Why Righteousness Cannot Be Merely Legal

The thing which makes sin hateful, is that by which it deserves punishment; which is but the expression of hatred. And that which renders virtue lovely, is the same with that on the account of which it is fit to receive praise and reward; which are but the expressions of esteem and love. But that which makes vice hateful, is its hateful nature; and that which renders virtue lovely, is its amiable nature. It is a certain beauty or deformity that are inherent in that good or evil will, which is the soul of virtue and vice (and not in the occasion of it), which is their worthiness of esteem or disesteem, praise, or dispraise, according to the common sense of mankind.

- Jonathan Edwards (Freedom of the Will, Part IV, Section 1)

The Augustinian doctrine of justification sees righteousness as something that is possessed as an internal character trait (which is also manifested by outward actions that display and express that inward character).  The Anti-Augustinian Protestant doctrine of justification treats righteousness as something that can be possessed in a purely legal way, as a status imputed to a person which does not necessarily flow from or correspond to an internal character.  (For more on these two doctrines of justification and arguments relating to them, see here.)

I want to argue briefly here that righteousness is something that must be understood in connection to an internal character trait and cannot be understood in purely legal terms.

Both in the Bible as well as in general human discourse, righteousness is something that is good.  It is a positive trait, something that deserves to be praised and rewarded.  It contrasts with unrighteousness or wickedness, which is a negative trait deserving of condemnation and punishment.  Righteousness is something that is pleasing to God, and which he rewards with good things - ultimately with an eternal life of joy.  This all means that we must understand righteousness to be something that is logically and intrinsically connected to happiness.  It is fit for happiness.  That is really just another way of saying that it is good, for the idea of the good is the idea of something that is pleasing or desirable, something that brings happiness to those who experience it.  (And, of course, the opposite of all of this can be said for the idea of badness.)  The Supreme Good is God, for God loves and delights in himself supremely and is the source of all delight, and the happiness of all beings in general can only be found ultimately in the enjoyment of God.  The natural consequence of loving God supremely is to attain supreme happiness, and the natural consequence of turning away from supreme love to God is to attain supreme misery.  When God contemplates a being who loves him supremely, he sees a being whose disposition is one that is naturally fit for happiness, and so he loves that disposition and desires it to achieve what it is fit for, and he rewards it with happiness.  When God contemplates a being who does not love him supremely, he sees a being whose disposition is one that is naturally fit for misery, and so he hates that disposition and desires it to achieve what it is fit for, and he punishes it with misery.  (Since God is a simple, indivisible being, his knowledge and will are ultimately one.  God's ultimate desires are identical with what ultimately is, and, when we speak of God, there is no ultimate distinction between moral rewards and punishments and natural or logical good or bad consequences.)

If all of the above is true, then righteousness can be nothing other than the disposition of a being who loves God supremely, and wickedness is the disposition of a being who doesn't.  Righteousness is the orientation of the will of a being towards God as the Supreme Good, and wickedness is the orientation of the will of a being away from God as the Supreme Good.  This is what both reason and revelation teach (see, for example, Luke 10:27; Matthew 22:36–40; Mark 12:28–31; James 3:9-12; Romans 13:8-10; Galatians 5:13-14).  But such a disposition of the will is, by definition, an internal character trait within a being.  It cannot be possessed merely legally or be a merely legal trait.  For God to see a person as righteous is for him to be pleased with a person and see that person as fit for the reward of happiness, but the only thing in a person that could be thus pleasing to God is the orientation of the being's will towards God, for that is the only thing that naturally attains and is fit for that reward and which God therefore sees as something ultimately good and delightful.  To imagine righteousness as being possessed by a person in a merely legal way, without reference to the actual internal state of the will, is like imagining that a person could be physically beautiful merely by legal imputation.  Righteousness is the beauty of a good will, and the only thing that can possess that kind of beauty is a good will.  If a person has that kind of will, God will be pleased with its beauty; if he has a wicked will, God will find that will morally ugly.  Just as a person who is physically beautiful will give the pleasure of physical beauty to onlookers.  A person who is physically ugly cannot become pleasing to onlookers merely by having beauty legally imputed to him, or vice versa.  Or, for another analogy, we can think of a person enjoying the taste of a certain food.  If I eat something that is tasty, I will experience pleasure in the taste of it.  This is because there is a logical connection between a food being tasty and that food giving the pleasure of taste to those who taste it.  Good taste cannot be possessed by a food in merely a legal way.  A substance or object with a disgusting taste cannot come to be enjoyed merely by having tastiness imputed to it.  It will produce the sensation natural to its nature.  I cannot take a lump of dirt, legally count it as possessing the tastiness of chocolate cake, and then enjoy it as if it is chocolate cake.  The only way it will taste like chocolate cake is if it actually possesses the taste of chocolate cake.

So the Anti-Augustinian Protestant doctrine of justification makes a fundamental error when it tries to separate righteousness and wickedness from the good or bad dispositions of the will which are the natural source of these ideas and turn them into qualities which can exist purely legally.  This makes no sense on biblical grounds, on the ground of ordinary human discourse, or on the ground of sound theology and philosophy.

ADDENDUM 5/5/23:  But can't righteousness and wickedness be possessed in terms of one's past record?  Isn't one guilty not only for what one now is, but for what one has done in the past, and likewise with desert of reward?

If we keep in mind what we already established above, we can see that a record is only important as a way of keeping track of the specific manifestations of a being's will which help us to identify what the state of that will is.  This is why we treat moral subjects differently from non-moral subjects even when they "commit" similar acts.  For example, imagine a tornado destroying someone's house vs. an arson destroying someone's house.  The outward act and the result are similar in both cases, but we don't set out to apprehend and punish the tornado as we do the arson.  Why?  Because the acts of a tornado do not manifest any evil will, whereas the acts of an arson do.  We see the act of the arson as a manifestation of an evil will, and we seek to apprehend the being who has that will so that he can receive his proper punishment.  We punish the man not ultimately because of the outward act itself but because of the internal disposition of will that was manifested in the outward act.

"But," it might be objected, "if a person commits an evil act but then later repents and changes, so that his will no longer possesses the evil orientation it previously had, we still want to punish him.  Doesn't that indicate that we are wanting to punish something other than the evil will?"  No, I don't think it does.  If that were the case, again, we would want to punish a tornado just as much.  I think what we are recognizing in such a case as this is that evil deeds have negative consequences that have to be faced.  A person cannot commit an evil deed and escape the consequences of that deed by repenting.  In fact, the repentance of an evil will inherently involves a facing up to those consequences and accepting them and choosing to do what one can to make up for the damage done.  That is why repentance involves feelings of guilt and sorrow and is often accompanied by an attempt to repair the damage caused by the previous evil act (helping to rebuild the destroyed house, giving back what was stolen, etc.).  (In Catholic theology, it is explicitly recognized that repentance involves deeds of penance.  This is something we all recognize but Catholicism gives a theological name to.  In the Bible, this is expressed by saying that in order to rise to a new life of righteousness, we must die to sin.  We must deny ourselves, crucify our old lives, put to death the deeds of the flesh, suffer with Christ so that we might be glorified with him, etc. - Romans 6; Romans 8; Romans 8:17; Galatians 2:19-20; John 12:24; Matthew 16:24-25; etc.)  So we naturally have an aversion to the idea of an evil will escaping from having to face up to the consequences of what it has done.  But this does not imply that we find anything morally ugly ultimately other than a wicked will.  (And, again, the same can be said in reverse with regard to a good will and acts of that good will.)  It is simply a recognition that the transition from an evil will to a good will - repentance - involves dealing with all that the evil will entailed, or the consequences of that evil will and its acts.  (For more, see here.)

Can a Pope Teach Heresy? And What Should the Church Do If That Were to Happen?

I want to make some comments on a topic that has been much discussed in Church history among Catholic theologians: the question of in what ways a Pope might be able to believe or teach error or even heresy, and what the Church should do about it if that should happen.

Let me start with a selection from St. Francis de Sales, who I think lays out the prevailing view on this subject that has been mostly followed by theologians throughout the history of the discussion of this topic.  St. Francis is one of the Church's great theologians, a Doctor of the Church.  He is writing towards the end of the sixteenth century, responding to the positions and arguments of the Protestant Reformation.  My text is taken from the full and plain text version of The Catholic Controversy as found here on the Internet Archive website.  This version was published originally in 1909 (Third Edition, Revised and Augmented) in London by Burns and Oates, translated by Rev. H. B. Mackey, under the direction of Rev. John Cuthbert Hedley, Bishop of Newport.

Under the ancient law the High Priest did not wear the Rational except when he was vested in the pontifical robes and was entering before the Lord. Thus we do not say that the Pope cannot err in his private opinions, as did John XXII; or be altogether a heretic as perhaps Honorius was. Now when he is explicitly a heretic, he falls ipso facto from his dignity and out of the Church, and the Church must either deprive him, or, as some say, declare him deprived, of his Apostolic See, and must say as S. Peter did: Let another take his bishopric. When he errs in his private opinion he must be instructed, advised, convinced; as happened with John XXII, who was so far from dying obstinate or from determining anything during his life concerning his opinion, that he died whilst he was making the examination which is necessary for determining in a matter of faith, as his successor declared in the Extrazagantes which begins Benedictus Deus. But when he is clothed with the pontifical garments, I mean when he teaches the whole Church as shepherd, in general matters of faith and morals, then there is nothing but doctrine and truth. And in fact everything a king says is not a law or an edict, but that only which a king says as king and as a legislator. So everything the Pope says is not canon law or of legal obligation; he must mean to define and to lay down the law for the sheep, and he must keep the due order and form. Thus we say that we must appeal to him not as to a learned man, for in this he is ordinarily surpassed by some others, but as to the general head and pastor of the Church: and as such we must honour, follow, and firmly embrace his doctrine, for then he carries on his breast the Urim and Thummim, doctrine and truth. And again we must not think that in everything and everywhere his judgment is infallible, but then only when he gives judgment on a matter of faith in questions necessary to the whole Church; for in particular cases which depend on human fact he can err, there is no doubt, though it is not for us to control him in these cases save with all reverence, submission, and discretion. Theologians have said, in a word, that he can err in questions of fact, not in questions of right; that he can err extra cathedram, outside the chair of Peter, that is, as a private individual, by writings and bad example.

But he cannot err when he is in cathedra, that is, when he intends to make an instruction and decree for the guidance of the whole Church, when he means to confirm his brethren as supreme pastor, and to conduct them into the pastures of the faith.

First of all, it should be noted that St. Francis lays out the teaching of the Church with regard to the indefectibility (inability to fall away) and infallibility of the See of St. Peter.  This is a crucial foundation for everything else.  In the Catholic epistemology, the Church is infallible.  The Magisterium of the Church cannot fall away into error or teach error authoritatively and bindingly upon the Church.  And the See of St. Peter, the Pope, in particular, is protected from error and cannot lead the Church into error in his official and authoritative teaching.  I would encourage readers to read the larger context of St. Francis's comments here, in which he makes crystal clear the indefectibility and unfailing reliability of the See of St. Peter.  Also, see here and here for a more complete explanation of the Catholic view and all the nuances involved in it and citations for it from the sources of Catholic doctrine.  I won't repeat all of that here, but it is a crucial foundation for understanding what we are going to discuss.

Can a Pope Err or Teach Heresy in His Private Capacity?

St. Francis articulates that Popes cannot err in their official, authoritative teaching.  But he allows that they might be able to err as private individuals, when they are not teaching a doctrine authoritatively and bindingly to the Church.  They might be able to err in their private opinions.  They might even be able to be heretics in their private opinions (that is, their opinions might contradict the foundational doctrines of the faith).  They might even articulate their errors or heresies explicitly and manifestly - that is, they might tell them to others or teach them.  Is it true that a Pope might do that?  Is that something that God might allow to happen?  That is something upon which there has not been universal consensus among Catholic theologians, and there is no official teaching on this matter by the Church.  There is a range of opinions that can be held here, within the boundaries laid down by what the Church has taught (and especially with regard to the Church's teachings on the indefectibility and infallibility of the Church, the Church's Magisterium, and the Roman See).  St. Robert Bellarmine, another Doctor of the Church, is famous for holding the position that it is most probable that God would not allow a Pope to fall into manifest heresy even as a private person.  (See De Controversiis: Tomus I: On the Roman Pontiff, Book IV, VI).  It seems to me that the doctrine of the indefectibility and infallibility of the Roman See does not absolutely or conclusively rule out the possibility of a Pope believing or teaching error or even heresy in his private capacity, since such teaching, by its very nature, would not bind the Church to error or enter into her official teaching.

What Would Happen If a Pope Taught Error or Heresy in His Private Capacity?

So what would happen if a Pope taught error or heresy in his private capacity?  St. Francis de Sales, in the quotation above, gives the common opinion on this among Catholic theologians through history:  "Now when he is explicitly a heretic, he falls ipso facto from his dignity and out of the Church, and the Church must either deprive him, or, as some say, declare him deprived, of his Apostolic See, and must say as S. Peter did: Let another take his bishopric. When he errs in his private opinion he must be instructed, advised, convinced."  If the Pope has kept his opinions to himself, of course, since there is no public knowledge of them, nothing can be publicly done about them.  If he is known to err in some lesser matter, he can be instructed and corrected.  But if he errs more fundamentally, by holding to heretical opinions (again, opinions that contradict the foundational doctrines of the Church), and has manifested those opinions publicly, St. Francis says that, by that act, he has basically cast himself out of both the papal office and the Church itself, and the Church can recognize this and depose him or declare him deposed.  This opinion has been common among Catholic theologians.

The Church has not issued any official teaching about this possibility in recent times, nor is there anything at all about this in current canon law.  However, as I've said, what St. Francis has laid out has been the common opinion among theologians.  Also, there have been statements made about this subject in the past in collections of canon law and by Popes.  The reader can see some of these statements and some statements by important theologians of the past on this matter in this very brief and helpful article by Erick Ybarra.  For example, in the Decretum Gratiani, which was a collection of Church rules from earlier days and was a central source of canon law in the 12th and 13th centuries and significantly informed much later canon law, we find the principle articulated that "No mortal shall presume to rebuke his [the Pope’s] faults, for he who is to judge all is to be judged by no one, unless he is found straying from the faith" (Decretum Gratiani, Dist. 40, c. 6; translation in Patrick Granfield, The Limits of the Papacy [New York: Crossroad Publishing Company, 1987], 71, found here).  Pope Innocent III (who was Pope from 1198-1216) is famous for laying out more commentary on what this meant, saying that "only on account of sin committed against the faith can I be judged by the church" (Patrologia Latina 217, 656; Translation in Jaroslav Pelikan, Reformation of the Church and Dogma (1300-1700), The Christian Tradition: A History of the Development of Doctrine, vol. 4 [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984], found here).  Pope Innocent III elaborated further on this concept:

Nevertheless he [the pope] should not mistakenly flatter himself about his power, nor rashly glory in his eminence or honor, for the less he is judged by man, the more is he judged by God. I say "less" because he can be judged by men, or rather shown to be judged, if he clearly loses his savor to heresy, since he "who does not believe, is already judged." It is only in this case that it should be understood of him that, "If the salt loses its savor, it is good for nothing anymore, except to be thrown out and to be trodden on by men."  (Pope Innocent III, Between God and Man: Six Sermons on the Priestly Office, trans. Corinne J. Vause and Frank C. Gardiner [Washington, DC, Catholic University of American Press, 2004), 48-49, found in Erick Ybarra, The Papacy: Revisiting the Debate between Catholics and Orthodox [Steubenville, OH: Emmaus Road Publishing, 2022], 534)

Innocent III here indicates the same nuance we see in other theologians - namely, that if the Church should judge a Pope for his heresy, it is not so much that the Church is judging the Pope herself as that she is officially recognizing a judgment already passed on the Pope by God.  It has been frequently stated by many Popes and theologians and has always been and currently is stated in canon law (see canon 1404) that "the First See is judged by no one."  There is no higher human authority in the Church than the Pope, who thus cannot be judged by equal or lower levels of authority in the Church.  But the Pope is obviously subject to God, and the Church can recognize the judgment of God.

So it has been acknowledged in the past that if a Pope were to fall into manifest heresy, he might be judged by the Church in this way.  But, as I said earlier, this teaching is not currently a part of canon law.  Could this be because such a thing could not happen, as Bellarmine and others have thought?  Perhaps, but, so far as I can tell at this point based on what I've seen, I don't think there is enough evidence to say for sure.

Since we are dealing here with something as extreme as the deposition of a reigning Pope from office, we have to proceed here with extreme caution, making very sure that we don't jeopardize the indefectibility of the Church or the unfailing reliability and supreme jurisdiction of the Magisterium and the Roman See in our opinions.  As Bellarmine points out, this has never happened in the two-thousand-year history of the Church.  (He points this fact out partly to use it to argue that such a thing probably could never happen.)  There is one case in Church history where a Pope was condemned for heresy: Pope Honorius was condemned as a heretic by the Sixth Ecumenical Council in 681.  But, in this case, the condemnation occurred decades after Honorius's death, and the condemnation was ratified by the Pope who was reigning at that time, Leo II (without whose ratification the council's condemnation could have had no validity).  (The Honorius affair is complex and filled with all sorts of nuances, so I will refer readers here for more on this.  For one thing, it is not clear that Honorius was actually a heretic in the sense of actually believing or teaching false doctrine; his condemnation can be interpreted as due not so much to his actual opinion as to his failing to be careful enough in his words to avoid aiding and abetting a heretical movement that actually really got going only after his death.)  There has never been a case where a currently-reigning Pope has been legitimately deposed from office by the Church.  So as we consider this hypothetical possibility (which may or may not be actually possible), we have to make sure our thoughts are consistent with Catholic teaching and Catholic epistemology.

If a Pope were to be deposed from office for heresy, the proceedings of the Church against the Pope would have to be done with full Magisterial authority.  This could not be a matter of one group of theologians (even if they are priests or bishops) arguing against other groups, with no official sanction, that some teaching of the Pope was heretical.  For example, some people argue that Pope Francis's teaching on the death penalty is at least something like heretical because it contradicts earlier definitive Church teaching on this subject.  But this is not at all clear and certain, and in fact I think it is evidently wrong (see here for more on this), and in any case they cannot cite their opinion as the authoritative position of the universal Magisterium.  Going along with this, the proceedings would have to be done according to clear and recognized rules, so that everyone would be able to recognize them as a legitimate Magisterial act.  Personally, I'm not sure how that could be done without there being some clear procedure laid out in canon law, which there currently is not.  If this scenario is at all a real possibility, my recommendation is that theologians and Church officials should work hard and give some real thought to trying to figure out how we should think about these things so that we can perhaps come to some conclusive and officially-recognized theological position on these matters, and I would also recommend that, if the Church decides that, yes, this could happen, she would consider laying out very clear and explicit procedures for such an eventuality in canon law.  In that way, if this ever happened, hopefully there would be no reasonable doubt as to how to proceed.  The procedures followed would have the clear imprint of Magisterial and papal authority.  The situation, in that case, would be much like what happens when a reigning Pope dies.  In the time between the death of the last Pope and the election of the new Pope, chaos does not ensue because the Church has clear procedures to follow in such a case.  Of course, God can protect the Church from falling apart even without such clear procedural rules, and he has many times in the past, and we know he will because that is his fundamental promise to the Church, yet the Church is morally obligated to do her due diligence in trying to avoid the negative consequences of her own negligence.  It would be to the Church's detriment if God has to protect her over and against her own negligence.  And even if we can be sure the Church would not fundamentally fall away, yet still the Church's negligence could lead to many bad results and schisms.

If there was a clear procedure laid out in canon law as described above, ratified by Magisterial (including papal) authority, then it could be carried out without violation of that authority.  But what if the Pope protests that he is not a heretic, or that the judgment against him is incorrect or without authority?  If he protests in his private capacity, simply as a member of the Church, this would not seem to be a problem.  But what if he were to protest in his official capacity as Pope?  As we have noted, the Pope has supreme jurisdiction in the Church and is also incapable of leading the Church into error in his official, authoritative teaching.  The Pope's authority and protection from error in these matters is precisely on the same level as that of the whole episcopate (for the episcopate necessarily includes the Pope and the Pope necessarily speaks authoritatively for the whole episcopate), so there is no possibility for the Church to contradict or overrule the Magisterial authority of the Pope.  If the Pope were to give an authoritative teaching declaring his own teaching orthodox, or if he were to declare the whole procedure against him void, the Church would have to submit to that.  So there could be no declaring the Pope a heretic or deprived from office if the Pope were to oppose this in his official capacity.  (But see the next section for another possible twist on this point.)

Could a Pope Teach Error or Heresy in an "Official" Form but Ultra Vires?

I want to throw out a hypothetical scenario for discussion that I have not heard anyone address before.  Perhaps this has been addressed and I am not aware of it, but it seems worth discussing.  Could it ever happen that a Pope might attempt to issue not a private but an authoritative teaching, whether definitively or non-definitively, but fail to do so due to the teaching being ultra vires - that is, beyond his competent authority?  For example, imagine that a Pope issues a statement claiming, in an ex cathedra manner, that the doctrine of the Trinity is incorrect and that there is instead a divine Quaternity.  Could this ever happen?  Of course, Church teaching is crystal clear that there could never be any real ex cathedra teaching from a Pope that is heretical, for here papal infallibility is in effect at its highest degree.  But perhaps, in such a scenario as I've laid out, the teaching might be considered a false claim of ex cathedra teaching.  We know that the Pope has supreme human jurisdiction in the Church, including in the teaching of doctrine.  But we also know that the Popes are servants of God and his revelation.  They have no authority to contradict God.  If a Pope attempted to give an ex cathedra teaching that contradicted divine revelation, then, that attempt would be ultra vires - beyond the authority he has been granted by God.  It would be like the governor of Idaho attempting to make an executive order for the State of Missouri.  In such a case, then, although the outward form of the teaching is ex cathedra and the Pope is attempting to give an ex cathedra teaching, the teaching would in reality have no papal or Magisterial authority at all.  It would be, in authority, equivalent to a private teaching of the Pope.

Could such a scenario ever happen?  I don't know.  I currently cannot think of any reason to consider it inherently impossible, because it would not threaten the indefectibility of the Church or contradict Magisterial or papal infallibility.  Of course, in order not to threaten the indefectibility of the Church and the Pope, God would only allow this to happen in cases where the "papal" teaching is so obviously heretical as to leave no room for reasonable doubt on the subject.  There would have to be absolutely manifest, clear heresy, recognized as such clearly and universally by the Church.  An example of a clear and clearly-and-universally-recognized heretical teaching would be an explicit and clear denial of the doctrine of the Trinity, or the clear and explicit affirmation of some other contrary doctrine (like a divine Quaternity or something like that).  There would be no reasonable doubt in such a case that the Pope had expressed heresy and had contradicted previously-given definitive Magisterial teaching.  Since we are obligated to follow the judgment of the Pope as of supreme authority on earth, as he exercises his office as the Vicar of Christ, we would only be authorized to reject a teaching coming from him if that teaching were so clearly heretical that there could be no doubt, and it would be basically universally recognized in the Catholic Church, that that teaching is not a true papal teaching but is ultra vires.  All the things I said in earlier sections about this not being able to happen with disputable teachings, or judged by private theologians or groups of theologians or bishops, etc., would apply here in the same way as they applied to the earlier scenarios we considered.  If the Pope were to be judged and even possibly deposed in such a scenario, it would have to be by means of clearly-recognized Magisterial authority operating with clearly-recognized procedural rules.

Brief Excursus on the Possibility of Other Forms of Ecclesiastical or Other Judgments Being Enacted against Popes

The Church has made it clear that "the First See is judged by no one," and statements by Popes and in canon law collections in the past have limited the possibility of the Church judging the Pope to cases of heresy, but is it possible to consider that there might be ways in which Popes, as human persons subject like all of us to sin, imprudence, incompetence, negligence, etc., could be judged for other things by the Church?  There is a lot of discussion in the Church today about keeping priests and bishops accountable (such as with regard to sexual sins and crimes and other things).  Must the Pope remain unaccountable in all of these areas?  Or could papal authority be consistent with some forms of papal accountability?

It is clear that, in the Catholic Church, the Pope has supreme jurisdictional and doctrinal authority.  So there can never be the kind of papal accountability that would threaten those things.  We have to trust that God will keep the Popes adequately accountable, since they are ultimately subject to his judgment.  But what if the Magisterium, including the Pope, were to put procedures into canon law for papal accountability, much as there are procedures for accountability of other persons in the Church?  In such a case, the laws would be legitimate, because established with legitimate Magisterial and papal authority.  Of course, there would always be the possibility that a Pope could overrule such procedures, since to deny this possibility would be to remove the supreme jurisdiction of the Pope, but at least there would be procedures in place that Popes would be ordinarily expected to follow, imposed upon them with papal authority.  There would be some moral force to these laws, even if that force is not jurisdictionally superior to papal jurisdiction, for if a Pope were to refuse to submit to such laws he would be going against established norms in the Church and against what his predecessors in the papacy or even he himself had previously established as important for the good of the Church, and this would reflect very badly on him.  Unless he had very good and clear reasons to refuse to submit to those laws, he would be publicly highlighting what would at least appear to be an unreasonable flaunting of his personal moral responsibility and thus would bring significant dishonor and perhaps even scandal upon himself, on the papal office, and on the Catholic Church.  Perhaps there could even be decrees or rules passed regarding papal accountability that would be definitive in nature, so that it would be ultra vires for a Pope to overturn them in the future.  I think there are some things at least worth considering here.

St. Thomas Aquinas on Predestination

St. Thomas Aquinas discussed his view of predestination in a number of places, including his famous Summa Theologica and his Summa Contra Gentiles.  Below, I have selected some key portions from both of these works which lay out St. Thomas's views on this subject.  The section on predestination from the Summa Theologica can be found here.  My selections from the Summa Contra Gentiles can be found here (#159-163 - though this source uses a different translation from the one in my text below).  My texts below come from public domain versions of both works, such as can be found here and here.

First, from the Summa Theologica:

It is fitting that God should predestine men. For all things are subject to His providence, as was shown above (I:22:2). Now it belongs to providence to direct things towards their end, as was also said (I:22:1 and I:22:2). The end towards which created things are directed by God is twofold; one which exceeds all proportion and faculty of created nature; and this end is life eternal, that consists in seeing God which is above the nature of every creature, as shown above (I:12:4). The other end, however, is proportionate to created nature, to which end created being can attain according to the power of its nature. Now if a thing cannot attain to something by the power of its nature, it must be directed thereto by another; thus, an arrow is directed by the archer towards a mark. Hence, properly speaking, a rational creature, capable of eternal life, is led towards it, directed, as it were, by God. The reason of that direction pre-exists in God; as in Him is the type of the order of all things towards an end, which we proved above to be providence. Now the type in the mind of the doer of something to be done, is a kind of pre-existence in him of the thing to be done. Hence the type of the aforesaid direction of a rational creature towards the end of life eternal is called predestination. For to destine, is to direct or send. Thus it is clear that predestination, as regards its objects, is a part of providence.  (I:23:1)

God does reprobate some. For it was said above (Article 1) that predestination is a part of providence. To providence, however, it belongs to permit certain defects in those things which are subject to providence, as was said above (I:22:2). Thus, as men are ordained to eternal life through the providence of God, it likewise is part of that providence to permit some to fall away from that end; this is called reprobation. Thus, as predestination is a part of providence, in regard to those ordained to eternal salvation, so reprobation is a part of providence in regard to those who turn aside from that end. Hence reprobation implies not only foreknowledge, but also something more, as does providence, as was said above (I:22:1). Therefore, as predestination includes the will to confer grace and glory; so also reprobation includes the will to permit a person to fall into sin, and to impose the punishment of damnation on account of that sin. (I:23:3)

Since predestination includes will, as was said above (Article 4), the reason of predestination must be sought for in the same way as was the reason of the will of God. Now it was shown above (I:19:5), that we cannot assign any cause of the divine will on the part of the act of willing; but a reason can be found on the part of the things willed; inasmuch as God wills one thing on account of something else. Wherefore nobody has been so insane as to say that merit is the cause of divine predestination as regards the act of the predestinator. But this is the question, whether, as regards the effect, predestination has any cause; or what comes to the same thing, whether God pre-ordained that He would give the effect of predestination to anyone on account of any merits.

Accordingly there were some who held that the effect of predestination was pre-ordained for some on account of pre-existing merits in a former life. This was the opinion of Origen, who thought that the souls of men were created in the beginning, and according to the diversity of their works different states were assigned to them in this world when united with the body. The Apostle, however, rebuts this opinion where he says (Romans 9:11-12): "For when they were not yet born, nor had done any good or evil . . . not of works, but of Him that calleth, it was said of her: The elder shall serve the younger."

Others said that pre-existing merits in this life are the reason and cause of the effect of predestination. For the Pelagians taught that the beginning of doing well came from us; and the consummation from God: so that it came about that the effect of predestination was granted to one, and not to another, because the one made a beginning by preparing, whereas the other did not. But against this we have the saying of the Apostle (2 Corinthians 3:5), that "we are not sufficient to think anything of ourselves as of ourselves." Now no principle of action can be imagined previous to the act of thinking. Wherefore it cannot be said that anything begun in us can be the reason of the effect of predestination.

And so others said that merits following the effect of predestination are the reason of predestination; giving us to understand that God gives grace to a person, and pre-ordains that He will give it, because He knows beforehand that He will make good use of that grace, as if a king were to give a horse to a soldier because he knows he will make good use of it. But these seem to have drawn a distinction between that which flows from grace, and that which flows from free will, as if the same thing cannot come from both. It is, however, manifest that what is of grace is the effect of predestination; and this cannot be considered as the reason of predestination, since it is contained in the notion of predestination. Therefore, if anything else in us be the reason of predestination, it will outside the effect of predestination. Now there is no distinction between what flows from free will, and what is of predestination; as there is not distinction between what flows from a secondary cause and from a first cause. For the providence of God produces effects through the operation of secondary causes, as was above shown (I:22:3. Wherefore, that which flows from free-will is also of predestination. We must say, therefore, that the effect of predestination may be considered in a twofold light—in one way, in particular; and thus there is no reason why one effect of predestination should not be the reason or cause of another; a subsequent effect being the reason of a previous effect, as its final cause; and the previous effect being the reason of the subsequent as its meritorious cause, which is reduced to the disposition of the matter. Thus we might say that God pre-ordained to give glory on account of merit, and that He pre-ordained to give grace to merit glory. In another way, the effect of predestination may be considered in general. Thus, it is impossible that the whole of the effect of predestination in general should have any cause as coming from us; because whatsoever is in man disposing him towards salvation, is all included under the effect of predestination; even the preparation for grace. For neither does this happen otherwise than by divine help, according to the prophet Jeremias (Lamentations 5:21): "convert us, O Lord, to Thee, and we shall be converted." Yet predestination has in this way, in regard to its effect, the goodness of God for its reason; towards which the whole effect of predestination is directed as to an end; and from which it proceeds, as from its first moving principle. (I:23:5)

The reason for the predestination of some, and reprobation of others, must be sought for in the goodness of God. Thus He is said to have made all things through His goodness, so that the divine goodness might be represented in things. Now it is necessary that God's goodness, which in itself is one and undivided, should be manifested in many ways in His creation; because creatures in themselves cannot attain to the simplicity of God. Thus it is that for the completion of the universe there are required different grades of being; some of which hold a high and some a low place in the universe. That this multiformity of grades may be preserved in things, God allows some evils, lest many good things should never happen, as was said above (I:22:2). Let us then consider the whole of the human race, as we consider the whole universe. God wills to manifest His goodness in men; in respect to those whom He predestines, by means of His mercy, as sparing them; and in respect of others, whom he reprobates, by means of His justice, in punishing them. This is the reason why God elects some and rejects others. To this the Apostle refers, saying (Romans 9:22-23): "What if God, willing to show His wrath [that is, the vengeance of His justice], and to make His power known, endured [that is, permitted] with much patience vessels of wrath, fitted for destruction; that He might show the riches of His glory on the vessels of mercy, which He hath prepared unto glory" and (2 Timothy 2:20): "But in a great house there are not only vessels of gold and silver; but also of wood and of earth; and some, indeed, unto honor, but some unto dishonor." Yet why He chooses some for glory, and reprobates others, has no reason, except the divine will. Whence Augustine says (Tract. xxvi. in Joan.): "Why He draws one, and another He draws not, seek not to judge, if thou dost not wish to err." Thus too, in the things of nature, a reason can be assigned, since primary matter is altogether uniform, why one part of it was fashioned by God from the beginning under the form of fire, another under the form of earth, that there might be a diversity of species in things of nature. Yet why this particular part of matter is under this particular form, and that under another, depends upon the simple will of God; as from the simple will of the artificer it depends that this stone is in part of the wall, and that in another; although the plan requires that some stones should be in this place, and some in that place. Neither on this account can there be said to be injustice in God, if He prepares unequal lots for not unequal things. This would be altogether contrary to the notion of justice, if the effect of predestination were granted as a debt, and not gratuitously. In things which are given gratuitously, a person can give more or less, just as he pleases (provided he deprives nobody of his due), without any infringement of justice. This is what the master of the house said: "Take what is thine, and go thy way. Is it not lawful for me to do what I will?" (Matthew 20:14-15). (I:23:5)

Second, from the Summa Contra Gentiles (Book III, #160-164):

160

SINCE no one can be set on the way to his last end without the aid of divine grace, or without it have the necessary means of reaching that end, as are faith, hope, love and perseverance, some might think that man is not to blame for being destitute of these gifts, especially seeing that he cannot merit the assistance of divine grace, nor be converted to God unless God convert him: for none is responsible for that which depends on another. But allow this, and many absurdities follow. It follows that the man who has neither faith nor hope nor love of God, nor perseverance in good, still does not deserve punishment: whereas it is expressly said: "He that believeth not the Son shall not see life, but the wrath of God abideth on him" (John iii, 36). And since none reaches the end of happiness without the aforesaid endowments, it would follow further that there are some who neither attain to happiness nor yet suffer punishment of God: the contrary whereof is shown from what will be said to all present at the judgement of God: "Come . . . . possess ye the kingdom prepared for you, or, Depart . . . . into everlasting fire" (Matt. xxv, 34-41).

To solve this doubt, we must observe that though one can neither merit divine grace beforehand, nor acquire it by movement of his free will, still he can hinder himself from receiving it: for it is said of some: "They have said unto God, ‘Depart from us, we will not have the knowledge of thy ways’" (Job xxi, 14). And since it is in the power of free will to hinder the reception of divine grace or not to hinder it, not undeservedly may it be reckoned a man’s own fault, if he puts an obstacle in the way of the reception of grace. For God on His part is ready to give grace to all men: "He wills all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth" (1 Tim. ii, 4). But they alone are deprived of grace, who in themselves raise an obstacle to grace. So when the sun lights up the world, any evil that comes to a man who shuts his eyes is counted his own fault, although he could not see unless the sunlight first came in upon him.

161

WHEN it is said that it is in the power of free will to avoid putting obstacles to grace, that saying is to be understood of those in whom the natural faculty is unimpaired by sin. But if the will has fallen into evil courses by some previous inordinate act, it will not be altogether in its power to avoid putting obstacles in the way of grace. For though for some momentary occasion it may abstain from some particular act of sin by its own power, nevertheless, if left long to itself, it will fall into sin; and by sin an obstacle is put to grace. For when the mind of man turns aside from the state of righteousness, it clearly puts itself out of relation with its due end. Thus what ought to be the prime object of its affections, as being its last end, comes to be less loved than that other object to which it has inordinately turned, making of it another last end. Whatever in such a posture of the mind occurs to fit in with the inordinate end, however inconsistent with the due end, will be chosen, unless the will be brought back to due order, so as to prefer the due end to all others, and that is an effect of grace. But the choice of anything inconsistent with the last end puts an obstacle in the way of grace, as grace goes to turn one in the direction of the end. Hence after sin a man cannot abstain from all further sin before by grace he is brought back to due order.

Moreover, when the mind is inclined to a thing, it is no longer impartial between two alternatives. And that to which the mind is more inclined it chooses, unless by a rational discussion, not unattended with trouble, it is withdrawn from taking that side: hence sudden emergencies afford the best sign of the inward bent of the mind. But it is impossible for the mind of man to be so continually watchful as rationally to discuss whatever it ought to do or not to do. Consequently the mind will at times choose that to which it is inclined by the present inclination: so, if the inclination be to sin, it will not stand long clear of sin, thereby putting an obstacle in the way of grace, unless it be brought back to the state of righteousness.

Further we must consider the assaults of passion, the allurements of sense, the endless occasions of evil-doing, the ready incitements of sin, sure to prevail, unless the will be withheld from them by a firm adherence to the last end, which is the work of grace.

Hence appears the folly of the Pelagian view, that a man in sin can go on avoiding further sins without grace. On the contrary the Lord bids us pray: "Lead us not into temptation, but deliver us from evil."

But though persons in sin cannot of their own power help putting obstacles in the way of grace, unless they be forestalled by some aid of grace, still this lack of power is imputable to them for a fault, because it is left behind in them by a fault going before; as a drunken man is not excused from murder, committed in drunkenness, when he gets drunk by fault of his own. Besides, though this person in sin has it not in his unaided power altogether to avoid sin, still he has power here and now to avoid this or that sin: hence whatever he commits, he voluntarily commits, and the fault is imputed to him not undeservedly.

162

THOUGH the sinner raises an obstacle to grace, and by the exigence of the order of things ought not to receive grace, nevertheless, inasmuch as God can work setting aside the connatural order of things, as when He gives sight to the blind, or raises the dead, He sometimes out of the abundance of His goodness forestalls by the assistance of His grace even those who raise an obstacle to it, turning them away from evil and converting them to good. And as He does not give sight to all the blind, nor heal all the sick, that in those whom He heals the work of His power may appear, and in the others the order of nature may be observed, so He does not forestall by His aid all who hinder grace, to their turning away from evil and conversion to good, but some He so forestalls, wishing in them His mercy to appear, while in others He would have the order of justice made manifest. Hence the Apostle says: "God, though willing to show his wrath, and to make his power known, endured with much longsuffering vessels of wrath, fitted for destruction, that he might show forth the riches of his glory upon the vessels of mercy, which he hath prepared unto glory" (Rom. ix, 22, 23).

But when, of men who are enthralled in the same sins, God forestalls and converts some, and endures, or permits, others to go their way according to the order of things, we should not enquire the reason why He converts these and not those: for that depends on His sheer will, just as from His sheer will it proceeded that, when all things were made out of nothing, some things were made in a position of greater advantage than others (digniora). Hence again the apostle says: "Hath not the potter power over the clay, to make of the same lump one vessel unto honour and another unto dishonour?" (Rom. ix, 21.)

Hereby is refuted the error of Origen, who said that the reason why some were converted to God, and not others, was to be sought in divers works that their souls had done before they were united with their bodies, a theory already set aside (B. II, Chapp. XLIV, LXXXIII).

163

THOUGH there are some sinners whom God does not convert to Himself, but leaves them in their sins according to their deserts, still He does not induce them to sin.

1. Men sin by deviating from God their last end. But as every agent acts to its own proper and befitting end, it is impossible for God’s action to avert any from their ultimate end in God.

2. Good cannot be the cause of evil, nor God the cause of sin.

3. All the wisdom and goodness of man is derived from the wisdom and goodness of God, being a likeness thereof. But it is repugnant to the wisdom and goodness of man to make any one to sin: therefore much more to divine wisdom and goodness.

4. A fault always arises from some defect of the proximate agent, not from any defect of the prime agent. Thus the fault of limping comes from some defect of the shin-bone, not from the locomotor power, from which power however is whatever perfection of movement appears in the limping. But the proximate agent of human sin is the will. The sinful defect then is from the will of man, not from God, who is the prime agent, of whom however is whatever point of perfect action appears in the act of sin.

Hence it is said: "Say not, He himself hath led me astray: for he hath no use for sinful men: He hath commanded none to do impiously, and he hath not given to any man license to sin" (Ecclus xv, 12, 21): "Let none, when he is tempted, say that he is tempted by God: for God tempteth no man to evil" (James i, 13).

Still there are passages of Scripture, from which it might seem that God is to some men the cause of sin. Thus it is said: "I have hardened the heart of Pharaoh and his servants" (Exod. x, 1): "Blind the heart of this people, and make its ears dull, and close its eyes, lest perchance it see with its eyes, and be converted, and I heal it: Thou hast made us wander from thy ways: Thou hast hardened our heart, that we should not fear thee" (Isai. vi, 10: lxiii, 17): "God delivered them over to a reprobate sense, to do those things which are not seemly" (Rom. i, 28). All these passages are to be understood as meaning that God does not bestow on some the help for avoiding sin which He bestows on others. This help is not merely the infusion of grace, but also an exterior guardianship, whereby the occasions of sin are providentially removed from a man’s path. God also aids man against sin by the natural light of reason, and other natural goods that He bestows on man. When then He withdraws these aids from some, as their conduct deserves that he should, according to the exigency of His justice, He is said to harden them, or to blind them.

164

SINCE it has been shown that by the action of God some are guided to their last end with the aid of grace, while others, bereft of that same aid of grace, fall away from their last end; and at the same time all things that are done by God are from eternity foreseen and ordained by His wisdom, as has also been shown, it needs must be that the aforesaid distinction of men has been from eternity ordained of God. Inasmuch therefore as He has from eternity pre-ordained some to be guided to the last end, He is said to have ‘predestined’ them. Hence the Apostle says: "Who hath predestined us to the adoption of sons, according to the purpose of his will" (Eph. i, 5). But those to whom from eternity He has arranged not to give grace, He is said to have ‘reprobated,’ or ‘hated,’ according to the text: "I have loved Jacob, and hated Esau" (Malach. i, 2). In point of this distinction, inasmuch as some He has reprobated and some He has predestined, we speak of the divine ‘election,’ of which it is said: "He hath elected us in him before the constitution of the world" (Eph. i, 4). Thus it appears that predestination and election and reprobation is a part of divine providence, according as by the said providence men are guided to their last end. And it may be shown that predestination and election do not induce necessity, by the same arguments whereby it was shown that divine providence does not take away contingency from creation (Chap. LXXII).

But that predestination and election have no cause in any human merits may be shown, not only by the fact that the grace of God, an effect of predestination, is not preceded by any merits, but precedes all merit, but also by this further fact, that the divine will and providence is the first cause of all things that are made. Nothing can be cause of the will and providence of God; although of the effects of providence, and of the effects of predestination, one effect may be cause of another. "For who hath first given to him, and recompense shall be made him? For of him and by him and in him are all things: to him be glory forever, Amen" (Rom. xi, 35, 36).

For more, see here.

Published on the feast of St. Katherine Drexel.