Showing posts with label Trinity. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Trinity. Show all posts

Thursday, August 6, 2020

The Heart of Reality

“I believe in Christianity as I believe that the Sun has risen, not only because I see it but because by it, I see everything else.”

~ C. S. Lewis

The heart of the Christian worldview exhibits the light of its own truth.  Whether we apprehend it on a more intuitive level or in the form of explicitly-articulated arguments, the Christian worldview testifies to us of its truth by providing us with the key that unlocks the door of reality.  It tells us the truth about ourselves and our world, cutting through the confusion, the errors, and the incompleteness of alternative viewpoints.  To describe it is thus to exhibit both its beauty and its truthfulness.

The heart of Christianity is that God exists.  Matter and energy, time and space, are not the ultimate reality.  The story of history is not, as Macbeth put it, "a tale told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, signifying nothing."  There is a Person at the back of all things.  Consciousness, and everything that goes along with that--awareness, wisdom, love, relationship, values, purpose--is the stuff of ultimate reality. It is not simply a by-product of mindless processes of matter and energy.

There is only one God, one Supreme Being from whom all things come.  This accounts for the unity of reality.  There is a oneness to all things.  All things are bound together and interdependent - like pieces of a puzzle.  Puzzle pieces fit together to make a puzzle because they come from a common source and a single vision.  Likewise, reality is one and interconnected because all of it flows from one common and unified Supreme Reality.  If there were only multiple, independent gods or original causes with no common source in one Supreme Being, or if God was himself disunified and divided into independent pieces lacking a common source, there would be no explanation for the unity of reality or source from which that unity could have arisen.

God is also a Trinity.  There is one God, and that one God exists in three Persons.  Each Person is a distinct, but full, manifestation of the single Divine Essence.  For an analogy, I like to think of a website.  There is an original version of each website that exists on a server computer somewhere.  Then that server “serves” the website to different computers, so that the same website exists on multiple computers.  It's one website, but multiple manifestations of that same website.  Each manifestation is distinct from the others, but they are all manifestations of the same site.  Similarly, there is one Divine Being, but that Divine Being manifests himself in three distinct Persons.  God the Father begets the Son, sharing with him his very Being, and the Holy Spirit is a third instantiation of the single Divine Essence who proceeds from the Father and from the Son and from their relationship.  (In my website analogy, the Holy Spirit might be analogous to the website as it exists flowing through the air or through the wires between computers, going from one computer to another.)  This is important because one of the essential characteristics of personhood is relationship.  Relationship, love, community--these are not mere accidental by-products of the universe; they are at the very heart of what reality is all about.  God is not just a Person; he is a Community.

Everything that exists that is not God was made by God, and the entire story of the universe is meant to reflect and exhibit God's glorious perfections, his supreme beauty.  We humans are made in God's image.  On a lesser scale, we reflect God's nature--his life, his consciousness, his reason, his love, his relationality.  Because we exist by sharing in the Supreme Good, we too have value.  Human life, and indeed all life, has value and dignity which we ought to respect.  Morality, too, is not simply a by-product of an amoral universe.  It is part of the fundamental essence of reality.  God's values constitute an objective standard of morality.  Moral goodness is not something we pursue simply because we are programmed to do so by our genes, while it has no meaning in any more ultimate sense.  Treating people with respect and love, treating all things with respect and love, and loving God above all else, really matters objectively and ultimately.

We were created to share in, to reflect, and to enjoy God's beauty, the beauty of the Supreme Good.  That's the purpose of life.  At the very heart of reality is the loving, joy-filled Community of the Trinity where the three Persons bask in the full enjoyment of all Good.  The goodness of this world--all the beauty, all the things we enjoy and that delight us--are derived from God and point back to him.  Our destiny, if we follow it and don't reject it, is to enjoy what God has made and to "follow the bread crumbs," as it were, of joy as they lead us back to the fount of all good, God himself.  We all know from experience that this world is but a foretaste of joy.  It is full of appetizing delight, but it never satisfies.  This is not because the universe is ultimately meaningless and we've simply evolved a taste for joy that can never be satisfied.  It is because this world comes from a Higher Realm and we are meant to follow its sign-posts to finally arrive there in the end.

The Christian faith teaches us that evil and suffering are a very real part of our world--something else we know only too well from personal experience.  The very idea of evil is meaningless unless there is true goodness.  Because God exists and we sense that intuitively, we are also aware of how far short our world falls when it comes to goodness.  The world is full of horrible acts of wickedness and terrible suffering.  Christianity does not sidestep this or trivialize it.  In the Christian worldview, God dives down fully into the world of our experience, thus validating it while at the same time linking it to something more.  Our world, while reflecting God, also contrasts with him.  Our weakness, ignorance, foolishness, ugliness, wickedness, and suffering contrast with God's strength, knowledge, wisdom, beauty, goodness, and joy.  Only God possesses Life and Joy in himself.  Our world can only get these things from God.  And the Christian faith teaches us that our world has rebelled against God, declaring independence from him and trying to strike out on its own, with the result that we have brought infinite calamity down upon ourselves.  We do not have the resources to save ourselves.  But God has come down into our world.  The Second Person of the Trinty, God the Son, has taken upon himself a human nature, so that his Divine Person is expressed now not only through a divine nature but through a human nature as well.  He has embraced our weakness, ignorance, foolishness, ugliness, wickedness, and suffering.  Rather than remaining aloof from us and our condition, he has come right down into it fully, but because he is God he has also brought with him the only thing that can save us--the power of the Divine Life.  He has bridged the gap between God and the world.  He has absorbed our evil while not being destroyed by it, and he has overcome our evil with his own infinite goodness.

This is why the cross is the central image of Christianity.  Notice the depth of profundity in this.  Some views of the world recognize the Supreme Good, but they fail to take seriously the reality of evil.  I sometimes call these "playground religions," because they sidestep the horrors of the world and try to make out that everything is really OK.  They do not speak to the darkness we all know so well.  Other views embrace the horrors of evil, but they become mired in despair and nihilism, abandoning hope of a Supreme Good that can provide the ultimate context for evil and promise its eventual overthrow and the redemption of the world.  Christianity embraces both sides and maintains the proper balance.  The cross exhibits this fully.  There we have a man whose feet and hands are nailed to wooden beams.  He hangs there, suffering and dying in agony, a victim of the wickedness and cruelty of the world.  He cries out, "My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?"  God himself suffers and dies an agonizing death at the hands of the evil of this world.  The cross is thus a sign and validation of the reality of evil and the full horror of it.  And yet the Scriptures tells us that this scene, with Jesus dying on the cross, was planned by the Sovereign and Good God from all eternity as the lynchpin to the fulfillment of his good plan for all history.  On the cross, by absorbing all our evil, he brings that evil in contact with the Supreme Good, and the end result is that Goodness overcomes and obliterates the evil.  Jesus does not give way to despair.  He does not fall into sin and reject God.  He dies, but in dying he destroys death.  In embracing evil, by facing it and not sidestepping it, he defeats it, and three days later he rises from the dead, conqueror of sin and death and hell.  He ascends into heaven, completing the circle.  He who came down from heaven into our world goes back up into heaven.  But he brings back up more than he brought down.  He has bound us to himself.  He remains fully God and fully human forever.  In his ascension, he brings our nature up with him, filling us with his Divine Life.  The Holy Spirit, who flows between the Father and the Son eternally, flows down to us and brings us up into the Divine Life and Love, and we are adopted as children of God.  Our evil overcome, we become heirs of God, destined, unless we refuse it, to share in the eternal celebration that is God's own inner life.  Only in Christianity are both sides of the equation affirmed and properly balanced--evil is acknowledged and accepted for all that it is, and yet it is put in its place as subservient to the Ultimate Good, giving way to that Good in the end.  The cross is a symbol of the power and reality of evil, but also a symbol of its defeat and the ultimate triumph of Goodness.  Whenever we see a cross on the outside of a church, in a church building, in the homes of the faithful, or anywhere, we see the sign of a faith that tells us the full truth about ourselves, leaving out nothing.  The whole story of all we are is there.  As the Church, we are the official witnesses of God in this world, bringing the message that unlocks the door of reality to all people, calling them to take up their crosses and follow Christ to eternal life, suffering and dying and rising with him, rejecting evil and putting it to death and turning to God to live out his life and goodness.

Deep within all of us, whether we recognize it or not explicitly, we know that consciousness, love, relationship, and joy are a deeper part of reality than mere mindless matter and energy and physical laws.  We know that there is a point to all of this, that reality is a story with a purpose that is unfolding.  We know that life and happiness matter, and that we ought to seek the good of ourselves and others and hate and oppose cruelty and wickedness and suffering, and that we ought to love the Supreme Good above all else, because goodness is not merely a by-product of a mindless and amoral universe but is at the heart of what reality is all about.  We know that there is great evil in this world, and that that evil is not merely out there but runs through our own hearts as well.  We know that we need to get back to the source of life and goodness, and that that source is outside of us, outside of our world, and we don't have the resources within ourselves to fulfill our longings for goodness or to fix the brokenness of our world.  We have to go back to the Source of all Being, the Supreme source of Goodness, to fill and replenish what we lack.  We know that if we are to be saved, and if any meaning is to come out of all of this, it must come from goodness overcoming evil--not sidestepping it, or ignoring it, or trivializing it, or succumbing to it, but facing it head-on, embracing it, and overcoming it.  There must be a bridge that can link us to the Supreme Good, and only the Supreme Good himself can build that bridge.  We can see in the cross the fulfillment of all that we know deep down, at the most fundamental level of our being.  And that is why we know, or can know, that Christianity really is God's message to us, God's coming to us, and that therefore it is true.

For more on our intuitions about morality and why they require God, see here and here.  For a short case for Christianity that makes use of explicit philosophical arguments, see here.  For a fuller case for Christianity, see here.  For a short case for Catholicism more specifically, see here.

Published, appropriately, on the Feast of the Transfiguration.

Saturday, July 18, 2020

Why Christianity? - A Brief, Philosophical Case

Below is a very basic philosophical case for the Christian worldview.  It tracks the main line of reasoning I use (though developed in much more detail) in my book, Why Christianity is True.

God Exists: The First Cause

There must be an Ultimate Reality, a Supreme Being that is the ground of all being.  This Being must be self-existent – that is, it must not have derived its existence from any other source.  This must be so because an unending chain of causality is absurd.  There are two sorts of being one might have – contingent being and self-existent being.  Contingent being is being that has characteristics that require us to say it is derived from a logically prior source.  Self-existent being is being that is not derived from any logically prior source, but is itself an ultimate foundation of being.  All contingent beings must be traced ultimately to self-existent being.  Every contingent being must be traced back to a logically prior source, so if all being is contingent, then all being must be derived from a logically prior source, which means that we will have an infinite chain of causes with no beginning, and this is logically absurd because it would mean that we have no ultimate explanation for anything.  To use a picturesque analogy, imagine a stack of books.  We want to say that the book on the top of the stack is held up by the book underneath it.  But what is holding up that book?  The book underneath it.  But what is holding up that book?  What if we imagine that the book stack is infinite, and that every book in the stack is being held up by a book underneath it?  The problem with this is that none of the books are able to explain how the whole stack is held up, because none of the books have the power to hold up anything themselves.  So we end up with no explanation, no accounting for why the stack of books is held up.  Here's another picture:  Imagine a group of people standing in a line.  Bob, one of the persons in the line, borrows a marker from Steve, the person in front of him in line.  He thanks Steve for the marker, but Steve replies that, actually, he borrowed the marker from a person in front of him in the line, Dave.  Dave says that he, too, has borrowed the marker from another person in front of him, Sarah.  Sarah tells Bob that, in fact, the line of people is infinite, and that all the people in the line are marker-borrowers, none of them are marker owners.  They've all, down to the last person, borrowed the marker from the person in front of them.  The problem with this, of course, is that if they are all marker-borrowers, there is no explanation, no accounting, for how anyone has a marker at all.  Similarly, if we say that all reality is contingent – derived from a logically prior source – we end up with no explanation, no accounting, for reality at all.  We end up with everything coming ultimately from nothing, which is logically absurd, for nothing can come from nothing.  Therefore, there must be a First Cause, a self-existent being at the back of all reality, the ultimate ground and cause of all being, which is a being-owner and not a being-borrower.

But why can't we get something from nothing?  Because nothing, being nothing, does nothing and can produce nothing, by definition.

But isn't the very idea of a First Cause, a self-existent being, itself an example of something coming from nothing?  No, because the First Cause doesn't get its being from nothing.  It doesn't get its being from something, either.  It doesn't get its being at all; it simply has its being.  That's the very idea of a self-existent First Cause.  It is to say that the very foundation of all things is a foundational being from which all else is derived.  There is nothing illogical about this idea in the way that there is something illogical about the idea of an infinite regress of being or of being coming from nothing.  In fact, as we’ve seen, not only is the idea of a self-existent First Cause not illogical, it is required by logic because all alternatives are illogical.

(“But how do we know that reality is logical?”, someone might ask.  We know this because logic is essential to the definition of beingLogic is ultimately nothing other than the “law of non-contradiction” - that is, the idea that “A is not non-A,” or “Whatever is, it is what it is and isn't what it isn't.”  But this is clearly a part of the very idea of being, for, by definition, being excludes non-being, and any positive characteristic of being – like “redness” – excludes its opposite – like “non-redness”.  To talk about being that doesn't exclude non-being, or to talk about some positive characteristic as if it doesn't exclude its opposite, is just meaningless gibberish.  “But how do you know your concepts and definitions apply to reality as it really is?”, someone might then ask.  Well, we must remember that when we are using words, we cannot forget the meanings of the words we are using.  Our words have definitions, and these definitions express particular concepts.  Reality itself is a concept.  You cannot get beyond concepts while you are still using words with definitions.  Our words reflect our concepts, and our concepts are nothing other than our formulations of our observations of reality.  Therefore, to analyze a concept and to find that something is incompatible with it is to find out something about reality itself.  If you want to talk about a reality beyond the concept of reality, a being beyond the concept of being, you will quickly find, if you pay attention, that you are speaking meaningless gibberish.  To talk about a reality beyond the concept of reality is simply to try to talk about a part of reality that doesn't fit within the very definition of “reality.”  But to say that something doesn't fit into the definition of “reality” is just to say that it is not real – that it is not a part of reality.  So to talk about the way things really are beyond all definitions is just to use words without meaning, to speak nonsense.  So when we observe our words and our concepts to imply something or to exclude something – like being excludes non-being or red excludes non-red – we are learning something about reality itself.  From this we know that knowledge of reality can be gained not only from the direct observation of objects by our senses, but also by logical reflection on the concepts that we derive from reality.)

The space-time world we live in cannot be Ultimate Reality, because it has the marks of contingency – that is, again, the marks of being derived from a logically prior source as opposed to being self-existent.  One of those marks is time.  Our universe comes to us in a temporal sequence, moment by moment.  It consists of a past flowing into a present flowing into a future.  Time is essential to our universe, because it is evident that all the characteristics of the world around us necessarily imply a past narrative; we cannot make sense of them without such a narrative.  Time is a contingent property because every moment in time begins, and since it begins, it must derive its existence from that which came before it.  It cannot be a First Cause, because it has come into being and thus has received being which it previously didn't have.  Therefore, the space-time universe cannot be the First Cause, the Ultimate Reality.  To imagine the space-time universe as the Ultimate Reality, we would have to imagine that its time-series is infinite – that is, we would have to imagine that every moment in history has been brought into being and is therefore explained by a previous moment in history, for otherwise we would have a first moment coming from nothing (which we know is absurd).  To say that the time-series of our universe is infinite would be to say that the past is infinite, that it's always been going on and had no beginning, no first moment.  But this is absurd.  It is absurd because it provides no ultimate explanation for being, as we saw earlier.  It is also absurd because if the past was infinite, it would have taken, literally, an infinite amount of time for the universe to reach this present moment.  But this is absurd, for, by definition, one cannot traverse (get through) an infinite amount of time.  If I began to count to infinity right now, when would I finish?  Never, because you cannot ever complete an infinite series by the addition of one piece at a time.  So if the past was infinite, we could never have arrived at this present moment.  And yet here we are.

If the space-time universe cannot be the Ultimate Reality, the First Cause, because time is a part of its nature (among other reasons, such as those discussed below), then we know that the true First Cause must be outside of time.  That is, temporal experience must not be a part of its nature.  It must be timeless.

God Exists: Single and Simple

The First Cause—the ultimate, self-existent reality—must be single and simple.  That is, there must be only one First Cause, and it must be without parts or pieces.  Why?  There are a number of ways of showing why this must be the case.

If there were multiple First Causes, each of them would be completely independent from each other, since none of them could be derived from any of the others (being First Causes).  Nor could any of them be derived from anything else (again, being First Causes).  But if they were completely independent, there would be no explanation for how they all fit together as parts of a larger whole.  If there were multiple First Causes, they would exist in a larger context, a larger fabric, which would include all of them.  But none of them, and indeed none of the pieces of that fabric, could explain the fabric as a whole and the mutual inter-dependence of the parts as they make up the larger whole.  We can illustrate the problem here partly by an analogy:  Imagine you walked throughout the world picking up random puzzle pieces and putting them in a bag.  When you got home, you put all the pieces together and were surprised to find they all fit together to make a coherent picture.  This is, of course, absurd, for, since all the pieces were independent of each other, there is no explanation for the larger pattern they are all a part of.  Similarly, if Ultimate Reality consisted of multiple beings or multiple parts, there would be no explanation for the coherence and inter-dependence of the whole.  In fact, it would be even worse than the situation with the puzzle pieces, because at least the puzzle pieces, by being parts of the same world, are similar to each other in that they are all made of matter, all share the same laws of logic and physics, all are made by humans to fit into some puzzle, etc.  But the multiple beings or parts of Ultimate Reality would literally have nothing in common, for they would be completely independent.

Anytime you have pieces making up a larger whole, those pieces are essentially defined at least in part by their relationship to the rest of the whole.  Their part-of-a-larger-whole-ness is an aspect of their essential definition.  But beings who are supposed to be completely independent of each other, all being First Causes, could not at the same time be defined essentially by their relationship to each other, as inter-connected parts of a larger whole, for this would make them dependent on each other and the larger whole for their very essence and definition.  So, Ultimate Reality must be single and simple.

To put this another way:  When we have an entity made up of multiple parts, what we really have are multiple entities connected to each other – in fact, an infinite number of them, as divisible objects are infinitely divisible (see below).  None of the entities present can explain or account for the other entities present or for the fabric that connects them together and makes them parts of a coherent whole.  Since a divisible entity is nothing other than a collection of parts, the only way to explain the fabric, the whole, in which these parts exist is to trace the parts back to a more ultimate reality from which the parts are all derived.  (Think of individual pages in an animator's book.  The pages altogether, flipped through quickly, create an animated story, but none of the individual pages themselves explain or account for the overall story.  To explain this, we must trace all the individual pages back to a single source – in this case, the mind of the narrator who has the story in mind and creates the pages based on this idea.)  But if we say that a divisible object with multiple parts is the ultimate reality, the First Cause, we cannot explain its parts by tracing them back to a more ultimate reality, and so we are left with no way to account for the whole in which the parts exist.  Nothing in the divisible entity itself explains that whole, and since it is not derived from any more ultimate unifying source, nothing explains the whole.

Another argument:  When you have a reality made up of multiple parts, those parts exist in different places from each other, and so you have a fabric of reality that is extended and has dimension – in other words, it has length, height, width, etc.  Such a reality is also divisible – that is, it is made up of parts that can be distinguished from each other.  But it turns out that an extended, divisible reality can only exist within a limited viewpoint.  Picture a tree.  It is an extended reality with parts.  It has a top, a bottom, a left side, a right side.  It has multiple leaves in different places, etc.  In order to have an object like that, the parts must be in different places relative to a grid, an X-Y axis.  (Draw a picture of a tree, and then draw an X-Y axis on the picture to have a visual version of what I am talking about.)  But, if you consider it, you will see that the central point on such an X-Y axis is actually the center-point in the perspective of the one viewing the tree.  If you try to remove the perspective of the one viewing, you lose the grid; and when you lose the grid, you lose the tree, for the tree as an extended, divisible object with parts can exist only on such a grid.  Its very nature implies such a grid.  So the very essence of an extended, divisible object like a tree is necessarily bound up with the viewpoint of a perceiver.  Remove the perceiver, and you remove the thing perceived.  And the viewpoint must be that of a limited perceiver – that is, a perceiver whose viewpoint is limited to one particular vantage point in the midst of a potentially infinite number of other vantage points.  The perceiver has to be looking from one particular location among other possible locations, so that the different parts of the tree are in different places relative to the specific location of the perceiver.  If we imagine an unlimited perceiver – one whose viewpoint is not limited to a particular location, but whose view would include the whole of reality from all vantage points, such a viewpoint would have no grid, for there would be no specific location relative to which different parts of the perceived objects could be in different places on the grid.  In such an unlimited viewpoint, all of reality would appear as a single, undivided whole.  A limited viewpoint can only be derived (by adding limitation) from an unlimited viewpoint (just as a part can only be derived from a whole—without a whole, the concept of a part has no meaning), and so our conclusion, then, must be that extended, divisible reality must be derived from a more ultimate state of reality that is single and simple. 

Related to the previous argument, we can also observe that there are certain paradoxes – certain logical anomalies – in reality which can only be solved if we recognize that space-time, extended, divisible reality is derived from a more ultimate, single, simple reality.  These paradoxes have to do with places where we run into the idea of infinity.  For example, consider a table.  How divisible is the table?  I'm not asking how practically divisible the table is – that is, how much one could use tools to actually physically divide it – but I am asking how theoretically divisible it is – that is, if we distinguish all its parts, how many parts does it ultimately have?  I can divide the table in half and get two parts.  I can divide both of those parts again and get four parts.  I can divide those parts again and get eight parts.  And so on.  There is no theoretical stopping point.  Every time I divide the parts, I end up with parts that can be further divided.  So we have to say that the table is infinitely divisible, which would imply that it is made up ultimately of an infinite number of parts or pieces that are infinitely small.  But there is a problem here, because an infinitely small piece of matter would have no size, would take up no space, and thus, no matter how many of such parts we have, we will not be able to make a table that has a particular size and which takes up space.  So it would seem that the table must be infinitely divisible, and it would seem at the same time that the table cannot be infinitely divisible.  We have a logical problem to solve.  The only way to solve it is to recognize that the table, as an extended object, only exists relative to a limited perceiver (as discussed in the previous paragraph).  If we recognize that, we can say that the table is potentially infinitely divisible because there is no theoretical stopping point for division, but at the same time we can say that the table is only actually finitely divided, because no limited (finite) perceiver actually ever perceives an infinite number of divisions.  The infinite potential divisibility is thus never infinitely actualized.  There is no logical problem with a potential infinite, but only with an actual infinite, and so our logical paradox is solved.  Apart from recognizing that the extended, divisible table is derived from a more ultimate, single, simple reality, we are stuck with unsolvable logical absurdity.

God Exists: Consciousness

The single, simple First Cause must be a conscious being, because consciousness is irreducible – that is, it cannot be derived from non-consciousness.  The irreducibility of consciousness is evident upon observation.  If we imagine ourselves to start out with material that is something other than consciousness, we cannot produce consciousness from such material.  To do so, we would have to get something from nothing.  The law of causality (“You cannot get something from nothing”) implies that everything that comes from something else must be explainable in terms of the ingredients it came from and the interactions between those ingredients.  But if we have nothing but bits of non-conscious matter, able to engage in non-conscious activity by means of non-conscious energy, we will never be able to produce consciousness from such ingredients no matter what we do with them.  We can put them together in ever-so-complicated patterns.  We can add more and more pieces.  We can move them about and bump them into each other.  But all we will ever have, logically, is simply larger or more complicated constructions of non-conscious matter.  (To make an analogy, if all we have are red legos, no matter how we arrange them, put them together, no matter how many we add or how complicated the structures or formations we make from them, whatever we end up with will only be red.  It will not be green, because the color green cannot be derived from or explained by our available ingredients.)  Therefore, consciousness cannot be derived from non-consciousness.  If consciousness ever arises (as it obviously has, since all we ever actually directly perceive are the impressions upon our own consciousnesses), it must be traced back to a conscious source.  Therefore, the First Cause, the ultimate origin and source of all things, must be a conscious being.

We have now proved that all of reality must be derived from a single, simple, conscious First Cause.  As St. Thomas Aquinas would say at this point, “and this all men call God.”  Therefore, God exists.

God Exists: Some Logical Consequences

If God exists, certain things logically follow.  If God exists, there will be a Trinity.  This is because God, being conscious and perceiving everything, will have a perfect image (that is, a perfect idea, for God is beyond space and time and so has no physical, dimensional image) of himself.  By having a perfect image of himself, he will become both subject and object, viewer and viewed, perceiver and perceived, lover and beloved (for God, being the fullness of all being, must be the fullness of all goodness, and so must be infinitely beautiful and beloved of himself).  God's self-reflexive act of producing an image of himself causes the Divine Essence to exist in two distinct subsistences – that is, there will be two distinct manifestations of the one, single, simple Divine Being.  There will be one Supreme Being, and that Supreme Being will exist in two subsistences that have a relationship with each other.  And their relationship will produce yet a third subsistence of the same Divine Being, for between the perceiver and the perceived there is the act of perception; between the lover and the beloved there is the act of loving.  There is the communication of the Divine Essence from the image-producer to the image.  And this Divine Being in act who connects the other two subsistences, being himself yet another manifestation of the Divine Being, will possess that Divine Essence just as fully as the other two.  So we have one Divine Being existing in three subsistences.  Each subsistence is distinct from the others in terms of his relation to the others, but there is no division in the one Divine Being.  The subsistences are distinct by their relationship to each other in virtue of God's self-reflexive act of viewing and loving himself, not by virtue of being pieces or percentages of the Divine Being (which, being single and simple, can have no pieces).  Each subsistence is a full manifestation of the entire single Divine Being, so each subsistence is fully God.  God is a Tri-Unity.

If God exists, then there is an objective moral law.  Morality is about goodness and badness.  It is about values and the priorities of values.  If God exists, then there is a supreme viewpoint that defines what reality is really, ultimately like.  Whatever that viewpoint finds pleasant or desirable will be objectively good.  Whatever that viewpoint finds unpleasant or undesirable will be objectively evil.

The Divine Being must love himself supremely, for he is the fullness of Being.  He cannot be dissatisfied with himself, because then he would have to have an image of how he would like things to be distinct from (and not derived from or an aspect of) how they actually are, and this would imply duality and divisibility in the Divine viewpoint, which is impossible.  Since God loves himself fully, he must hate that which is the opposite or absence of himself, which would be non-being.  (Non-being is the implied notional opposite of Being, and thus an aspect of the awareness the Supreme Being has of himself involves the awareness of the idea of this notional opposite.)  The space-time universe is derived from, created by, the Divine Being.  It differs from the Divine Being in that it is limited.  God possesses in himself the fullness of reality, but the space-time universe is nothing in comparison, for each being in it is only a point in a potentially infinite (but actually finite – see earlier discussion) grid.  Thus, finite, limited reality is a manifestation of Being that is infinitely inferior in being (and thus in value) to God.  Inasmuch as Being is manifested in the space-time universe, it is lovely to God, for he loves the image of himself.  But insofar as our finite reality is a manifestation of lack and limitation, it is different from the Divine Being and manifests characteristics that are hateful to God.  While God is infinitely (completely, fully) satisfying, the space-time universe is ultimately unsatisfying.  While God is infinitely (completely, fully) powerful, the space-time universe is weak.  While God is infinitely good, the space-time universe has fallen into evil.  Misery is both a natural and a moral consequence of evil.  The natural consequence of the loss of God is the loss of happiness, and the very idea of that which is hateful being rewarded with happiness is itself hateful to a Being who loves goodness and therefore could never be willed by that Being.  There is no hope for the space-time universe and the beings in it to ultimately avoid evil and misery and to attain ultimately to goodness and happiness unless they derive these things from God, the only one who ultimately owns them.

So the space-time universe and the beings within it, without God's help, will end up in total evil and misery in a condition hateful to God.  But God does not only contrast in his fullness with space-time reality in its emptiness; he is also the filler of all.  He fills non-being with being.  If God is to save space-time creatures and fill them with himself, he must take upon himself their emptiness – their limitations, their evil, their misery.  He must absorb all of this into himself, face it, and endure it.  And then he must overcome it all, destroying the emptiness by enduring it and filling it up with his own fullness.  To use an analogy, imagine a pitcher full of water filling an empty cup.  The pitcher must take on the emptiness of the cup in order to fill the cup up with water.  After it does this, the pitcher has less water in it than it had before, corresponding to the lack of water the cup had previously.  And this is where the analogy breaks down, for when God takes upon himself our emptiness and fills us with his fullness, he loses nothing ultimately.  His fullness is so full, and our emptiness so small in comparison, that he can absorb it without ultimate harm or loss, while we gain his fullness.  While he must endure our emptiness, absorb it into himself, and overcome it, his victory, unlike the pitcher's, is complete. 

Christianity is the True Religion

The reason Christianity is the true religion is because, of all the philosophies and religions existing in the world, it is the only one which gets reality fundamentally right.  All others fail by fundamental error or at least by fundamental incompleteness.

Christianity teaches that there is one God, absolute, single, and simple.  It teaches that this God exists in a Trinity of three subsistences (Persons), each of whom bear the whole of the Divine Being and who are distinct only in terms of their relationships to each other.  The Father begets the Son, who is the fullness of his Being and his perfect Image.  The Holy Spirit is the third Person of the Trinity who proceeds from the Father and the Son, the manifestation of the love and the relationship between the Father and the Son.  Christianity teaches that God created the space-time universe, which has being but which is not divine and is infinitely inferior to God.  The creation has fallen into decay and emptiness.  Humankind has fallen into a state of moral evil (sin) by rebellion against God, and God's objective moral law decrees destruction and misery for humans due to sin.  But God has provided salvation for humanity by doing for us what we cannot do for ourselves.  The Second Person of the Trinity – God the Son – has taken upon himself our limitations by acquiring a human nature.  God has become man while remaining fully God.  That human is Jesus Christ.  Christ took upon himself the sins and miseries of the world.  He suffered, died, and was buried, thus absorbing into himself all our weaknesses, lacks, sinfulness, and misery.  On the third day he rose again from the dead, the conqueror of sin, death, and hell, and has ascended to the Father.  Through his death and his resurrection, he has attained eternal salvation for the human race, and all those who trust in him to the end are redeemed and filled with the fullness of God.  God sends to them his Holy Spirit, the Third Person of the Trinity, who fills them with the Divine Life and makes them adopted children of God, sharing by grace in the Sonship of the Son, purified and made holy and beautiful to God, and destined to enjoy the fullness of the life of God forever in the Beatific Vision.

If all this sounds familiar, it should, for it is the very nature of reality we proved in our previous arguments.  Christianity gets all this right.  All other religions fail to do so (although they often have a good deal of truth mixed in).  Some worldviews, like Atheism, deny the existence of God and thus fall into absurdity from the very beginning.  Others, like Agnosticism, fail by failing to realize all that can indeed be known, as we have shown by our arguments above.  Other religions, like paganism, Jainism, and Shinto, deny or fail to teach an ultimate, single, simple reality, and so fail in the same way Atheism does.  Other religions, like Hinduism and Buddhism and Taoism, teach an Ultimate, single Reality, but they fail to clarify whether that Supreme Being is fully conscious.  They fail to point out his Trinitarian nature.  They treat the world as an illusion, as almost a day-dream of the Divine Being rather than a conscious creation.  They hold that what goes on down here is ultimately unimportant, and that our salvation lies in simply learning to ignore and forget about this world and focus instead on union with the Ultimate Reality.  They fail to recognize that our salvation can only come from God's help and grace, as he actively takes upon himself our emptiness and our sin and fills us with his fullness and goodness.  The way to salvation is not by ignoring this fallen, empty reality but by God's dealing with that reality and confronting it with his fullness.  The pitcher does not fill the cup simply by trying to convince the cup to forget that it is a cup and to focus on the importance of the pitcher, but by taking on the emptiness of the cup and filling the cup with its fullness.  Religions like Judaism and Islam believe in a fully conscious, single, simple Creator God, and in this they do well.  But they fail to recognize his Trinitarian nature.  And they fail to recognize the full implications of our emptiness and sin.  They tell us to save ourselves by obedience to God, but they fail to recognize that we cannot be saved unless God unites himself with us, takes upon himself our limitations and failures, conquers these, and thus breaks the barrier and fills us with his Divine life and righteousness.

In the world, there are many philosophies and many religions.  Some claim to have been invented or discovered by humans, others to have been revealed by God or the gods or some form of Ultimate Reality.  But among all of these, Christianity stands unique as the only one to provide the key that unlocks for us the true nature of reality, to reveal reality to us in all its crucial aspects.  Thus, Christianity's claim to be the true divine revelation stands vindicated, as it is clear that God has associated the revelation of himself inseparably with the Christian religion.  In Christ, God has reached out to the human race and brought to us the knowledge of himself, the knowledge of ourselves, and the way of salvation.

For why Catholicism more specifically is true, see here.

Published on the feast of St. Camillus de Lellis.

ADDENDUM 8/6/20:  See here for a more intuitive case for Christianity.

ADDENDUM 2/5/23:  In my Apologetics class, I make use of another layout of the basic argument for God and for Christianity in the form of a series of points I want to emphasize in class.  I have pasted it below.  "George" refers to my Catholic role-play character, George Stewart.  (I role-play different characters with different worldviews in class as a way of aiding engagement in the arguments.)

1. Rationalism, as George defines the word, refers to the position that holds that knowledge is gained not only through the senses and direct internal reflection, but also through the logical analysis of concepts.

2. George holds that philosophical arguments (by which he means non-empirical arguments rooted in the logical analysis of concepts) can give us true knowledge of objective reality.  Our experience of the world provides the basis for our concepts or ideas (for example, our experience with cats in the world provides the foundation for our concept of a “cat”).  These concepts/ideas have certain essential characteristics that give them definite meaning (for example, the concept of a “cat” necessarily involves things like “walks on four legs,” “gives birth to live young,” “is a mammal,” etc.).  So we can gain knowledge about cats by examining the essential characteristics involved in the concept of “cat.”  We can even have universal knowledge beyond the limits of our empirical experience.  For example, if it is essential to the definition of a “cat” that it be a mammal, then we know that wherever cats exist, even if they exist in distant galaxies beyond the reach of our empirical investigation, they will be mammals.  It is even easier to see the validity of this method of knowing when we are dealing with very simple concepts with clearer essences.  For example, by definition, a “triangle” has three sides.  If something doesn’t have three sides, then by definition it is not a triangle.  Therefore, we can know that wherever triangles exist, even if they are beyond the reach of our empirical experience, they will certainly have three sides.


3. There are two fundamental categories of “being.”  In other words, there are two basic kinds of beings that can exist.  (And by “being” here we mean not just living things but “all things that exist.”)  The two basic kinds of beings are “contingent” beings and “self-existent” beings.  A contingent being is a being that depends on something else for its existence.  It gets its existence from something outside of itself.  (For example, I am a contingent being because I got my existence from my parents.)  A “self-existent” being is a being that does not depend on anything else for its existence.  It simply has its existence; it doesn’t get its existence from anything outside of itself.  The classical theistic concept of God is an example of a self-existent being, since God did not get his existence from anything else and is not dependent on anything else for his existence.  His existence is simply a rock-bottom foundational reality, not dependent on any deeper level of reality from which it comes.


4. George holds that all beings cannot be contingent because then there would be no ultimate explanation for anything.  If everything that exists is dependent on something else for its existence, then there is no final source for existence, so we have all things ultimately coming from nothing at all.  Picture a circle of people with a marker.  They are all passing the marker back and forth to each other.  None of them is the owner of the marker; they’ve all borrowed the marker from each other.  If this circle of people were all that existed, there would be no explanation for where the marker came from.  If they are all marker-borrowers, there is no one from whom the marker was originally borrowed, and so the marker has come from nothing ultimately.  If you imagine an infinitely long row of marker-borrowers, each person in the row borrowing the marker from the person on his left side, this still will not solve the problem, because there would still be no marker-owner from which the marker was originally borrowed.  A marker-borrower cannot ultimately explain where the marker came from.  Similarly, a contingent being cannot explain where being came from.  A reality full of nothing but contingent beings would be a world with no ultimate explanation for where existence came from.  There must be a self-existent being who is an owner and not a borrower of being in order to avoid being coming from nothing.


5. George holds that we cannot get something from nothing because “nothing,” by definition, has nothing to give and can do nothing.  For example, if you ask me where I got my marker, and I say, “from nothing,” this will not provide an adequate explanation for where my marker came from, for nothing, being nothing, cannot produce a marker or give one to me.


6. George calls the self-existent being that is the ultimate foundation and explanation for all that exists the “First Cause” because it itself is the cause or source of everything else but is not itself caused by or derived from anything else.  He holds that the First Cause must be timeless–or be outside of time, or not have time as a part of its experience–because time is a contingent property.  That is, to be in time is to be a contingent being.  If you are in time, you have a past history, and so every moment of your existence has come into being and has to be explained by whatever existed before it in the timeline.  So your existence is made up of a series of moments which are all contingent.  A being like that must be traced back ultimately to a being which is outside of time and so could be self-existent.


7. George argues that the First Cause must be single and simple–that is, that there can only be one First Cause and that it cannot be divisible into parts–because if something has parts, those parts are pieces of a larger reality and have to be explained by whatever is the source of that larger reality.  Imagine a puzzle.  A puzzle is made up of pieces.  None of the individual pieces explain the other pieces or the larger puzzle they are all a part of, nor do they even explain themselves as pieces of the larger whole.  In order to explain the puzzle, we have to refer back to the puzzle-maker–the one who designed the puzzle and created the pieces.  Only the puzzle-maker can explain the larger whole that all the pieces are parts of.  So the highest reality from which all things come cannot have parts; it must be single and simple.  Anything that is divisible into parts will have to be traced back to a more ultimate single and simple reality that can explain its parts and the unity of those parts.


Related to this, George points out that all pieces of a larger whole are defined in relation to each other.  A puzzle-piece, for example, cannot be understood without reference to the other pieces of the puzzle and to the puzzle as a whole.  “Being part of a larger puzzle” is part of the definition of a puzzle-piece.  But a First Cause, by definition, cannot be defined in reference to anything else outside of itself, because, being a self-existent being and not contingent, it is not dependent on anything outside of itself.  It does not get its existence from anything else, and so, being completely self-sufficient, it would be defined only in relation to itself and not to anything else.


Another argument George makes is that whenever you have multiple objects, or an object made up of multiple parts, those parts are all in different places only relative to some observer, some particular point of view.  For example, I look out on the classroom and see multiple desks.  Those desks are in different places relative to where I am standing and looking out from.  My viewpoint creates a grid on which the desks are in different places.  If you remove the particular viewpoint from which things are being observed, you lose the grid and so lose the reality of multiple things existing in extended space.  This means that multiplicity and divisibility exist only in connection to limited, particular points of view.  If we imagine reality as it exists outside of a limited point of view–from the perspective of an unlimited point of view, a point of view which would see all reality in a complete view–there would be no multiplicity or divisibility, but only one single and simple essence, for there would be no limited or particular vantage-point from which some things would be more distant than others, some more to the left or to the right, etc.  Therefore, ultimate reality–or the First Cause–is single and simple, and all multiple and divisible reality is limited and contingent, derived from a more ultimate and unlimited state of reality.


8. George argues that the First Cause would have to be a conscious being–that is, a being which has 1st-person experience–because consciousness cannot be derived from non-consciousness.  If you start out with non-conscious stuff, or mind-independent matter (MIM), no matter what you do with that stuff–put it together into complex patterns, cause the pieces of it to interact with each other and affect each other, etc.--it will never be anything more than arrangements of MIM.  You cannot get something in the product that is not explainable in terms of the ingredients and the relationships between the ingredients, for that is to get something from nothing.  If all we have starting out is MIM and non-conscious MIM interactions, then no matter how large or complex we make those interactions, they will not become something fundamentally different from what was there before.  Just as if I start out with red marbles, no matter what I do with them–build large and complex structures out of them, cause them to bump into each other or move each other around in complex ways, etc.--I will never end up with anything other than red marbles receiving and causing red-marble-type effects.  So, since consciousness exists in this world, the First Cause, from which this world comes, must itself possess consciousness and be a conscious being.


George also argues that the very concept of a “material object” or a “physical object” is derived ultimately from consciousness.  Physical characteristics–texture, color, taste, size, position, length, shape, etc.--are nothing other than experiences had in the 1st-person conscious experience of beings.  If you remove everything from the concept of a material object–say, a chair–that exists only by means of being experienced by a mind, you will remove every characteristic of the chair altogether and have nothing left.  So consciousness is the fundamental reality, and physical objects and effects are simply modes of conscious experience.  Therefore, the First Cause, which is the ultimate reality and the source of all other reality, must be a conscious being.  At this point in his argument, George feels that the First Cause can be called God.


9. If God exists, there will be an objective moral law–that is, an objective standard defining “good” and “bad.”  This is because God’s viewpoint defines and is identical to objective reality, for he is the source and ultimate context of all reality.  By contrast, our subjective viewpoint is distinct from and can be in conflict with objective reality.  (We call that “being wrong.”)  Therefore, whatever God views as “good” will be good objectively, and whatever God views as “bad” will be bad objectively.


10. God must be omnibenevolent–that is, he must love the happiness of beings in general and hate the suffering of beings in general–because he, being all-knowing and experiencing all things in reality, would have an absolute foundation for empathy.  It is not possible to delight in the suffering of any being if one experiences the pain of that being, nor is it possible to be indifferent to the happiness of any being if one experiences that happiness.


11. God is infinitely more valuable than his creation.  This is because he is the Supreme Being, the one who is identical to objective and ultimate reality.  We are infinitesimal beings by comparison, our experience and viewpoint being a mere point in a universe that extends out from us with potential infinity in all directions, with a potentially infinite number of other possible particular vantage points.  Although we exist in our own sphere, we are nothing in comparison to God, and all we have is derived from him as well.  Since God’s being is the complete and sufficient source of happiness, and we are nothing in comparison to him and without him, he is infinitely more important than we are.  We have value in our own sphere, and we can be greatly valuable to God insofar as our existence contributes to his plans and purposes, but we are valueness in comparison to God and without God.  (Note:  In salvation through Christ, we are raised up and given a value infinitely above our natural worth, for we are made partakers of the infinitely-valuable divine life itself.)


12. “Moral evil” is evil of the will, as opposed to “natural evil,” which is something bad outside of a will.  If I hate what I should love and love what I should hate and so choose something of lesser value over something of greater value–for example, I choose the value of eating a cheeseburger over the value of respecting human life–this is an example of moral evil.  If a tornado knocks down a house, this is an example of natural evil, for no evil will is involved.  Since all value comes from God and is defined in relation to his objective moral law, all moral evil is ultimately against God.  An act of moral evil is ultimately an act of rejecting God and choosing to put our happiness in something else.  We choose to treat ourselves as if we are God and thus the definer of good and evil and so attempt to oust God from his place, going our own way instead of God’s way.  Since God is the Supreme Good–the source of all happiness and so a being of complete or unlimited value–to reject him is to commit an act which deserves and attains the consequence of complete and utter misery.  So moral evil, in its nature, tends towards misery.


(Note:  We can distinguish between what Catholic theologians call “mortal” and “venial” sin.  Mortal sin is an act like that described above.  It is an act of the will which involves a rejection of God as the Supreme Good.  Venial sin is also a kind of rejection of God, but it is one that does not come up to a full and definitive act of the will.  It is a kind of limited inconsistency within a person who still chooses God as their Supreme Good.  I still choose God overall, but there are smaller pockets or areas of inconsistency in my life where I am not living consistently with what supreme love to God should imply.  For an analogy, think of getting an infection.  By its nature, all infection tends towards death.  Some infection actually causes death because it affects the vital organs of life, while other infection does not actually cause death because it does not affect vital organs.  Similarly, all sin involves a kind of rejection of God and so tends towards misery, but some [“mortal sin”] leads to complete misery because it involves the will’s fundamental rejection of God, while other sin [“venial sin”] does not lead to complete misery because it is a limited or partial inconsistency in the will rather than a fundamental rejection of God.)


The fact that moral evil leads to misery is bad news for us because all goodness comes from God.  We have no goodness of our own and can only receive it as a gift from God, for we are completely contingent and dependent upon God.  Without his sharing his own goodness with us, we are doomed to fall into moral evil (even “mortal sin”) and suffer the infinite consequences.  And we can see the reality of this fact empirically all around us as we look at all the moral evils that are committed by us and by others in this world.


13. Only God can save us from ultimate misery and bring us to ultimate happiness.  This is because, as we saw above in #12, God is the source of all goodness and therefore all happiness, and without him there is no goodness or happiness.  If we contingent beings are to receive happiness, therefore, it can only be by means of God uniting himself to us, absorbing onto himself our limitations and our evil and misery and filling us with his divine life, goodness, and happiness.


14.  George’s fundamental argument for Christianity is that it is the only worldview which gives us a complete and accurate picture of the fundamental nature of reality.  All other worldviews–whether they claim to be some kind of supernatural revelation or simply human philosophies–fail either by fundamental inaccuracy or at least by fundamental incompleteness.  Only Christianity gives us a reality where there exists one God, a Trinity, who is the Creator of all other beings and the source of an objective moral law.  Only Christianity teaches that all happiness comes from God, that we are made for God and to be happy in God, but that, left to ourselves, we have fallen into a condition of sin and misery, and that we are doomed to complete misery (hell) unless God saves us.  He has done so by means of God the Son–the Second Person of the Trinity–coming into this world and taking upon himself a human nature in addition to his divine nature.  Absorbing our limitations, he also absorbed our sins and sufferings upon himself, dying on the cross.  But, being divine, he was able to overcome sin and death.  He rose from the dead on the third day, becoming the source of eternal salvation as he fills us with his own divine life, goodness, and happiness.  Since Christianity, which claims to be a revelation from God, is the only worldview existing in the world which gets reality fundamentally right, the world is clearly set up in such a way as to associate Christianity with God’s fundamental revelation of himself and his truth to us.  Since God is ultimate reality and knows and loves himself supremely, and therefore he created the world as an extension of the manifestation and enjoyment of his own perfections, the world which comes from him will reflect his actual nature and not be designed to exhibit that which is false.  But if Christianity is not a revelation from God, then the world has been set up in such a way as to associate the revelation of God and his fundamental truth with falsehood, which is something God would not do, and so we can be sure that we are warranted to accept Christianity as an authentic divine revelation and therefore as true.

Monday, June 15, 2020

Church History Companion Unit 3: The Church Post-Constantine and in the Early Middle Ages

To return to the Introduction and Table of Contents, click here.

This period spans from about 313 until about 1000.  This is a time of enormous growth for the Church--in geography, in numbers, and in doctrinal development.

This unit corresponds with pp. 24-45 in our textbook.

Christianity Legalized

In 313, the Emperor Constantine issued the Edict of Milan, which made Christianity legal in the Roman Empire as a whole for the first time in its history.  A little later, in 380, the Emperor Theodosius would make Christianity not only legal but the official religion of the Roman Empire.  What an astonishing reversal!  From a tiny, illegal, persecuted religion at the end of the first century, Christianity in a relatively short time had gone to being the official religion.  For over 200 years, the Church and the Roman state had fought over whether "Caesar is Lord" or "Christ is Lord".  With regard to only human considerations, I think that pretty much any observant party would have said through much of that time that it was surely the Roman state that would win in the end.  And yet it was Caesar in the end who bowed and acknowledged Christ as the true ultimate Lord of all.

Of course, this had a dramatic impact on the condition of the Church.  Her numbers grew as it became fashionable to be a Christian.  Her resources and leverage grew as she now had the power of the Roman state behind the promotion of her beliefs and values.  And she now had more time and opportunity to reflect more fully on the meaning of what she believed.

Between Constantine and Theodosius, the rulers of the Empire were Christian, except during the reign of Julian, often called "Julian the Apostate" because he sought to reverse Christianity's growing influence in the Empire and restore classic Roman paganism.  Julian reigned as sole Emperor from 361-363.  He was the last non-Christian ruler of the Roman Empire.

Many things attracted the people of the Roman Empire to Christianity as they observed the Christians during the centuries between Christ's resurrection and the reign of Constantine.  Among these things was the Christians' commitment to caring for the vulnerable, the poor, etc.  The Christians would even rescue newborn babies left to die by families who did not want them (a not uncommon practice in the ancient pagan world).  Julian the Apostate is said to have wanted to create charitable institutions in a pagan Roman Empire to prevent the Christians from attracting people to them by means of their charity.

East and West

Another significant political event that occurred in the 4th century was the appointing of two emperors to govern the two halves of the Roman Empire--the Western half and the Eastern half.  This state of affairs began in 395 and ended around 476 when the Western part of the Empire fell to Germanic "barbarians".  After this time, until 800, there was only one Roman emperor, who reigned in the city of Constantinople in the East.  (This Eastern Roman Empire became known as the Byzantine Empire, because its capital was in Constantinople, which was also called Byzantium.)  In 800, the Pope crowned Charlemagne, King of the Franks, as the Holy Roman Emperor, thus reviving the Empire in the West.  The relationship between East and West varied quite a bit for several centuries--sometimes being amiable, sometimes less so.  The political division between East and West was accompanied by cultural and religious differences as well.  The Easterners spoke Greek and the Westerners spoke Latin.  These differences, though not necessarily problems in themselves, eventually led to religious conflict between East and West, culminating in the Great Schism between the Roman Catholic and the Eastern Orthodox churches.  But we'll get into that more in the next unit.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Western_Roman_Empire

The Rise of Islam

Also during our time period, we see the origin and rise of the religion of Islam.  Especially during the 7th and 8th centuries, Islam spread rapidly, taking over many formerly Christian lands in the Byzantine Empire, North Africa, and Spain.  It was stopped in France by Charles Martel.  Thus was created a very serious enemy and threat to Christendom.

https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/teach/muslims/timeline.html - A short timeline of Islam and its growth and spread.

Ecumenical Councils

As I mentioned, the Church experienced a great amount of doctrinal growth during this period.  This is the period of the first eight ecumenical councils of the Catholic Church.  These councils were tremendously important in terms of the Church coming to articulate more explicitly and clearly central aspects of her worldview.  There had been many earlier local councils, but there had not been any councils encompassing the whole Church (which is what is meant by an "ecumenical" council) since the Jerusalem Council mentioned in Acts 15.  During the time of persecution, it was difficult for the Church to meet together in large numbers.  But now that Constantine had made Christianity legal, it was much easier for the bishops throughout the world to come together in common councils.

Let's take a look at each of these eight ecumenical councils and what they were all about.

http://www.newadvent.org/library/almanac_14388a.htm - Nice, short list of all twenty-one ecumenical councils of the Catholic Church from the beginning up to the present day, with short summary descriptions of each of them.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Catholic_ecumenical_councils - Another good list and summary of all the ecumenical councils.

https://ccel.org/ccel/schaff/npnf214/npnf214. - Collection of primary documents of and connected to each of the first seven ecumenical councils.  Here is where you can read for yourself what happened at each of the councils, the decrees of the councils, the conversations that took place in the council meetings, letters associated with, written by, or read at the councils, etc.

The First Ecumenical Council: Nicaea I

The main instigation for the calling of the First Council of Nicaea was the Arian controversy.  Arius was a priest in the Church of Alexandria.  He was unhappy with the Church's formulations on the nature of Christ.  The Church had confessed Christ to be God from her very beginning.  The Church had also confessed that Christ was distinct from his Father.  (We see both of these ideas, for example, in the Gospel of John's formulation that "The Word was with God, and the Word was God" [John 1:1].)  The Church also confessed that there is only one God.  Arius found this whole thing confusing and difficult (understandably).  He set out to resolve the apparently paradoxes, and he ended up saying that, although Christ is far above human beings, although he is the greatest being in reality apart from God, although he has much of the nature of God in him and represents God to us, so that we can honor him as a manifestation of God to us in an important sense, yet, technically and strictly speaking, he is not God.  How could he be God, when he is not the Father, the Father is God, and there is only one God?

Well, not surprisingly, Arius's teachings caused enormous controversy.  Many opposed him, but enough supported him that the Chrisitan world was in an uproar arguing about this issue.  The Emperor Constantine, who had himself become a Christian and wanted Christianity to be a unifying factor in his Empire, decided to call a council of bishops from the Church throughout the world so that they could discuss this matter and come to a definite conclusion, to put an end to all the endless arguing.  He himself didn't seem to grasp the importance of the issue, but he knew it was important that the Church settle the issue.

So, in the year 325, Constantine called the bishops of the world to convene in the city of Nicaea.  318 bishops participated.  The end result was that Arianism was condemned, and Arius and the few who stuck with him by the end of the council were banished.  The council affirmed that Christ is homoousian (Greek  "of one essence") with the Father.  There was some argument over whether that word should be used, considering that it is not found in Scripture.  But the council Fathers ended up deciding that it was appropriate to use the word, even though not found in Scripture, because it expressed the true sense of the meaning of Scripture and closed the loophole from the Arians who wished to use Scriptural language, wrongly-interpreted, to support their own heretical ideas.

The council also dealt with some other issues, including making a resolution on the date of Easter for the universal Church.

As we saw with the Jerusalem Council in Acts 15 during the time of the apostles, so we see here at the Council of Nicaea the guidance of God over the Church and the development of her doctrine.  It wasn't as if the question of the divinity of Christ had never been faced before, or that it had previously been unimportant to the Church.  But the Arians forced the Church to become more precise in defining the relationship between the Father and the Son.  Arius's reasoning seemed plausible on the surface.  If there is one God, and the Father is God, and the Son is not the Father, then the Son can't be God.  How could there possibly be a flaw in that logic?  And yet the logic is flawed.  There is a way for both the Father and the Son to be fully God without there being more than one God.  Arius misread Scripture in light of his fallacious logic and so ended up gutting the very heart of the gospel.  For if Jesus is not God, then Jesus cannot save us, for only God can save us.  But the Holy Spirit prevented the Church from losing the gospel, and helped her to articulate the truth in response to Arius's false logic.

Let's talk a bit more about the Church's doctrine here to bring out more clearly both its profundity and its supreme importance.  The Catholic view is that there is one God, and that one God exists in three Persons.  Each Person is a distinct, but full, manifestation of the single Divine Essence.  The Trinity is notoriously hard to explain (which is not really surprising, considering that we are talking about the nature of God).  If you want an analogy, I like to think of a website.  There is an original version of each website that exists on a server computer somewhere.  Then that server “serves” the website to different computers, so that the same website exists on multiple computers.  It's one website, but multiple manifestations of that same website.  Each manifestation is distinct from the others, but they are all manifestations of the same site.  Similarly, there is one Divine Being, but that Divine Being manifests himself in three distinct Persons.  God the Father begets the Son, sharing with him his very Being, and the Holy Spirit is a third instantiation of the single Divine Essence who proceeds from the Father and from the Son and from their relationship.  (In my website analogy, the Holy Spirit might be analogous to the website as it exists flowing through the air or through the wires between computers, going from one computer to another.)

The doctrine of the Trinity is the synthesis of various ideas found in the Scriptures.  The Scriptures teach that God is one, that there is only one God.  The Scriptures also teach that there are three divine Persons who are distinct from each other.  The Scriptures also teach that each of these three Persons is fully God.  The Trinity is simply what you get when you try to fit all these ideas together without subverting or eliminating any of them.

But the Trinity is also a profound idea philosophically.  To be sure, the Trinity is an idea difficult to grasp and communicate.  (Again, why would we expect understanding and describing God to be easy?  We can't even fully understand or describe the things of this world!  Think of the complexities we run into in trying to describe the world in modern physics, for example.  It would at best be very suspicious if we found God an easy topic to grasp!)  But it also an idea that turns out to be incredibly profound in its implications and importance.

The Catholic idea is that God is both one and three (in different respects).  The unity of God explains the unity of the universe we live in.  The universe is like a vast puzzle with an infinite variety of pieces.  But each of these pieces fit together to make up a coherent whole.  Matter, energy, the laws of physics, the laws of logic, and all the myriad entities that exist, function together as parts of an incredibly complex system.  And this system actually works!  We take this for granted, but it really ought to amaze us.  This incredible fact points to an underlying unity from which all things are derived.  If I were to go about the world with a bag and collect all the random puzzle pieces I could find, what would be the chances that, upon arriving back home, I could assemble all those pieces into a coherent puzzle?  Obviously, the chances are extremely low (to the point of practical impossibility).  This is because all the pieces I've collected would not have arisen from a common source which could give them a unifying coherence.  Well, the situation is infinitely more difficult when we talk about explaining the coherence of the universe!  At least my hypothetical puzzle pieces share a common world, a common set of physical laws, are all made by human beings with a common human nature, etc.  But if there is no unifying Source from which all the parts of the universe are derived, all those parts would have literally nothing in common!  They could not possibly, therefore, be coherent parts of the larger whole.  So the Catholic idea of one God who is the unifying source of all reality is absolutely necessary to explain the universe we live in.

But if God were only unity and not also Trinity, we would have just as large a problem.  For the universe is obviously not only coherent, it is also inherently diverse and relational.  It is made up of an infinite number of pieces that relate to each other in an infinite variety of ways.  Diversity and relationship are fundamental characteristics of our universe and every part of it.  Everything relates to everything else.  The actions of everything affect everything else.  And, of course, the very existence of the universe requires a relational explanation, for the universe is not God.  The objects of our space-time universe are not infinite, eternal, and unchangeable.  How do they relate to the Supreme Being who is beyond all limitation?  If God did not possess relationality as an essential part of his Being, he could never have brought us into existence, for there would be no foundation in reality for the ideas of relationship and act.  So everything we are only makes sense if the universe is derived from a Being who is both single and undivided but who is also relational.  Only classical Christianity possesses this idea—the idea of one single Divine Being who exists in Three Persons in relationship with each other and who is the foundation of all reality.

https://www.desiringgod.org/articles/what-is-the-doctrine-of-the-trinity - A very helpful article on the Trinity from a Protestant writer (mainstream Protestants and Catholics--and Eastern Orthodox--agree on this doctrine).

https://www.ccel.org/ccel/edwards/trinity/files/trinity.html - Another helpful article on the Trinity, looked at from a more philosophical perspective.  Also by a Protestant author (one of my favorite theologians and philosophers, Jonathan Edwards).


After Nicaea

The Council of Nicaea seemed to settle the issue of the divinity of Christ.  Unfortunately, however, this was not the case.  There arose a group of men who, while rejecting the extreme form of Arianism defeated at the Council of Nicaea, were still not comfortable with the Nicene doctrine.  They embraced and promoted a mitigated form of Arianism which has come to be called Semi-Arianism.  Whereas Nicaea said that the Son is homoousian ("of one essence") with the Father, and Arius said that the Son was heteroousian ("of a different essence") from the Father, the Semi-Arians said that the Son was homoiousian ("of a similar essence") to the Father.  (You have to look closely or you just might miss the one-letter difference between homoousian and homoiousian.)  Well, the problem with the Semi-Arian position is that it really amounts to the same position as Arianism in the end, for one is either God or one is not.  One can't be sort of God.  You are either the First Cause of all reality, or you are a contingent, dependent being, derived from a more ultimate reality.  So Semi-Arianism just wasn't going to cut it.  But it had a significant following, and for many decades after Chalcedon the Nicaeans and the Semi-Arians fought each other.  This gets really complicated, so I'll refer you to a lecture by Dr. Ryan Reeves linked to below for more of the specifics.  One of the most important figures during this time period was St. Athanasius, who became Bishop of Alexandria shortly after the end of the Council of Nicaea.  He was a staunch upholder of the Council of Nicaea and vigorous in its defense.  His refusal to compromise on this ultimately got him banished five times during his career as Bishop of Alexandria, as various Church and political leaders embraced Semi-Arianism or were troubled by his activities.

The Semi-Arian controversy was brought to an end by the second ecumenical council, the First Council of Constantinople.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CfP7DNG_ZbM&list=PLRgREWf4NFWZEd86aVEpQ7B3YxXPhUEf-&index=19&t=0s - Half-hour lecture on the Semi-Arian controversy after Nicaea.

Watch in classhttps://www.catholic.org/saints/saint.php?saint_id=336 - Short article and video on the life of St. Athanasius.

Talk about in classhttps://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2019/07/historical-challenges-to-infallibility_27.html - The bishops of Rome played an important role in defending Nicene orthodoxy and the Council of Nicaea during this time period, when Semi-Arianism had developed a strong following in the East.  However, there is an incident involving Pope Liberius that is sometimes appealed to in order to call into question the divine protection of the orthodoxy of the bishops of Rome.  This is a very short article looking at the case of Pope Liberius.

The Second Ecumenical Council: Constantinople I

In 380, the Emperor Theodosius made Christianity not only legal, but the official religion of the Roman Empire.  Following in the footsteps of his predecessor earlier in the century, the Emperor Constantine, Theodosius called an ecumenical council to deal with various heresies and to help promote orthodoxy and unity in the Church.

At this council, Semi-Arianism was finally defeated.  The creed of Nicaea was reaffirmed and elaborated upon.  One elaboration had to do with the Holy Spirit.  Nicaea had dealt with the relationship between the Father and the Son, but it had not discussed how the Holy Spirit fits in.  A heresy rose up whose followers became known as the Macedonians (after their founder Macedonius) or the Pneumatomachians ("fighters against the Holy Spirit") which denied the divinity of the Holy Spirit.  This heresy was repudiated at the Constantinopolitan council.

The council also rejected a heresy called Apollinarism (after Apollinaris) which affirmed that Jesus was not fully human.  Apollinarism taught that Jesus had a human body but only a divine mind (and not a human mind).  But the Church affirmed that Jesus was both fully God and fully man (we'll come back to this later when we get to the Council of Chalcedon, the fourth ecumenical council).  If Jesus didn't have a human mind, then he was more like a humanoid zombie than a real human.  How can one be a real human being if one does not have real human thoughts, feelings, etc.?  So the council rejected this idea.

In both of these cases, again, it is not that the Church embraced new ideas out of nowhere.  There was development of her doctrine, but it was an organic growth of what was already there into a more clearly understood and specifically articulated form.  The Church, goaded into further reflection on the teachings of the revelation she had received as a result of challenges from heretical ideas, grew through those challenges into a greater awareness of all the implications of that revelation.

After this council, the Church finally had the creed Catholics have come to know as the Nicene Creed.  If we want to be really accurate, we should call this creed the Niceno-Constantinopolitan Creed, but who wants to say that all the time?  Part of the creed was written up by the Fathers of Nicaea.  The Fathers of Constantinople edited and added to it in response to everything that had happened since Nicaea.  They brought it to the final form in which we know it today.  (Well, almost.  There was one more slight change that was later made by the Western part of the Church but which has never been accepted by the Eastern part--the Filioque [Latin for "and the Son"].  We'll talk more about that in Unit 4.)

Look at in class - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nicene_Creed#Comparison_between_creed_of_325_and_creed_of_381 - Here you can see, side by side, the original creed of Nicaea and the fully-completed Niceno-Constantinopolitan Creed.


The Donatists

The Donatist schism was basically a revival of the similar Novatianist position we read about in our previous unit.  In the persecutions that occurred shortly before Constantine became emperor and legalized Christianity, several people, fearing the threats of their persecutors, handed over their copies of the Scriptures to be burned as demanded by the authorities, and many handed over other things as well, including their fellow Christians.  Those who handed over the Scriptures became known as traditors ("those who hand over").  Many of these traditors later repented, and sometimes they were restored not only to communion but even to positions of authority in the Church.  Some people thought that was unacceptable, and so they refused to accept any sacraments administered by a former traditor.  They would sometimes appoint an alternative bishop to administer sacraments when they found the regular one unacceptable.  As the sect grew, this led eventually to a number of towns having both Catholic and Donatist bishops.  The Donatists were orthodox except for their position on the traditors, so they are often thought of as schismatics (those who divide the unity of the Church) rather than heretics (those who promote false doctrine).

The Donatists were opposed by the orthodox bishops.  St. Augustine, the Bishop of Hippo, was especially effective at refuting them.  Eventually, some of the Donatists and those associated with them began to resort to violence to promote their cause, and this brought upon them repression by the State.

It was during this controversy especially that the Church formulated her idea that the validity of the sacraments does not depend on the worthiness of the minister.  In opposition to the Donatist idea that sinful minister cannot administer sacraments, Catholic apologists like St. Augustine and St. Optatus argued that the sacraments have a promise of blessing from God when done correctly, and God still gives those blessings even when the minister of the sacrament is a sinner himself (as all people are), or even a person who has committed grave sins.

Donatism eventually died out over the next few centuries.

https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/05121a.htm - Catholic Encyclopedia article on Donatism.

St. Augustine of Hippo and His Confessions

One of the greatest theologians in the history of the Catholic Church lived during this time.  St. Augustine (354-430) was from North Africa.  His mother was a Christian and his father was a pagan (although he converted to Christianity on his deathbed).  As Augustine grew up, he rejected the Christian faith of his mother and embraced a life of immorality and false philosophies.  He became a skilled rhetorician and, after going to Carthage and to Rome, eventually ended up teaching in Milan.  There he met the Bishop of Milan, St. Ambrose, who was also skilled at rhetoric, and who made a deep impression on Augustine.  Eventually, Augustine converted to Christianity and was baptized.  He went on to become bishop of the city of Hippo in North Africa and became one of the most important saints and doctors in the history of the Catholic Church, having a deep influence on Catholic theology and the development of the Church's doctrine.  He was especially influential in his writings on the unity of the Church as he responded against the Donatist schism (discussed above) and in his writings on sin and grace in response to the Pelagian heresy (which we will deal with below).  Augustine has been called by the Church the "Doctor of Grace" for his powerful influence on Catholic thinking about sin and grace.

Augustine's mother, Monica, is also a canonized saint.  She is famous for faithfully and lovingly praying for her son and her husband for many years and finally seeing both of them convert to the faith.

One of the most popular works in Christian history is Augustine's Confessions, in which he tells the story of his life and how he eventually was led to the Catholic faith.  His writing is full of profound philosophy but is also intensely personal.  He writes from the heart.  The Confessions are written as addressed to God.  See here for a short quote.


The Third Ecumenical Council: Ephesus

The third ecumenical council came about because of the views of Nestorius, Patriarch of Constantinople from 428-431.  Nestorius was greatly concerned that some of the ways some Christians talked about Christ blurred the lines between his humanity and his divinity.  For example, he really didn't like the phrase Theotokos ("God-bearer" or "Mother of God") applied to the Virgin Mary.  He thought it made it sound like the divine nature itself had a mother, which would of course be absurd.  He advocated instead the term Christotokos ("Christ-bearer").  In general, he articulated a view of how the humanity and the divinity were united in Christ that strongly emphasized the distinction between the two.  Nestorius's own language then became very controversial, as his critics understood him to be emphasizing the distinction between humanity and divinity in Christ to the extent that, in effect, Christ was made to be two persons instead of one--a divine Christ and a human Christ, two distinct persons inhabiting the same body.

Nestorius's greatest critic was St. Cyril of Alexandria, the Patriarch of Alexandria.  Cyril tended to have the opposite emphasis from Nestorius, strongly articulating the oneness of Christ's person.  Cyril wrote to Pope Celestine of Rome, who delegated authority to Cyril to declare Nestorius excommunicated unless he should repent within ten days.  Nestorius, meanwhile, convinced Emperor Theodosius II to convene an ecumenical council.  The council was convened, and Cyril became its president.  A good deal of politics took place during the council, as is typically the case with councils, but the end result was that Nestorianism was condemned.

There were many, though, who still supported Nestorius.  Most of this support was squelched within the Roman Empire, which took the side of the Catholics, but support continued outside the borders of the Empire to the east.  This was the first ecumenical council to create a lasting schism.  There were those who rejected the decisions of the earlier councils, but the positions of the rejecters eventually died out.  In the case of the Nestorian split, however, the schism continues even up to the present day.  The churches that favored Nestorius, and were now out of communion with Rome and the rest of the Catholic Church, spread throughout the east in what is now Iraq and Iran, and even into India and beyond.  At their height, these churches covered more territory than the Catholic Church.  Later on, however, during the High Middle Ages and afterwards, they greatly declined, and at this time they are represented by only a few relatively small churches.  There were a number of schisms that eventually took place within the "Nestorian" churches, and today the remaining churches that are descended from the original group of Nestorians are the Assyrian Church of the East, the Ancient Church of the East, and the Chaldean Catholic Church.  None of these three are in communion with each other, but the third has returned to full communion with Rome and is fully a part of the Catholic Church.

The Catholic Church has been involved in substantial dialogue with the Assyrian Church of the East for some time, and there has been significant fruit.  For example, Pope John Paul II and Mar Dinkha IV, Catholicos-Patriarch of the Assyrian Church of the East, signed a joint statement in 1994 which, among other things, affirmed that the two churches have the same faith in terms of the person of Christ.  It affirmed that the divisions in the past were rooted partly in misunderstandings, and that today there is no substantial division in this area.

This is the unique faith that we profess in the mystery of Christ. The controversies of the past led to anathemas, bearing on persons and on formulas. The Lord's Spirit permits us to understand better today that the divisions brought about in this way were due in large part to misunderstandings.

Whatever our Christological divergences have been, we experience ourselves united today in the confession of the same faith in the Son of God who became man so that we might become children of God by his grace. We wish from now on to witness together to this faith in the One who is the Way, the Truth and the Life, proclaiming it in appropriate ways to our contemporaries, so that the world may believe in the Gospel of salvation.  (Common Christological Declaration between the Catholic Church and the Assyrian Church of the East)

The statement also points out some areas where there is more work to be done to attain to full unity in the faith.

A question might arise at this point:  How could the divisions of the past on the doctrine of Christ have been "due in large part to misunderstandings"?  Was not the Catholic Church infallible in her Christological declarations at the early ecumenical councils?  I think the answer to that question is suggested in the language of the Common Christological Declaration when it says that the controversies and anathemas of the past were "bearing on persons and formulas."  We can distinguish various aspects of what the Church affirmed in those councils (and in any councils).  The truly doctrinal part of the council was the condemnation of "Nestorianism", defined as the idea that Christ is, in effect, two persons, the unity between his divinity and humanity not being sufficiently safeguarded.  The doctrine of Christ is a central dogma of the Catholic faith, and "Nestorianism" as defined by the Council of Ephesus is clearly incompatible with it and is therefore heretical.  It is altogether another question to ask whether Nestorius was rightly understood as teaching "Nestorianism", or whether the churches that followed him were teachers of "Nestorianism".  In terms of the doctrine defined and the heresy condemned at the council, we can say that Church teaching was definitively and unchangeably defined.  However, the condemnation of the person of Nestorius was not a doctrinal affirmation itself but was rather a practical application of the Church's doctrinal affirmation, and there is no reason (that I am aware of) to think that this practical ruling must be looked at as having been intended to be definitive, infallible, and unchangeable.  No doubt the ruling condemning Nestorius and his formulas was authoritative and binding, and Nestorius and his followers ought to have submitted to it because it represented the authority of the Church exercised to safeguard the Church's teaching, but that does not necessarily imply that the Church was bound to hold as definitively settled that Nestorius personally intended the heretical consequences the Church saw in his formulas.  There was room to continue to ponder that question even after the condemnation took effect, and so that reconsideration has been taking place in the modern day.


http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/chrstuni/sub-index/index_east-assyrian.htm - A page from the Vatican website containing links to important documents pertaining to the Catholic Church's dialogue with the Assyrian Church of the East.

Pelagianism

The Council of Ephesus dealt with another heresy as well: Pelagianism.  Pelagius was a British monk who was greatly concerned about the moral laxity he saw all around him in the Christianized Roman Empire.  When Constantine made Christianity legal and then Theodosius made it the official religion, this, not surprisingly, encouraged many people to join the Church who were not necessarily very serious about living out their Christian faith consistently.  Pelagius wanted to call people to a more radical life of repentance and holiness.

He articulated views on free will, sin, and grace that he thought were necessary to safeguard moral purity.  He argued that since God has given all people free will, all people must be able to obey God's moral law without being given any further ability through the grace of God.  Pelagius reasoned that if people lack the ability to obey God without grace, that would excuse their sin, since no one can justly be required to do something that they are unable to do.  So, by definition, a being with free will must be able to choose and do what is morally required of them without being given any extra aids not already inherent in their free will.

Logically, then, he also denied what Catholics came to call "original sin".  Since all people have free will, even after the Fall, Pelagius reasoned, they can never have lost the ability to choose and to do what is right.  So the Fall cannot have affected humanity such that humans lost the ability to do good.  But to say this is to deny original sin, since the doctrine of original sin states that, by means of the Fall, humans fell into a state in which they lost both the will and the ability to choose and to do what is good.  (Fallen humans without supernatural grace can do some good, but not saving good--that is, they cannot move their wills back into a condition of being in a fundamentally right relationship with God.)  Such an ability can only be restored by a subsequent and supernatural gift of grace.

Since we are not in a state of original sin and already have the ability to choose and to do good without anything added to our free will, grace--in the sense of the supernatural help of God necessary to choose and to do good--was denied by Pelagius.

Pelagius gained a number of followers in various places, including in Britain where he had come from.  His most famous follower was a man named Caelestius, who was actually more radical than Pelagius himself and got both of them into more trouble than perhaps Pelagius would have been in without him.

Pelagianism's main opponent was St. Augustine, who helped lead the North African church to condemn it.  In 418, the North African Council of Carthage condemned Pelagianism.  The condemnation of Pelagianism was also affirmed by Pope Innocent I and Pope Zosimus (although the latter waffled a bit as he had trouble understanding what Pelagius was trying to say before finally agreeing conclusively with the condemnation of Pelagius's views).  Finally, Pelagianism was condemned at the ecumenical Council of Ephesus.

After the condemnation of Pelagianism, a modified version of it arose in the Church which has come to be called Semipelagianism.  We will look at it a little later in this unit.

https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/11604a.htm - Catholic Encyclopedia article on Pelagianism.

The Fourth Ecumenical Council: Chalcedon

In the 440s, a monk names Eutyches started making public statements in favor of what he considered to be orthodox Christology, following the teaching of St. Cyril of Alexandria.  He felt that some other teachers in the Church leaned too heavily towards Nestorianism.  Eventually, he got into a fight with Eusebius, the Bishop of Dorylaeum, and the whole thing ended up before Flavius, the Patriarch of Constantinople.  Eusebius and Flavius accused Eutyches of emphasizing the unity of Christ so much that he ended up dissolving the human nature into the divine nature and therefore denying Jesus's fully intact humanity.  Eutyches, on the other hand, accused Eusebius and Flavius of being Nestorian.  A synod was held, and Eutyches was condemned.  A report was sent to Pope Leo I of Rome.

The Patriarch of Alexandria, Dioscorus, got involved in defense of Eutyches.  The whole thing got so heated that the Emperor Theodosius II decided to call an ecumenical council to deal with it.  The council met in 449 in the city of Ephesus and was headed up by Patriarch Dioscorus.  Dioscorus was very heavy-handed in how he conducted the council.  Eusebius of Dorylaeum and Flavius of Constantinople and several others ended up getting condemned and deposed, and Dioscorus demanded that Cyril of Alexandria's language be accepted as the orthodox definition on Christology.  Cyril had affirmed that Christ was fully human and fully divine, and that those two natures had come together into one human-and-divine nature at the Incarnation.  Pope Leo was not personally present, but was represented by Hilary, his papal legate (ambassador).  Hilary strenuously opposed the proceedings.  Leo had written a document intended to define the orthodox position (this has since come to be referred to as the "Tome of Leo"), but Dioscorus wouldn't even allow it to be read at the council.  When Hilary returned to Rome and made his report to Leo, Leo condemned the whole council, calling it a "robber council".

Leo called for another council to be held to replace the illegitimate "robber council".  Emperor Theodosius II didn't agree, but shortly afterwards he died and Marcian became emperor.  Marcian agreed with Leo and so called the new council, which convened in 451 in the city of Chalcedon.  It was headed up by the papal legates.  Leo's Tome was read and approved.  Dioscorus was censured and deposed for refusing to present himself before the council to be judged.  The council wrote up a formula intending to articulate clearly the relationship between the two natures in the one Person of Christ.  Here is the formula they came up with:

Following, then, the holy Fathers, we all unanimously teach that our Lord Jesus Christ is to us One and the same Son, the Self-same Perfect in Godhead, the Self-same Perfect in Manhood; truly God and truly Man; the Self-same of a rational soul and body; co-essential with the Father according to the Godhead, the Self-same co-essential with us according to the Manhood; like us in all things, sin apart; before the ages begotten of the Father as to the Godhead, but in the last days, the Self-same, for us and for our salvation (born) of Mary the Virgin Theotokos as to the Manhood; One and the Same Christ, Son, Lord, Only-begotten; acknowledged in Two Natures unconfusedly, unchangeably, indivisibly, inseparably; the difference of the Natures being in no way removed because of the Union, but rather the properties of each Nature being preserved, and (both) concurring into One Person and One Hypostasis; not as though He was parted or divided into Two Persons, but One and the Self-same Son and Only-begotten God, Word, Lord, Jesus Christ; even as from the beginning the prophets have taught concerning Him, and as the Lord Jesus Christ Himself hath taught us, and as the Symbol of the Fathers hath handed down to us.

They articulated the historic faith of the Church, which is that Jesus was and is fully God and fully man.  They used the language of "two natures in one Person" to express this.

Perhaps an analogy might help to explain this formulation.  Imagine that you are the author of a novel.  In your novel, you have created an entire imaginary world, with places, a series of events, characters, etc.  At one point, you decide to write yourself into your own novel, making yourself a character.  At this point, you have, in a sense, "incarnated" yourself into your novel.  You are still one person, but your person is now expressed through two natures--an "author" nature and a "character" nature.  You have not ceased to be the author.  You still exist outside the time and space of your novel.  You transcend it.  You are its creator and you hold it in being and define its reality.  But you are also now a character, living within the time and space of the novel, just as fully a character as any of your other characters.  What unites the author and the character is that both are you, who are one person.  Similarly, Christ became incarnate not by ceasing to be God, or by transforming from God into a human, or by becoming a chimeric mix of human and divine, but by taking upon himself a human nature in addition to his divine nature and uniting that human nature to his one Person, so that his one Person was expressed fully in both a fully divine nature and a fully human nature.

As with the ecumenical Council of Ephesus (not to be confused with the later "robber council" discussed above), so the Council of Chalcedon proved to be the beginning of a long-lasting schism that has continued even to the present day.  A large portion of the church in Alexandria and Antioch and elsewhere refused to accept the decisions of Chalcedon and broke off from the Catholic unity.  These churches came to be known as the "Oriental Orthodox" churches, the largest of them being the Coptic Orthodox Church of Alexandria.  There are descendants of these Oriental Orthodox churches that have returned to full communion with Rome and with the Catholic Church, such as the Coptic Catholic Church, the Armenian Catholic Church, and the Syriac Catholic Church.  But a number of others continue to be out of full communion with the Catholic Church.  The churches that accepted the Council of Chalcedon have often called the position of the Oriental Orthodox Christians Monophysitism ("one nature"), because they object to the language of Christ having two natures and instead want to affirm, with Cyril of Alexandria, that Christ has one nature which is fully human and fully divine.  The Oriental Orthodox don't like the term Monophysite, preferring the term Miaphysite ("one nature").  They want to distance themselves from the connotations of the term Monophysite, which has come to suggest the idea that the divine nature has so absorbed the human nature in Christ that he was not really fully human.  On the contrary, the Oriental Orthodox want to affirm the full divinity and the full humanity of Christ.

The Catholic Church and the Oriental Orthodox churches have been carrying on substantial dialogue over the past several decades.  As with the dialogue with the Assyrian Church of the East, the dialogue here has found that Christological differences between the two traditions are more terminological than substantial, and the two traditions have been able to declare a unified faith on the nature of Christ.  In 1973, Pope Paul VI and Pope Shenouda III of Alexandria, head of the Coptic Orthodox Church (the Copts use the term "Pope" for the Patriarch of Alexandria as well, though without the specific theological meaning involved in the Roman usage), put out a formal statement together articulating their unity of faith:

In accordance with our apostolic traditions transmitted to our Churches and preserved therein, and in conformity with the early three ecumenical councils, we confess one faith in the One Triune God, the divinity of the Only Begotten Son of God, the Second Person of the Holy Trinity, the Word of God, the effulgence of His glory and the express image of His substance, who for us was incarnate, assuming for Himself a real body with a rational soul, and who shared with us our humanity but without sin. We confess that our Lord and God and Saviour and King of us all, Jesus Christ, is perfect God with respect to His Divinity, perfect man with respect to His humanity. In Him His divinity is united with His humanity in a real, perfect union without mingling, without commixtion, without confusion, without alteration, without division, without separation. His divinity did not separate from His humanity for an instant, not for the twinkling of an eye. He who is God eternal and invisible became visible in the flesh, and took upon Himself the form of a servant. In Him are preserved all the properties of the divinity and all the properties of the humanity, together in a real, perfect, indivisible and inseparable union.  (Common Declaration of Pope Paul VI and of the Pope of Alexandria Shenouda III, on the Vatican website)

In 1984, Pope John Paul II issued a joint declaration with Mar Ignatius Zakka I Iwas, head of the Syrian Orthodox Church, which made this statement:

3. First of all, Their Holinesses [Pope John Paul II and Mar Ignatius Zakka I Iwas] confess the faith of their two Churches, formulated by Nicene Council of 325 A.D. and generally known as "the Nicene Creeds". The confusions and schisms that occurred between their Churches in the later centuries, they realize today, in no way affect or touch the substance of their faith, since these arose only because of differences in terminology and culture and in the various formulae adopted by different theological schools to express the same matter.

Accordingly, we find today no real basis for the sad divisions and schisms that subsequently arose between us concerning the doctrine of Incarnation.

In words and life we confess the true doctrine concerning Christ our Lord, notwithstanding the differences in interpretation of such a doctrine which arose at the time of the Council of Chalcedon.  (Common Declaration of Pope John Paul II and His Holiness Mar Ignatius Zakka I Iwas, on the Vatican website)


https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/03555a.htm - Catholic Encyclopedia article on the Council of Chalcedon.

https://www.newadvent.org/fathers/3604028.htm - The text of the Tome of Pope St. Leo, which helped determine the language of Chalcedon in defining the two natures in one Person of Christ.

http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/chrstuni/sub-index/index_ancient-oriental-ch.htm - Documents relating to the dialogue between the Catholic Church and the Oriental Orthodox churches, including the two joint statements quoted from above.

Canon 28

Towards the end of the Council of Chalcedon, a resolution was passed--Canon 28--which caused some controversy.  It gave the See of Constantinople the second place as a patriarchate before the Sees of Alexandria and Antioch.  Here's the canon:

Following in every way the decrees of the holy fathers and recognising the canon which has recently been read out–the canon of the 150 most devout bishops who assembled in the time of the great Theodosius of pious memory, then emperor, in imperial Constantinople, new Rome — we issue the same decree and resolution concerning the prerogatives of the most holy church of the same Constantinople, new Rome. The fathers rightly accorded prerogatives to the see of older Rome, since that is an imperial city; and moved by the same purpose the 150 most devout bishops apportioned equal prerogatives to the most holy see of new Rome, reasonably judging that the city which is honoured by the imperial power and senate and enjoying privileges equalling older imperial Rome, should also be elevated to her level in ecclesiastical affairs and take second place after her. The metropolitans of the dioceses of Pontus, Asia and Thrace, but only these, as well as the bishops of these dioceses who work among non-Greeks, are to be ordained by the aforesaid most holy see of the most holy church in Constantinople. That is, each metropolitan of the aforesaid dioceses along with the bishops of the province ordain the bishops of the province, as has been declared in the divine canons; but the metropolitans of the aforesaid dioceses, as has been said, are to be ordained by the archbishop of Constantinople, once agreement has been reached by vote in the usual way and has been reported to him.  (Text from Papal Encyclicals Online, taken originally from Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, edited by Norman P. Tanner)

The papal legates strongly objected to this canon and refused to approve it.  Constantinople had tried back at the second ecumenical council (the First Council of Constantinople) to do the same thing, but this had never been approved by Rome.  The council refused to rescind the canon, despite the protests of the papal legates.  They sent a deferential letter to Rome, however, asking the Pope to approve and confirm the canon.  Anatolius, the Patriarch of Constantinople, also sent a letter explaining things to the Pope and asking for his confirmation.  Here is a selection from his letter:

    4. . . . As there was no doubt that your holiness and your church possessed still higher honour, the synod willingly confirmed the canon of the 150 fathers [who had met at the First Council of Constantinople] that the bishop of Constantinople should have the next rank after the most holy Roman see, since Constantinople is new Rome. And they further decreed that he should ordain the metropolitains of the provinces of Pontus, Asia, and Thrace, the bishops under them being ordained by their own metropolitans, a decree by which the see of Constantinople lost several rights of ordination which it had exercised for sixty or seventy years.
    5. But when all things were going well, and were joyfully concluding, the most pious bishops [and papal legates] Paschasinus and Lucentius and the most reverend presbyter Boniface (who had often been informed by us about this same matter), not knowing the intention of your holiness which you have towards the holiest church of Constantinople, after the sacred synod had signed and by subscription confirmed this decree, scorn the synod, and without cause throw the assembly into confusion, setting this see at nought, and bringing much occasion of insolence on me and on this most holy church of  Constantinople. Moreover these decrees had been drawn up in accordance with the will of our most pious emperors, the most magnificent and glorious judges of the council assisting by pronouncing the definition of the holy synod to be secure. . . . God is witness that we on our part, both before and after their arrival, were careful in all things which pertain to your glory and honour, and this being clear, it is also evident that similar honour and reverence was accorded to them. And in accordance with your dignity, the sacred synod has remitted this decree to your holiness, that we may obtain approval and confirmation from you; and we implore you, O most holy one, that this be made effective by you. For the throne of Constantinople has your apostolic throne as its father. . . .  (E. Giles, Documents Illustrating Papal Authority, A.D. 96-454 [London: S.P.C.K., 1952], 325-326, italics removed, bracketed words mine)

Leo, however, continued to refuse to accept the canon.  In a letter to the Empress Pulcheria (the wife of Marcian), he made this very plain:

    2. My brother and fellow bishop Anatolius, not sufficiently considering your grace's kindness and the favour of my assent, whereby he gained the priesthood of the church of Constantinople, instead of rejoicing at what he had gained, has been inflamed with undue desires beyond the measure of his rank, believing that his intemperate ambition could be advanced by the assertion that certain persons had signified their assent thereto by an extorted signature; in spite of the fact that my brethren and fellow bishops who represented me, faithfully and laudably expressed their dissent from these attempts, which are doomed to speedy failure.
    . . . For it is alleged that connivance at this sort of thing has been going on for about sixty years, a fact which the aforesaid bishop supposes will help his cause. . . .
    3. . . . Indeed resolutions of bishops which are repugnant to the rules of the holy canons composed at Nicaea, in conjunction with the loyalty of your faith, we dismiss as invalid, and by the authority of Peter, the blessed apostle, we absolutely disannul by a general decree in all ecclesiastical cases, obeying those laws which the Holy Ghost defined by the 318 bishops for the pacific observance of all priests, in such sort that even if a much greater
number were to pass a different decree from theirs, whatever was opposed to their constitution would have to be held in no respect.  (Ibid., 328, italics removed)

In a letter to Patriarch Anatolius himself, Leo points out one of the chief causes of Rome's antipathy to giving Constantinople second place--that it would usurp a rank that belonged by right to the Patriarchates of Alexandria and Antioch.

    . . . The rights of provincial primates may not be overthrown, nor may metropolitan bishops be defrauded of privileges based on antiquity. The see of Alexandria may not lose any of that dignity which it merited through S. Mark the evangelist, and disciple of blessed Peter, nor may the splendour of so great a church be obscured by another's clouds, Dioscorus having fallen through his persistence in impiety. The church of Antioch too, in which first, at the preaching of the blessed apostle Peter, the Christian name arose, must continue in the position assigned it by the fathers, and, being set in the third place, must never be lowered therefrom. For the see is on a different footing from the holders of it; and each individual's chief honour is his own integrity. And since that does not lose its proper worth in any place, how much more glorious must it be when placed in the magnificence of the city of Constantinople, where many priests may find, through your observance, both a defence of the canons of the fathers, and an example of uprightness! (Ibid., 329)

Patriarch Anatolius replied to Pope Leo by suggesting that the whole thing was not his idea in the first place and that, of course, the "whole force and confirmation" of the canon "was reserved for the authority of your blessedness."

    4. As for those things which the universal council of Chalcedon recently ordained in favour of the church of Constantinople, let your holiness be sure that there was no fault in me, who from my youth have always loved peace and quiet, keeping myself in humility. It was the most reverend clergy of the church of Constantinople who were eager about it, and
they were equally supported by the most reverend priests of those parts, who agreed about it. Even so the whole force and confirmation of the acts was reserved for the authority of your blessedness. Therefore let your holiness know for certain that I did nothing to further the matter, having always held myself bound to avoid the lusts of pride and covetousness.  
(Ibid., 330, italics removed)

Despite Anatolius's deference, however, the Eastern churches would continue to treat Constantinople as having second place in practice, and, eventually, when circumstances had much changed, Rome would finally accept this reality and grant the second place to Constantinople, but this didn't happen until the eighth ecumenical council in 869-870.

Acacian Schism and Formula of Hormisdas

In 482, the Emperor Zeno, following the suggestion of Acacius, Patriarch of Constantinople, wrote a document called the Henoticon, which attempted to state the doctrine of Christ's person and natures in a way that avoided touching on controversial issues that divided the Catholics from the Monophysites.  It also avoided mentioning the Council of Chalcedon.  In response to this, Pope Felix excommunicated Acacius for abandoning the Church's teaching at Chalcedon, and Acacius in turn rejected the Pope from communion.  Thus began what is known as the "Acacian schism".  It lasted about 35 years, from about 484 to 519.  What is particularly interesting about this schism is how it ended.  Most of the Eastern Christians remained faithful to Chalcedon, despite the defection of the Emperor and the Patriarch of Constantinople.  Finally a new Emperor came to the throne--Justin, who was accompanied by his nephew Justinian (who would later become Emperor himself).  These two chose the orthodox rather than the Monophysite side, and, in accordance with the desires of the populace, they reached out to the Pope (now Pope Hormisdas) in order to restore communion with the Apostolic See and with the West.  Pope Hormisdas had written up a document with the intention of requiring the Easterners to sign it before he would agree to come back into communion with them.  The document not only affirmed Chalcedonian orthodoxy, but it also contained a strong affirmation of the primacy of the Pope as the successor of St. Peter.  As we've seen, the Eastern Church leaders had a long history of taking the wrong side in doctrinal disputes, while Rome (due to the promise given to St. Peter, as everyone believed) defended the cause of orthodoxy.  Perhaps Pope Hormisdas, tiring of Rome's constant need to bring back erring Eastern leaders, decided to try to pin them down more formally to their own oft-professed conviction that all the churches should follow Rome's lead in doctrinal disputes because of the unique gift given to the Church of Rome to preserve orthodoxy.

This document that Pope Hormisdas had written up to be an instrument of renewed communion between East and West was called the libellus.  It has been known to history as the Formula of Pope Hormisdas.  All the Easterners signed it without any (known) reservations whatsoever regarding the papal claims in it.  And they didn't reject those papal claims until many centuries later.  Here is what the Formula said:

     The first condition of salvation is to keep the norm of the true faith and in no way to deviate from the established doctrine of the Fathers.  For it is impossible that the words of our Lord Jesus Christ who said, "Thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build my Church" (Matt. 16:18), should not be verified.  And their truth has been proved by the course of history, for in the Apostolic See the Catholic religion has always been kept unsullied.  From this hope and faith we by no means desire to be separated and, following the doctrine of the Fathers, we declare anathema all heresies [Here follows a long list of condemned heresies and heretics] . . .
     Following, as we have said before, the Apostolic See in all things and proclaiming all its decisions, we endorse and approve all the letters which Pope St. Leo wrote concerning the Christian religion.  And so I hope I may deserve to be associated with you in the one communion which the Apostolic See proclaims, in which the whole, true, and perfect security of the Christian religion resides.  I promise that from now on those who are separated from the communion of the Catholic Church, that is, who are not in agreement with the Apostolic See, will not have their names read during the sacred mysteries.  But if I attempt even the least deviation from my profession, I admit that, according to my own declaration, I am an accomplice to those whom I have condemned.  I have signed this my profession with my own hand and have directed it to you, Hormisdas, the holy and venerable pope of Rome.  (Jesuit Fathers of St. Mary's College, St. Mary's, Kansas, The Church Teaches: Documents of the Church in English Translation, tr. John F. Clarkson, et al. [Tan, 2009])

So here we have the Eastern churches formally affirming what they had always affirmed before regarding the Church of Rome.  But now the Pope had it in writing in a more specific way as an aid to Eastern memory when the next heretical movement should come along.  In the next century, the great Eastern saint and theologian St. Maximus the Confessor, revered to this day by both Catholics and Eastern Orthodox, articulated the common view of the Eastern churches regarding the Church of Rome:

All the ends of the inhabited world, and those who anywhere on earth confess the Lord with a pure and orthodox faith, look directly to the most holy Church of the Romans and her confession and faith as to a sun of eternal light, receiving from her the radiant beam of the patristic and holy doctrines, just as the holy six synods, inspired and sacred, purely and with all devotion set them forth, uttering most clearly the symbol of faith. For, from the time of the descent to us of the incarnate Word of God, all the Churches of the Christians everywhere have held and possess this most great Church as the sole base and foundation, since, according to the very promise of the Saviour, it will never be overpowered by the gates of hell, but rather has the keys of the orthodox faith and confession in him, and to those who approach it with reverence it opens the genuine and unique piety, but shuts and stops every heretical mouth that speaks utter wickedness.  (Footnotes removed--the quotation is from "The Ecclesiology of St. Maximos the Confessor," by Andrew Louth, published in the International Journal for the Study of the Christian Church, Vol. 4, No. 2, July 2004, p. 116.)

John Chapman, Studies on the Early Papacy, pp. 210-216.

Semipelagianism

Pelagianism had been condemned.  However, Augustine's doctrines about grace, sin, free will, etc., did not sit well with some.  In Gaul and elsewhere, a movement arose to adopt a kind of middle ground between Augustinianism and Pelagianism.  Sure, they said, we need grace to be able to do good.  But we don't want to say that everything good in us is a supernatural gift of grace.  What about our choice to accept grace?  Grace is offered to us, but we have to accept it, and that acceptance is something we contribute.  Otherwise, what would make the difference between a person who accepts God's grace and a person who rejects it?  If acceptance of grace is itself a gift of grace, then it is a gift that God must give to some and not to others, for not all accept grace.  But this would seem to lead to a kind of predestinarian sort of view in which God chooses some to bring to salvation and not others, and it doesn't seem to leave enough room to the freedom of the will to accept or reject grace.  Not all the opponents of full Augustinianism held the same views on everything, but the outline I've just given emerged out of the movement as a kind of general tendency.

Augustine vigorously opposed this new movement, and so did his followers--especially his greatest disciple, St. Prosper of Aquitaine--although Augustine was much more sympathetic towards the Semipelagians than he was towards the Pelagians, as he recognized their position as a plausible one that could be born of confusion.  He himself had been confused on some of these points earlier in his life.

The controversy raged on for some time, even after St. Augustine's death.  Finally, in 529, the staunch Augustinian St. Caesarius, Bishop of the city of Arles in Gaul, got approval from Rome to call a council in the city of Orange.  The council strongly affirmed that all good, even the good of the good will itself that accepts and cooperates with grace, is a gift of grace, and it strongly condemned the Semipelagian notion that our good will, or the beginning of our good will, is from ourselves and is not a gift of supernatural grace.  The decisions and teaching of this council were confirmed by Pope Boniface II in 530 and so became binding on the universal Church.  Here are some selections from the Second Council of Orange:

Canon 5. If anyone says that not only the increase of faith but also its beginning and the very desire for faith, by which we believe in Him who justifies the ungodly and comes to the regeneration of holy baptism — if anyone says that this belongs to us by nature and not by a gift of grace, that is, by the inspiration of the Holy Spirit amending our will and turning it from unbelief to faith and from godlessness to godliness, it is proof that he is opposed to the teaching of the Apostles, for blessed Paul says, "And I am sure that he who began a good work in you will bring it to completion at the day of Jesus Christ" (Phil. 1:6). And again, "For by grace you have been saved through faith; and this is not your own doing, it is the gift of God" (Eph. 2:8). For those who state that the faith by which we believe in God is natural make all who are separated from the Church of Christ by definition in some measure believers.

Canon 6. If anyone says that God has mercy upon us when, apart from his grace, we believe, will, desire, strive, labor, pray, watch, study, seek, ask, or knock, but does not confess that it is by the infusion and inspiration of the Holy Spirit within us that we have the faith, the will, or the strength to do all these things as we ought; or if anyone makes the assistance of grace depend on the humility or obedience of man and does not agree that it is a gift of grace itself that we are obedient and humble, he contradicts the Apostle who says, "What have you that you did not receive?" (1 Cor. 4:7), and, "But by the grace of God I am what I am" (1 Cor. 15:10).

Canon 7. If anyone affirms that we can form any right opinion or make any right choice which relates to the salvation of eternal life, as is expedient for us, or that we can be saved, that is, assent to the preaching of the gospel through our natural powers without the illumination and inspiration of the Holy Spirit, who makes all men gladly assent to and believe in the truth, he is led astray by a heretical spirit, and does not understand the voice of God who says in the Gospel, "For apart from me you can do nothing" (John 15:5), and the word of the Apostle, "Not that we are competent of ourselves to claim anything as coming from us; our competence is from God" (2 Cor. 3:5).

Canon 12. Of what sort we are whom God loves. God loves us for what we shall be by his gift, and not by our own deserving.

Canon 22. Concerning those things that belong to man. No man has anything of his own but untruth and sin. But if a man has any truth or righteousness, it is from that fountain for which we must thirst in this desert, so that we may be refreshed from it as by drops of water and not faint on the way.  (Canons of the Second Council of Orange [529 AD], retrieved from the EWTN website at https://www.ewtn.com/catholicism/library/local-council-history-and-text-1472)

Just a couple of years ago, in March of 2018, Pope Francis issued an Apostolic Exhortation, Gaudete et Exsultate, in which (among many other things) he reaffirmed the condemnation of Semipelagianism and the teachings of the Second Council of Orange on the utter graciousness of our salvation.  The following is from Gaudete et Exsultate, Chapter Two, sections 47-56 (found on the Vatican website--footnotes and section number headings removed):

Gnosticism gave way to another heresy, likewise present in our day. . . . The same power that the gnostics attributed to the intellect, others now began to attribute to the human will, to personal effort. This was the case with the pelagians and semi-pelagians. Now it was not intelligence that took the place of mystery and grace, but our human will. It was forgotten that everything “depends not on human will or exertion, but on God who shows mercy” (Rom 9:16) and that “he first loved us” (cf. 1 Jn 4:19). . . . 
The Church has repeatedly taught that we are justified not by our own works or efforts, but by the grace of the Lord, who always takes the initiative. The Fathers of the Church, even before Saint Augustine, clearly expressed this fundamental belief. Saint John Chrysostom said that God pours into us the very source of all his gifts even before we enter into battle. Saint Basil the Great remarked that the faithful glory in God alone, for “they realize that they lack true justice and are justified only through faith in Christ”. 
The Second Synod of Orange taught with firm authority that nothing human can demand, merit or buy the gift of divine grace, and that all cooperation with it is a prior gift of that same grace: “Even the desire to be cleansed comes about in us through the outpouring and working of the Holy Spirit”. Subsequently, the Council of Trent, while emphasizing the importance of our cooperation for spiritual growth, reaffirmed that dogmatic teaching: “We are said to be justified gratuitously because nothing that precedes justification, neither faith nor works, merits the grace of justification; for ‘if it is by grace, it is no longer on the basis of works; otherwise, grace would no longer be grace’ (Rom 11:6)”. 
The Catechism of the Catholic Church also reminds us that the gift of grace “surpasses the power of human intellect and will” and that “with regard to God, there is no strict right to any merit on the part of man. Between God and us there is an immeasurable inequality”. His friendship infinitely transcends us; we cannot buy it with our works, it can only be a gift born of his loving initiative. This invites us to live in joyful gratitude for this completely unmerited gift, since “after one has grace, the grace already possessed cannot come under merit”. The saints avoided putting trust in their own works: “In the evening of this life, I shall appear before you empty-handed, for I do not ask you, Lord, to count my works. All our justices have stains in your sight”. 
This is one of the great convictions that the Church has come firmly to hold. It is so clearly expressed in the word of God that there can be no question of it. Like the supreme commandment of love, this truth should affect the way we live, for it flows from the heart of the Gospel and demands that we not only accept it intellectually but also make it a source of contagious joy.

If our salvation is entirely a gift of supernatural grace, this does indeed raise the question of why some are saved and not others, and this leads naturally into questions surrounding things like predestination, free will, etc.  Catholic theologians have discussed these issues for centuries.  The Church, while avoiding spending too much time trying to define all the myriad complexities and intricacies of these issues, has recognized certain central truths as important.  One can take a look at this article to see my own summary of Church teachings and Catholic theology based on Church teachings regarding these subjects.

https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/13703a.htm - Catholic Encyclopedia article on Semipelagianism and the history of the controversy.

The Fifth Ecumenical Council: Constantinople II

In the year 551, the Emperor Justinian decided to condemn three selections out of the works of three different authors.  The authors were Theodore of Mopsuestia, Ibas of Edessa, and Theodoret of Cyrus.  These works had long been suspected or accused by various people of tending towards or advocating Nestorianism.  Ever since the split between the Catholics and the Monophysites (or Miaphysites, if you will, though when speaking historically I tend to continue to use the term "Monophysite" since this is the term that has been most commonly used in historical literature on this subject), there had been a great effort on the part of Catholics, Monophysites, and the Emperors to end the schism and reconcile the divided parties.  We saw earlier how the Emperor Zeno had put forward his Henoticon as another such effort to placate the Monophysites.  The Emperors were particularly interesting in reconciling the Monophysites, not only as a matter of faith, charity, and unity (though we shouldn't underestimate these motives), but also because the Monophysites, unlike the Nestorians, were still living within the boundaries of the Roman Empire, and so the disunity between Catholics and Monophysites caused much tension within the Empire and threatened its unity.  So, in 551, Justinian made another attempt to placate the Monophysites by condemning selections from sections of the works of Theodore, Ibas, and Theodoret which were particularly offensive to the Monophysites.  Justinian was probably hoping that if the Catholic Church and the Empire could show that they condemned these Nestorian-suspected writings, they might mitigate the charge of the Monophysites that their own doctrine--that is, the doctrine of Chalcedon--was Nestorian.

Well, the condemnation of the Three Chapters--as these three selections of writings came to be known --didn't end up reconciling the Monophysites.  It did cause some other temporary schisms, however, because the move was very controversial--not because it condemned Nestorianism, which everyone involved in the discussion agreed was a good thing to do, but because it condemned writings from men who had died in good standing within the Church (and some of whom had been exonerated from suspicion of heresy by the Council of Chalcedon).  To some people, therefore, the condemnation of the Three Chapters seemed to be a slight against good men and against the rulings of the Council of Chalcedon.  Pope Vigilius in particular was, at first anyway, opposed to the condemnation of the Three Chapters, as were the Western bishops in general, and even most of the Eastern bishops at first were at best reluctant to go along with Justinian's plan.  But emperors tend to be good at getting what they want, and so Justinian ended up eventually bringing everyone around to his own point of view in one way or another.

I've told this story elsewhere, particularly as it pertains to Pope Vigilius, who did some waffling during the whole affair that has given ammunition to some people to ask questions about the infallibility of the Apostolic See of Rome.  Please see the article below for more on this story.



The Sixth Ecumenical Council: Constantinople III

So the condemnation of the Three Chapters had failed to reunite the Catholics and the Monophysites.  But there was still a strong desire to accomplish this, and other attempts were made.  During the 620s through the 630s, a movement arose to promote the idea that Christ, being a unified Person who was both divine and human, had only "one energy".  In other words, Christ had only one source of operation or activity, since he was only one Person.  When Christ performed an act, there was only one act performed.  When Christ, for example, made an act of will--for example, when he chose his Twelve Apostles--there was only one Person acting, and so only one act.  So talking about "one energy" was a way of stressing the unity of the one Person of Christ.  You can see how this might have been used to try to placate the Monophysites, since their big concern was to protect the unity of the one divine Person and their great fear was that the Catholic, Chalcedonian position was Nestorian because it too much divided the human from the divine in Christ.

Anyway, this idea of Christ having "one energy" was promoted especially by Sergius, the Patriarch of Constantinople.  The Emperor Heraclius accepted it and promoted it as well.  Eventually, Sergius and Heraclius convinced the Patriarch of Antioch and the Patriarch of Alexandria to agree as well.  But not everyone was convinced.  Particularly, Sophronius, who became Patriarch of Jerusalem in 634, objected strongly to the doctrine.  He asserted that Christ had two energies and not one.  He agreed that Christ was a single person, but he pointed out that if Christ really was both human and divine, he would have to have a human version and a divine version of all the faculties of a person.  He would have to have a human mind and a divine mind, a human will and a divine will, etc.  And therefore when Christ performs an action--say, makes a choice--there must be the exercise of both the human will and the divine will, which would mean there are two acts.  Now, the two activities are bound together without any conflict, and they totally agree, so that they can be two different forms of the act of one unified Person, but they are still two acts, because there is both a human faculty and a divine faculty acting.

Perhaps I can make this clearer by going back to my author-novel analogy I introduced earlier when we were discussing the formula of the Council of Chalcedon.  I am an author, and I have written a novel, and I have written myself into my novel as a character.  When my character who is me does something--say, chooses to eat a cheeseburger--there is one person acting.  I choose, in my character nature, to eat a cheeseburger.  My character's choice is my choice, the choice of the one person who is me.  However, since I am both fully character and fully author, we can talk about the act of choice coming from me as the author, but also coming from me as a character.  My character nature has a will, and my author nature has a will, and they are both active in my character's choice.  I think this is even more obvious when we think about the faculty of mind or thought.  I have a certain perspective as the author (I'm outside of the time and space of my novel, etc.), and I have a different perspective as a character (I see things from within the time and space of the novel, etc.).  So when my character thinks, it is I who am thinking, it is the thinking of the unified person who is me.  But in a way there are also two acts.  There is the act of thinking done by my character mind, and there is the act of thinking done by my author mind.  So when Christ thinks, there is one Person thinking, but he is thinking with both his human mind (within time and space) and his divine mind (outside of time and space), so both the human and the divine faculties are acting, making two acts, but two acts that are completely unified as the thinking of one Person.  It's complicated, but hopefully this helps give an idea of what everyone was arguing about.  Sophornius of Jerusalem was concerned that talking about "one energy" in Christ had the effect of communicating the idea that Christ did not truly have two natures with their own full sets of faculties, both of which are acting when Christ acts.

Sophronius seemed to be gaining ground in his opposition to the "one energy" doctrine, so Sergius decided to write to Pope Honorius of Rome.  He didn't promote the "one energy" doctrine to the Pope, but instead tried to convince Honorius that it is better if people avoid arguing about the subject of "one energy" vs. "two energies" altogether.  Sergius admitted that the language of "one energy" was confusing and offensive to some, but he asserted that the language of "two energies" is at least equally problematic, since it makes it sound like Christ has two wills which might be in conflict with each other.

Pope Honorius wrote back to Sergius and agreed with him--people should stop arguing about "one energy" vs. "two energies".  He affirmed that Christ has only "one will", because in Christ the humanity and the divinity are in complete agreement, being faculties of one single Person.  Thus, there can be no idea of two opposing wills, or two wills willing in contradiction to each other.

Eventually, the argument about energies died down.  But, in its place, discussion began to occur about whether or not Christ has one or two wills.  Sergius and the Emperor Heraclius began promoting the idea that Christ has only one will.  Eventually, this campaign was very successful, and all the patriarchs of the East accepted it.  Sergius died in the year 638, and so did Sophronius of Jerusalem and Pope Honorius.  But Sergius's successor in Constantinople continued to promote the one will doctrine (which came to be called Monothelitism - Greek for "one will").  Sophronius's successor in Jerusalem also accepted it, so all the Eastern patriarchs accepted it.

But Rome would not accept it, and so a conflict began (yet again) between East and West.  The Eastern patriarchs pointed out that Pope Honorius, in his letter to Sergius, had affirmed that Christ had "one will".  Honorius's successors replied that what Honorius had affirmed was something completely different from what the Monothelities were now promoting.  Honorius had used the language of "one will" in order to say that Christ did not have two conflicting wills.  He was not intending to make a metaphysical affirmation regarding whether both the divine nature and the human nature have their own faculty of willing.  What the Monothelites were arguing, however, said the Popes, amounted to a capitulation to Monophysitism, denying that Christ has a truly human will but affirming only his divine will.  But if Christ's human nature did not have a human will, it would not have been a truly complete human nature, for how can you be human without having a human faculty of willing?  The Monothelite position seemed akin to the earlier Apollinarian position which affirmed that Christ had only a divine mind but not a human mind.  So the Popes strenuously opposed the Monothelite position as a compromise of the true and full humanity of Christ.  This was of crucial importance, for if Christ was not truly and fully human, he could not save us from our sins.  He could not take upon himself our sins and truly suffer and die for them, making himself an offering to God as an act of righteousness.

The Emperor Heraclius died in 641, and his successor, Emperor Constans II, tired of the controversy, ordered that everyone must stop arguing about whether Christ had one or two wills.  Those who continued to argue about this, he persecuted.  Pope Martin I (who was Pope from 649 to 655) held a council in Rome condemning Monothelitism, and the Emperor had him kidnapped and brought to Constantinople where he was imprisoned and tortured, leading eventually to his death.  The great defender of orthodox teaching St. Maximus the Confessor was also tortured by Emperor Constans II for fighting against Monothelitism.

But Constantine IV, who succeeded Constans II when he died in 668, affirmed the Dyothelite ("two wills") position.  He called for an ecumenical council to settle the dispute once and for all.  The council condemned Monothelitism and affirmed Dyothelitism.

Following the five holy Ecumenical Councils and the holy and approved Fathers, with one voice defining that our Lord Jesus Christ must be confessed to be very God and very man, one of the holy and consubstantial and life-giving Trinity, perfect in Deity and perfect in humanity, very God and very man, of a reasonable soul and human body subsisting; consubstantial with the Father as touching his Godhead and consubstantial with us as touching his manhood; in all things like unto us, sin only excepted; begotten of his Father before all ages according to his Godhead, but in these last days for us men and for our salvation made man of the Holy Ghost and of the Virgin Mary, strictly and properly the Mother of God according to the flesh; one and the same Christ our Lord the only-begotten Son of two natures unconfusedly, unchangeably, inseparably indivisibly to be recognized, the peculiarities of neither nature being lost by the union but rather the proprieties of each nature being preserved, concurring in one Person and in one subsistence, not parted or divided into two persons but one and the same only-begotten Son of God, the Word, our Lord Jesus Christ, according as the Prophets of old have taught us and as our Lord Jesus Christ himself hath instructed us, and the Creed of the holy Fathers hath delivered to us; defining all this we likewise declare that in him are two natural wills and two natural operations indivisibly, inconvertibly, inseparably, inconfusedly, according to the teaching of the holy Fathers.  And these two natural wills are not contrary the one to the other (God forbid!) as the impious heretics assert, but his human will follows and that not as resisting and reluctant, but rather as subject to his divine and omnipotent will.  For it was right that the flesh should be moved but subject to the divine will, according to the most wise Athanasius.  For as his flesh is called and is the flesh of God the Word, so also the natural will of his flesh is called and is the proper will of God the Word, as he himself says:  "I came down from heaven, not that I might do mine own will but the will of the Father which sent me!" where he calls his own will the will of his flesh, inasmuch as his flesh was also his own.  For as his most holy and immaculate animated flesh was not destroyed because it was deified but continued in its own state and nature (oro te kai logo), so also his human will, although deified, was not suppressed, but was rather preserved according to the saying of Gregory Theologus:  "His will [i.e., the Saviour's] is not contrary to God but altogether deified."

We glorify two natural operations indivisibly, immutably, inconfusedly, inseparably in the same our Lord Jesus Christ our true God, that is to say a divine operation and a human operation, according to the divine preacher Leo, who most distinctly asserts as follows:  "For each form (morphe) does in communion with the other what pertains properly to it, the Word, namely, doing that which pertains to the Word, and the flesh that which pertains to the flesh."

For we will not admit one natural operation in God and in the creature, as we will not exalt into the divine essence what is created, nor will we bring down the glory of the divine nature to the place suited to the creature.

We recognize the miracles and the sufferings as of one and the same [Person], but of one or of the other nature of which he is and in which he exists, as Cyril admirably says.  Preserving therefore the inconfusedness and indivisibility, we make briefly this whole confession, believing our Lord Jesus Christ to be one of the Trinity and after the incarnation our true God, we say that his two natures shone forth in his one subsistence in which he both performed the miracles and endured the sufferings through the whole of his economic conversation (di holes autou tes oikonomkes anastrophes), and that not in appearance only but in very deed, and this by reason of the difference of nature which must be recognized in the same Person, for although joined together yet each nature wills and does the things proper to it and that indivisibly and inconfusedly.  Wherefore we confess two wills and two operations, concurring most fitly in him for the salvation of the human race.

These things, therefore, with all diligence and care having been formulated by us, we define that it be permitted to no one to bring forward, or to write, or to compose, or to think, or to teach a different faith.  Whosoever shall presume to compose a different faith, or to propose, or teach, or hand to those wishing to be converted to the knowledge of the truth, from the Gentiles or Jews, or from any heresy, any different Creed; or to introduce a new voice or invention of speech to subvert these things which now have been determined by us, all these, if they be Bishops or clerics let them be deposed, the Bishops from the Episcopate, the clerics from the clergy; but if they be monks or laymen:  let them be anathematized.  (From the declaration of faith made by the Fathers of the Third Council of Constantinople, taken from the plain text version on the CCEL website)

Thus ended the controversy.  The council's decisions were sent to Pope Leo II, and he approved and confirmed them.

The council, along with condemning Sergius and others who had promoted the Monothelite position, also condemned Pope Honorius for aiding and abetting Monothelitism by affirming "one will" in his letter to Sergius.  Earlier Popes and others, as I mentioned above, had defended Honorius as intending something different by his "one will" language than the Monothelites later intended.  But Leo II and subsequent Popes accepted the council's condemnation of Honorius on the grounds that he had failed to adequately safeguard the truth in his correspondence with Sergius.  He had not perceived and used his authority to condemn the nascent error, and so had, in effect, aided and abetted its growth and influence.


Discuss in classhttps://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2019/07/historical-challenges-to-infallibility_30.html - In this article, I go more deeply into the issue of Pope Honorius and his relationship to the Monothelite heresy, and I respond to the concern that the whole affair is a challenge to the idea of papal infallibility and reliability.  The article also highlights the important role played by the Popes and their teachings at the sixth ecumenical council.

The Seventh Ecumenical Council: Nicaea II

During the first half of the 8th century, Emperor Leo III (often called "the Isaurian" because he founded the Isaurian dynasty) became convinced that it was wrong to have and make use of images--pictures, representations, of Christ, of Mary, of the saints, etc.--in the Church.  He began a campaign to remove images from all over his empire.  He appointed a patriarch in Constantinople who would support his cause.  The other Eastern patriarchs and the Pope opposed him.  Most of the general populace was opposed to him.

In the Old Testament, images of God are forbidden, and in general the worship of images is forbidden.  However, God sometimes makes use of a kind of image to represent himself (see Daniel 7 and God's representation of himself in Daniel's vision as the "Ancient of Days", for example).  In the New Testament, God himself becomes a human being and thus becomes, in a new way, picturable.  But the New Testament never addresses whether the Incarnation should affect the Christian attitude towards the use of images.  In the first few centuries of the Church, we see moderate images in Christian churches.  There are paintings of biblical scenes, and even subtle representations of Christ in different forms in paintings in the catacombs where Christians worshiped, etc.  Over the centuries, the practice of having images in churches grew.  After Constantine declared Christianity legal, Christians were able to build large and well-decorated public buildings to use as churches, and over time we see more and more Christian art in these churches.  Over time, Christians began to make use of images in their worship--not worshiping the images themselves, but using them as symbols of Christ and therefore as an aid to worshiping Christ, or using an image of a saint to facilitate communion with the saint, etc.

Interestingly, very little is actually explicitly said or argued regarding the growing use of images, either for or against, throughout the first 700 years of Church history.  It was never a significant point of controversy for most people in the Church.  The fact that, by 700, images are in nearly all of the churches and we have abundant evidence that they were used in Christian devotion shows that the general attitude towards them was positive, but we have very little explicit argumentation on their behalf.  Likewise, we have very little evidence of any opposition to them.  There are a few examples of opposition.  Around the year 305 or 306, a major synod held in Spain (in the city of Elvira) made a negative statement regarding images:

It has seemed good that images should not be in churches so that what is venerated and worshiped not be painted on the walls.  (Canon 36, Synod of Elvira, taken from the Wikipedia page on the subject)

People have disputed exactly what this canon was after.  Was it intended as a general prohibition of images in churches on principle?  Was it a more temporary or limited prohibition due to fear of idolatrous use of images at a particular point in time?  It is difficult to say, seeing that we have only this one sentence with no surrounding commentary to go on.

Probably the best example of a negative attitude towards images in the earlier days of the Church comes from a letter written by St. Epiphanius of Salamis, in which he discusses an incident involving a church curtain that happened while he was traveling.  The letter is from around 394:

Moreover, I have heard that certain persons have this grievance against me: When I accompanied you to the holy place called Bethel, there to join you in celebrating the Collect, after the use of the Church, I came to a villa called Anablatha and, as I was passing, saw a lamp burning there. Asking what place it was, and learning it to be a church, I went in to pray, and found there a curtain hanging on the doors of the said church, dyed and embroidered.  It bore an image either of Christ or of one of the saints; I do not rightly remember whose the image was. Seeing this, and being loth that an image of a man should be hung up in Christ's church contrary to the teaching of the Scriptures, I tore it asunder and advised the custodians of the place to use it as a winding sheet for some poor person. They, however, murmured, and said that if I made up my mind to tear it, it was only fair that I should give them another curtain in its place. As soon as I heard this, I promised that I would give one, and said that I would send it at once. Since then there has been some little delay, due to the fact that I have been seeking a curtain of the best quality to give to them instead of the former one, and thought it right to send to Cyprus for one. I have now sent the best that I could find, and I beg that you will order the presbyter of the place to take the curtain which I have sent from the hands of the Reader, and that you will afterwards give directions that curtains of the other sort--opposed as they are to our religion--shall not be hung up in any church of Christ. A man of your uprightness should be careful to remove an occasion of offence unworthy alike of the Church of Christ and of those Christians who are committed to your charge. ("From Epiphanius, Bishop of Salamis, in Cyprus, to John, Bishop of Jerusalem", found in plain text on the CCEL website, footnotes removed)

There are a couple of other possible references to a negative attitude to images from the first 700 years, and that's about it.  In general, the use of images grew in the practice of the Church without any real opposition.

But in the early 700s, this changed.  Islam had spread rapidly in various parts of the world, and had become a next-door-neighbor to the Roman (Byzantine) Empire.  Emperor Leo III may have been moved by the growing complexity and extravagance of image-use in the churches, combined with arguments from the Muslims (who were strongly anti-image) who reminded him of biblical prohibitions on images from the Old Testament.  But whatever his motivation, as I mentioned above, he became very opposed to images and began to work to systematically eliminate them and to persecute those who didn't want to give them up.

In 741, Leo III died, and his son Constantine V succeeded him.  In 754, Constantine decided to call an ecumenical council to establish definitively the anti-image point of view.  The Patriarchate of Constantinople was represented, but no representatives were sent from the other major patriarchates--Rome, Alexandria, Antioch, and Jerusalem.  As expected, the council, which met in the city of Hieria, condemned images and established the iconoclast ("destruction of images") point of view.

After the council, Constantine V continued to work to impose the iconoclast position all over the Empire.  He removed images of Christ and the saints from the churches and persecuted those who supported them.  The Catholic Encyclopedia article on "Iconaclasm" makes this humorous observation:  "Instead of paintings of saints the churches were decorated with pictures of flowers, fruit, and birds, so that the people said that they looked like grocery stores and bird shops" (footnotes removed).  Leo IV became emperor after Constantine V, and he continued to oppose images.

When Leo IV died, his son, Constantine VI, was only nine years old, and so Leo IV's wife, Irene, acting as regent, took charge of the empire at that time.  Irene was a strong supporter of images.  She, along with Tarasius, the new Patriarch of Constantinople, who was also a supporter of images, decided to call a new council to undo the previous iconoclast council.  They sought the help and approval of Pope Adrian to do this, and he agreed and sent legates.  The council was convened at Nicaea in the year 787.  It condemned the iconoclast position and affirmed the validity of images in the Church, also clarifying how they are to be used properly and how to avoid using them improperly.  Here is a selection from the council's confession of faith (from the plain text on the CCEL website):

To make our confession short, we keep unchanged all the ecclesiastical traditions handed down to us, whether in writing or verbally, one of which is the making of pictorial representations, agreeable to the history of the preaching of the Gospel, a tradition useful in many respects, but especially in this, that so the incarnation of the Word of God is shown forth as real and not merely phantastic, for these have mutual indications and without doubt have also mutual significations.

We, therefore, following the royal pathway and the divinely inspired authority of our Holy Fathers and the traditions of the Catholic Church (for, as we all know, the Holy Spirit indwells her), define with all certitude and accuracy that just as the figure of the precious and life-giving Cross, so also the venerable and holy images, as well in painting and mosaic as of other fit materials, should be set forth in the holy churches of God, and on the sacred vessels and on the vestments and on hangings and in pictures both in houses and by the wayside, to wit, the figure of our Lord God and Saviour Jesus Christ, of our spotless Lady, the Mother of God, of the honourable Angels, of all Saints and of all pious people.  For by so much more frequently as they are seen in artistic representation, by so much more readily are men lifted up to the memory of their prototypes, and to a longing after them; and to these should be given due salutation and honourable reverence (aspasmon kai timetiken proskunesin), not indeed that true worship of faith (latreian) which pertains alone to the divine nature; but to these, as to the figure of the precious and life-giving Cross and to the Book of the Gospels and to the other holy objects, incense and lights may be offered according to ancient pious custom.  For the honour which is paid to the image passes on to that which the image represents, and he who reveres the image reveres in it the subject represented.  For thus the teaching of our holy Fathers, that is the tradition of the Catholic Church, which from one end of the earth to the other hath received the Gospel, is strengthened.  Thus we follow Paul, who spake in Christ, and the whole divine Apostolic company and the holy Fathers, holding fast the traditions which we have received. So we sing prophetically the triumphal hymns of the Church, "Rejoice greatly, O daughter of Sion; Shout, O daughter of Jerusalem.  Rejoice and be glad with all thy heart.  The Lord hath taken away from thee the oppression of thy adversaries; thou art redeemed from the hand of thine enemies.  The Lord is a King in the midst of thee; thou shalt not see evil any more, and peace be unto thee forever."

Those, therefore who dare to think or teach otherwise, or as wicked heretics to spurn the traditions of the Church and to invent some novelty, or else to reject some of those things which the Church hath received (e.g., the Book of the Gospels, or the image of the cross, or the pictorial icons, or the holy reliques of a martyr), or evilly and sharply to devise anything subversive of the lawful traditions of the Catholic Church or to turn to common uses the sacred vessels or the venerable monasteries, if they be Bishops or Clerics, we command that they be deposed; if religious or laics, that they be cut off from communion.  

https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/11045a.htm - Catholic Encyclopedia article on the Second Council of Nicaea.

https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/07620a.htm - Catholic Encyclopedia article on Iconoclasm.

https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/07664a.htm - Catholic Encyclopedia article on the veneration of images.

https://www.vatican.va/archive/ccc_css/archive/catechism/p3s2c1a1.htm - Here, in #2129-2132, you can find the Catechism of the Catholic Church's brief discussion of images.

The Eighth Ecumenical Council: Constantinople IV

The course of events that led up to the eighth ecumenical council was rooted in politics.  In the year 857, Byzantine Emperor Michael III deposed Ignatius from being Patriarch of Constantinople.  In his place, he put a man names Photius, who had previously been a layman.  Photius was very quickly put through various advances and ordinations and went from layman to bishop and Patriarch of Constantinople in about six days.  Ignatius's deposition and Photius's rapid advancement caused a great deal of controversy within the Church of Constantinople and beyond.  Eventually, some of Ignatius's supporters appealed to Pope Nicholas I, who sent legates to see what was going on and to provide information to help him decide between the claims of Ignatius and Photius.  The legates, while there, were persuaded (perhaps bribed) by the Emperor and the supporters of Photius and gave their approval to his cause.  After coming home, however, the Pope was greatly displeased with them for coming to a decision without consulting him.  Upon further investigation, Pope Nicholas decided to rule in favor of Ignatius instead.  The Emperor and Photius refused to listen, and, in response, Photius convened a council and excommunicated the Pope.  There was also, at this time, an ongoing controversy over which church--Rome or Constantinople--had proper jurisdiction over the recently-converted Bulgarians and their infant church.  The Westerners (Latins) and the Easterners (Greeks) disagreed about how to approach some aspects of the missionary work there.  In his attack on the Pope and the Westerners, Photius complained of certain Latin customs and practices, particularly the fact that some Westerners had added the words "and the Son" to the Niceno-Constantinopolitan Creed.  ". . . who proceeds from the Father and the Son" (in Latin, it's the word filioque).  Not all Westerners had added these words.  The Pope had not added them (though later the whole Western church including the Pope would add them, though it would not be required of the Eastern churches), but some Westerners had added them.

But then there was a change of political regime in Constantinople.  In 867, Michael III was killed and was replaced by his killer, Basil the Macedonian.  (This sort of thing was not as uncommon as one might wish in Byzantine politics.)  Basil didn't like Photius, and he deposed him and reinstated Ignatius.  He wrote to the Pope about this, and the Pope (now Adrian II) agreed with Emperor Basil to convene an ecumenical council.  The Pope sent legates, and all the Eastern Patriarchs--Constantinople, Alexandria, Antioch, and Jerusalem--were represented as well.  The council was held in 869-870.  At the very beginning of this council, the papal legates, who presided, required all the attending bishops to again sign the Formula of Hormisdas, which we talked about and quoted from earlier in our section on the "Acacian Schism" and which affirmed the divine institution of the papacy and the divine requirement to follow the leading of the Apostolic See of Rome.  They all did so.  After this, the council passed 27 canons which addressed a number of issues.  The council reaffirmed the conclusions of the previous ecumenical council regarding images.  The council also confirmed the deposition of Photius and the rightful place of Ignatius as Patriarch of Constantinople.  Interestingly, the council also listed Constantinople before Alexandria, Antioch, and Jerusalem, in its list of the five patriarchs.  Rome, apparently, decided to acquiesce in the reality of Constantinople's actual practical influence by this time and to agree to its formalization.  (We see this order affirmed in later ecumenical councils as well, such as at the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215.)  When the papal legates returned to Rome, Pope Adrian II approved and confirmed the decrees of the council.

After his deposition, Photius worked hard to get himself back into the good graces of the Emperor, and eventually he succeeded.  He also reconciled with Patriarch Ignatius.  After Ignatius died in 877, Emperor Basil once again recognized Photius as Patriarch of Constantinople.  Pope John VIII accepted this and recognized Photius, so no further schism resulted from this.

In 879-880, Photius called for another ecumenical council in Constantinople.  Pope John VIII sent legates.  The council affirmed Photius as rightful Patriarch of Constantinople.  It also stated that no one should take it upon themselves to add anything to the Nicene Creed (presumably having the Filioque in mind).  There is dispute as to whether or to what extent Pope John VIII recognized the decisions of this council.  Eventually, however, as the centuries went on and the Eastern churches drifted away from the Roman church, the Catholic Church made it clear that she formally accepted the council of 869-870 as the eighth ecumenical council, and the council of 879-880 has no formal recognition.  Among the Eastern Orthodox churches (the Eastern churches which later broke from full communion with Rome and their descendent churches), however, the council of 869-870 is not recognized, while some (but not all) recognize the council of 879-880 as an eighth ecumenical council. So, with the eighth ecumenical council, we move beyond the period whose ecumenical councils are recognized by both Catholics and Eastern Orthodox today.

After Emperor Basil died, Leo VI succeeded him, and he once again deposed Photius, who spent the rest of his life living in a monastery.  Photius was one of the great scholars of the ninth century and of the Eastern church.  His reputation in the Catholic Church is mixed because, while he was a great scholar, his controversies with Rome helped pave the way for greater schisms to come between Rome and the Eastern churches.




https://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/basis/const4.asp - The canons of the eighth ecumenical council.

The Canon of Scripture

Another doctrinal development we see during this time period is the development of the Church's conception of the canon of Scripture--which books should be counted as belonging in the Scriptures.  We recall that in the period covered by our previous unit (from about 64 until 313), the canon was still in a state of flux, with a number of books well settled but some still in dispute.  During the period of this unit, however, the canonical question becomes settled (at least in terms of the authority and the official doctrine of the Church).  In 382, Pope Damasus I held a council in Rome during which he defined "what the universal Catholic Church accepts and what she ought to shun."  See the quotation from the council here to see the list, which, you will notice, is the same list still held by the Catholic Church today.  This list was reaffirmed shortly thereafter by the North African councils of Hippo (393) and Carthage (387) and by Pope Innocent I in a letter to the Bishop of Toulouse (see here).  It would be affirmed later on in Church history at various times, such as at the Council of Florence in the 15th century and the Council of Trent in the 16th century (in response to the Protestants who decided to reject some of the books included in the canon).

Here we see again the work of the Spirit as he guides the Church in the development of her doctrine.  She had had and used these Scriptures all along, but when it became important in the life of the Church to further formally clarify what should be considered in the canon and what should not be, the Church is guided to make a decision which is guaranteed to be the right one by the Holy Spirit.

Read in class (the section on the Council of Rome and the canon)https://www.tertullian.org/decretum_eng.htm

http://www.bible-researcher.com/innocent.html - Letter of Pope Innocent I on the canon

http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/03267a.htm - Catholic Encyclopedia on the canon of the Old Testament

http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/03274a.htm - Catholic Encyclopedia on the canon of the New Testament

Missions

This period of Church history also saw a boom with regard to the missionary work of the Church.  The apostles and the earlier Christians had spread the gospel throughout the Roman Empire.  But in our period, there are noteworthy concerted efforts to spread the faith to new lands as of yet unreached by the gospel.

One example is that of St. Patrick, who was born in Britain in the 5th century.  When he was 16 years old, he was kidnapped by Irish pirates and taken as a slave to Ireland, which was at that time a pagan land.  Having before his kidnapping been mostly worldly and irreligious, he was drawn close to God during the days of his captivity.  After six years, he escaped from slavery and walked to the sea, finding a ship leaving Ireland which he boarded (being directed in these things by God's guidance).  Eventually, he made his way back home, and after many years became a bishop.  He felt that God was calling him to return to Ireland to preach the gospel there, and so, amidst some opposition, he went as a missionary to Ireland.  He had great success, and was a major influence in the conversion of the Irish people to Christianity.

Watch in classVeggieTales St. Patrick

https://www.confessio.ie/etexts/confessio_english# - Patrick's own autobiographical account of his experiences

Another important missionary from this time period was St. Augustine of Canterbury.  He was sent by Pope Gregory the Great in 595 to preach the gospel to the pagan Anglo-Saxons (Germanic tribesmen who had conquered Britain over the past hundred years or so).  His story is told in the Venerable St. Bede's Ecclesiastical History of England, a fantastic work that covers the history of Britain and the spread of the gospel in Britain from Celtic times down to his own day (he wrote around the year 731).  Pope St. Gregory had seen Anglo-Saxons in Rome at one point and he was taken with their looks (their fair hair, etc.).  He said they looked like Angels rather than Angles, and he was moved to send someone to evangelize them.  He chose Augustine, a Benedictine monk, to lead the mission.  After some trepidation about going on a mission to a strange and barbaric people, Augustine and his companions came to England and had great success establishing Christianity among the Anglo-Saxons, particularly after securing the favor and eventual conversion of King Ethelbert of Kent (yes, Blazers, it was that Ethelbert).  England became a bastion of medieval Catholic Christianity, and missionaries were eventually sent out from both the Celts and the English to continental Europe where they played an important role in the conversion of other pagan Germanic peoples (see the story of St. Boniface below).  Augustine was appointed by Pope Gregory the first Archbishop of Canterbury.

One of the conflicts Augustine and his missionaries had to endure was actually with the earlier Christian establishment among the Celts.  The Celtic Christians (Scots, Britons, Irish, etc.) had been established centuries earlier, but, since the Romans had moved out of Britain, they had not had as much regular contact with the rest of the Church.  Consequently, they had missed some of the consolidations the Church had undergone after the conversion of Constantine and the Council of Nicaea--particularly regarding the date of Easter.  They had not got the memo about how Easter had come to be universally celebrated after Nicaea.  When Augustine and the other new missionaries tried to get them to conform to the practice of the rest of the Church in this and some other matters, there was great resistance.  This caused tension for some time, although eventually the Celtic churches submitted to the practice of the universal Church (some of them held out for a few centuries, though).  Also, the Celts sometimes had trouble bridging the culture gap with the new missionaries.  For example, Bede tells the story of how Augustine had a meeting with the British bishops.  They decided to judge him on the basis of whether he showed pride or humility.  In their culture, to remain seated in the company of the bishops indicated pride, whereas to rise up indicated humility.  Augustine, presumably not being aware of this test, remained seated when the British bishops approached, so they rejected him as prideful.  Over time, however, these tensions were eased.

Read in class:  Bede, Ecclesiastical History of England, pp. 47-51 and 197-199, and also 76-78 and 154-158 (download PDF).

Another major missionary from this period was St. Boniface, an Anglo-Saxon who became a missionary to Germanic tribes on the continent in the 8th century.  He became known as the "Apostle of the Germans".  He was eventually made an archbishop in Germany by Pope Gregory III.  One of the famous stories told about him tells how he went out to chop down an oak tree that was held to be sacred by the Germanic pagans.  When he was not struck down by the gods for this, the people were encouraged to convert to Christianity.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saint_Boniface

https://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/basis/boniface-letters.asp - Correspondence of St. Boniface

Early Monasticism

Around the beginning of our time period, we see the early stages in the development of what came to be known as Christian monasticism.  The background for this movement is in the concept of the "Evangelical Counsels".  God has given us commandments to live by which all of us are obliged to.  However, some people are called, in varying ways and to varying degrees, to put aside a more ordinary worldly life in order to devote themselves more fully and directly to certain forms of piety and service.  Jesus mentions those who "make themselves eunuchs for the kingdom of God" (Matthew 19:10-11)--that is, who forgo marriage and sexuality.  St. Paul talks also about people who choose to forgo marriage in order to devote themselves more fully and exclusively to service (1 Corinthians 7).  We see John the Baptist being called to live out in the desert and subsist on locusts and wild honey.  These are not things that all people are called to.  Over time in the Church, this idea of a life devoted more directly and singly to the evangelical counsels began to flower into a number of new forms, such as orders of consecrated virgins who chose not to marry in order to devote themselves to prayer and/or service.  Monasticism is another development of this tradition.  It started with people like St. Anthony of Egypt, who left civilization to go out and live a simple life by himself in the desert.  Eventually groups of these monks (the word comes from monos, or "alone") joined together for a certain degree of communal life, which is the origin of what we know as monasteries.

One of the most famous of these monastics was St. Benedict of Nursia (who lived from around 480 to 547).  He wrote up a famous book of rules by which monasteries could be ordered effectively.  His rule-book (which we know as the Rule of St. Benedict) caught on in the West and became the foundation for most of Western monasticism until the High Middle Ages (1000-1300).  It is still in use today by Benedictine monks and monasteries.

http://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2016/01/what-are-evangelical-counsels.html - In this article, I give a more thorough explanation of the idea of the evangelical counsels.


Watch in classhttps://www.catholic.org/saints/saint.php?saint_id=556 - Brief bio on St. Benedict

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rule_of_Saint_Benedict - contains an outline of the Rule of St. Benedict and links to the document online.

https://www.osb.org/gen/greg/tocalt.html - Pope St. Gregory the Great wrote a biography of St. Benedict around the year 593.

Church and State

As we saw earlier, in 380, Emperor Theodosius made Christianity the official religion of the Roman Empire.  This led Christians to have to reflect a lot more on how political power fits in with the life of the gospel.

St. Paul, in his letter to the Romans, 13:1-7, lays out a foundational vision of civil power which has informed Christian thought ever since:

Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers. For there is no power but of God: the powers that be are ordained of God. Whosoever therefore resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God: and they that resist shall receive to themselves damnation. For rulers are not a terror to good works, but to the evil. Wilt thou then not be afraid of the power? do that which is good, and thou shalt have praise of the same: For he is the minister of God to thee for good. But if thou do that which is evil, be afraid; for he beareth not the sword in vain: for he is the minister of God, a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil. Wherefore ye must needs be subject, not only for wrath, but also for conscience sake. For for this cause pay ye tribute also: for they are God's ministers, attending continually upon this very thing. Render therefore to all their dues: tribute to whom tribute is due; custom to whom custom; fear to whom fear; honour to whom honour.

We see here a recognition that to the extent that civil authority is valid, it must be seen as coming from God.  For only God can authorize anything ultimately.  God created humanity in such a way that we naturally develop into social groupings, and those social groupings require rules and rulers.  So political authority, being natural to human societies, is ordained and authorized by God.  Like all areas of life, its legitimate use must be regulated by the moral law of God so that its exercise will be just.

In the earliest centuries of the Church, Christians spent most of their mental energy with regard to the Roman civil authority discussing the duties and obligations of people in general and of Christians in particular towards that authority, especially in light of the fact that that authority was often engaged in persecuting them.  There are many pleas from the early Fathers to the Roman governors to grant religious liberty to minority religions (like themselves) on the grounds that it is unjust and futile to attempt to force people to perform acts of piety (since, by definition, such acts must be voluntary and sincere).  Tertullian (155-220), an important early Christian writer, put it this way:

However, it is a fundamental human right, a privilege of nature, that every man should worship according to his own convictions: one man’s religion neither harms nor helps another man. It is assuredly no part of religion to compel religion — to which free-will and not force should lead us — the sacrificial victims even being required of a willing mind. You will render no real service to your gods by compelling us to sacrifice. For they can have no desire of offerings from the unwilling, unless they are animated by a spirit of contention, which is a thing altogether undivine.

Once the Empire became Christian, however, new questions arose.  To what extent should political power be used to promote the good of religion and to oppose religious evils?  This is a natural question.  After all, if piety towards God is the greatest of goods and the supreme moral act, then blasphemy, false religion, and heresy must be great moral evils and also greatly harmful.  It is the job of the civil power to promote the well-being and the good values of the society and to protect society from that which brings harm.  So shouldn't the civil power promote true religion and oppose false religion?  In the words of St. Paul, is not the civil magistrate "the minister of God, a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil"?  What could be more evil than to insult and oppose God and to corrupt the true religion, the source of salvation?

So Christians during this time began to contemplate how political power might be used to promote truth and oppose error.  The Emperor Theodosius himself was one of the first to move in this direction, as we can see from this selection from his law code:

It is our desire that all the various nation which are subject to our clemency and moderation, should continue to the profession of that religion which was delivered to the Romans by the divine Apostle Peter, as it has been preserved by faithful tradition and which is now professed by the Pontiff Damasus and by Peter, Bishop of Alexandria, a man of apostolic holiness. According to the apostolic teaching and the doctrine of the Gospel, let us believe in the one diety of the father, Son and Holy Spirit, in equal majesty and in a holy Trinity. We authorize the followers of this law to assume the title Catholic Christians; but as for the others, since in out judgment they are foolish madmen, we decree that the shall be branded with the ignominious name of heretics, and shall not presume to give their conventicles the name of churches. They will suffer in the first place the chastisement of divine condemnation an the second the punishment of out authority, in accordance with the will of heaven shall decide to inflict.

The great St. Augustine of Hippo illustrates the growing consideration of the obligations Christians might have to use political power to promote religious truth and goodness in his letter to Vincentius regarding the Donatists (Vincentius was himself a Donatist).  In the letter, Augustine tells how he was originally opposed to the use of civil penalties against the Donatists.  He says he came around, however, partly by the realization of the great good that civil coercion can do for such people.  He recounts stories of former Donatists who now testify to how grateful they are that they were coerced, because the civil power was able to jolt them out of their error, indifference, or complacency to consider new truths and so to be brought to a better relationship with God and his Church.  Although true religion must be voluntary, yet civil authority can be used to get people to consider or pay attention to or take seriously things they might otherwise have neglected and so come to a better understanding of the truth and so make better voluntary choices.

The Church will continue to reflect on the relation between the Church, religion, and the State in subsequent centuries, and our narrative will continue to revisit this theme.

https://wherepeteris.com/religious-liberty-neglected-by-christendom-restored-in-vatican-ii/ - Article on early Christian arguments for religious liberty in the Roman Empire.

Read in Class - http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/1102093.htm - St. Augustine's letter on the Donatists (read 2-9, 16-18).

https://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/source/theodcodeXVI.asp - The selection from Theodosius's law code.

Read in class - https://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/source/gelasius1.asp - Letter from Pope Gelasius to Emperor Anastasius on spiritual and temporal power (494).

Saints and Pilgrims

Some other great saints from this time period:  Basil, Gregory Nazianzen, John Chrysostom, Ambrose, Jerome, Augustine of Hippo, Leo the Great, Gregory the Great.

We also have from this time period (the 380s) a delightful pilgrimage account from a woman named Egeria who was probably from Spain or France.  She travels throughout biblical sites in Egypt, the Holy Land, etc.  Her account provides a wealth of information about life and the Church during this time period.  (And I love these "common people" sorts of accounts, with all the human interest they bring to these ancient times.)

https://web.archive.org/web/20120811003740/http:/www.egeriaproject.net/about_egeria.aspx - About Egeria.

https://www.ccel.org/m/mcclure/etheria/etheria.htm - Egeria's pilgrimage journal.