Religious Freedom and the Fallibility of the Roman Catholic Church, Part II

Continued from Part I.

DIGNITATIS HUMANAE AND MODERN ROMAN CATHOLIC TEACHING REGARDING RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Roman Catholic Church continued to wrestle with the concept of religious freedom, which was rapidly increasing in prevalence.  As we've noted, church leaders fought strongly against the doctrine for a time, but, eventually, they acquiesced in it and decided to wholeheartedly embrace it.  The culmination of this transition occurred during the ecumenical (from the Roman Catholic point of view) Vatican II Council, and particularly with the document Dignitatis Humanae, the council's "Declaration on Religious Freedom."  This document put forward the views of the council on religious freedom, as well as the papal point of view, being "promulgated by His Holiness Pope Paul VI."  The document is dated December 7, 1965.

The document begins by noting the growing prevalence of modern notions of religious freedom:

A sense of the dignity of the human person has been impressing itself more and more deeply on the consciousness of contemporary man,(1) and the demand is increasingly made that men should act on their own judgment, enjoying and making use of a responsible freedom, not driven by coercion but motivated by a sense of duty. The demand is likewise made that constitutional limits should be set to the powers of government, in order that there may be no encroachment on the rightful freedom of the person and of associations. This demand for freedom in human society chiefly regards the quest for the values proper to the human spirit. It regards, in the first place, the free exercise of religion in society.

Having noted this growing sense that people ought to have religious freedom, the document then goes on to add the Roman Catholic Church's wholehearted approval of this sense:

This Vatican Council takes careful note of these desires in the minds of men. It proposes to declare them to be greatly in accord with truth and justice. To this end, it searches into the sacred tradition and doctrine of the Church-the treasury out of which the Church continually brings forth new things that are in harmony with the things that are old.

It is already evident that we are on very different ground here than in previous church statements on this subject.  We recall that Pope Pius IX and other earlier popes and declarations from the church had brought up and noted the growing tendency among people in the western world to promote religious freedom or liberty of conscience only to lambast it as a terrible and dangerous tendency.  But here we have exactly the opposite response:  "People these days are growing more and more in favor of religious freedom--and that's great!  We agree with them!"

The document goes on to make the church's new ("continually brings forth new things") position on this subject abundantly clear:

This Vatican Council declares that the human person has a right to religious freedom. This freedom means that all men are to be immune from coercion on the part of individuals or of social groups and of any human power, in such wise that no one is to be forced to act in a manner contrary to his own beliefs, whether privately or publicly, whether alone or in association with others, within due limits.
 
The council further declares that the right to religious freedom has its foundation in the very dignity of the human person as this dignity is known through the revealed word of God and by reason itself.(2) This right of the human person to religious freedom is to be recognized in the constitutional law whereby society is governed and thus it is to become a civil right.

The about-face the church has made on this subject is abundantly clear.  Before, as articulated in such documents as Quanta Cura, the concept of religious freedom, limited only by concerns for secular public order, was denounced as false and dangerous and opposed to historic Catholic teaching.  Now the very same idea is embraced as a fundamental human right, rooted in the inherent dignity of man and in both revelation and reason, and it is now the duty of all societies to recognize this right in constitutional law and thus embrace it as a civil right.

Notice how striking the comparison is between the language of the council here and the general language of liberty of conscience used in the west in modern times, as exhibited in such documents as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights:

Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.

In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.  (Universal Declaration of Human Rights)

This Vatican Council declares that the human person has a right to religious freedom. This freedom means that all men are to be immune from coercion on the part of individuals or of social groups and of any human power, in such wise that no one is to be forced to act in a manner contrary to his own beliefs, whether privately or publicly, whether alone or in association with others, within due limits.  (Dignnitatis Humanae)

The council is clearly getting not only its ideas but even much of its language from general western articulations of the concept of religious freedom.  And note also how this same sort of language--along with the ideas it articulates--was brought up in derision by earlier documents such as Quanta Cura:

And, against the doctrine of Scripture, of the Church, and of the Holy Fathers, they do not hesitate to assert that "that is the best condition of civil society, in which no duty is recognized, as attached to the civil power, of restraining by enacted penalties, offenders against the Catholic religion, except so far as public peace may require." From which totally false idea of social government they do not fear to foster that erroneous opinion, most fatal in its effects on the Catholic Church and the salvation of souls, called by Our Predecessor, Gregory XVI, an "insanity,"2 viz., that "liberty of conscience and worship is each man's personal right, which ought to be legally proclaimed and asserted in every rightly constituted society; and that a right resides in the citizens to an absolute liberty, which should be restrained by no authority whether ecclesiastical or civil, whereby they may be able openly and publicly to manifest and declare any of their ideas whatever, either by word of mouth, by the press, or in any other way."  (Quanta Cura)

There can be no reasonable doubt that it is the same basic concept of religious freedom that is being rejected as false by Quanta Cura, presented as true by the Universal Declaration, and also affirmed as true and of fundamental importance by Dignitatis Humanae.

Earlier I noted that some popes shortly before Vatican II had been toying with the idea of a limited toleration to be perhaps enacted in non-ideal circumstances.  I argued that this concept was not necessarily or directly contradictory to historic Roman teaching on the duty of magistrates to use civil coercion to restrain and punish heretics.  But with Dignitatis Humanae, we have an idea promoted that goes far beyond a limited, non-ideal toleration from time to time.  We have a full-blown affirmation that religious freedom is a basic and fundamental right for all people that is rooted, not in non-ideal circumstances, but in the very natural dignity of man, in reason, and in revelation, and which ought to be embraced by all people and all societies at all times (even by those societies which have an established--even Catholic--religion).  This concept of religious freedom as a fundamental right was explicitly opposed by popes even in the very midst of their considerations of a non-ideal tolerance, as we have seen.  It is evident that this new concept is unavoidably incompatible with previous teaching.  It represents a fundamental about-face for the Roman Catholic Church and its teaching on this crucial issue.

Let me provide some further examples of what Dignitatis Humanae has to say about the right to religious freedom, how it is rooted in natural human dignity and in reason and revelation, how it applies even to those who misuse their consciences to come to wrong conclusions, how it applies to all societies--even those which have established religions, how it is an essential duty of government, etc., in a series of short quotations:

It is in accordance with their dignity as persons-that is, beings endowed with reason and free will and therefore privileged to bear personal responsibility-that all men should be at once impelled by nature and also bound by a moral obligation to seek the truth, especially religious truth. They are also bound to adhere to the truth, once it is known, and to order their whole lives in accord with the demands of truth. However, men cannot discharge these obligations in a manner in keeping with their own nature unless they enjoy immunity from external coercion as well as psychological freedom. Therefore the right to religious freedom has its foundation not in the subjective disposition of the person, but in his very nature. In consequence, the right to this immunity continues to exist even in those who do not live up to their obligation of seeking the truth and adhering to it and the exercise of this right is not to be impeded, provided that just public order be observed.

The protection and promotion of the inviolable rights of man ranks among the essential duties of government.(5) Therefore government is to assume the safeguard of the religious freedom of all its citizens, in an effective manner, by just laws and by other appropriate means.

If, in view of peculiar circumstances obtaining among peoples, special civil recognition is given to one religious community in the constitutional order of society, it is at the same time imperative that the right of all citizens and religious communities to religious freedom should be recognized and made effective in practice.

Finally, government is to see to it that equality of citizens before the law, which is itself an element of the common good, is never violated, whether openly or covertly, for religious reasons. Nor is there to be discrimination among citizens.

Dignitatis Humanae not only affirms that religious freedom is an individual moral and civil right, but it affirms that part of what it necessarily means is that people of any religion should be allowed not only believe and practice their religion as individuals, but to form religious communities and practice and disseminate their religions publicly:

The social nature of man, however, itself requires that he should give external expression to his internal acts of religion: that he should share with others in matters religious; that he should profess his religion in community. Injury therefore is done to the human person and to the very order established by God for human life, if the free exercise of religion is denied in society, provided just public order is observed.

4. The freedom or immunity from coercion in matters religious which is the endowment of persons as individuals is also to be recognized as their right when they act in community. Religious communities are a requirement of the social nature both of man and of religion itself.

Provided the just demands of public order are observed, religious communities rightfully claim freedom in order that they may govern themselves according to their own norms, honor the Supreme Being in public worship, assist their members in the practice of the religious life, strengthen them by instruction, and promote institutions in which they may join together for the purpose of ordering their own lives in accordance with their religious principles.

Religious communities also have the right not to be hindered in their public teaching and witness to their faith, whether by the spoken or by the written word. However, in spreading religious faith and in introducing religious practices everyone ought at all times to refrain from any manner of action which might seem to carry a hint of coercion or of a kind of persuasion that would be dishonorable or unworthy, especially when dealing with poor or uneducated people. Such a manner of action would have to be considered an abuse of one's right and a violation of the right of others.

These ideas are clearly contrary to those expressed by Pope Pius IX in Quanta Cura.  It sure doesn't sound like he was all that big on the idea of letting people propagate false religions:

From which totally false idea of social government they do not fear to foster that erroneous opinion, most fatal in its effects on the Catholic Church and the salvation of souls, called by Our Predecessor, Gregory XVI, an "insanity,"2 viz., that "liberty of conscience and worship is each man's personal right, which ought to be legally proclaimed and asserted in every rightly constituted society; and that a right resides in the citizens to an absolute liberty, which should be restrained by no authority whether ecclesiastical or civil, whereby they may be able openly and publicly to manifest and declare any of their ideas whatever, either by word of mouth, by the press, or in any other way." But, while they rashly affirm this, they do not think and consider that they are preaching "liberty of perdition;"3 and that "if human arguments are always allowed free room for discussion, there will never be wanting men who will dare to resist truth, and to trust in the flowing speech of human wisdom; whereas we know, from the very teaching of our Lord Jesus Christ, how carefully Christian faith and wisdom should avoid this most injurious babbling."4

Dignitatis Humanae, like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, does not affirm a totally unrestrained notion of religious freedom.  It acknowledges that "public order" or "due order" puts limits on what can be allowed to go on in society under the name of religion:

7. The right to religious freedom is exercised in human society: hence its exercise is subject to certain regulatory norms. In the use of all freedoms the moral principle of personal and social responsibility is to be observed. In the exercise of their rights, individual men and social groups are bound by the moral law to have respect both for the rights of others and for their own duties toward others and for the common welfare of all. Men are to deal with their fellows in justice and civility.

This respect for "public order," however, just as with the Declaration of Human Rights, does not give the state any license to engage in civil coercion against any person who is following his conscience--so we can't read into this limitation on religious freedom any allowance for the punishing of heretics, but only for maintaining a secular sort of public order--that is, protecting things like life, property, etc., in accordance with the sorts of rights noted in the Universal Declaration:

Furthermore, society has the right to defend itself against possible abuses committed on the pretext of freedom of religion. It is the special duty of government to provide this protection. However, government is not to act in an arbitrary fashion or in an unfair spirit of partisanship. Its action is to be controlled by juridical norms which are in conformity with the objective moral order. These norms arise out of the need for the effective safeguard of the rights of all citizens and for the peaceful settlement of conflicts of rights, also out of the need for an adequate care of genuine public peace, which comes about when men live together in good order and in true justice, and finally out of the need for a proper guardianship of public morality.

These matters constitute the basic component of the common welfare: they are what is meant by public order. For the rest, the usages of society are to be the usages of freedom in their full range: that is, the freedom of man is to be respected as far as possible and is not to be curtailed except when and insofar as necessary.

Some have attempted to differentiate between the "liberty of conscience" condemned by Quanta Cura and other earlier church teaching from that which is positively affirmed in Dignitatis Humanae by saying that the idea condemned earlier was a totally unlimited notion of religious freedom, whereas the notion embraced by Vatican II was a limited notion of religious freedom.  But we recall that Quanta Cura, for example, made it clear that the notion of religious freedom being opposed was not an unlimited notion but a limited one:

And, against the doctrine of Scripture, of the Church, and of the Holy Fathers, they do not hesitate to assert that "that is the best condition of civil society, in which no duty is recognized, as attached to the civil power, of restraining by enacted penalties, offenders against the Catholic religion, except so far as public peace may require."

Pope Pius IX and the earlier Roman leaders were not stupid.  They knew that pretty much nobody was advocating a totally unlimited idea of religious freedom, and they made it perfectly clear that they were intending to criticize a notion of religious freedom that was actually becoming common among people of the west and not some hypothetical idea of religious freedom held by virtually nobody.  And it is clearly this same notion of religious freedom that continues to prevail in the western world in the modern day and which was affirmed with great bravado by Vatican II--contrary to earlier Roman church teaching.

DIGNITATIS HUMANAE TRIES TO SHOW THAT IT HAS NOT CHANGED ROMAN DOCTRINE

It is both instructive and (in my opinion) somewhat amusing to watch the writers of Dignitatis Humanae try so very hard to justify their embracing of modern notions of religious freedom in light of Scripture and church history, and to show that they haven't really changed any church doctrine on the subject.

One way in which they do this is to try to root the idea of religious freedom in the idea that true faith is a required duty of all men (so far as they are capable of it) and that such faith must be voluntary.  They rightly point out that that has always been church teaching, and then they use it to suggest that the church has always held to the basic ideal of religious freedom--even if it failed to explicitly articulate this in the past as well as it is doing in the present.

9. The declaration of this Vatican Council on the right of man to religious freedom has its foundation in the dignity of the person, whose exigencies have come to be are fully known to human reason through centuries of experience. What is more, this doctrine of freedom has roots in divine revelation, and for this reason Christians are bound to respect it all the more conscientiously. Revelation does not indeed affirm in so many words the right of man to immunity from external coercion in matters religious. It does, however, disclose the dignity of the human person in its full dimensions. It gives evidence of the respect which Christ showed toward the freedom with which man is to fulfill his duty of belief in the word of God and it gives us lessons in the spirit which disciples of such a Master ought to adopt and continually follow. Thus further light is cast upon the general principles upon which the doctrine of this declaration on religious freedom is based. In particular, religious freedom in society is entirely consonant with the freedom of the act of Christian faith.

10. It is one of the major tenets of Catholic doctrine that man's response to God in faith must be free: no one therefore is to be forced to embrace the Christian faith against his own will.(8) This doctrine is contained in the word of God and it was constantly proclaimed by the Fathers of the Church.(7) The act of faith is of its very nature a free act. Man, redeemed by Christ the Savior and through Christ Jesus called to be God's adopted son,(9) cannot give his adherence to God revealing Himself unless, under the drawing of the Father,(10) he offers to God the reasonable and free submission of faith. It is therefore completely in accord with the nature of faith that in matters religious every manner of coercion on the part of men should be excluded. In consequence, the principle of religious freedom makes no small contribution to the creation of an environment in which men can without hindrance be invited to the Christian faith, embrace it of their own free will, and profess it effectively in their whole manner of life.

This Vatican Council likewise professes its belief that it is upon the human conscience that these obligations fall and exert their binding force. The truth cannot impose itself except by virtue of its own truth, as it makes its entrance into the mind at once quietly and with power.

Religious freedom, in turn, which men demand as necessary to fulfill their duty to worship God, has to do with immunity from coercion in civil society. Therefore it leaves untouched traditional Catholic doctrine on the moral duty of men and societies toward the true religion and toward the one Church of Christ.

On his part, man perceives and acknowledges the imperatives of the divine law through the mediation of conscience. In all his activity a man is bound to follow his conscience in order that he may come to God, the end and purpose of life. It follows that he is not to be forced to act in a manner contrary to his conscience. Nor, on the other hand, is he to be restrained from acting in accordance with his conscience, especially in matters religious. The reason is that the exercise of religion, of its very nature, consists before all else in those internal, voluntary and free acts whereby man sets the course of his life directly toward God. No merely human power can either command or prohibit acts of this kind.(3)

There are two related problems with this line of reasoning used as a justification to prove that the church has not changed her teaching:  1. It does not necessarily, logically follow from the fact that true faith must be voluntary that civil coercion in religious matters is wrong.  In fact, Christian theologians over the past 1500 years or so, at least from Augustine to Vatican II, had argued that the one does not necessarily imply the other.  2. And even more importantly, what we've seen already from previous Roman church teaching and practice shows quite clearly that before the twentieth century the Roman church did not embrace a necessary connection between faith being voluntary and the wrongness of civil coercion in religious matters but rather repudiated the idea of such a necessary connection as false.  If the church has always held the idea of such a necessary connection, it sure did a fantastic job of fooling everybody!

Just to provide briefly an example of the sort of reasoning more in vogue in Roman circles before Vatican II, let me quote Augustine, whose teachings on religious freedom helped to set the standard for the next 1500 years of western church history.  These two quotations are from a letter from Augustine to a schismatic bishop named Vincentius written in the year 408 (Augustine, Letters, vol. I in Works, 15 vols, ed. Marcus Dods [Edinburgh, 1872], vol. VI, pp. 395-404, 409-13, taken from "Augustine, Letter 93, Augustine to Vincentius, a schismatic bishop in Mauretania (408)," found in David George Mullan, ed., Religious Pluralism in the West [Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1998], 42-43, 40-41):

You are of the opinion that no one should be compelled to follow righteousness; and yet you read that the householder said to his servants, "Whomsoever ye shall find, compel them to come in" [Luke 14: 23].  You also read how he who was at first Saul, and afterwards Paul, was compelled, by the great violence with which Christ coerced him, to know and to embrace the truth; for you cannot but think that the light which our eyes enjoy is more precious to men than money or any other possession.  This light, lost suddenly by him when he was cast to the ground by the heavenly voice, he did not recover until he became a member of the Holy Church.

Wherefore, if we were so to overlook and forbear with those cruel enemies who seriously disturb our peace and quietness by manifold and grievous forms of violence and treachery, as that nothing at all should be contrived and done by us with a view to alarm and correct them, truly we would be rendering evil for evil.  For if any one saw his enemy running headlong to destroy himself when he had become delirious through a dangerous fever, would he not in that case be much more truly rendering evil for evil if he permitted him to run on thus, than if he took measures to have him seized and bound?  And yet he would at that moment appear to the other to be most vexatious, and most like an enemy, when, in truth, he had proved himself most useful and most compassionate; although, doubtless, when health was recovered, he would express to him his gratitude with a warmth proportioned to the measure in which he had felt his refusal to indulge him in his time of frenzy.  Oh, if I could show you how many we have even from the Circumcelliones, who are now approved Catholics, and condemn their former life, and the wretched delusion under which they believed that they were doing in behalf of the Church of God whatever they did under the promptings of a restless temerity, who nevertheless would not have been brought to this soundness of judgment had they not been, as persons beside themselves, bound with the cords of those laws which are distasteful to you!  As to another form of most serious distemper,--that, namely, of those who had not, indeed, a boldness leading to acts of violence, but were pressed down by a kind of inveterate sluggishness of mind, and would say to us:  "What you affirm is true, nothing can be said against it; but it is hard for us to leave off what we have received by tradition from our fathers,"--why should not such persons be shaken up in a beneficial way by a law bringing upon them inconvenience in worldly things, in order that they might rise from their lethargic sleep, and awake to the salvation which is to be found in the unity of the Church?  How many of them, now rejoicing with us, speak bitterly of the weight with which their ruinous course formerly oppressed them, and confess that it was our duty to inflict annoyance on them, in order to prevent them from perishing under the disease of lethargic habit, as under a fatal sleep!

Augustine here takes a quite different line of reasoning from the one embraced by Dignitatis Humanae.  Although he agrees that a person must embrace from the heart the true faith, he argues that sometimes civil coercion can help people to get free of hindrances that prevent them from fully seeing and embracing the truth.  Clearly, for Augustine--as well as for 1500 years of subsequent Roman teaching--the fact that faith is voluntary does not at all imply that civil coercion ought not to be used in religious matters.  Vatican II did not embrace the only logical position out there; rather, it repudiated its clearly-affirmed previous reasoning in order to adopt a line of reasoning that just happens to be the one favored by the modern western world.

Dignitatis Humanae summarizes its claim that it continues to affirm the same teaching that the Roman Catholic Church has always affirmed:

In faithfulness therefore to the truth of the Gospel, the Church is following the way of Christ and the apostles when she recognizes and gives support to the principle of religious freedom as befitting the dignity of man and as being in accord with divine revelation. Throughout the ages the Church has kept safe and handed on the doctrine received from the Master and from the apostles. In the life of the People of God, as it has made its pilgrim way through the vicissitudes of human history, there has at times appeared a way of acting that was hardly in accord with the spirit of the Gospel or even opposed to it. Nevertheless, the doctrine of the Church that no one is to be coerced into faith has always stood firm.

Thus the leaven of the Gospel has long been about its quiet work in the minds of men, and to it is due in great measure the fact that in the course of time men have come more widely to recognize their dignity as persons, and the conviction has grown stronger that the person in society is to be kept free from all manner of coercion in matters religious.

My version of these paragraphs:  "We've continued to hand on unchanged from the beginning the doctrine of Christ.  Sure, there have been times when we haven't fully lived up to it [like the previous 1500 years consistently--editorial comment], but we're getting better.  People are starting to realize that religious freedom is a fundamental right, and we've always taught that faith must be voluntary, which implies religious freedom, so we've really taught religious freedom all along, even though it hasn't really looked like it and we've never actually said it before or noticed that we taught it until recently."  But as we've seen above, Vatican II does not simply carry on the same teaching that the church carried on previously, but rather, in this area, it fundamentally reverses the church's teaching.  Dignitatis Humanae, being a deliverance of an ecumenical council, represents the mind of the whole church gathered together, as well as the mind of the pope.  It is giving a clear, definitive statement on the subject of religious freedom, using its divine teaching authority, addressed to the whole church.  It therefore must be believed as having been delivered with the seal of the church's divinely-inspired teaching authority--that is, it cannot be rejected but it must be accepted as infallible.  And even if some might try to argue on technical grounds that the document is not intended as infallible (which argument I do not think would be successful), we have already seen that even when statements fall outside some technical definition of infallibility, they are to be received as being the teaching of Christ's divinely-guided church.  They cannot simply be ignored and rejected.

So what we have seen above is that the Roman Catholic Church has taught, using its claimed divine teaching authority, which is to be trusted as a final arbiter of theological truth, both that the modern notion of religious freedom is wrong and wicked and that it is right and righteous.  As these cannot both be true, we must consider the church's claim to have an ultimately-reliable (i.e. infallible) teaching authority to be falsified.

A LOOK AT A RESPONSE FROM ROMAN CATHOLIC WRITER BRYAN CROSS

In this final section, I would like to briefly look at some arguments attempting to show that the church has not contradicted itself in its teaching on religious freedom.  Particularly, I want to look at a recent article by Bryan Cross posted at the Called to Communion website, a Roman Catholic website dedicated to fostering dialogue between Roman Catholics and Reformed Christians.  Let's look at some of Bryan's attempts at resolution:

As Pope Pius IX makes clear in Quanta Cura, and Pope Leo XIII confirmed subsequently, the conception of liberty of conscience Pope Gregory XVI condemned follows from the indifferentist conception of the best condition of civil society. Hence this “liberty of conscience” refers to a freedom not only from coercion but also from guidance, teaching, or influence by both civil and ecclesial authorities toward religious truth, and from restriction, impedance, or opposition by such authorities toward religious error. It includes the notion of freedom from the influence or idea or existence of public religious truth and from public religious practice by the civil authority or the endorsement of religious practice by the civil authority. Each man’s guide in matters of religion must be his reason alone, and his reason must not be informed or influenced by civil authorities as such, whether through word or actions, or by ecclesial authorities publicly recognized as such by the civil authority. According to this notion any such informing or influencing would be an abuse of power because there is no true religion and no true form of Christianity. More generally, this conception of freedom of conscience views authority and freedom as opposed, such that the action of a civil authority in its capacity as civil authority to advance a particular religion is ipso facto a violation of the freedom of the citizens with respect to religion. Religion can have no place in the public square, because there can be no publicly recognized religious truth; there can be only private religious decisions. Hence there are no possible social conditions in which upholding the common good requires or allows action of this sort by civil authorities.

The freedom of conscience referred to in Dignitatis Humanae, by contrast, is a more specific definition of freedom, namely, freedom from coercion to act against one’s conscience in matters of religion, within due limits in relation to the common good. The freedom of conscience affirmed in Dignitatis Humanae is not a freedom to form one’s conscience apart from any guidance or direction toward the truth by the civil authority or by an ecclesial authority recognized as such by the civil authority, but instead a freedom to act according to one’s conscience with regard to religion, without coercion, within due limits in relation to the common good.¹ This liberty of conscience requires that no government may impose on its citizens the profession or repudiation of any religion such that any citizens are compelled or coerced to act against their conscience with regard to religion. But this liberty of conscience does not disallow a publicly recognized religion, or the promotion and defense and practice of that public religion by the civil authority as such.²

So the “liberty of conscience” condemned in the earlier document is not the same “liberty of conscience” affirmed in Dignitatis Humanae, and for that reason there is no contradiction between the two teachings.

Bryan points out accurately that Dignitatis Humanae does not oppose the idea, taught earlier by the church, that civil governments ought to embrace the Roman Catholic religion and promote it.  DH does not seem particularly enthused about the idea, such as when it talks about a situation where the civil government embraces a particular religion as involving a set of "peculiar circumstances"--hardly words suggesting that this is the norm that everyone ought to follow.  And DH does not explicitly promote as good the idea that civil societies should establish Roman Catholicism or promote it.  But I grant that it doesn't seem to want to explicitly oppose this idea either, so Bryan is right that there is no clear contradiction here.  (Or, at least, I am willing to grant this for the sake of the current argument.)

But Bryan's response, while accurate as far as it goes, also misses the point of the alleged contradiction.  The contradiction arises not in connection with the question of whether or not civil societies should have an established religion but whether or not they should use civil coercion to restrain and punish heretics.  Bryan's response sidesteps that crucial question.  As we have seen, it is clear that earlier Roman teaching affirmed quite positively that heretics ought to be restrained and punished by civil society (at least most of the time--recognizing some room in non-ideal circumstances for some toleration) beyond merely what would be required to maintain a secular civil peace and order, and that DH just as clearly affirmed that such restraint and punishment should not happen.  The entire point of the modern notion of religious freedom or liberty of conscience is that beyond the requirements of a secular public peace and order--that is, a concern for the life, property, and other such rights of all citizens of whatever religion--there should be no restraint on anyone's conscience, no matter what religion he professes.  And it is quite clear that it is this notion that DH enthusiastically teaches and promotes.  So Bryan has failed to resolve the actual contradiction that exists.

What then of the seeming contradiction between the older teaching that it is false that liberty of conscience and worship is each man’s personal right, and the teaching in Dignitatis Humanae that liberty of conscience and worship is each man’s personal right? Here too, the position condemned is not the same position affirmed, because the ‘right’ condemned in the older documents is not the right affirmed in Dignitatis Humanae. The position condemned is the notion that human persons have a right not only to follow their conscience in matters of religion without coercion from the civil authority, but also to form their conscience without any influence by the civil authority as such in matters of religion, through endorsement or promotion or practice of any particular religion, or opposition to any particular religious claim or practice. The ‘right’ of religious freedom as conceived by the indifferentists entails that the civil authority has no obligation to promote and defend religious truth, oppose false religious claims, and practice the true religion. Rather, this proposed ‘right’ entails that the civil authority has an obligation not to do each of those, and thus violates this right if it does them.

In contrast, the right to religious freedom affirmed in Dignitatis Humanae is the right to be immune from coercion to act against one’s conscience in matters of religion, within due limits in relation to the common good.³ This right does not entail that the civil authority has no obligation to promote and defend religious truth, oppose false religious claims, and practice the true religion. This right does not entail that the civil authority has an obligation not to do each of those. The civil authority can defend and practice one particular religion, and oppose false religious claims or practices, while upholding and respecting the right to religious freedom as this right is defined and affirmed in Dignitatis Humanae.

So here too the false right of liberty of conscience and worship rejected in the earlier documents is not the same right of liberty and conscience affirmed in Dignitatis Humanae, and for that reason there is no contradiction between the two teachings. This is also why there is no contradiction between the claim in Quanta Cura that it is false that “liberty of conscience and worship is each man’s personal right, which ought to be legally proclaimed and asserted in every rightly constituted society” (QC, 3) and the claim in Dignitatis Humanae that “This right of the human person to religious freedom is to be recognized in the constitutional law whereby society is governed and thus it is to become a civil right” (DH, 2). The liberty that Pope Pius IX teaches should not be legally recognized is not the same liberty that the Second Vatican Council teaches should be recognized.

Again, in this response, Bryan sidesteps the real issue in the same way he did in the previous response.  Again, the issue is not whether or not a civil government should endorse or promote or encourage anyone towards the true religion.  I grant that DH did not clearly address that question and thus did not clearly contradict previous Roman teaching on that subject.  But that is not the issue upon which the contradiction lies.  Again, the contradiction lies in previous Roman teaching that heretics can be civilly coerced as such--that is, beyond concern for the secular public order--and DH's teaching that they cannot.  And this issue continues not to be addressed by Bryan's responses.

Bryan goes on to address the alleged contradiction that earlier Roman teaching asserted that a society is worse off if it has religious freedom while DH affirmed that the best society is one which embraces religious freedom.

So here too the false conception of religious liberty said in the earlier Church documents to be harmful to society is not the same conception of religious liberty affirmed in Dignitatis Humanae as part of the very order established by God, and which when denied injures the human person. The false conception of religious liberty is not merely a freedom from coercion when following one’s conscious in matters religious, but is a much broader concept that includes within itself a denial of the possibility of the public discovery, preservation, and dissemination of religious truth, and thus includes within itself a denial of the incarnation. The religious liberty affirmed in Dignitatis Humanae, by contrast, entails no such thing.⁵ Rather, Dignitatis Humanae acknowledges that society has the right to defend itself against possible abuses committed on the pretext of freedom of religion, and that this responsibility belongs especially to the civil authority, not only for the sake of preserving public peace, but also for a “proper guardianship of public morality:” . . .

The claim that Dignitatis Humanae contradicts prior Church teaching takes another form regarding the perfection of society. According to that objection, the teaching of Dignitatis Humanae that civil authorities ought not coerce citizens to act against their conscience in matters of religion, within due limits, contradicts the falsehood of the statement condemned by Pope Pius IX in Quanta Cura that the best condition of civil society is one in which no duty is recognized by the civil power of restraining offenders against the Catholic religion, except so far as public peace may require. However, that the best condition of society is one in which the civil authority does recognize a duty to restrain offenders against the Catholic religion does not entail that anyone should be subject to coercion to act against his conscience in matters of religion beyond due limits. The moral duty by civil authorities to defend religious truth for the sake of the common good is compatible with the moral duty by civil authorities not to coerce citizens to act against their conscience in matters of religion, beyond due limits. For that reason, here too there is no contradiction between the two teachings.

Bryan's first response here misses the point once again in the same way that he has previously.  Again, the question that gives rise to the claim of contradiction is not the question of how much the civil government should officially endorse or promote the true religion, but whether or not the civil government should use civil coercion to restrain or punish heretics.  And this question is again sidestepped by Bryan.  Bryan appeals to the fact that some of the earlier papal documents are responding to the teaching of "indifferentism"--the idea that there is no known true religion, that civil governments and individuals have no obligation to follow any particular religion, etc.--in order to paint everything they have said on the subject of religious freedom as a response to that particular error.  However, our examination made clear that while "indifferentism" was certainly a major part of what those earlier papal writings were worried about, their concerns were not limited to the aspects of "indifferentism" that DH also opposes, but they were also opposing other ideas about civil coercion that DH would later clearly endorse, and thus the contradictions remain.

Bryan's second response seems to play on the meaning of phrases like "public peace," "common good," "within [or beyond] due limits," and "public morality."  His argument seems to be that there is no necessary contradiction between saying that there should be religious freedom but only within "due limits" on the one hand, and saying that there should not be religious freedom beyond these "due limits" on the other; or saying that civil coercion of heretics is improper except for what is necessary to preserve public peace and moral order on the one hand, and saying that civil coercion of heretics is proper when they threaten the public peace and moral order on the other.  Making this argument more concrete, we could justify the execution of a heretic for, say, publicly teaching against the Trinity within the bounds of DH by saying that the heretic, by teaching against the Trinity, has gone beyond "due limits" and has threatened "public peace and moral order," and so it is appropriate to execute him (since that is the only way to really stop the damage he is doing).

The problem with this line of reasoning is that while phrases like "due limits" and "public peace and moral order" left all by themselves can be ambiguous and so can be taken in as loose or as strict a sense as anyone wants, so that pretty much any civil behavior could be justified or condemned by them depending on whatever meaning someone wants to put on them at any given moment, our examination of the Roman church's earlier teaching and our examination of DH revealed that these phrases cannot simply be taken in any way one wants in interpreting the relevant statements.  In fact, both the earlier statements (at least those from the nineteenth century onwards) and DH make it clear that they have in mind the classic, modern notion of religious freedom that is articulated famously in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  Quanta Cura, for example, made it clear that it was attacking the very notion of liberty of conscience that the UDHR later articulated, and DH made it clear that it was defending the very same notion of religious freedom.  Both of them appealed to common sentiments in the western world as a reference point to understand what they were talking about.  We recall, for example, how DH begins by linking its subject with modern western sentiments:

A sense of the dignity of the human person has been impressing itself more and more deeply on the consciousness of contemporary man,(1) and the demand is increasingly made that men should act on their own judgment, enjoying and making use of a responsible freedom, not driven by coercion but motivated by a sense of duty. The demand is likewise made that constitutional limits should be set to the powers of government, in order that there may be no encroachment on the rightful freedom of the person and of associations. This demand for freedom in human society chiefly regards the quest for the values proper to the human spirit. It regards, in the first place, the free exercise of religion in society.

This Vatican Council takes careful note of these desires in the minds of men. It proposes to declare them to be greatly in accord with truth and justice. To this end, it searches into the sacred tradition and doctrine of the Church-the treasury out of which the Church continually brings forth new things that are in harmony with the things that are old.

We recall also that DH explicitly stated that the concept of religious freedom it was defending included a rejection of governmental "discrimination" in religious matters:

Finally, government is to see to it that equality of citizens before the law, which is itself an element of the common good, is never violated, whether openly or covertly, for religious reasons. Nor is there to be discrimination among citizens. 

That is, in protecting the "public peace and moral order," the government is not to engage in any civil coercion that would imply religious discrimination (and therefore a lack of religious equality) in the law.  Therefore, the sorts of rights that the civil government could use civil coercion to protect could not involve anything that would favor one religion over another, and therefore those rights must be limited to "secular" types of rights--life, property, religious freedom, etc.--which modern western society typically takes to be religiously neutral.  So we see, both from the observation that DH explicitly links its idea of religious freedom to that growing in prominence in the western world in modern times and from the fact that it explicitly excludes "religious discrimination" from its idea of what can be civilly proceeded against in defense of the "common good" and "public peace and morality," that the concept of "public peace," "public order," "public morality," or "common good," used in DH, has the same basic content that it has in the secular Universal Declaration of Human Rights or other typical secular statements of religious freedom, and therefore phrases like these cannot be used to reconcile DH with previous Roman teaching that it is acceptable (and even normally a duty) for the government to "religiously discriminate" by punishing heretics as such rather than simply as violators of the secular public order.

Bryan points out, rightly, that there is much overlap between DH and earlier Roman Catholic teaching.  Both affirm that faith in the true religion is a duty and must be voluntary.  And both affirm that the Roman Catholic faith is the one true religion.  But this agreement does not hide the clear disagreement that exists, and this disagreement cannot be seen as anything other than a falsification of the Roman Catholic claim to have an infallible teaching authority.

Religious Freedom and the Fallibility of the Roman Catholic Church, Part I

In this article, I want to point out an example of the Roman Catholic Church blatantly contradicting itself in its teaching on a very important doctrinal matter--the matter of religious freedom.  This is an important sort of thing to point out, because the Roman Catholic Church claims to have an infallible teaching authority.  It claims that Christ gave to his apostles and their successors--the bishops of the church who are the successors of the apostles, in communion with the bishop of Rome--an ability to teach in such a way that the teaching of the church as a whole is completely and utterly reliable, not subject to some higher tribunal to double-check its accuracy.  This doctrine is in fundamental opposition to the Protestant and Reformed doctrine of Sola Scriptura, which holds that Scripture alone possesses such infallible reliability.  According to Reformed doctrine, the teaching of the church, while it is to be held in high regard and deference is to be had to it, is not considered to possess infallibility, and therefore it is necessary to double-check whatever the church teaches, even when speaking as a whole in a universal council, with reference to the infallible Scriptures.

Augustine of Hippo (writing against the Donatists) well described this Sola Scriptura concept:

But who can fail to be aware that the sacred canon of Scripture, both of the Old and New Testament, is confined within its own limits, and that it stands so absolutely in a superior position to all later letters of the bishops, that about it we can hold no manner of doubt or disputation whether what is confessedly contained in it is right and true; but that all the letters of bishops which have been written, or are being written, since the closing of the canon, are liable to be refuted if there be anything contained in them which strays from the truth, either by the discourse of some one who happens to be wiser in the matter than themselves, or by the weightier authority and more learned experience of other bishops, by the authority of Councils; and further, that the Councils themselves, which are held in the several districts and provinces, must yield, beyond all possibility of doubt, to the authority of plenary Councils which are formed for the whole Christian world; and that even of the plenary Councils, the earlier are often corrected by those which follow them, when, by some actual experiment, things are brought to light which were before concealed, and that is known which previously lay hid, and this without any whirlwind of sacrilegious pride, without any puffing of the neck through arrogance, without any strife of envious hatred, simply with holy humility, catholic peace, and Christian charity?  (Quoted from here--the entire article provides a helpful discussion of the meaning of this passage from Augustine; the whole context of the quotation can be found here)

THE DOCTRINE OF INFALLIBILITY

The Catholic Encyclopedia, in the article entitled "Infallibility," articulates the rationale for the idea that the church should have an infallible teaching authority (the embedded links in the following quotations come from the Catholic Encyclopedia website itself--this is true for all subsequent quotations from the Catholic Encyclopedia as well):

In the next place there is question particularly in this passage of doctrinal authority — of authority to teach the Gospel to all men — if Christ's promise to be with the Apostles and their successors to the end of time in carrying out this commission means that those whom they are to teach in His name and according to the plenitude of the power He has given them are bound to receive that teaching as if it were His own; in other words they are bound to accept it as infallible. Otherwise the perennial assistance promised would not really be efficacious for its purpose, and efficacious Divine assistance is what the expression used is clearly intended to signify. Supposing, as we do, that Christ actually delivered a definite body of revealed truth, to be taught to all men in all ages, and to be guarded from change or corruption by the living voice of His visible Church, it is idle to contend that this result could be accomplished effectively — in other words that His promise could be effectively fulfilled unless that living voice can speak infallibly to every generation on any question that may arise affecting the substance of Christ's teaching. . . .

Without infallibility there could be no finality regarding any one of the great truths which have been identified historically with the very essence of Christianity; and it is only with those who believe in historical Christianity that the question need be discussed. Take, for instance, the mysteries of the Trinity and Incarnation. If the early Church was not infallible in her definitions regarding these truths, what compelling reason can be alleged today against the right to revive the Sabellian, or the Arian, or the Macedonian, or the Apollinarian, or the Nestorian, or the Eutychian controversies, and to defend some interpretation of these mysteries which the Church has condemned as heretical? . . .

From these considerations we are justified in concluding that if Christ really intended His promise to be with His Church to be taken seriously, and if He was truly the Son of God, omniscient and omnipotent, knowing history in advance and able to control its course, then the Church is entitled to claim infallible doctrinal authority. This conclusion is confirmed by considering the awful sanction by which the Church's authority is supported: all who refuse to assent to her teaching are threatened with eternal damnation. This proves the value Christ Himself set upon His own teaching and upon the teaching of the Church commissioned to teach in His name; religious indifferentism is here reprobated in unmistakable terms. . . .

If, during the early centuries, there was no explicit and formal discussion regarding ecclesiastical infallibility as such, yet the Church, in her corporate capacity, after the example of the Apostles at Jerusalem, always acted on the assumption that she was infallible in doctrinal matters and all the great orthodox teachers believed that she was so. Those who presumed, on whatever grounds, to contradict the Church's teaching were treated as representatives of Antichrist (cf. 1 John 2:18 sq.), and were excommunicated and anathematized. . . .

It is needless to go on multiplying citations, since the broad fact is indisputable that in the ante-Nicene, no less than in the post-Nicene, period all orthodox Christians attributed to the corporate voice of the Church, speaking through the body of bishops in union with their head and centre, all the fullness of doctrinal authority which the Apostles themselves had possessed; and to question the infallibility of that authority would have been considered equivalent to questioning God's veracity and fidelity. It was for this reason that during the first three centuries the concurrent action of the bishops dispersed throughout the world proved to be effective in securing the condemnation and exclusion of certain heresies and maintaining Gospel truth in its purity; and when from the fourth century onwards it was found expedient to assemble ecumenical councils, after the example of the Apostles at Jerusalem, it was for the same reason that the doctrinal decision of these councils were held to be absolutely final and irreformable. Even the heretics, for the most part recognized this principle in theory; and if in fact they often refused to submit, they did so as a rule on the ground that this or that council was not really ecumenical, that it did not truly express the corporate voice of the Church, and was not, therefore, infallible. This will not be denied by anyone who is familiar with the history of the doctrinal controversies of the fourth and fifth centuries, and within the limits of this article we cannot do more than call attention to the broad conclusion in proof of which it would be easy to cite a great number of particular facts and testimonies.

I'm not going to comment here on the veracity of the various claims made in these quotations or try to refute any of them.  My purpose in quoting them here is simply to provide an articulation of the rationale behind the idea that the church should be infallible in its teaching.  The idea is that we cannot rely on the Scriptures alone.  We need an ongoing, living, infallible teaching magisterium to ensure that we do not stray into doctrinal error.

It is obvious that this rationale would be undermined if the church held to be infallible in its teaching were to teach false doctrine or were to contradict itself in its teaching.  The whole point of having an infallible magisterium is to provide a reliable place wherein to place our trust in doctrinal matters.  The implication is that we can trust the church not to lead us astray.  If we can't place this kind of final trust in the church's teaching, then the fundamental end of having an infallible magisterium is destroyed.

The Roman Catholic Church teaches that the church is not always infallible in every way.  Errors can be made by individual bishops and even by bishops acting in council in certain circumstances.  But it affirms that there are circumstances in which the church's teachings can be held to be infallible.  There are three organs by which the church can express infallible teachings:  1. the whole body of the bishops defining doctrine in their ordinary capacities in their various jurisdictions, 2. the whole body of bishops defining doctrine in an ecumenical council of the whole church, subject to the bishop of Rome, and 3. when the bishop of Rome (the pope) defines a doctrine ex cathedra for the entire church.  The council of Vatican I defined explicitly the concept and parameters of papal infallibility:

Therefore, faithfully adhering to the tradition received from the beginning of the Christian faith, to the glory of God our savior, for the exaltation of the Catholic religion and for the salvation of the Christian people, with the approval of the Sacred Council, we teach and define as a divinely revealed dogma that when the Roman Pontiff speaks EX CATHEDRA, that is, when, in the exercise of his office as shepherd and teacher of all Christians, in virtue of his supreme apostolic authority, he defines a doctrine concerning faith or morals to be held by the whole Church, he possesses, by the divine assistance promised to him in blessed Peter, that infallibility which the divine Redeemer willed his Church to enjoy in defining doctrine concerning faith or morals. Therefore, such definitions of the Roman Pontiff are of themselves, and not by the consent of the Church, irreformable.

The Catholic Encyclopedia article entitled "Theological Definition," after quoting from this definition of papal infallibility, makes these comments:

From this teaching we obtain an authoritative notion of the meaning of definition in its theological, as distinct from its philosophical, or canonical, sense. It is an irrevocable decision, by which the supreme teaching authority in the Church decides a question appertaining to faith or morals, and which binds the whole Church. From this explanation it will be seen that four conditions are required for a theological definition.

The four conditions, according to this article, are these:  1. "It must be a decision by the supreme teaching authority in the Church."  These would be the three organs I defined above.  2. "The decision must concern a doctrine of faith or morals."  3. "The decision must bind the universal Church."  4. "The decision must be irrevocable or, as it is called, definitive."  The article describes what these conditions mean in greater detail, but the gist of what they mean is fairly obvious on the surface of it.

All of these conditions are fairly obvious in terms of what might be expected from a concept of an infallible teaching authority in the church.  If the doctrinal definition does not come from the supreme authority in the church, then obviously it would not be final, as it would be subject to the higher authority in the church.  The definition must concern faith or morals, because these are the kinds of things the church is to teach about.  The decision must bind the universal church, because if it is not directed to the church, the church obviously would have no reason to believe itself bound to believe or follow it.  (By the way, on this third condition, the Catholic Encyclopedia adds that "It is not, however, absolutely necessary that the decree should be directly sent or addressed to the whole Church; it is quite sufficient if it is made clear that the supreme teaching authority means to bind the Universal Church.")  And if the definition is to be taken as giving the final word on a subject, which is implied in the idea of an infallible or utterly reliable ruling, then, obviously, it must intend to provide the final word on the subject.  If the church says, "Well, we're kind of thinking that A is true, but we'll not know for sure until later," of course the church should not be taken to be teaching A infallibly in that statement.

I think we could sum up the conditions of infallibility (or utter reliability and finality) as follows:  When the church, speaking in the use of its supreme authority, in the voice either of the pope alone or in the voice of all the bishops in union with the pope, teaches definitively a certain doctrine with the clear implication that the entire church is to believe and follow that doctrine, the church is to be regarded as infallible (or utterly reliable as a final resting place for trust) in its teaching.

PRE-VATICAN-II ROMAN CATHOLIC TEACHING ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

Now, having established the contours of the infallible reliability of the church in its teaching magisterium, I want to look at some of the things the Roman Catholic Church has taught regarding the issue of religious freedom or liberty of conscience.  My goal is to show that the church's so-claimed infallible teachings have contradicted each other on this important topic, and therefore that there is a serious problem with the church's claim to possess an infallible teaching authority.

Before I put out some specific quotations, let me point out that the Roman Catholic Church's teaching regarding religious liberty has been, to a great extent, made quite clear through the centuries through the actual activities the church has officially engaged in with the approval of its supreme magisterium.  I could recount many examples (well known to anyone even a little familiar with the history of the Middle Ages) of heretics punished with the approval of the leadership of the Roman Catholic Church (see here and here for further specifics).  When the supreme leadership of the Roman Catholic Church supports the punishment of heretics over a period of hundreds of years, I think it is safe to say that this activity amounts quite clearly to a definition from the leadership of the church that punishing heretics is a fine thing to do.  The Roman Catholic Church has clearly, by its words and actions, articulated that it supports the punishment of heretics as a good thing, which is a position quite opposed to the modern western concept of "liberty of conscience" or "religious freedom".  If the church has misled its people on this point so thoroughly and systematically for so long, it cannot reasonably regarded as possessing a teaching authority that can truly be relied upon as a supreme, final authority, to be believed without question--that is, an infallible teaching authority.

These words from Thomas Aquinas (from his Summa Theologica, II:II 11:3--again, links within quotations from the Summa Theologica are from the website itself) illustrate at least a common late medieval viewpoint within the Roman Catholic Church:

I answer that, With regard to heretics two points must be observed: one, on their own side; the other, on the side of the Church. On their own side there is the sin, whereby they deserve not only to be separated from the Church by excommunication, but also to be severed from the world by death. For it is a much graver matter to corrupt the faith which quickens the soul, than to forge money, which supports temporal life. Wherefore if forgers of money and other evil-doers are forthwith condemned to death by the secular authority, much more reason is there for heretics, as soon as they are convicted of heresy, to be not only excommunicated but even put to death.

On the part of the Church, however, there is mercy which looks to the conversion of the wanderer, wherefore she condemns not at once, but "after the first and second admonition," as the Apostle directs: after that, if he is yet stubborn, the Church no longer hoping for his conversion, looks to the salvation of others, by excommunicating him and separating him from the Church, and furthermore delivers him to the secular tribunal to be exterminated thereby from the world by death. For Jerome commenting on Galatians 5:9, "A little leaven," says: "Cut off the decayed flesh, expel the mangy sheep from the fold, lest the whole house, the whole paste, the whole body, the whole flock, burn, perish, rot, die. Arius was but one spark in Alexandria, but as that spark was not at once put out, the whole earth was laid waste by its flame." 

Now let's look at some more specific quotations, most of which are from papal documents from the nineteenth century, in which Roman Catholic doctrine concerning the punishment of heretics and liberty of conscience are set forth.  I'm sure there are innumerable documents from throughout the church's history that I could quote from to set forth the traditional Roman Catholic teaching.  I do not think it is necessary to do a thorough survey (but see the two links from the Catholic Encyclopedia given earlier).  The quotations from (mostly) the nineteenth century are sufficient to prove my point.  The Roman Catholic Church struggled with the concepts of religious freedom and liberty of conscience during the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries, as did other Christian churches, as these modern ideas were introduced in western discourse and eventually came into vogue and became dominant.  It seems that the Roman Catholic Church's period of intense struggle with modern notions of liberty occurred mostly in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and that is one reason why there are so many on-topic quotations to draw from during this period, as popes and other Roman authorities at first vehemently opposed, later began to compromise with, and finally all but completely came to terms with "liberty of conscience."

First, I would like to provide a quotation from the Fourth Lateran Council (1215), which is reckoned by the Roman Catholic Church to be the twelfth ecumenical council.  The Fourth Lateran Council is described by the Roman Catholic website New Advent in this way:

The Fourth Lateran Council was held under Innocent III. There were present the Patriarchs of Constantinople and Jerusalem, 71 archbishops, 412 bishops, and 800 abbots the Primate of the Maronites, and St. Dominic. It issued an enlarged creed (symbol) against the Albigenses (Firmiter credimus), condemned the Trinitarian errors of Abbot Joachim, and published 70 important reformatory decrees. This is the most important council of the Middle Ages, and it marks the culminating point of ecclesiastical life and papal power. 

The third canon produced by the council has this to say about heretics and their punishments:

We excommunicate and anathematize every heresy that raises against the holy, orthodox and Catholic faith which we have above explained; condemning all heretics under whatever names they may be known, for while they have different faces they are nevertheless bound to each other by their tails, since in all of them vanity is a common element. Those condemned, being handed over to the secular rulers of their bailiffs, let them be abandoned, to be punished with due justice, clerics being first degraded from their orders. As to the property of the condemned, if they are laymen, let it be confiscated; if clerics, let it be applied to the churches from which they received revenues. But those who are only suspected, due consideration being given to the nature of the suspicion and the character of the person, unless they prove their innocence by a proper defense, let them be anathematized and avoided by all 1-intil (sic) they have made suitable satisfaction; but if they have been under excommunication for one year, then let them be condemned as heretics. Secular authorities, whatever office they may hold, shall be admonished and induced and if necessary compelled by ecclesiastical censure, that as they wish to be esteemed and numbered among the faithful, so for the defense of the faith they ought publicly to take an oath that they will strive in good faith and to the best of their ability to exterminate in the territories subject to their jurisdiction all heretics pointed out by the Church; so that whenever anyone shall have assumed authority, whether spiritual or temporal, let him be bound to confirm this decree by oath. But if a temporal ruler, after having been requested and admonished by the Church, should neglect to cleanse his territory of this heretical foulness, let him be excommunicated by the metropolitan and the other bishops of the province. If he refuses to make satisfaction within a year, let the matter be made known to the supreme pontiff, that he may declare the ruler's vassals absolved from their allegiance and may offer the territory to be ruled lay (sic) Catholics, who on the extermination of the heretics may possess it without hindrance and preserve it in the purity of faith; the right, however, of the chief ruler is to be respected as long as he offers no obstacle in this matter and permits freedom of action. The same law is to be observed in regard to those who have no chief rulers (that is, are independent). Catholics who have girded themselves with the cross for the extermination of the heretics, shall enjoy the indulgences and privileges granted to those who go in defense of the Holy Land. 

We decree that those who give credence to the teachings of the heretics, as well as those who receive, defend, and patronize them, are excommunicated; and we firmly declare that after any one of them has been branded with excommunication, if he has deliberately failed to make satisfaction within a year, let him incur ipso jure the stigma of infamy and let him not be admitted to public offices or deliberations, and let him not take part in the election of others to such offices or use his right to give testimony in a court of law. Let him also be intestable, that he may not have the free exercise of making a will, and let him be deprived of the right of inheritance. Let no one be urged to give an account to him in any matter, but let him be urged to give an account to others. If perchance he be a judge, let his decisions have no force, nor let any cause be brought to his attention. If he be an advocate, let his assistance by no means be sought. If a notary, let the instruments drawn up by him be considered worthless, for, the author being condemned, let them enjoy a similar fate. In all similar cases we command that the same be observed. If, however, he be a cleric, let him be deposed from every office and benefice, that the greater the fault the graver may be the punishment inflicted.

If any refuse to avoid such after they have been ostracized by the Church, let them be excommunicated till they have made suitable satisfaction. Clerics shall not give the sacraments of the Church to such pestilential people, nor shall they presume to give them Christian burial, or to receive their alms or offerings; otherwise they shall be deprived of their office, to which they may not be restored without a special indult of the Apostolic See. Similarly, all regulars, on whom also this punishment may be imposed, let their privileges be nullified in that diocese in which they have presumed to perpetrate such excesses.

But since some, under "the appearance of godliness, but denying the power thereof," as the Apostle says (II Tim. 3: 5), arrogate to themselves the authority to preach, as the same Apostle says: "How shall they preach unless they be sent?" (Rom. 10:15), all those prohibited or not sent, who, without the authority of the Apostolic See or of the Catholic bishop of the locality, shall presume to usurp the office of preaching either publicly or privately, shall be excommunicated and unless they amend, and the sooner the better, they shall be visited with a further suitable penalty. We add, moreover, that every archbishop or bishop should himself or through his archdeacon or some other suitable persons, twice or at least once a year make the rounds of his diocese in which report has it that heretics dwell, and there compel three or more men of good character or, if it should be deemed advisable, the entire neighborhood, to swear that if anyone know of the presence there of heretics or others holding secret assemblies, or differing from the common way of the faithful in faith and morals, they will make them known to the bishop. The latter shall then call together before him those accused, who, if they do not purge themselves of the matter of which they are accused, or if after the rejection of their error they lapse into their former wickedness, shall be canonically punished. But if any of them by damnable obstinacy should disapprove of the oath and should perchance be unwilling to swear, from this very fact let them be regarded as heretics.

We wish, therefore, and in virtue of obedience strictly command, that to carry out these instructions effectively the bishops exercise throughout their dioceses a scrupulous vigilance if they wish to escape canonical punishment. If from sufficient evidence it is apparent that a bishop is negligent or remiss in cleansing his diocese of the ferment of heretical wickedness, let him be deposed from the episcopal office and let another, who will and can confound heretical depravity, be substituted.

We see here the Roman Catholic Church asserting quite clearly that heretics ought to be punished not only by ecclesiastical censures but also by civil penalties, such as the confiscation of goods and by being "exterminated" out of the lands.  At the very least, heretics are not to be treated as innocent equals to the orthodox by civil law and society.

Another quotation I would like to provide is from the papal rejection of the teachings of Martin Luther in 1520, in the Bull of Pope Leo X entitled Exsurge Domine.  In this document, Pope Leo X condemned a number of presumed errors associated with Martin Luther.  Condemned error #33 is this:

33. That heretics be burned is against the will of the Spirit.

According to Pope Leo X, it is an error to say that it is against the will of the Spirit that heretics be burned.  Any teaching, then, that says that it is against the will of God to burn heretics, is condemned here as false teaching.

Now some people have tried to escape the force of this by overly parsing wording used in this papal document, trying to reach the conclusion that we can't really say for sure that the pope is saying that this idea is really wrong.  Others have tried to escape by saying that Pope Leo X here was not speaking infallibly (and therefore we don't have to believe or follow what he says).  But it seems to me that Pope Leo X himself is quite clear that the ideas condemned in this document are indeed errors and that they are indeed required to be rejected as false by all the faithful (implying that their opposites are required to be held as true).  Here is how Leo himself bookends this list of errors:

In virtue of our pastoral office committed to us by the divine favor we can under no circumstances tolerate or overlook any longer the pernicious poison of the above errors without disgrace to the Christian religion and injury to orthodox faith. Some of these errors we have decided to include in the present document; their substance is as follows:  [And here, as indicated, follows the list of errors, of which our above quotation is #33.]

No one of sound mind is ignorant how destructive, pernicious, scandalous, and seductive to pious and simple minds these various errors are, how opposed they are to all charity and reverence for the holy Roman Church who is the mother of all the faithful and teacher of the faith; how destructive they are of the vigor of ecclesiastical discipline, namely obedience. This virtue is the font and origin of all virtues and without it anyone is readily convicted of being unfaithful.

Therefore we, in this above enumeration, important as it is, wish to proceed with great care as is proper, and to cut off the advance of this plague and cancerous disease so it will not spread any further in the Lord's field as harmful thornbushes. We have therefore held a careful inquiry, scrutiny, discussion, strict examination, and mature deliberation with each of the brothers, the eminent cardinals of the holy Roman Church, as well as the priors and ministers general of the religious orders, besides many other professors and masters skilled in sacred theology and in civil and canon law. We have found that these errors or theses are not Catholic, as mentioned above, and are not to be taught, as such; but rather are against the doctrine and tradition of the Catholic Church, and against the true interpretation of the sacred Scriptures received from the Church. . . .

With the advice and consent of these our venerable brothers, with mature deliberation on each and every one of the above theses, and by the authority of almighty God, the blessed Apostles Peter and Paul, and our own authority, we condemn, reprobate, and reject completely each of these theses or errors as either heretical, scandalous, false, offensive to pious ears or seductive of simple minds, and against Catholic truth. By listing them, we decree and declare that all the faithful of both sexes must regard them as condemned, reprobated, and rejected . . . We restrain all in the virtue of holy obedience and under the penalty of an automatic major excommunication....

Surely all of this indicates the presence of reliable, infallible teaching, according to the Roman Catholic Church's own standards as examined earlier.  So it would seem that the Roman Catholic Church infallibly teaches that the idea that it is against the will of God to burn heretics is completely and horrendously false.  This fits in with what we saw earlier from Thomas Aquinas.

The next document I would like to cite is a papal encyclical entitled Mirari Vos, issued by Pope Gregory the XVI in 1832.  The document is addressed to "All Patriarchs, Primates, Archbishops, and Bishops of the Catholic World."  It was written, according to Pope Gregory, in accordance with "that voice by which We have been commanded, in the person of blessed Peter, to strengthen the brethren."  The Pope issues a call to all the bishops of the church to use the authority given them by Christ to uproot the serious errors of the time (some of which will be addressed in the encyclical):

We must raise Our voice and attempt all things lest a wild boar from the woods should destroy the vineyard or wolves kill the flock. It is Our duty to lead the flock only to the food which is healthful. In these evil and dangerous times, the shepherds must never neglect their duty; they must never be so overcome by fear that they abandon the sheep. Let them never neglect the flock and become sluggish from idleness and apathy. Therefore, united in spirit, let us promote our common cause, or more truly the cause of God; let our vigilance be one and our effort united against the common enemies.

This encyclical thus represents the pope using his Petrine authority to help guide the bishops of the church to do their duty in teaching truth and uprooting heresy.  We can thus be confident (assuming Roman Catholic doctrine) that truth, and not heresy, is taught in this encyclical, in accordance with the authority given by Christ to the pope to guide the church into truth and not error.

Point #14 of the document has this to say about the notion (growing in prevalence throughout the western world at that time) of "liberty of conscience":

14. This shameful font of indifferentism gives rise to that absurd and erroneous proposition which claims that liberty of conscience must be maintained for everyone. It spreads ruin in sacred and civil affairs, though some repeat over and over again with the greatest impudence that some advantage accrues to religion from it. "But the death of the soul is worse than freedom of error," as Augustine was wont to say.[21] When all restraints are removed by which men are kept on the narrow path of truth, their nature, which is already inclined to evil, propels them to ruin. Then truly "the bottomless pit"[22] is open from which John saw smoke ascending which obscured the sun, and out of which locusts flew forth to devastate the earth. Thence comes transformation of minds, corruption of youths, contempt of sacred things and holy laws -- in other words, a pestilence more deadly to the state than any other. Experience shows, even from earliest times, that cities renowned for wealth, dominion, and glory perished as a result of this single evil, namely immoderate freedom of opinion, license of free speech, and desire for novelty.

It would seem safe to say that the Pope Gregory the XVI was not particularly fond of the notion of "liberty of conscience" (to put it mildly).  Again, the attitude expressed here corresponds to the universal consensus of the Roman Catholic Church in previous centuries:  Far from there being a moral right to a legal "liberty of conscience" for those who err, the civil government ought to use its coercive power to restrain error and promote truth.

A few decades later (in 1864), Pope Pius IX issued an encyclical, entitled Quanta Cura, in which he used his papal authority once more to lambast the growing notion of liberty of conscience:

For you well know, venerable brethren, that at this time men are found not a few who, applying to civil society the impious and absurd principle of "naturalism," as they call it, dare to teach that "the best constitution of public society and (also) civil progress altogether require that human society be conducted and governed without regard being had to religion any more than if it did not exist; or, at least, without any distinction being made between the true religion and false ones." And, against the doctrine of Scripture, of the Church, and of the Holy Fathers, they do not hesitate to assert that "that is the best condition of civil society, in which no duty is recognized, as attached to the civil power, of restraining by enacted penalties, offenders against the Catholic religion, except so far as public peace may require." From which totally false idea of social government they do not fear to foster that erroneous opinion, most fatal in its effects on the Catholic Church and the salvation of souls, called by Our Predecessor, Gregory XVI, an "insanity,"2 viz., that "liberty of conscience and worship is each man's personal right, which ought to be legally proclaimed and asserted in every rightly constituted society; and that a right resides in the citizens to an absolute liberty, which should be restrained by no authority whether ecclesiastical or civil, whereby they may be able openly and publicly to manifest and declare any of their ideas whatever, either by word of mouth, by the press, or in any other way." But, while they rashly affirm this, they do not think and consider that they are preaching "liberty of perdition;"3 and that "if human arguments are always allowed free room for discussion, there will never be wanting men who will dare to resist truth, and to trust in the flowing speech of human wisdom; whereas we know, from the very teaching of our Lord Jesus Christ, how carefully Christian faith and wisdom should avoid this most injurious babbling."4

Lest it be thought that Pope Pius IX is here doing nothing more than expressing his private opinion, not binding on the church, he adds a quite definitive conclusion to his assertions in this encyclical that make it clear he intends his assertions to be intended as coming from his own supreme authority and as binding on the entire church:

6. Amidst, therefore, such great perversity of depraved opinions, we, well remembering our Apostolic Office, and very greatly solicitous for our most holy Religion, for sound doctrine and the salvation of souls which is intrusted to us by God, and (solicitous also) for the welfare of human society itself, have thought it right again to raise up our Apostolic voice. Therefore, by our Apostolic authority, we reprobate, proscribe, and condemn all the singular and evil opinions and doctrines severally mentioned in this letter, and will and command that they be thoroughly held by all children of the Catholic Church as reprobated, proscribed and condemned.

On the very same day that Quanta Cura was published, Pope Pius IX also published a Syllabus of Errors in which he listed a number of errors that he wished to be regarded as condemned.  Many of them overlap with errors denounced in Quanta Cura, including a number dealing with liberty of conscience:

15. Every man is free to embrace and profess that religion which, guided by the light of reason, he shall consider true. -- Allocution "Maxima quidem," June 9, 1862; Damnatio "Multiplices inter," June 10, 1851

77. In the present day it is no longer expedient that the Catholic religion should be held as the only religion of the State, to the exclusion of all other forms of worship. -- Allocution "Nemo vestrum," July 26, 1855.

78. Hence it has been wisely decided by law, in some Catholic countries, that persons coming to reside therein shall enjoy the public exercise of their own peculiar worship. -- Allocution "Acerbissimum," Sept. 27, 1852.

79. Moreover, it is false that the civil liberty of every form of worship, and the full power, given to all, of overtly and publicly manifesting any opinions whatsoever and thoughts, conduce more easily to corrupt the morals and minds of the people, and to propagate the pest of indifferentism. -- Allocution "Nunquam fore," Dec. 15, 1856. 

It is clear from Quanta Cura and from the Syllabus of Errors that Pope Pius IX was no fan of the modern notion of "liberty of conscience."  He condemns as a "totally false idea" the concept that "no duty" should be "recognized, as attached to the civil power, of restraining by enacted penalties, offenders against the Catholic religion, except so far as public peace may require."  Put positively, he asserts that a duty should be recognized, belong to the civil magistrate, to "restrain by enacted penalties" "offenders against the Catholic religion," beyond what "public peace may require."  In other words, the civil magistrate has a duty to punish heretics as such (and not merely for secular reasons, such as that they are being rambunctious in the middle of night and being a public nuisance).  He says that the idea that "liberty of conscience and worship is each man's personal right, which ought to be legally proclaimed and asserted in every rightly constituted society" is an "insanity."  All of these "singular and evil opinions and doctrines," he says, "we reprobate, proscribe, and condemn . . . and will and command that they be thoroughly held by all children of the Catholic Church as reprobated, proscribed and condemned."

(As a side point, Quanta Cura and the Syllabus of Errors also condemn the idea that Roman Catholics are free to ignore or disbelieve pronouncements by the church so long as they don't touch on dogmas of faith and morals or do not fit the qualifications for infallibility:

Nor can we pass over in silence the audacity of those who, not enduring sound doctrine, contend that "without sin and without any sacrifice of the Catholic profession assent and obedience may be refused to those judgments and decrees of the Apostolic See, whose object is declared to concern the Church's general good and her rights and discipline, so only it does not touch the dogmata of faith and morals." But no one can be found not clearly and distinctly to see and understand how grievously this is opposed to the Catholic dogma of the full power given from God by Christ our Lord Himself to the Roman Pontiff of feeding, ruling and guiding the Universal Church.  (from Quanta Cura)

22. The obligation by which Catholic teachers and authors are strictly bound is confined to those things only which are proposed to universal belief as dogmas of faith by the infallible judgment of the Church. -- Letter to the Archbishop of Munich, "Tuas libenter," Dec. 21, 1863.  (Error condemned in the Syllabus of Errors)

I mention this in order to avoid any objections to quotations such as the earlier quotation from Mirari Vos which do not as strongly make clear--though I think they make it clear enough--that the pronouncement is intended to be definitive or infallible.  Despite my attempts to define the criteria of infallibility carefully earlier, the fact is that any exercise of papal teaching authority directed to the entire church is binding on the church according to Roman Catholic teaching and therefore cannot be ignored or dismissed merely on the grounds that it does not fit some narrow definition of "infallibility.")

CAN A LIMITED TOLERATION BE ALLOWED IN CERTAIN NON-IDEAL CIRCUMSTANCES?

All of these quotations, to which, of course, many more could be added, put forward the historic teaching of the Roman Catholic Church with regard to liberty of conscience and the punishing of heretics.  In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, as secularism in government was becoming more and more popular and demanded by the people, the popes began to consider whether or not some kind of toleration to false religious views and practices might be granted in certain cases.  Here is an example of this kind of thinking from an address entitled Ci Riesce by Pope Pius XII in 1953 (so we've come quite a number of decades into the future with this quotation, almost right up against Vatican II):

Thus the two principles are clarified to which recourse must be had in concrete cases for the answer to the serious question concerning the attitude which the jurist, the statesman and the sovereign Catholic state is to adopt in consideration of the community of nations in regard to a formula of religious and moral toleration as described above. First: that which does not correspond to truth or to the norm of morality objectively has no right to exist, to be spread or to be activated. Secondly: failure to impede this with civil laws and coercive measures can nevertheless be justified in the interests of a higher and more general good.

Pope Pius XII affirms that toleration of errors and wrong practices can sometimes be granted in certain circumstances if a higher good calls for it.  But he is also quite clear that such toleration does not at all imply some kind of objective "right to exist" belonging to "that which does not correspond to truth or to the norm of morality."

Pope Leo XIII had addressed the question of toleration back in 1888 in his encyclical Libertas, in which he says this:

41. Lastly, there remain those who, while they do not approve the separation of Church and State, think nevertheless that the Church ought to adapt herself to the times and conform to what is required by the modern system of government. Such an opinion is sound, if it is to be understood of some equitable adjustment consistent with truth and justice; in so far, namely, that the Church, in the hope of some great good, may show herself indulgent, and may conform to the times in so far as her sacred office permits. But it is not so in regard to practices and doctrines which a perversion of morals and a warped judgment have unlawfully introduced. Religion, truth, and justice must ever be maintained; and, as God has intrusted these great and sacred matters to her office as to dissemble in regard to what is false or unjust, or to connive at what is hurtful to religion.

42. From what has been said it follows that it is quite unlawful to demand, to defend, or to grant unconditional freedom of thought, of speech, or writing, or of worship, as if these were so many rights given by nature to man. For, if nature had really granted them, it would be lawful to refuse obedience to God, and there would be no restraint on human liberty. It likewise follows that freedom in these things may be tolerated wherever there is just cause, but only with such moderation as will prevent its degenerating into license and excess. And, where such liberties are in use, men should employ them in doing good, and should estimate them as the Church does; for liberty is to be regarded as legitimate in so far only as it affords greater facility for doing good, but no farther.

Pope Leo XIII, as will Pope Pius XII later, affirms that some kind of toleration might sometimes be called for, but, even more strongly than Pope Pius XII, he affirms that such toleration can only go so far.  It cannot include allowing the church to be silent in matters of truth or morality, or be to such an extent that there is degeneration "into license and excess."  And he explicitly opposes the idea that there is some kind of inalienable or natural "right" to toleration possessed by practitioners of false religions.

Are these statements on the possibility of a mitigated tolerance in some circumstances compatible with historic Roman Catholic teaching on the duty of the civil magistrate to punish heretics, as expressed by Thomas Aquinas and Quanta Cura (and many other places throughout Christian history)?  I am willing to say that they may be.  I say this because duties sometimes admit of exceptions in certain situations.  It is perfectly consistent to say, on the one hand, that civil magistrates have a general duty to punish heresy (even with death) and at the same time to say, on the other hand, that there are particular situations where it is better for civil magistrates to mitigate their practice of this general duty for the sake of other duties or of a higher good--such as when the people are so against the punishment of some error that to carry out the full punishment in such circumstances would dissolve the entire stability of the society (leading to many other problems civil magistrates have a duty to try to prevent).  So while these statements advocating mitigated toleration may strike a bit of a different tone from historic Roman Catholic statements on the duty to punish heretics, I do not think we can say that the two ideas are inherently contradictory.

THE MODERN WESTERN NOTION OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

In the modern era, ideas began growing up in western society that are fundamentally at odds with historic Roman Catholic teaching on how the state should deal with errors in doctrine and practice.  The western world began to be enamored of ideas about "liberty of conscience" and "freedom of religion."  A good historic argument for these ideas from the early days of their growing prominence in the 1600s is John Locke's A Letter Concerning Toleration, and there are many, many more examples, especially as we move into the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.  (This Wikipedia article provides a general history that can be used as a starting point for further research.)  These ideas were opposed by most Christians, including both Roman Catholics and Reformed (see, for example, Samuel Rutherford's great book A Free Disputation Against Pretended Liberty of Conscience), but in our day they have gained an unquestioning adherence among the vast majority of westerners and are clearly, without rival, the dominant ideas on these subjects in the modern western world.  A good summary statement of what is meant by "liberty of conscience" and "religious freedom" and other related phrases can be found in Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: 

Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.

Article 29 in the Universal Declaration adds a few qualifiers to this freedom (and to all the other freedoms/rights mentioned in the document).  Among them are these:

In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.

The modern, prevailing idea of "liberty of conscience" or "religious freedom," then, is that whatever religion a person professes to believe, he must be allowed the right to believe in and practice that religion, in private and in public (that is, he must be able to do it openly and advocate for it), without hindrance from the state, limited only by the concern of civil government for the basic maintenance of the secular public order.

This is precisely the idea of liberty of conscience that was condemned, for example, in Quanta Cura, as cited earlier:

And, against the doctrine of Scripture, of the Church, and of the Holy Fathers, they do not hesitate to assert that "that is the best condition of civil society, in which no duty is recognized, as attached to the civil power, of restraining by enacted penalties, offenders against the Catholic religion, except so far as public peace may require." From which totally false idea of social government they do not fear to foster that erroneous opinion, most fatal in its effects on the Catholic Church and the salvation of souls, called by Our Predecessor, Gregory XVI, an "insanity,"2 viz., that "liberty of conscience and worship is each man's personal right, which ought to be legally proclaimed and asserted in every rightly constituted society; and that a right resides in the citizens to an absolute liberty, which should be restrained by no authority whether ecclesiastical or civil, whereby they may be able openly and publicly to manifest and declare any of their ideas whatever, either by word of mouth, by the press, or in any other way."

It is clear that this modern notion of liberty of conscience is completely incompatible with historic Roman Catholic teaching.  Historic Roman teaching affirmed a duty belonging to the civil magistrate, ordinarily at least, to punish heresy as such (that is, beyond simply what secular "public peace" or order would require) with civil penalties, and it denied emphatically any natural or general right belonging to heretics to allow them to practice their religion without interference from civil penalties.  The modern notion of liberty of conscience, on the other hand, teaches precisely the opposite.  Heretics (or those deemed to be heretics by some particular religion) are not to be punished by civil penalties, except when they violate secular "public order."  The punishment of heretics is precisely one of the main things modern notions of liberty of conscience were designed to abolish.

Continued in Part II.