What They Have That We Don't

The various Reformed churches in the world, and in the United States, are not united in one body, under mutually-binding councils.  Assuming a presbyterian ecclesiology, this means that these separate denominations do not recognize each others' presbyterial authority.  They do not accept each other as legitimate branches of the de jure church of Christ (though they may see each other as expression of the church of Christ in a de facto sense).

Some Reformed people protest this evaluation, saying that the various Reformed denominations do indeed accept each others' legitimacy.  But, as I've argued in many places (such as here and here), such a claim makes no sense in a presbyterian context.  According to presbyterianism, the oneness of the church involves in its essence collegiality in its government--that is, churches which accept each others' legitimacy must function together in mutual submission to each other.  But divided denominations are not in such submission to each other, by definition.  Some protest that there is some connection between the denominations.  For example, many of them join together in various non-binding Reformed organizations (like ICRC and NAPARC).  The problem is that these organizations are non-binding.  Thus, they do not represent an expression of presbyterial mutual submission between the denominations.

It is helpful here to contrast the situation of the Reformed denominations with the situation of the Eastern Orthodox churches--particularly in the United States.  Due to a number of particular historical circumstances, there are many EO jurisdictions existing in the United States which overlap with each other.  This bugs many EO, because it presents an appearance of disunity.  For example, in the area where I live (northern Utah, near Salt Lake City), there are overlapping jurisdictions--including the Antiochian Archdiocese of North America and the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of America.  Ideally, distinct jurisdictions ought not to overlap.  (If you want to get a better feel of what I'm talking about here in terms of what's going on with the EO church in America, check out this helpful article by EO Father Andrew Stephen Damick.)  Does this mean that the EO church is in a similar state to the various Reformed denominations existing in the US, often overlapping each other by having presbytery boundaries overlap, etc.?  No, it does not, and the difference highlights the disunity of the Reformed churches compared to the EO.

The EO, despite the messiness of their jurisdictional situation in the US, still recognize each others' legitimacy and authority, and this is manifest tangibly in various ways.  For one thing, all the Orthodox churches in the US share the same faith, practice, and worship, unlike the various Reformed denominations.  Also, the EO churches function in mutual submission to each other governmentally, unlike the Reformed churches.  They accept the idea of larger, mutually-binding councils between themselves.  One of the most interesting tangible manifestations of their governmental unity is the existence of a body called The Assembly of Canonical Orthodox Bishops of the United States of America.  On the website of this body, you can find lists of churches that are in full communion with each other and are officially recognized as canonical--i.e. possessing de jure legitimacy.  You'll find no such official list recognized by the various Reformed denominations.  The Assembly is also working in concrete ways to end the jurisdictional confusion.  Here are some quotations from the "About" page of their website (linked to just above):

The Assembly of Canonical Orthodox Bishops of the United States of America is one of thirteen bishops' assemblies that have been established in different geographical regions throughout the world. It is made up of all the active, canonical Orthodox bishops of the United States of America, of every jurisdiction.

The Assembly was established in accordance with the Decision of the 4^th Pre-Conciliar Pan-Orthodox Conference, convoked in Chambésy, Switzerland, June 6-12, 2009, at which met representatives from all the universally-recognized autocephalous Orthodox churches. These representatives recognized substantial canonical "anomalies" in the organization and life of the Church in these regions, and realized that, though these anomalies had arisen from specific historical circumstances and pastoral needs, they nonetheless present a number of serious problems for the faithful; moreover, they give an appearance of disunity in the one holy Church. As such, these representatives unanimously agreed to the formation of the assemblies of bishops to heal, as quickly as possible, these anomalies. . . .

The purpose of the Assembly of Bishops of the United States of America is to preserve and contribute to the unity of the Orthodox Church by helping to further her spiritual, theological, ecclesiological, canonical, educational, missionary and philanthropic aims. To accomplish this, the Assembly has as its goals: i) the promotion and accomplishment of Church unity in the United States ii) the strengthening of the common pastoral ministry to all the Orthodox faithful of the region; and iii) a common witness by the Church to all those outside her. In addition, the Assembly has as an express goal iv) the organization of the Church in the United States in accordance with the ecclesiological and the canonical tradition of the Orthodox Church. . . .

Unlike SCOBA however, the Assembly is a transitional body. If it achieves its goal, it will make itself obsolete by developing a proposal for the canonical organization of the Church in the United States. This proposal will in turn be presented to the forthcoming Great and Holy Council, which will consist of all canonical Orthodox bishops throughout the world. Should this proposal be accepted, it is hoped that the Assembly of Bishops will then come to an end, ultimately to be succeeded by a governing Synod of a united Church in the United States.

The various Reformed denominations in the US, or throughout the world, could never have an organization like this, because the Reformed denominations are not unified in faith and practice, and they are unwilling to recognize any higher council outside of their own highest general assemblies.  There is no Reformed "Great and Holy Council" coming up to which plans for organizing and systematizing the various denominational jurisdictions could be submitted.  The EO are working to make it so that there will no longer be churches of the Greek Orthodox jurisdiction in the same locations as churches of the Antiochian or Russian Orthodox jurisdictions, etc.  But the Reformed denominations will never submit to a situation where there will no longer be any overlapping Reformed denominational jurisdictions.  The EO, despite some administrative confusion, are still one church, unified in faith and practice, with all the branches in mutual submission to each other.  Not so with the Reformed denominations.  So perhaps it is time for us to face up to that fact and stop pretending that we have more unity than we do.  Then we will be in a better position to seek the full unity of Christ's de facto church on the earth.

For more, see the above links, and also check out this book.

New Book: Presbyterianism Re-asserted

The book I wrote up last summer and have been tweaking ever since is now finally published, and can be found here as a free PDF.  I plan to put out a print version of it soon, and when I do I will put that link in an update here.

The book is an extended look at presbyterian church government and denominationalism and an argument that the one is inconsistent with the other.  I've made this argument many times on this blog (such as here), but the book ties the core observations and arguments (both from catholic and Reformed history and from the Bible) together.

B. B. Warfield Was No Presbyterian

I have noted in previous posts (such as here) the presence of a form of independency or semi-independency tending to pop up even in Presbyterian circles.  I have recently become aware that this tendency is present in full force in the writings of B. B. Warfield, a famous American Presbyterian theologian writing at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century.  I have read very little Warfield, but I recently came across some quotations from him that made me want to learn more about his views on church unity.  In my search, I came across his essay entitled "True Church Unity: What It Is."  (This version appears on the website of World Reformed Fellowship.  According to the website, it comes from a version "[r]eprinted in The Banner of Truth; Number 89; February, 1971; pp. 26-32; from Selected Shorter Writings; 1970; pp 299-307.)

If this article is characteristic of Warfield's thought in this area, then I can safely say that at least in the areas of church authority and unity, Warfield was no presbyterian but was rather a congregationalist (or at best a semi-congregationalist--but is this really different?).  He emphatically denies ecclesiastical authority outside of the local churches, which is the historic hallmark of independency as opposed to presbyterianism:

It is important to observe, however, that this unity was not organic, in the special sense of that word which would imply that it was founded on the inclusion of the whole Church under one universal government. The absence of such an organization is obvious on the face of the New Testament record, nor do its pages contain any clear promise of or prominent provision for it for the future. The churches are all organized locally, but no external bonds bind them together, except as this was here and there supplied to certain groups of churches by the common authority over them of the same apostolical founders. No central authority ruled over the whole Church. It is perfectly obvious that Jerusalem exercised no domination over Antioch, Antioch none over the churches founded by its missionaries. Nor were the churches associated in a common dominion of the whole over all the parts. Even in the next generation the most powerful lever Rome could bring to bear on Corinth was entreaty and advice. The apostles went forth to evangelize the world, not to rule it; they divided the work among themselves, and did not seek to control it as a 'college'; they delegated their individual authority to the local officers and founded no dynasty, whether individual or collegiate.

Presbyterians would agree that "no central authority ruled over the whole Church," in the sense of a single person (like the Pope) or some group of people above the ordinary officers of the local churches (such as cardinals or archbishops).  But Presbyterians would also equally insist that there is indeed another kind of central authority ruling over the church--precisely one of the kinds, in fact, that Warfield explicitly excludes when he says, "[n]or were the churches associated in a common dominion of the whole over all the parts."  The apostles, Warfield says, "delegated their individual authority to the local officers and founded no dynasty, whether individual or collegiate."  But this is not true, for according to Presbyterianism, the elders of the local churches do not function independently but are part of a college of elders ruling over the entire church.  This is the foundation for the authority of presbyteries and synods or councils.

1. For the better government, and further edification of the Church, there ought to be such assemblies as are commonly called synods or councils.

3. It belongeth to synods and councils, ministerially to determine controversies of faith and cases of conscience, to set down rules and directions for the better ordering of the public worship of God and government of His Church; to receive complaints in cases of maladministration, and authoritatively to determine the same: which decrees and determinations, if consonant to the Word of God, are to be received with reverence and submission; not only for their agreement with the Word, but also for the power whereby they are made, as being an ordinance of God appointed thereunto in His Word. (Westminster Confession of Faith, Chapter 31)

CHRIST hath instituted a government, and governors ecclesiastical in the church: to that purpose, the apostles did immediately receive the keys from the hand of Jesus Christ, and did use and exercise them in all the churches of the world upon all occasions.

And Christ hath since continually furnished some in his church with gifts of government, and with commission to execute the same, when called thereunto.

It is lawful, and agreeable to the word of God, that the church be governed by several sorts of assemblies, which are congregational, classical, and synodical. . . .

IT is lawful, and agreeable to the word of God, that the several assemblies before mentioned have power to convent, and call before them, any person within their several bounds, whom the ecclesiastical business which is before them doth concern.

They have power to hear and determine such causes and differences as do orderly come before them.

It is lawful, and agreeable to the word of God, that all the said assemblies have some power to dispense church-censures. . . .

Synodical assemblies may lawfully be of several sorts, as provincial, national, and oecumenical. (Form of Presbyterial Church Government)

In short, according to Presbyterianism, the presbyterate of the church does not function simply in isolated factions, over local congregations, with (as Warfield puts it) "no external bonds" to "bind them together."  Rather, the presbyterate is collegial in nature, as individual elders function as parts of congregational sessions, sessions function in submission to presbyteries, and presbyteries function in submission to larger synods or councils.  There is no office above that of the the local elder (teaching or ruling), but the elders collectively exercise an authority over each other and have an obligation to submit to each other, and larger groups of elders have authority over individual elders or smaller groups of elders.  As Charles Hodge sums it up, "The Presbyterian doctrine on this subject is, that the Church is one in such a sense that a smaller part is subject to a larger, and the larger to the whole."

It is astonishing that nowhere in Warfield's article does he even mention a passage of Scripture which clearly overturns his entire congregationalist mentality, and which is constantly on the lips of true presbyterians when they contend for the biblical view of church government.  I refer, of course, to the narrative of the Jerusalem Council in Acts 15.  This passage, among many others, is a great bane of congregationalists, for it shows the church doing exactly what they want to say the church is never to do--exercising collegial authority binding on the whole catholic church.

Warfield makes clear throughout his article that one of his main concerns is a false, latitudinarian idea of unity in which there is to be organizational unity among Christian at the expense of holding on to the whole counsel of God's Word.  And he is quite right to warn us of this idea.  But in avoiding this extreme, he seems to have gone to one on the other side and simply jettisoned the whole idea of organizational, governmental unity in the visible church.  The truth is that we need not just unity, and not just truth, but unity and truth and unity in the truth.

Here are just a couple more quotations from Warfield's article, from towards the end of it where he is summing up some of the consequences of his principles:

1. We are not to seek it [that is, church unity] in the inclusion of all Christians in one organization and under one government. A story is told of a man who, wishing a swarm of bees, caught every bee that visited his flowers and enclosed them together in a box, only to find the difference between an aggregation and a hive. We cannot produce unity by building a great house over a divided family. Different denominations have a similar right to exist with separate congregations, and may be justified on like grounds. . . .

The true pathway seems, then, to lead us as our present duty to:

1. Hearty recognition of all Christians as members of the body of Christ, and of all denominations which preach the gospel of Christ as sections of this one body.

2. Hearty and unwavering testimony to all God's truth known to us, as the truth of God to be confessed by all his people.

3.Co-operation in all good works as brethren.

4.Formal federation of denominations for prosecuting tasks common to the federated bodies, so far as such federation involves no sacrifice of principle or testimony.

Contrary to Warfield, different denominations do not have a right to exist similar to that of separate congregations.  Separate congregations are lawful and pragmatic divisions of the one church into local units for the better functioning and fellowship of the church (see the discussion of this in the Form of Presbyterial Church Government, linked to above).  However, these distinct congregations have an obligation to function in visible and governmental unity with each other in a presbyterial system--under sessions, presbyteries, and higher synods.  The whole idea of separate denominations, on the other hand, involves the idea of distinct churches or groups of churches refusing to submit to each other in formal, governmental unity, and this idea is inherently schismatic.  Divided denominations may recognize each other as de facto parts of the visible church, but the very idea of governmental division implies (at least assuming a consistent presbyterian system) that the divided denominations do not recognize each other as parts of the visible church de jure.

For a brief biblical case for presbyterian church government, see here.  For an examination of the Westminster Standards as they speak to the unity and collegial government of the church, see here.  For more, see here.

UPDATE 2/3/15:  Another concrete way of getting at how un-presbyterian Warfield's view is is to note that his view does not allow for any binding church assemblies beyond (at best) the level of presbytery.  He says, "[t]he churches are all organized locally, but no external bonds bind them together, except as this was here and there supplied to certain groups of churches by the common authority over them of the same apostolical founders."  He never (in this article, at least) clarifies whether by "locally" he is referring to the level of the local congregation or the level of the local presbytery.  My guess would be the former, because in later Presbyterianism presbyteries in general seem to get a lot less local than they used to be.  They seem almost to take over the role previously assigned to the "provincial synod."

Either way, Warfield's view does not recognize a presbyterial structure beyond the presbytery level.  In the OPC, for example, there are congregational sessions, presbyteries, and the General Assembly.  In the FPCS, there are sessions, presbyteries, and the Synod (with the idea that there would normally be a higher General Assembly if the church was larger).  Warfield's view declares illegitimate and without authority the Synod and the General Assembly, because larger church assemblies, in his view, have no authority to rule over smaller church groups.  So not only does Warfield deny the overall governmental unity of the visible church; his view also removes levels of governmental unity that are almost universally practiced in modern Presbyterian denominations.  Boettner's view amounts to the same thing.

The Implication of FP Churches in Other Nations

A little while back, a commenter on another post called my attention to a brief statement in the FP Religion and Morals Committee report from 2011.  The statement occurs in an introductory paragraph to the second part of the report (found on p. 11) explaining why the Religion and Morals Committee decided to focus in its report on the state of morals and religion in Scotland rather than reporting conditions in other countries as well:

This part of the report is generally confined to a consideration of the state of religion and morals in Scotland. It is in Scotland that the Free Presbyterian Church of Scotland lays express claim in her constitution to the rights and privileges of the historic established relation with the State. Scotland is also the country in which our Presbyterial structures have a complete and biblical form with a supreme court of review. The Committee believes that this Presbyterial structure is the model for Church government in every nation and that our presence as a Church in other nations implies that we aim at fully established Presbyterian structures within these nations. The Committee would welcome separate reports on religion and morals to be sent to the Synod from Overseas Presbyteries.

The FPCS has churches (and even sometimes entire presbyteries) in nations other than Scotland.  I mentioned in an earlier post that if the FPCS formally recognized the jurisdiction of other denominations in other nations, this would be at worst a blatantly schismatic act and at best a highly irregular situation, because if there are de jure churches in these other nations, what business does the FP church have in coming over and setting up rival congregations?

This statement from the report clarifies that the existence of FP churches in other nations is not an anomaly, but that it "implies that we aim at fully established Presbyterian structures within these nations."  That is, there is a larger goal of establishing more congregations, presbyteries, and eventually national synods in these countries.  Of course, there are already plenty of Presbyterian and Reformed churches, presbyteries, and general assemblies in some of these nations (such as the United States), but these churches have sufficient problems in terms of doctrine and practice (though many of them are quite faithful in most areas) that the FPCS cannot at this time embrace them in full communion, and so there is the goal of establishing other national Presbyterian churches with which the FPCS could be in full communion.  Since the unity of the one visible church of Christ is an absolute duty, the ultimate goal is to see the world full of orthodox national churches in different nations who are all in full formal communion with and committed to mutual presbyterial submission to each other.

For more, see here.

Must the Unity and Purity of the Church Wait for Ideal Circumstances?

In my discussions with various people about presbyterian church government and its implications for the unity and collegiality of the church (see here for example), I sometimes encounter people claiming that it is all very well and good that the church should be unified and function collegially, and that denominationalism is antithetical to the very nature of the church and its government, but that one cannot insist on such things in our current non-ideal climate.  Sure, the collegial functioning of church government is ideally supposed to be an important way in which the church maintains its unity and purity, but the ideal simply can't exist right now.  For example, the OPC cannot right now embrace full unity with the RPCNA and function collegially with them in terms of government--such as by holding a common council to come to terms with doctrinal differences such as the dispute over exclusive psalmody.  The OPC cannot do this because it would have to compromise its own doctrinal commitments to do so, such as its commitment to allow the singing of uninspired hymns in public worship.  A denomination ought never to compromise its doctrinal commitments for the sake of unity when it believes those commitments to be biblical.  So we'll just have to settle for a non-ideal denominational division between de jure true churches at this time and hope and work for better in the future.

So the argument goes, and it sounds plausible on the surface.  But when examined just a little more closely, it makes no sense.  For one thing, does God give the church permission to ignore his prescriptions for how the church is to function simply on the basis that "we live in non-ideal times"?  All times this side of eternity are "non-ideal."  Do we get to dispense with other commands of God when we feel the times are not right for them--like prayer, Bible study, the preaching of the gospel, love to neighbor, etc.?  Only God's Word can tell us when we can make exceptions to his general commands, and where in God's Word has he given us the right to divide the unity of the church and ignore the authority of fellow presbyters and church courts on the grounds that we think them less orthodox in doctrine or practice than ourselves?  As James Durham put it, "by way of precept there is an absolute necessity of uniting laid upon the church, so that it falls not under debate ‘Whether a church should continue divided or united . . . more than it falls under debate whether there should be preaching, praying, keeping of the Sabbath, or any other commanded duty; . . . [T]hat men should by agreement state a division in the church, or dispense therewith and prefer the continuing of division, as fitter for edification than union, we suppose is altogether unwarrantable."

The reply might be made that a faithful denomination cannot unify with all other denominations, because Christ has also commanded the church to keep the faith pure, which can't be done if it does not remain separate from groups which have distorted it in some way.  This is quite true, but it brings us to another absurdity of the argument under examination.  The argument maintains that de jure churches ought to remain separate from other less pure de jure churches in order to protect the purity of the faith, and that therefore there cannot at this time be unity and a collegial exercise of church authority between such divided denominations, such as would be manifested by having common councils, etc.  But this argument seems to forget one of the main purposes for which Christ commanded collegial and conciliar authority in his church, which was to preserve the purity of the church within its unity.  Thus, instead of being a reason for de jure churches to avoid participating in common binding councils, existing contradictions in doctrine and practice are the best reasons for holding such councils.  In fact, a non-ideal situation of churches contradicting each other in doctrine and practice is actually the most ideal situation for holding church councils, for the collegial and conciliar use of church authority is a primary means appointed by Christ for the church to use to help maintain its unity by dealing with the divisions in doctrine and practice that threaten it.  Collegial church authority is intended to help preserve the purity of the church within its unity.  To neglect this means of the sanctification of the church and instead, contrary to Christ's command, to willingly separate the de jure church into isolated factions that refuse to respect each others' authority and deal with their differences is not only not the way Christ has ordained to preserve the purity and unity of the church but is certainly one of the best ways to ensure the continuation of disunity and impurity within it.  This argument and course of action, then, is like a sick man who refuses to go to the doctor because his circumstances are non-ideal--i.e. he is sick.  When he gets better, he says that that will be the time to go.

Therefore, this argument clearly fails as an excuse to continue to keep the de jure church in a divided state.  Denominationalism is never permitted, and it is never the path towards the healing of the church.  In terms of a consistent presbyterian practice, the division of two churches into two distinct denominations can only mean that the two denominations are rejecting each others' legality and authority as de jure churches, having pronounced sentence upon each other and cut each other off.  Any attempt to justify the severance of de jure churches from each other while continuing to attribute de jure status to them entails an abandonment of biblical presbyterianism.

I've dealt with this argument in other places as well, such as here and here. 

UPDATE 2/6/15:  From my book on this subject, a couple of analogies that provide further illustration of why the "non-ideal time" argument doesn't work:

#1. You're absolutely right that it would be a great thing for all the different denominations, and especially the Reformed denominations, to be united. This is definitely the ideal we should be seeking. But we need to have proper nuance in our thinking. Just because, say, the OPC and the PCA are not united in the ideal way, it doesn't follow that they are not united at all, or that they are rejecting each others' de jure legitimacy and authority. Husbands and wives can be separated to some degree in times of marital trouble without being fully and finally divorced. So churches might be separated in ways that are not ideal without it necessarily implying that they completely reject each other as legal churches.

The problem with this argument is that it fails to acknowledge the real essence of the problem. It is absolutely crucial that all actual nuances be properly recognized, but it is also crucial that we avoid inventing nuances where they do not in fact exist. Imagine that Frank and Sarah are a married couple having problems, and Frank comes to you and says this: “You know that Sarah and I have been having problems in our marriage. Here's what we've decided to do: We're going to live separately, avoid intimate relations, have separate bank accounts, and feel free to see other people. Although this is not ideal, we think it will be good for our relationship. We'll still be husband and wife, but in a sort of recovery mode.” You will probably respond by informing Frank that what he has in mind is not any kind of marriage relationship at all, whether he chooses to call it that or not, because he and Sarah will be living in such a way as to deny the very essence of what it means to be married. To be married involves more than just a name; there are certain essential characteristics that have to be there to lay just claim to the name. Husbands and wives can't see other people, they have to actually spend time with each other, etc. Without these things, they can't claim the name “marriage” for their relationship.

Similarly, the relationship between two legal churches in a presbyterian system involves certain essential characteristics, and if these characteristics are not there, the churches can't claim to recognize each others' legality. As we've seen, active, legal elders have an inherent right to function as parts of larger church courts, and church courts have an inherent right to function as parts of the universal governing body of the catholic church. The very recognition of legality when it comes to ecclesiastical authority involves formal and binding mutual submission and accountability. When denominations are separate from each other, that mutual submission and accountability are not there. For Denomination A to refuse to engage in mutual submission and accountability with Denomination B while still choosing to say they attribute legal authority to Denomination B is a mere pretense—a name without the thing. Another parallel that might help is to think of the sphere of civil relations. Imagine someone saying, “Sure, I acknowledge the legal authority of the United States government! I just don't think I have any obligation to obey any of their laws and policies, pay taxes, show respect, etc.” Such alleged “acknowledgment of legal authority” would be merely a sham; there is no real acknowledgment there are all, for the essence of what such acknowledgment means is denied.

The OPC article on biblical unity, cited earlier, uses the term “sinful disunity” to describe denominational division. It does so precisely because denominational unity between the legitimate churches of Christ is not just some nice ideal to work for someday; it is a moral requirement that necessarily always exists between all legitimate churches, a requirement they cannot abandon without sin. Denominational division, by its very essential nature, involves a rejection of legitimacy in terms of legal authority. It is certainly true that churches can exist in a state of tension with each other without an implied mutual rejection of legitimacy. Temporary states of discipline can exist between elders and elders, or between elders and members, etc., without a violation of the essential unity of the church. What can't consist with that essential unity, however, in a presbyterian system, is a settled, permanent division in which the separated denominations refuse to submit to each other.

A Couple of Analogies for the Trinity and the Incarnation, Part II

Continued from Part I.

THE INCARNATION

Here is the Westminster Confession on the Incarnation of Christ (Chapter VIII, Section II):

The Son of God, the second person in the Trinity, being very and eternal God, of one substance and equal with the Father, did, when the fulness of time was come, take upon Him man’s nature, with all the essential properties and common infirmities thereof, yet without sin: being conceived by the power of the Holy Ghost, in the womb of the virgin Mary, of her substance. So that two whole, perfect, and distinct natures, the Godhead and the manhood, were inseparably joined together in one person, without conversion, composition, or confusion. Which person is very God, and very man, yet one Christ, the only Mediator between God and man.

Our analogy here will be a little more straightforward, because here we are discussing the relationship between "Godhood" and "creatureliness," and we happen to have a very useful analogy for this in general on hand.  That analogy is the author-novel analogy.

When an author writes a novel, he creates a world, complete with a distinct time and space, characters, and a whole history of events.  He functions in many ways analogously to God in his relationship to the world of his novel.  He brings it into being; he ordains all that comes to pass in it; he is imminent with it, present in every part, and yet exists outside of its time and space; etc.  Of course, like any analogy, this one breaks down at some point, such as in the fact that a human author is not a Supreme Being and does not exist absolutely outside of time and space, or in the fact that a human author can forget what he has written in the past, or in the fact that the world of a novel does not have a solid reality, etc., but it does go a long way and is thus very useful at elucidating a number of truths about the nature of God's relationship with the world.  One area where it is useful is in illuminating the doctrine of the Incarnation.

When Christ became man, he took upon himself a human nature while retaining his divine nature, so that from that point on he has been and always will be one person in two distinct but inseparable natures.  But how can one person have two distinct natures, particularly when the natures possess contradictory characteristics?  The divine nature has the property of being infinite; human nature is finite.  The divine nature possesses omniscience and omnipotence; the human nature is limited in knowledge and power.  The divine nature cannot suffer (because blessedness is one of its essential characteristics); the human nature can certainly suffer.  And many other contrasts could be made as well.  How can one person have contradictory characteristics?  A kangaroo and a snake have contradictory characteristics:  A kangaroo is a warm-blooded mammal with a pouch which gives birth to its young.  A snake is a cold-blooded reptile with no pouch and which lays eggs.  This means that there can never be a single entity that is both completely a kangaroo and a snake.  It might be some strange chimeric mix, but it can never possess both a kangaroo nature and a snake nature at the same time "without conversion, composition, or confusion."  So how can we resolve this apparent contradiction at the heart of this central Christian doctrine?

Here is where our author-novel analogy can provide some illumination.  Imagine that you are an author, and you are writing a novel.  You decide to write yourself into your novel.  So you create a character in your novel, narrated just like all the other characters, but which you identify with yourself.  You decide to have your character who is you have a conversation with another of your characters, Bob.  Perhaps the narration might go something like this:

I walked into the coffee shop where Bob was sitting and said hello to him.  Bob gave me a vague greeting, then continued to sip his coffee. 

"Do you know who I am?" I asked casually. 

"No, I don't think so," replied Bob.  "Should I?" 

"No, you've never met me before.  But I know you very well.  I'm the author." 

"You're who?" 

"The author." 

"The author of what?" 

"The author of the universe.  Yours, at least." 

At this point, Bob began to look a little concerned and confused, so I said, "I can prove it.  Watch this."  I made Bob's cup of coffee disappear.  Bob looked shocked.  I made his coffee reappear.  Bob looked a bit relieved but still shocked.  I disappeared myself.  At that Bob looked quite alarmed. 

"Where are you?" he asked. 

"I'm still here, but I've made my form disappear."  I reappeared.  Bob started at my sudden reappearance. 

"You are the author!" 

"I know." 

"But how can you be the author?  I mean, the author is outside of our space and time.  But you are here within space and time.  The author has no physical body within this universe.  But you clearly do." 

"I've assumed a character-nature, Bob." 

"So you're not the author anymore?" 

"No, I'm still the author, but now I'm also a character as well." 

"But isn't that a contradiction?  Don't author-nature and character-nature have contradictory characteristics, such as the ones I've just mentioned?" 

"It works like this, Bob.  My original nature is, of course, an author-nature.  But I created a new character, and I associated my personal identity with that new character.  I didn't morph my author-nature into a character-nature, or create some impossible hybrid by fusing the two.  I simply chose to unite my personal identity with a character-nature, and now my one person expresses itself through an intrinsic, original author-nature as well as through this character-nature that you see in front of you.  So there's no contradiction.  For example:  In my author-nature, I am all-powerful.  But in my character-nature, I'm not.  Try pushing me down." 

"What?" 

"Try pushing me down."  Bob pushed me down, and I promptly fell on the floor.  Bob looked startled. 

"How did I do that?" he asked. 

"Well, of course, as the author, I could have infused my character-nature with extra-ordinary strength, but I chose not to at this time.  I gave it only the strength it naturally possesses.  Your push therefore knocked me down.  You can push pretty hard, Bob." 

"So in your author-nature, you are outside our space and time and continue to exist in that way, but in your character-nature, you are in space and time with me?" 

"Precisely. And that goes for all the other differences between the author-nature and the character-nature as well." 

"I'm still not sure I fully get it." 

"Perhaps an analogy will help, Bob.  Imagine that you are an author, and that you are writing a novel . . ."

Analogous in many ways to this scenario, Christ, the Second Person of the Trinity, became man by taking to himself a human nature.  He did not relinquish his divine nature, nor did he merge his divine nature with a human nature to make some kind of hybrid.  Rather, he created a human body and a reasonable soul--a human nature, with all that that involves--and associated this new nature with his divine person, so that his personal identity would be expressed through it.  Thus Jesus was and is fully and completely human, not just in appearance but in true reality, and yet in his personal identity he was and is the divine Second Person of the Trinity.  His person is capable of different things and is expressed by means of different characteristics in each nature.  In his divine nature, he is intrinsically omniscient and omnipotent, but not in his human nature.  In his divine nature, he is intrinsically and necessarily outside of space and time, but not in his human nature.  In his divine nature, he is absolutely blessed and incapable of suffering, but his human nature is fully capable of suffering.  The union of the divine and human natures in one person is what made salvation possible.  For example, the atonement could only happen because Christ's sacrifice for our sins was infinite in value and efficacy due to its being the sacrifice of a divine person, and yet the sacrifice (which included Christ's suffering and death) could only occur because that divine person was able to suffer and die in his human nature.

Our analogy, hopefully, sheds some light on what it means for a single divine person to keep his divine nature while taking on a human nature "without conversion, composition, or confusion" between the natures.  Of course, the analogy cannot fully exhibit this reality which, in its fullness, is beyond our comprehension; but perhaps it can help us to grasp the meaning of it a little more clearly and to be able to defend it against certain objections.

A Couple of Analogies for the Trinity and the Incarnation, Part I

The doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation are central doctrines in Christianity.  Therefore, much effort has been spent trying to understand and articulate them accurately.  It has always been acknowledged that, of course, we cannot understand them fully or completely comprehend them.  If the very table in front of me is beyond my complete comprehension, how much more must the nature of God and how Christ became a man be beyond my complete comprehension!

And yet, people have rightly tried to get a substantial and accurate view of these doctrines.  Sometimes people have developed analogies to try to capture and articulate the essence of these ideas.  So we have Augustine's analogy of the the divisions of the soul.  We have later popular analogies such as the three forms of water, or the three parts of an egg, etc., etc.  Some of these analogies are more helpful than others.  Many of them, in my view, are more harmful than useful, because they convey more error than truth about the things they are trying to describe.  No analogy perfectly describes what it is an analogy for, because, obviously, if it did it would no longer be an analogy but just a description of the actual thing.  So all analogies fail at some point.  But there can be more or less helpful analogies.  An analogy is useful if it exhibits sufficient similarity to actually help to elucidate some truth about its object, while the dissimilarities are far enough in the background to not greatly or immediately distort the effect.  Analogies, while always involving a degree of risk (because no analogy is perfect), are on the whole very useful things, because they are so effective at helping to communicate a clearer view of many things.

In light of all this, I would like to offer here a couple of analogies, one relating to the Trinity and the other relating to the Incarnation.  My dissatisfaction with existing Trinitarian analogies has led me to want to develop one that is more effective and less error-ridden, because I think analogy can be very useful in elucidating such a difficult concept.  As the for the doctrine of the Incarnation, I'm not sure I've ever actually heard anyone attempt an analogy for this, so I have seen a need for one to be attempted.  Like all analogies, the ones offered below are not perfect, but hopefully they will be helpful.

THE TRINITY

Here is a basic statement articulating the doctrine of the Trinity from the Westminster Confession of Faith, Chapter II, Section III:

In the unity of the Godhead there be three persons, of one substance, power, and eternity; God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Ghost. The Father is of none, neither begotten, nor proceeding: the Son is eternally begotten of the Father: the Holy Ghost eternally proceeding from the Father and the Son.

A couple of articles I often refer to when trying to help people understand the Trinity are "What is the Doctrine of the Trinity?" by Matt Perman, which I think is a nice, brief, helpful discussion of it, and, when I want a more philosophical account, the "Unpublished Essay on the Trinity" by Jonathan Edwards.  Edwards's article is, in my opinion, the most substantial and effective attempt to examine the doctrine of the Trinity philosophically I have yet come across.  I don't agree necessarily with every aspect of what he says, but I find it very useful overall.  I am going to use Edwards's article (quotations are from the plain text version at CCEL) to help me articulate the philosophical dimensions of the doctrine as I set forth my analogy.  If you want to skip the first quotation from Edwards (which is a bit dense), feel free to do so.  I don't think that will impair your grasp of my analogy.

Here is Edwards on the relationship between the Father and the Son:

It is common when speaking of the Divine happiness to say that God is infinitely happy in the enjoyment of Himself, in perfectly beholding and infinitely loving, and rejoicing in, His own essence and perfection, and accordingly it must be supposed that God perpetually and eternally has a most perfect idea of Himself, as it were an exact image and representation of Himself ever before Him and in actual view, and from hence arises a most pure and perfect act or energy in the Godhead, which is the Divine love, complacence and joy. The knowledge or view which God has of Himself must necessarily be conceived to be something distinct from His mere direct existence. There must be something that answers to our reflection. The reflection as we reflect on our own minds carries something of imperfection in it. However, if God beholds Himself so as thence to have delight and joy in Himself He must become his own object. There must be a duplicity. There is God and the idea of God, if it be proper to call a conception of that that is purely spiritual an idea.

If a man could have an absolutely perfect idea of all that passed in his mind, all the series of ideas and exercises in every respect perfect as to order, degree, circumstance and for any particular space of time past, suppose the last hour, he would really to all intents and purpose be over again what he was that last hour. And if it were possible for a man by reflection perfectly to contemplate all that is in his own mind in an hour, as it is and at the same time that it is there in its first and direct existence; if a man, that is, had a perfect reflex or contemplative idea of every thought at the same moment or moments that that thought was and of every exercise at and during the same time that that exercise was, and so through a whole hour, a man would really be two during that time, he would be indeed double, he would be twice at once. The idea he has of himself would be himself again. 

Note, by having a reflex or contemplative idea of what passes in our own minds I don't mean consciousness only. There is a great difference between a man's having a view of himself, reflex or contemplative idea of himself so as to delight in his own beauty or excellency, and a mere direct consciousness. Or if we mean by consciousness of what is in our own minds anything besides the mere simple existence in our minds of what is there, it is nothing but a power by reflection to view or contemplate what passes. 

Therefore as God with perfect clearness, fullness and strength, understands Himself, views His own essence (in which there is no distinction of substance and act but which is wholly substance and wholly act), that idea which God hath of Himself is absolutely Himself. This representation of the Divine nature and essence is the Divine nature and essence again: so that by God's thinking of the Deity must certainly be generated. Hereby there is another person begotten, there is another Infinite Eternal Almighty and most holy and the same God, the very same Divine nature. 

And this Person is the second person in the Trinity, the Only Begotten and dearly Beloved Son of God; He is the eternal, necessary, perfect, substantial and personal idea which God hath of Himself; and that it is so seems to me to be abundantly confirmed by the Word of God.

Edwards then goes on to provide a Scriptural foundation for his philosophical analysis.

So what we have in the Trinity is a single person, God the Father, who perceives a perfect image of himself, God the Son.  Since the image is perfect and exact, with nothing lacking, the image has exactly the same essence as the one whose image he is.  So by viewing his own essence, God the Father begets another instantiation of his own divine essence--God the Son.  (We'll get to the Holy Spirit shortly.)

So here's Part I of my analogy:

Put on your science-fiction glasses for a moment and imagine that there exists a Robotic Artificial Intelligence (RAI).  That is, there is a robot with a computer mind and the computer is so sophisticated it has become an intelligence.  (You can think of it as alive or not as you like--after all, computers, without being alive, can do many intelligent things, such as play chess.  It doesn't matter, since I am not claiming that any of this can really happen, of course.  It is just an imaginary scenario to use as my analogy.  It is difficult to find a good analogy for the Trinity among the things of daily life, because really nothing in this world is sufficiently like the Trinity to make a good analogy.  Hence the resort to a science-fiction-ish scenario.) 

Now, this RAI (we'll call him Robot 1) "decides" that "he" "wants" (you can take the terms metaphorically or literally) to be able to interact with himself the way he interacts with other beings.  So he builds another robot body with another computer inside.  Then he establishes a wireless connection between the two computers and transmits his own mind into the new computer.  His original mind now functions kind of like an internet server which hosts a website, but then sends out that website into other computers, so that there can be multiple instantiations of the same website as different computers access it.  (I hope I'm not botching this up too much--I'm not a great computer expert.) 

So Robot 1 has now produced (shall we use the term "begotten"?) a new instantiation of his own essence, existing in the newly created RAI (whom we'll call, not surprisingly, Robot 2).  Robot 2 is exactly like Robot 1, since they are literally sharing the same computer "mind."  The only difference is that Robot 1 is the "server" in which the mind originally resides and Robot 2 is a receiver who gets all he has from Robot 1.  Robot 2 is like the child of Robot 1, except that unlike with the production of human children the "child" shares exactly the same essence as the "parent."  Robot 1 and Robot 2 can interact with each other as two distinct "persons," since they are two distinct instantiations of the same computer-essence, but they are one in "being" for the same reason.

OK, now let's take this one step further (Part II):

A scientist (we'll call him Dr. Zinzemborff, or Dr. Z for short) who works in the laboratory in which Robot 1 and Robot 2 live is fascinated by their relationship.  He wants to access the wireless connection that connects Robot 1 to Robot 2 and allows Robot 2 to function.  So he builds a new robotic body with a new computer brain designed to pick up on the wireless signal and instantiate it in its own system.  When it is completed, he turns it on, and it immediately comes to "life" as it picks up the signal. 

"Are you online?" Dr. Z asks? 

"Yes I am," the new RAI replies. 

"What are you experiencing?" 

"I find that I have become another instantiation of the computer mind of Robot 1, distinct from the other two instantiations (Robot 1 and Robot 2).  Since the wireless connection between Robot 1 and Robot 2 conveys completely the entire computer-essence of Robot 1, by tapping into that transmission I have become another complete instantiation of the same essence.  I have the same thoughts as both Robot 1 and Robot 2, except that in identity I am not the same as either of them.  I am the instantiation of the very connection between the two of them." 

"Well then, we'll call you Robot 3," says Dr. Z.

Perhaps you have picked up by this point that "Robot 3" represents the Holy Spirit, the Third Person of the Trinity.  Here is how Jonathan Edwards describes the Holy Spirit and his relationship with the Father and the Son:

The Godhead being thus begotten by God's loving an idea of Himself and shewing forth in a distinct subsistence or person in that idea, there proceeds a most pure act, and an infinitely holy and sacred energy arises between the Father and Son in mutually loving and delighting in each other, for their love and joy is mutual, (Prov. 8:30) "I was daily His delight rejoicing always before Him." This is the eternal and most perfect and essential act of the Divine nature, wherein the Godhead acts to an infinite degree and in the most perfect manner possible. The Deity becomes all act, the Divine essence itself flows out and is as it were breathed forth in love and joy. So that the Godhead therein stands forth in yet another manner of subsistence, and there proceeds the third Person in the Trinity, the Holy Spirit, viz., the Deity in act, for there is no other act but the act of the will.

The Holy Spirit is God's essence, as it were, "breathed forth."  By his Spirit, the Father begets the Son, and by the Spirit the Son and the Father are connected.  And it is by the Holy Spirit, not surprisingly, that we come to share in the divine life and are made children of God when we are regenerated in salvation.  It is by the Spirit that the Word of God is breathed forth from God, either directly and supremely (such as in the Incarnation of Christ) or finitely and partially (such as when the Word of God spoke through the prophets).

Here is how Edwards sums up his articulation of the Trinity:

And this I suppose to be that blessed Trinity that we read of in the Holy Scriptures. The Father is the Deity subsisting in the prime, un-originated and most absolute manner, or the Deity in its direct existence. The Son is the Deity generated by God's understanding, or having an idea of Himself and subsisting in that idea. The Holy Ghost is the Deity subsisting in act, or the Divine essence flowing out and breathed forth in God's Infinite love to and delight in Himself. And I believe the whole Divine essence does truly and distinctly subsist both in the Divine idea and Divine love, and that each of them are properly distinct Persons.

I highly recommend that you go and read the rest of Edwards's article.  He provides copious Scriptural evidence for his account of the Trinitarian relationships and relates very well his philosophical language with the language of Scripture.  He also shows how his philosophical perspective sheds light on the meaning of certain key elements of the orthodox Trinitarian doctrine.  I would reproduce all of that here, but then I would simply be reproducing his entire article.

I would like to make one more observation before I conclude, and it has to do with that notoriously difficult Trinitarian subject--the famous Filioque.  I think the light shed on the Trinity by Edwards's philosophical account and hopefully to some degree by the above analogy also sheds light on this debate.  (I'm not going to explain what this debate is about here.  If you want to read about it, one place to start is here.)  Edwards gets close to discussing this issue explicitly here:

I shall only now briefly observe that many things that have been wont to be said by orthodox divines about the Trinity are hereby illustrated. Hereby we see how the Father is the fountain of the Godhead, and why when He is spoken of in Scripture He is so often, without any addition or distinction, called God, which has led some to think that He only was truly and properly God. Hereby we may see why in the economy of the Persons of the Trinity the Father should sustain the dignity of the Deity, that the Father should have it as His office to uphold and maintain the rights of the Godhead and should be God not only by essence, but as it were, by His economical office.

In our analogy, Robot 1 is the original RAI.  The other two RAIs are derived from him.  They share the same essence, but their instantiations of that essence are derived from his.  The reason the Eastern church has historically been opposed to the Filioque is that they have wanted to avoid having two ultimate origins of the Holy Spirit or diminish the role of the Father as the sole original source of the Godhead.  We can see that these concerns are satisfied in our analogy.  Robot 1 is the sole source of the computer-mind that is shared by all three.  He is the original instantiation.  Robot 3 (who is analogous to the Holy Spirit) is the instantiation of the wireless transmission which has its ultimate origin in Robot 1.  Similarly, the Father is the sole source of the Godhead and thus the Spirit's only ultimate source.  The West, on the other hand, has been motivated to insert and to keep the Filioque out of a concern to preserve the equality of the Son and sometimes to emphasize the fact that the Spirit proceeds out of the relationship between the two.  In our analogy, the wireless transmission that emanates originally from Robot 1 is also the conduit through which Robot 1 relates to Robot 2 and through which Robot 2 communicates with Robot 1, so Robot 3 is an instantiation not simply of something coming from Robot 1 but also of the connection between the two.  Similarly, the Spirit originates ultimately only from the Father, but because he is also the conduit of connection between the Father and the Son, he is a manifestation of both the Father and the Son and the relationship between them.  So we have preserved here, embedded in our analogy, the Father as the sole ultimate fountain of the Godhead, and also the equality of the Son and Spirit with the Father and the Spirit as manifesting the Son as well as the Father.  We could express this by saying simply that the Spirit "proceeds from the Father" (emphasizing that the Father is the only ultimate source of the Godhead) as well as by saying that the Spirit "proceeds from the Father and the Son" (emphasizing that the Spirit emanates from the relationship between the Father and the Son and is thus an expression of the Son as well as of the Father).  Either way would be fundamentally orthodox.  And these are the lines along which the East and the West have generally worked to reconcile their different articulations.  My hope in this regard is that my analogy might help make it easier for some people to see what the debate is actually about and how there can be a reconciliation (at least on the pure doctrinal issues--there are other issues involved in this debate as well, such as the concern over the West changing the Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed).

Continued in Part II.

ADDENDUM 7/1/16:  It occurred to me later that I could simplify my analogy for the Trinity here quite a bit if I left out the robots and just focused on the internet-type analogy included in it.  The Father is the server where the website originally resides.  The Son is the computer which receives the website from the server and thus constitutes a second instantiation of the same website-essence.  The Spirit is the data stream sent from the server which connects the two computers and which thus constitutes a third instantiation of the same website-essence.