Emails I Wrote to Myself as I Was Making My Transition from Protestantism to Catholicism

I recently came across a few emails I had written and sent to myself on Thursday, March 19, 2015.  I remember writing them, sitting in the computer lab in the library at Utah Valley University and grading philosophy papers.  When an idea occurred to me, I would stop grading and email the idea to myself.  As I describe here, I began my transition to the Catholic Church on Saturday, March 14.  During the week from that Saturday to the end of the following weekend, I did a great deal of thinking with regard to the workability and truth of Sola Scriptura.  It was during this week I first realized that I had been defaulting to Sola Scriptura without a good basis for doing so, and that the default really lies on the side of the Catholic Tradition and interpreting Scripture in the context of that, following the Spirit-guided teaching of the Catholic Church.  I had been taking Scripture and Church Tradition as independent pieces which had to be justified independently.  Thus, I felt that if I knew Scripture was a locus of revelation, I could stick with it alone unless some independent proof could be presented for Tradition.  What I had not been taking into account is the historical reality that Scripture originally came in the context of Catholic Tradition, and that the Protestants had to rip Scripture out of that context in order to establish Sola Scriptura.  Once that piece was properly in place, it became apparent that the default is not with Sola Scriptura but with Scripture as interpreted within the context of Catholic Tradition.  I could no longer assume the sufficiency of Scripture out of the context of an authoritative interpretive tradition.

I came to call this line of reasoning my "default" argument.  I describe it in the article linked to above (my narrative outlining my doctrinal history leading to my Catholic transition).  I've also discussed it here, as well as other places.  At the end of that first week of thinking, beginning on Saturday, March 14, I was ready to write up a kind of semi-formal version of my default argument, and I did so (you can read it here).  But what I came across in the series of emails I wrote on Thursday, March 19, was the writing where I put down my thought processes chronicling the very beginning of my awareness of the default argument.  I had been writing to myself quite a bit that week previously (this is one of the major ways in which I tend to help myself to work out ideas), but in these emails is where the scale was finally tipped to the Catholic side.  By the end of them, I was no longer simply baffled by the practical difficulties of Sola Scriptura and where they had led myself and my family; I had now spotted the fundamental problem with my previous reason for going with Sola Scriptura.

Anyway, I found it very interesting to read these emails and observe my own train of thought on that day, so I thought I'd post them here as well.  I sent several emails to myself that Thursday, and I've separated them below as labeled by the time I sent them.  I've left them unedited from how I wrote them at the time.

Enjoy!

12:20 PM:

1. We can say there is a line somewhere at which general feasibility comes to an end.  People in general can be expected to see certain things, to grasp certain arguments.  But there is a point beyond which it will be too hard to see clearly enough to come to reliable and clear conclusions.  This will especially be the case when we are dealing not with relatively straightforward logical arguments, but with intricate and very nuanced details of biblical exegesis and history, particularly where plausible readings are very close and much hinges on a sentence, a meaning of a word (especially if the word is in Greek or Hebrew), subtle hints of language, and inferences trying to bring things out that are only very obscure in the text itself.  Some things the Bible says pretty clearly and obviously, and people can be expected to grasp those things.

2. The gates of hell will not prevail against the church.  The new tenants will succeed at producing good fruit where the old tenants failed (the implication being that the new tenants will never have to have their tenancy taken away from them).  The Holy Spirit is given in a new way, and will guide us into all truth.  We had revelation through all history in the past, so now will we have no living revelation (or does Christ speak through his Spirit in the church)?  (On the other hand, miracles seemed to go along with revelation, and haven't they ceased?  Isn't there a difference between apostolic times and now?  Hasn't revelation ceased?  So shouldn't we expect this difference?)

3. Could it be that I am dealing with intricacies in exegesis, etc., that are so difficult, that certain conclusions may appear slightly more objectively plausible to me, and even often consistently, without that being because they really are objective better but because of my personality and mental states?  In this case, it would explain the odd situation that I am able to come to conclusions (though, admittedly, only with great difficulty and with lack of self-confidence) much of the time, with much consistency, and yet the conclusions I come to in some areas are ones no one else has reached, or rather the combination of conclusions is one shared by almost no one else, leading to a situation where my family is isolated from most or possible even all currently existing denominations for one thing or another?  Wouldn't we expect, if sola scriptura is true, that there would be at least a significant minority of people in the world, and among professing Christians, who would be able to do what I have done and come to the same conclusions, more than (literally!) a handful?  This seems really odd on the assumption that people in general can do this.  But if my conclusions are partly a product of my own personality, as seems plausible given the intricacy of literary and historical interpretation and subtle inferences based on a complex literary text, then it would explain why I can come to conclusions often but my overall set of conclusions is shared by so few--other people might be trying to do the same thing, but they are coming to somewhat different conclusions on a few things because they have different personalities, reading styles, cultural backgrounds, etc., and so see the text slightly differently.

4. Could my lack of self-confidence and my dismal feelings be coming not from simply discontent, but from a nagging sense that I don't really have a firm foundation for my positions?  When I can see clearly that something is true, I tend to be confident and content in disagreement.  It could be that I am simply feeling a lack of confidence because am out of tune with majority opinion, but it could also be that some of it is coming from a lack of intellectual confidence in my biblical conclusions (because I recognize how tentative they are, being so close to other plausible conclusions, being so difficult to determine).

5. There does seem to be some difference between a logical analysis and an empirical literary and historical analysis.  The one is more straightforward than the other, and an ability to do one well does not necessarily imply an ability to do the other well.  This is especially the case when the empirical analyses involve very complex and nuanced literary and/or historical data and inferences from obscure data.

6. What can people in general be expected to accomplish in thinking through arguments and data?  This is a very difficult question to answer, for there are so many factors to consider, including questions about how much people might be trying (either through laziness or lack of noticing what to try, etc.).  It might be that many people are not good at sorting through theological and philosophical and literary and historical arguments and some are better than others.  Some might be good at some forms and not others.  With logical analysis, there is the possibility of instinct--an intuitional grasp of truth that cannot be articulated and which does not involve an ability to do very well at difficult and confusing arguments from opposing positions (and yet is justified, because the limitations are recognized and the intuitions can be seen to really be tracking something even if one can't articulate exactly how).  With empirical sorts of analyses, it would seem these intuitions wouldn't exist to the same degree.  Well, they might exist somewhat--someone, for example, might be good at intuiting meaning in literary texts.  But, on the whole, since the data is far more empirical and less logical and so dependent on factors not as generally available to minds, Instinct will no doubt be less able  here.  For example, we can assume that arguments for the existence of God can be grasped intuitively, for they deal with perceptions that all people have (even if they don't consciously dwell on it or articulate it).  But an argument that infant baptism is implied by biblical data, or that the Revolution Settlement was justified, or that exclusive psalmody is the best inference (at least slightly) from the biblical data, is probably not going to be subject to the same instincts or perhaps general instincts at all.

12:39 PM:

1. God has not given a revelation to all men, meaning every individual.  The gospel has not gone to all.  Some people are mentally retarded, or only newborn babies, etc.  But God has given a revelation to men in general--meaning that God's revelation has gone out into the world, is not restricted from certain classes of ordinary, adult people (like certain races, or certain personality types, etc.), and so it is possible that ordinary people in general can find the revelation and understand and follow it.  It is available to be found and followed.  Some people might not know that because they haven't encountered it yet, or they might not recognize it for some reason, or they might be confused, etc., but the revelation is out there, and it is possible in the ordinary circumstances of this world for ordinary people in general to find out about it and understand and follow it.  Besides something like mental retardation that makes a person incapable of being aware of the world around them, people of ordinary intelligence can do this.  That is, one need not be a genius, or really good at something or other (like apologetics, or literary analysis, etc.).  Since the church is commanded not only to follow God's revelation but be unified over it, people in general should be able to do this well enough to come to correct conclusions enough for the church in general to be unified.

4:04 PM:

OK, so we have two options. Assuming equality in data, we have two equal options: 1. Sola scriptura. 2. Infallible teaching authority. Which one is the default? The argument for the latter is that we are given teachers with gifts to teach and guide in to truth, and we are commanded to stay in unity, so we should default to our ordinary teachers and so stay in unity with them. Therefore, if we don't know whether 1 or 2 is true, we should default to 2. The response from 1 would be that we cannot defer to our teachers and to unity with them so far as to trust them implicitly without cause. If we don't know if they are infallible or not, it could go either way, then we must ask for evidence of their infallibility before trusting them implicitly. 2 might respond that putting an implicit trust in sola scriptura is also a risk. It is true that both 1 and 2 accept Scripture as a valid reliable authority, so we know that, but this is not the same as position 1. Assuming position 1 entails trusting that relying on Scripture alone without deferring to an infallible teaching authority beyond it will bring us to doctrinal truth, but if 1 is false it will likely lead us to error, confusion, and disunity. Trusting in 2 assumes that deferring to teachers' views will lead to truth, but if this is wrong it is also likely to lead to error, confusion, and disunity. Both, then, are risks. Which is a worse risk? Well, trusting in 2 is not absolute, in that we still have Scripture and it does speak clearly on some things, and we still have reason and logic, so there are correctives there to a significant degree. Position 1 is not absolute either, for, again, we have reason and logic, and Scripture is, again, clear to all on some things, perhaps many things. So where are we now? Which one do we default to? Position 1's argument that we obviously default to 1 because we already know that Scripture is reliable seems erroneous, because, again, it confuses knowing that Scripture is reliable with sola scriptura, but these are very different. Scripture may be reliable, but if we are also to have an infallible church, again, trying to rely on it in a way in which it was not intended will likely lead to error, perhaps very significant error. So position 1 is not as obvious as it might seem on the surface. I was thinking before that "we know Scripture, but we don't know anything else, so we simply go with Scripture, and require additional evidence for anything else." My argument went like this: "We know Scripture. Scripture works by itself (that is, it is possible to rely on it alone because we can say the best reading is the right reading and so come to definite conclusions). We don't know anything else independently. Therefore, obviously, we go with sola scriptura." The flaw, though, is that we actually don't know if Scripture by itself works. We know how it could work if we assume there is no infallible church, but we don't actually know if it in fact does work in this way. The idea of "the best reading is the right reading" adds an element to reading the literature of Scripture which is not inherently present within it. The fact that we have to articulate such an idea suggests that Scripture is not clear enough by itself to tell us many things we need to know. For example, Scripture does not tell us clearly in itself whether or not women should wear head coverings in public worship. Simply literarily speaking, it is not clear what Paul intended to communicate there. There is nothing in the text that requires us to take the "cloth covering" approach. It seems like we can say that is the most likely reading, but not by a great deal, and not at all for sure. So we really don't know what Paul was trying to teach there. But we have to either have women wear a cloth covering or not, so we have to know. So we add the assumption that "the best reading is the right reading," which then allows us to get from "this seems to be the better reading overall, even if not by much" to "this is definitely the right reading; we know what Paul intended." Perhaps this works fine, but it must be noted that it only works by adding this assumption to the text itself. This assumption is not taught by the text; it is a logical requirement for sola scriptura to work. But, on the opening supposition, we don't actually know if sola scriptura works. That's why we are asking this question about which side we default on. So we don't actually know that "the best reading is the right reading" is correct. All we know is that sola scriptura can work if we add that assumption (assuming there are no other issues with it). So, since we don't know if Scripture is sufficient by itself, we are taking a risk either way with position 1 or 2. Position 1 is a significant risk, for we can end up coming to all kinds of false and dangerous conclusions if we try to use it and it is not true. We can end up doing immoral things, worshipping God wrongly, missing important elements of the faith, imposing on the consciences of others, etc., etc. Position 2 also entails significant risks. Believing a teacher is infallible when he is not can result in doing immoral things, worshipping God wrongly, messing up parts of the faith or missing parts of it, imposing on consciences, etc., etc. Is there a greater risk one way than another? It is hard to say there is. Are we assuming more without evidence in one case than another? It would seem not, because in both cases it is not just Scripture we are assuming but some added infallible interpretive aid. One difference is that position 2 asks us to defer to an institution that is actually in place that we know about and which we already know we should defer to, whereas position 1 asks us to defer to a theory which we have no grounds at all to defer to or think true outside of it being a logical necessity granting the (unproven) assumption of sola scriptura.

It would be helpful here, probably to bring in Scriptural arguments, such as Jesus's conversation with the Pharisees, the role of revelation in the ongoing life of God's people in the New Testament, the promise of the Holy Spirit and its guidance, the promise about the gates of hell not prevailing and the parable of the tenants. Do we have reason from within Scripture to prefer sola scriptura vs. an infallible teaching authority? There is nothing clearly stated (without "the best reading is the right reading" assumed). There are hints that might go in both directions. And we can add to this discussion also the question of whether sola scriptura really works, and here we have the incredible splits of Protestantism, the incredible difficulty of figuring out all the doctrines, the feeling of hopelessness from trying to do this, the strange fact that my conclusions seem to lead me to have trouble being fully unified with anyone outside my own family, etc. On the other hand, perhaps we have the difficulty of distinguishing between the Eastern Orthodox and the Roman Catholic churches.

5:47 PM:

So where are we now? What is our default--option 1 or option 2? As we've seen, neither of them are without assumption, both have risks. We cannot simply default to 1 because it has Scripture alone, for knowing that Scripture is reliable is not the same as knowing it is reliable by itself without the context of an infallible teaching authority. Right now we're assuming there is no biblical or other data pushing us one way or another. Where would we default? It seems to me that in this case, we since we have been given teachers and we are commanded to obey them and be guided by them and to keep unity with them (at least when possible), our practical default to going with them would imply that we ought to go with them here. If we were to defy them and split from the unity of the catholic body in this case, we would have no good reason to do so, and so surely it would be wrong. So we should, it seems, defer to them. This changes the dynamic a bit. It means that if there is no good, clear reason to embrace sola scriptura, we should assume a reliable catholic church and so defer to catholic tradition and interpret Scripture in light of the assumptions of catholic tradition.

Published on the feast of  St. Louis IX of France and St. Joseph Calasanctius