Religious Freedom and the Fallibility of the Roman Catholic Church, Part II

Continued from Part I.

DIGNITATIS HUMANAE AND MODERN ROMAN CATHOLIC TEACHING REGARDING RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Roman Catholic Church continued to wrestle with the concept of religious freedom, which was rapidly increasing in prevalence.  As we've noted, church leaders fought strongly against the doctrine for a time, but, eventually, they acquiesced in it and decided to wholeheartedly embrace it.  The culmination of this transition occurred during the ecumenical (from the Roman Catholic point of view) Vatican II Council, and particularly with the document Dignitatis Humanae, the council's "Declaration on Religious Freedom."  This document put forward the views of the council on religious freedom, as well as the papal point of view, being "promulgated by His Holiness Pope Paul VI."  The document is dated December 7, 1965.

The document begins by noting the growing prevalence of modern notions of religious freedom:

A sense of the dignity of the human person has been impressing itself more and more deeply on the consciousness of contemporary man,(1) and the demand is increasingly made that men should act on their own judgment, enjoying and making use of a responsible freedom, not driven by coercion but motivated by a sense of duty. The demand is likewise made that constitutional limits should be set to the powers of government, in order that there may be no encroachment on the rightful freedom of the person and of associations. This demand for freedom in human society chiefly regards the quest for the values proper to the human spirit. It regards, in the first place, the free exercise of religion in society.

Having noted this growing sense that people ought to have religious freedom, the document then goes on to add the Roman Catholic Church's wholehearted approval of this sense:

This Vatican Council takes careful note of these desires in the minds of men. It proposes to declare them to be greatly in accord with truth and justice. To this end, it searches into the sacred tradition and doctrine of the Church-the treasury out of which the Church continually brings forth new things that are in harmony with the things that are old.

It is already evident that we are on very different ground here than in previous church statements on this subject.  We recall that Pope Pius IX and other earlier popes and declarations from the church had brought up and noted the growing tendency among people in the western world to promote religious freedom or liberty of conscience only to lambast it as a terrible and dangerous tendency.  But here we have exactly the opposite response:  "People these days are growing more and more in favor of religious freedom--and that's great!  We agree with them!"

The document goes on to make the church's new ("continually brings forth new things") position on this subject abundantly clear:

This Vatican Council declares that the human person has a right to religious freedom. This freedom means that all men are to be immune from coercion on the part of individuals or of social groups and of any human power, in such wise that no one is to be forced to act in a manner contrary to his own beliefs, whether privately or publicly, whether alone or in association with others, within due limits.
 
The council further declares that the right to religious freedom has its foundation in the very dignity of the human person as this dignity is known through the revealed word of God and by reason itself.(2) This right of the human person to religious freedom is to be recognized in the constitutional law whereby society is governed and thus it is to become a civil right.

The about-face the church has made on this subject is abundantly clear.  Before, as articulated in such documents as Quanta Cura, the concept of religious freedom, limited only by concerns for secular public order, was denounced as false and dangerous and opposed to historic Catholic teaching.  Now the very same idea is embraced as a fundamental human right, rooted in the inherent dignity of man and in both revelation and reason, and it is now the duty of all societies to recognize this right in constitutional law and thus embrace it as a civil right.

Notice how striking the comparison is between the language of the council here and the general language of liberty of conscience used in the west in modern times, as exhibited in such documents as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights:

Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.

In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.  (Universal Declaration of Human Rights)

This Vatican Council declares that the human person has a right to religious freedom. This freedom means that all men are to be immune from coercion on the part of individuals or of social groups and of any human power, in such wise that no one is to be forced to act in a manner contrary to his own beliefs, whether privately or publicly, whether alone or in association with others, within due limits.  (Dignnitatis Humanae)

The council is clearly getting not only its ideas but even much of its language from general western articulations of the concept of religious freedom.  And note also how this same sort of language--along with the ideas it articulates--was brought up in derision by earlier documents such as Quanta Cura:

And, against the doctrine of Scripture, of the Church, and of the Holy Fathers, they do not hesitate to assert that "that is the best condition of civil society, in which no duty is recognized, as attached to the civil power, of restraining by enacted penalties, offenders against the Catholic religion, except so far as public peace may require." From which totally false idea of social government they do not fear to foster that erroneous opinion, most fatal in its effects on the Catholic Church and the salvation of souls, called by Our Predecessor, Gregory XVI, an "insanity,"2 viz., that "liberty of conscience and worship is each man's personal right, which ought to be legally proclaimed and asserted in every rightly constituted society; and that a right resides in the citizens to an absolute liberty, which should be restrained by no authority whether ecclesiastical or civil, whereby they may be able openly and publicly to manifest and declare any of their ideas whatever, either by word of mouth, by the press, or in any other way."  (Quanta Cura)

There can be no reasonable doubt that it is the same basic concept of religious freedom that is being rejected as false by Quanta Cura, presented as true by the Universal Declaration, and also affirmed as true and of fundamental importance by Dignitatis Humanae.

Earlier I noted that some popes shortly before Vatican II had been toying with the idea of a limited toleration to be perhaps enacted in non-ideal circumstances.  I argued that this concept was not necessarily or directly contradictory to historic Roman teaching on the duty of magistrates to use civil coercion to restrain and punish heretics.  But with Dignitatis Humanae, we have an idea promoted that goes far beyond a limited, non-ideal toleration from time to time.  We have a full-blown affirmation that religious freedom is a basic and fundamental right for all people that is rooted, not in non-ideal circumstances, but in the very natural dignity of man, in reason, and in revelation, and which ought to be embraced by all people and all societies at all times (even by those societies which have an established--even Catholic--religion).  This concept of religious freedom as a fundamental right was explicitly opposed by popes even in the very midst of their considerations of a non-ideal tolerance, as we have seen.  It is evident that this new concept is unavoidably incompatible with previous teaching.  It represents a fundamental about-face for the Roman Catholic Church and its teaching on this crucial issue.

Let me provide some further examples of what Dignitatis Humanae has to say about the right to religious freedom, how it is rooted in natural human dignity and in reason and revelation, how it applies even to those who misuse their consciences to come to wrong conclusions, how it applies to all societies--even those which have established religions, how it is an essential duty of government, etc., in a series of short quotations:

It is in accordance with their dignity as persons-that is, beings endowed with reason and free will and therefore privileged to bear personal responsibility-that all men should be at once impelled by nature and also bound by a moral obligation to seek the truth, especially religious truth. They are also bound to adhere to the truth, once it is known, and to order their whole lives in accord with the demands of truth. However, men cannot discharge these obligations in a manner in keeping with their own nature unless they enjoy immunity from external coercion as well as psychological freedom. Therefore the right to religious freedom has its foundation not in the subjective disposition of the person, but in his very nature. In consequence, the right to this immunity continues to exist even in those who do not live up to their obligation of seeking the truth and adhering to it and the exercise of this right is not to be impeded, provided that just public order be observed.

The protection and promotion of the inviolable rights of man ranks among the essential duties of government.(5) Therefore government is to assume the safeguard of the religious freedom of all its citizens, in an effective manner, by just laws and by other appropriate means.

If, in view of peculiar circumstances obtaining among peoples, special civil recognition is given to one religious community in the constitutional order of society, it is at the same time imperative that the right of all citizens and religious communities to religious freedom should be recognized and made effective in practice.

Finally, government is to see to it that equality of citizens before the law, which is itself an element of the common good, is never violated, whether openly or covertly, for religious reasons. Nor is there to be discrimination among citizens.

Dignitatis Humanae not only affirms that religious freedom is an individual moral and civil right, but it affirms that part of what it necessarily means is that people of any religion should be allowed not only believe and practice their religion as individuals, but to form religious communities and practice and disseminate their religions publicly:

The social nature of man, however, itself requires that he should give external expression to his internal acts of religion: that he should share with others in matters religious; that he should profess his religion in community. Injury therefore is done to the human person and to the very order established by God for human life, if the free exercise of religion is denied in society, provided just public order is observed.

4. The freedom or immunity from coercion in matters religious which is the endowment of persons as individuals is also to be recognized as their right when they act in community. Religious communities are a requirement of the social nature both of man and of religion itself.

Provided the just demands of public order are observed, religious communities rightfully claim freedom in order that they may govern themselves according to their own norms, honor the Supreme Being in public worship, assist their members in the practice of the religious life, strengthen them by instruction, and promote institutions in which they may join together for the purpose of ordering their own lives in accordance with their religious principles.

Religious communities also have the right not to be hindered in their public teaching and witness to their faith, whether by the spoken or by the written word. However, in spreading religious faith and in introducing religious practices everyone ought at all times to refrain from any manner of action which might seem to carry a hint of coercion or of a kind of persuasion that would be dishonorable or unworthy, especially when dealing with poor or uneducated people. Such a manner of action would have to be considered an abuse of one's right and a violation of the right of others.

These ideas are clearly contrary to those expressed by Pope Pius IX in Quanta Cura.  It sure doesn't sound like he was all that big on the idea of letting people propagate false religions:

From which totally false idea of social government they do not fear to foster that erroneous opinion, most fatal in its effects on the Catholic Church and the salvation of souls, called by Our Predecessor, Gregory XVI, an "insanity,"2 viz., that "liberty of conscience and worship is each man's personal right, which ought to be legally proclaimed and asserted in every rightly constituted society; and that a right resides in the citizens to an absolute liberty, which should be restrained by no authority whether ecclesiastical or civil, whereby they may be able openly and publicly to manifest and declare any of their ideas whatever, either by word of mouth, by the press, or in any other way." But, while they rashly affirm this, they do not think and consider that they are preaching "liberty of perdition;"3 and that "if human arguments are always allowed free room for discussion, there will never be wanting men who will dare to resist truth, and to trust in the flowing speech of human wisdom; whereas we know, from the very teaching of our Lord Jesus Christ, how carefully Christian faith and wisdom should avoid this most injurious babbling."4

Dignitatis Humanae, like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, does not affirm a totally unrestrained notion of religious freedom.  It acknowledges that "public order" or "due order" puts limits on what can be allowed to go on in society under the name of religion:

7. The right to religious freedom is exercised in human society: hence its exercise is subject to certain regulatory norms. In the use of all freedoms the moral principle of personal and social responsibility is to be observed. In the exercise of their rights, individual men and social groups are bound by the moral law to have respect both for the rights of others and for their own duties toward others and for the common welfare of all. Men are to deal with their fellows in justice and civility.

This respect for "public order," however, just as with the Declaration of Human Rights, does not give the state any license to engage in civil coercion against any person who is following his conscience--so we can't read into this limitation on religious freedom any allowance for the punishing of heretics, but only for maintaining a secular sort of public order--that is, protecting things like life, property, etc., in accordance with the sorts of rights noted in the Universal Declaration:

Furthermore, society has the right to defend itself against possible abuses committed on the pretext of freedom of religion. It is the special duty of government to provide this protection. However, government is not to act in an arbitrary fashion or in an unfair spirit of partisanship. Its action is to be controlled by juridical norms which are in conformity with the objective moral order. These norms arise out of the need for the effective safeguard of the rights of all citizens and for the peaceful settlement of conflicts of rights, also out of the need for an adequate care of genuine public peace, which comes about when men live together in good order and in true justice, and finally out of the need for a proper guardianship of public morality.

These matters constitute the basic component of the common welfare: they are what is meant by public order. For the rest, the usages of society are to be the usages of freedom in their full range: that is, the freedom of man is to be respected as far as possible and is not to be curtailed except when and insofar as necessary.

Some have attempted to differentiate between the "liberty of conscience" condemned by Quanta Cura and other earlier church teaching from that which is positively affirmed in Dignitatis Humanae by saying that the idea condemned earlier was a totally unlimited notion of religious freedom, whereas the notion embraced by Vatican II was a limited notion of religious freedom.  But we recall that Quanta Cura, for example, made it clear that the notion of religious freedom being opposed was not an unlimited notion but a limited one:

And, against the doctrine of Scripture, of the Church, and of the Holy Fathers, they do not hesitate to assert that "that is the best condition of civil society, in which no duty is recognized, as attached to the civil power, of restraining by enacted penalties, offenders against the Catholic religion, except so far as public peace may require."

Pope Pius IX and the earlier Roman leaders were not stupid.  They knew that pretty much nobody was advocating a totally unlimited idea of religious freedom, and they made it perfectly clear that they were intending to criticize a notion of religious freedom that was actually becoming common among people of the west and not some hypothetical idea of religious freedom held by virtually nobody.  And it is clearly this same notion of religious freedom that continues to prevail in the western world in the modern day and which was affirmed with great bravado by Vatican II--contrary to earlier Roman church teaching.

DIGNITATIS HUMANAE TRIES TO SHOW THAT IT HAS NOT CHANGED ROMAN DOCTRINE

It is both instructive and (in my opinion) somewhat amusing to watch the writers of Dignitatis Humanae try so very hard to justify their embracing of modern notions of religious freedom in light of Scripture and church history, and to show that they haven't really changed any church doctrine on the subject.

One way in which they do this is to try to root the idea of religious freedom in the idea that true faith is a required duty of all men (so far as they are capable of it) and that such faith must be voluntary.  They rightly point out that that has always been church teaching, and then they use it to suggest that the church has always held to the basic ideal of religious freedom--even if it failed to explicitly articulate this in the past as well as it is doing in the present.

9. The declaration of this Vatican Council on the right of man to religious freedom has its foundation in the dignity of the person, whose exigencies have come to be are fully known to human reason through centuries of experience. What is more, this doctrine of freedom has roots in divine revelation, and for this reason Christians are bound to respect it all the more conscientiously. Revelation does not indeed affirm in so many words the right of man to immunity from external coercion in matters religious. It does, however, disclose the dignity of the human person in its full dimensions. It gives evidence of the respect which Christ showed toward the freedom with which man is to fulfill his duty of belief in the word of God and it gives us lessons in the spirit which disciples of such a Master ought to adopt and continually follow. Thus further light is cast upon the general principles upon which the doctrine of this declaration on religious freedom is based. In particular, religious freedom in society is entirely consonant with the freedom of the act of Christian faith.

10. It is one of the major tenets of Catholic doctrine that man's response to God in faith must be free: no one therefore is to be forced to embrace the Christian faith against his own will.(8) This doctrine is contained in the word of God and it was constantly proclaimed by the Fathers of the Church.(7) The act of faith is of its very nature a free act. Man, redeemed by Christ the Savior and through Christ Jesus called to be God's adopted son,(9) cannot give his adherence to God revealing Himself unless, under the drawing of the Father,(10) he offers to God the reasonable and free submission of faith. It is therefore completely in accord with the nature of faith that in matters religious every manner of coercion on the part of men should be excluded. In consequence, the principle of religious freedom makes no small contribution to the creation of an environment in which men can without hindrance be invited to the Christian faith, embrace it of their own free will, and profess it effectively in their whole manner of life.

This Vatican Council likewise professes its belief that it is upon the human conscience that these obligations fall and exert their binding force. The truth cannot impose itself except by virtue of its own truth, as it makes its entrance into the mind at once quietly and with power.

Religious freedom, in turn, which men demand as necessary to fulfill their duty to worship God, has to do with immunity from coercion in civil society. Therefore it leaves untouched traditional Catholic doctrine on the moral duty of men and societies toward the true religion and toward the one Church of Christ.

On his part, man perceives and acknowledges the imperatives of the divine law through the mediation of conscience. In all his activity a man is bound to follow his conscience in order that he may come to God, the end and purpose of life. It follows that he is not to be forced to act in a manner contrary to his conscience. Nor, on the other hand, is he to be restrained from acting in accordance with his conscience, especially in matters religious. The reason is that the exercise of religion, of its very nature, consists before all else in those internal, voluntary and free acts whereby man sets the course of his life directly toward God. No merely human power can either command or prohibit acts of this kind.(3)

There are two related problems with this line of reasoning used as a justification to prove that the church has not changed her teaching:  1. It does not necessarily, logically follow from the fact that true faith must be voluntary that civil coercion in religious matters is wrong.  In fact, Christian theologians over the past 1500 years or so, at least from Augustine to Vatican II, had argued that the one does not necessarily imply the other.  2. And even more importantly, what we've seen already from previous Roman church teaching and practice shows quite clearly that before the twentieth century the Roman church did not embrace a necessary connection between faith being voluntary and the wrongness of civil coercion in religious matters but rather repudiated the idea of such a necessary connection as false.  If the church has always held the idea of such a necessary connection, it sure did a fantastic job of fooling everybody!

Just to provide briefly an example of the sort of reasoning more in vogue in Roman circles before Vatican II, let me quote Augustine, whose teachings on religious freedom helped to set the standard for the next 1500 years of western church history.  These two quotations are from a letter from Augustine to a schismatic bishop named Vincentius written in the year 408 (Augustine, Letters, vol. I in Works, 15 vols, ed. Marcus Dods [Edinburgh, 1872], vol. VI, pp. 395-404, 409-13, taken from "Augustine, Letter 93, Augustine to Vincentius, a schismatic bishop in Mauretania (408)," found in David George Mullan, ed., Religious Pluralism in the West [Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1998], 42-43, 40-41):

You are of the opinion that no one should be compelled to follow righteousness; and yet you read that the householder said to his servants, "Whomsoever ye shall find, compel them to come in" [Luke 14: 23].  You also read how he who was at first Saul, and afterwards Paul, was compelled, by the great violence with which Christ coerced him, to know and to embrace the truth; for you cannot but think that the light which our eyes enjoy is more precious to men than money or any other possession.  This light, lost suddenly by him when he was cast to the ground by the heavenly voice, he did not recover until he became a member of the Holy Church.

Wherefore, if we were so to overlook and forbear with those cruel enemies who seriously disturb our peace and quietness by manifold and grievous forms of violence and treachery, as that nothing at all should be contrived and done by us with a view to alarm and correct them, truly we would be rendering evil for evil.  For if any one saw his enemy running headlong to destroy himself when he had become delirious through a dangerous fever, would he not in that case be much more truly rendering evil for evil if he permitted him to run on thus, than if he took measures to have him seized and bound?  And yet he would at that moment appear to the other to be most vexatious, and most like an enemy, when, in truth, he had proved himself most useful and most compassionate; although, doubtless, when health was recovered, he would express to him his gratitude with a warmth proportioned to the measure in which he had felt his refusal to indulge him in his time of frenzy.  Oh, if I could show you how many we have even from the Circumcelliones, who are now approved Catholics, and condemn their former life, and the wretched delusion under which they believed that they were doing in behalf of the Church of God whatever they did under the promptings of a restless temerity, who nevertheless would not have been brought to this soundness of judgment had they not been, as persons beside themselves, bound with the cords of those laws which are distasteful to you!  As to another form of most serious distemper,--that, namely, of those who had not, indeed, a boldness leading to acts of violence, but were pressed down by a kind of inveterate sluggishness of mind, and would say to us:  "What you affirm is true, nothing can be said against it; but it is hard for us to leave off what we have received by tradition from our fathers,"--why should not such persons be shaken up in a beneficial way by a law bringing upon them inconvenience in worldly things, in order that they might rise from their lethargic sleep, and awake to the salvation which is to be found in the unity of the Church?  How many of them, now rejoicing with us, speak bitterly of the weight with which their ruinous course formerly oppressed them, and confess that it was our duty to inflict annoyance on them, in order to prevent them from perishing under the disease of lethargic habit, as under a fatal sleep!

Augustine here takes a quite different line of reasoning from the one embraced by Dignitatis Humanae.  Although he agrees that a person must embrace from the heart the true faith, he argues that sometimes civil coercion can help people to get free of hindrances that prevent them from fully seeing and embracing the truth.  Clearly, for Augustine--as well as for 1500 years of subsequent Roman teaching--the fact that faith is voluntary does not at all imply that civil coercion ought not to be used in religious matters.  Vatican II did not embrace the only logical position out there; rather, it repudiated its clearly-affirmed previous reasoning in order to adopt a line of reasoning that just happens to be the one favored by the modern western world.

Dignitatis Humanae summarizes its claim that it continues to affirm the same teaching that the Roman Catholic Church has always affirmed:

In faithfulness therefore to the truth of the Gospel, the Church is following the way of Christ and the apostles when she recognizes and gives support to the principle of religious freedom as befitting the dignity of man and as being in accord with divine revelation. Throughout the ages the Church has kept safe and handed on the doctrine received from the Master and from the apostles. In the life of the People of God, as it has made its pilgrim way through the vicissitudes of human history, there has at times appeared a way of acting that was hardly in accord with the spirit of the Gospel or even opposed to it. Nevertheless, the doctrine of the Church that no one is to be coerced into faith has always stood firm.

Thus the leaven of the Gospel has long been about its quiet work in the minds of men, and to it is due in great measure the fact that in the course of time men have come more widely to recognize their dignity as persons, and the conviction has grown stronger that the person in society is to be kept free from all manner of coercion in matters religious.

My version of these paragraphs:  "We've continued to hand on unchanged from the beginning the doctrine of Christ.  Sure, there have been times when we haven't fully lived up to it [like the previous 1500 years consistently--editorial comment], but we're getting better.  People are starting to realize that religious freedom is a fundamental right, and we've always taught that faith must be voluntary, which implies religious freedom, so we've really taught religious freedom all along, even though it hasn't really looked like it and we've never actually said it before or noticed that we taught it until recently."  But as we've seen above, Vatican II does not simply carry on the same teaching that the church carried on previously, but rather, in this area, it fundamentally reverses the church's teaching.  Dignitatis Humanae, being a deliverance of an ecumenical council, represents the mind of the whole church gathered together, as well as the mind of the pope.  It is giving a clear, definitive statement on the subject of religious freedom, using its divine teaching authority, addressed to the whole church.  It therefore must be believed as having been delivered with the seal of the church's divinely-inspired teaching authority--that is, it cannot be rejected but it must be accepted as infallible.  And even if some might try to argue on technical grounds that the document is not intended as infallible (which argument I do not think would be successful), we have already seen that even when statements fall outside some technical definition of infallibility, they are to be received as being the teaching of Christ's divinely-guided church.  They cannot simply be ignored and rejected.

So what we have seen above is that the Roman Catholic Church has taught, using its claimed divine teaching authority, which is to be trusted as a final arbiter of theological truth, both that the modern notion of religious freedom is wrong and wicked and that it is right and righteous.  As these cannot both be true, we must consider the church's claim to have an ultimately-reliable (i.e. infallible) teaching authority to be falsified.

A LOOK AT A RESPONSE FROM ROMAN CATHOLIC WRITER BRYAN CROSS

In this final section, I would like to briefly look at some arguments attempting to show that the church has not contradicted itself in its teaching on religious freedom.  Particularly, I want to look at a recent article by Bryan Cross posted at the Called to Communion website, a Roman Catholic website dedicated to fostering dialogue between Roman Catholics and Reformed Christians.  Let's look at some of Bryan's attempts at resolution:

As Pope Pius IX makes clear in Quanta Cura, and Pope Leo XIII confirmed subsequently, the conception of liberty of conscience Pope Gregory XVI condemned follows from the indifferentist conception of the best condition of civil society. Hence this “liberty of conscience” refers to a freedom not only from coercion but also from guidance, teaching, or influence by both civil and ecclesial authorities toward religious truth, and from restriction, impedance, or opposition by such authorities toward religious error. It includes the notion of freedom from the influence or idea or existence of public religious truth and from public religious practice by the civil authority or the endorsement of religious practice by the civil authority. Each man’s guide in matters of religion must be his reason alone, and his reason must not be informed or influenced by civil authorities as such, whether through word or actions, or by ecclesial authorities publicly recognized as such by the civil authority. According to this notion any such informing or influencing would be an abuse of power because there is no true religion and no true form of Christianity. More generally, this conception of freedom of conscience views authority and freedom as opposed, such that the action of a civil authority in its capacity as civil authority to advance a particular religion is ipso facto a violation of the freedom of the citizens with respect to religion. Religion can have no place in the public square, because there can be no publicly recognized religious truth; there can be only private religious decisions. Hence there are no possible social conditions in which upholding the common good requires or allows action of this sort by civil authorities.

The freedom of conscience referred to in Dignitatis Humanae, by contrast, is a more specific definition of freedom, namely, freedom from coercion to act against one’s conscience in matters of religion, within due limits in relation to the common good. The freedom of conscience affirmed in Dignitatis Humanae is not a freedom to form one’s conscience apart from any guidance or direction toward the truth by the civil authority or by an ecclesial authority recognized as such by the civil authority, but instead a freedom to act according to one’s conscience with regard to religion, without coercion, within due limits in relation to the common good.¹ This liberty of conscience requires that no government may impose on its citizens the profession or repudiation of any religion such that any citizens are compelled or coerced to act against their conscience with regard to religion. But this liberty of conscience does not disallow a publicly recognized religion, or the promotion and defense and practice of that public religion by the civil authority as such.²

So the “liberty of conscience” condemned in the earlier document is not the same “liberty of conscience” affirmed in Dignitatis Humanae, and for that reason there is no contradiction between the two teachings.

Bryan points out accurately that Dignitatis Humanae does not oppose the idea, taught earlier by the church, that civil governments ought to embrace the Roman Catholic religion and promote it.  DH does not seem particularly enthused about the idea, such as when it talks about a situation where the civil government embraces a particular religion as involving a set of "peculiar circumstances"--hardly words suggesting that this is the norm that everyone ought to follow.  And DH does not explicitly promote as good the idea that civil societies should establish Roman Catholicism or promote it.  But I grant that it doesn't seem to want to explicitly oppose this idea either, so Bryan is right that there is no clear contradiction here.  (Or, at least, I am willing to grant this for the sake of the current argument.)

But Bryan's response, while accurate as far as it goes, also misses the point of the alleged contradiction.  The contradiction arises not in connection with the question of whether or not civil societies should have an established religion but whether or not they should use civil coercion to restrain and punish heretics.  Bryan's response sidesteps that crucial question.  As we have seen, it is clear that earlier Roman teaching affirmed quite positively that heretics ought to be restrained and punished by civil society (at least most of the time--recognizing some room in non-ideal circumstances for some toleration) beyond merely what would be required to maintain a secular civil peace and order, and that DH just as clearly affirmed that such restraint and punishment should not happen.  The entire point of the modern notion of religious freedom or liberty of conscience is that beyond the requirements of a secular public peace and order--that is, a concern for the life, property, and other such rights of all citizens of whatever religion--there should be no restraint on anyone's conscience, no matter what religion he professes.  And it is quite clear that it is this notion that DH enthusiastically teaches and promotes.  So Bryan has failed to resolve the actual contradiction that exists.

What then of the seeming contradiction between the older teaching that it is false that liberty of conscience and worship is each man’s personal right, and the teaching in Dignitatis Humanae that liberty of conscience and worship is each man’s personal right? Here too, the position condemned is not the same position affirmed, because the ‘right’ condemned in the older documents is not the right affirmed in Dignitatis Humanae. The position condemned is the notion that human persons have a right not only to follow their conscience in matters of religion without coercion from the civil authority, but also to form their conscience without any influence by the civil authority as such in matters of religion, through endorsement or promotion or practice of any particular religion, or opposition to any particular religious claim or practice. The ‘right’ of religious freedom as conceived by the indifferentists entails that the civil authority has no obligation to promote and defend religious truth, oppose false religious claims, and practice the true religion. Rather, this proposed ‘right’ entails that the civil authority has an obligation not to do each of those, and thus violates this right if it does them.

In contrast, the right to religious freedom affirmed in Dignitatis Humanae is the right to be immune from coercion to act against one’s conscience in matters of religion, within due limits in relation to the common good.³ This right does not entail that the civil authority has no obligation to promote and defend religious truth, oppose false religious claims, and practice the true religion. This right does not entail that the civil authority has an obligation not to do each of those. The civil authority can defend and practice one particular religion, and oppose false religious claims or practices, while upholding and respecting the right to religious freedom as this right is defined and affirmed in Dignitatis Humanae.

So here too the false right of liberty of conscience and worship rejected in the earlier documents is not the same right of liberty and conscience affirmed in Dignitatis Humanae, and for that reason there is no contradiction between the two teachings. This is also why there is no contradiction between the claim in Quanta Cura that it is false that “liberty of conscience and worship is each man’s personal right, which ought to be legally proclaimed and asserted in every rightly constituted society” (QC, 3) and the claim in Dignitatis Humanae that “This right of the human person to religious freedom is to be recognized in the constitutional law whereby society is governed and thus it is to become a civil right” (DH, 2). The liberty that Pope Pius IX teaches should not be legally recognized is not the same liberty that the Second Vatican Council teaches should be recognized.

Again, in this response, Bryan sidesteps the real issue in the same way he did in the previous response.  Again, the issue is not whether or not a civil government should endorse or promote or encourage anyone towards the true religion.  I grant that DH did not clearly address that question and thus did not clearly contradict previous Roman teaching on that subject.  But that is not the issue upon which the contradiction lies.  Again, the contradiction lies in previous Roman teaching that heretics can be civilly coerced as such--that is, beyond concern for the secular public order--and DH's teaching that they cannot.  And this issue continues not to be addressed by Bryan's responses.

Bryan goes on to address the alleged contradiction that earlier Roman teaching asserted that a society is worse off if it has religious freedom while DH affirmed that the best society is one which embraces religious freedom.

So here too the false conception of religious liberty said in the earlier Church documents to be harmful to society is not the same conception of religious liberty affirmed in Dignitatis Humanae as part of the very order established by God, and which when denied injures the human person. The false conception of religious liberty is not merely a freedom from coercion when following one’s conscious in matters religious, but is a much broader concept that includes within itself a denial of the possibility of the public discovery, preservation, and dissemination of religious truth, and thus includes within itself a denial of the incarnation. The religious liberty affirmed in Dignitatis Humanae, by contrast, entails no such thing.⁵ Rather, Dignitatis Humanae acknowledges that society has the right to defend itself against possible abuses committed on the pretext of freedom of religion, and that this responsibility belongs especially to the civil authority, not only for the sake of preserving public peace, but also for a “proper guardianship of public morality:” . . .

The claim that Dignitatis Humanae contradicts prior Church teaching takes another form regarding the perfection of society. According to that objection, the teaching of Dignitatis Humanae that civil authorities ought not coerce citizens to act against their conscience in matters of religion, within due limits, contradicts the falsehood of the statement condemned by Pope Pius IX in Quanta Cura that the best condition of civil society is one in which no duty is recognized by the civil power of restraining offenders against the Catholic religion, except so far as public peace may require. However, that the best condition of society is one in which the civil authority does recognize a duty to restrain offenders against the Catholic religion does not entail that anyone should be subject to coercion to act against his conscience in matters of religion beyond due limits. The moral duty by civil authorities to defend religious truth for the sake of the common good is compatible with the moral duty by civil authorities not to coerce citizens to act against their conscience in matters of religion, beyond due limits. For that reason, here too there is no contradiction between the two teachings.

Bryan's first response here misses the point once again in the same way that he has previously.  Again, the question that gives rise to the claim of contradiction is not the question of how much the civil government should officially endorse or promote the true religion, but whether or not the civil government should use civil coercion to restrain or punish heretics.  And this question is again sidestepped by Bryan.  Bryan appeals to the fact that some of the earlier papal documents are responding to the teaching of "indifferentism"--the idea that there is no known true religion, that civil governments and individuals have no obligation to follow any particular religion, etc.--in order to paint everything they have said on the subject of religious freedom as a response to that particular error.  However, our examination made clear that while "indifferentism" was certainly a major part of what those earlier papal writings were worried about, their concerns were not limited to the aspects of "indifferentism" that DH also opposes, but they were also opposing other ideas about civil coercion that DH would later clearly endorse, and thus the contradictions remain.

Bryan's second response seems to play on the meaning of phrases like "public peace," "common good," "within [or beyond] due limits," and "public morality."  His argument seems to be that there is no necessary contradiction between saying that there should be religious freedom but only within "due limits" on the one hand, and saying that there should not be religious freedom beyond these "due limits" on the other; or saying that civil coercion of heretics is improper except for what is necessary to preserve public peace and moral order on the one hand, and saying that civil coercion of heretics is proper when they threaten the public peace and moral order on the other.  Making this argument more concrete, we could justify the execution of a heretic for, say, publicly teaching against the Trinity within the bounds of DH by saying that the heretic, by teaching against the Trinity, has gone beyond "due limits" and has threatened "public peace and moral order," and so it is appropriate to execute him (since that is the only way to really stop the damage he is doing).

The problem with this line of reasoning is that while phrases like "due limits" and "public peace and moral order" left all by themselves can be ambiguous and so can be taken in as loose or as strict a sense as anyone wants, so that pretty much any civil behavior could be justified or condemned by them depending on whatever meaning someone wants to put on them at any given moment, our examination of the Roman church's earlier teaching and our examination of DH revealed that these phrases cannot simply be taken in any way one wants in interpreting the relevant statements.  In fact, both the earlier statements (at least those from the nineteenth century onwards) and DH make it clear that they have in mind the classic, modern notion of religious freedom that is articulated famously in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  Quanta Cura, for example, made it clear that it was attacking the very notion of liberty of conscience that the UDHR later articulated, and DH made it clear that it was defending the very same notion of religious freedom.  Both of them appealed to common sentiments in the western world as a reference point to understand what they were talking about.  We recall, for example, how DH begins by linking its subject with modern western sentiments:

A sense of the dignity of the human person has been impressing itself more and more deeply on the consciousness of contemporary man,(1) and the demand is increasingly made that men should act on their own judgment, enjoying and making use of a responsible freedom, not driven by coercion but motivated by a sense of duty. The demand is likewise made that constitutional limits should be set to the powers of government, in order that there may be no encroachment on the rightful freedom of the person and of associations. This demand for freedom in human society chiefly regards the quest for the values proper to the human spirit. It regards, in the first place, the free exercise of religion in society.

This Vatican Council takes careful note of these desires in the minds of men. It proposes to declare them to be greatly in accord with truth and justice. To this end, it searches into the sacred tradition and doctrine of the Church-the treasury out of which the Church continually brings forth new things that are in harmony with the things that are old.

We recall also that DH explicitly stated that the concept of religious freedom it was defending included a rejection of governmental "discrimination" in religious matters:

Finally, government is to see to it that equality of citizens before the law, which is itself an element of the common good, is never violated, whether openly or covertly, for religious reasons. Nor is there to be discrimination among citizens. 

That is, in protecting the "public peace and moral order," the government is not to engage in any civil coercion that would imply religious discrimination (and therefore a lack of religious equality) in the law.  Therefore, the sorts of rights that the civil government could use civil coercion to protect could not involve anything that would favor one religion over another, and therefore those rights must be limited to "secular" types of rights--life, property, religious freedom, etc.--which modern western society typically takes to be religiously neutral.  So we see, both from the observation that DH explicitly links its idea of religious freedom to that growing in prominence in the western world in modern times and from the fact that it explicitly excludes "religious discrimination" from its idea of what can be civilly proceeded against in defense of the "common good" and "public peace and morality," that the concept of "public peace," "public order," "public morality," or "common good," used in DH, has the same basic content that it has in the secular Universal Declaration of Human Rights or other typical secular statements of religious freedom, and therefore phrases like these cannot be used to reconcile DH with previous Roman teaching that it is acceptable (and even normally a duty) for the government to "religiously discriminate" by punishing heretics as such rather than simply as violators of the secular public order.

Bryan points out, rightly, that there is much overlap between DH and earlier Roman Catholic teaching.  Both affirm that faith in the true religion is a duty and must be voluntary.  And both affirm that the Roman Catholic faith is the one true religion.  But this agreement does not hide the clear disagreement that exists, and this disagreement cannot be seen as anything other than a falsification of the Roman Catholic claim to have an infallible teaching authority.