Monday, March 13, 2017

Catholicism and TULIP

As a Catholic who is a former Calvinist, I am very interested in the relationship between various Calvinist doctrines and the Catholic faith.  I've always had a particular interest in the Calvinist doctrines concerning predestination and efficacious grace.  I remember back at the very beginning of the year in 1997 when I first came to understand and be convinced of what I then (and for many years afterwards) called the "Calvinist" doctrines of grace.  I always knew, as Calvinists profess, that these doctrines predated John Calvin.  The doctrines of grace had been passed down through the tradition of the Catholic Church for centuries before the Protestant Reformation.  They were articulated in Scripture, apparent to a great degree to reason (at least parts of them), and worked out by the Church (and particularly by the great St. Augustine and his followers) in the Pelagian and Semipelagian controversies of the fifth and sixth centuries.  Calvinists, over the years, have come to be fond of summarizing these doctrines using the acrostic TULIP--Total Depravity, Unconditional Election, Limited Atonement, Irresistible Grace, and the Perseverance of the Saints.  You can find here a brief, typical Calvinist explanation of the TULIP doctrines.

Of course, ever since Calvinists as such came into existence at the Protestant Reformation, Catholics and Calvinists have naturally been at odds with each other and highly suspicious of each others' theology.  This is not surprising, seeing that the Protestant Reformation was a rebellion against the Catholic Church and the establishment of an alternative tradition(s).  Judging from my reading and experience, it appears to me that Catholics and Calvinists have had a perennial tendency to misunderstand each others' points of view regarding the doctrines of grace.  I find this sad and irritating as a person who has been on both sides and who believes that these traditions have much more in common than either tend to perceive or admit.  For this situation, there is blame to be had on both sides.  I see myself as having a calling to try to help create a bridge of understanding between the two traditions, and what better time to be working on this than the 500th anniversary year of the Protestant Reformation.  I want Catholics to see that most Calvinists' beliefs on these matters come, to a great degree, straight out of the Augustinian and biblical tradition of the Catholic Church and are not to be feared but to be celebrated.  I want Calvinists to see Catholics not as betrayers of the doctrines of grace (which is how many Calvinists in fact see them) but to see the Catholic tradition as one that has preserved and which honors these great biblical and Christian doctrines--indeed, even more, as the tradition in which is found the true home and context of these doctrines.  Martin Luther once said that the doctrines of grace were the "essential issue" of the Reformation, the "hinge upon which all turns."  He believed that the Catholic Church had betrayed these doctrines.  If he was wrong, perhaps it is time for Protestants to consider whether they might have left home to preserve something that had been there all along.  And lastly, I want to help Catholics to better understand this aspect of their own tradition so that they might treasure it more highly and receive its blessings.  Calvinists tend to spend a lot of time thinking about these matters, but the average Catholic does not.  He knows that the Church emphasizes salvation by the grace of God, but he is extremely fuzzy when it comes to what that means in terms of predestination, the efficaciousness of grace, and the other issues addressed by the TULIP doctrines.  I want to help Catholics be more aware of the rich treasures their tradition holds in these areas.

EXAMINATION OF TULIP

What I want to do in this article is to examine each of the TULIP doctrines.  To some degree, it must be admitted, Catholics have been right to be wary of Calvinist articulations of these doctrines, for not all Calvinists have understood them in a sound manner (from a Catholic point of view).  But Catholics have too frequently gone too far and painted all Calvinists with a broad brush, attributing to the tradition in general the errors of some, even though, so far as I can see, the most classic manifestations of this tradition (the historic Reformed confessions of faith, the greatest Reformed theologians) have avoided these errors and have articulated a much sounder version of these doctrines.  (The sounder Calvinists have often referred to the less sound version of Calvinism as "Hyper-Calvinism.")  So as we look at each point of TULIP, I will lay out two broad interpretations--a basically sound interpretation and an unsound interpretation--and I will show briefly that the Catholic tradition agrees with the sound interpretation of each of the points (except for one substantial difference occurring in the very last point, the P, which I will discuss when we get there).

It should be noted that while I am going to defend the substance of the "sound interpretation" of these Calvinist doctrines, I should not be taken necessarily in all cases to be defending the language used to articulate that doctrinal substance.  The Catholic Church has been very wary over the centuries of people misspeaking when it comes to the doctrines of grace, due to the ease with which people tend to misunderstand these ideas and come to very harmful wrong conclusions regarding them.  Calvinist verbage (including the TULIP acrostic) is not always free from language that can be misleading, as even Calvinists themselves frequently acknowledge.

T - Total Depravity

Unsound interpretation:  The Fall of Adam destroyed the free will of man.  Since that time, men are unable to choose what is right but are determined to evil.  Their descent into evil has been so thorough that no one since the Fall has been able to think any good thought, feel anything right, or do anything good at all in any sense.  It might be asked how man can be blamed for sin if his free will has been destroyed.  The answer is that he is blamed in Adam.  Adam represented us when he ate the forbidden fruit, and so when he sinned, God regarded this sin as the sin of us all and blames us for it.  Therefore, we can be held responsible for our sins even though we can't avoid them.

Sound interpretation:  The Fall of Adam plunged the human race into sin, but it did not destroy our natural faculties as human beings.  We are still humans, made in the image of God, possessing reason and true free will (that is, the ability to make true choices, including moral choices).  However, while we retain our natural faculties, those faculties have become inclined to sin, so that fallen man, without grace, ever lives in rebellion against God and is thus doomed, apart from grace, to reap the fruit of sin in eternal damnation.  Fallen man still possesses the image of God, and this manifests itself in his ability to think true thoughts, have good natural affections, and make good choices to some extent, but never to the extent that he will emerge from his state of rebellion against God and be fundamentally reconciled to him apart from grace.

Most Calvinists hold to the latter, sound interpretation of Total Depravity.  For a couple of examples, take two classic Calvinist confessions of faith: the Canons of Dordt and the Westminster Confession.  The Canons of Dordt (Third and Fourth Head, Article 4) say that "there remain, however, in man since the fall, the glimmerings of natural light, whereby he retains some knowledge of God, or natural things, and of the difference between good and evil, and shows some regard for virtue and for good outward behavior."  They also say (Third and Fourth Head, Article 16) that "man by the fall did not cease to be a creature endowed with understanding and will, nor did sin which pervaded the whole race of mankind deprive him of the human nature, but brought upon him depravity and spiritual death."  The Westminster Confession (Chapter 9, section 1) says that "God hath endued the will of man with that natural liberty, that it is neither forced, nor by any absolute necessity of nature determined to good or evil."  Both of these statements go on to point out that, even though man is still man after the fall, and still possesses free will, he is bound in sin and is unable, without grace, to emerge from the state of sin and be reconciled to God.

This is the same position that is taught by the Catholic faith.  Here is Canon 22 of the Canons of the Council of Orange, which articulated the Catholic Church's official and authoritative response to the Semipelagian heresy back in the 6th century and remains authoritative today:

Concerning those things that belong to man. No man has anything of his own but untruth and sin. But if a man has any truth or righteousness, it is from that fountain for which we must thirst in this desert, so that we may be refreshed from it as by drops of water and not faint on the way.

Canon 5 says this:

If anyone says that not only the increase of faith but also its beginning and the very desire for faith, by which we believe in Him who justifies the ungodly and comes to the regeneration of holy baptism — if anyone says that this belongs to us by nature and not by a gift of grace, that is, by the inspiration of the Holy Spirit amending our will and turning it from unbelief to faith and from godlessness to godliness, it is proof that he is opposed to the teaching of the Apostles, for blessed Paul says, "And I am sure that he who began a good work in you will bring it to completion at the day of Jesus Christ" (Phil. 1:6). And again, "For by grace you have been saved through faith; and this is not your own doing, it is the gift of God" (Eph. 2:8). For those who state that the faith by which we believe in God is natural make all who are separated from the Church of Christ by definition in some measure believers.

The Council of Trent, which further articulated the Catholic Church's official teaching on grace, said this (Sixth Session, Chapter 1--page number removed):

The holy Synod declares first, that, for the correct and sound understanding of the doctrine of Justification, it is necessary that each one recognise and confess, that, whereas all men had lost their innocence in the prevarication of Adam-having become unclean, and, as the apostle says, by nature children of wrath, as (this Synod) has set forth in the decree on original sin,-they were so far the servants of sin, and under the power of the devil and of death, that not the Gentiles only by the force of nature, but not even the Jews by the very letter itself of the law of Moses, were able to be liberated, or to arise, therefrom; although free will, attenuated as it was in its powers, and bent down, was by no means extinguished in them.

While many Calvinists and the most enduring and central confessions of the Reformed churches have taught a sound interpretation of Total Depravity, there have been Calvinists (again, "Hyper-Calvinists" as their Calvinist adversaries call them) who have taught less sound interpretations.  One of the most memorable and dramatic examples (at least to me, having studied this example in my PhD thesis a number of years ago) is a certain strand of what is called "preparationist" theology among the English Puritans.  During the heyday of classic Puritanism in England and in colonial America, the doctrine of Total Depravity in some circles began to take on a sort of connotation which seemed to excuse sinners from obeying the gospel.  Puritan parishioners began to reason that if, without grace, no one is able to have faith and repentance, those who are without grace (all those who have not in fact been regenerated by grace) are unable to turn to God in faith and repentance and so cannot be expected to perform these acts.  Instead of performing these acts, then, they began to emphasize the need to focus on doing other acts they believed to be within the ability of fallen man--such as reading the Bible, coming to church, praying for repentance, trying to live as moral a life as possible.  Their idea was that if they did the things they could do, it might make it more likely that God would someday give them grace to do the things they couldn't do.  Eventually, among some, this got taken to the point that people stopped thinking they had any duty to obey the gospel but only to try to "prepare" themselves to receive grace.  Some Puritan pastors encouraged this way of thinking and preached to their people accordingly.  It was this extreme form of preparationist theology and preaching that inspired Jonathan Edwards, the great American Calvinist theologian and philosopher (who had a much sounder understanding of man's sinful state and man's free will in a sinful condition), to emphasize in his preaching man's remaining freedom even under sin and his consequent moral responsibility for his sinful acts and to write his great treatise on the freedom of the will (one of my favorite books--truly a masterpiece of theology and philosophy).  Edwards's followers eventually evolved into what become known as the "New England theology," which found itself frequently at odds with more conventional articulations of Calvinism because of its increasing tendency to emphasize in its language the remaining freedom of the will even under sin (raising the specter of "Arminianism" or even "Pelagianism" in many Calvinist minds, though unjustly in my opinion).  But this is a story for another time--albeit a fascinating one.

U - Unconditional Election

Unsound interpretation:  God, from all eternity, has ordained whatsoever comes to pass in history.  Therefore, everything is predestined, and there is nothing we can do about it.  What will be will be, and so it doesn't matter what we choose.  If I am destined to be saved, I will be saved, no matter what I do.  If I am destined to be damned, I will be damned, no matter what I do.  Nothing can ever be any way other than the way it is, according to God's eternal plan.  There is therefore no free will, for I can never do anything other than what God ordains me to do.  Those who are saved are forced to be saved, and those who are damned are forced to be damned.  God never gives either any chance to be anything else.  Evil is created by God in the same way that good is.  Both come from God and God acts equally in both.

Sound interpretation:  Everything that happens happens in accordance with God's eternal plan, but not in such a way as to imply a necessitating fatalism ("what will be will be, no matter what we do"), the destruction or subversion of free will, or the negation of the reality of contingent possibilities (different things may happen depending on other things that may happen or what we may do).  All good comes from God, but evil is not a positive entity that comes from God.  God does not create evil, but permits it to occur according to his plan because he uses it to accomplish perfectly the good that he wills.  Although evils which are contrary to God's nature occur in the world, yet they cannot ultimate subvert but, by God's perfect providence, ultimately help to secure the total fulfillment of God's good purposes.  God permitted the Fall of man to occur and all the evils that have flowed from it.  Among the mass of fallen humanity, God chooses to bring some to eternal salvation, while he chooses to permit others to reject him to the end and thus end up in eternal damnation.

All Calvinists that I have known or read have affirmed the latter interpretation rather than the former, though they are frequently accused by Catholics and others of affirming the former.  The Westminster Confession has these things to say about God's eternal decree and his providence in history (footnotes removed--as throughout this article):

God from all eternity did, by the most wise and holy counsel of His own will, freely, and unchangeably ordain whatsoever comes to pass: yet so, as thereby neither is God the author of sin, nor is violence offered to the will of the creatures, nor is the liberty or contingency of second causes taken away, but rather established. (3:1) 
Although, in relation to the foreknowledge and decree of God, the first Cause, all things come to pass immutably, and infallibly: yet, by the same providence, He ordereth them to fall out, according to the nature of second causes, either necessarily, freely, or contingently. (5:2)

God has chosen some men out of the mass of fallen humanity to bring to eternal salvation, and he has left others in their sinful condition and permitted them to perish.  Notice the Westminster Confession's care to avoid suggesting that God has produced evil in fallen sinners or has coerced or caused anyone to remain in sin or reject the gospel:

By the decree of God, for the manifestation of His glory, some men and angels are predestinated unto everlasting life, and others foreordained to everlasting death. (3:3) 
As God hath appointed the elect unto glory, so hath He, by the eternal and most free purpose of His will, foreordained all the means thereunto. Wherefore they who are elected, being fallen in Adam, are redeemed by Christ, are effectually called unto faith in Christ by His Spirit working in due season, are justified, adopted, sanctified, and kept by His power through faith unto salvation. Neither are any other redeemed by Christ, effectually called, justified, adopted, sanctified, and saved, but the elect only. (3:6) 
The rest of mankind God was pleased, according to the unsearchable counsel of His own will, whereby He extendeth or withholdeth mercy, as He pleaseth, for the glory of His sovereign power over His creatures, to pass by; and to ordain them to dishonour and wrath, for their sin, to the praise of His glorious justice. (3:7)

Regarding the idea that God works evil and damnation in the world in the same way he works good and salvation, see this concise article by Calvinist theologian R. C. Sproul.  In the article, Sproul has this to say:

The distortion of double predestination looks like this: There is a symmetry that exists between election and reprobation. God works in the same way and same manner with respect to the elect and to the reprobate. That is to say, from all eternity God decreed some to election and by divine initiative works faith in their hearts and brings them actively to salvation. By the same token, from all eternity God decrees some to sin and damnation (destinare ad peccatum) and actively intervenes to work sin in their lives, bringing them to damnation by divine initiative. In the case of the elect, regeneration is the monergistic work of God. In the case of the reprobate, sin and degeneration are the monergistic work of God. Stated another way, we can establish a parallelism of foreordination and predestination by means of a positive symmetry. We can call this a positive-positive view of predestination. This is, God positively and actively intervenes in the lives of the elect to bring them to salvation. In the same way God positively and actively intervenes in the life of the reprobate to bring him to sin. 
This distortion of positive-positive predestination clearly makes God the author of sin who punishes a person for doing what God monergistically and irresistibly coerces man to do. Such a view is indeed a monstrous assault on the integrity of God. This is not the Reformed view of predestination, but a gross and inexcusable caricature of the doctrine. Such a view may be identified with what is often loosely described as hyper-Calvinism and involves a radical form of supralapsarianism. Such a view of predestination has been virtually universally and monolithically rejected by Reformed thinkers. . . . 
In the Reformed view God from all eternity decrees some to election and positively intervenes in their lives to work regeneration and faith by a monergistic work of grace. To the non-elect God withholds this monergistic work of grace, passing them by and leaving them to themselves. He does not monergistically work sin or unbelief in their lives.

Or listen to the great Calvinist theologian Jonathan Edwards:

They who object, that this doctrine makes God the Author of Sin, ought distinctly to explain what they mean by that phrase, The Author of Sin. I know the phrase, as it is commonly used, signifies something very ill. If by the Author of Sin, be meant the Sinner, the Agent, or Actor of Sin, or the Doer of a wicked thing; so it would be a reproach and blasphemy, to suppose God to be the Author of Sin. In this sense, I utterly deny God to be the Author of Sin; rejecting such an imputation on the Most High, as what is infinitely to be abhorred; and deny any such thing to be the consequence of what I have laid down. But if, by the Author of Sin, is meant the permitter, or not a hinderer of Sin; and, at the same lime, a disposer of the state of events, in such a manner, for wise, holy, and most excellent ends and purposes, that Sin, if it be permitted or not hindered, will most certainly and infallibly follow: I say, if this be all that is meant, by being the Author of Sin, I do not deny that God is the Author of Sin, (though I dislike and reject the phrase, as that which by use and custom is apt to carry another sense,) it is no reproach for the Most High to be thus the Author of Sin. This is not to be the Actor of Sin, but, on the contrary, of holiness. . . . 
[T]here is a great difference between God being; concerned thus, by his permission, in an event and act, which, in the inherent subject and agent of it, is sin, (though the event will certainly follow on his permission,) and his being concerned in it by producing it and exerting the act of sin; or between his being the orderer of its certain existence, by not hindering it, under certain circumstances, and his being the proper actor or author of it, by a positive agency or efficiency. And this, notwithstanding what Dr. Whitby offers about a saying of philosophers, that causa defitiens, in rebus necessariis, ad causam per se efficientem reducenda est. As there is a vast difference between the sun being the cause of the lightsomeness and warmth of the atmosphere, and the brightness of gold and diamonds, by its presence and positive influence; and its being the occasion of darkness and frost, in the night, by its motion, whereby it descends below the horizon. The motion of the sun is the occasion of the latter kind of events; but it is not the proper cause, efficient, or producer of them; though they are necessarily consequent on that motion, under such circumstances: no more is any action of the Divine Being the cause of the evil of men’s Wills. If the sun were the proper cause of cold and darkness, it would be the fountain of these things, as it is the fountain of light and heat: and then something might be argued from the nature of cold and darkness, to a likeness of nature in the sun; and it might be justly inferred, that the sun itself is dark and cold, and that his beams are black and frosty. But from its being the cause no otherwise than by its departure, no such thing can be inferred, but the contrary; it may justly be argued, that the sun is a bright and hot body, if cold and darkness are found to be the consequence of its withdrawment; and the more constantly and necessarily these effects are connected with and confined to its absence, the more strongly does it argue the sun to be the fountain of light and neat. So, inasmuch as sin is not the fruit of any positive agency or influence of the Most High, but, on the contrary, arises from the withholding of his action and energy, and, under certain circumstances, necessarily follows on the want of his influence; this is no argument that he is sinful, or his operation evil, or has any thing of the nature of evil; but, on the contrary, that he, and his agency, are altogether good and holy, and that he is the fountain of all holiness. It would be strange arguing, indeed, because men never commit sin, but only when God leaves them to themselves, and necessarily sin when he dues so, that therefore their sin is not from themselves, but from God; and so, that God must be a sinful being: as strange as it would be to argue, because it is always dark when the sun is gone, and never dark when the sun is present, that therefore all darkness is from the sun, and that his disk and beams must needs be black. (Freedom of the Will, Part IV. Section IX)

All of this is the same as what is taught by Catholic doctrine.  Catholic doctrine teaches that God's eternal plan includes all that comes to pass and that it cannot be thwarted:

The Holy Scriptures repeatedly confess the universal power of God. He is called the "Mighty One of Jacob", the "LORD of hosts", the "strong and mighty" one. If God is almighty "in heaven and on earth", it is because he made them. Nothing is impossible with God, who disposes his works according to his will. He is the Lord of the universe, whose order he established and which remains wholly subject to him and at his disposal. He is master of history, governing hearts and events in keeping with his will: "It is always in your power to show great strength, and who can withstand the strength of your arm?  (Catechism of the Catholic Church, #268-269--footnotes removed) 
The witness of Scripture is unanimous that the solicitude of divine providence is concrete and immediate; God cares for all, from the least things to the great events of the world and its history. The sacred books powerfully affirm God's absolute sovereignty over the course of events: "Our God is in the heavens; he does whatever he pleases." And so it is with Christ, "who opens and no one shall shut, who shuts and no one opens". As the book of Proverbs states: "Many are the plans in the mind of a man, but it is the purpose of the LORD that will be established."  (Catechism #303--footnotes removed) 
The truth that God is at work in all the actions of his creatures is inseparable from faith in God the Creator. God is the first cause who operates in and through secondary causes: "For God is at work in you, both to will and to work for his good pleasure."  (Catechism #308) 
St. Thomas More, shortly before his martyrdom, consoled his daughter: "Nothing can come but that that God wills. And I make me very sure that whatsoever that be, seem it never so bad in sight, it shall indeed be the best." (Catechism #313--footnotes removed)

The Catholic Encyclopedia article on "Predestination" puts it this way:

 According to the doctrinal decisions of general and particular synods, God infallibly foresees and immutably preordains from eternity all future events (cf. Denzinger, n. 1784), all fatalistic necessity, however, being barred and human liberty remaining intact (Denz., n. 607).

Regarding moral evil:

God is in no way, directly or indirectly, the cause of moral evil. He permits it, however, because he respects the freedom of his creatures and, mysteriously, knows how to derive good from it: . . . 
For almighty God. . ., because he is supremely good, would never allow any evil whatsoever to exist in his works if he were not so all-powerful and good as to cause good to emerge from evil itself. . . . (Catechism #311--footnotes removed)

The Catechism of St. Pius X talks about God's permission of moral evil in this way (in the section on "The First Article of the Creed"):

10 Q. Does God take any interest in the world and in the things created by Him?
A. Yes, God takes an interest in the world and in all things created by Him; He preserves them, and governs them by His infinite goodness and wisdom; and nothing happens here below that He does not either will or permit. 
11 Q. Why do you say that nothing happens here below that He does not either will or permit?
A. We say that nothing happens here below that He does not either will or permit, because there are some things which God wills and commands, while there are others which He simply does not prevent, such as sin. 
12 Q. Why does not God prevent sin?
A. God does not prevent sin, because even from the very abuse man makes of the liberty with which He is endowed, God knows how to bring forth good and to make His mercy or His justice become more and more resplendent. 

If God ordains all that comes to pass, and if all good comes from him and all evil is permitted willingly by him, and if all saving moral goodness that we humans can possess is a gift of grace through Christ (as we saw earlier and will see more later), and if some end up saved and others end up damned, it follows that those who are saved are saved by the election and mercy of God and as a gift of his grace, and that those who are damned are permitted to be damned by God, who decided not to give them the same gift of salvation he gave to his elect.  Accordingly, this is what is affirmed by Catholic doctrine.  Ludwig Ott, in his well-respected and widely-used book on Catholic doctrine, Fundamentals of Catholic Dogma (Rockford, IL: TAN Books, 1974 {orig. 1952}, 242-245), explains (capitalization removed) that it is Catholic dogma that "God, by his eternal resolve of will, has predetermined certain men to eternal blessedness."  Ott goes on:

This doctrine is proposed by the Ordinary and General Teaching of the Church as a truth of Revelation. The doctrinal definitions of the Council of Trent presuppose it . . . The reality of Predestination is clearly attested to in Rom 8:29 et seq: . . . cf. Mt 25:34, Jn 10:27 et seq., Acts 13:48, Eph 1:4 et seq. . . . Predestination is a part of the Eternal Divine Plan of Providence. (found here--ellipsis in original)

Fr.  Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, in his book Predestination [(Charlotte, NC: TAN Books, 2013), p. 10], which is pretty universally regarded as a modern classic reference on Catholic theology regarding predestination, makes the same point:

But in any case, from this minimum admitted by all we get three propositions to which all Catholic theologians subscribe. They are: (1) Predestination to the first grace is not because God foresaw our naturally good works, nor is the beginning of salutary acts due to natural causes; (2) predestination to glory is not because God foresaw we would continue in the performance of supernaturally meritorious acts apart from the special gift of final perseverance; (3) complete predestination, in so far as it comprises the whole series of graces from the first up to glorification, is gratuitous or previous to foreseen merits. These three propositions are admitted by all Catholic theologians.

St. Thomas Aquinas, one of the greatest Doctors of the Catholic Church, talks about how some have been predestined by God to grace and to eternal life, while others have been "reprobated" by God--that is, passed over by God and permitted by his providence to remain in sin:

God does reprobate some. For it was said above (Article 1) that predestination is a part of providence. To providence, however, it belongs to permit certain defects in those things which are subject to providence, as was said above (I:22:2). Thus, as men are ordained to eternal life through the providence of God, it likewise is part of that providence to permit some to fall away from that end; this is called reprobation. Thus, as predestination is a part of providence, in regard to those ordained to eternal salvation, so reprobation is a part of providence in regard to those who turn aside from that end. Hence reprobation implies not only foreknowledge, but also something more, as does providence, as was said above (I:22:1). Therefore, as predestination includes the will to confer grace and glory; so also reprobation includes the will to permit a person to fall into sin, and to impose the punishment of damnation on account of that sin.  (Summa Theologica, First Part, Question 23, Article 3--from the New Advent website, embedded links removed)

In the early medieval Church, the doctrine of predestination was dealt with in a number of councils which (as the Catholic Encyclopedia article above alluded to) have informed the development of Catholic thinking on this subject.  Two of these councils were the Council of Quiercy (853) and the Council of Valence (855).  Here is a selection from the canons of Quiercy [Guido Stucco, God's Eternal Gift: A History of the Catholic Doctrine of Predestination from Augustine to the Renaissance (Xlibris, 2009), 350-351--footnotes removed]:

     Almighty God created man without sin, righteous and endowed with free will.  He placed man in paradise, and wanted him to dwell in the sanctity of justice.  Man, by making bad use of his free will, sinned and fell (from this state of justice), becoming the 'mass of perdition' of the entire humankind.  However, the good and righteous God, according to his foreknowledge (secundum praescientiam suam), chose out of this mass of perdition those whom he predestined through grace (Rom 8:29 ff; Eph 1:11) to eternal life, and likewise, he predestined eternal life for them.  He foreknew that everybody else, whom he abandoned in the mass of perdition according to his just decree, was going to perish, though he did not predestine them to perish; rather, being just, he predestined eternal punishment for them.  Because of this, we speak of only one divine predestination, which pertains to either the gift of grace or to the retribution of justice. . . . 
     We lost the freedom of will in the first man, but got it back through Christ our Lord.  We have free will to do what is good, which is preceded and helped by God's grace; we have free will to do what is evil, as it is abandoned by God's grace.  We [can say] we have free will because it is freed and healed from corruption by grace. . . . 
     Almighty God wants "all men to be saved" (1 Tim 2:4) without exception (sine exceptione), even though not all will be saved.  The fact that some are saved, is the gift of the saving God; the fact that some perish, is their own fault.

Here is part of Canon 3 from the Council of Valence (Stucco, 363-364):

     In regard to God's predestination, we wished in the past and still faithfully wish to claim in the present, on the basis of the apostolic authority, that: "Does not the potter have a right over the clay to make out of the same lump one vessel for a noble purpose and another for an ignoble one?" (Rom 9:21), and also according to what immediately comes next: "What if God, wishing to show his wrath and make known his power, has endured with much patience the vessels of wrath made for destruction?  This was to make known the riches of his glory to the vessels of mercy, which he has prepared previously for glory" (Rom 9:22).  With confidence, we profess the predestination of the elect to life and the predestination of the impious to death: in the election of those who are to be saved, the mercy of God anticipates their good merit; in the damnation of those who will perish, their guilt anticipates just judgment.  "By means of predestination, God has only established what he is going to do either out of gratuitous mercy, or out of just judgment," as we read in the Scriptures:  "He has done what will be," (Is 45:11 LXX).  In the case of evil people, he has foreknown their malice, which originates from themselves, but has not predestined it, because it does not stem from him . . . [as the] Second Council of Orange said: "That some people have been predestined by the divine power," meaning that they could not be otherwise, "not only we do not believe, but if there are some who wish to believe something so evil, we anathemize and detest them."

"The fact that some are saved, is the gift of the saving God; the fact that some perish, is their own fault."  This same statement, with nearly the same wording, was articulated by the Reformed Confession of 1536:  "Our salvation is from God, but from ourselves there is nothing but sin and damnation. (Art. 9)" (found here).

In the year 785, Pope Hadrian I articulated briefly and succinctly the Catholic teaching on predestination in a letter to the bishops of Spain, where there was apparently some confusion on the topic.  Some were asking what the point of doing anything is if everything is predestined, and others were asking what the point of asking God for help is if we can make our own choices.

    As for that, however, which some of these say, that predestination to life or to death is in the power of God and not in ours; they say: "Why do we try to live, because it is in the power of God?"; again others say: "Why do we ask God, that we may not be overcome by temptation, since it is in our power, as in the freedom of will?"  For truly they are able to render or to accept no plan, being ignorant . . . [of the words] of blessed Fulgentius [against a certain Pelagius]:  "Therefore, God in the eternity of His changelessness has prepared works of mercy and justice . . . but for men who are to be justified He has prepared merits; He has prepared rewards for those who are to be glorified; but for the wicked He has not prepared evil wills or evil works, but He has prepared for them just and eternal punishments.  This is the eternal predestination of the future works of God, which as we have always acknowledged to be taught to us by apostolic doctrine, so also faithfully we proclaim. . . ."  (Henry Denzinger, The Sources of Catholic Dogma, tr. Roy J. Deferrari [Fitzwilliam, NH: Loreto Publications, 2002], a translation of "the thirtieth edition of Enchiridion Symbolorum by Henry Denzinger, revised by Karl Rahner, S.J., published in 1954, by Herder & Co., Freiburg", p. 120, #300--ellipses and brackets in original)

In short, God is the source of the good works of the saints as well as of their eternal reward, but he is not the positive source of the evil works of the damned, though he ordains their eternal punishment.

L - Limited Atonement

Unsound interpretation:  Christ died only for the elect.  Therefore, his atonement does not have sufficient merit or power to save the non-elect (the reprobate).  Even if the reprobate should come to Christ, they would have to be rejected, because no atonement was made for them.  Salvation is offered only to the elect, the others not being invited.

Sound interpretation:  Christ died only for the elect, in the sense that in God's eternal plan the atonement was only intended to actually fully accomplish the eternal salvation of the elect and in fact it only accomplishes their eternal salvation.  However, the atonement, being of infinite value, is sufficient to save all men, elect and reprobate, and it is sincerely offered to all men, so that any who come to Christ have plentiful grace available to them to accomplish fully their eternal salvation.

Most Calvinists I have known and read have embraced the latter rather than the former interpretation.  Well-respected Calvinist theologian Loraine Boettner, in his book The Reformed Doctrine of Predestination (Eerdmans, 1932 - footnote references added to text), explains:

This doctrine does not mean that any limit can be set to the value or power of the atonement which Christ made. The value of the atonement depends upon, and is measured by, the dignity of the person making it; and since Christ suffered as a Divine-human person the value of His suffering was infinite. . . .
While the value of the atonement was sufficient to save all mankind, it was efficient to save only the elect. It is indifferently well adapted to the salvation of one man to that of another, thus making the salvation of every man objectively possible; yet because of subjective difficulties, arising on account of the sinners own inability either to see or appreciate the things of God, only those are saved who are regenerated and sanctified by the Holy Spirit. The reason why God does not apply this grace to all men has not been fully revealed.  (Chapter XII, 2, 3) 
Will any one contend that God cannot sincerely offer salvation to a free moral agent unless in addition to the invitation He exerts a special influence which will induce the person to accept it? After a civil war in a country it often happens that the victorious general offers free pardon to all those In the opposing army, provided they will lay down their arms, go home, and live peaceable lives, although he knows that through pride or malice many will refuse. He makes the offer in good faith even though for wise reasons he determines not to constrain their assent, supposing him possessed of such power. . . .
When the Gospel is presented to mankind in general nothing but a sinful unwillingness on the part of some prevents their accepting and enjoying it. No stumbling block is put in their way. All that the call contains is true; it is adapted to the conditions of all men and freely offered if they will repent and believe. No outside influence constrains them to reject it. The elect accept; the non-elect may accept if they will, and nothing but their own nature determines them to do otherwise. "According to the Calvinistic scheme," says Dr. Hodge, "the non-elect have all the advantages and opportunities of securing their salvation, that, according to any other scheme, are granted to mankind indiscriminately. Calvinism teaches that a plan of salvation adapted to all men and adequate for the salvation of all, is freely offered to the acceptance of all, although in the secret purpose of God He intended that it should have precisely the effect which in experience it is found to have. He designed in its adoption to save His own people, but consistently offers its benefits to all who are willing to receive them. More than this no anti-Calvinist can demand." [137--Systematic Theology, II., p. 644.]  (Chapter XXI, 2)

In other words, in the Calvinist scheme, the atonement is infinite in value and sufficient for the sins of all men.  It is freely offered to all men.  It makes the salvation of all men objectively possible, removing all barriers to their salvation apart from their own unwillingness to receive it.  It gives to all men the ability to be saved if they will choose to avail themselves of the opportunity.  But only the elect will do so, because only to the elect does God give the gift of a good will.  The reprobate are not caused, not coerced, but permitted to reject the real opportunity they have been given and so fail to attain eternal salvation.

The Catholic view is no different, although the Church has taught Catholics to be averse to the language of "limited atonement" because of its natural false connotations (as expressed in the "unsound interpretation" above).  So Catholics ought to avoid some of the Calvinist terminology here.  Calvinists themselves sometimes complain of the connotations of their own terminology, thus agreeing to some extent with the Catholic Church's concern on this point.  Loraine Boettner, for example, in the same book quoted from just above, complains a little about the term "limited atonement":

The meaning might be brought out more clearly if we used the phrase "Limited Redemption" rather than "Limited Atonement." The Atonement is, of course, strictly an infinite transaction; the limitation comes in, theologically, in the application of the benefits of the atonement, that is in redemption. But since the phrase "Limited Atonement" has become well established in theological usage and its meaning is well known we shall continue to use it. (Chapter XII, 1)

But, apart from questions of terminology and connotations, in my experience what most Calvinists mean by "limited atonement" is consistent with Catholic doctrine on this point.  We saw above that God has elected some to eternal salvation and passed by others in his eternal plan.  Since he ordains freely all that comes to pass and is not forced or locked into doing anything by anything coming ultimately from outside himself, since he is the First Cause, we must say that he chooses those he will save in a free and unconstrained way.  The plan of history flows from him rather than being something forced upon him or something he discovers as involving factors originating ultimately from outside himself, outside his free acts of causing and permitting.  Therefore, we must say that if some men are not ultimately saved, it was not God's eternal intention to bring about their salvation.  Therefore, Christ's atonement was not intended by God to bring about their eternal salvation, and it does not in fact bring about their eternal salvation.  In the words of the Council of Trent (Sixth Session, Chapter III--page number removed), "though He died for all, yet do not all receive the benefit of His death, but those only unto whom the merit of His passion is communicated."  This is all that Calvinists typically mean by "limited atonement."  Christ died for all men, in that his atonement is sufficient to save all men, in that it provides sufficient opportunity and grace to enable all men to be saved if they will choose to avail themselves of their opportunity, and in that God intended it to provide such objective opportunity to all men and to make possible the free and sincere offer of the gospel to all men; though, in his eternal plan, he predestined that the atonement would only actually end up bringing about the eternal salvation of the elect through the application of divine grace.  All this both Catholics and the sounder Calvinists grant, so there is no substantial difference in doctrine upon this point (except in relation to the doctrine of the perseverance of the saints--the P in TULIP--which we will discuss further below).

I - Irresistible Grace

Unsound interpretation:  When God converts a sinner, he sends him a grace he cannot resist no matter how hard he tries.  Thus, man is not converted through any act of his own will but only by God's act of dragging him apart from his will into reconciliation with God.  Only God acts in conversion; we do not act.

Sound interpretation:  When God converts a sinner, he sends him a grace that efficaciously opens his eyes to see the truth and beauty of the gospel so that he chooses willingly to come to Christ.  The sinner could reject this grace if he wished to do so, but he does not want to because he is effectively persuaded by it to desire freely to turn to God in faith and repentance.

Some Calvinists seem to have understood the efficaciousness of grace in the unsound manner described above, but from my experience and reading I would say that the most sophisticated and classic expressions of Calvinistic doctrine have understood it in the latter, sounder sense.  The Westminster Confession, for example, is quite clear on this point:

All those whom God hath predestinated unto life, and those only, He is pleased in His appointed and accepted time effectually to call, by His Word and Spirit, out of that state of sin and death, in which they are by nature, to grace and salvation by Jesus Christ; enlightening their minds spiritually and savingly to understand the things of God; taking away their heart of stone, and giving unto them a heart of flesh; renewing their wills, and by His almighty power determining them to that which is good, and effectually drawing them to Jesus Christ: yet so, as they come most freely, being made willing by His grace. (10:1--emphasis added)

Once again, Calvinist author Loraine Boettner provides helpful clarification:

On other grounds also it may be shown that certainty is consistent with free agency. We are often absolutely certain how we will act under given conditions so far as we are free to act at all. A parent may be certain that he will rescue a child in distress, and that in doing so he will act freely. God is a free agent, yet it is certain that He will always do right. The holy angels and redeemed saints are free agents, yet it is certain that they will never sin; other- wise there would be no assurance of their remaining in heaven. On the other hand, it is certain that the Devil, the demons and fallen men will commit sin, although they are free agents. A father often knows how his son will act under given circumstances and by controlling these he determines beforehand the course of action which the son follows, yet the son acts freely. If he plans that the son shall be doctor, he gives him encouragement along that line, persuades him to read certain books, to attend certain schools, and so presents the outside inducements that his plan works out. In the same manner and to an infinitely greater extent God controls our actions so that they are certain although we act freely. His decree does not produce the event, but only renders its occurrence certain; and the same decree which determines the certainty of the action at the same time determines the freedom of the agent in the act.  (The Reformed Doctrine of Predestination, Chapter XVI, 2) 
In accordance with this we believe that, without destroying or impairing the free agency of men, God can exercise over them a particular providence and work in them through His Holy Spirit so that they will come to Christ and persevere in His service. We believe further that none have this will and desire except those whom God has previously made willing and desirous; and that He gives this will and desire to none but His own elect. But while thus induced, the elect remain as free as the man that you persuade to take a walk or to invest in government securities.  (Chapter XVI, 5)

In other words, God efficaciously draws the elect to Christ.  Because he does so, they will certainly come.  But they also come completely freely.  Grace does not subvert or destroy their will or intellect but rather works by persuading them effectively to do the right thing.

OK, but can they do otherwise?  The Council of Trent (Sixth Session, Chapter V) says that the sinner who is the subject of the inspiration of divine grace is not "utterly without doing anything while he receives that inspiration, forasmuch as he is also able to reject it."  The Catholic view holds that when God converts us, we are not converted as blocks or stones but as human beings with free will, and so our will must cooperate with grace (even if that cooperation is itself a product and gift of grace).  If grace is irresistible, it would seem that the will cannot do otherwise than accept it.  And if the will cannot do otherwise, then how is it truly free in its acceptance?  Boettner comments:

Nor does it follow from the absolute certainty of a person's acts that he could not have acted otherwise. He could have acted otherwise if he had chosen to have done so. Oftentimes a man has power and opportunity to do that which it is absolutely certain he will not do, and to refrain from doing that which it is absolutely certain he will do. That is, no external influence determines his actions. Our acts are in accordance with the decrees, but not necessarily so we can do otherwise and often should. Judas and his accomplices were left to fulfill their purpose, and they did as their wicked inclinations prompted them. Hence Peter charged them with the crime, but he at the same time declared that they had acted according to the purpose of God,--"Him being: delivered up by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God, ye by the hands of lawless men did crucify and slay," Acts 2:23. (Chapter XVI, 2)

In other words, those who receive efficacious grace can do otherwise than accept it, but it is certain they will not.

Calvinist theologian Jonathan Edwards, in Freedom of the Will (Part I, Section IV), also comments on the fact that both in reference to the person who rejects the gospel and the person who accepts it, it may be certain that they will do what they do, but at the same time they could have done otherwise.  Edwards articulates this using the language of "moral inability" vs. "natural inability":

We are said to be naturally unable to do a thing, when we cannot do it if we will, because what is most commonly called nature does not allow of it, or because of some impeding defect or obstacle that is extrinsic to the Will; either in the Faculty of understanding, constitution of body, or external objects. Moral Inability consists not in any of these things; but either in the want of inclination; or the strength of a contrary inclination; or the want of sufficient motives in view, to induce and excite the act of the Will, or the strength of apparent motives to the contrary. Or both these may be resolved into one; and it may be said in one word, that moral Inability consists in the opposition or want of inclination. For when a person is unable to will or choose such a thing, through a defect of motives, or prevalence of contrary motives, it is the same thing as his being unable through the want of an inclination, or the prevalence of a contrary inclination, in such circumstances, and under the influence of such views. . . . 
But it must be observed concerning moral Inability, in each kind of it, that the word Inability is used in a sense very diverse from its original import. The word signifies only a natural Inability, in the proper use of it; and is applied to such cases only wherein a present will or inclination to the thing, with respect to which a person is said to be unable, is supposable. It cannot be truly said, according to the ordinary use of language, that a malicious man, let him be never so malicious, cannot hold his hand from striking, or that he is not able to show his neighbor kindness; or that a drunkard, let his appetite be never so strong, cannot keep the cup from his mouth. In the strictest propriety of speech, a man has a thing in his power, if he has it in his choice, or at his election: and a man cannot be truly said to be unable to do a thing, when he can do it if he will. It is improperly said, that a person cannot perform those external actions, which are dependent on the act of the Will, and which would be easily performed, if the act of the Will were present. And if it be improperly said, that he cannot perform those external voluntary actions, which depend on the Will, it is in some respect more improperly said, that he is unable to exert the acts of the Will themselves; because it is more evidently false, with respect to these, that he cannot if he will: for to say so, is a downright contradiction; it is to say, he cannot will, if he does will. And in this case, not only is it true, that it is easy for a man to do the thing if he will, but the very willing is the doing; when once he has willed, the thing is performed; and nothing else remains to be done. Therefore, in these things, to ascribe a non-performance to the want of power or ability, is not just; because the thing wanting, is not a being able, but a being willing. There are faculties of mind, and a capacity of nature, and every thing else, sufficient, but a disposition: nothing is wanting but a will.

Calvinists are forever clarifying the misconception of their doctrine that would suggest they are teaching that man is dragged by grace against his will to come to Christ.  They often acknowledge that the Calvinist terminology itself here can be misleading.  Boettner once again:

The special grace which we refer to as efficacious is sometimes called irresistible grace. This latter term, however, is somewhat misleading since it does suggest that a certain overwhelming power is exerted upon the person, in consequence of which he is compelled to act contrary to his desires, whereas the meaning intended, as we have stated before, is that the elect are so influenced by divine power that their coming is an act of voluntary choice.  (The Reformed Doctrine of Predestination, Chapter XIII, 7)

Catholic doctrine agrees with the sounder Calvinists on the point of the efficaciousness of divine grace.  Let me quote again from Canon 5 of the Canons of the Second Council of Orange:

If anyone says that not only the increase of faith but also its beginning and the very desire for faith, by which we believe in Him who justifies the ungodly and comes to the regeneration of holy baptism — if anyone says that this belongs to us by nature and not by a gift of grace, that is, by the inspiration of the Holy Spirit amending our will and turning it from unbelief to faith and from godlessness to godliness, it is proof that he is opposed to the teaching of the Apostles, for blessed Paul says, "And I am sure that he who began a good work in you will bring it to completion at the day of Jesus Christ" (Phil. 1:6). And again, "For by grace you have been saved through faith; and this is not your own doing, it is the gift of God" (Eph. 2:8).

Catholic doctrine is crystal clear that all good that we have relative to salvation is a gift of God coming from his grace through the sacrifice and merits of Christ.  It is not only the completion of good actions that comes from God, but also the very beginning of our good actions all the way down to the basic good will itself.  If we have a good will, it is entirely a gift of God's grace.  (Just read through the entirety of the Canons of Orange and ask yourself how this point could be emphasized any more clearly or strongly!)  As the Catechism of the Catholic Church puts it (#2001--footnotes removed):

The preparation of man for the reception of grace is already a work of grace. This latter is needed to arouse and sustain our collaboration in justification through faith, and in sanctification through charity. God brings to completion in us what he has begun, "since he who completes his work by cooperating with our will began by working so that we might will it:"

Then follows a quotation from St. Augustine:

Indeed we also work, but we are only collaborating with God who works, for his mercy has gone before us. It has gone before us so that we may be healed, and follows us so that once healed, we may be given life; it goes before us so that we may be called, and follows us so that we may be glorified; it goes before us so that we may live devoutly, and follows us so that we may always live with God: for without him we can do nothing.

Calvinsts sometimes complain about Catholic language talking about how man's will "cooperates" with grace, as if this suggests that man's will contributes something to salvation in addition to what God's grace contributes.  But, obviously, this is not what Catholic teaching intends.  Yes, the will of the Christian must cooperate with divine grace.  This is only to say that grace does not destroy or subvert human will but rather perfects it by bringing it to function properly.  The sounder Calvinist doctrine affirms the same.  But it is imperative that it not be forgotten that man's cooperation with divine grace is itself a fruit of divine grace.  There is no idea here of any independent contribution from man.  The idea that man makes an independent contribution to salvation is precisely the idea of the Semipelagianism that the Catholic Church has condemned so thoroughly time and time again.  No, as the Catechism of the Catholic Church (#2011) says, "[t]he saints have always had a lively awareness that their merits were pure grace."  And because even our good will is in its entirety a gift of divine grace, grace must be efficacious.  If God gives a person the gift of a good will, that person will have a good will.  God's grace does not need to be met with some independent contribution from the will, without which grace remains ineffective.  Grace itself provides the very assent of the will that cooperates with it.

Fr. John Hardon, in his Course on Grace: Part IIA - Grace Considered Intensively, Chapter XV, comments on Catholic dogma regarding efficacious grace:

It is a dogma of the Catholic faith that there exists a truly sufficient but inefficacious grace, and also that there exists a truly efficacious grace which, however, is not necessitating. 
A truly sufficient grace is sufficient for placing a salutary act. It carries with it the power of producing such an act. . . .
By a truly efficacious grace is meant one that will be (is) infallibly followed by the act to which it tends, e.g. contrition. If you receive such a grace, even before your will consents to it, that grace is infallibly “sure of success;” it will infallibly procure your consent, produce that act – of contrition. But although it infallibly procures your consent, it does not necessitate you to consent: it leaves you free to dissent. Your will will infallibly say "yes" to it, but it is free to say "no.”

God gives sufficient grace to all, so that there is no obstacle to a person coming to Christ outside his own free refusal to avail himself of the opportunity presented to him by the offer of salvation through Christ.  God commands us to return to him in reliance on his grace.  In order for us to be able to fulfill this command, God must make divine grace available to us upon condition that we will choose to make good use of it.  This is why Catholic doctrine insists that God has provided "sufficient grace" to all men.  All obstacles external to the will have been removed.  However, no one will choose to avail himself of the opportunity to return to God unless God gives him the gift not only of the ability to come to Christ if he will, but also the willingness itself, and it is efficacious grace which provides this willingness to those whom God has chosen.  The sounder Calvinists and orthodox Catholics are fundamentally one on all of these points.

P - The Perseverance of the Saints

Unsound interpretation:  God guarantees that anyone who has once been regenerated will definitely attain eternal salvation.  Therefore, we don't have to do anything to strive for it, or to watch and be wary lest we fall, since we can't fall.  We should never do anything out of concern to maintain our right relationship with God, but should leave it entirely in God's hands and so not take personal care for it.  Instead, we should just live spontaneously, knowing that if God has ordained some good work for us to do, he will cause us to do it.

Sounder interpretation:  God has promised that all those whom he regenerates and brings to faith and repentance he will prevent from ever finally falling away and so bring them safe at last to eternal salvation.  So we can rest assured of our eternal salvation and trust in God's grace.  However, this doesn't mean that we are not still required to be diligent and strive to persevere and grow in holiness, for it is precisely by means of our striving, to which we are moved by God's grace, that God will in the end bring us to eternal salvation.

I have heard people maintain the "unsound" interpretation or something like it on this point, but I don't recall ever hearing it from any serious Calvinist or Calvinist theologian.  The classic Calvinist doctrine on this point is expressed in the "sounder interpretation."

Here is the Westminster Confession on the doctrine of perseverance (Chapter 17--footnotes removed):

1. They, whom God hath accepted in His Beloved, effectually called, and sanctified by His Spirit, can neither totally, nor finally, fall away from the state of grace: but shall certainly persevere therein to the end, and be eternally saved.
2. This perseverance of the saints depends not upon their own free will, but upon the immutability of the decree of election flowing from the free and unchangeable love of God the Father; upon the efficacy of the merit and intercession of Jesus Christ; the abiding of the Spirit, and of the seed of God within them; and the nature of the covenant of grace: from all which ariseth also the certainty and infallibility thereof.
3. Nevertheless, they may, through the temptations of Satan and of the world, the prevalency of corruption remaining in them, and the neglect of the means of their preservation, fall into grievous sins; and, for a time, continue therein: whereby they incur God’s displeasure, and grieve His Holy Spirit, come to be deprived of some measure of their graces and comforts, have their hearts hardened,m and their consciences wounded, hurt and scandalize others, and bring temporal judgments upon themselves.

You probably noted that while on all the other points I contrasted an "unsound" interpretation with a "sound" interpretation, on this point I contrast an "unsound" with a "sounder" interpretation.  This is because on this point, unlike with the other four, even the best Calvinist interpretation deviates from sound Catholic doctrine to some degree.  I think we can distinguish three parts to the Calvinist doctrine of the perseverance of the saints:  1. All those whom God has elected to eternal salvation will certainly persevere to the end and attain eternal salvation.  2. There is a fundamental difference between the elect and the reprobate.  Considering each in terms of the whole course of their existence (as opposed to one isolated moment in their lives), the elect receive a victory over sin that the reprobate never receive.  Whatever repentance and holiness the reprobate attain by God's grace in this life, they are eventually conquered by sin and die in a state of enmity with God, in which they are confirmed forever.  So only the elect are ever the children of God in the fullest sense.  The reprobate may receive some temporary benefits from God's grace, but they are never possessers of the full, eternal aspects of justification, sanctification, or adoption.  3. All those who are brought to faith and repentance in any real sense at any one moment in their lives will certainly be given the gift of final perseverance by God and so will attain to eternal salvation.  In other words, only the elect ever actually come to any real faith and repentance.  The best the reprobate ever attain to is a kind of partial repentance which leaves them in the depths of their heart in a continuing state of rejection of God.

Catholic doctrine agrees with the first two of these three points but rejects the third.  The Catholic Church does not teach that all who are in any real sense regenerated or brought to faith and repentance at any moment in their lives are certainly elect and will be given the gift of final perseverance.  Catholic doctrine allows for the idea that God may give a temporary regeneration, a temporary faith and repentance, to some of the reprobate but withhold from them the gift of final perseverance, granting them a temporary taste of the life of Christ in this world but not the fullness of eternal life in Christ.

This also creates a real difference between Calvinist and Catholic doctrines regarding the possibility of being assured that one is elect and will attain eternal salvation.  Calvinists, logically, link their doctrine of assurance to their doctrine of perseverance.  Since all the regenerate are elect, if one looks within oneself and perceives signs that one has real faith and repentance, one can know that one is among the elect and will persevere to the end.  Catholic theology, on the other hand, does not allow for this unbreakable connection.

Here is the Council of Trent (Sixth Session, Chapters XII and XIII--page numbers removed) on these matters:

No one, moreover, so long as he is in this mortal life, ought so far to presume as regards the secret mystery of divine predestination, as to determine for certain that he is assuredly in the number of the predestinate; as if it were true, that he that is justified, either cannot sin any more, or, if he do sin, that he ought to promise himself an assured repentance; for except by special revelation, it cannot be known whom God hath chosen unto Himself. . . .
So also as regards the gift of perseverance, of which it is written, He that shall persevere to the end, he shall be saved:-which gift cannot be derived from any other but Him, who is able to establish him who standeth that he stand perseveringly, and to restore him who falleth:-let no one herein promise himself any thing as certain with an absolute certainty; though all ought to place and repose a most firm hope in God's help. For God, unless men be themselves wanting to His grace, as he has begun the good work, so will he perfect it, working (in them) to will and to accomplish. Nevertheless, let those who think themselves to stand, take heed lest they fall, and, with fear and trembling work out their salvation, in labours, in watchings, in almsdeeds, in prayers and oblations, in fastings and chastity: for, knowing that they are born again unto a hope of glory, but not as yet unto glory, they ought to fear for the combat which yet remains with the flesh, with the world, with the devil, wherein they cannot be victorious, unless they be with God's grace, obedient to the Apostle, who says; We are debtors, not to the flesh, to live according to the flesh; for if you live according to the flesh, you shall die; but if by the spirit you mortify the deeds of the flesh, you shall live.

And here is the Catechism of the Catholic Church (#2005--footnotes removed) on the assurance of salvation:

Since it belongs to the supernatural order, grace escapes our experience and cannot be known except by faith. We cannot therefore rely on our feelings or our works to conclude that we are justified and saved. However, according to the Lord's words "Thus you will know them by their fruits" - reflection on God's blessings in our life and in the lives of the saints offers us a guarantee that grace is at work in us and spurs us on to an ever greater faith and an attitude of trustful poverty.
A pleasing illustration of this attitude is found in the reply of St. Joan of Arc to a question posed as a trap by her ecclesiastical judges: "Asked if she knew that she was in God's grace, she replied: 'If I am not, may it please God to put me in it; if I am, may it please God to keep me there.'"

It must be kept in mind that assurance of salvation is not an all-or-nothing affair. Final perseverance is a gift of grace, and it cannot be presumed on as if we have a right to it, but at the same time God's grace works in us in a natural and organic way in which early attainments in sanctification lead to later ones. In this way, sanctification is much like every other area of human life. The more we develop certain habits, the more we are likely to live in accordance with those habits in the future. If I have spent a good deal of time and effort to train myself to avoid immoderate anger in my responses to the events of life, I am much less likely to have an outburst of such anger at any given time, all other things being equal, than a person undisciplined in this area. Most of us do not go around nervously wondering if tomorrow we shall slit our neighbor's throat, not because it is absolutely impossible that we might do so or that we know infallibly that we shall not, but because we recognize that through the training of our habits, beliefs, and values throughout our lives, and because of other traits of our personalities that we have come to know, it is extremely unlikely that we will engage in that sort of activity. Similarly, if, by God's grace, we have become the sort of people who truly love God, who have developed habits of living faithfully for him, of loving our neighbors, of living a life of charity, etc., we have good reason to believe that the growth in grace we have attained will have the effect of helping preserve us from much possible future sin, such that we are unlikely to spend a great deal of time (if any) in a state of mortal sin (that is, in a state of total rejection of a right relationship with God) or to die and end up confirmed eternally in such a condition.

We must also remember that God will never abandon a person who has not abandoned him first. If we choose Christ, we are secure. We cannot go to hell if we die in such a state. If we end up in hell, it will only be because we have deliberately, with full knowledge and consent of our hearts, chosen to turn away from a relationship of love to Christ and from the way of life he has called us to in favor of living life according to our own desires. To do this, we must resist the testimony and pleading of God to our consciences, calling us back to the good path of salvation. We are not talking here about the venial sins we all commit throughout our lives--slips into sinful attitudes and behavior flowing from the fact that we have not yet been made perfect in grace--for these, though evil (and converted souls long to be rid of such evils), do not interrupt the overall commitment of our lives to God. In Catholic language, they do not destroy the overall state of charity (that is, the state of love to God in the commitment of our lives). If we are following Christ, however imperfectly, God will not abandon us.

In short, we cannot know with infallible certainty that we are truly converted or that we are among the elect who will receive eternal salvation.  But we can observe the fruits of God's grace in our lives and so know that we love God and choose to follow him just as we know other things about our internal desires and choices by self-observation, and so be comforted that we are in a state of grace.  And we can observe in ourselves the development and growth of our love towards God and our neighbors, and the strengthening of godly habits and desires, and so have a strong hope that we will  not in the future finally abandon God but will continue to follow to the end, in reliance on the ever-present help of God who continues to build within us grace upon grace.

My wife has written up an interesting article in which she articulates that the transition from Calvinist to Catholic on this point for her was not as large a practical step as I think many Calvinists would assume it to be.  You can find it here.

CONCLUSION

So, to sum up what we have seen, Catholics agree with the soundest Calvinist interpretations of TULI, and they agree with two-thirds of the P as well.  In Calvinist language (though not language that Catholics would typically want to use, since it would be misleading), it can thus be said that orthodox Catholics are four-and-two-thirds-point Calvinists!

As I conclude, I would like to provide an extended quotation from St. Isidore of Seville, who was Archbishop of Seville in the seventh century and is both a saint and a Doctor of the Catholic Church.  I think he sums up well and succinctly the Catholic view of the matters addressed in the TULIP doctrines:

Between the infusion of divine grace and the faculty of the human will there is the following element: the decision stemming from a human choice, which is capable of spontaneously desiring good or bad things. Grace is the free gift of divine mercy, through which we evidence the beginning of a good will and its fruits. Divine grace anticipates man, so that he may do what is good; human free will does not anticipate God's grace, but grace itself anticipates an unwilling person, so that he may want what is good. Because of the burden of the 'flesh,' man finds it easy to sin, though he is slow to repent. Man has within himself the seeds of corruption but not of spiritual growth, unless the Creator, in order to raise him up, stretched his merciful hand to man, who is prostrated as a result of the Fall. Thus, through God's grace human free will is restored, which the first man had lost; in fact, Adam had free will to do what is good, even though he did it with God's help. We obtain our will to do what is good and embrace God perfecting us, thanks to divine grace. We receive the power to begin and to perfect what is good from God, who gave us the gift of grace; as a result of that, our free will is restored in us. Whatever good we do, it is God's, thanks to his prevenient and subsequent grace; but it is also ours, thanks to the [God-made] obedient power of our wills. But if it isn't God's, why do we give him thanks? And if it isn't ours, why do we look forward to the reward of good works? Insofar as we are anticipated by God's grace, it is God's; insofar as we follow prevenient grace to do what is good, it is ours. Nobody anticipates God's grace with his merits, thus making him almost indebted to us. The just Creator chose in advance some people by predestining them, but justly abandoned the others to their evil ways. Thus, the truest gift of grace does not proceed from human nature, nor is the outcome of our free will, but is bestowed only in virtue of the goodness of God's mercy. In fact, some people are saved by a gift of God's mercy which anticipates them, and thus are made "vessels of mercy;" but the reprobates are damned, having been predestined and made "vessels of wrath." The example of Jacob and Esau comes to mind, who, before been [sic] born, and again, after being born as twins, shared the bond of original sin. The prevenient goodness of divine mercy drew one of them to itself through sheer grace, but condemned the other through the severity of divine justice. The latter was abandoned in the mass of perdition, being 'hated' by God; this is what the Lord says through the prophet: "I loved Jacob but hated Esau" (Mal 1:3). From this we learn that grace is not conferred on account of any pre-existing merits, but only because of divine calling; and that no one is either saved or damned, chosen or reprobated other than by decision of God's predestination, who is just towards the reprobates and merciful towards the elect ("All the paths of the Lord are faithful love" Ps 25:10).  [The quotation is from St. Isidore of Seville, Libri Duo Differentiarum, chapter XXII, found in God's Eternal Gift: A History of the Catholic Doctrine of Predestination from Augustine to the Renaissance, by Guido Stucco (Xlibris, 2009), pp. 317-319.]

The doctrines of grace are all about . . . well, grace.  Everything we have is a gift of grace, whether in the order of creation or in the order of redemption and eternal life.  In the order of redemption, everything flows from the righteousness and the sacrifice of Christ.  It has all "been merited for us by the Passion of Christ who offered himself on the cross as a living victim, holy and pleasing to God, and whose blood has become the instrument of atonement for the sins of all men" (Catechism of the Catholic Church #1992).  "With regard to God, there is no strict right to any merit on the part of man. Between God and us there is an immeasurable inequality, for we have received everything from him, our Creator" (Catechism, #2007).  As Canon 12 of the Canons of Orange observes, "God loves us for what we shall be by his gift, and not by our own deserving."  The holiness that God works in us by his grace and the good works that manifest that holiness are indeed truly and greatly pleasing to God, for they are his own works in us.  They are "Christ in us, the hope of glory," to paraphrase the Apostle Paul (Colossians 1:27).  The Catholic Church has even chosen to use the term "merit" to refer to the righteousness that is a gift of God to us in Christ.  God's work in us "merits" God's positive regard--that is, it warrants God's favor, for he cannot but be pleased with his own holiness, the work of his Spirit, the image of his own Son in us, mirrored back to him.  But we have nothing to boast of, for, as the Church says to God, following the apt words of St. Augustine, "You are glorified in the assembly of your Holy Ones, for in crowning their merits you are crowning your own gifts" (Catechism, heading before #2006--footnote removed).  "The saints have always had a lively awareness that their merits were pure grace" (Catechism, #2011).

Our salvation is not something we have produced or earned by our own goodness or our own works, but from first to last is a free, undeserved gift to us from the grace of God through our Lord Jesus Christ, who lived a life of righteousness, suffered and died, rose again from the dead, and intercedes for us in heaven in order to merit and procure for us this blessing.  This is the very heart of the doctrines of grace, and it is something both Catholics and Calvinists share.  On this 500th anniversary of the Protestant Reformation, may both sides learn better to see these great truths mirrored in each others' traditions and to rejoice and give glory to God for it.

Here you can find an article on the Catholic doctrines of predestination and efficacious grace that goes deeper and fuller in some areas than I have gone here.  For a more basic overview of the Catholic doctrine of salvation in general, which also contains links to more specific topics (like indulgences and purgatory, for example), see here.  For some thoughts on the Protestant doctrine of "justification by faith alone" and how Catholic theology relates to it, see here.  For those who are wondering how the Catholic school of thought known as Molinism fits into all of this, see herehere, and here.  For a look at the heresy of Jansenism and the Catholic Church's response to it, which sheds further light on the issues discussed here, see here.

Sola Gratia!  Soli Deo Gloria!

43 comments:

Clayton said...

Maybe you answered it in this post and I missed it, but it seems to me (admittedly I still have a lot of learning to do on the subject,) that with this explanation of TULIP, divine reprobation is still believed by some Catholics, and uliltimatly double predestination.
To explain my possible confusion.
"God gives sufficient grace to all, so that there is no obstacle to a person coming to Christ outside his own free refusal to avail himself of the opportunity presented to him by the offer of salvation through Christ."
Yet you idicate that, definitely, none will choose to avail themselves of this opportunity, because they are decidedly unwilling.
In order to be willing at all they must be given this willingness by God. Known as efficacious grace.
This grace however is not given to all. It is only given to certain that God choses. Which means that there are those who God did not chose.
In effect it means that the first kind of grace is only important to those who are made willing through the second (efficacious) kind of grace. And to those who do not receive the efficacious grace, the first grace is well and truly pointless, because they are not even able to desire this grace.
So wouldn't this make the real "saving" grace not the first kind, but actually the kind called "efficacious grace"? And thus, saving grace is not given to all, because efficacious grace is not given to all.
If so this would mean that not everyone receives a real ability to be saved.
That would mean that, for those who do not become saved, it was the choice of God, due to His withholding His efficacious grace from these, who were unable to make any real choice without this efficacious grace. (Please understand, I don't claim double predestination is true, nor do I think you subscribe to that belief.)
Isn't that effectively the same as double predestination?

Mark Hausam said...

Hi Clayton. I have two basic responses, I think:

1. I would not say that sufficient grace is not real grace at all, or that it is pointless, or that it does not give anyone a real ability to be saved. It really does give real ability, and that in itself is a very valuable thing, even though it is indeed true that no one will actually choose to come to Christ without also being efficaciously moved to it. But God truly does invite all people to salvation. He truly does remove all obstacles outside their will to it. And this gives all people both opportunity and moral responsibility for choosing or rejecting Christ.

The idea that sufficient grace, if it is not efficacious to actually produce a willing heart, is pointless and really nothing, was an idea the Jansenists put forward. They accused the Dominicans of having such a pointless sufficient grace and they rejected the idea of any non-efficacious sufficient grace. This view was condemned by the Church. I talk about the Jansenists here - http://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2016/06/what-was-wrong-with-jansenism.html

Just because sufficient grace doesn't actually bring about an actual choice for good doesn't mean it doesn't give a real ability to choose good. That is, it removes all obstacles other than the will itself freely rejecting the real option before it of following Christ.

more coming . . .

Mark Hausam said...

2. I think the terminology of "double predestination" can be ambiguous. Catholic theology does indeed imply that there is a kind of predestination and a kind of reprobation. St. Thomas, and lots of other Catholic theologians, have been explicit about this. There are some whom God moves efficaciously to will to come to Christ and receive eternal salvation. There are others whom God does not move efficaciously to will to come to Christ (and to persevere in choosing Christ to the end), and these, though they have the ability to come to Christ, will in fact choose not to do so. Whom God moves efficaciously to come to him and persevere in him and whom he does not is all a part of God's plan for all of history. It is part of his "predestination" in that sense. The former have typically been called "the elect" and the latter have often been labeled "the reprobate."

The Calvinists, of course, got a lot of their ideas from the Augustinian tradition of the Catholic Church. How does the Calvinist doctrine differ from the Catholic doctrine? There is no official Church teaching on what a Catholic must believe about what Calvinists believe. In fact, people have different opinions about how to interpret Calvinism. If you understand the Calvinists to be denying sufficient grace as the Catholics affirm it, and therefore denying any real ability of the non-elect to come to Christ, then there is a serious problem with the Calvinist view, of course. I tend to have a more optimistic appraisal of Calvinist theology than a lot of Catholics, and I tried in this article to show why. See, for example, Jonathan Edwards's and R. C. Sproul's rejection of double predestination understood as a kind of damning of people without giving them an actual opportunity to choose to follow or reject God, etc., or see Boettner's comments about how people with or without efficacious grace still have free will and can choose among multiple options, etc. So my own opinion is that the best examples of Calvinist theology are actaully a lot closer to the Catholic view than many Catholics or Calvinists realize.

Mark Hausam said...

With regard to "double predestination," there are things we don't want to say. We don't want to say that God created people to be damned as some kind of end goal in itself. We don't want to say that God infuses evil into people just as he infuses good into them. We don't want to say that God damns people (that is, sentences them to damnation and actually damns them) without regard for their sin. We don't want to say that God damns people apart from their choices or without giving them any real option or ability to choose the good. If you interpret Calvinists as teaching these things, then Calvinism is seriously problematic in these areas, obviously. What we DO want to say is that God is in control of history, that God's plan of history includes all things, including who is saved and who is not, that those who are saved are saved as a result of God's efficaciously moving them to choose the good, that those who are damned have not been efficaciously moved to choose the good but rather allowed by God to continue to choose evil and that God voluntarily intended, for his own good purposes, to move the former efficaciously to good and to refrain from moving the latter to good. Call all of this what you will, it is what you get when you put all the pieces of Catholic doctrine together, and it is what Catholic theologians have been explicitly teaching since Augustine. It's what St. Thomas taught. I would avoid the phrase "double predestination" to refer to it because of its negative connotations, but I don't like to spend a lot of time arguing about semantics unless I feel it is useful. So if a Calvinist agrees with me in substance and the only difference is he calls his view "double predestination," I'm going to look at the substance of what he says rather than at the label he sticks on it to interpret how close or how far apart we are in substance. (That doesn't mean I won't criticize his labeling if I feel it is problematic.)

Does all this help a bit?

Clayton said...

Thanks for the response!
I just want to give a brief explanation of my perspective regarding Calvin.
I have recently come (via the Eucharistic teachings of the Church,) to believe that the Catholic Church is the True Church, and thus that I belong their. I cannot yet join, (due to extenuating circumstances) but intend to when I am able. Meanwhile I am trying to learn what I can. I have been Calvinist ever before. So I came to this article trying to understand better how Free Will lines up with Grace. (Also I very much appreciate many of your other articles, they have helped a lot.) If the next comments seem antagonistic, please know they are not intended that way.
That being said. . .

Clayton said...

Question 1: How is sufficient grace truly "Sufficient" if another type of grace(Efficacious) is by necessity required for one to come to Christ? It seems that for it to actually be sufficient no other grace would be required. Much like sufficient funds, means you need no more money for whatever is being funded.

Question 2: If sufficient grace does give the Real ability to choose good, then it seems that you cannot with certainty say that no one will choose this good. For, if no one ever does or did choose this good when given the real ability to(Excluding cases where they were moved by the external grace known as efficacious grace), than it stands to reason that they can't, or that something has bound their will such that the outcome is always a "No" rather than a "Yes". If that were the case they defiantly don't have a free will, but a bound will. An analogy could be like a die (yes I know the human will is not random per se, it's the best example I could think of,) If I roll a 6 sided die and it always with certainty lands 1 face up, and never 2-6 face up. Than imo I can't conclude that it is possible for the die to land 2-6 face up. It also means that the die has no ability to land 2-6 face up. Otherwise it wouldn't be certain that it won't.

Question 3: Does not efficacious grace negate free will? Because, for the will to be free it has to be able to say "yes," and "no." But with Efficacious Grace it becomes certain that those who receive it will be moved to accept the grace God offers. But humans cannot do anything to "get" efficacious grace, as it is given to whom God chooses, and so they receive it without consent. They also cannot refuse this efficacious grace, otherwise it is not efficacious. So it would seem to disregard the will of the receiver.

Feel free to point out any errors in my thoughts.

Mark Hausam said...

Thanks for your questions. This is a great conversation!

If I understood you correctly, you have never been a Calvinist, but are coming to Catholicism from some other tradition?

Question #1: We have to ask what sufficient grace is sufficient for. It is sufficient to provide the ability to come to Christ. It is not sufficient to actually, effectually move the will to choose Christ, for otherwise everyone who received sufficient grace would choose Christ.

Mark Hausam said...

Question #2: Sufficient grace gives to all the ability to choose Christ. The idea of "ability" referring to the will means that there are true options in front of the will that the will is able to choose. But ability to choose between multiple options is not incompatible with certainty with regard to which option will be chosen. That's because the will is not some kind of causeless, arbitrary thing. I would define a choice as the settling of a preference. We have options in front of us. We have a host of different desires. Those desires are rooted in all kinds of things - our personality, our genetics, our past history, our environment, our previous choices, the grace of God, etc. In making a choice, our reason examines our options and our desires, attempting to figure out what we most want, or what we prefer overall, given our options. Eventually, we settle on an overall preference, and that settling on a preference is what we call a "choice." Since a choice is the settling of a preference rooted in desires, choices are inherently predictable. If you knew literally everything about me at the moment of a choice and literally everything had any influence at all on my views, desires, etc., you could predict with 100% accuracy what I would choose. I would still be quite truly free to choose otherwise, but you would know what I in fact would choose. God, in fact, is in precisely that position. Additionally, God has complete control and is the ultimate source of all the causal factors in the universe. He is the source of all positive being, and any negative being (like darkness, ignorance, evil, etc.) is deliberately allowed or not prevented by him. When he created the world and set up all the conditions, he knew every detail of what would follow from all that he would do and all he would not do. This included all free choices of all creatures. So God's plan and foreknowledge includes all our free choices. This is why predestination, understood correctly, is not incompatible with free will.

Mark Hausam said...

So it is perfectly consistent to say that sufficient grace gives to all the real ability to come to Christ, but that no one who does not receive efficacious grace will ever actually do so. Sufficient grace removes all obstacles to the will's ability to choose between options. We really can deliberate on the choice between good and evil, and we are truly free to choose either. But if God refrains from giving us, by his providence and his grace, the actual conditions by which we will prefer to choose good, we will not do so. To say that God does not give efficacious grace to some is to say that he chooses in his providential plan for history to allow some people to choose evil. That is, in his plan for history, he ordains things in such a way that it will come to pass that some will choose evil. He knows that will happen, and he chooses not to alter conditions so as to prevent it. For God to give efficacious grace to a person means that, on the contrary, in his providential plan, he had decided to effect conditions so that that person will come to actually will to choose Christ. He applies grace to them in such a way that it has the effect not only of removing obstacles to their real ability to choose Christ, but also of actually bringing their minds and hearts and external influences into such a condition that it will actually happen that they will choose to turn to Christ.

Mark Hausam said...

Question #3: This is really the same issue as Question #2. Efficacious grace does not push someone into choosing Christ in such a way as to circumvent or overwhelm their will. Rather, efficacious grace is simply God applying grace in such a way that, combined with all the other factors of his providence, the person will be in such a condition that they will freely decide to choose Christ. They could choose otherwise, but in fact they will not want to do so.

You might find these two articles helpful to comment more on all of this:

https://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2022/01/philosophical-thoughts-on-free-will.html

http://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2022/06/against-first-causal-libertarian-free.html

Mark Hausam said...

Perhaps it might help to relate this to foreknowledge. Even apart from thinking about things like predestination and efficacious grace, the idea of foreknowledges puts us in touch with the distinction between ability and certainty.

Imagine that God sends an angel down to me right now who tells me that, tomorrow at noon, I will choose to eat a peanut butter and jelly sandwich. I now know that it is certain that I will eat a PBJ sandwich tomorrow at noon. It will certainly happen, because otherwise God's foreknowledge would be wrong, which is impossible. But this doesn't imply that I am forced to eat the sandwich or that I have no true ability to choose otherwise. I am truly free to eat or not eat the sandwich. Either options is really, genuinely in front of my will, and I truly have the ability to do either act. But I know that, when the time comes, I will prefer to eat the sandwich to all other options, and that is what I will do. My future act is certain, but it is not forced or necessary in the sense of being determined against or apart from my free will.

Does this help? These are certainly deep subjects (and some of my favorite subjects)!

Clayton said...

Thanks for the explanation. Now I get what you mean by sufficient grace (I think.) I was raised Calvinist; the Church I attend follows the Westminster Confession, though they are now unaffiliated with any other church.
Regaurding your explanation of Sufficient Grace; how can we be sure that no one will choose to accept the offer? Why won’t people accept the Grace offered without Efficacious Grace?

On another point: I assumed Efficacious Grace was a term Calvin came up with, but I guess not. Is it something that’s actually taught in Catholic circles? I haven’t been able to find a reference to it in the C.C.C. The only form of Grace I saw was Actual Grace and Sanctifying Grace. So, I guess I’m wondering where the idea comes from?

Clayton said...

On Free Will. Thanks for the link to your article on Free Will. That cucumber analogy was funny.
I think however you and I differ on our understanding of Free Will. So, I’ll do my best to try and write out what I think you think, and my response to that.

It seems that you are saying in your blog post about Free Will, that your Will (or the choice you make with it) is only a result of circumstances and previous causes. As though, human Free Will is simply a result of cause and effect. Your list of things that culminate in a choice is [Choice <- Preference <- Desire or Value atm <- Product of many many things] and you state that the Choices made “are what they are because of prior causes.” This is why you conclude that the Will is predictable with 100% accuracy when all the factors are accounted for.
When you say, predictable with 100% accuracy such that you can know for certain; what you’re describing is not a prediction, but a determination. It sounds like you’re saying that all man's volitions are invariably determined by pre-existing circumstances. If so then when I know (not can guess, but know,) what choice you will make, then it becomes an illusion of choice rather than an actual choice. Because you think your choice is the thing making a difference, when with this view, it was decided before by all of the things that lead up to it, and your choice was simply a result of some other cause.
You seem to assume that, for the will to not be arbitrary or inherently random, it has to be predictable. This from, “That's because the will is not some kind of causeless, arbitrary thing.” This feels like a form of theological determinism. I say that because you seem to hold that God, as the Sovereign God, has determined all the factors that cause my choice to be what it will be. That is effectively the same as God determining my choice. Because the cause of the choice makes the choice. And thus, we wouldn’t cause our own choice from your view, because it is the product of many things that we didn’t choose, so something else causes it for us.

Clayton said...

From my understanding the Will is not a thing at all. It is a being in and of itself. I don’t think our DNA causes us to choose, it only influences our choices. The same is true of Nurture, and Nature. This is true of all things that could have an effect on choice. I don’t think any one thing outside the Will itself could be considered something that causes us to choose something. The cause of the choice is the Will itself, which is self-determining. If the Will was not a cause of the choice, but only a result of prior causes then we would not be culpable, because all our actions would draw their origin from something other than ourselves. Consider the Will of God. God is self-determining. His decisions are not caused by anything outside of Himself, because He determines His own choices, and His choices are a result of His own Will.
In a similar way, don’t we act as free agents because we have been given the gift of Free Will? Doesn’t this Free Will allow us to be self-determining in nature? (This is not to say that we are God like, but I think it would be true to say that we are “like God” in the sense that we are made in the image of God. (I think it’s cool to say, “we are literal icons of God.”) Yet of course we have limits. The creation can never be greater or equal to the creator, and in our case not even close to the creator.)
So our choices are only determined by ourselves. There are factors that influence our choice, but no factors that determine our choice. This means I truly can do something that God does not want me to do. Some might see this as contradicting the Sovereignty of God, it means in effect that no one could truly know what someone with this version of Free Will would choose. In a way this would mean that God cannot predict what someone will choose. (I know that might sound like heresy but hear me out for a moment. If I speak heresy, I shall recant quicker than lightning.)
Prediction is something humans can do, only because we lack all of the possible bits of knowledge, and we don’t see the future. God however cannot predict, nor can He foresee. Both of those things are time-based ways of knowing the future. We know that instead God foreknows. His view of time is inherently different from ours. The C.C.C. says,” To God, all moments of time are present in their immediacy.” So it would be like, He doesn’t see what we are going to do, but that He sees what we did, and it just didn’t happen yet. So our choices or Free Will decisions can truly be ours yet also known by God. We can’t thwart His plan, not because He planned out our choices, but because our choices were included in His plan, seeing as how He can see all choices, not by prediction, but by foreknowing.

This, to me, helps explain how Christ at several points shows a desire that people come to Him, yet they do not come. It’s not that God set it up so that they would choose not to come to Him (as though God wanted them to make the choice that way), but that He offered them every Grace to be saved, and they turned away. Like the rich young ruler, which it says Christ loved.
I hope that explains where I differ from you on Free Will. I honestly don’t really do much thinking about abstract topics like this, so pardon me if it is somewhat incoherent.

Mark Hausam said...

"Regaurding your explanation of Sufficient Grace; how can we be sure that no one will choose to accept the offer? Why won’t people accept the Grace offered without Efficacious Grace?"

Because sufficient grace only gives the ability to choose good; it does not produce the desire to choose good. So a person who receives sufficient grace is fully able to choose Christ, but he won't prefer to do so all things considered. Efficacious grace is the term we use when God not only gives ability to choose Christ to a person but also moves their will to choose Christ. (This movement involves God enlightening a person's mind and heart in such a way that he comes to be persuaded effectively to choose Christ.)

"On another point: I assumed Efficacious Grace was a term Calvin came up with, but I guess not. Is it something that’s actually taught in Catholic circles? I haven’t been able to find a reference to it in the C.C.C. The only form of Grace I saw was Actual Grace and Sanctifying Grace. So, I guess I’m wondering where the idea comes from?"

Yes, it is a Catholic term. It's very common in Catholic theology. (See here - https://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2019/02/predestination-grace-and-free-will-in.html - for some examples of its usage.) See the quotation right at the top of this article (http://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2018/08/clearing-up-another-concern-about.html) for an example of a Pope using it to as part of his explanation for why he did not condemn the theological school of Molinism.

The term, however, does not occur in the Catechism. I think that's because the Catechism is not intended as an advanced theology text for theologians but is meant to be accessible to all people. In the Catholic world, these kinds of questions about predestination and grace have typically been seen as higher-order theological subjects rather than parts of what would be commonly preached about to non-theologians. But the doctrine of efficacious grace is certainly a core idea of Catholic doctrine. The term may not be used in the Catechism, but the idea is implied in many places.

Mark Hausam said...

"It sounds like you’re saying that all man's volitions are invariably determined by pre-existing circumstances. If so then when I know (not can guess, but know,) what choice you will make, then it becomes an illusion of choice rather than an actual choice. Because you think your choice is the thing making a difference, when with this view, it was decided before by all of the things that lead up to it, and your choice was simply a result of some other cause."

I think you are confusing two ideas: 1. An action that is a product of previous causes in such a way that it is not also the product of a real free choice. This would be like my body being taken over by aliens or something and forced to do something contrary to or at least without my will. 2. A real choice occurs, but that real choice does not occur in a vacuum. A choice simply IS the settling of a preference. There are causes that lead me to choose what I choose, but they are not the sort of causes that override or ignore choice but rather are the sorts of causes that LEAD TO choice. So there are all these factors that influence me and give me the knowledge and desires I have at any given moment. I have the ability to use my reason to examine the options in front of me to determine what I most prefer all things considered and then to settle on that preference. That's what making a choice IS. So yes, there are causes of a sort that explain why I choose what I choose. But this is not the same as to say that those causes circumvent or bowl over my choice so that there is no real choice.

Mark Hausam said...

"You seem to assume that, for the will to not be arbitrary or inherently random, it has to be predictable. This from, “That's because the will is not some kind of causeless, arbitrary thing.” This feels like a form of theological determinism."

There are two possibilities: Either an event is uncaused, coming from nothing, and so has no sufficient explanation for its existence, which is logically absurd, or it is 100% predictable by an omniscient being. If an event is not predictable by an omniscient being, that must be because it has no sufficient explanation for its occurrence. It comes literally from nothing for no reason.

There is no reason why we should imagine a choice to have to come from nothing, if we consider what a choice actually is. Again, a choice is settled preference. Why do I settle on a certain preference rather than some other preference? This is explainable in terms of my desires and beliefs, and THESE are explainable in terms of other things. So nothing is happening out of nowhere and nothing at all. But that's not a problem. It is a false assumption that leads to absurdity to assume that a choice, to be real, must be an event without any cause whatsoever. Again, we have to distinguish between different sorts of causes. If an alien takes over my body and directly makes it do things without my will being involved, that's obviously a cause that circumvents or overrides my will. But if my mind and heart are affected by new ideas or new ways of seeing things such that my desires are affected such that my preferences change, this doesn't circumvent or override my will at all. This is what happens in persuasion.

Mark Hausam said...

"I say that because you seem to hold that God, as the Sovereign God, has determined all the factors that cause my choice to be what it will be. That is effectively the same as God determining my choice. Because the cause of the choice makes the choice. And thus, we wouldn’t cause our own choice from your view, because it is the product of many things that we didn’t choose, so something else causes it for us."

The error here is that you are confusing God influencing my choice by means of persuasion with God influencing my actions in a way that circumvents my will. But these are two fundamentally distinct things (as I tried to show with my alien analogy earlier).

It is true that God controls all the factors that have any influence on me. That makes him the perfect persuader. Everything that leads to my being who I am today, with the ideas, desires, and everything, that leads to my settling on the preferences I settle on, comes about ultimately from God's plan for the universe, for all that exists and happens is a result ultimately of what God has done and what God has allowed. How could it be any different, if God is the First Cause of all reality? There cannot exist any positive being that does not come from God ultimately, and there cannot be any negative realities (like darkness, ignorance, or sin) which do not come from God's choice to allow them to happen. So if God is the Creator and source of all reality and knows all things, then his act of creation had to involve the production of an entire universal history which included every free choice of every free being.

But this does not at all imply that those free choices don't really happen. God does not set up the universe in such a way that our actions result from causes that circumvent or override our wills. I was trying to get at that with my cucumber example. Your error here is like not being able to see the difference between someone effectively persuading me to eat a cucumber vs. someone stuffing a cucumber down my throat while I'm kicking and screaming. Do you see the difference between these two kinds of causality? The differnce is not that one is more effective than the other. In principle, persuasion (especially when exercised by an omniscient being who is in control of all the factors influencing my desires) can be just as certainly effective as will-overriding or will-circumventing causation. The difference is just that one kind of causality works by influecing the will to act according to its own nature while the other kind of causality works by circumventing or riding over the will.

I'll get to your last post soon . . .

Clayton said...

"Because sufficient grace only gives the ability to choose good; it does not produce the desire to choose good. So a person who receives sufficient grace is fully able to choose Christ, but he won't prefer to do so all things considered."
OK let me ask the question again. Why Not? How do you know he won't "prefer" to? You have simply stated THAT he won't, but you have given no reasons for WHY he won't. I want to know WHY man Certainly won't choose this good. With your belief it seems that God set up everything so that Man decidedly wouldn't choose to accept this offer.
So is it the case that God brings a human into this world with a will that can only desire evil, (and this man didn't choose his own will, but was given it,) and then God offers this man grace? When this man (with a will made to only desire evil,) ultimately rejects God's offer, because he is unable to desire otherwise, does he get condemned? Doesn't this mean that man is condemned because of an unchangeable inclination to evil? I suppose he was "freely" able to make a preferential choice, but that "free" choice makes no difference when his desire was made to only choose evil. If God is selecting certain ones to get this amazing Efficacious grace, and withholding it from everyone else, and that without this Efficacious grace no one will want God's sufficient grace, and these people can't choose to change their own heart or desires, then He is effectively Choosing who will go to Heaven and who will go to Hell. I mean how else could you put it? You have clearly stated that No Man (without God's Efficacious Grace) will choose to accept God's Sufficient Grace. Which means that God knows that if He doesn't step in an give man His efficacious grace too, then nobody is going to accept His Sufficient Grace.
If He condemns people to Hell because He gave them a desire to reject His Sufficient Grace, ok then, I just want to know how we know that.

Clayton said...

https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/04756c.htm This article is kind of why I feel like your view is a bit deterministic in nature. I didn't ever say our choice comes from nowhere, I would say our choice is from the self, and thus we are self-determining.

Yet again. Please know that, ideally I would that we come to an agreement, but I am likely misunderstanding what you have said, so this may be why I still have questions.

Mark Hausam said...

" I don’t think any one thing outside the Will itself could be considered something that causes us to choose something. The cause of the choice is the Will itself, which is self-determining."

It depends on what you mean. Of course the will is the cause of choice. The "will" is the faculty of choosing. Just like the mind is the source of thought, the "heart" is the cause of emotions, etc. But there still has to be an explanation for why we will what we will. We do not will randomly. Again, it helps if we consider what "willing" actually is more specifically. It is the act of the mind settling on a preference. We have beliefs and desires. We have options. The mind deliberates upon those options in light of our beliefs and desires, trying to settle on what we want most, all things considered. The settling of that question by the mind is what we call the act of "willing." So out willing always reflects are beliefs and desires, and these are the results of lots of other factors - past choices, memories, DNA, past events, how we're feeling at the moment, our beliefs and convictions, our values, etc. Nothing here happens randomly, isolated from the whole nexcus of reality around it. Before I will anything at any given time, all sorts of things have happened which have led me to have the beliefs and desires I have at that given time, and my choice will reflect those beliefs and desires, because that's what a choice IS. Those beliefs and desires don't circumvent my will and directly cause my actions. But they are the stuff out of which my choice arises, and their nature leads to the particular choice that is made.

Mark Hausam said...

"If the Will was not a cause of the choice, but only a result of prior causes then we would not be culpable, because all our actions would draw their origin from something other than ourselves."

And right there is your basic error. You are confusing two things: 1. The particular choice arising out of our beliefs and desires and therefore certainly reflecting those beliefs and desires. 2. Beliefs, desires, and other factors circumventing or replacing our act of willing or overriding it, so that our actions result from something other than our act of willing. You are not adequately distinguishing these two fundamentally different things. Whenever I talk about the choice arising out of and certainly reflecting beliefs and desires, and beliefs and desires being the results of other factors, you hear "beliefs and desires and other things skipping or overriding the act of choice so that no real act of choice occurs and the action occurs without the will."

"Consider the Will of God. God is self-determining. His decisions are not caused by anything outside of Himself, because He determines His own choices, and His choices are a result of His own Will."

Even God's choices reflect his beliefs and desires, for the act of will, again, is nothing other than the mind weighing options based on beliefs and desires and settling on a preference.

Mark Hausam said...

The difference between our willing and God's willing is that God is the First Cause, so that there is nothing in him that is the result of anything outside of himself, whereas we, as creatures, are products of Being outside of ourselves. So we are what we are, and we have the beliefs and desires we have, due to previous causes and factors that ultimately originate outside of ourselves. That is, the beliefs and desires we have, out of which flow our choices, are the results of prior events - our previous choices, our upbringing, our circumstances, our DNA, etc. - which are ultimately results of things going back to even before we were born. That's just what it means to be a "creature" rather than the "Creator" - our being is not self-existent but contingent on other being, ultimately the Supreme Being. Everything we are is a direct result of God's actions, an indirect result of God's actions, or a result of God's permission (in the sense of what God allows to happen and does not prevent).

"There are factors that influence our choice, but no factors that determine our choice."

It depends on what you mean by "determine." I think you are using this word in a confusing and ambiguous way, confusing two distinct ideas, as I laid out above. Our choices are "determined" by previous factors if that means that our choices arise out of and certainly reflect our beliefs and desires, which are also results of previous factors. Our choices are not "determined" by our beliefs and desires if, by that, you mean that beliefs, desires, and other factors determine our actions in such a way that the will is overriddent or circumvented. Since you are not adequately distinguighing these two different ideas, your use of the word "determine" is ambiguous.

Mark Hausam said...

"This means I truly can do something that God does not want me to do. Some might see this as contradicting the Sovereignty of God, it means in effect that no one could truly know what someone with this version of Free Will would choose. In a way this would mean that God cannot predict what someone will choose."

Perhaps you'll clarify this more as I read further. (I'm responding as I go.) It sounds like you may have a greatly overinflated view of what free will is. It sounds like you are making free will a kind of First Causal power, so that every choice is kind of a self-existent being arising out of nothing logically preceding it. But that is contrary both to the law of causality and to the very nature of willing. And it leads, ultimately, to the destruction of theism and of reason. I see hints of that direction in what you are saying here. If a choice is First Causal and self-existent and does not at all arise out of the rest of created reality but is completely independent from it, and in no way arises from God's acts or plans, then you are right - such a thing would be, in its own nature, completely unpredictable, even to God. That's why those who hold this view of the will often end up denying God's foreknowledge, like the Open Theists do. They recognize that there is a conflict between God's foreknowledge and the idea of willing as a totally uncaused event. If God knows what I will do in the future, my future choices must be certain. But they can't be certain if they arise out of no connection with the rest of reality.

But there is no need to adopt this overinflated view of the act of choice. In reality, a choice is the mind settling on a preference. We don't need First Causal self-existendce for this to happen. I talk about this in this article - http://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2022/06/against-first-causal-libertarian-free.html

Mark Hausam said...

"So it would be like, He doesn’t see what we are going to do, but that He sees what we did, and it just didn’t happen yet."

I'm glad that you are trying to protect God's foreknowledge.

I do see a problem with your reasoning here: Just because God is outside of time, that doesn't eliminate the fore in foreknowledge, because there must be a real sense in which God's knowledge of the future exists now, before the future happens. Right now, God knows what I will eat for lunch tomorrow. Therefore, right now, it is certain what I will eat for lunch tomorrow. If free will is inconsistent with certainty of any sort, then free will is inconsistent with foreknowledge.

We can see the present reality of foreknowledge even more clearly when we think about prophecy. Let's say God sent an angel to me this afternoon telling me what I will eat for lunch tomorrow. At that point, it is crystal clear that right now it is certain what I will eat for lunch tomorrow. It will certainly happen as God has told me it will happen, for God cannot be wrong. (We know that God can do this, because in Scripture God often tells what will happen in the future.) So it is absolutely, unchangeably certain what I will choose to eat for lunch tomorrow, and yet that choice is no less real, because it will be a true result of my own mind deliberating on my options and settling on a preference. This reality is not diminished by the fact that, given all the factors involved in my choice at the time of my choice, it is certain what I will choose, and therefore my choice is inherently preditable to a being with enough knowledge. But if you think of a choice as an event completely isolated from God and from all other reality, then it could not be certain until it happens, and so there could be no foreknowledge or prophecy. That's why the Open Theists come to that conclusion - they are committed to a false view of free will and are trying to follow that out to its logical conclusion.

Mark Hausam said...

Theism, as well as the Christian faith, as well as Catholicism in particular, requires an absolutely sovereign God, for that idea flows from the very nature of God as the Supreme Being, the First Cause, the Creator of all things, all-knowing, etc. All being comes ultimately from God. All chains of causes and effects ultimately stem from his creative acts. All good is a positive product of his being. All evil is deliberately and with full knowledge allowed by him in its exact parameters according to his good and wise purposes.

Does God want us to sin? We must distinguish between "God's will" in the sense of what God has planed to cause and allow to happen in history, and "God's will" in the sense of what God loves and hates. God hates evil, but he willingly allows it to happen because he chooses to use it to bring about a greater good. So evil is evil, but it is good that some evils be allowed to happen. When God created the world, he knew every single detail of the history that would result from his acts (of course, he saw all of this from a timeless point of view), including all our sins. In that sense, our sins are a part of his plan. He knew that if he did certain things and refrained from certain things, specific sins would happen, and he deliberate chose to bring about a reality in which he would allow them to occur. But sin, in its own nature, is displeasing to God. He allows it not becaue he likes it, but because allowing it brings about a greater overall good.

Mark Hausam said...

"Why Not? How do you know he won't "prefer" to? You have simply stated THAT he won't, but you have given no reasons for WHY he won't. I want to know WHY man Certainly won't choose this good."

He won't choose it because he won't want to choose it. He will prefer not to, all things considered. And God, in his sovereign plan of history, sometimes allows that to happen and does not prevent it. God could produce a world in which all people would have the beliefs and desires that would lead them to choose Christ, but, instead, he deliberately allows people to form beliefs and desires that lead to the free choice of rejecting Christ. (Again, I didn't say that their beliefs and desires FORCE them to reject Christ apart from their will. Rather, their free choice to reject Christ certainly arises out of their beliefs and desires, as ALL choices, by definition, arise out of beliefs and desires.

The only alternative to this scenario is to imagine a universe in which God is not God, where things happen outside of God's overall control and reality turns out overall differently than God wants it to be in his overall plan, where God is fundamentally dissapointed with his creation, where some chains of being do not originate in God, making God not the true First Cause and source of all reality, where there other Ultimate Beings (other Gods) and the universe is ultimately the product of chance and not a monotheistic God.

Mark Hausam said...

"So is it the case that God brings a human into this world with a will that can only desire evil, (and this man didn't choose his own will, but was given it,) and then God offers this man grace? When this man (with a will made to only desire evil,) ultimately rejects God's offer, because he is unable to desire otherwise, does he get condemned? Doesn't this mean that man is condemned because of an unchangeable inclination to evil? I suppose he was "freely" able to make a preferential choice, but that "free" choice makes no difference when his desire was made to only choose evil. If God is selecting certain ones to get this amazing Efficacious grace, and withholding it from everyone else, and that without this Efficacious grace no one will want God's sufficient grace, and these people can't choose to change their own heart or desires,"

A lot of your difficulty here is because you confuse the certainty of a choice arising out of beliefs and desires with a FORCED action that circumvents choice. So you are imagining that I am saying that there are people who are condemned becuase they are forced to be evil and there is nothing they can do about it, as if they are evil without or against their own will. But that is not the case. No one is condemned except as a result of his own truly free choice. Your use of words like "can't" are important here. People CAN'T not be evil, people CAN'T reject Christ, etc. The use of the word "can't" creates the impression of a person who is forced without or against his will, but that is not the idea. Choices flow from beliefs and desires, and so are certainly predictable from these for an omniscient being, and yet they are truly free because the essence of freedom in the will is that he mind is free to deliberate upon options in order to settle on a preference arising out of beliefs and desires.

"He is effectively Choosing who will go to Heaven and who will go to Hell. I mean how else could you put it? You have clearly stated that No Man (without God's Efficacious Grace) will choose to accept God's Sufficient Grace. Which means that God knows that if He doesn't step in an give man His efficacious grace too, then nobody is going to accept His Sufficient Grace."

It is true that who goes to heaven and who goes to hell, like all other events, fall under the purview of God's eternal plan for history. Nothing happens outside of that overall providential plan, for, if it did, God would not be God. The universe would ultimately be a product of chance. If someone goes to heaven, it is because they choose freely to follow Christ, and that choice was both their own choice and the gift of God by means of his sufficient and efficacious grace. The good will is the gift of God. (See the Council of Orange - https://www.ewtn.com/catholicism/library/local-council-history-and-text-1472) Id a person ends up in hell, it is because they freely chose to reject Christ. God knew that if he set up the world the way he did, one result would be some people choosing to reject Christ and end up in hell, and he deliberately set up the world in this way anyway. He knew all the evils that would happen. Nothing has taken him by surprise. He has chosen not to prevent some evils in order to bring about a greater good. Again, the only alternative to this is to deny God's Godhood, to make God a bystander in a universe ultiately run by chance, wishing things were different but unable to produce what he wants. God hates evil, but he deliberately allows it in order to bring about a greater good. So that, while the evil is hateful to him, the overall product of reality that even allowed evil contributes to, is exactly what God wants. This is the ultimate victory of good and defeat of evil.

Mark Hausam said...

"https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/04756c.htm"

In my opinion, this is a poorly-written article, because it confuses causal necessity which would circumvent free choice with the certainty of a choice as it arises from beliefs and desires. Or at least it doesn't adequately distinguish between them, which I believe is a serious blunder. This would lump together determinists who deny free will with pretty much all Catholic theologians in history, including Augustine and Thomas Aquinas. Fortunately, other articles in the Catholic Encyclopedia do a better job, like the article on "Predestination," which, among other things, makes this comment:

"In order to emphasize how mysterious and unapproachable is Divine election, the Council of Trent calls predestination "hidden mystery". That predestination is indeed a sublime mystery appears not only from the fact that the depths of the eternal counsel cannot be fathomed, it is even externally visible in the inequality of the Divine choice. The unequal standard by which baptismal grace is distributed among infants and efficacious graces among adults is hidden from our view by an impenetrable veil. Could we gain a glimpse at the reasons of this inequality, we should at once hold the key to the solution of the mystery itself. Why is it that this child is baptized, but not the child of the neighbour? Why is it that Peter the Apostle rose again after his fall and persevered till his death, while Judas Iscariot, his fellow-Apostle, hanged himself and thus frustrated his salvation? Though correct, the answer that Judas went to perdition of his own free will, while Peter faithfully co-operated with the grace of conversion offered him, does not clear up the enigma. For the question recurs: Why did not God give to Judas the same efficacious, infallibly successful grace of conversion as to St. Peter, whose blasphemous denial of the Lord was a sin no less grievous than that of the traitor Judas? To all these and similar questions the only reasonable reply is the word of St. Augustine (loc. cit., 21): "Inscrutabilia sunt judicia Dei" (the judgments of God are inscrutable)."

See my article (https://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2019/02/predestination-grace-and-free-will-in.html) for other quotes from Catholic sources showing a more balanced view.

"I didn't ever say our choice comes from nowhere, I would say our choice is from the self, and thus we are self-determining."

Of course our choices come from ourselves. Who thinks otherwise? An act of choice is the act of the mind settling on a preference. My choice is my act. But that doesn't answer the question of why I make the particular choices I make. To answer that fully, we have to talk about how choices arise out of beliefs and desires, for that is the stuff of which preferences are made. That's the material out of which the mind settles on a preference. If you have different beliefs and desires, you have different preferences and different choices.

These are questions that tend to be difficult for people to think through, which is one reason, I think, why there tends to be so much confusion on these topics. I appreciate your willingness to engage on these difficult subjects, which I think is a very fruitful endeavor.

Clayton said...

A point about foreknowledge: The reason God is said to have foreknowledge is not to indicate He has any kind of predictive powers. What it tells us is something unique to God. If the bible said post-knoledge or current-knowledge, that wouldn't tell us much. Humans have both those things. God's foreknowledge indicates that nothing can happen that He does not already know. Really that's it. This doesn't have much bearing on how Grace or Predestination or Free Will works. Like, I can know that somebody is sitting in front of me, but my knowing this doesn't indicate my controlling in any way whatsoever. I'm not even predicting what's happening in front of me, I just know. So God doesn't predict what's going to happen, He simply knows. He can't predict. That would require a lack of foreknowledge.

Remember how predction works. 1st lack of knowledge, 2nd knowledge gained, 3rd based on current knowledge a guess is made about the future. That is predicting. The accuracy of the guess depends on the completeness of the knowledge gained. But remember it is still a guess. God doesn't operate that way, because there is no first stage or second or third. He just knows.

So why does God need to be able to predict something in order to know what will happen?

Was God able (in your lunch prophecy example) to tell you what you would do because He predicted it, or because He sees all things at once and therefore He foreknows what you will do? I would say the latter.

"Choice is the Settling of preference." OK I get it. You don't have to tell me again. One thing you seem to think is that God's foreknowledge depends on choice being predictable. Not so. I wouldn't limit Him to having to predict what is going to happen in order to know.
"therefore choice is inherently preditable to a being with enough knowledge" this does not logically flow from your example. You are assuming that for something to be certain it has to be predictable, that is not a given. Yet again you are limiting God's foreknowledge to having to predict things, in order to know. He is not limited to seeing only the here and now, like we are. (More to come)

Mark Hausam said...

"God's foreknowledge indicates that nothing can happen that He does not already know. Really that's it. This doesn't have much bearing on how Grace or Predestination or Free Will works."

I agree that God is outside of time and so his knowledge is not "looking forward" in his point of view the way it would be for us. Nonetheless, God's foreknowledge has a very significant bearing on free will, etc., because it implies that there exists a reality of what the future will be before it is. God is outside of time, but it is still nonetheless true that he exists right now. His reality is fully real right now. He is present fully in all times, while his experience transcends being limited in one time. So all that God knows exists right now as well. That's why prophecy is possible. God can send an angel and tell us anything about the future he wants, because that knowledge exists right now. That means that all the events in what we call the future are already planned out right now in God's mind. There is, right now, an existing reality and plan about all the things that will happen in the future.

So, right now, there already exists an unchangeable plan that describes every single thing I am going to choose tomorrow, the next day, and every day for the rest of my life. It is absolutely certain that these things will all happen, for God's foreknowledge cannot be wrong. So if we have a view of free will that can't handle that, we have a problematic view of free will. This is why the most consistent advocates of First-Causal free will deny God's foreknowledge, like the Open Theists. But I would say that he proper response is to have a more rational view of free will. Future choices can be absolutely certain but still fully free because what makes a choice free is not exemption from the general flow of causes and effects, broadly speaking, in the universe, or an intrinsic uncertainty, but simply that a choice flow from a person and from that person's mind, reason, willing capacity, etc., without anything circumventing or overwhelming it. Not to belabor the point, but it is crucial - a choice is nothing other than a settled preference, and so it is inherently connected and flows out of desires and beliefs. We do not choose randomly, but our choices flow from our desires and beliefs, and there are reasons we have those desires and beliefs. If we have a view of free will that does not violate the law of causality and make nonsense our of our own psychological experience, we will not have a problem with foreknowledge or predestination rightly understood. The Catholic tradition, as well as the Reformed tradition, has historically understood this.

More to come . . .

Clayton said...

When you write stuff on this blog, do you have irl friends (priests, church doctors, scholars, ect) that you ask to check your work to see if it's valid, or do you just post conclusions you have regardless of whether anyone agrees with you or not?

Mark Hausam said...

"God doesn't operate that way, because there is no first stage or second or third. He just knows. So why does God need to be able to predict something in order to know what will happen?"

I agree that God doesn't predict things in the way a being in time who did not have direct experiential knowledge of the future would. But there is a kind of non-temporal, logical "prediction" in God's knowledge. That is, God knows that if he does certain things, produces certain conditions, refrains from doing other things, etc., his creatures will make certain choices and not other ones. That is, God knows the logical connection between his actions and the choices of his creatures. But this only works if there IS such a connection. If we have a First-Causal view of free will, then there is no connection at all between a particular choice and anything else, so choices of creatures can in no way be part of the plan of God, contrary to Catholic doctrine.

"Was God able (in your lunch prophecy example) to tell you what you would do because He predicted it, or because He sees all things at once and therefore He foreknows what you will do? I would say the latter."

He knows what I will do in the future. Therefore, knowledge of what I will do in the future exists now. Therefore, that knowledge can be made known to me. Therefore, it is certain what I will in fact choose in the future. Therefore, future certainty is compatible with free will and we must have a view of free will that can accommodate that.

I agree, though, that God does not predict things the way he would if he were in time like we are. He sees all times as present. That does not preclude, however, that there is a logical connection between his actions and our choices, nor does it alter the fact that there exists, right now, certain knowledge of what I will choose in the future.

Mark Hausam said...

"One thing you seem to think is that God's foreknowledge depends on choice being predictable. Not so. I wouldn't limit Him to having to predict what is going to happen in order to know."

God's foreknowledge depends on there being a logical and certain connection between what God knows and does and the choices we make, and the certain connection between God's knowledge as it exists now and choices that will be made in the future.

The main point that I am trying to stress is this discussion of foreknowledge is simply that, right now, knowledge exists of all that I will do in the future, and therefore the future of my choices is certain before I make those choices. That fact has a crucial bearing on how we think about free will.

See here - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_Hli1fo1p2s&ab_channel=BishopRobertBarron - for a clip from Bishop Robert Barron basically making the same point I'm making. (See time index 17:00-20:53.)

"You are assuming that for something to be certain it has to be predictable, that is not a given."

It is evident that if something is certain, it is inherently predictable. If my future free choice is certain to happen, there is something that makes it certain. If God is all-knowing, he knows all the facts involved in making my future free choice certain. So he can predict with certainty my future free choice. (I know that God is outside of time. That's not the point here. If it helps, imagine a time-bound all-knowing being. My point right now is simply to point out that it is indeed the case that certainty inherently implies predictability.)

Mark Hausam said...

"When you write stuff on this blog, do you have irl friends (priests, church doctors, scholars, ect) that you ask to check your work to see if it's valid, or do you just post conclusions you have regardless of whether anyone agrees with you or not?"

I don't formally submit my blog posts to anyone. I've thought about doing something like that, but I think it would be impractical. You can do that with books, but to do it with blog posts would be beyond the ability of bishops and others to keep up with, etc.

Nevertheless, the stuff I talk about on this blog I talk about in lots of places - in my teaching in my local church (I teach in the RCIA program in sometimes in other adult education events), in my classes as a Theology teacher, etc., so my teaching is very public. And I also share my blog posts with people, etc. So, informally, I get feedback and dialogue in various contexts (like with our conversation right now).

I also try to make distinctions between my own thoughts and Church teaching, and I try to avoid claiming anything about Church teaching that I can't back up from Church teaching. You can see that from the articles I've given you. (You might watch that Bishop Barron link I gave you just above. Do you know Bishop Barron? He's a very well-known Catholic bishop and teacher. In the short clip I referenced, he says pretty much everything I've been saying in this conversation. And that's because what I'm saying, in terms of doctrine, is standard Catholic theology and has been for thousands of years. Of course, I'm adding some of my own arguments and analysis to explore it futher, etc.)

Clayton said...

I don’t know if you do or don’t, but I ask that you read the full comment before replying as it may not make sense if it is taken one paragraph at a time. (though I understand if you lose the point of it while reading.)

Thanks for the article on Predestination, Grace, and Free Will in Catholic Theology. I have read it already, but then I went back to read it again. After looking at your sources sighted for Efficacious Grace, I am still left to believe that Efficacious Grace (the term itself), is not a common term in Catholic theology and that the earliest description of something nearly the same came from Calvin when he wrote about irresistible grace. Also, efficacious grace does not seem to be a proper teaching (or doctrine) of the Catholic Church per se, but it is defiantly taught by some in the Church in our day and age. The only Catholics sighted as using the term Efficacious Grace seem to be after 1550 or there abouts. At that time Calvin had already published his work “The Institutes of the Christian Religion” in 1536. (Domingo Banez, Molina, and others related to the Dominican and Jesuit controversy would have been very young at that time.) It seems like no coincidence that mention of Efficacious Grace by Catholics came only after Calvin had started using the term irresistible grace. This is not to say that Catholics copied Calvin, but that Calvin probably prompted the debate with his own ideas. Now if a quote of some respected Catholic about Efficacious Grace can be found before the time of Calvin, I will happily conclude that Calvin did not develop the idea, but that it is founded on former Catholic teachers.

The quote from Fr. John A. Hardon, “It is a dogma of the Catholic faith that there exists a truly sufficient but inefficacious grace, and also that there exists a truly efficacious grace which, however, is not necessitating,” is an interesting statement. Depending on how he understands Efficacious Grace, this statement might be true. Though, his claim that it is a dogma, remains unsubstantiated. That is assuming that Church Dogma has to be formally defined (like the Trinity and Cannon of Scripture.)

He wrote another article on the History of Efficacious Grace, and in it he also sights no one before Calvin. http://www.therealpresence.org/archives/Grace/Grace_015.htm

Your quote from St. Thomas would seem like it is implying Efficacious Grace, but it doesn’t say it. “In the same way God antecedently wills all men to be saved, but consequently wills some to be damned, as His justice exacts.” That’s as close as he gets, but St. Thomas is showing how some can be Damned and it still fits into God’s will, even though He wills all to be saved. He is not here saying that the ones who are saved have received a unique grace that is different from the grace received by others. “However, all things considered, He sees that it is better to allow some to be lost than to bring all to salvation through efficacious grace.” This conclusion does not follow from what St. Thomas said, as St. Thomas was not talking about the reason some become reprobated.

Clayton said...

When St. Thomas is being quoted by Thomists, (or people with almost the same view as Thomists,) It only kind of supports their arguments, but it seems more like these quotes serve to not deny the argument rather than to positively support the argument. In this article ( https://www.ewtn.com/catholicism/library/actual-grace-12237 ) the author says that St. Thomas was not a Thomist at all. I’m led to believe him on this, as I have yet to see any quotes that positively support the Thomist view.

Another article https://www.thomasaquinas.edu/news/lecture-dr-lawrence-feingold-aquinas-predestination-grace talks about what Thomas Aquinas taught, and he also points out that St. Thomas never divides grace between Efficacious and Sufficient. Personally, this article’s explanation of grace makes sense to me. Though it may leave some unanswered questions (maybe, idk.) Anyway, the point being St. Thomas doesn’t seem to support Thomist ideas on Efficacious and Sufficient Grace.

One other point: In a quote you gave from the Catholic Encyclopedia it mentions Efficacious Grace: “The unequal standard by which baptismal grace is distributed among infants and efficacious graces among adults is hidden from our view by an impenetrable veil.” What does it mean by efficacious graces here? It could mean that the graces given to adults is a type of grace known as Efficacious, but not necessarily. It may be using the word efficacious to mean, a grace that has become (but is not inherently) efficacious because it brought about it’s purposed result (because all grace is oriented towards salvation, but does not always bring it about.) If it’s the latter, then this grace is still intrinsically the same as the sufficient grace God gives to all. (Thanks for the video from Bishop Baron, I’m sure he’s a very well-read man, and knows his stuff quite well. That being said, he didn’t really go into enough detail in his explanation to tell what his thoughts are.)

I don’t have enough time right now, but I have some thoughts on “choice” that I intend to write out and post. Until then I hope this will be able to further the discussion.

Mark Hausam said...

While it can be helpful to read secondary sources to understand a primary source, you have to be careful to check the primary source to ensure the secondary sources are accurately interpreting the primary source. If we want to discuss the views of St. Thomas, I suggest we actually look at what St. Thomas has said from his own texts in their own context. First of all, Feingold quotes St. Thomas's work Summa Contra Gentiles regarding the idea of people putting an impediment in the way of grace. It is true that he talks about that, but it is instructive to read the whole context of what he says about it. Here is a link to the discussion there:

https://isidore.co/aquinas/english/ContraGentiles3b.htm#159

I recommend reading from here to the end of the link. Particularly notice 160, 161, and 163. St. Thomas's view, overall, goes like this: Without grace, no one can choose good, and specifically no one can avoid putting an impediment in the way of grace. In some people, the reprobate, God allows them to continue to put an impediment in the way of grace and so reject grace. That is, he doesn't give grace to move their will to stop putting that impediment in the way. But to others, the elect, he gives grace which moves their will to stop impeding grace and instead to accept it.

St. Thomas doesn't use the language of efficacious and sufficient grace (that terminology evolves later in the history of Catholic theology), but he expresses the same basic ideas. Grace is offered to all, but sinful men impede it with their free will. This is what later theologians will call "sufficient grace." In some, but not all, God applies grace such as to move the will to stop impeding grace and instead to accept it. This is what later theologians will call "efficacious grace." The terminology is different, but the ideas are basically the same.

Mark Hausam said...

Read also St. Thomas's comments on predestination in this section of the Summa Theologica:

https://www.newadvent.org/summa/1023.htm

And his thoughts on grace in this section of the Summa Theologica:

https://www.newadvent.org/summa/2111.htm

What I've said in our conversation about sufficient and efficacious grace, and how these tie into predestination and free will, etc., are fully consistent with St. Thomas's teaching. I do not see where I have disagreed with him at all in this conversation.

You may be right that the terminology of "efficacious grace" does not occur before the Reformation period. But the idea is certainly there in Catholic theology and doctrine from the beginning. It follows from what is taught in the Catechism, as I tried to show in my article, and all, or at least the majority, of Catholic theologians since the Reformation have affirmed efficacious grace.

Mark Hausam said...

Interestingly, Pope Paul VI, in a letter to a Spanish ambassador shortly after the end of the Dominican-Molinist controversy, comments on why he did not condemn either side, and he explains that one reason is that both sides accepted the "Catholic truth" of efficacious grace:

"I postponed making a decision in the matter of de auxiliis [the great controversy between the Molinists and the Dominicans] for three reasons: . . . The second, because both parties are in substantial agreement with Catholic truth, namely that God through his efficacious grace makes us act and turns us from unwilling to willing subjects, bending and changing human will. There is disagreement about that, but only concerning the manner in which God does this: the Dominicans say that he predetermines our wills in a physical manner, namely, really and efficaciously, while the Jesuits claim that he does so congruously and morally. Both opinions can be defended." (http://freethoughtforchrist.blogspot.com/2018/08/clearing-up-another-concern-about.html)

Pope Paul VI refers to the Molinist congruist position which argued that God moves the will by producing circumstances, including grace, which he knows will result in the will choosing something. (This is much like I've talked about above and Bishop Barron does in his quote.) But, with both the Dominicans and the Molinists, grace is efficacious. That is, God is able, in his providence, to apply grace in such a way to the will as he knows will infallibly move the will to assent to grace, for that assent itself is an effect and gift of grace (as the Second Council of Orange taught emphatically).

Anyway, the ideas of efficacious and sufficient grace, if not the terminology, is rooted in perennial Catholic doctrine. All people are given grace to have the ability to assent to God. Some people assent, some people do not. If a person does not assent, this non-assent is not from God but is allowed by God and not prevented by him. If God does not move the will to assent, it will not assent, but it COULD assent if it wanted to. If a person DOES assent, it is because God has moved the will to assent. The idea that all people have grace to give them the ability to assent has come to be called "sufficient grace." The idea that the assent itself is a product of grace which effectively moves the will to assent has come to be called "efficacious grace." Sufficient grace and efficacious grace are not two different kinds of grace. They are simply descriptions of grace being applied in different ways. Sufficient grace is simply grace being applied to provide ability but without actually, effectually moving the will to actually assent to it, while efficacious grace is just God applying grace in such a way as to actually, effectively move the will to assent.

Clayton said...

"While it can be helpful to read secondary sources to understand a primary source, you have to be careful to check the primary source to ensure the secondary sources are accurately interpreting the primary source." Ok come now. This is unfair. You have provided multiple links to secondary sources, to which I haven't complained.
Now that I do, you act like it's invalid?

Mark Hausam said...

Secondary sources are not invalid. But when we're reading a secondary source talking about what someone else taught, especially on a difficult-to-understand and controversial matter, it's important to check to make sure the secondary source is accurately conveying what the other person taught. In this case, I think that Feingold and Most have conveyed a misleading impression of what St. Thomas actually taught, which I think you can see if you go back and actually read St. Thomas himself, which is why I provided links and references to St. Thomas original texts in that connection.

Clayton said...

I am still intending to give a reply to you.
Thanks for you clarification about your issue with the secondary sources. I have been reading a lot of Summa Theologica (It's a lot to try to understand) and I see that you are right in that he does indeed imply a type of Sufficient and Efficacious grace.