:  Sarah and Suzie are both human and descendants of Adam and Eve, and so both are inheritors of original sin.  Both would therefore be doomed to hell apart from God's grace.  However, God has sent his Son Jesus Christ into the world to redeem it, and Christ has given the world grace through his sacrifice and merits, redeeming men from the curse of sin.  This salvation is made available and offered to all the world through the preaching of the gospel by the Church.  Thus, God has provided sufficient grace to both Sarah and Suzie, and both can freely avail themselves of it if they will.  There is no hindrance to the salvation of either of them outside the potential refusal of their own free will.  From all eternity, God has ordained everything that has come or will come to pass in time, including all events both good and evil.  Good (like light) is a positive thing, produced by God's positive power and working, while evil (like darkness) is a negative thing.  God positively brings about all good but permits or allows evil, as he has determined to use both to fulfill his glorious purposes in history.  Therefore, nothing happens which defeats his ultimate goals or purposes for the creation.  Evil is a thing displeasing to God in its own nature, but its presence in history is not a defeat of his sovereignty, for it only exists at his sufferance to the extent and in the form that he has wisely and freely determined to permit in every detail.  God's free ordination of all things includes who will and who will not be saved, as it includes every other detail of history.  From all eternity, God freely decided that, in addition to making sufficient grace available to both Sarah and Suzie, he would give Sarah a special efficacious grace that would move her will to accept the gospel and persevere in that acceptance to the end of her life and so arrive at ultimate salvation, while he determined not to give that particular gift to Suzie.  In other words, God chose to give Sarah a good will but not to give that gift to Suzie.  He predestined Sarah to salvation by his grace.  He did not predestine Suzie to damnation, in the sense of forcing her to reject the gospel or infusing into her evil that caused her to reject the gospel.  He simply refrained, of his own free and wise will, for his good purposes, from moving Suzie's will to accept the gospel, allowing her to continue to reject it of her own free will until her death.

Why would God do this?  He did not elect Sarah to salvation because she was any better than Suzie, for both were equally in need of grace due to original and actual sin.  He did not refrain from moving Suzie's will to salvation out of any malice or hatred or lack of compassion, but rather because he saw that it would be better, all things considered, to give a grace to Sarah that he did not give to Suzie.  (This issue, then, is simply part of the larger question of why God allows evil and suffering to exist in his creation.  He does not do so because he loves or approves of evil, or because he is incapable of keeping evil out of his creation, but because he sees, in his infinite wisdom, that it is ultimately better overall to allow certain evils to happen than to stop them from happening or to arrange things so they don't happen.  As Pope Leo XIII put it in his encyclical Libertas, "God Himself in His providence, though infinitely good and powerful, permits evil to exist in the world, partly that greater good may not be impeded, and partly that greater evil may not ensue.")  God did not do any injustice to Suzie in not granting her the same efficacious grace that he gave to Sarah, for he granted her sufficient grace for salvation which she could have availed herself of if she had wished to do so.  Nothing outside of her will was impeding her acceptance of salvation.  In rejecting it, she acted with full freedom of will--as did Sarah, who was moved and inspired but not forced to accept the gospel by God's efficacious grace.  Nor did Suzie (or Sarah) do anything to deserve or merit God's efficacious grace.  All human beings since the Fall deserve God's damnation rather than his grace, and any grace received is an unmerited gift rather than something owed to us.

Catholic doctrine accords with Scenario 2 but not with Scenario 1.  This is because Catholic doctrine teaches that God is the creator of all things and is therefore sovereign over all things, and it also teaches that all good that we have relative to salvation is a gift of God coming from his grace through the sacrifice and merits of Christ.

GOD IS SOVEREIGN

First of all, the Catholic Church teaches that God is the creator of all things and therefore sovereign over all things:

The Holy Scriptures repeatedly confess the universal power of God. He is called the "Mighty One of Jacob", the "LORD of hosts", the "strong and mighty" one. If God is almighty "in heaven and on earth", it is because he made them. Nothing is impossible with God, who disposes his works according to his will. He is the Lord of the universe, whose order he established and which remains wholly subject to him and at his disposal. He is master of history, governing hearts and events in keeping with his will: "It is always in your power to show great strength, and who can withstand the strength of your arm?  (Catechism of the Catholic Church, #268-269--footnotes removed) 
The witness of Scripture is unanimous that the solicitude of divine providence is concrete and immediate; God cares for all, from the least things to the great events of the world and its history. The sacred books powerfully affirm God's absolute sovereignty over the course of events: "Our God is in the heavens; he does whatever he pleases." And so it is with Christ, "who opens and no one shall shut, who shuts and no one opens". As the book of Proverbs states: "Many are the plans in the mind of a man, but it is the purpose of the LORD that will be established."  (Catechism #303--footnotes removed) 
The truth that God is at work in all the actions of his creatures is inseparable from faith in God the Creator. God is the first cause who operates in and through secondary causes: "For God is at work in you, both to will and to work for his good pleasure."  (Catechism #308) 
St. Thomas More, shortly before his martyrdom, consoled his daughter: "Nothing can come but that that God wills. And I make me very sure that whatsoever that be, seem it never so bad in sight, it shall indeed be the best." (Catechism #313--footnotes removed)

The Catholic Encyclopedia article on "Predestination" puts it this way:

 According to the doctrinal decisions of general and particular synods, God infallibly foresees and immutably preordains from eternity all future events (cf. Denzinger, n. 1784), all fatalistic necessity, however, being barred and human liberty remaining intact (Denz., n. 607).

Regarding moral evil:

God is in no way, directly or indirectly, the cause of moral evil. He permits it, however, because he respects the freedom of his creatures and, mysteriously, knows how to derive good from it: . . . 
For almighty God. . ., because he is supremely good, would never allow any evil whatsoever to exist in his works if he were not so all-powerful and good as to cause good to emerge from evil itself. . . . (Catechism #311--footnotes removed)

The Catechism of St. Pius X talks about God's permission of moral evil in this way (in the section on "The First Article of the Creed"):

10 Q. Does God take any interest in the world and in the things created by Him?
A. Yes, God takes an interest in the world and in all things created by Him; He preserves them, and governs them by His infinite goodness and wisdom; and nothing happens here below that He does not either will or permit. 
11 Q. Why do you say that nothing happens here below that He does not either will or permit?
A. We say that nothing happens here below that He does not either will or permit, because there are some things which God wills and commands, while there are others which He simply does not prevent, such as sin. 
12 Q. Why does not God prevent sin?
A. God does not prevent sin, because even from the very abuse man makes of the liberty with which He is endowed, God knows how to bring forth good and to make His mercy or His justice become more and more resplendent. 

If God ordains all that comes to pass, and if all good comes from him and all evil is permitted willingly by him, and if all saving moral goodness that we humans can possess is a gift of grace through Christ (as we will see more later), and if some end up saved and others end up damned, it follows that those who are saved are saved by the election and mercy of God and as a gift of his grace, and that those who are damned are permitted to be damned by God, who decided not to give them the same gift of salvation he gave to his elect.  Ludwig Ott, in his well-respected and widely-used book on Catholic doctrine, Fundamentals of Catholic Dogma (Rockford, IL: TAN Books, 1974 {orig. 1952}, 242-245), explains (capitalization removed) that it is Catholic dogma that "God, by his eternal resolve of will, has predetermined certain men to eternal blessedness."  Ott goes on:

This doctrine is proposed by the Ordinary and General Teaching of the Church as a truth of Revelation. The doctrinal definitions of the Council of Trent presuppose it . . . The reality of Predestination is clearly attested to in Rom 8:29 et seq: . . . cf. Mt 25:34, Jn 10:27 et seq., Acts 13:48, Eph 1:4 et seq. . . . Predestination is a part of the Eternal Divine Plan of Providence. (found here--ellipsis in original)

While Catholic theologians do not entirely agree with regard to all aspects of how to articulate the doctrine of predestination, they agree on certain things.  They agree on the utterly gratuitous nature of predestination, in that we have nothing good which is not a gift of God.  Ott puts it this way:

Only incomplete Predestination to grace is independent of every merit (ante praevisa merita), as the first grace cannot be merited. In the same way, complete Predestination to grace and glory conjointly is independent of every merit, as the first grace cannot be merited, and the consequent graces, as well as the merits acquired with these graces and their reward, depend like the links of a chain, on the first grace . . . [ellipses in original]

Fr. Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, in his book Predestination [(Charlotte, NC: TAN Books, 2013), p. 10], which is pretty universally regarded as a modern classic reference on Catholic theology regarding predestination, makes the same point:

But in any case, from this minimum admitted by all we get three propositions to which all Catholic theologians subscribe. They are: (1) Predestination to the first grace is not because God foresaw our naturally good works, nor is the beginning of salutary acts due to natural causes; (2) predestination to glory is not because God foresaw we would continue in the performance of supernaturally meritorious acts apart from the special gift of final perseverance; (3) complete predestination, in so far as it comprises the whole series of graces from the first up to glorification, is gratuitous or previous to foreseen merits. These three propositions are admitted by all Catholic theologians.

St. Thomas Aquinas, one of the greatest Doctors of the Catholic Church, talks about how some have been predestined by God to grace and to eternal life, while others have been "reprobated" by God--that is, passed over by God and permitted by his providence to remain in sin:

God does reprobate some. For it was said above (Article 1) that predestination is a part of providence. To providence, however, it belongs to permit certain defects in those things which are subject to providence, as was said above (I:22:2). Thus, as men are ordained to eternal life through the providence of God, it likewise is part of that providence to permit some to fall away from that end; this is called reprobation. Thus, as predestination is a part of providence, in regard to those ordained to eternal salvation, so reprobation is a part of providence in regard to those who turn aside from that end. Hence reprobation implies not only foreknowledge, but also something more, as does providence, as was said above (I:22:1). Therefore, as predestination includes the will to confer grace and glory; so also reprobation includes the will to permit a person to fall into sin, and to impose the punishment of damnation on account of that sin.  (Summa Theologica, First Part, Question 23, Article 3--from the New Advent website, embedded links removed)

In the early medieval Church, the doctrine of predestination was dealt with in a number of councils which have informed the development of Catholic thinking on this subject.  Two of these councils were the Council of Quiercy (853) and the Council of Valence (855).  Here is a selection from the canons of Quiercy [Guido Stucco, God's Eternal Gift: A History of the Catholic Doctrine of Predestination from Augustine to the Renaissance (Xlibris, 2009), 350-351--footnotes removed]:

     Almighty God created man without sin, righteous and endowed with free will.  He placed man in paradise, and wanted him to dwell in the sanctity of justice.  Man, by making bad use of his free will, sinned and fell (from this state of justice), becoming the 'mass of perdition' of the entire humankind.  However, the good and righteous God, according to his foreknowledge (secundum praescientiam suam), chose out of this mass of perdition those whom he predestined through grace (Rom 8:29 ff; Eph 1:11) to eternal life, and likewise, he predestined eternal life for them.  He foreknew that everybody else, whom he abandoned in the mass of perdition according to his just decree, was going to perish, though he did not predestine them to perish; rather, being just, he predestined eternal punishment for them.  Because of this, we speak of only one divine predestination, which pertains to either the gift of grace or to the retribution of justice. . . . 
     We lost the freedom of will in the first man, but got it back through Christ our Lord.  We have free will to do what is good, which is preceded and helped by God's grace; we have free will to do what is evil, as it is abandoned by God's grace.  We [can say] we have free will because it is freed and healed from corruption by grace. . . . 
     Almighty God wants "all men to be saved" (1 Tim 2:4) without exception (sine exceptione), even though not all will be saved.  The fact that some are saved, is the gift of the saving God; the fact that some perish, is their own fault.

Here is part of Canon 3 from the Council of Valence (Stucco, 363-364):

     In regard to God's predestination, we wished in the past and still faithfully wish to claim in the present, on the basis of the apostolic authority, that: "Does not the potter have a right over the clay to make out of the same lump one vessel for a noble purpose and another for an ignoble one?" (Rom 9:21), and also according to what immediately comes next: "What if God, wishing to show his wrath and make known his power, has endured with much patience the vessels of wrath made for destruction?  This was to make known the riches of his glory to the vessels of mercy, which he has prepared previously for glory" (Rom 9:22).  With confidence, we profess the predestination of the elect to life and the predestination of the impious to death: in the election of those who are to be saved, the mercy of God anticipates their good merit; in the damnation of those who will perish, their guilt anticipates just judgment.  "By means of predestination, God has only established what he is going to do either out of gratuitous mercy, or out of just judgment," as we read in the Scriptures:  "He has done what will be," (Is 45:11 LXX).  In the case of evil people, he has foreknown their malice, which originates from themselves, but has not predestined it, because it does not stem from him . . . [as the] Second Council of Orange said: "That some people have been predestined by the divine power," meaning that they could not be otherwise, "not only we do not believe, but if there are some who wish to believe something so evil, we anathemize and detest them."

In the year 785, Pope Hadrian I articulated briefly and succinctly the Catholic teaching on predestination in a letter to the bishops of Spain, where there was apparently some confusion on the topic.  Some were asking what the point of doing anything is if everything is predestined, and others were asking what the point of asking God for help is if we can make our own choices.

    As for that, however, which some of these say, that predestination to life or to death is in the power of God and not in ours; they say: "Why do we try to live, because it is in the power of God?"; again others say: "Why do we ask God, that we may not be overcome by temptation, since it is in our power, as in the freedom of will?"  For truly they are able to render or to accept no plan, being ignorant . . . [of the words] of blessed Fulgentius [against a certain Pelagius]:  "Therefore, God in the eternity of His changelessness has prepared works of mercy and justice . . . but for men who are to be justified He has prepared merits; He has prepared rewards for those who are to be glorified; but for the wicked He has not prepared evil wills or evil works, but He has prepared for them just and eternal punishments.  This is the eternal predestination of the future works of God, which as we have always acknowledged to be taught to us by apostolic doctrine, so also faithfully we proclaim. . . ."  (Henry Denzinger, The Sources of Catholic Dogma, tr. Roy J. Deferrari [Fitzwilliam, NH: Loreto Publications, 2002], a translation of "the thirtieth edition of Enchiridion Symbolorum by Henry Denzinger, revised by Karl Rahner, S.J., published in 1954, by Herder & Co., Freiburg", p. 120, #300--ellipses and brackets in original)

In short, God is the source of the good works of the saints as well as of their eternal reward, but he is not the positive source of the evil works of the damned, though he ordains their eternal punishment.

1 Timothy 2:4 says that God "will have all men to be saved, and to come unto the knowledge of the truth."  How does this square with the fact that God has only predestined some, not all, to salvation, choosing to grant the efficacious grace that creates the good will and perseverance in good only to his elect?  God wills all men to be saved by what Catholic theology calls his "antecedent" will, but not by his "consequent" will.  Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange, in Predestination, pp. 74-75 (footnotes retained in square brackets), in the context of describing the theology of St. Thomas Aquinas on these matters, articulates this distinction:

     What metaphysical definition shall we give, then, of the consequent and antecedent wills?  St. Thomas gives us in substance the answer to this question.  He points out that good is the object of the will; now goodness, unlike truth, is formally not in the mind but in things as they actually are.  Hence we will, truly and simply, what we will as having to be at once realized, and this is called the consequent will, which in God is always efficacious.  As St. Thomas says:  "The will is directed to things as they are in themselves, and in themselves they exist under particular qualifications.  Hence we will a thing simply, inasmuch as we will it when all particular circumstances are considered; and this is what is meant by willing consequently. . . .  Thus it is clear that whatever God simply wills, takes place." [Ibid., Ia, q.19, a.6 ad 1um]  As we shall see later on, this principle concerning the will is of supreme importance for St. Thomas as constituting the foundation for the distinction between efficacious and sufficient graces.
     If, on the other hand, the will is drawn to what is good in itself regardless of the circumstances, not to a thing as it actually is, then this is called the antecedent will, which of itself and as such is not efficacious, since good, whether natural or supernatural, easy or difficult to acquire, is realized only with its accompanying circumstances.  As St. Thomas says:  "A thing taken in its primary sense, and absolutely considered, may be good or evil, and yet when some additional circumstances are taken into account, by a consequent consideration may be changed into the contrary.  Thus that a man should live is good, . . . but if in a particular case we add that a man is a murderer . . . to kill him is good." [Ibid., q.19, a.6 ad 1um]  Thus the merchant during a storm would will (conditionally) to retain his merchandise, but he wills to cast it into the sea so as to save his life. [Ibid., Ia IIae, q.6, a.6, c.]  Thus again, God wills antecedently that all the fruits of the earth become ripe, although for the sake of a greater good he permits this not to happen in all cases.  He also wills antecedently that all men should be saved, although, in view of a greater good, of which He alone is the judge, He permits that some commit sin and are lost.

In short, in itself considered, God loves the salvation of all men and hates their damnation, but in his wise providence, all things considered, he sees that it is better not to predestine all to receive the grace that efficaciously leads to salvation.  With regard to Christ having died for all men, of course his atonement was of infinite value and so was sufficient for all men and is truly offered and available to all (thus providing sufficient grace to all), and yet only those who, moved by grace, receive it have its benefits actually applied to them in such a way as to move them from a state of sin into a state of grace (and, with the elect, moving them to persevere in a state of grace to the end of their lives).

SALVATION IS ENTIRELY OF GRACE

This has already been spelled out above quite clearly in the context of what we have said about God's sovereignty and predestination, but it bears emphasizing in its own right.  Catholic doctrine is crystal clear that all good that we have relative to salvation is a gift of God coming from his grace through the sacrifice and merits of Christ.  It is not only the completion of good actions that comes from God, but also the very beginning of our good actions all the way down to the basic good will itself.  If we have a good will, it is entirely a gift of God's grace.  As the Catechism of the Catholic Church puts it (#2001--footnotes removed):

The preparation of man for the reception of grace is already a work of grace. This latter is needed to arouse and sustain our collaboration in justification through faith, and in sanctification through charity. God brings to completion in us what he has begun, "since he who completes his work by cooperating with our will began by working so that we might will it:"

Then follows a quotation from St. Augustine of Hippo, another of the Church's greatest Doctors, called the Doctor of Grace:

Indeed we also work, but we are only collaborating with God who works, for his mercy has gone before us. It has gone before us so that we may be healed, and follows us so that once healed, we may be given life; it goes before us so that we may be called, and follows us so that we may be glorified; it goes before us so that we may live devoutly, and follows us so that we may always live with God: for without him we can do nothing.

This was a major point emphasized by the Church in its opposition to the heresy of Semipelagianism, which affirmed the necessity of God's grace for salvation (unlike pure Pelagianism) but which wanted to attribute some part of salvation--such as the very beginnings of a good will--to ourselves apart from the grace of God.  The Church made its response to this back in the year 529 at the Second Council of Orange, the canons of which were confirmed by Pope Boniface II.  As the Catechism says (#406--footnotes removed), "[t]he Church pronounced on the meaning of the data of Revelation on original sin especially at the second Council of Orange (529) and at the Council of Trent (1546)."  Here is Canon 5 from the Canons of Orange:

If anyone says that not only the increase of faith but also its beginning and the very desire for faith, by which we believe in Him who justifies the ungodly and comes to the regeneration of holy baptism — if anyone says that this belongs to us by nature and not by a gift of grace, that is, by the inspiration of the Holy Spirit amending our will and turning it from unbelief to faith and from godlessness to godliness, it is proof that he is opposed to the teaching of the Apostles, for blessed Paul says, "And I am sure that he who began a good work in you will bring it to completion at the day of Jesus Christ" (Phil. 1:6). And again, "For by grace you have been saved through faith; and this is not your own doing, it is the gift of God" (Eph. 2:8). For those who state that the faith by which we believe in God is natural make all who are separated from the Church of Christ by definition in some measure believers. 

Canon 22 puts it this way:

No man has anything of his own but untruth and sin. But if a man has any truth or righteousness, it is from that fountain for which we must thirst in this desert, so that we may be refreshed from it as by drops of water and not faint on the way.

St. Augustine elaborates upon the point:

Men, however, are laboring to find in our own will some good thing of our own, -- not given to us by God; but how it is to be found I cannot imagine.  The apostle says, when speaking of men's good works, "What hast thou that thou didst not receive?  now, if thou didst receive it, why dost thou glory, as if thou hadst not received it?"  But, besides this, even reason itself, which may be estimated in such things by such as we are, sharply restrains every one of us in our investigations so as that we may not so defend grace as to seem to take away free will, or, on the other hand, so assert free will as to be judged ungrateful to the grace of God, in our arrogant impiety. . . . 
Unless, therefore, we obtain not simply determination of will, which is freely turned in this direction and that, and has its place amongst those natural goods which a bad man may use badly; but also a good will, which has its place among those goods of which it is impossible to make a bad use:—unless the impossibility is given to us from God, I know not how to defend what is said: “What hast thou that thou didst not receive?”  For if we have from God a certain free will, which may still be either good or bad; but the good will comes from ourselves; then that which comes from ourselves is better than that which comes from Him.  But inasmuch as it is the height of absurdity to say this, they ought to acknowledge that we attain from God even a good will.  It would indeed be a strange thing if the will could so stand in some mean as to be neither good nor bad; for we either love righteousness, and it is good, and if we love it more, more good,—if less, it is less good; or if we do not love it at all, it is not good.  And who can hesitate to affirm that, when the will loves not righteousness in any way at all, it is not only a bad, but even a wholly depraved will?  Since therefore the will is either good or bad, and since of course we have not the bad will from God, it remains that we have of God a good will; else, I am ignorant, since our justification is from it, in what other gift from Him we ought to rejoice.  Hence, I suppose, it is written, “The will is prepared of the Lord;” and in the Psalms, “The steps of a man will be rightly ordered by the Lord, and His way will be the choice of his will;” and that which the apostle says, “For it is God who worketh in you both to will and to do of His own good pleasure.”  ("On the Merits and Remission of Sins, and On the Baptism of Infants," found in A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church, 1st Series, Vol. V: Saint Augustine: Anti-Pelagian Writings, ed. Philip Schaff [Edinburgh: T&T Clark, (1887); Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, reprinted 1987], 56 [footnotes removed])

St. Thomas Aquinas makes the same point, affirming that our good will is a gift of God's grace.  He divides grace into two categories: operative and cooperative.  Operative grace is grace working by itself in us without our cooperation.  Cooperative grace is grace working with our active cooperation.  By operative grace, God changes our bad will (inherited from Adam) into a good will, causing us to turn to him in love.  This grace is operative because before it has finished its task, there is no good will in the person to cooperate with it.  But once the good will is created by grace, that good will cooperates with grace by not resisting grace, turning to God, and in the doing of good works and the furthering of sanctification (and of course the continuation of the good will in us is owing to the continuation of God's grace).  There is a logical sequence here (logical rather than temporal).  God arouses our collaboration, and, once thus aroused, we collaborate.  Thus all our goodness is fully a product of divine grace from beginning to end.

Now . . . grace is fittingly divided into operating and cooperating. For the operation of an effect is not attributed to the thing moved but to the mover. Hence in that effect in which our mind is moved and does not move, but in which God is the sole mover, the operation is attributed to God, and it is with reference to this that we speak of "operating grace." But in that effect in which our mind both moves and is moved, the operation is not only attributed to God, but also to the soul; and it is with reference to this that we speak of "cooperating grace." Now there is a double act in us. First, there is the interior act of the will, and with regard to this act the will is a thing moved, and God is the mover; and especially when the will, which hitherto willed evil, begins to will good. And hence, inasmuch as God moves the human mind to this act, we speak of operating grace. But there is another, exterior act; and since it is commanded by the will, as was shown above (I-II:17:9) the operation of this act is attributed to the will. And because God assists us in this act, both by strengthening our will interiorly so as to attain to the act, and by granting outwardly the capability of operating, it is with respect to this that we speak of cooperating grace. Hence after the aforesaid words Augustine subjoins: "He operates that we may will; and when we will, He cooperates that we may perfect." (Summa Theologica, First Part of the Second Part, Question 111, Article 2--from the New Advent website, embedded links removed)

God efficaciously draws his people to Christ.  Because he does so, they will certainly come.  But they also come completely freely.  Grace does not subvert or destroy their will or intellect but rather works by persuading them effectively to do the right thing.

But can they do otherwise, or are they drawn by irresistible power against their will?  The Council of Trent (Sixth Session, Chapter V) says that the sinner who is the subject of the inspiration of divine grace is not "utterly without doing anything while he receives that inspiration, forasmuch as he is also able to reject it."  The Catholic view holds that when God converts us, we are not converted as blocks or stones but as human beings with free will, and so our will must cooperate with grace.  Grace does not destroy or subvert human will but rather perfects it by bringing it to function properly.  But it is imperative that it not be forgotten that man's cooperation with divine grace is itself a fruit of divine grace.  There is no idea here of any independent contribution from man.  The idea that man makes an independent contribution to salvation is precisely the idea of the Semipelagianism that the Catholic Church has condemned so thoroughly time and time again.  No, as the Catechism of the Catholic Church (#2011) says, "[t]he saints have always had a lively awareness that their merits were pure grace."  And because even our good will is in its entirety a gift of divine grace, grace must be efficacious.  If God gives a person the gift of a good will, that person will have a good will.  God's grace does not need to be met with some independent contribution from the will, without which grace remains ineffective.  Grace itself provides the very assent of the will that cooperates with it.

Fr. John Hardon, in his Course on Grace: Part IIA - Grace Considered Intensively, Chapter XV, comments on Catholic dogma regarding efficacious grace:

It is a dogma of the Catholic faith that there exists a truly sufficient but inefficacious grace, and also that there exists a truly efficacious grace which, however, is not necessitating. 
A truly sufficient grace is sufficient for placing a salutary act. It carries with it the power of producing such an act. . . .
By a truly efficacious grace is meant one that will be (is) infallibly followed by the act to which it tends, e.g. contrition. If you receive such a grace, even before your will consents to it, that grace is infallibly “sure of success;” it will infallibly procure your consent, produce that act – of contrition. But although it infallibly procures your consent, it does not necessitate you to consent: it leaves you free to dissent. Your will will infallibly say "yes" to it, but it is free to say "no.”

God gives sufficient grace to all, so that there is no obstacle to a person coming to Christ outside his own free refusal to avail himself of the opportunity presented to him by the offer of salvation through Christ.  God commands us to return to him in reliance on his grace.  In order for us to be able to fulfill this command, God must make divine grace available to us upon condition that we will choose to make good use of it.  This is why Catholic doctrine insists that God has provided "sufficient grace" to all men.  All obstacles external to the will have been removed.  However, no one will choose to avail himself of the opportunity to return to God unless God gives him the gift not only of the ability to come to Christ if he will, but also the willingness itself, and it is efficacious grace which provides this willingness to those whom God has chosen.

WHY NOT SCENARIO 1?

With all of this in mind, look back at Scenario 1 at the very beginning of this article, which we rejected in favor of Scenario 2.  It is evident now why Scenario 1 is contrary to Catholic doctrine.

First, it contradicts the Catholic doctrine that God is the creator of all things and is therefore sovereign over all things.  If God's contributions to both Sarah and Suzie are truly exactly the same in all relevant respects, then Sarah, in producing her good will to embrace the gospel, has brought about the existence of something out of nothing.  She has produced something which does not in any way have its root in God.  She has exhibited a First Causal power not ultimately traceable to God, the one First Cause.  "But God gave her the ability to choose," one might say, "and so her choice did come from God."  Yes, that would explain Sarah's general ability to make choices; but it would not explain why she made the particular choice she did.  It would explain Sarah's general will, but not her good will.  A good will (that accepts the gospel) and a bad will (that rejects it) are two significantly different things--so different as to result in exactly opposite eternal consequences.  If God's contribution explains why Sarah had a will but not why she had a good will rather than a bad one, then all the aspects of Sarah's will that differentiate it from Suzie's would not be in any way traceable back to God, but would be created ex nihilo by Sarah herself apart from God.

Also, if God in every way and sense wills salvation equally to Sarah and to Suzie, then God's will is defeated when Suzie rejects the gospel and ends up in hell.  On the whole, the universe will not turn out exactly as God wants it to be.  We must picture God, observing the whole of space and time, and concluding, "I got some of what I wanted, but not everything.  My ideal and what actually happened are not the same.  They are different in some very significant ways, in that some people have gone to hell when I wanted everyone to go to heaven."  But if the universe is not ultimately completely in accordance with God's will, then God is not the creator of all of reality.  There are aspects of reality, laws governing it, causes at work in it, that aren't traceable to God and which defy him and win.  Instead of the idea of one supreme God who is the creator of all things and rules over all in accordance with his sovereign will, we end up with the idea of a universe partly uncreated by God, ruled partly by God and partly by forces beyond his control which can thwart his desires and ideals.  We have abandoned monotheism for a polytheism in which God is merely one god in the midst of other ultimate realities that are at the root of existence.

Secondly, Scenario 1 contradicts the Catholic doctrine that all good that we have relative to salvation is a gift of God coming from his grace through the sacrifice and merits of Christ.  In Scenario 1, as I noted above, since God's contributions to Sarah and Suzie are exactly the same, Sarah's good will (at least the particularly good aspects of that will) is not ultimately traceable to God, and therefore cannot be conceived of as a gift of God's grace.  Rather, it is something Sarah has produced from herself, and the difference between her and Suzie is that Sarah did produce from herself and Suzie didn't produce from herself a good will.  But, as St. Augustine indicated in our quotation earlier, our very justification is ultimately rooted in our good will.  It is our good will which allows us to be reconciled to God and therefore makes the difference between heaven and hell.  To say, then, that the part of a good will that distinguishes it from a bad will is not ultimately attributable to God's grace but fully and ultimately to ourselves is to blaspheme God by taking to ourselves the highest credit for our salvation.  This is the heresy of justification by works that St. Paul so strenuously argued against in his letters to the Romans and the Galatians and which the Church so strenuously resisted in its battles with Pelagianism and Semipelagianism.

I will close this article with one of my favorite summary statements of the doctrines of grace and predestination, from St. Isidore of Seville, a 7th century Doctor of the Church.  I like this statement because he puts all the pieces of the puzzle together so clearly--God's sovereignty over all things, salvation by God's grace alone, God's permission of evil according to his eternal plan, the freedom of the will, etc.:

Between the infusion of divine grace and the faculty of the human will there is the following element: the decision stemming from a human choice, which is capable of spontaneously desiring good or bad things. Grace is the free gift of divine mercy, through which we evidence the beginning of a good will and its fruits. Divine grace anticipates man, so that he may do what is good; human free will does not anticipate God's grace, but grace itself anticipates an unwilling person, so that he may want what is good. Because of the burden of the 'flesh,' man finds it easy to sin, though he is slow to repent. Man has within himself the seeds of corruption but not of spiritual growth, unless the Creator, in order to raise him up, stretched his merciful hand to man, who is prostrated as a result of the Fall. Thus, through God's grace human free will is restored, which the first man had lost; in fact, Adam had free will to do what is good, even though he did it with God's help. We obtain our will to do what is good and embrace God perfecting us, thanks to divine grace. We receive the power to begin and to perfect what is good from God, who gave us the gift of grace; as a result of that, our free will is restored in us. Whatever good we do, it is God's, thanks to his prevenient and subsequent grace; but it is also ours, thanks to the [God-made] obedient power of our wills. But if it isn't God's, why do we give him thanks? And if it isn't ours, why do we look forward to the reward of good works? Insofar as we are anticipated by God's grace, it is God's; insofar as we follow prevenient grace to do what is good, it is ours. Nobody anticipates God's grace with his merits, thus making him almost indebted to us. The just Creator chose in advance some people by predestining them, but justly abandoned the others to their evil ways. Thus, the truest gift of grace does not proceed from human nature, nor is the outcome of our free will, but is bestowed only in virtue of the goodness of God's mercy. In fact, some people are saved by a gift of God's mercy which anticipates them, and thus are made "vessels of mercy;" but the reprobates are damned, having been predestined and made "vessels of wrath." The example of Jacob and Esau comes to mind, who, before been [sic] born, and again, after being born as twins, shared the bond of original sin. The prevenient goodness of divine mercy drew one of them to itself through sheer grace, but condemned the other through the severity of divine justice. The latter was abandoned in the mass of perdition, being 'hated' by God; this is what the Lord says through the prophet: "I loved Jacob but hated Esau" (Mal 1:3). From this we learn that grace is not conferred on account of any pre-existing merits, but only because of divine calling; and that no one is either saved or damned, chosen or reprobated other than by decision of God's predestination, who is just towards the reprobates and merciful towards the elect ("All the paths of the Lord are faithful love" Ps 25:10).  [The quotation is from St. Isidore of Seville, Libri Duo Differentiarum, chapter XXII, found in God's Eternal Gift: A History of the Catholic Doctrine of Predestination from Augustine to the Renaissance, by Guido Stucco (Xlibris, 2009), pp. 317-319--first set of brackets in original.]

For another article which is similar to this one but which is arranged differently (it is a chapter from a book), see here.  For a more basic overview of the Catholic doctrine of salvation in general, see here.  For those who are wondering how the Catholic school of thought known as Molinism fits into all of this, see here and here.  For a look at the heresy of Jansenism and the Catholic Church's response to it, which sheds further light on the issues discussed here, see here.  And finally, for those who are interested in how all of this relates to Calvinism, see here.

Published on the feast of St. Margaret of Scotland and St. Gertrude