Is Church Discipline Incompatible with Sola Scriptura?

Church Discipline Is, in Theory, Compatible with Sola Scriptura

In their arguments against Sola Scriptura, I have frequently heard Catholics argue that Protestant churches are acting hypocritically when they discipline members for disagreeing with or opposing the teaching of the church, given the teaching of Sola Scriptura.  The argument often goes something like this:  "Sola Scriptura teaches that there is no Magisterium, no Supreme Court in the Church that determines what the true interpretation of Scripture is.  Rather, everyone has a right to interpret Scripture for themselves.  This is called the 'right of private judgment'.  Each Protestant church can maintain its own existence only by maintaining this right, because their independent position is based on their own unique biblical interpretations.  But Protestant churches, particularly confessional churches that have courts that try people for false teaching, are being hypocritical, because the leaders maintain their own positions by means of the right of private judgment, while they deny that right to their members and discipline them for disagreeing with the biblical interpretations of the leaders.  They tell everyone to practice Sola Scriptura--which includes the right of private judgment--but then they discipline them when they do so."

I think this argument--or at least this form of it--is fundamentally flawed.  Here's why:  Protestants who affirm Sola Scriptura do not affirm a "right of private judgment" understood as described above.  No such right is inherent in the idea of Sola Scriptura.  Protestants (at least historical, theologically-conservative, confessional Protestants) do not teach that people have a right to interpret Scripture any way they like.  Protestants affirm rather that the Bible is the supreme authority in matters of doctrine, and that everyone has a duty to agree with the Bible.  Confessional Protestant churches affirm the Bible as the supreme authority, so they do indeed recognize a right and a duty belonging to each Christian to check the views of their leaders against the teachings of Scripture and to reject those views if they go against Scripture.  But if, instead, it is the leaders' position that is in accord with Scripture, the church member has no right to oppose it but rather a duty to submit to it.  So if a church member opposes the teaching of Scripture which is enshrined in the church's official confession, the church has every right to discipline that member.  Such discipline is perfectly consistent with the idea of Sola Scriptura.

In short, confessional Protestants do not teach that everyone's individual interpretation of Scripture is the ultimate authority, or that everyone's personal views are the ultimate authority; rather, they teach that Scripture, rightly interpreted is the ultimate authority, and everyone has a duty to conform their views to Scripture.  So it is perfectly appropriate, then, for churches to discipline members for rejecting or opposing the proper interpretation of Scripture on the basis of their own false interpretations of Scripture.

Church Discipline Is, in Practice, Often Incompatible to Some Degree with Sola Scriptura

However, while this common Catholic argument is fundamentally flawed in the way it is often formulated, there is some truth to it.  Sola Scriptura does say that every individual has the right and the duty to conduct his own investigation into the meaning of Scripture and, after he has done so, to stick with that interpretation even in opposition to church leadership.  That investigation must be conducted with care, diligence, humility, and prayer, with deference to the Church's tradition, to the great doctors of the Church, to the work of scholars, etc.  It cannot be a sloppy, haphazard, biased investigation.  But, once a properly-executed investigation of Scripture is carried out, every individual has a right and a duty to follow the interpretation that emerges from such a study--not because every individual has a right to believe whatever he wants, but because every individual has a duty to follow Scripture as the supreme standard.

However, under the Sola Scriptura view, unlike in Catholicism, there is no human Supreme Court on earth in doctrinal matters that can be looked to with implicit trust to provide the objectively-correct interpretation of Scripture.  This causes some serious problems in Protestant practice that Catholics (and others) have often justly pointed out.

1. For one thing, even if Scripture is perfectly plain and clear in its teachings, the lack of a human supreme doctrinal court tends to contribute to a significant amount of anarchy and division among Protestants.  It is evident why that would be the case, when we understand human nature.  A church may have come to the correct understanding of Scripture, and enshrined that understanding in their confession of faith.  A church member comes along and opposes that teaching.  The church attempts to discipline that member, but the member says, "I have the right and duty to conduct my own investigation into the meaning of Scripture.  I have done so, and I find your interpretation incorrect.  So, since Scripture is a higher standard, a higher court of appeal, than you are, and since you disagree with Scripture, I have a right and a duty to refuse to submit to your discipline and to continue to promote what I see Scripture as teaching.  We must obey God rather than men."  There is no human court to which both sides in this dispute can turn to adjudicate this difference over the proper interpretation of Scripture, so this controversy must end at an impasse, practically speaking, unless one side changes their view.  The two sides will go their separate ways, both insisting that they are right because they are in accord with the true supreme standard--the Scriptures.

Here is a statement of this problem coming, not from a Catholic, but from an Atheist Libertarian author:

The likelihood of conflicting interpretations of special revelation did not pose as much of a theoretical problem for Catholics as it did for Protestants. In the Catholic Church the pope was the ultimate arbiter of doctrinal controversies. His function was rather like that of the Supreme Court in American law; what the pope said was final, and that was the end of the matter (at least in theory). But Protestants, in rejecting papal authority and in maintaining that each person should use his or her own conscience to understand Scripture, generated a serious problem for themselves. Hundreds of Protestant sects arose, and their conflicting interpretations of the Bible frequently spilled over into politics. Thus Catholic critics of Luther, Calvin, and other Reformers were basically correct when they predicted that the Protestant approach to the Bible would result in a type of religious anarchy, as each individual viewed himself as the supreme authority in religious matters. Reverting to my previous analogy, the result was similar to what would happen if America had no Supreme Court, or judicial system of any kind, and each American was free to interpret and implement law according to his own judgment.

2. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that, in reality, Scripture is not always completely plain and clear.  Certainly, there are some things on which Scripture is so explicit and clear that hardly anyone will be able to find themselves in honest disagreement with what almost everyone can see that it says.  For example, if someone wants to argue that Jesus was just an ordinary human being, it is pretty easy to see that Scripture is clearly against such a view.

However, on many issues which often constitute the basis of theological controversy, Scripture is not so explicitly clear.  Take infant baptism, for example.  This is one of the issues over which Protestants and Protestant churches have often been divided.  Scripture never explicitly addresses the subject.  And yet this is an issue that cannot be avoided.  A church must take some stand on this subject.  It must embrace and practice infant baptism, oppose infant baptism, allow infant baptism as optional, etc.  Any church cannot but take some position on this issue that others disagree with.  Since Scripture never explicitly addresses this subject, nor even clearly and plainly hints at it, if one is practicing Sola Scripture one must come to one's convictions on this subject by looking at what Scripture does say and trying to infer, based on all available evidence, what the most likely correct answer is.  But here we are into complex literary and doctrinal interpretation, and at this level of interpretation it is going to be very difficult to come to any clear, objective conclusion.  We simply do not know what the apostles would say if we were able to ask them what the proper answer is.  We can find clues in Scripture that we can try to use to help us lean more one way or another, but we have to admit that the evidence is sparse enough that we would not think it terribly surprising or absurd if, were we able to ask, say, the Apostle Paul what the correct answer is, he gave an answer different from ours.

This is exacerbated by the fact that we can't even know if this method of trying to figure out the truth is the proper one until we first show that Sola Scriptura is the correct presupposition for interpreting Scripture.  If Sola Scriptura is correct, then the proper way to figure out the answers to doctrinal disputes is to do one's best to interpret Scripture for oneself, making use of all the clues available, trying to infer the correct answer as best one can even in areas where Scripture is not plain or explicit.  But if Catholicism should turn out to be true, this would be the wrong way to interpret Scripture.  According to Catholicism, Scripture comes as part of a package deal which includes also an infallible Tradition and an infallible Church teaching authority (Magisterium).  Scripture is meant to be interpreted within the context of the infallible Tradition of the Church and under the guidance of the Church's God-guided interpreters.  The Magisterium of the Church constitutes a divinely-appointed human, visible Supreme Court to adjudicate doctrinal disputes.  So if Catholicism is true, the Sola Scriptura method of interpreting Scripture is almost certainly going to lead to false conclusions, at least sometimes, because we will not be using the proper, God-ordained method for its interpretation.

So when we try to come to a conclusion about something like infant baptism on the basis of our own personal investigation into Scripture, trying to sort out the most likely answer based on whatever clues and hints we can find, without any reliance on an infallible Tradition or Magisterium, we are in deep waters, and the results of our investigation are going to be very subjective.  If we know for a fact that Sola Scriptura is the right method for interpreting Scripture, then we can trust that God will overrule the obvious tendency towards subjectivity here and ensure that, if we do our best, we will end up with the right answer.  And, when we find ourselves in dispute with lots of other readers of Scripture who come to different conclusions, we will assume that they are objectively wrong, even though it is hard to prove on a human level that one's own conclusion was arrived at in a clearly, objectively-better way than the alternative conclusions.  (After all, in disputes over the meaning of complex and subtle literary documents, it is notoriously difficult to separate objectively-better interpretations from differences rooted in personality, background, bias, etc., and the Bible is certainly an extremely complex literary document, written in ancient times in ancient languages by many different people in ancient cultures, very alien from our own in many ways, over thousands of years, containing a variety of literary forms, etc.)  But when we throw in the fact that we first have to prove that Sola Scriptura is even the proper way of proceeding to begin with, I think it must be concluded that there is simply insufficient data in Scripture available to do what Protestants try to do with it.  To a large extent, Protestants are trying to squeeze the milk of a complete and detailed doctrinal system out of the stone of a Scripture that simply cannot yield what they want from it.

Conclusion

I think that Catholics should be more careful in their criticism of Sola Scriptura not to caricature the viewpoint.  To conflate the idea of Scripture as the supreme doctrinal standard with the idea that people have a right to interpret Scripture in their own way is inaccurate and misrepresents what Protestants believe.  However, I think that this caricature is based on some true observations and legitimate criticisms that, if stated more carefully and clearly, can constitute some significant and legitimate concerns and objections regarding Sola Scriptura without mischaracterizing the position.  While Sola Scriptura does not imply that individuals have an intrinsic right to interpret Scripture contrary to the teachings of the leaders of their particular church, and so church discipline is not, per se, contrary to Sola Scriptura, yet, in practice, the lack of a supreme human doctrinal court combined with Scripture's lack of explicitness and clarity on many important doctrinal subjects does indeed lead to the conclusion that there is a degree of inconsistency between the practice of Sola Scriptura and the practice of church discipline.  For a church to be able reasonably to discipline one of its members for rejecting or opposing the doctrinal positions of the church and its leaders, the church has to be able to show with objective conclusiveness that its own doctrinal positions are indeed the positions of Scripture.  Since the Sola Scriptura method of interpreting Scripture cannot supply that kind of objective conclusiveness, there is often an unreasonable inequality involved when the church regards its own interpretations of Scripture as objectively superior to the interpretations of its allegedly erring members.

For more, see here, here, and here.

Published on the feast of St. Maximilian Kolbe.

Disobedient Obedience? The Paradoxical Logic of Catholic Hyper-Traditionalism

But what think ye? A certain man had two sons; and he came to the first, and said, "Son, go work to day in my vineyard." He answered and said, "I will not": but afterward he repented, and went. And he came to the second, and said likewise. And he answered and said, "I go, sir": and went not. Whether of them twain did the will of his father? They say unto him, "The first." Jesus saith unto them, "Verily I say unto you, that the publicans and the harlots go into the kingdom of God before you. For John came unto you in the way of righteousness, and ye believed him not: but the publicans and the harlots believed him: and ye, when ye had seen it, repented not afterward, that ye might believe him."

Matthew 21:28-32

Catholic hyper-traditionalists like the Society of St. Pius X want to have their cake and eat it too.  They want to dissent and rebel against the teachings of the Magisterium of the Catholic Church, but at the same time they want to present themselves as obedient children of the Church.  Not surprisingly, this leads to some interesting twists in terms of how they justify their position.  I thought that perhaps an analogy by way of a fictional dialogue might be a good way of bringing this out.  Of course, in my dialogue, we are dealing with motherly authority, which has no promise of unfailing divine guidance from God like the Magisterial authority of the Church has according to Catholic teaching.  So if my dialogue shows the absurdity of Johnny's reasoning in this case, how much more would the argument apply when we are dealing with the divinely protected and guided authority of the Church, which God has appointed to "preserve God's people from deviations and defections and to guarantee them the objective possibility of professing the true faith without error" (Catechism of the Catholic Church #890)?

I'm imagining Johnny as being about seven or eight years old, though I've given him a rather sophisticated vocabulary and reasoning ability in order to explore more nuance than a real, ordinary seven-or-eight-year-old would likely be able to express.

Mom:  Johnny, I would like you to clean up your room before going outside to play today.

Johnny:  No, Mom, I won't do it.

Mom:  What do you mean you won't do it?  I'm telling you to do it.

Johnny:  And with all due respect, I'm telling you I won't.

Mom:  You're directly disobeying what I'm telling you to do.  There is no respect in that!

Johnny:  Actually, Mom, though it may seem like I'm disobeying you, I'm actually obeying you.

Mom:  And how, exactly, do you make that out?

Johnny:  Well, a few days ago, if you recall, we were talking about how our days were going to be structured this summer, and you said that you were going to allow me to go outside each day to play after lunch.  Well, I just finished lunch, so, according to what you said before, I should be allowed to go outside and play now.  Your present command is in contradiction with your previous statement.  Since they can't both be correct, I have to decide which one I ought to follow.  Upon reflection, I have decided that your previous statement makes more sense, and so I have chosen to follow that in preference to your current command.  So, although I am technically disobeying your current command, I'm actually doing it out of obedience to you.

Mom:  But my previous statement doesn't contradict my current command!  I didn't mean that you would always be allowed to go outside and play after lunch in every possible set of circumstances.  I was stating my general intention, but one which could admit of exceptions.  Today, for example, your room is messier than usual, because we didn't have time to clean it this morning, so you need to clean it up now before you go outside to play.

Johnny:  Mom, that may be your interpretation of your previous statement, but I disagree with that interpretation.  You never said that you were intending merely a general policy that would admit of exceptions.  You simply said that you were planning to let me go outside to play after lunch each day.  You didn't use any mitigating language, like the word sometimes, nor did you state any exceptions.  So I have to insist that you are misinterpreting your previous statement, and your current command does indeed contradict that statement.  Now, you have also said before that you are capable of being wrong, and that I always ought to do what is right.  Well, if you are capable of being wrong, then you are capable of being wrong about how you understand the meaning of your previous statement, and about what I ought to do today.  So, in honor of your command to me to always do what is right, I must, respectfully, disobey your command to clean my room.

Mom:  What?!  You can't say I've misinterpreted my own statement!  It was my statement!  I said it!  I'm the one who gets to interpret what it meant!

Johnny:  But you're ignoring what I just pointed out, that you have said you can be wrong sometimes.  So I have to consider the possibility that you might be wrong in your interpretation of your previous statement.  I have to consider your contradictory statements and see which of them makes more sense, and then I have to go with what I think is right--as you have always taught me to do.  So my disobedience to you is actually my obedient tribute to your authority.

Mom:  This is ridiculous!  Johnny, all your bluster and pretense of obedience can't obscure the fact that you are sitting here, right now, explicitly refusing to obey what I'm telling you to do!  You can't pretend that you respect my authority when you are blatantly defying it!  Your pretense of obeying me is based on a twisting of things that I have said in the past, taking my own words out of the context of my own interpretation and giving them your own interpretation instead and then using them to tell me I mean something different from what I'm clearly and plainly telling you I mean!  But you don't get to give the definitive interpretation of my statements.  I do!  They are my statements, after all!  You're not obeying me; you're obeying nobody but yourself.  You're ignoring your real mother and creating a fake, imaginary mother in your head who agrees with what you think you should do, and then using your submission to this imaginary mother as the basis for your claim that you are obeying your real mother!  Yes, I made a general statement before, but now I have clarified further what I meant by it as a new situation has arisen.  Yes, I've said in the past that I can be wrong sometimes, but that doesn't give you a license to take any statement of mine you wish, declare that it could be wrong, and so decide to ignore it unless it agrees with what you already have decided to do.  I did not intend to give you that license when I made the general comment that sometimes I can be wrong.  Again, you are taking my words, ignoring my own stated meaning of them, giving them your own interpretation, and then using them to defy my authority while claiming to be submitting to it.  But your defiance is not removed simply because you try to obscure it with a barrage of convoluted and illogical reasoning and cover it with the veneer of the language of obedience.  I'm glad we're catching this behavior now!  I can't imagine what would happen if you tried to use reasoning like this with some future employer!

Johnny:  Mom, you've always taught me to think for myself.  Now you're asking me to stop thinking and just blindly follow whatever you say?

Mom:  It is not an abandonment of critical thinking to recognize that a person has the right to interpret their own statements, and that a person who has authority has the right to explain their own commands, and even to command different things at different times depending on the circumstances.  Look, Johnny, I'm not asking you to ignore what your reason is telling you.  But you have no basis in reason to draw the conclusion that your interpretations of my previous statements are correct and mine are wrong.  Obviously, the fact that they are my statements, combined with the fact that I have authority over you as your mother, implies that you ought to defer to my own reading of my own words.  So unless you can prove that I have blatantly contradicted myself, or that I am confused and don't really mean what I am saying, you can't jump to that conclusion.  You can't dismiss my own perfectly plausible account of the meaning of my own statements in favor of your own interpretations without much weightier justification than simply pointing out ways my words, by themselves, without the context of my own explanatory interpretations, might be understood to mean something else.  You would not want anyone to interpret your statements in that way, and so you shouldn't do it to anyone else either, and you especially should not be doing it to your mother!

For more, see here and here.

Why Catholicism? - In a Nutshell

Since Christianity is a divine revelation—that is, it comes from God supernaturally as opposed to being something we’ve come up with through our own reasoning, though it is consistent with our reason—it is something that we can only receive by virtue of its being handed down to us through history as that history is guided by the providence of God.  God gave his revelation through the patriarchs and the prophets, through Christ’s words and actions, and through the apostles, and the apostles have handed it down to the community of Christians—the Church—which has passed it down through history.  We must receive it as it has been passed down.  We cannot alter it to fit our own desires.  We must trust God that he has guided the passing down of his Word through history in such a way that it has been preserved in its accuracy and fullness.

For example, consider the question of the canon of Scripture—that is, the list of books that are supposed to be in the Bible.  How do we know which books are supposed to be in the Bible?  How do we know, for example, that the Book of Jude is supposed to be in the Bible?  All mainstream Christians (today) think it is, but how do we know?  It was the early Church that decided on the canon of Scripture, and claimed divine guidance in doing so.  All we can do is trust that God guided the Church to get it right.  We have no way of independently verifying whether or not Jude should be in the Bible, for even if we can prove that the book has been around for a long time, has been accepted by many Christians from the earliest times, etc., this still falls short of giving us an adequate basis for concluding that it should be in the Bible unless, in the end, we trust that God ensured that the process of canonization went aright.  So we have good reason to give that trust, for we have good reason to believe that God, if he wants us to receive his revelation, will have made it possible for us to know where to find it.  And this same reality applies to all aspects of the Christian revelation.  How do we know that there is any Scripture at all?  How do we know if God’s Word is only passed down infallibly in Scripture (as Protestants say) or if God has also guaranteed the infallible passing down of his Word in the Church’s Tradition (that is, in her preaching, teaching, worship, etc.) (as Catholics and Orthodox Christians say)?  We have to look at history and see what God, in his providence, has actually passed down to us.

When we look at history, we can see that just as the historic Church, organically descended from the apostles, handed down to us a Scripture and a canon of Scripture, she also handed down to us the claim of an infallible Tradition and an infallible Church authority to authentically interpret and apply God’s Word in Scripture and Tradition.  The historic Church did not hold to the Protestant view of Sola Scriptura (Scripture alone).  The Protestants had to break off from the faith as this had been historically handed down in order to maintain their view of Sola Scriptura.  Could they justify this?  I don’t think they could.  They could not prove Sola Scriptura from Scripture, for it does not teach it.  They could not prove Sola Scriptura from history, or from Tradition, or from reason, or from anything else.  Therefore, the Protestants had no basis to break off from the historic Church on this point.  And all the other doctrinal points whereby Protestants disagree with Catholics and Orthodox are rooted in Sola Scriptura, for they come from Protestants interpreting Scripture themselves without listening to the guidance of the infallible Tradition as interpreted by the infallible Church.  So if Sola Scriptura falls, they fall too.  There is therefore no justification for the Protestant position in general.

What about Catholicism’s other serious competitor, the Eastern Orthodox churches (and I’m including here also other Eastern churches that aren’t in communion with the Catholic Church, such as the Oriental Orthodox churches)?  Well, they’ve got the same problem the Protestants have.  They broke off from the Catholic Church during the Middle Ages.  Their main difference with the Catholics is over the office of the Pope.  The historic Church acknowledged the Pope—the Bishop of Rome—to be the head of the Church’s bishops, for he is the Successor of St. Peter, the head of the apostles.  He thus has the highest authority in the Church, and he has also a divine promise of guidance from God to keep his teaching free from error, so that he can be the guarantor of the unity and orthodoxy of the universal Church.  The Eastern churches, it would appear from history, along with the Western churches, used to view him in this way (and some of them still do), as the whole Church did from the beginning, but in the Middle Ages many Eastern churches broke off from Catholicism and ended up repudiating this view of the Pope.  So what is their justification for this position?  Well, they actually aren’t entirely sure.  There is no official doctrine in the Eastern Orthodox churches (or the other non-Catholic Eastern churches) as to what exactly is the ultimate way to determine what true doctrine is.  They believe in an infallible Scripture, an infallible Tradition, and an infallible Church, but, unlike the Catholic Church, they do not have any official or universally-agreed upon criteria for determining how to tell what the infallible Church or the infallible Tradition are saying (and thus also how to interpret the infallible Scripture).  In spite of this, however, many of the Eastern Orthodox attempt to justify their position by saying that it is the position of the early Church, and that the Catholics broke off from the positions of the earlier Church in a number of areas (whereas the Orthodox have not broken off).  The problem with this is that the Eastern Orthodox cannot back up their claims on this point.  That is, they cannot show from history that the early Church ever embraced any ideas that are incompatible with the teaching of the Catholic Church.  And they cannot show that the early Church ever embraced definitively their own positions by which they distinguish themselves from Catholicism (such as their view of the papacy).  Therefore, the Eastern Orthodox cannot provide an adequate justification for their own position or their break from the Catholic Church.

The Catholic Church, on the other hand, can indeed justify her position.  The early Church, as we’ve seen, taught that the revelation of God is known through the three-legged stool of infallible Scripture, infallible Tradition, and infallible Church authority.  You need all three of these legs working in harmony to know God’s revelation aright, and God protects all three from error and keeps them working properly in the transmission, interpretation, and application of divine revelation.  (The historic Church, it is important to note, also accepted the idea of doctrinal development.  Although the revelation of God was given completely to the Church by the time of the apostles, yet God guides the Church over time to fully unpack, understand, and apply all the implications of that revelation.  The great Church Father St. Vincent of Lerins compared the Church’s doctrine to a living being which grows from an embryo into an adult.  All the potential for its adulthood is packed into it from the very beginning, but the fullness of that adulthood is only realized over time as the living creature develops.)  This is the faith that the historic Church has handed down.  So this rules out Protestantism.  But the early Church also handed down the idea that the Bishop of Rome has divine guidance to get the faith right and to lead the Church, and she has handed down no alternative method of determining who is right when there is a split among bishops over something not previously definitively decided by the Church.  So what we have in Catholicism, Eastern Orthodoxy, and Protestantism are three traditions that have broken off from each other.  Two of them (Protestantism and Eastern Orthodoxy) are out of accord with the teaching of the historic Church, and those same two can provide no objective criteria that can show their own position to be correct.  The Catholic Church, on the other hand, has a view that is grounded in the teaching and practice of the historic Church, cannot be shown to contradict the historic Church, and puts forward a viable criterion—the authority and reliability of the Bishop of Rome as the Successor of St. Peter—that is capable of showing her own view to be correct.

Even the very name of Catholic is a marker of her continuity with the historic Church, for this was the proper name the Church adopted for herself in her early centuries, and both Eastern and Western Fathers have seen in this name a divine gift to the Church to help people distinguish the de jure Church of Christ from groups which lack de jure authority.

In summary, then, since Christianity is a divine revelation, we must defer to the continuity of the faith as this is handed down to us historically in the providence of God.  (We should also add that the historical records show that Christ founded a Church and appointed leaders with authority.  Christ appointed apostles, who appointed bishops, who appointed other bishops, who appointed other bishops, and so on down through history.  The historic Church has emphasized the importance of preserving the unity of the Church and obedience to her established leaders, and she has taught that God protects the unity and orthodoxy of the Church through the succession of her bishops, especially of the Bishop of Rome.  So just as we should defer to the continuity of the faith in history, we should also defer to the unity of the Church and the authority of her established teachers.)  But if we are to defer to the continuity, unity, and authority of the historic faith and the historic Church, we must stick with the Catholic Church, for she can trace herself and her faith back to the apostles, while the groups which have broken with her over the centuries cannot provide a justification for their separation.

For more evidence backing up this outline, see here, here and here.  Also see my book-length case for Catholicism, No Grounds for Divorce.

St. Francis de Sales on the Pope as the Guarantor of Orthodoxy and Unity in the Church

Below you will find a selection from St. Francis de Sales' great work The Catholic Controversy.  St. Francis is a Doctor of the Church and was a very successful missionary to the Calvinists of his day (he lived from 1567 to 1622), in addition to being a very well-loved and respected devotional writer.  In this section of the book, addressing Protestants and encouraging them to abandon their Protestant ministers who have led them away from the Catholic faith and the Catholic Church, he is explaining the Catholic view of the papacy.  In particular, he is discussing the central importance of papal authority to the Catholic Church.  Christ appointed St. Peter and his successors to be the guarantor of the unity and orthodoxy of the Catholic Church.  The Pope has been given authority as supreme judge in matters of the faith, and to be in communion with the Catholic Church and in agreement with the faith is to follow and abide by the Pope's judgments.  One cannot dissent from the Pope's official teachings without violating the requirements of the Catholic faith.

My text is taken from the full and plain text version of The Catholic Controversy as found here on the Internet Archive website.  This version was published originally in 1909 (Third Edition, Revised and Augmented) in London by Burns and Oates, translated by Rev. H. B. Mackey, under the direction of Rev. John Cuthbert Hedley, Bishop of Newport.

Below the selection, I provide some further commentary on some of the nuances St. Francis discusses in the course of his teaching.

CHAPTER XIII.

IN HOW GREAT ESTEEM THE AUTHORITY OF THE POPE

OUGHT TO BE HELD

It is certainly not without mystery that often in the Gospel where there is occasion for the Apostles in general to speak, S. Peter alone speaks for all. In S. John (vi.) it was he who said for all: Lord, to whom shall we go? Thou hast the words of eternal life. And we have believed and have known that thou art the Christ the Son of God. It was he, in S. Matthew (xvi.), who in the name of all made that noble confession: Thou art Christ, the Son of the living God. He asked for all: Behold we have left all things, &c. (Matt, xxvii.) In S. Luke (xii.): Lord, dost thou speak this parable to us, or likewise to all? 

It is usual that the head should speak for the whole body; and what the head says is considered to be said by all the rest. Do you not see that in the election of S. Matthias it is he alone who speaks and determines?

The Jews asked all the Apostles: What shall we do, men and brethren (Acts, ii.)? S. Peter alone answers for all: Do penance, &c. And it is for this reason that S. Chrysostom and Origen have called him "the mouth and the crown of the Apostles," as we saw above, because he was accustomed to speak for all the Apostles; and the same S. Chrysostom calls him "the mouth of Christ," because what he says for the whole Church and to the whole Church as head and pastor, is not so much a word of man as of Our Lord: Amen, I say to you he that receiveth whomsoever 1 send receiveth me (John xiii.). Therefore what he said and determined could not be false. And truly if the confirmer be fallen, have not all the rest fallen? — if the confirmer fall or totter, who shall confirm him? — if the confirmer be not firm and steady, when the others grow weak who shall strengthen them? For it is written that if the blind lead the blind both shall fall into the ditch, and if the unsteady and the feeble would hold up and support the feeble, they shall both come to ground. So that Our Lord, giving authority and command to Peter to confirm the others, has in like proportion given him the power and the means to do this; otherwise vainly would he have commanded things that were impossible. Now in order to confirm the others and to strengthen the weak, one must not be subject to weakness oneself, but be solid and fixed as a true stone and a rock. Such was S. Peter, in so far as he was Pastor-general and governor of the Church.

So when S. Peter was placed as foundation of the Church, and the Church was certified that the gates of hell should not prevail against it, — was it not enough to say that S. Peter, as foundation-stone of the ecclesiastical government and administration, could not be crushed and broken by infidelity or error, which is the principal gate of hell? For who knows not that if the foundation be overthrown, if that can be sapped, the whole building falls. In the same way, if the supreme acting shepherd can conduct his sheep into venomous pastures, it is clearly visible that the flock is soon to be lost. For if the supreme acting shepherd leads out of the path, who will put him right? If he stray, who will bring him back?

In truth, it is necessary that we should follow him simply, not guide him; otherwise the sheep would be shepherds. And indeed the Church cannot always be united in General Council, and during the first three centuries none were held. In the difficulties then which daily arise, to whom could one better address oneself, from whom could one take a safer law, a surer rule, than from the general head, and from the vicar of Our Lord? Now all this has not only been true of S. Peter, but also of his successors; for the cause remaining the effect remains likewise. The Church has always need of an infallible confirmer, to whom she can appeal; of a foundation which the gates of hell, and principally error, cannot overthrow; and has always need that her pastor should be unable to lead her children into error. The successors, then, of S. Peter all have these same privileges, which do not follow the person but the dignity and public charge.

S. Bernard calls the Pope another "Moses in authority." Now how great the authority of Moses was everyone knows. For he sat and judged concerning all the differences amongst the people, and all difficulties which occurred in the service of God: he appointed judges for affairs of slight importance, but the great doubts were reserved for his cognizance: if God would speak to the people, it is by his mouth and using him as a medium. So then the supreme pastor of the Church is competent and sufficient judge for us in all our greatest difficulties; otherwise we should be in worse condition than that ancient people who had a tribunal to which they might appeal for the resolution of their doubts, particularly in religious matters. And if anyone would reply that Moses was not a priest, nor an ecclesiastical pastor, I would send him back to what I have said above on this point. For it would be tedious to make these repetitions.

In Deuteronomy (xvii.): Thou shalt do whatsoever they shall say that preside in the place which the Lord shall choose, and what they shall teach thee according to his law: neither shalt thou decline to the right hand nor to the left hand. But he that shall he proud, and refuse to ohey the commandment of the priest . . . that man shall die. What will you say to this necessity of accepting the judgment of the sovereign pontiff? — that one was obliged to accept that judgment which was according to the law, not any other? Yes, but in this it was needful to follow the sentence of the priest; otherwise, if one had not followed it but had examined into it, it would have been vain to have gone to him, and the difficulty and doubt would never have been settled. Therefore it is said simply: He that shall he proud, and refuse to obey the commandment of the priest and the decree of the judge shall die. And
in Malachi (ii. ): The lips of the priest shall keep knowledge; and they shall seek the law at his mouth. Whence it follows that not everybody could answer himself in religious matters, nor bring forward the law after his own fancy, but must do so according as the pontiff laid it down. Now if God had such great providence over the religion and peace of conscience of the Jews as to establish for them a supreme judge in whose sentence they were bound to acquiesce, there can be no doubt he has provided Christianity with a pastor, who has this same authority, to remove the doubts and scruples which might arise concerning the declarations of the Scriptures.

And if the High Priest wore on his breast the Rational of judgment (Ex. xxviii.), in which were the Urim and the Thummim, doctrine and truth, as some interpret them, or illuminations and perfections, as others say (which is almost the same thing, since perfection consists in truth and doctrine is only illumination) — shall we suppose that the High Priest of the New Law has not also the efficacy of them? In truth, all that was given out and out to the ancient Church, and to the servant Agar, has been given in much better form to Sara and to the Spouse. Our High Priest then still has the Urim and the Thummim on his breast.

Now whether this doctrine and truth were nothing but these two words inscribed on the Rational, as S. Augustine seems to think and Hugh of S. Victor maintains, or whether they were the name of God, as Rabbi Solomon asserts according to Vatablus and Augustine bishop of Eugubium, or whether it was simply the stones of the Rational, by which Almighty God revealed his will to the priest, as that learned man Francis Ribera holds; — the reasons why the High Priest had doctrine and truth in the Rational on his breast was without doubt because he declared the truth of judgment, as by the Urim and Thummim the priests were instructed as to the good pleasure of God, and their understandings enlightened and perfected by the Divine revelation: thus the good Lyra understood it, and Ribera has in my opinion sufficiently proved. Hence when David wished to know whether he should pursue the Amalecites he said to the priest Abiathar: Bring me hither the ephod ( i Kings XXX. 7), or vestment for the shoulders, which was without doubt to discover the will of God by means of the Rational which was joined to it, as this Doctor Ribera continues learnedly to prove. I ask you, — if in the shadow there were illuminations of doctrine and perfections of truth on the breast of the priest to feed and confirm the people therewith, what is there that our High Priest shall not have, the priest of us, I say, who are in the day and under the risen sun? The High Priest of old was but the vicar and lieutenant of Our Lord, as ours is, but he would seem to have presided over the night by his illuminations, and ours presides over the day by his instructions; both of them as ministering for another and by the light of the Sun of Justice, who though he is risen is still veiled from our eyes by our own mortality; — for to see him face to face belongs ordinarily to those alone who are delivered from the body which goes to corruption. This has been the faith of the whole ancient Church, which in its difficulties has always had recourse to the Rational of the See of Rome to see therein doctrine and truth. It is for this reason that S. Bernard has called the Pope "Aaron in dignity," and S. Jerome the Holy See "the most safe harbour of Catholic communion," and "heir of the Apostles," for he bears the Rational to enlighten with it the whole of Christendom, like the Apostles and Aaron, in doctrine and truth. It is in this sense that S. Jerome says to S. Damasus: "He who gathereth not with thee scattereth, that is, he who is not of Christ is of Antichrist ;" and S. Bernard says that the scandals which occur, particularly in the faith, must be brought before the Roman See: — "for I think it proper that there chiefly should the damage of faith be repaired where faith cannot fail; for to what other see was it ever said:I have prayed for thee that thy faith fail not?" And S. Cyprian: "They dare to sail off to the Apostolic See and to the chief (principalem) Church, forgetting tliat those are Romans, to whom wrong faith cannot have access." Do you not see that he speaks of the Romans because of the Chair of S. Peter, and says that error cannot prevail there. The Fathers of the Council of Milevis with the Blessed S. Augustine demand help and invoke the authority of the Roman See against the Pelagian heresy, writing to Pope Innocent in these terms: "We beseech you to deign to apply the pastoral solicitude to the great dangers of the infirm members of Christ; since a new heresy and most destructive tempest has begun to arise amongst the enemies of the grace of Christ." And if you would know why they appeal to him, what do they say? "The Lord has by his highest favour placed thee in the Apostolic See." This is what this holy Council with its great S. Augustine believed, to whom S. Innocent replying in a Letter which follows the one just quoted amongst those of S. Augustine: "Carefully and rightfully," he says, "have you consulted the secret oracles of the Apostolic honour: his, I say, with whom, besides those things which are outside, remains the solicitude of all the churches as to what doctrine is to be held in doubtful things. For you have followed the fashion of the ancient rule, which you and I know to have been always held by the whole world. But this I pass over, for I do not believe that it is unknown to your wisdom; how indeed have you confirmed it by your actions, save knowing that throughout all the provinces answers to petitioners ever emanate from the Apostolic See? Especially when questions of faith are discussed, I consider that all our brethren and co-bishops must refer to Peter only, that is, to the author of their name and honour; even as your charity has now referred that which may advantage all churches in general throughout the whole world." Behold the honour and credit in which was the Apostolic See with the most learned and most holy of the Ancients, yea with entire Councils. They went to it as to the true Ephod and Rational of the new law. Thus did S. Jerome go to it in the time of Damasus, to whom, after having said that the East was cutting and tearing to pieces the robe of Our Lord, seamless and woven from the top throughout, and that the little foxes were spoiling the vineyard of the Master, he says: "As it is difficult, amongst broken cisterns that can hold no water, to discern where is that fountain sealed up, and garden enclosed, therefore I considered that I must consult the Chair of Peter and the faith praised by Apostolic mouth." I shall never end if I try to bring forward the grand words which the Ancients have uttered on this point: he who wishes can read them quoted in the great Catechism of Peter Canisius, in which they have been given in full by Busembaum. Cyprian refers all heresies and schisms to the contempt of this chief minister; so does S. Jerome; S. Ambrose holds for one same thing "to communicate and agree with the Catholic bishops and to agree with the Roman Church" He protests that he follows in all things and everywhere the form of the Roman Church. S. Irenaeus will have every one be united to this Holy See, "on account of its principal power." The Eusebians bring before it the accusations against S. Athanasius; S. Athanasius, who was at Alexandria, a principal and patriarchal see, went to answer at Rome, being called and cited to appear there: his adversaries would not appear, "knowing," says Theodoret, "that their lies were manifested in open court." The Eusebians acknowledge the authority of the see of Rome when they call S. Athanasius thither, and S. Athanasius when he presents himself. But particularly do those Arian heretics the Eusebians confess the authority of the see of Rome when they dare not appear there for fear of being condemned.

But who does not know that all the ancient heretics tried to get themselves acknowledged by the Pope? Witness the Montanists or Cataphrygians, who so deceived Pope Zephyrinus, if we may believe Tertullian (not now the man he had been but become a heretic himself), that he issued letters of reunion in their favour, which, however, he promptly revoked by the advice of Praxeas. In fine, he who despises the authority of the Pope will restore the Pelagians, Priscillians and others, who were only condemned by provincial councils with the authority of the Holy See of Rome. If I wished to occupy myself in showing you how much Luther made of it in the beginning of his heresy I should astonish you with the great alteration in this your father. Look at him in Cochlseus: "Prostrate at the feet of Your Beatitude, I offer myself with all I am and have; give me life, slay me, call, recall, approve, reject; I shall acknowledge the voice of Christ presiding and speaking." These are his words in the dedicatory letter which he wrote to Pope Leo X on certain conclusions of his, in the year 1518. But I cannot omit what this great arch-minister wrote in 1519, in certain other resolutions of other propositions; for in the thirteenth he not only acknowledges the authority of the Holy Roman See, but proves it by six reasons which he holds to be demonstrations. I will summarise them:
1st reason — the Pope could not have reached this height and this monarchy except by the will of God; but the will of God is always to be venerated, therefore the primacy of the Pope is not to be called in question.
2d. We must give in to an adversary rather than break the union of charity; therefore it is better to obey the Pope than to separate from the Church.
3d. We must not resist God who wills to lay on us the burden of obeying many rulers, according to the word of Solomon in his Proverbs (xxviii. 2).
4th. There is no power which is not from God, therefore that of the Pope which is so fully established is from God.
5th. Practically the same.
6th. All the faithful so believe, and it is impossible that Our Lord should not be with them; now we must stay with Our Lord and Christians in all things and everywhere: He says afterwards that these reasons were unanswerable, and that all the Scripture comes to support them. What do you think of Luther, — is he not a Catholic? And yet this was at the beginning of his reformation.

Calvin gives the same testimony, though he goes on to embroil the question as much as he can; for speaking of the See of Rome he confesses that the Ancients have honoured and revered it, that it has been the refuge of bishops, and more firm in the faith than the other sees, which last fact he attributes to a want of quickness of understanding.

CHAPTER XIV.

HOW THE MINISTERS HAVE VIOLATED THIS AUTHORITY.

Under the ancient law the High Priest did not wear the Rational except when he was vested in the pontifical robes and was entering before the Lord. Thus we do not say that the Pope cannot err in his private opinions, as did John XXII; or be altogether a heretic as perhaps Honorius was. Now when he is explicitly a heretic, he falls ipso facto from his dignity and out of the Church, and the Church must either deprive him, or, as some say, declare him deprived, of his Apostolic See, and must say as S. Peter did: Let another take his bishopric. When he errs in his private opinion he must be instructed, advised, convinced; as happened with John XXII, who was so far from dying obstinate or from determining anything during his life concerning his opinion, that he died whilst he was making the examination which is necessary for determining in a matter of faith, as his successor declared in the Extrazagantes which begins Benedictus Deus. But when he is clothed with the pontifical garments, I mean when he teaches the whole Church as shepherd, in general matters of faith and morals, then there is nothing but doctrine and truth. And in fact everything a king says is not a law or an edict, but that only which a king says as king and as a legislator. So everything the Pope says is not canon law or of legal obligation; he must mean to define and to lay down the law for the sheep, and he must keep the due order and form. Thus we say that we must appeal to him not as to a learned man, for in this he is ordinarily surpassed by some others, but as to the general head and pastor of the Church: and as such we must honour, follow, and firmly embrace his doctrine, for then he carries on his breast the Urim and Thummim, doctrine and truth. And again we must not think that in everything and everywhere his judgment is infallible, but then only when he gives judgment on a matter of faith in questions necessary to the whole Church; for in particular cases which depend on human fact he can err, there is no doubt, though it is not for us to control him in these cases save with all reverence, submission, and discretion. Theologians have said, in a word, that he can err in questions of fact, not in questions of right; that he can err extra cathedram, outside the chair of Peter, that is, as a private individual, by writings and bad example.

But he cannot err when he is in cathedra, that is, when he intends to make an instruction and decree for the guidance of the whole Church, when he means to confirm his brethren as supreme pastor, and to conduct them into the pastures of the faith. For then it is not so much man who determines, resolves, and defines as it is the Blessed Holy Spirit by man, which Spirit, according to the promise made by Our Lord to the Apostles, teaches all truth to the Church, and, as the Greek says and the Church seems to understand in a collect of Pentecost, conducts and directs his Church into all truth: But when that Spirit of truth shall come, he will teach you all truth or, will lead you into all truth. And how does the Holy Spirit lead the Church except by the ministry and office of preachers and pastors? But if the pastors have pastors they must also follow them, as all must follow him who is the supreme pastor, by whose ministry Our God wills to lead not only the lambs and little sheep, but the sheep and mothers of lambs; that is, not the people only but also the other pastors: he succeeds S. Peter, who received this charge: Feed my sheep. Thus it is that God leads his Church into the pastures of his Holy Word, and in the exposition of this he who seeks the truth under other leading loses it. The Holy Spirit is the leader of the Church, he leads it by its pastor; he therefore who follows not the pastor follows not the Holy Spirit.

But the great Cardinal of Toledo remarks most appositely on this place that it is not said he shall carry the Church into all truth, but he shall lead; to show that though the Holy Spirit enlightens the Church, he wills at the same time that she should use the diligence which is required for keeping the true way, as the Apostles did, who, having to give an answer to an important question, debated, comparing the Holy Scriptures together; and when they had diligently done this they concluded by this — It hath seemed good to the Holy Spirit and to us; that is, the Holy Spirit has enlightened us and we have walked, he has guided us and we have followed him, up to this truth. The ordinary means must be employed to discover the truth, and yet in this must be acknowledged the drawing and presence of the Holy Spirit. Thus is the Christian flock led — by the Holy Spirit but under the charge and guidance of its Pastor, who however does not walk at hazard, but according to necessity convokes the other pastors, either partially or universally, carefully regards the track of his predecessors, considers the Urim and Thummim of the Word of God, enters before his God by his prayers and invocations, and, having thus diligently sought out the true way, boldly puts himself on his voyage and courageously sets sail. Happy the man who follows him and puts himself under the discipline of his crook! Happy the man who embarks in his boat, for he shall feed on truth, and shall arrive at the port of holy doctrine!

Thus he never gives a general command to the whole Church in necessary things except with the assistance of the Holy Spirit, who, as he is not wanting in necessary things even to the animals, because he has established them, will not be more wanting to Christianity in what is necessary for its life and perfection. And how would the Church be one and holy, as the Scriptures and Creeds describe her? — for if she followed a pastor, and the pastor erred, how would she be holy; if she followed him not, how would she be one? And what confusion would be seen in Christendom, while the one party should consider a law good the others bad, and while the sheep, instead of feeding and fattening in the pasture of Scripture and the Holy Word, should occupy themselves in controlling the decision of their superior?

It remains therefore that according to Divine Providence we consider as closed that which S. Peter shall close with his keys, and as open that which he shall open, when seated in his chair of doctrine teaching the whole Church.

If indeed the ministers had censured vices, proved the inutility of certain decrees and censures, borrowed some holy counsels from the ethical books of S. Gregory, and from S. Bernard's De Consideratione, brought forward some good plan for removing the abuses which have crept into the administration of benefices through the malice of the age and of men, and had addressed themselves to His Holiness with humility and gratitude, all good men would have honoured them and favoured their designs. The good Cardinals Contarini the Theatine, Sadolet, and Pole, with those other great men who counselled the reformation of abuses in this way, have thereby deserved immortal commendation from posterity. But to fill heaven and earth with invectives, railings, outrages, — to calumniate the Pope, and not only in his person, which is bad enough, but in his office, to attack the See which all antiquity has honoured, to wish to go so far as to sit in judgment upon him, contrary to the sense of the whole Church, to style his position itself anti-Christianism — who shall call this right? If the great Council of Chalcedon was so indignant when the Patriarch Dioscorus excommunicated Pope Leo, who can endure the insolence of Luther, who issued a Bull in which he excommunicates the Pope and the bishops and the whole Church? All the Church gives him (the Pope) patents of honour, speaks to him with reverence. What shall we say of that fine preface in which Luther addressed the Holy See: "Martin Luther to the most Holy Apostolic See and its whole Parliament, grace and health. In the first place, most holy see, crack but burst not on account of this new salutation in which I place my name first and in the principal place." And after having quoted the Bull against which he was writing, he begins with these wicked and vile words: "Ego autem dico ad papam et hullce hujus minas, istud: qui prce minis moritur ad ejus sepulturam compulsari debet crepitihus ventris." And when writing against the King of England, — "Living," said he, "I will be the enemy of the papacy, burnt I will be thy enemy." What say you of this great Father of the Church? Are not these words worthy of such a reformer? I am ashamed to read them, and my hand is vexed when it lays out such shameful things, but if they are hidden from you, you will never believe that he is such as he is, — and when he says: "It is ours not to be judged by him but to judge him."

But I detain you too long on a subject which does not require great examination. You read the writings of Calvin, of Zwingli, ofLuther:: take out of these, I beg you, the railings, calumnies, insults, detraction, ridicule, and buffoonery which they contain against the Pope and the Holy See of Rome, and you will find that nothing will remain. You listen to your ministers; impose silence upon them as regards railings, detraction, calumnies against the Holy See, and you will have your sermons half their length. They utter a thousand calumnies on this point: this is the general rendezvous of all your ministers. On whatever subjects they may be composing their books, as if they were tired and spent with their labour they stay to dwell on the vices of the Popes, very often saying what they know well not to be the fact. Beza says that for a long time there has been no Pope who has cared about religion or who has been a theologian. Is he not seeking to deceive somebody? — for he knows well that Adrian, Marcellus, and these five last have been very great theologians. What does he mean by these lies? But let us say that there may be vice and ignorance: "What has the Roman Chair done to thee," says S. Augustine, "in which Peter sat and in which now Anastasius sits? . . . Why do you call the Apostolic Chair the chair of pestilence? If it is on account of men whom you consider to be declaring and not keeping the law — did Our Lord, on account of the Pharisees, of whom he said they say and do not do any injury to the chair in which they sat? Did he not commend that chair of Moses, and reprove them, saving the honour of their chair? For he says: Super cathedram, &c, (Matt, xxiii. 2). If you considered these things you would not, on account of the men you speak  against, blaspheme the Apostolic Chair, with which you do not communicate. But what does it all mean save that they have nothing to say, and yet are unable to keep from ill-saying."

Commentary on Some of St. Francis's Nuances

As I mentioned in my introduction, St. Francis de Sales provides here a powerful statement of the central importance of the authority of the papacy.  St. Francis is a very careful writer, and in the course of his discussion he introduces some nuances in his view of papal authority that would be worth briefly addressing.

First, St. Francis points out that the infallibility, or unfailing reliability, of the Pope only applies when he is acting, as St. Francis puts it, in cathedra, and not when he is acting extra cathedram.  St. Francis writes before Vatican I, so we must be careful not to read his words as if he is referring to the Vatican definitions.  From context, it is clear that what St. Francis is saying is that when the Pope is acting in his official capacity as the Pastor of the universal Church, intending to guide and shepherd the Church in matters of the faith (this is what he means by in cathedra), he cannot err.  He is unfailingly reliable.  St. Francis poignantly points out how unstable the condition of the Church would be if the Supreme Pastor could lead the Church astray.  However, when the Pope speaks as a private person, or a private theologian--or, in general, in any case when he is not acting in his official capacity as Pastor of the universal Church (that is, when he is acting extra cathedram, to use St. Francis's language)--he can err.  He may even be able to err so much as to be a heretic.

Vatican I and Vatican II, and other Magisterial teachings since those two councils, have further clarified the authority and infallibility of the Pope.  A very important clarification is the distinction between the definitive teachings of the Pope and the non-definitive teachings of the Pope.  When the Pope is teaching in his official capacity as Pope, he sometimes intends to teach definitively--that is, he intends to teach in such a way as to provide the final word on some subject--but sometimes he intends to teach non-definitively--that is, he intends to teach something true and important but it is not necessarily intended to be the final word on the subject.  In the latter case, his teaching may have some provisionality about it and may be reformed (with papal approval) in the future.  However, it is still to be accepted and adhered to as reliable and authoritative.  All papal teaching is to be received and adhered to according to the intentions of the Pope in teaching it, definitive teaching as definitive and non-definitive teaching as non-definitive (to varying degrees and in varying ways).  (See this document from the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith which helpfully spells out the various ways in which Popes and other bishops teach and the various forms of submission required of those teachings.  There are three different documents in this link--the one I am referring to is the last one.)  St. Francis does not bring out this distinction between definitive and non-definitive teaching, but he makes clear that all official papal teaching is reliable and authoritative and cannot lead into error.  This claim regarding the utter reliability of official papal teaching is of the essence of the Catholic doctrine of the papacy.  As St. Francis makes clear, this utter reliability is essential to the ability of the papacy to preserve the orthodoxy and unity of the Church.  The later Magisterial clarifications I mentioned above regarding definitive vs. non-definitive teaching do not contradict or annul this essential teaching, though they do add nuances and clarification.  They develop the previous teaching, but they do not reverse or contradict it.  It is important to emphasize this, as some dissident theologians have taken occasion from the later clarifications to argue that one need not assent to papal teaching when it is non-definitive, even sometimes asserting that non-definitive papal teaching can lead into error or even be heretical.  St. Francis is an important witness to the universal Tradition of the Catholic Church, a Tradition just as applicable today as it ever has been, that official papal teaching in general, per se, is unfailingly reliable and authoritative, that the Popes as guarantors of orthodoxy and unity cannot, by their teaching, lead the Church into error or schism.

(For more on this subject, see here.)

Secondly, St. Francis tells us that Popes can err in matters of fact but not in matters of the faith.  It is clear from context that he means that Popes are not infallible in anything they may say, even in factual matters which aren't themselves involved in matters of faith, but only in matters of faith--that is, only when they are intending to teach the Church as Supreme Pastor, for, in such a case, they will of necessity be dealing with matters of faith.  It is clearly not the role of the Popes to give authoritative discourses on mathematics, or science, or engineering, etc., but to teach truth regarding the faith to the people of God.  But, in saying this, we want to avoid another error sometimes made by dissenting theologians, which is to deny that Popes are guaranteed to be reliable on matters of fact even when a matter of fact impacts the teaching of the faith.  One of the most memorable examples of this error in Church history came from the Jansenists.  You can read their whole story here, but, in short, what happened was that the Pope condemned five propositions out of a book by Cornelius Jansen.  Those who wished to defend this book (the Jansenists) argued that Popes were infallible in matters of faith but not in matters of fact, and on that ground they declared that they agreed with the papal condemnation of the five propositions but not with the claim that those propositions occurred in Jansen's book.  In this way, they attempted to agree with papal doctrine while remaining Jansenists, despite the Pope's clear intention to condemn Jansenism.  Pope Alexander VII responded by condemning this evasion in a papal bull ("Ad sanctam Beati Petri sedem"):

(6) We declare and define that these five propositions have been taken from the book of the aforementioned Cornelius Jansen, Bishop of Ypres, entitled AUGUSTINUS, and in the sense understood by that same Cornelius condemned. ( (Henry Denzinger, The Sources of Catholic Dogma, tr. Roy J. Deferrari [Fitzwilliam, NH: Loreto Publications, 2001], a translation of "the thirtieth edition of Enchiridion Symbolorum by Henry Denzinger, revised by Karl Rahner, S.J., published in 1954, by Herder & Co., Freiburg", p. 318)

The Church has made it clear that papal reliability extends to all matters that are essential to safeguarding the faith, even if those matters are not expressly revealed in Scripture, have to do with morality, or are in themselves matters of non-doctrinal fact (historical, etc.).  St. Francis is not attempting to contradict this, but is simply making a distinction between things that have to do with the faith and things that do not.  The former fall under the cognizance of official papal authority (and therefore papal reliability) while the latter do not.  (And note that if a Pope declares that a certain matter falls under his cognizance, that in itself is a statement about the doctrine of papal authority, which is a matter of the faith.)  So St. Francis here is really saying nothing different from what he said before--that papal reliability only comes into play when Popes are speaking in their official capacity, not while they are speaking as private persons or private theologians.

Thirdly, St. Francis expresses his opinion that if a Pope should become a heretic (in his private person--he cannot do so in his official capacity, as St. Francis makes clear), he could be deposed--or declared ipso facto already deposed--by the Church.  This is a matter that has been debated throughout Church history.  There has been at least one time when a Pope has been declared a heretic by a later council (with papal approval)--the case of Pope Honorius (although, it should be noted, the term "heretic" as applied to Honorius may be used in a broader sense than we usually think of it, since there seems to be no good reason to conclude that Honorius actually held any view that was contrary to the faith of the Church, his error lying more in his failure to clarify and defend truth in a time of need).  But there has never been a time, recognized by the Catholic world, where a currently-reigning Pope has been declared a heretic by the Church and declared deposed from his office.  Could this ever happen?  This is an interesting question, but one I don't intend to discuss at this time.  [Note 4/1/23:  I have just written an article on this subject.]  It is a question that is not relevant to the central point St. Francis is making and that I wish to highlight--that Popes are protected by God from leading the Church into error and that official papal teaching is, per se, authoritative and unfailingly reliable.  The only thing we need to note for now on the question of heretical popes is that if such a situation were to arise, the case would need to be decided by the Magisterium of the Church (which, by definition, means the bishops of the Church in proper communion with the Chair of St. Peter) in a clear way and not by the private judgment of theologians.  The latter method, rather than resolving the issue, would simply and inevitably lead to schism.

The Original Version of the Default Argument

The argument I call the "Default Argument" is an important part of the reason I am a Catholic rather than a Protestant.  Coming to recognize its truth was the crucial turning point that led me to decide to become Catholic out of Presbyterianism.  I have described this argument already in a number of places, particularly here and here, and in the context of my personal narrative documenting my doctrinal progression leading up to my conversion.

Not too long ago, I ran across a document I had written back in the first few days after I started considering transitioning to Catholicism.  This document contains a whole bunch of rambling thoughts back and forth, and part of it contains the first written version of the default argument, written down just as I was coming to understand and embrace it.  I first began to consider converting to Catholicism at the end of the day on March 14, 2015 (really in the middle of the night between March 14 and March 15--so far as I recall, I went to bed that night greatly troubled about where Sola Scriptura had led myself and my family, and when I woke up in the morning the thought of considering Catholicism had formed in my mind).  March 14 was a Saturday.  This first version of the default argument was written probably around the following weekend, maybe Thursday the 19th, Friday the 20th, or the next couple of days.  I first came to see the truth of the argument in my mind on Thursday the 19th.  Before that, I had been coming to the conclusion that I should stick with Sola Scriptura and Presbyterianism, despite the great difficulties of following it and the troubles it seemed to be leading us into.  The default argument provided the evidence that pushed me over the line.

So you will find below that original version of the default argument.  I've left it exactly as it is in the document.  One clarification:  I talk about an idea regarding the interpretation of Scripture I call "the best reading is the right reading."  This was an idea I had developed over the years as necessary to make Sola Scriptura work.  Basically, it means that since I am supposed to use Sola Scriptura to interpret the Bible, Sola Scriptura must work, and so I must assume that whatever the best reading of a biblical passage or series of passages is regarding a particular topic we need an answer to, that reading must be right--for otherwise it would be impossible to determine what the correct conclusion is when Scripture is somewhat obscure.  Take infant baptism, for example.  In order to be able to follow Christ, we have to know whether or not we should baptize babies.  The answer may be that we should, it may be that we shouldn't, it may be that we can do it if we want to, etc., but we have to do something, and we have to be able to know what we should do (for otherwise God would have made it impossible to do the right thing, which is absurd).  But Scripture nowhere addresses infant baptism.  We have to infer it from various things Scripture does say.  Now, if we don't know for sure that "the best reading is the right reading"--that no matter how obscure the evidence is, if there is any conclusion that has even a 1% greater chance of being right than the others, we can be sure that conclusion is correct--then we can't possibly use Scripture to tell us what is right.  We might try to infer that, if asked, the apostles would have told us to baptize infants, based on what they said and what the Old Testament said and what Jesus said, etc., but we really could have no idea if our inference is right.  But if "the best reading is the right reading," then we can be sure our inference is correct so long as it seems to be even slightly the best inference.  So if Sola Scriptura is correct, it must be the case that "the best reading is the right reading," for Sola Scriptura cannot function without that assumption.

OK, with that defined, here is the original default argument.  Why am I posting this?  Why would anyone care about seeing the first version of my default argument?  I have no idea.  I'm putting it here because I want it to be here, and it's my blog.  So enjoy, or ignore, at your pleasure!  Oh yes, I should also note--what becomes evident upon reading it--that I what I did is write out two arguments, the first supporting Sola Scriptura and the second opposing it.  The first argument was the argument I used to make as a Protestant.  But then I realized my error, and that is what led to me embrace argument #2.  After both arguments, I wrote out an analysis of them and why the second rather than the first is right.

I should also mention that I am less sanguine now than I was then about the ability to make a good case for Sola Scriptura from Church history.

OK, here we go:

The Default Arguments:

1. Christianity is true.

2. By clear observation: Christianity is a divine revelation.

3. By logical inference: If God has given a revelation in Christianity, he wants us to know and follow it, so it must be possible to find out what it is, understand it, and follow it.

4. By observation from Christian historical literature (particularly the Bible, the church fathers, and the general observation of developing Christian tradition through the centuries): A plausible case can be made for sola Scriptura (A).  A plausible case also can be made for Scripture interpreted in light of traditions involved in the living practice of faith in the church and trust in God's guidance through his Spirit of the overall tradition of the catholic church (B).

5. By observation of Christian historical literature: The Scripture is pointed to so clearly as a locus of divine revelation (and even the ultimate foundational source of Christian doctrine) that it is abundantly clear that Scripture is such.  The historical record is such that we must say that if Scripture is not a revelation, we do not have one.

6. Since Scripture is able to function on its own, without any other infallible context of interpretation (if we add the assumption, logically necessary to make Scripture work on its own in this way, that “the best reading is the right reading”), Scripture alone (A) fulfills the requirement that we be able to find, understand, and follow, a divine revelation.  Nothing else is therefore needed to satisfy that requirement.

7. Logically following from #6: The requirement to find a locus of divine Christian revelation (established in #3) does not justify believing in in infallible catholic tradition, for such is not needed to fulfill that requirement.  Therefore, in order to warrant belief in such, additional independent evidence will have to be given.  The default will be to A, for A is established as workable by the fact of the reliability of Scripture while B is not.

8. From #4, we observe that there is no such sufficient additional evidence.

9. Therefore, from #7 and #8, we conclude that we are unjustified in holding to any infallible catholic tradition, which leaves us with A as our conclusion.  (In short, since A satisfies our requirement for a Christian divine revelation and we have no independent sufficient evidence for any other infallible authority, the situation described in #4 logically entails that we go with A.)  Therefore, we should follow A, even if that means defying the stated teachers of the church and breaking the organizational unity of the church.  We are commanded to defer to our teachers and to the unity of the church, but we have no reason from observation of the data to conclude that such deference must be absolute, and so we are warranted in defying it if obedience to God calls for it, and the lack of warrant for B constitutes such a call (for we cannot, in honesty, affirm what we have no basis to affirm)  In short, the Reformation was justified.

1. Christianity is true.

2. By clear observation: Christianity is a divine revelation.

3. By logical inference: If God has given a revelation in Christianity, he wants us to know and follow it, so it must be possible to find out what it is, understand it, and follow it.

4. By observation from Christian historical literature (particularly the Bible, the church fathers, and the general observation of developing Christian tradition through the centuries): A plausible case can be made for sola Scriptura (A).  A plausible case also can be made for Scripture interpreted in light of traditions involved in the living practice of faith in the church and trust in God's guidance through his Spirit of the overall tradition of the catholic church (B).

5. By observation of Christian historical literature: The Scripture is pointed to so clearly as a locus of divine revelation (and even the ultimate foundational source of Christian doctrine) that it is abundantly clear that Scripture is such.  The historical record is such that we must say that if Scripture is not a revelation, we do not have one.

6. Scripture is able to function on its own without a further infallible context only if we add the assumption that “the best reading is the right reading” (for otherwise Scripture, as a complex and often somewhat informal and occasional literary document, does not give us sufficient information to clearly and positively decide its meaning or conclusions in a number of areas).  By observation, it would appear that Scripture itself does not clearly tell us that this assumption is true.  Therefore, the fact of the reliability of Scripture (established in #5 and assumed by both A and B) does not by itself logically imply that the assumption that “the best reading is the right reading” is true and therefore that Scripture can function on its own without an infallible catholic tradition.

7. From logical inference from #6: Both A and B require additional assumptions beyond the simple fact of the reliability of Scripture.  Therefore, the fact of the reliability of Scripture does not by itself decide between A and B or lead us to default to one or the other.  The fact of the reliability of Scripture does not by itself infer that A or B works.  Therefore, we cannot infer A from that fact alone (or B).  Additional information or argumentation is therefore required to decide between A and B or to warrant us to choose either of them.

8. Logical inference from clear observations in Christian historical literature: Since God has given us teachers in the church (the bishops or elders who have succeeded the apostles) and has commanded us to obey them, and since he has commanded us to preserve the organizational unity of the church, it follows that we ought to defer and default to submission to our teachers and to the preservation of the unity of the church and not break away from these at least unless there is good, sufficient reason to warrant this.  In short, our practical default ought to be deference to the stated teachers and the unity of the church.

9. From #4-#7, it follows that we have no clear and sufficient reason from the data arising from Christian historical literature to affirm A over B (or vice versa).  Therefore, combining this conclusion with the claim of #8, it follows that we ought to defer and default to the stated teachers and the organizational unity of the church and not break away from these, for we have no good reason for doing so and so insufficient warrant to do so.

10. Since adhering to the conclusion reached in #9 requires us to accept B, it follows that we ought to accept B.  If it is objected that we have no reason from the data (following #4) to accept B and that therefore it is unwarranted for us to do so, it must be said in reply that we equally have no reason from the data to accept A and that therefore if B is unwarranted so equally is A.  But, following #3, we must be able to decide between A and B.  We are warranted to infer, therefore, that since, following #8, in such a situation we ought to defer to the stated teachers and the unity of the church, such deference will lead us to the right conclusion, and therefore we can conclude that B is true.  In short, the Reformation was unjustified.

Analysis:  The arguments are the same up to #5, and then at #6 they diverge.  The divergence point is that the first argument asserts that the fact of the reliability of Scripture (established in #5) logically implies the workability of A, while the second argument asserts that #5 does not logically imply the workability of A.  The first argument concludes that since A is workable (following logically from #5), we know that A satisfies the demand (established in #3) for a knowable and followable revelation of Christianity, and so that demand rests its case upon nothing more than the conclusion of #5 (the reliability of the conclusion that Scripture is a divine revelation).  Therefore, since nothing more is needed besides Scripture alone, #4 leads us directly to default to A, and B is left to have to provide for itself additional independent data outside of anything determined from #4 to establish its warrant.  But #4 indicates that it can't do so, and so B has no warrant, and so A is right.  The second argument, however, does not believe that the workability of A can be logically inferred from #5.  Therefore, #5 does not show that Scripture alone can satisfy the demand of #3, and so it does not show that nothing more is needed.  Therefore, unlike with the first argument, #4 does not produce a default to A and leave B to establish additional warrant.  Instead, #4 leaves A and B as equals.  Both the first and the second arguments agree that we ought to defer practically to the stated teachers and to the organizational unity of the church, but both also acknowledge that such deference may not be absolute but may be able to be overridden by other concerns.  The first argument, since it sees #4 (in light of the other points, particularly #7 and #8)) as implying that we ought to embrace A and not B, sees this as sufficient warrant to overturn our practical default of deferring to the established church in order to affirm A as correct, while the second argument, since it sees #4 as leaving A and B as equals, does not acknowledge a reason to override our practical deference to the established church, and so it concludes that, in the absence of other data leading to other conclusions, it must be right to continue that deference, and so concludes from this that B and not A is the right position.

My current observation of these arguments suggests to me that the second argument is correct while the first argument is flawed.  It appears to me that the first argument begs the question by jumping from the fact of the reliability of accepting Scripture as divine revelation (established in #5 and agreed upon by both A and B) to the conclusion that A is workable without providing proof for this leap.  #5 does not inherently imply that A is workable, because the additional assumption needed to make A work (“the best reading is the right reading”) is not clearly taught in Scripture.  We have to provide additional data (which doesn't exist) in order to establish that assumption and so the workability of A.  So then, it seems that #4 and #5 actually leave A and B as equals rather than giving us reason to default to A.  Once that is granted, we no longer have sufficient warrant to overturn our deference to the established church, etc.  So it would seem, granting all the premises of the second argument, that B and not A is our justified conclusion.

My Basic Reason for Being a Catholic Rather than a Protestant - or, the Default Argument

Why do I accept the Catholic Church and its teachings?  Here is my fundamental reason:

Christianity, as a historical revelation, has been handed down to us through history by the Church.  I have no authority to change it.  In the early Church, the basic outlines of Christianity were worked out--the basic beliefs of the faith (such as the Trinity, the two natures of Christ, etc.), the canon of Scripture, the belief in the validity of certain extra-biblical traditions (such as using oil in Confirmation, the sign of the cross, etc.), a belief in the authority of the Church guided by the Holy Spirit.  These developments were organic, and the historic Church's testimony has been that these developments have been guided by the Holy Spirit.  All of these developments are woven together.  To try to take one piece of them without the others is to arbitrarily divide what has been handed down to us as a seamless garment.  Christ has commanded us to obey the shepherds he appointed over us in the Church--and we see in Scripture and in Church history that Christ appointed the apostles to lead the Church, and they appointed elders/bishops to continue to guide the Church after them.  Christ also commanded his people to keep unity in the Church.  At the least, these things imply that we should not break the unity of the Church or reject the authority of its shepherds without proof that we have good cause to do so.  In order to accept part of the Church's Tradition while rejecting other parts (such as, for example, accepting the Bible while rejecting the Church's extra-biblical traditions or its authority), I would have to rebel against the established teachings of the historic Church, disobeying its established shepherds and tearing its unity.  In fact, that is precisely what happened in the Protestant Reformation (as Protestant writer Carl Trueman articulates well).  In order for Martin Luther and the other reformers to maintain Sola Scriptura and their other distinctive ideas and practices, they had to rebel against the established Catholic Church which had organically grown from the early Church and break its unity.  They believe they were justified in doing this, but I see no clear, non-question-begging basis for affirming Sola Scriptura or other distinctive Protestant doctrines.  Therefore, since I have no basis to reject what has been handed down from the historic Church, I must embrace Catholic faith and unity.

The central point is this:  I did not invent Christianity.  It is a historical revelation that has come to me.  I believe I have good reasons to think it to be true.  I have no basis or authority to make it something other than what it is as I have received it.  Therefore, I cannot go with the Protestant Reformation and its attempt to reinvent the Christian faith in opposition to its historic formulation and historic communion.  Therefore, I am Catholic.  Of course, much unpacking can and ought to be done at various specific points in what I am saying (and some of that is done in the articles in the above embedded links and in the links provided below), but that is the basic argument.

For more, see above embedded links, and see my narrative account of the intellectual developments that led ultimately to my conversion to Catholicism.  See also my fictional dialogue with a Protestant.  See also a brief case for the Catholic view from my book Why Christianity is True.

Protestant Theologian Carl Trueman on Catholicism as the Default Position

In my account of my conversion to Catholicism, I mention that one of the main things that led me in that direction was coming to realize that the Catholic position is the default position.  What that means is this:  Protestantism broke off from the Catholic Church.  Christ founded his Church, and he commanded its members to obey their shepherds and preserve the Church's unity.  Therefore, unless Protestants can provide a good reason for having broken off from the Catholic Church, their movement is rebellious and schismatic and a violation of Christ's commands.  The burden of proof is on Protestantism to justify itself.  If, in all other respects, the evidence for Catholicism and Protestantism were exactly the same, we should choose Catholicism.

In an oft-cited quotation, Protestant theologian Carl Trueman makes the same basic point.  The quotation comes from a book review of a book by Mark Noll and Carolyn Nystrom asking the question, "Is the Reformation Over?"

Every year I tell my Reformation history class that Roman Catholicism is, at least in the West, the default position. Rome has a better claim to historical continuity and institutional unity than any Protestant denomination, let alone the strange hybrid that is evangelicalism; in the light of these facts, therefore, we need good, solid reasons for not being Catholic; not being a Catholic should, in others words, be a positive act of will and commitment, something we need to get out of bed determined to do each and every day. It would seem, however, that if Noll and Nystrom are correct, many who call themselves evangelical really lack any good reason for such an act of will; and the obvious conclusion, therefore, should be that they do the decent thing and rejoin the Roman Catholic Church. I cannot go down that path myself, primarily because of my view of justification by faith and because of my ecclesiology; but those who reject the former and lack the latter have no real basis upon which to perpetuate what is, in effect, an act of schism on their part.