Persevering Towards the "P"

This article focuses on theological dialogue between Calvinists and Catholics on doctrines relating to predestination, efficacious grace, and related issues.  If you are not familiar with these issues, I would recommend you read these two articles (here and here) before reading this one.  I am going to be making a lot of assumptions and using specific terminology that you will want some background for before diving into this subject.

In a previous article, I compared Catholic theology with the famous Calvinist TULIP doctrines.  I concluded that, if we take the soundest versions of both theologies, they are actually mostly in agreement.  The one area where there seemed to be an irreconcilable difference in substance was in the P of TULIP - the Perseverance of the Saints.  But even here, there was a lot of agreement.  Here is how I summarized the agreements and the area of disagreement in my previous article:

I think we can distinguish three parts to the Calvinist doctrine of the perseverance of the saints:  1. All those whom God has elected to eternal salvation will certainly persevere to the end and attain eternal salvation.  2. There is a fundamental difference between the elect and the reprobate.  Considering each in terms of the whole course of their existence (as opposed to one isolated moment in their lives), the elect receive a victory over sin that the reprobate never receive.  Whatever repentance and holiness the reprobate attain by God's grace in this life, they are eventually conquered by sin and die in a state of enmity with God, in which they are confirmed forever.  So only the elect are ever the children of God in the fullest sense.  The reprobate may receive some temporary benefits from God's grace, but they are never possessers of the full, eternal aspects of justification, sanctification, or adoption.  3. All those who are brought to faith and repentance in any real sense at any one moment in their lives will certainly be given the gift of final perseverance by God and so will attain to eternal salvation.  In other words, only the elect ever actually come to any real faith and repentance.  The best the reprobate ever attain to is a kind of partial repentance which leaves them in the depths of their heart in a continuing state of rejection of God.

Catholic doctrine agrees with the first two of these three points but rejects the third.  The Catholic Church does not teach that all who are in any real sense regenerated or brought to faith and repentance at any moment in their lives are certainly elect and will be given the gift of final perseverance.  Catholic doctrine allows for the idea that God may give a temporary regeneration, a temporary faith and repentance, to some of the reprobate but withhold from them the gift of final perseverance, granting them a temporary taste of the life of Christ in this world but not the fullness of eternal life in Christ.

I would like to propose a possible reconciliation between Catholics and Calvinists on this point of disagreement.  Calvinists typically grant that there can be a kind of limited and temporary conversion that can happen to the non-elect.  They can come to be attached to God in certain ways and to turn away from some sins.  There can be a limited faith and repentance.  What distinguishes this temporary conversion from real regeneration is that regeneration is more universal.  That is, in real regeneration, the sinner comes to love God above all things.  Of course, he is not completely consistent in this supreme love, for he falls into sins on a regular basis.  But he eventually repents of his sins and moves towards holiness.  His fundamental life choice is for God supremely and all created things are subordinate to God, so that the overall trajectory of his life is towards God and towards holiness.  In temporary "pseudo-regeneration," on the other hand, although the sinner moves towards God in some ways and may turn away from some sins, he never really loves God supremely.  There is always some created thing that is higher in his value system.  So long as his limited obedience to God is consistent with his pursuit of that which he values more highly than God, he may act in a way that is indistinguishable, to outsiders at least, from a truly regenerate person.  But once his highest love comes into conflict with his obedience to God, as it must eventually, he will show his true colors by falling away.  (Think of two cars on the same highway, going the same direction, but having two different ultimate destinations.  You won't be able to tell the difference between their destinations until they have to take different paths to get to their diverse destinations.  But, eventually, they will have to take different paths, and so their different destinations will become apparent.)

So the question is:  Can this Calvinist view be reconciled with the Catholic position which holds that people can be truly in a state of grace temporarily without having the gift of final perseverance and so eventually fall away?

Perhaps a reconciliation can be reached if we think of an individual person in terms of their overall life narrative instead of considering only what they are experiencing at a given moment.  Consider a person who is in what Catholics would call a state of grace but who is not elect (and therefore will not receive the gift of final perseverance).  Does this person love God supremely?  Yes, considering the options they have before them in their current experience of reality.  Looking at the things they are aware of, they want God above all else.  But, if they will not end up persevering, we know that there is something down the line in their future that they will end up loving more than God.  God has not given them efficacious grace to resist all alternatives to God, though he has given them the grace to choose God above all currently experienced alternatives.  On the other hand, the elect person (considered in terms of their whole life narrative) has been granted by God a grace that will prove efficacious universally - that is, it will, eventually, bring them through every temptation so that they will end up choosing God above all things and will arrive at a state of moral perfection (after this life is over) and remain there permanently.

So is the converted, non-elect person ever truly regenerate?  It depends on how you define the concept of "regeneration."  If by "regenerate," we mean that, given all currently-experienced alternatives, the person loves God above all other things, then yes, he is regenerate.  But if we mean that he has been given by God a grace that will prove eventually victorious over all alternatives to God so that he will have the will to choose God above all things absolutely in all conditions that will come to him during the course of his entire life narrative, then no, he is not regenerate.  So if we look at the elect and the non-elect (even the converted non-elect) from a God's-eye point of view, considering their identities as bound up with all that they have been, are, and will be, and all that they have been granted by God from eternity, there is a fundamental and eternal difference between them:  The elect have been given by God a grace that overcomes all obstacles of will and will effectively cause them to love God perseveringly through all temptations, while the non-elect have been given a grace that is more limited and temporary - it will get them through some temptations, but not all, for it will eventually fail.  Therefore, if we define "regenerating grace" as a grace that has the power to effectively bring a person through all obstacles into heaven eventually, the non-elect never have it.  They have a more limited and temporary grace that falls short of overcoming all temptations.

Calvinists recognize that the elect can fall away temporarily (the example of David committing adultery and murder in the Bathsheba affair and continuing unrepentant for a time is often cited in this context).  But they have a grace granted them by God that will always keep coming back to bring them eventually to repentance, and, in the end, it will be victorious over all sin.  This is all part of how Calvinists think about the idea of "regenerating grace."  Here is the Westminster Confession (Chapter 17) on these matters:

I. They, whom God hath accepted in His Beloved, effectually called, and sanctified by His Spirit, can neither totally nor finally fall away from the state of grace, but shall certainly persevere therein to the end, and be eternally saved. . . .

III. Nevertheless, they may, through the temptations of Satan and of the world, the prevalency of corruption remaining in them, and the neglect of the means of their preservation, fall into grievous sins; and, for a time, continue therein: whereby they incur God’s, displeasure, and grieve His Holy Spirit, come to be deprived of some measure of their graces and comforts, have their hearts hardened, and their consciences wounded; hurt and scandalize others, and bring temporal judgments upon themselves.

So even though Catholics typically speak as if non-elect persons can really be in a state of grace, albeit temporarily, perhaps we can say, using Calvinist terminology, that the grace that these people have is not "real regeneration" because, although it turns them towards God and away from all the alternatives to God that they currently have experience and awareness of, it does not give them the strength of will to turn from all alternatives to God that they will eventually encounter and will not give them final perseverance.  Again, Calvinists typically grant that "non-regenerate" people do experience many effects similar to regeneration.  They can truly be turned away from many sins and come to cling to God in a number of ways.  There is certainly a robust concept of "temporary and limited conversion" in Calvinist thinking.

But is all this enough to truly reconcile the two views?  I'm not entirely sure.  I think it will depend on how broadly Calvinists want to construe the possible effects of "temporary, non-regenerate conversion."  If the elect can have periods of time where they are not pursuing God as their supreme end and yet, during that very time, they are still considered to possess efficacious grace and be regenerate, perhaps the non-elect could be imagined to have periods of time where they are pursuing God as their supreme end (at least considering all currently-experienced alternatives), and yet, during that time, they are not regenerate because they do not possess grace which would preserve them in that state through all future temptations.  If Calvinists could grant something like that, I think we might be able to bridge the gap between Calvinists and Catholics on this point.  However, if Calvinists want to say instead that the non-elect never love God supremely at any given moment of time even considering all currently-experienced alternatives - that is, if the non-elect are always in a state of loving some currently-experienced created reality above God - then I don't think a full reconciliation can be reached.  Honestly, I'm not entirely sure at this moment which scenario is actually the case.  This would be a great point for further dialogue between Calvinists and Catholics.  (I should note, however, that even if full reconciliation on this particular point could be reached, there would still, I think, be a substantial difference in terms of the doctrine of assurance - for Calvinists seem clearly to want to say that elect persons, as such, in principle at least if not always in practice, have the ability to know if they are elect, while the Catholic Church has made it plain that certain knowledge of one's election cannot ordinarily be had in this life.  But, even here, perhaps further dialogue will reveal more possibilities than I can currently imagine.)

Published on the feast of St. Mary Magdalene.

The Relationality of the Classical Theistic God

 This is a selection from my book, Why Christianity is True (pp. 83-86):

The Relationality of the Classical Theistic God

We have seen that the God of classical theism is dimensionless and non-temporal. This brings up some natural and important questions. How can such a God relate to the space-time universe and the beings in it? If he is outside of time and space, how can he relate to beings who are in time and space? And how could he be the creator of the space-time universe, if he himself is dimensionless? Earlier I said that consciousness must go back to the First Cause, because you can’t get consciousness from non-consciousness. You can’t start from one thing and then get something so totally different that the product can’t be explained by the ingredients and the relationships between the ingredients. Well, the same issue can be raised here. If God is dimensionless, non-spatial and non-temporal, how can he be the source of a dimensional universe? Wouldn’t that be an example of having a product that is not explained by the ingredients and their relationships?

All the western, monotheistic religions are committed both to the idea of a classical concept of God--God is dimensionless, etc.--and to the idea that God is the source of the space-time universe and can relate personally with that universe. So if these two ideas are in conflict, that would be fatal for all of these religions (and for any form of classical theism, as all forms of it require God to be the source of the universe, even if he doesn‘t interact with it any further). The Bible, for example, teaches a classical theistic concept of God. It teaches that God is the source of the entire space-time universe and that he owns it and everything in it (Genesis 1-2; Romans 11:36; Psalm 24:1-2; Psalm 95:3-7; Psalm 100:3; John 1:1-3; Hebrews 11:3). Therefore, all things exist for him, to exhibit his glory and to do his will, and the destiny of all things will fulfill the will of God and glorify God (Romans 11:36; 1 Corinthians 15:24-28; Philippians 2:5-11; Colossians 3:17; Colossians 1:15-18; Romans 12:1-2; 1 Corinthians 10:31; Isaiah 43:5-7; Revelation 20:11-22:17). He is the only God, the highest being and the highest authority in the universe, and our ultimate purpose is therefore to obey him, to love him with all our hearts, and to worship him alone (Isaiah 42:5, 8; 43:8-13; 44:6-8; 45:20-25; 46:5-10; Exodus 20:1-7; Deuteronomy 6:4-5; 1 Corinthians 8:4-6; 1 John 3:4; James 2:8-13). God is all-powerful, does whatever he pleases, and ordains everything that happens in the world and in history (Amos 3:3-6; Isaiah 45:6-7; Amos 9:7; Lamentations 3:37-38; Job 42:2; Daniel 4:34-35; Psalms 115:3; Proverbs 16:33; Proverbs 19:21; Proverbs 21:1; Psalm 105:17, 25; Isaiah 46:8-10; Genesis 30:1-2; Ephesians 1:3-14; Genesis 45:5-8; 50:20; Job 1-2; Acts 4:27-28; John 9:1-5; Exodus 4:11; Matthew 10:29; Romans 11:30-36; Romans 8:28-30; Romans 9-11; Exodus 4:21-23; 10:1-3; 1 Timothy 1:11). God knows all things, including the entire future (Psalm 11:4-5; 14:2-3; 33:13-15; Hebrews 4:12-13; Isaiah 46:8-10; Genesis 15:5, 12-16; 25:23; Exodus 7:2-5; Daniel 7-12; John 13:21-30, 38; Genesis 40:8; 1 Samuel 23:9; Genesis 37:5-11; 49:1; Deuteronomy 31:14-29; 30:1-10). All of these things (and I could go on for quite a while longer adding to our list) show that the Bible is committed to and teaches classical theism. Although the Bible does not speak in the philosophical language that we have been using (because the Bible was written to many different kinds of people in many different cultures at many different times, not just to philosophers or to people trying to lay out a rationally articulated proof of the existence of God), its teachings clearly point to a classical theistic concept of God once they are “transposed,” so to speak, into a philosophical key and their necessary philosophical implications are spelled out. The same thing could be said for the Qur’an as well, which is the claimed revelation of Islam.

The Bible (as well as the Qur’an) is also committed to claims about God that might seem, at first glance, to be incompatible with classical theism. The Bible depicts God as being the creator of the space-time universe. But how could God, who is dimensionless, outside of space and time, create a dimensional universe? The Bible depicts God as acting in time and space, and entering into relationships and interacting with people in time and space. But how could God, being outside of time and space, act and interact in time and space?

The answer lies in realizing that God sees reality very differently from the way we do. God is all-knowing, outside of space and time, all-powerful, etc. We are clearly not. The universe is obviously going to look different to God than it does to us, just as the world no doubt looks different to us than it does to, say, a lizard. A lizard has far less intelligence than a human being. The intelligence that it does have is very different from ours, as well as its instincts, desires, etc. This is going to have a profound impact on how the world looks to a lizard as compared to how it looks to us. And the difference between God and humans is infinitely greater than the relationship between humans and lizards. God, being dimensionless, is going to see reality as a single, indivisible whole. We, being dimensional as well as limited in our point of view, are going to see the universe as divided up into parts spread out through space and time. We are in one place at one time, and so the universe appears to us as a large system spreading out away from us in space and in time, with everything getting smaller (at least in space) the farther away it gets, until it finally vanishes from our sight--until we try to explore further. But no matter how much we explore, there will always be more universe out there for us to discover. But God, being outside of space and time, and therefore equally present in all places and at all times (omnipresent and omnitemporal), will not see the universe in that way. This vast difference in the way we and God see things is what creates the impression that our two realities are incompatible.

However, they are not incompatible. We just have to recognize that the language that we use at any given time will reflect one of the two points of view--God’s or man’s. What would be said one way in reference to God’s point of view would be said in a different way in reference to man’s point of view. (41)  I like to think of the analogy of a prism. I look at my prism, and I see that white light goes into the prism, but a rainbow of colored light comes out. How can the colored light that comes out be the same as the white light that went in? Well, the prism has caused the different wavelengths of light to be divided up, so that what started out as single and unified white light ends up divided up into an array of different colors. When you try to describe the light, therefore, you must keep in mind which side of the prism you are on. Think of the universe as it looks from God’s omniscient point of view as represented by the white light. The prism itself represents the transition from God’s point of view to our limited, dimensional point of view. And the rainbow of colored light represents the universe as it looks from our human point of view.

Now, let’s take this analogy and apply it to our understanding of God’s relationship to our space-time universe and the beings within it. The Bible says that about twenty-five hundred years ago (or so), God parted the waters of the Red Sea so that Moses and the Israelites could pass through on dry ground. Then, about fifteen hundred (or so) years later, God sent an angel to release the Apostle Peter from prison. These are two events attributed to God in the Bible. (Of course, every event is ultimately attributed to God in the Bible in some sense, as we saw a little earlier, but miraculous events, being special acts of God outside of the normal course of things, make good examples for our present purpose.) God performed these two acts at two different times. Does that imply that God must be in time? Not at all. From God’s point of view, all of reality appears as an indivisible whole, for all reality is immediately present to God’s omniscient view. So if we were talking about these events from God’s point of view, we would not describe them in the same sort of temporal language. I don’t know exactly how we would describe them, because I am much further from being able to see things from God’s point of view than I am from a lizard’s point of view! But the Bible, if it is the Word of God (which we have yet to establish, but let us assume that it is hypothetically for now for the sake of thinking through this issue), is a communication to human beings that is meant to be understandable to them, and therefore describes events in their space-time universe from the point of view from which the description would make sense--namely, from a human point of view. Both the human point of view and the divine point of view are correct--neither of them is in error--but they are different, just like the lizard‘s and the human‘s points of view. Therefore, the Bible is accurate in describing these events in human-point-of-view-language. In fact, it is more accurate in a sense, because being accurate involves communicating clearly and understandably to the ones to whom you are speaking. So, when we are contemplating God acting at various points in time (and the same things apply to God acting in different places in space as well), we should not think that we are seeing things just as God would see them, but we are looking at them “through the prism,” so to speak, translated into the forms that the universe takes from our limited, dimensional point of view.

Let’s look at another example. We’ll use another event in the life of Moses. When God called Moses to lead the people of Israel out of Egypt, at the burning bush, Moses reacted at first by coming up with excuses for why he wasn’t the right person for the job. In response, Exodus 4:14 says that “the anger of the LORD was kindled against Moses.” Now, this may seem strange, considering that we are talking about a non-dimensional, omniscient, omnipotent (all-powerful) Being. This passage shows God involved in a personal relationship in time and in space with a particular person, and even getting angry with that person. How could this be possible?

There is only conflict here if we make the unwarranted assumption that God’s relationship to Moses--to his particular behavior, at this particular time, in this particular place--is all that there is to God. God sees all reality in its totality in one, undivided view. This does not mean that he is missing a part of reality. How could seeing all of reality in one view imply that one is missing something? It would be exactly the opposite of missing something, as far away from it as it is possible to get! God’s seeing all reality in one view does not mean that he does not see particular places or particular times and cannot relate to those places and times. True, he does not seem them the same way that we do, for he does not see them all divided up as we do, but he does see them and relate to them. Some people seem to have the idea that we have to choose between knowing a portion of space or time and knowing the whole, just as we can either be close to the forest and see the individual pine trees and pine needles but not see the whole forest, or we can be far away (say, flying above in an airplane) and see the whole forest but not the individual trees (or at least not the pine needles). But being omniscient means that God would see all of reality in one complete picture, without missing anything.  So God could know and relate to Moses’s time and place in Exodus 4, while still being omnipresent and omnitemporal and seeing all reality as a whole. Think of the prism analogy again. Saying that God’s involvement with Moses in space and time contradicts his transcending space and time would be like saying that the blue light that comes out of my prism contradicts the white light that went into it. It is the same light, but one view of it sees it as a united whole, while the other view of it sees it as divided up into a rainbow of colors. To say that God’s relationship with Moses at that place and at that time was a part of God’s total experience (abstracted from the whole, as we humans see things) does not preclude that there is more to God’s experience than simply that part.

But what about God getting angry with Moses? Is this not incompatible with a classical concept of God? If God is dimensionless and the source of all reality, then how could he dislike any portion of reality? Wouldn’t that be to dislike himself, since all things have come from him and are based on him? And since he is a dimensionless being, to have any dislike of himself would imply a total dislike of himself, since he does not come in parts. But if God disliked himself, he would be at odds with himself, which would imply that he is divided into parts and not dimensionless. He would have to have an idea of how he would wish himself to be and to love that image, while hating what he really is, which would clearly imply division in God‘s mind. So surely God could not dislike himself, and so must be unmitigatedly happy with everything, all things considered as a whole. Ah, but there’s the key phrase--all things considered as a whole. Yes, God would have to be unmitigatedly satisfied with all things as a whole, but that does not imply that he must be satisfied with all the parts of reality abstracted from the whole, as we humans see things. It is possible to be fully satisfied with something as a whole, while being displeased with some individual parts considered in themselves apart from the whole. Consider J. K. Rowling and her famous Harry Potter books. Voldemort is a bad guy in the books. Does J. K. Rowling like Voldemort? Does she find him, in himself, pleasing? I doubt it! But does that imply that she is dissatisfied with her books because Voldemort is in them? No, of course not. Voldemort is displeasing in himself, but he contributes to the overall good of the books as a whole. To use another example, a symphony might have discordant notes in it that are not in themselves pleasing or beautiful, but which in the context of the entire piece contribute to the whole, making it better than it would be without them. So it is no contradiction to say that God found Moses’s behavior in Exodus 4 displeasing, in itself considered, while recognizing that in the context of the whole, it is not displeasing, but contributes to an overall good product which is totally satisfying to God. So why did the Bible describe God’s reaction to Moses as being one of anger, rather than unmitigated happiness? It is appropriate for God to express his emotional experience in “pieces,” so to speak, because we experience life in “pieces.” If we want to know how God feels about some particular event or thing in our experience as we experience it, abstracted from its place in the overall tapestry of reality, a communication of God’s overall emotional life would hardly be helpful. For God to have represented himself as unmitigatedly happy when Moses was making excuses would have been to misrepresent his attitude toward Moses’s behavior. In itself, that behavior was displeasing to him, and that is what needed to be expressed at the time, however true it might have been that Moses’s displeasing behavior was infinitely overbalanced by good in the overall scheme of things (as the Bible teaches elsewhere).

There is one more thing we need to address in this section: the issue of creation. How could a dimensionless, temporal God have created the space-time universe? Isn’t creation, by necessity, a temporal act? To create something, doesn’t that imply that there is a before, a during, and an after? If I create a cake, that implies that there was a time before the cake was made, a time when the cake was being made, and a time after the cake was made. It is a temporal process, one that would be impossible for a being that is outside of time and is thus incapable of acting temporally.

Well, of course the concept of creation by humans will always involve an inherent temporal component, because we are temporal beings. But the concept of creation itself need not necessarily be conceived temporally. The core concept at the root of the idea of “creation” is “dependence.” The reason we say that “I made the cake” is because the cake came from me. The cake exists because of me, because of something I did. I was the cause of why the cake came to be. If the cake started out not being there, and then came into being while I watched and did nothing and had no part in it, then we would not say that I made the cake. When we say that I made the cake, we are saying that the existence of the cake is dependent on me and on my actions.

Similarly, to say that the universe is created by God is to say that it is derived ultimately from God, and derived willingly--not by unconscious instinct or accident. If God is fully conscious and omniscient, and if he is indivisible, then all that he does he does with all that he is--with full knowledge and will (“will” here being defined as a “desire which brings about a certain state of affairs”). God is the creator of the universe, because the universe exists because of God and his will. Even if the relationship between God and the creation is non-temporal (from God’s point of view), this doesn’t make the term “creation” any less valid as a way of expressing the fact that the universe exists because of God. From God’s point of view, his relationship with the universe is part of one unchanging, indivisible whole, but from our point of view--on our side of the prism--the creation is a temporal event that took place in the past, and God is still bringing new moments of time into existence in the present and presumably will on into the future as well. (Classical theists usually speak of God’s having created the world in the past, while superintending it and ordaining all events by his providence throughout subsequent history.) So there is no conflict between saying that God is dimensionless and non-temporal and saying that he is the creator of the space-time universe.

41  You can get a sense of this when you read novels, or stories, attempting to portray the world we live in from a different point of view than the typical, adult human point of view--such as stories told from an animal’s point of view, or a child’s point of view.  (Of course, many of the stories told from an animal’s point of view often distort the effect by humanizing the animals, like in Finding Nemo or Bambi.)  But the distance between our point of view and God’s, as I’ve mentioned, would be infinitely greater than any of these other distances, for obvious reasons.

Published on the feast of St. Henry II.

St. Thomas Aquinas on Predestination

St. Thomas Aquinas discussed his view of predestination in a number of places, including his famous Summa Theologica and his Summa Contra Gentiles.  Below, I have selected some key portions from both of these works which lay out St. Thomas's views on this subject.  The section on predestination from the Summa Theologica can be found here.  My selections from the Summa Contra Gentiles can be found here (#159-163 - though this source uses a different translation from the one in my text below).  My texts below come from public domain versions of both works, such as can be found here and here.

First, from the Summa Theologica:

It is fitting that God should predestine men. For all things are subject to His providence, as was shown above (I:22:2). Now it belongs to providence to direct things towards their end, as was also said (I:22:1 and I:22:2). The end towards which created things are directed by God is twofold; one which exceeds all proportion and faculty of created nature; and this end is life eternal, that consists in seeing God which is above the nature of every creature, as shown above (I:12:4). The other end, however, is proportionate to created nature, to which end created being can attain according to the power of its nature. Now if a thing cannot attain to something by the power of its nature, it must be directed thereto by another; thus, an arrow is directed by the archer towards a mark. Hence, properly speaking, a rational creature, capable of eternal life, is led towards it, directed, as it were, by God. The reason of that direction pre-exists in God; as in Him is the type of the order of all things towards an end, which we proved above to be providence. Now the type in the mind of the doer of something to be done, is a kind of pre-existence in him of the thing to be done. Hence the type of the aforesaid direction of a rational creature towards the end of life eternal is called predestination. For to destine, is to direct or send. Thus it is clear that predestination, as regards its objects, is a part of providence.  (I:23:1)

God does reprobate some. For it was said above (Article 1) that predestination is a part of providence. To providence, however, it belongs to permit certain defects in those things which are subject to providence, as was said above (I:22:2). Thus, as men are ordained to eternal life through the providence of God, it likewise is part of that providence to permit some to fall away from that end; this is called reprobation. Thus, as predestination is a part of providence, in regard to those ordained to eternal salvation, so reprobation is a part of providence in regard to those who turn aside from that end. Hence reprobation implies not only foreknowledge, but also something more, as does providence, as was said above (I:22:1). Therefore, as predestination includes the will to confer grace and glory; so also reprobation includes the will to permit a person to fall into sin, and to impose the punishment of damnation on account of that sin. (I:23:3)

Since predestination includes will, as was said above (Article 4), the reason of predestination must be sought for in the same way as was the reason of the will of God. Now it was shown above (I:19:5), that we cannot assign any cause of the divine will on the part of the act of willing; but a reason can be found on the part of the things willed; inasmuch as God wills one thing on account of something else. Wherefore nobody has been so insane as to say that merit is the cause of divine predestination as regards the act of the predestinator. But this is the question, whether, as regards the effect, predestination has any cause; or what comes to the same thing, whether God pre-ordained that He would give the effect of predestination to anyone on account of any merits.

Accordingly there were some who held that the effect of predestination was pre-ordained for some on account of pre-existing merits in a former life. This was the opinion of Origen, who thought that the souls of men were created in the beginning, and according to the diversity of their works different states were assigned to them in this world when united with the body. The Apostle, however, rebuts this opinion where he says (Romans 9:11-12): "For when they were not yet born, nor had done any good or evil . . . not of works, but of Him that calleth, it was said of her: The elder shall serve the younger."

Others said that pre-existing merits in this life are the reason and cause of the effect of predestination. For the Pelagians taught that the beginning of doing well came from us; and the consummation from God: so that it came about that the effect of predestination was granted to one, and not to another, because the one made a beginning by preparing, whereas the other did not. But against this we have the saying of the Apostle (2 Corinthians 3:5), that "we are not sufficient to think anything of ourselves as of ourselves." Now no principle of action can be imagined previous to the act of thinking. Wherefore it cannot be said that anything begun in us can be the reason of the effect of predestination.

And so others said that merits following the effect of predestination are the reason of predestination; giving us to understand that God gives grace to a person, and pre-ordains that He will give it, because He knows beforehand that He will make good use of that grace, as if a king were to give a horse to a soldier because he knows he will make good use of it. But these seem to have drawn a distinction between that which flows from grace, and that which flows from free will, as if the same thing cannot come from both. It is, however, manifest that what is of grace is the effect of predestination; and this cannot be considered as the reason of predestination, since it is contained in the notion of predestination. Therefore, if anything else in us be the reason of predestination, it will outside the effect of predestination. Now there is no distinction between what flows from free will, and what is of predestination; as there is not distinction between what flows from a secondary cause and from a first cause. For the providence of God produces effects through the operation of secondary causes, as was above shown (I:22:3. Wherefore, that which flows from free-will is also of predestination. We must say, therefore, that the effect of predestination may be considered in a twofold light—in one way, in particular; and thus there is no reason why one effect of predestination should not be the reason or cause of another; a subsequent effect being the reason of a previous effect, as its final cause; and the previous effect being the reason of the subsequent as its meritorious cause, which is reduced to the disposition of the matter. Thus we might say that God pre-ordained to give glory on account of merit, and that He pre-ordained to give grace to merit glory. In another way, the effect of predestination may be considered in general. Thus, it is impossible that the whole of the effect of predestination in general should have any cause as coming from us; because whatsoever is in man disposing him towards salvation, is all included under the effect of predestination; even the preparation for grace. For neither does this happen otherwise than by divine help, according to the prophet Jeremias (Lamentations 5:21): "convert us, O Lord, to Thee, and we shall be converted." Yet predestination has in this way, in regard to its effect, the goodness of God for its reason; towards which the whole effect of predestination is directed as to an end; and from which it proceeds, as from its first moving principle. (I:23:5)

The reason for the predestination of some, and reprobation of others, must be sought for in the goodness of God. Thus He is said to have made all things through His goodness, so that the divine goodness might be represented in things. Now it is necessary that God's goodness, which in itself is one and undivided, should be manifested in many ways in His creation; because creatures in themselves cannot attain to the simplicity of God. Thus it is that for the completion of the universe there are required different grades of being; some of which hold a high and some a low place in the universe. That this multiformity of grades may be preserved in things, God allows some evils, lest many good things should never happen, as was said above (I:22:2). Let us then consider the whole of the human race, as we consider the whole universe. God wills to manifest His goodness in men; in respect to those whom He predestines, by means of His mercy, as sparing them; and in respect of others, whom he reprobates, by means of His justice, in punishing them. This is the reason why God elects some and rejects others. To this the Apostle refers, saying (Romans 9:22-23): "What if God, willing to show His wrath [that is, the vengeance of His justice], and to make His power known, endured [that is, permitted] with much patience vessels of wrath, fitted for destruction; that He might show the riches of His glory on the vessels of mercy, which He hath prepared unto glory" and (2 Timothy 2:20): "But in a great house there are not only vessels of gold and silver; but also of wood and of earth; and some, indeed, unto honor, but some unto dishonor." Yet why He chooses some for glory, and reprobates others, has no reason, except the divine will. Whence Augustine says (Tract. xxvi. in Joan.): "Why He draws one, and another He draws not, seek not to judge, if thou dost not wish to err." Thus too, in the things of nature, a reason can be assigned, since primary matter is altogether uniform, why one part of it was fashioned by God from the beginning under the form of fire, another under the form of earth, that there might be a diversity of species in things of nature. Yet why this particular part of matter is under this particular form, and that under another, depends upon the simple will of God; as from the simple will of the artificer it depends that this stone is in part of the wall, and that in another; although the plan requires that some stones should be in this place, and some in that place. Neither on this account can there be said to be injustice in God, if He prepares unequal lots for not unequal things. This would be altogether contrary to the notion of justice, if the effect of predestination were granted as a debt, and not gratuitously. In things which are given gratuitously, a person can give more or less, just as he pleases (provided he deprives nobody of his due), without any infringement of justice. This is what the master of the house said: "Take what is thine, and go thy way. Is it not lawful for me to do what I will?" (Matthew 20:14-15). (I:23:5)

Second, from the Summa Contra Gentiles (Book III, #160-164):

160

SINCE no one can be set on the way to his last end without the aid of divine grace, or without it have the necessary means of reaching that end, as are faith, hope, love and perseverance, some might think that man is not to blame for being destitute of these gifts, especially seeing that he cannot merit the assistance of divine grace, nor be converted to God unless God convert him: for none is responsible for that which depends on another. But allow this, and many absurdities follow. It follows that the man who has neither faith nor hope nor love of God, nor perseverance in good, still does not deserve punishment: whereas it is expressly said: "He that believeth not the Son shall not see life, but the wrath of God abideth on him" (John iii, 36). And since none reaches the end of happiness without the aforesaid endowments, it would follow further that there are some who neither attain to happiness nor yet suffer punishment of God: the contrary whereof is shown from what will be said to all present at the judgement of God: "Come . . . . possess ye the kingdom prepared for you, or, Depart . . . . into everlasting fire" (Matt. xxv, 34-41).

To solve this doubt, we must observe that though one can neither merit divine grace beforehand, nor acquire it by movement of his free will, still he can hinder himself from receiving it: for it is said of some: "They have said unto God, ‘Depart from us, we will not have the knowledge of thy ways’" (Job xxi, 14). And since it is in the power of free will to hinder the reception of divine grace or not to hinder it, not undeservedly may it be reckoned a man’s own fault, if he puts an obstacle in the way of the reception of grace. For God on His part is ready to give grace to all men: "He wills all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth" (1 Tim. ii, 4). But they alone are deprived of grace, who in themselves raise an obstacle to grace. So when the sun lights up the world, any evil that comes to a man who shuts his eyes is counted his own fault, although he could not see unless the sunlight first came in upon him.

161

WHEN it is said that it is in the power of free will to avoid putting obstacles to grace, that saying is to be understood of those in whom the natural faculty is unimpaired by sin. But if the will has fallen into evil courses by some previous inordinate act, it will not be altogether in its power to avoid putting obstacles in the way of grace. For though for some momentary occasion it may abstain from some particular act of sin by its own power, nevertheless, if left long to itself, it will fall into sin; and by sin an obstacle is put to grace. For when the mind of man turns aside from the state of righteousness, it clearly puts itself out of relation with its due end. Thus what ought to be the prime object of its affections, as being its last end, comes to be less loved than that other object to which it has inordinately turned, making of it another last end. Whatever in such a posture of the mind occurs to fit in with the inordinate end, however inconsistent with the due end, will be chosen, unless the will be brought back to due order, so as to prefer the due end to all others, and that is an effect of grace. But the choice of anything inconsistent with the last end puts an obstacle in the way of grace, as grace goes to turn one in the direction of the end. Hence after sin a man cannot abstain from all further sin before by grace he is brought back to due order.

Moreover, when the mind is inclined to a thing, it is no longer impartial between two alternatives. And that to which the mind is more inclined it chooses, unless by a rational discussion, not unattended with trouble, it is withdrawn from taking that side: hence sudden emergencies afford the best sign of the inward bent of the mind. But it is impossible for the mind of man to be so continually watchful as rationally to discuss whatever it ought to do or not to do. Consequently the mind will at times choose that to which it is inclined by the present inclination: so, if the inclination be to sin, it will not stand long clear of sin, thereby putting an obstacle in the way of grace, unless it be brought back to the state of righteousness.

Further we must consider the assaults of passion, the allurements of sense, the endless occasions of evil-doing, the ready incitements of sin, sure to prevail, unless the will be withheld from them by a firm adherence to the last end, which is the work of grace.

Hence appears the folly of the Pelagian view, that a man in sin can go on avoiding further sins without grace. On the contrary the Lord bids us pray: "Lead us not into temptation, but deliver us from evil."

But though persons in sin cannot of their own power help putting obstacles in the way of grace, unless they be forestalled by some aid of grace, still this lack of power is imputable to them for a fault, because it is left behind in them by a fault going before; as a drunken man is not excused from murder, committed in drunkenness, when he gets drunk by fault of his own. Besides, though this person in sin has it not in his unaided power altogether to avoid sin, still he has power here and now to avoid this or that sin: hence whatever he commits, he voluntarily commits, and the fault is imputed to him not undeservedly.

162

THOUGH the sinner raises an obstacle to grace, and by the exigence of the order of things ought not to receive grace, nevertheless, inasmuch as God can work setting aside the connatural order of things, as when He gives sight to the blind, or raises the dead, He sometimes out of the abundance of His goodness forestalls by the assistance of His grace even those who raise an obstacle to it, turning them away from evil and converting them to good. And as He does not give sight to all the blind, nor heal all the sick, that in those whom He heals the work of His power may appear, and in the others the order of nature may be observed, so He does not forestall by His aid all who hinder grace, to their turning away from evil and conversion to good, but some He so forestalls, wishing in them His mercy to appear, while in others He would have the order of justice made manifest. Hence the Apostle says: "God, though willing to show his wrath, and to make his power known, endured with much longsuffering vessels of wrath, fitted for destruction, that he might show forth the riches of his glory upon the vessels of mercy, which he hath prepared unto glory" (Rom. ix, 22, 23).

But when, of men who are enthralled in the same sins, God forestalls and converts some, and endures, or permits, others to go their way according to the order of things, we should not enquire the reason why He converts these and not those: for that depends on His sheer will, just as from His sheer will it proceeded that, when all things were made out of nothing, some things were made in a position of greater advantage than others (digniora). Hence again the apostle says: "Hath not the potter power over the clay, to make of the same lump one vessel unto honour and another unto dishonour?" (Rom. ix, 21.)

Hereby is refuted the error of Origen, who said that the reason why some were converted to God, and not others, was to be sought in divers works that their souls had done before they were united with their bodies, a theory already set aside (B. II, Chapp. XLIV, LXXXIII).

163

THOUGH there are some sinners whom God does not convert to Himself, but leaves them in their sins according to their deserts, still He does not induce them to sin.

1. Men sin by deviating from God their last end. But as every agent acts to its own proper and befitting end, it is impossible for God’s action to avert any from their ultimate end in God.

2. Good cannot be the cause of evil, nor God the cause of sin.

3. All the wisdom and goodness of man is derived from the wisdom and goodness of God, being a likeness thereof. But it is repugnant to the wisdom and goodness of man to make any one to sin: therefore much more to divine wisdom and goodness.

4. A fault always arises from some defect of the proximate agent, not from any defect of the prime agent. Thus the fault of limping comes from some defect of the shin-bone, not from the locomotor power, from which power however is whatever perfection of movement appears in the limping. But the proximate agent of human sin is the will. The sinful defect then is from the will of man, not from God, who is the prime agent, of whom however is whatever point of perfect action appears in the act of sin.

Hence it is said: "Say not, He himself hath led me astray: for he hath no use for sinful men: He hath commanded none to do impiously, and he hath not given to any man license to sin" (Ecclus xv, 12, 21): "Let none, when he is tempted, say that he is tempted by God: for God tempteth no man to evil" (James i, 13).

Still there are passages of Scripture, from which it might seem that God is to some men the cause of sin. Thus it is said: "I have hardened the heart of Pharaoh and his servants" (Exod. x, 1): "Blind the heart of this people, and make its ears dull, and close its eyes, lest perchance it see with its eyes, and be converted, and I heal it: Thou hast made us wander from thy ways: Thou hast hardened our heart, that we should not fear thee" (Isai. vi, 10: lxiii, 17): "God delivered them over to a reprobate sense, to do those things which are not seemly" (Rom. i, 28). All these passages are to be understood as meaning that God does not bestow on some the help for avoiding sin which He bestows on others. This help is not merely the infusion of grace, but also an exterior guardianship, whereby the occasions of sin are providentially removed from a man’s path. God also aids man against sin by the natural light of reason, and other natural goods that He bestows on man. When then He withdraws these aids from some, as their conduct deserves that he should, according to the exigency of His justice, He is said to harden them, or to blind them.

164

SINCE it has been shown that by the action of God some are guided to their last end with the aid of grace, while others, bereft of that same aid of grace, fall away from their last end; and at the same time all things that are done by God are from eternity foreseen and ordained by His wisdom, as has also been shown, it needs must be that the aforesaid distinction of men has been from eternity ordained of God. Inasmuch therefore as He has from eternity pre-ordained some to be guided to the last end, He is said to have ‘predestined’ them. Hence the Apostle says: "Who hath predestined us to the adoption of sons, according to the purpose of his will" (Eph. i, 5). But those to whom from eternity He has arranged not to give grace, He is said to have ‘reprobated,’ or ‘hated,’ according to the text: "I have loved Jacob, and hated Esau" (Malach. i, 2). In point of this distinction, inasmuch as some He has reprobated and some He has predestined, we speak of the divine ‘election,’ of which it is said: "He hath elected us in him before the constitution of the world" (Eph. i, 4). Thus it appears that predestination and election and reprobation is a part of divine providence, according as by the said providence men are guided to their last end. And it may be shown that predestination and election do not induce necessity, by the same arguments whereby it was shown that divine providence does not take away contingency from creation (Chap. LXXII).

But that predestination and election have no cause in any human merits may be shown, not only by the fact that the grace of God, an effect of predestination, is not preceded by any merits, but precedes all merit, but also by this further fact, that the divine will and providence is the first cause of all things that are made. Nothing can be cause of the will and providence of God; although of the effects of providence, and of the effects of predestination, one effect may be cause of another. "For who hath first given to him, and recompense shall be made him? For of him and by him and in him are all things: to him be glory forever, Amen" (Rom. xi, 35, 36).

For more, see here.

Published on the feast of St. Katherine Drexel.

Against First-Causal Libertarian Free Will

Catholics have always defended the existence of true free will in human beings against any who would deny it.  But whenever one is attacking any error in defense of a truth, one is always prone to falling into the opposite error, the error on the other side.  Occasionally some Catholics talk about free will in such a way as to give the impression that they have fallen a bit into an error I am calling First-Causal Libertarian Free Will (let's call it the FCL view of free will for short).

The idea of "libertarian" free will is often defined as the idea that a free choice is one where the chooser is truly able to make a choice other than the one he in fact ends up making.  So, for example, I choose to eat a salad for dinner rather than a hamburger, but I could have chosen to eat the hamburger.  The ability to choose otherwise must always be in my power, or I do not have true free will.

So far so good.  But this libertarian formulation has the potential to be interpreted in different ways.  The correct and harmless way to interpret it is that it is recognizing that a true choice is the settling of a preference between multiple options.  I have a rational mind that can deliberate on my options and then make a decision based on that deliberation.  In choosing option A, I have the faculty of mind and will to have chosen option B as well.  I was not determined to go with option A by any kind of force or influence that would have obliterated or circumvented the deliberation and decision-making of my mind and will, so that my act of going with A rather than B was truly a product of my use of those faculties.  This idea is not only harmless and consistent with truth and with orthodox Catholic faith, it is essential to a true understanding of free will and to orthodox Catholic faith.  To deny this idea would be heretical, because it would contradict the essential nature of human personhood, moral responsibility, etc.

But sometimes people take libertarianism a step further and posit a kind of absolute independence in the choice of the will.  In reality, a free choice is part of a nexus of causes and explanations that are subject to the providence of God and to the characteristics of human psychology.  Going back to my salad and hamburger example, if we ask why I chose the salad, there are sufficient explanations to be had.  I chose the salad because, all things considered, I wanted it more than I wanted the hamburger.  When I was deliberating on my options, I weighed all the factors involved and how they related to my desires.  Those desires were the product of all sorts of causal influences, including my genetics, my upbringing, my previous experiences (both remote and recent), all the myriad specific circumstances of my present situation, etc.  I found after weighing all of this that, overall, I preferred the salad.  That act of concluding my deliberations and settling on a preference we call "making a choice."  So, according to human psychology, there is going to be a kind of causal connection (in a broad sense) between the state of my desires and what I choose.  If you knew absolutely everything about me and my thoughts and desires at the moment of my choice, you could predict with 100% accuracy what I would choose.  And thus my choices are also included in the nexus of divine providence.  For it was God who brought everything into existence and thus set the parameters of all that would be and would happen.  In creating the world, he couldn't but create a history for that world down to its smallest detail, for he knew 100% all the effects of everything he chose to do.  This is why historic Catholic thought has never had a problem holding both free will and divine foreknowledge and predestination.

The FCL position, however, holds that for a choice to be free, it must be absolutely undetermined in any way by any causal influences of any sort.  This position takes the idea of "ability to choose otherwise" and blows it up to something much grander metaphysically than the more modest libertarianism.  In addition to saying, rightly, that, in order to make a free choice, I must have faculties of mind and will capable of deliberating and choosing between options, the FCL view says there must be an absolute metaphysical possibility of any choice being made regardless of any causal influences acting on the one making the choice.  In this view, my choices are viewed as truly random events, not the product of my mind settling on preferences rooted in my desires.  Regardless of what I most want overall, it must be possible for it to happen that I might choose something different.  So if, upon deliberation, I decide that, overall, I prefer the salad to the hamburger, it has to be that it might actually happen that I might totally randomly, for no reason, decide to choose the hamburger instead.  (I say that choice would be "for no reason" because any psychological reason for the choice would amount to something in my desires influencing my overall preference.)  Critics of this view have rightly pointed out that, while on the surface sounding grand ("Not only can I choose what I want, I can even choose what I don't want!  Look how free I am!"), this idea actually obliterates the very nature of free choice and makes "choosing" something that happens to one without one's will.  It's more like getting struck by lightning, from a psychological point of view.  If you try to picture it, it leads to absurd sorts of scenarios like this one:

I am at a party, and I have a choice between eating chocolate ice cream and eating rice pudding.  I happen to utterly detest rice pudding, but I love chocolate ice cream.  There is absolutely no reason why I should choose anything other than the chocolate ice cream, let's suppose.  There are no bad consequences for choosing what I most prefer.  As one who holds the FCL view, I know that since I am free, it must be possible that I should choose against my strongest motives and strongest preferences, and that my choices are ultimately not determined by or inseparably tied to my preferences.  I begin to get nervous, hoping that I won't choose against my preferences this time and get stuck with eating rice pudding.  It has been known to happen.  I warily and quickly approach the dessert table, reaching for the chocolate ice cream.  But then, right before I can get my hand around the serving spoon, it happens!  My FCL free will kicks in and I find myself, to my dismay, choosing the rice pudding!  "Aarrgh," I think to myself, "I hate it when this happens.  I would really love to be eating the chocolate ice cream, but my accursed FCL freedom is once again going against my strongest and deepest preferences!"  So I spend the next ten minutes freely eating my rice pudding while staring longingly at the ice cream.

FCL, while trying to defend free will, thus ends up destroying it.

This doctrine of free will is also incompatible with the sovereign providence of God over the creation--which is a part of Catholic dogma.  If my free choices are truly random--not the product of anything logically preceding them at all--then we have being in the world that is not ultimately traceable to God, contrary to God being the First Cause of all reality.  And since the choices are random, God can't control them, and he can't even know about them apart from actually seeing them happen.  This is why the most logical proponents of this view often end up denying not only God's sovereign providence but also God's complete foreknowledge of the future.  History is the result of a mix of what God has decreed in his providence on the one hand and what random chance has added to the mix on the other.  There are really two gods operating in this view--God and Random Chance.  The very foundations of monotheism are destroyed.

So this view makes nonsense out of human psychology, destroys the very nature of free choice it is supposed to be protecting, and obliterates classical monotheism itself.  It is obviously imperative, then, that Catholics avoid this view just as much as they avoid the opposite error of denying free will.  Sometimes, though, I hear Catholics saying things that make me think that this view might be influencing their thinking to some degree--though, usually, it is more of a vague, unconscious, confused influence which hasn't really been thought through much at all.  Oftentimes these kinds of statements come out in connection with trying to explain why bad things happen in the world.  For example:

"God chose to create a world of free creatures.  But there was a price.  Once you create free creatures, you can't control what they do.  You can't guarantee they will choose what you would like them to choose.  You have relinquished some control over what happens.  That's why sin exists in the world.  God would like it if there was no sin, but, without overriding and destroying free will, there's nothing he can do about it.  He can't make a person choose good or evil.  He can invite, he can encourage, but he can't guarantee what they will choose.  He has to take what he gets."

This is seriously problematic, because it seems to be denying the absolute sovereignty of God over all creation--as if, in creating free creatures, God has given up control over the outcome of events, so that how things turn out is not in accordance with his overall providential plan.  But, as I've pointed out, this is contrary to Catholic doctrine and even to monotheism itself.  Also, in taking the will, and the choice of good or evil, out of the control of God, this statement undermines the idea of salvation by grace.  It is Catholic dogma that, when we choose what is good, and particularly when we choose God as our Supreme Good and thus move ourselves into a right relationship with him, this good choice is both our choice and is also a product of God's grace.  The good will itself is a gift of God.  But in the view of this statement, God can't give us a good will.  All he can do is try to encourage us to make good choices, but he can't actually cause us to do so.  He just has to sit back and watch to see if we will make a good choice or a bad choice.  He cannot exercise any kind of causal power there.  But this makes any good choices we make ours in an exclusive sense, excluding those choices also being gifts of God.  Sure, the ability to choose is still a gift of God (though how God can give the ability to someone to produce uncaused, random events is a serious question), but not the good choice itself, contrary to Catholic teaching.

Now, there is certainly truth in the statement.  It is true that, in making us free, God has given us space to choose.  He respects our freedom and doesn't override it or destroy it.  He does not use coercion upon us or cause us to choose in any way that would invalidate or circumvent our minds and wills.  He does not cause my good choices in the same way he causes water to fall from the sky in rain.  In the latter case, the causation is physical and involuntary.  In the case of my good choices, the causation is of a sort suitable to the nature of the will.  It moves and influences me to choose in a persuasionary sort of way, not in a mechanistic sort of way.  We can understand this difference even from looking at how we humans influence things.  I use one kind of causality when I'm moving a rock from one place to another.  I use a very different kind of causality when I persuade a friend to watch a movie with me.  Usually the latter sort of causality is less than 100% guaranteed, but that is only because I do not have full control of all the factors of influence.  If I knew everything about my friend, and not only that but I was also the ultimate determiner of all the influences that affected his desires (as God is for us), I could have 100% certainty of effectively persuading him to watch the movie without any violation of or circumvention of his free will.  So the essential difference between these two kinds of causality does not, in principle, lie in how guaranteed their effectiveness is, but in the nature and kind of the causation itself.  (With regard to bad choices, Catholic doctrine says that God does not actively bring these about as he does with good choices, but rather he allows them to occur.  That is, knowing that if he sets things up in certain ways, we will make certain bad choices, he chooses to allow that to happen in some cases based on the sovereign, overall purposes of his providence.)  So our statement above is right in pointing out that God does not coerce, or violate, or circumvent our freedom which he himself has given to us.  And it also rightly points out that our freedom is what makes evil possible.  There could be no creaturely good or evil without creaturely free will, for free will is what makes moral acts and moral responsibility possible.  But the statement is wrong in then concluding from this that God has no guaranteed influence over our choices.  (Of course, recognizing that God is still in control over his creation does bring to the forefront the question of why sin and evil--and their consequences--exist in the world.  For more on this, see here and here.)

So, in conclusion, while Catholics should be zealous in defending free will, they should avoid the FCL definition of free will as contrary to the truth and to Catholic faith.

For more, see here and here.

Published on the feast of the First Martyrs of the Holy Roman Church.

Philosophical Thoughts on Free Will, Foreknowledge, and Predestination

This article follows up on my article outlining Catholic teaching on free will, grace, and predestination.

The Nature of Free Will

There are two areas of philosophical confusion which, in my observation, tend to make it difficult for people to understand Catholic teaching regarding issues surrounding free will, grace, and predestination.  The first area of confusion has to do with the idea of free will itself.  There is a tendency sometimes for people to focus so much on the freedom of the will that they forget that the will is not completely unpredictable and uncontrollable.  They cannot see how the idea of free will is compatible with the idea that God knows the future and even plans the future.  In Catholic theology, the entire future unfolds, down to its last detail, exactly according to God's foreknowledge and plan (the plan of "predestination").  If that is so, many wonder, how in the world can we really have free will?  For (it would seem) if God infallibly knows everything I am going to do in the future and even has planned everything I am going to do in the future in some way, then it is impossible for anything to happen differently than God knows and has planned, and so I can't make any different choices than the ones God knows and has planned for me to make.  So I would seem to have no free will at all.  So how can Catholic theology hold together free will, foreknowledge, and predestination?

At least part of the answer is that while, of course, coercion, force, certain psychological conditions, etc., can override or circumvent the will and so limit or remove its freedom, there are ways in which the will can be moved and directed which don't override or destroy freedom.  It can be helpful here to distinguish between "necessity" and "certainty."  As with many words adapted to abstract, philosophical use, people don't always use these words in the same way, so we don't want to be so rigid in our use of these words that we can't recognize differences of meaning in how we and others use them and so end up getting into meaningless, semantic fights.  Nevertheless, in some philosophical/theological circles, these words have been used in a way that can be helpful at capturing an important distinction.  We can think of the will being moved "necessarily" or "with certainty but not necessarily."  For the will to be moved necessarily is for the will really to be obliterated by having its options removed, so that the person willing can really only do one thing and it is impossible for him to do otherwise.  For example, say you want me to eat a cucumber.  It so happens that I hate cucumbers, so it is not going to be easy to get me to eat one.  You might attempt to get me to eat a cucumber by forcing me to eat one necessarily, removing my options and so circumventing my will.  You could tie me down and force the cucumber down my throat.  Or you could use a supercomputer to take over my brain and force my body to eat the cucumber.  Etc.

On the other hand, it is possible to move the will with certainty but without necessity, without removing legitimate options and thus circumventing and destroying the act of free choice.  Going back to the cucumber example, you might get me to certainly, yet freely, eat the cucumber by using persuasion, which involves appealing to my motives so that I freely alter my choice.  You might offer me $1,000 to eat the cucumber.  If you did that, I would certainly eat it (all other things being equal).  I would still hate the taste of the cucumber, but my distaste for cucumber would lose the battle with my desire to win $1,000.  If I really hated cucumbers and wouldn't do it even for $1,000, you could offer me $1,000,000, if you happened to have that kind of money on hand (and were that bizarrely obsessed with getting me to eat a cucumber for some reason).  In a case like this, you have performed an action that caused me to do something you wanted me to do, and made it certain I would do it, but without any overwhelming or circumventing of my will.

This can happen because acts of will, while free in some ways, are not arbitrary or groundless.  This is evident both from the law of causality as well as from a simple psychological examination of how the will actually works.  The law of causality does not allow that something can come from nothing.  If an effect occurs, it must have a cause sufficient to explain the effect.  The only alternative to this would be to have something coming from nothing.  But "nothing" is nothing and so does nothing.  It has no reality, and so cannot originate anything or exert any energy or activity to cause anything to happen.  It cannot be the explanation for why anything happens.  So if anything happens, if anything in reality undergoes change, some cause must have effected that change.  If there is anything in the universe that cannot explain itself, it must be explained by something outside of itself and not by "nothing."

And with regard to the psychology of willing, consider for yourself how you make choices.  When I examine the activity of my own will, I see this basic pattern:  1. I am aware of various states of affairs that could come about or be brought about.  I call these my "options."  2. My mind begins to examine its own desires.  What do I like?  What do I dislike?  What do I want to happen?  What do I not want to happen?  3. As this process continues, I recognize that, among the things I have some desire for, there are things I want more than other things.  In other words, I find that I have "preferences."  I prefer some states of affairs to other states of affairs.  Out of the complexity of my views, ideas, and desires, my mind attempts to sort out what I truly prefer to have come about or to bring about, all things considered, in that moment.  4. Finally, I am successful at determining my true preference in the current situation, and I settle on that preference.  This act of my mind settling on a preference is what I call the act of "choice."  5. Then, if what I have chosen is to perform some action, my body (or my mind) responds to the act of choice by performing the action (or at least attempts to do so).

Is this not how the action of choosing goes for all of us?  We can see, then, by looking at it, that the act of choice is not arbitrary or outside a nexus of causation.  My choice flows from my preference.  My preference is what I most desire or value in that moment.  (And I would add that, when I am thinking of "desire" here, I don't mean mere non-rational instinct, but what my rational mind values.)  And what I desire is a product of many, many things--my personality, my beliefs and values, all the circumstances that exist around me and inside of me at the time of my choice, the earlier circumstances that led to those circumstances, all my previous experiences, the entire previous history of my life, my DNA, the choices of my parents, the choices of their parents, the entire history of the universe, etc.  At the moment of my choice, I choose what I prefer, and the desires, values, beliefs, ideas, etc., that determine what I prefer do not spring out of nowhere.  They are what they are because of prior causes.  This is why you can cause with certainty, but without will-circumventing necessity, that I will choose to eat that cucumber.  This is why, if you happened to know everything about me and all the circumstances affecting my choice at any given moment, you could always predict with 100% accuracy what I would choose.  This is why, if you happened to have control of all the causal factors in the entire universe, you could ensure that I would always choose what you wanted me to choose.

Now consider God's relationship to the creation.  God is the First Cause, the Source of all reality.  There is no being in the universe that does not derive from him.  There are no chains of causes in the universe which do not ultimately trace back to his action.  And God is also omniscient, or all-knowing.  There is nothing in all of reality which he does not know thoroughly.  If that is the case, then it cannot be otherwise than that the history of creation will unfold according to God's perfect foreknowledge and plan.  When God created the universe, he knew exactly what he was creating, and he created exactly what he wanted.  And he knew everything that would result from that creation down through the entire chain of universal history from beginning to end.  He knew all the free choices that all creatures would make.  He knew all the free choices he himself would make as he would continue to interact with creation as its history continued to unfold, for he knew himself and his own preferential tendencies perfectly as well.  So God could not have created the universe without, at the same time, perfectly knowing and planning its entire history, down to the smallest detail.  As the Catechism of the Catholic Church puts it (#308), "[t]he truth that God is at work in all the actions of his creatures is inseparable from faith in God the Creator."

And none of this is in any way inconsistent with free will, for God's foreknowledge and predestination, understood in this way, do not at all overwhelm, obliterate, or circumvent anyone's free choices.  Just as you did not obliterate my free will when you offered me money to eat the cucumber, neither does God obliterate free will when he creates a universe and ordains a history in which he knows I will choose all the things I will choose in my life.  (See here--and particularly time index 17:00-20:53--for a helpful discussion of this same issue by Bishop Robert Barron.)

The Problem of Evil

All of this leads us to the second major problem a lot of people have with Catholic teaching in this area.  Even if I can see how God's foreknowledge and predestination are consistent with the freedom of my choices, yet if all of this is so, why does God's plan involve so much evil?  Why did he choose to create a world in which so much sin and suffering happen?  Why not create one where everyone makes only right choices and is always happy?  When we think of the will as outside of God's control, this can provide a kind of smokescreen, to an extent, against this second objection.  Why all the sin and suffering?  Well, God can't really do anything about it, because he can't control free will.  (Of course, this gets God off the hook from responsibility for evil only by removing his sovereignty as God, but people often don't press these sorts of things to their logical conclusions.)  But if God can control free will, if it is not outside the effects of his plan and foreknowledge, then how could God justifiably create a world in which all this sin and suffering happen?

I won't attempt to give a complete answer to this question here, because I have already dealt with it in a separate article to which I will refer you.  Sometimes this objection is expressed in terms of feeling like God is somehow still violating my freedom by exercising such absolute control over the history of my life.  I think this thought partly stems from a failure to fully recognize how different God's relationship with us is from our relationship with other creatures.  If you were to somehow gain absolute control over my life such that my entire life history became subject to your knowledge and plans, I would complain that you had violated my "free space," for no creature from outside of myself should have that kind of control over me, and you could only have gotten that kind of control by somehow conquering me from without and subjugating me illicitly.  But I make a mistake if I then transfer that feeling to my relationship with God.  God is my Creator.  His control over my life does not result from any kind of illicit conquest or manipulation or invasion of my "space."  His control arises from the fundamental fact of who he is and who I am.  The one who creates my fundamental essence and my entire world cannot but be the source of all that I am and cannot fail to exercise a kind of ownership and control over my life and my world that no mere creature could ever have.  It is his prerogative, and no one else's, to know fully and to determine the course of the universe's history and my history.  To complain about God's plan governing my life is like complaining against my mother for giving birth to me.  "If my next-door neighbor tried to give birth to me, I should be very upset!  So how I can tolerate you having given birth to me, Mom?"  Well, by the very nature of our relationship, my mother has a kind of role in bringing me into existence that my next-door neighbor can never have (unless, of course, my next-door neighbor happens to be my mother).  My mother's unique role is not a usurpation, but a natural and fully appropriate relationship.  And so is God's unique role in my life as my Creator and the one whose plan governs my life history.  

I talked above about how God's complete knowledge of and control over the factors that determine my choices make it so that I will choose precisely and only what God wants me to choose.  But does that mean that God wants me to choose to sin?  If a person should choose to commit a mortal sin, rejecting fundamentally a right relationship with God, and end up in hell as a result of this, was it God's will for this to happen?  The answer is: yes and no.  God hates sin and suffering.  He does not take delight in either of these things.  But he sees that the overall good of the universe, that which brings about the greatest overall goodness and happiness, is best achieved by allowing certain evils to occur.  So his design for the history of the universe was not set simply on stopping me from committing any sin or experiencing any suffering.  He saw that the best way to set up the universe was to ordain a set of circumstances such that it would come about that I would, at times, commit sin and experience suffering.  He did not produce sin in me (for sin is a negative thing, like darkness, rather than a positive being, like light), but he set up the world such that he knew the result would be that I would sin and that suffering would come to me--not because he delighted in the idea of my sin and suffering, but because he knew that allowing these things would bring about a greater good.  And this extends to all the sin and suffering in the universe, even to mortal sin and hell.  So God did not want me to sin, per se, but he wanted to create a universe in which I would be freely permitted by him to sin because he knew that this universe would be the one suited to accomplish his perfect purposes.

A Brief Note on Various Philosophical and Theological Schools of Thought

How does what I've said above relate to different philosophical schools of thought regarding the nature of free will?  There are two positions, broadly speaking, which are typically discussed--libertarianism and compatibilism.  I often find that there are ambiguities in terms of how these positions are defined that make it difficult to identify with either of the labels.  For example, sometimes the libertarian view of free will is defined as the idea that "it is possible to choose otherwise at the moment of a choice," and compatibilism is defined as the idea that "the will is free if, at the moment of choice, a choice is made according to one's own mind and will, voluntarily, even if it is impossible to choose otherwise because the will is determined by the strongest desires of the person."  But the phrase "able to choose otherwise" is ambiguous.  Are we talking about the ability of my mind to actually make choices between various options--that is, my ability to use my rational mind to settle on preferences?  Or does "able to choose otherwise" imply the idea that there is no certainty in choosing--that, at any given moment of choice, there is an absolute possibility that various choices might happen such that there can be no knowledge in principle about what choice will actually be made until the choice is actually made?  "Ability to choose otherwise" in the former sense is an idea that makes perfect sense and is an essential component of what it means to make an act of will.  "Ability to choose otherwise" in the latter sense is logically absurd (because it implies that totally uncaused events happen for no reason, thus denying the law of causality) and, far from being an essential component of the idea of a free act of the will, it is completely incompatible with how willing actually takes place.  It turns an act of will, which is really the act of a rational mind settling on a preference, and turns it into something fundamentally different--a totally random event which is independent of everything that comes before it (and therefore, absurdly, independent even of the person making the choice and any act of that person) but which produces actions and events in the world.

If we define "ability to choose otherwise" in the former, rational sense, then I could identify my position as libertarian.  But if we define "ability to choose otherwise" in the latter, absurd sense, then I would be inclined to say I am a compatibilist.  The libertarian view, taken in the absurd sense, is incompatible with Catholic faith, because it implies a fundamental incompatibility between the Catholic doctrine of free will and the Catholic doctrines of divine foreknowledge and predestination (not to mention that by obliterating the law of causality it destroys the very rational fabric of reality itself).

What about the various Catholic schools of thought pertaining to free will, grace, and predestination--in particular, Bañezian Thomism and Molinism?  I think that my account of free will above is consistent with any of the accepted Catholic schools of thought.  It doesn't take sides in the details of the disputes between these schools.  For more on my views regarding the Bañezian-Molinist dispute, and in particular how I understand Molinism, see here, here, and here.  All the historic, approved Catholic schools of thought agree on the fundamental theological points of Catholic doctrine regarding free will, grace, and predestination.  Here is how Catholic philosopher Alfred J. Freddoso describes the traditional Catholic teaching on free will and predestination and how both Bañezian Thomism and Molinism agree on this teaching:

According to the traditional doctrine of divine providence, God freely and knowingly plans, orders and provides for all the effects that constitute the created universe with its entire history, and he executes his chosen plan by playing an active causal role that ensures its exact realization. Since God is the perfect craftsman, not even trivial details escape his providential decrees. Whatever occurs is specifically decreed by God; more precisely, each effect produced in the created universe is either specifically and knowingly intended by him or, in concession to creaturely defectiveness, specifically and knowingly permitted by him. Divine providence thus has both a cognitive and a volitional aspect. By his pre-volitional knowledge God infallibly knows which effects would result, directly or indirectly, from any causal contribution he might choose to make to the created sphere. By his free will God chooses one from among the infinity of total sequences of created effects that are within his power to bring about and, concomitantly, wills to make a causal contribution that he knows with certainty will result in his chosen plan's being effected down to the last detail. 

This much is accepted by both Molina and the Bañezians. They further agree that it is because he is perfectly provident that God has comprehensive foreknowledge of what will occur in the created world. That is, God's speculative post-volitional knowledge of the created world -- his so-called free knowledge or knowledge of vision -- derives wholly from his pre-volitional knowledge and his knowledge of what he himself has willed to do. Unlike human knowers, God need not be acted upon by outside causes in order for his cognitive potentialities to be fully actualized; he does not have to, as it were, look outside himself in order to find out what his creative act has wrought. Rather, he knows 'in himself' what will happen precisely because he knows just what causal role he has freely chosen to play within the created order and because he knows just what will result given this causal contribution. In short, no contingent truth grasped by the knowledge of vision can be true prior to God's specifically intending or permitting it to be true or to his specifically willing to make the appropriate causal contribution toward its truth.

For more, see my problem of evil article, and my predestination article this article follows up on.  To see arguments relative to the deeper, most fundamental philosophical issues involved in all of this, see my case for the existence of God and the truth of Christianity in general here and here.

Published on the feast of St. Raymond of Peñafort.

Was Arminius Really an Arminian (in the Bad Sense)?

About three years ago, I had a change of view regarding Molinism.  Before that time, I had had an inaccurate picture of what Molinism is which led me to believe it was incompatible with Scripture, reason, Augustinian views of predestination and grace, and the doctrines of the Catholic Church.  I describe my change of mind and the reason for it here.  I had encountered forms of Molinism or ways of describing Molinism which were indeed contrary to the Catholic faith, and I had assumed that these forms of or ways of describing Molinism provided an accurate picture of the views of Molina himself and his earlier disciples at the time when the views of the Molinists were being investigated by the Catholic Church (this was the famous De Auxiliis controversy, which you can read about here.)  Through further research, I discovered that the less palatable idea of Molinism I had in my head was not the view of Molina himself or the earlier Molinists (and presumably not the view of many present-day Molinists either).  The original Molinism turned out to be a viewpoint that was defensible from the perspective of historic Augustinian, Catholic teaching, not contrary to it.

After I had discovered this, it did not take long for the thought to enter my mind that perhaps something similar would turn out to be the case with regard to the theology of Arminianism, which was a movement condemned by the Calvinistic Reformed churches in the seventeenth century and which has, since that time, been typically seen by Calvinists as one of their greatest arch-enemies.  I determined that I needed to go back and read Jacob (or James) Arminius himself.  So finally, last summer, I got around to doing that.  The works of Arminius are available online here and here.  From my research thus far, it seems that my suspicions were correct.  The theology of Arminius himself appears to be much less terrible than the "Arminianism" Calvinists seem typically to have in mind and that I have had in my own mind.

Now, I am not saying that this more heretical form of Arminianism doesn't actually exist.  I know it does.  I've read a number of authors advocating it.  One of the most prominent as well as dramatic examples of this kind of theology in the modern day, at least in Evangelical circles, is the Open Theist movement, which I'll mention again just below.  But what my reading of Arminius seems to be telling me is that this more heretical Arminianism doesn't represent the views of Arminius himself.  So far as I can tell, his views on predestination, free will, and grace seem to be quite Augustinian.  It seems to me that he was unjustly condemned with regard to these points by the Reformed churches.  (It should be noted that I am not here discussing all of Arminius's views on every subject, but only his views on matters related to predestination, free will, and grace, the matters that are most often discussed in Calvinist-Arminian arguments.)

The more evil version of Arminianism holds that God cannot accomplish all his will for the universe.  He is limited by certain laws of reality that even he cannot violate, even though these laws lead to a situation where he cannot produce a universe that matches his ideal.  He wants to create truly free creatures, but to be "truly free", in this view, the creature must have a kind of free will in which a person's choice has no sufficient reason for its existence beyond itself.  So if Sarah chooses to accept the gospel and be saved, while Suzie chooses to reject the gospel and ends up damned, there is no ultimate explanation for either choice beyond itself.  Neither choice is planned by God.  God has to watch Sarah and Suzie to see what they will do, and then he can work around their choices to try to make things work out as well as he can manage.  God would prefer everyone to be saved, but if he gives creatures free will, he can't guarantee this, because he can't control what people will choose.  If Sarah chooses to go right, this choice has no explanation beyond itself.  If Suzie chooses to go wrong, likewise.  So, in this view, there is an ultimate element of chance in the universe.  There are events with literally no prior cause or explanation.

Obviously, this viewpoint violates the doctrine of the sovereignty of God, for it portrays God as having to deal with a universe beyond his fundamental control, a universe where he can't accomplish his ideal desires and where events occur without any prior causes or explanations.  Also, in this view, conversion to the good cannot be a product or a gift of grace, for the choice to go right can have no explanation beyond itself.  The difference between Sarah and Suzie, in terms of their choices, is something coming entirely from themselves and from chance and not from God.  So righteousness cannot, in this view, be a gift of grace.  This Arminian view is contrary to Catholic doctrine, and to all the approved schools of Catholic thought on the subject of predestination, grace, and free will--Dominicanism, Molinism, Augustinianism, etc.  Molinism, for example, holds that God has what they call middle knowledge, meaning knowledge of what people will choose to do in particular circumstances.  But this Arminian view precludes such knowledge, for, since each choice has no explanation beyond itself, it cannot be determined by any previous circumstances.  Sarah could be placed in a particular set of circumstances, and yet she might still choose right or wrong.  God cannot know from the particular circumstances what she will do, as this is ultimately a matter of chance.  The only way he can know what she will do is to watch what she actually does when she actually makes her choice.  The most logical of these Arminians (such as the Open Theists) deny that God has any foreknowledge of the future, for they rightly recognize that if God knows my future, my future choices must now be certain  But if they happen ultimately by chance, they cannot be certain until they've actually occurred.  Catholic theologians recognize that God knows all things through the knowledge of his own essence, for he knows all that he will do and all that he will permit.  But in this Arminian view, God only knows the future by looking outside of himself to see what will happen ultimately by chance.

So the Calvinists are quite right to consider this Arminian viewpoint a great evil.  Taken to its logical conclusion, it entails the destruction of Christianity and of theism, and even of reason itself.  But, from my reading of Arminius thus far, it seems that he did not hold this viewpoint.  His form of Arminianism seems rather to have been very much akin to the Molinist view within Catholicism, which maintains the sovereignty of God and salvation by grace.  This probably explains to a great degree why the Calvinists condemned him, for they have traditionally been unable to understand what Molinism is all about and have typically misunderstood it as indistinguishable from something like the evil Arminianism I just described.  The Dominicans in the Catholic Church have typically had the same problem understanding Molinism.  I myself had this erroneous view of Molinism until I looked at it more closely, as I describe here.  As I mentioned, this clarification regarding Molinism is what led me to want to look at Arminius more closely.

Arminius's Views

Arminius articulates his views several places in the corpus of his writings.  In The Works of Arminius, Volume I, Declaration of the Sentiments of Arminius on Predestination, on the Providence of God, on the Free Will of Man, and on the Grace of God, he gives a fairly systematic account of his views.  The Works of Arminius, Volume I, can be found here.  I have taken all of my text of Arminius below, throughout the rest of this article, from the plain text version of this document found on the website of the Christian Classics Ethereal Library.

I. The first absolute decree of God concerning the salvation of sinful man, is that by which he decreed to appoint his Son, Jesus Christ, for a Mediator, Redeemer, saviour, Priest and King, who might destroy sin by his own death, might by his obedience obtain the salvation which had been lost, and might communicate it by his own virtue. 

II. The second precise and absolute decree of God, is that in which he decreed to receive into favour those who repent and believe, and, in Christ, for his sake and through Him, to effect the salvation of such penitents and believers as persevered to the end; but to leave in sin, and under wrath, all impenitent persons and unbelievers, and to damn them as aliens from Christ. 

III. The third Divine decree is that by which God decreed to administer in a sufficient and efficacious manner the means which were necessary for repentance and faith; and to have such administration instituted (1.) according to the Divine Wisdom, by which God knows what is proper and becoming both to his mercy and his severity, and (2.) according to Divine Justice, by which He is prepared to adopt whatever his wisdom may prescribe and put it in execution. 

IV. To these succeeds the fourth decree, by which God decreed to save and damn certain particular persons. This decree has its foundation in the foreknowledge of God, by which he knew from all eternity those individuals who would, through his preventing grace, believe, and, through his subsequent grace would persevere, according to the before described administration of those means which are suitable and proper for conversion and faith; and, by which foreknowledge, he likewise knew those who would not believe and persevere.  (On Predestination, p. 170)

The context of Arminius's outline here is the discussions in Reformed circles regarding the order of the divine decrees.  Previous to this outline in this same work, Arminius had outlined the views of other Reformed theologians and explained what he found problematic about them.  What he is especially concerned about is that God's decrees be so described as to make logical sense and to be consistent with all of what God has revealed.  For example, he is very critical of the supralapsarian Reformed view.  That view says that God's decree to bring some to heaven and condemn some to hell preceded his decree to give efficacious grace to convert his elect, his decree to send Christ as Savior, his decree to permit the Fall of man, and even his decree to create human beings.  Arminius saw this as immensely problematic, because it pictures God condemning people to hell without any idea in his mind of the sinfulness of these people, their rejection of the gospel, or even their existence.  But, Arminius notes, God only condemns real, existing, fallen sinners who reject him to hell.  If God condemned people to hell without any regard to sin, he would act unjustly.  Likewise, if God ordained some people to heaven without any regard to whether or not they would choose what is right and accept the gospel, or even without any regard to the redemption of Christ, he would contradict his Word which links salvation to the redemption of Christ and to the conversion, faith, and repentance of people.  So Arminius lays out the order of the divine decrees in a way which he thinks makes sense and which is consistent with all the teaching of the Word of God.  First, God decrees the creation of people.  Then, he decrees to permit the Fall.  (Arminius doesn't mention these two in his outline above, but he mentions them elsewhere.)  Then, he decrees to send Christ as Savior.  Then, he decrees to save all believers.  Then, he decrees to give out sufficient and efficacious graces according to his divine wisdom.  Then, he decrees to save those particular persons who will choose to believe through the working of the sufficient and efficacious grace of God, and he decrees to damn those particular persons who will choose to reject the gospel, which choice will be permitted by God to occur.

Opponents of Arminius have misunderstood him as if he taught that a person's choice to believe is a chance event, not brought about by God's grace, which God has to look outside of himself to learn about, and then he chooses those who just happen to choose what is right.  But this is not at all what Arminius taught.  He attributes all things, good and evil, to the providence of God, and nothing to chance.  He attributes all evil choices to the free will of creatures, permitted by the providence of God.  He attributes all good choices to the sufficient and efficacious grace of God.  As with Catholic theology, Arminius holds that God makes available sufficient grace to all, which renders them culpable if they reject the gospel, but he moves some to salvation efficaciously.

I consider Divine Providence to be "that solicitous, continued, and universally present inspection and oversight of God, according to which he exercises a general care over the whole world, but evinces a particular concern for all his [intelligent] creatures without any exception, with the design of preserving and governing them in their own essence, qualities, actions, and passions, in a manner that is at once worthy of himself and suitable to them, to the praise of his name and the salvation of believers. In this definition of Divine Providence, I by no means deprive it of any particle of those properties which agree with it or belong to it; but I declare that it preserves, regulates, governs and directs all things and that nothing in the world happens fortuitously or by chance. Beside this, I place in subjection to Divine Providence both the free-will and even the actions of a rational creature, so that nothing can be done without the will of God, not even any of those things which are done in opposition to it; only we must observe a distinction between good actions and evil ones, by saying, that "God both wills and performs good acts," but that "He only freely permits those which are evil." Still farther than this, I very readily grant, that even all actions whatever, concerning evil, that can possibly be devised or invented, may be attributed to Divine Providence Employing solely one caution, "not to conclude from this concession that God is the cause of sin." This I have testified with sufficient clearness, in a certain disputation concerning the Righteousness and Efficacy of Divine Providence concerning things that are evil, which was discussed at Leyden on two different occasions, as a divinity-act, at which I presided. In that disputation, I endeavoured to ascribe to God whatever actions concerning sin I could possibly conclude from the scriptures to belong to him; and I proceeded to such a length in my attempt, that some persons thought proper on that account to charge me with having made God the author of sin. The same serious allegation has likewise been often produced against me, from the pulpit, in the city of Amsterdam, on account of those very theses; but with what show of justice such a charge was made, may be evident to any one, from the contents of my written answer to those Thirty-one Articles formerly mentioned, which have been falsely imputed to me, and of which this was one.  (On the Providence of God, p. 173) 

This is my opinion concerning the free-will of man: In his primitive condition as he came out of the hands of his creator, man was endowed with such a portion of knowledge, holiness and power, as enabled him to understand, esteem, consider, will, and to perform the true good, according to the commandment delivered to him. Yet none of these acts could he do, except through the assistance of Divine Grace. But in his lapsed and sinful state, man is not capable, of and by himself, either to think, to will, or to do that which is really good; but it is necessary for him to be regenerated and renewed in his intellect, affections or will, and in all his powers, by God in Christ through the Holy Spirit, that he may be qualified rightly to understand, esteem, consider, will, and perform whatever is truly good. When he is made a partaker of this regeneration or renovation, I consider that, since he is delivered from sin, he is capable of thinking, willing and doing that which is good, but yet not without the continued aids of Divine Grace.  (One the Free Will of Man, p. 174) 

In reference to Divine Grace, I believe, 1. It is a gratuitous affection by which God is kindly affected towards a miserable sinner, and according to which he, in the first place, gives his Son, "that whosoever believes in him might have eternal life," and, afterward, he justifies him in Christ Jesus and for his sake, and adopts him into the right of sons, unto salvation. 2. It is an infusion (both into the human understanding and into the will and affections,) of all those gifts of the Holy Spirit which appertain to the regeneration and renewing of man--such as faith, hope, charity, &c.; for, without these gracious gifts, man is not sufficient to think, will, or do any thing that is good. 3. It is that perpetual assistance and continued aid of the Holy Spirit, according to which He acts upon and excites to good the man who has been already renewed, by infusing into him salutary cogitations, and by inspiring him with good desires, that he may thus actually will whatever is good; and according to which God may then will and work together with man, that man may perform whatever he wills. 

In this manner, I ascribe to grace the commencement, the continuance and the consummation of all good, and to such an extent do I carry its influence, that a man, though already regenerate, can neither conceive, will, nor do any good at all, nor resist any evil temptation, without this preventing and exciting, this following and co-operating grace. From this statement it will clearly appear, that I by no means do injustice to grace, by attributing, as it is reported of me, too much to man's free-will. For the whole controversy reduces itself to the solution of this question, "is the grace of God a certain irresistible force?" That is, the controversy does not relate to those actions or operations which may be ascribed to grace, (for I acknowledge and inculcate as many of these actions or operations as any man ever did,) but it relates solely to the mode of operation, whether it be irresistible or not. With respect to which, I believe, according to the scriptures, that many persons resist the Holy Spirit and reject the grace that is offered.  (On the Grace of God, p. 175)

Calvinists may jump on Arminius with regard to that last point, his denial of the irresistibility of grace.  "Aha!  You see?  He denied that grace is irresistible!  That shows that he doesn't really attribute conversion to God's grace.  For if man can resist grace, then grace is not sufficient to bring a person to faith.  It requires, in addition, an independent cooperation of the free will of man, a cooperation which is not itself the product of grace."

But this completely misunderstands Arminius.  The confusion here is caused by the fact that Calvinists typically don't distinguish between irresistible and efficacious grace.  They tend to use "irresistible" to mean "efficacious," and so they think that if someone denies irresistible grace they must be denying efficacious grace.  But this is a point of terminology peculiar to the Calvinists, and one which every other theological school of thought tends to find baffling.  Other schools of thought tend to make a distinction between irresistible and efficacious grace.  By irresistible grace, they mean grace acting in such a way as to remove any option from the will to say yes or no.  It would be a force which overpowers human willing, so that no real choice can be made.  They therefore deny that grace is irresistible.  But many non-Calvinist schools of thought acknowledge efficacious grace, by which they mean grace applied in such a way as to infallibly move the will to consent.  Fr. John Hardon, a well-respected twentieth-century Catholic theologian, describes efficacious grace in this way:

By a truly efficacious grace is meant one that will be (is) infallibly followed by the act to which it tends, e.g. contrition. If you receive such a grace, even before your will consents to it, that grace is infallibly “sure of success;” it will infallibly procure your consent, produce that act – of contrition. But although it infallibly procures your consent, it does not necessitate you to consent: it leaves you free to dissent. Your will will infallibly say "yes" to it, but it is free to say “no.”  (Fr. John Hardon, Course on Grace, Part IIB, chapter 15 [Inter Mirifica, 1998], retrieved here from the website of the Real Presence Eucharistic Education and Adoration Association)

You see the distinction between efficacious and irresistible grace?  Arminius denies irresistible grace, but he affirms the efficaciousness of grace.

Here are some other quotations scattered throughout the corpus of his writings in which Arminius addresses this matter:

Concerning the expression, "By this grace they may believe, if they will." These words, when delivered in such a crude and undigested form, are capable of being brought to bear a very bad interpretation, and a meaning not at all agreeable to the scriptures, as though, after that power had been bestowed, the Holy Spirit and Divine Grace remain entirely quiescent, waiting to see whether the man will properly use the power which he has received, and will believe the gospel. When, on the contrary, he who wishes to entertain and to utter correct sentiments on this subject, will account it necessary to ascribe to Grace its own province, which, indeed, is the principal one, in persuading the human will that it may be inclined to yield assent to those truths which are preached.  (The Apology Or Defense Of James Arminius, Article VIII, p. 215) 

It is not only a rash saying, but a false and an ignorant one, "that a thing which, in regard to second causes, is done contingently is said to be done necessarily in regard to the divine decree." For the divine decree itself, being an internal action of God, is not immediately the cause of the thing; but, whatever effects it may produce, it performs them by power, according to the mode of which a thing will be said to be either necessarily or contingently. For if God resolve to use an irresistible power in the execution of his decree, or if he determine to employ such a quantum of power as nothing can resist or can hinder it from completing his purpose, it will follow that the thing will necessarily be brought into existence. Thus, "wicked men who persevere in their sins, will necessarily perish," for God will by an irresistible force, cast them down into the depths of hell. But if he resolve to use a force that is not irresistible, but that can be resisted by the creature, then that thing is said to be done, not necessarily but contingently, although its actual occurrence was certainly foreknown by God, according to the infinity of his understanding, by which he knows all results whatever, that will arise from certain causes which are laid down, and whether those causes produce a thing necessarily or contingently. From whence the school-men say that "all things are done by a necessity of infallibility," which phrase is used in a determinate sense, although the words in which its enunciation is expressed are ill-chosen. For infallibility is not an affection of a being, which exists from causes; but it is an affection of a Mind that sees or that foresees what will be the effect of certain causes. But I readily endure a catachrestic metalepsis, when it is evident concerning a thing, although it is my wish that our enunciations were always the best accommodated to the natures of the things themselves. 

But the inventors of these articles try to prove by the examples which they produce, that "one and the same thing, which, with respect to second causes, is done contingently, is, in respect to the Divine Decree, done necessarily." They say "It was possible for the bones of Christ to be broken, or not to be broken. It was possible for them to be broken, if any person considers the nature of bones; for they were undoubtedly fragile. But they could not be broken, if the decree of God be taken into the account." In answer to this, I deny that in respect of the DIVINE DECREE, they could not be broken. For God did not decree that it was impossible for them to be broken, but that they should not be broken. This is apparent from the manner in which the transaction was actually conducted. For God did not employ an irresistible power by which he might prevent the bones of Christ from being broken by those who approached to break them; but by a mild kind of suasion, he caused that they should not will to break the bones of Christ, by an argument drawn from its inutility. For, since Christ had already given up the ghost, before those who broke the legs had arrived at the cross, they were not at all inclined to undertake a vain and fruitless labour in breaking the legs of our saviour. Because the breaking of legs, with the design to hasten death, was only done lest the bodies should remain suspended on the cross on a festival or sacred day, contrary to the divine law. Indeed, if the divine Wisdom knows how to effect that which it has decreed, by employing causes according to their nature and motion--whether their nature and motion be contingent or free, the praise due to such Wisdom is far greater than if it employ a power which no creature can possibly resist. Although God can employ such a power whensoever it may seem expedient to his Wisdom. I am therefore, of opinion that I committed no offense when I said, "No contingent thing--that is, nothing which is done or has been done CONTINGENTLY--can be said to be or have been done NECESSARILY, with regard to the divine decree."  (The Apology Or Defense Of James Arminius, Article V, p. 207) 

Through his own Will, and by means of his Power, God is the cause of all other things; (Lam. iii. 37, 38;) yet so that when he acts through second causes, either with them or in them, he does not take away their own peculiar mode of acting with which they have been divinely endued but he suffers them according to their own mode to produce their own effects, necessary things necessarily, contingent things contingently, free things freely: and this contingency and freedom of second causes does not prevent that from being certainly done, or coming to pass, which God in this manner works by them; and therefore, the certain futurition of an event does not include its necessity. (Isa. x. 5, 6, 7; Gen. xlv. 5, 28; Acts xxvii. 29, 31.)  (Twenty-Five Public Disputations of James Arminius, Disputation 4, On the Nature of God, LIV, p. 332) 

The will of God is also distinguished into that by which he wills to do or to prevent something, and which is called "the will of his good pleasure," or rather "of his pleasure;" (Psalm cxv. 3;) and into that by which he wills something to be done, or to be omitted, by creatures endued with understanding, and which is called "the will which is signified." The latter is revealed; the former is partly revealed, and partly hidden. (Mark iii. 35; 1 Thess. iv. 3; Deut. xxix, 29; 1 Cor. ii. 11, 12.) The former is efficacious, for it uses power, either so much as cannot be resisted, or such a kind as He certainly knows nothing will withstand: (Psalm xxxiii. 9; Rom. ix. 19.) The latter is called "inefficacious," and resistance is frequently made to it; yet so that, when the creature transgresses the order of this revealed Will, the creature by it may be reduced to order, and that the Will of God may be done on those by whom his Will has not been performed. (2 Sam. xvii. 14; Isa. v. 4, 5; Matt. xxi. 39-41; Acts v. 4; 1 Cor. vii. 28.) To this two-fold Will is opposed the Remission of the Will, which is called "Permission," and which is also two-fold. The one, which permits something to the power of a rational creature, by not circumscribing its act with a law; and this is opposed to "the revealed Will." The other is that by which God permits something to the capability and will of the creature, by not interposing an efficacious hindrance; and this is opposed to "the Will of God's pleasure" that is efficacious. (Acts xiv. 16; Psalm lxxxi. 13.)  (Ibid., LVIII, p. 333)

We can understand from these quotations Arminius's actual understanding of how grace works, and how free will relates to God's providence and predestination.  God's providence, and his grace, operate on things according to their natures.  With regard to free will, it is not according to its nature that it be moved by necessity or an irresistible force, for these things would overpower and extinguish it.  Free will must be moved by a persuasive force--that is, one that operates on it by persuading it to see things a certain way, have certain affections, and freely choose certain things.  And God can indeed efficaciously (Arminius even uses the word "efficacious") move the will.  In his providence, he moves the wills of his creatures by putting them in circumstances in which he knows they will be persuaded to act in certain ways.  Arminius uses the example of Christ's bones not being broken.  Being bones, they could have been broken.  The Roman soldiers could have broken them if they had wanted to.  But God ensured they would not want to by ordaining circumstances such that they would be effectually motivated not to.  So it was certain they would not break Christ's bones, and yet no irresistible force, negating their own wills, was applied to them.  In efficacious grace, God efficaciously moves the will to be persuaded to assent to Christ.  He enlightens the hearts of his elect, moves their affections, and persuades their wills to embrace Christ.  No creaturely power could do this.  Only a divine power could overcome the darkness of sin and the slavery of our wills to it.  Grace is God's divine power which efficaciously, certainly, and infallibly, but not irresistibly, moves the wills of his elect to faith.  Thus, faith is entirely a gift of God's grace.  With regard to those who are damned, God permits them to reject God's grace.  He refrains from moving their wills efficaciously to faith.

Arminius's theological terminology is very Catholic and Molinistic.  It contrasts significantly with the terminology that came to dominate the Reformed tradition.*  For example, Arminius affirms strongly the terminology of sufficient grace, which even the Jansenists within the Catholic Church had trouble with.

"Can God, now, in his own right, demand from fallen man faith in Christ, which he cannot have of himself, though God neither bestows on him, nor is ready to bestow, sufficient grace by which he may believe?" This question will be answered by a direct negative. God cannot by any right demand from fallen man faith in Christ, which he cannot have of himself, except God has either bestowed, or is ready to bestow, sufficient grace by which he may believe if he will. Nor do I perceive what is false in that reply, or to what heresy it has affinity. It has no alliance with the Pelagian heresy: for Pelagius maintained, that with the exception of the preaching of the Gospel, no internal grace is required to produce faith in the minds of men. But what is of more consequence, this reply is not opposed to St. Augustine's doctrine of Predestination; "yet this doctrine of his, we do not account it necessary to establish," as Innocent, the Roman Pontiff, has observed.  (Nine Questions, Question 5, p. 281)

Sufficient grace makes it possible for all to choose Christ, if they should want to.  Efficacious grace, by contrast, actually moves the will to choose Christ.  Sufficient grace gives ability; efficacious grace gives willingness.

Arminius even uses explicitly the terminology of middle knowledge, which is associated with Molinism and is typically objected to even by other legitimate Catholic schools of thought, such as the Dominicans.

The schoolmen say besides, that one kind of God's knowledge is natural and necessary, another free, and a third kind middle. (1.) Natural or necessary knowledge is that by which God understands himself and all things possible. (2.) Free knowledge is that by which he knows, all other beings. (3.) Middle knowledge is that by which he knows that "if This thing happens, That will take place." The first precedes every free act of the Divine will; the second follows the free act of God's will; and the last precedes indeed the free act of the Divine will, but hypothetically from this act it sees that some particular thing will occur. But, in strictness of speech, every kind of God's knowledge is necessary. For the free understanding of God does not arise from this circumstance, that a free act of His will exhibits or offers an object to the understanding; but when any object whatsoever is laid down, the Divine understanding knows it necessarily on account of the infinity of its own essence. In like manner, any object whatsoever being laid down hypothetically, God understands necessarily what will arise from that object.  (Twenty-Five Public Disputations of James Arminius, Disputation 4, On the Nature of God, LIV, p. 329)

I would go so far as to say that I have not yet, in my reading, discerned any significant difference between either the substance or the terminology of Arminius's and Molina's theology.  I'm sure there are plenty of differences in various places.  Arminius was a Protestant, after all!  But, in the areas under discussion in this article, I have not yet seen any clear difference.  If I didn't know who Arminius was, and all I had was the text from him that I have read thus far, I would assume he was a Molinist Catholic theologian.

And this, of course, explains why the Calvinists didn't like him.  And why they saw his theology as a dangerous "road to Rome."  In a sense, they were right.  He did provide a bridge between Reformed thought and Catholic thought.  But he was too radical and too Molinist for Calvinist sensibilities.  The Amyraldian school of thought (another school of thought arising from within the Reformed tradition, which I won't get into here) did a better job at doing some of the same things but being less dramatically offensive to Calvinist ears.  But I have come to understand Molina better.  I have been able to grasp the orthodoxy of his point of view.  And so I have also come to appreciate the orthodoxy and the Augustinian nature of Arminius's views, so far as I have been able to understand and interpret them thus far.

For more on Molinism and its consistency with orthodox Augustinianism, see here, here, and here.  For more on the Catholic doctrines of predestination, free will, and grace in general, see here.  For more on the relationship between the Catholic and the Calvinist doctrines on these subjects, see here.

Published on the feast of St. Stanislaus

* Although the terminologies are not completely diverse.  Calvinist theologians inherited many of the concepts and terms of medieval scholastic Catholic theology.  See, for example, the Calvinist Westminster Confession of Faith (found here, provided by Wikisource under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License) 3:1 and 5:2, and compare with what Arminius says in the quotations above:

God, from all eternity, did, by the most wise and holy counsel of His own will, freely, and unchangeably ordain whatsoever comes to pass: yet so, as thereby neither is God the author of sin, nor is violence offered to the will of the creatures; nor is the liberty or contingency of second causes taken away, but rather established.  (3:1)

Although, in relation to the fore-knowledge and decree of God, the first Cause, all things come to pass immutably, and infallibly; yet, by the same providence, He ordereth them to fall out, according to the nature of second causes, either necessarily, freely, or contingently.  (5:2)