Not too long ago, I ran across a document I had written back in the first few days after I started considering transitioning to Catholicism. This document contains a whole bunch of rambling thoughts back and forth, and part of it contains the first written version of the default argument, written down just as I was coming to understand and embrace it. I first began to consider converting to Catholicism at the end of the day on March 14, 2015 (really in the middle of the night between March 14 and March 15--so far as I recall, I went to bed that night greatly troubled about where Sola Scriptura had led myself and my family, and when I woke up in the morning the thought of considering Catholicism had formed in my mind). March 14 was a Saturday. This first version of the default argument was written probably around the following weekend, maybe Thursday the 19th, Friday the 20th, or the next couple of days. I first came to see the truth of the argument in my mind on Thursday the 19th. Before that, I had been coming to the conclusion that I should stick with Sola Scriptura and Presbyterianism, despite the great difficulties of following it and the troubles it seemed to be leading us into. The default argument provided the evidence that pushed me over the line.
So you will find below that original version of the default argument. I've left it exactly as it is in the document. One clarification: I talk about an idea regarding the interpretation of Scripture I call "the best reading is the right reading." This was an idea I had developed over the years as necessary to make Sola Scriptura work. Basically, it means that since I am supposed to use Sola Scriptura to interpret the Bible, Sola Scriptura must work, and so I must assume that whatever the best reading of a biblical passage or series of passages is regarding a particular topic we need an answer to, that reading must be right--for otherwise it would be impossible to determine what the correct conclusion is when Scripture is somewhat obscure. Take infant baptism, for example. In order to be able to follow Christ, we have to know whether or not we should baptize babies. The answer may be that we should, it may be that we shouldn't, it may be that we can do it if we want to, etc., but we have to do something, and we have to be able to know what we should do (for otherwise God would have made it impossible to do the right thing, which is absurd). But Scripture nowhere addresses infant baptism. We have to infer it from various things Scripture does say. Now, if we don't know for sure that "the best reading is the right reading"--that no matter how obscure the evidence is, if there is any conclusion that has even a 1% greater chance of being right than the others, we can be sure that conclusion is correct--then we can't possibly use Scripture to tell us what is right. We might try to infer that, if asked, the apostles would have told us to baptize infants, based on what they said and what the Old Testament said and what Jesus said, etc., but we really could have no idea if our inference is right. But if "the best reading is the right reading," then we can be sure our inference is correct so long as it seems to be even slightly the best inference. So if Sola Scriptura is correct, it must be the case that "the best reading is the right reading," for Sola Scriptura cannot function without that assumption.
OK, with that defined, here is the original default argument. Why am I posting this? Why would anyone care about seeing the first version of my default argument? I have no idea. I'm putting it here because I want it to be here, and it's my blog. So enjoy, or ignore, at your pleasure! Oh yes, I should also note--what becomes evident upon reading it--that I what I did is write out two arguments, the first supporting Sola Scriptura and the second opposing it. The first argument was the argument I used to make as a Protestant. But then I realized my error, and that is what led to me embrace argument #2. After both arguments, I wrote out an analysis of them and why the second rather than the first is right.
I should also mention that I am less sanguine now than I was then about the ability to make a good case for Sola Scriptura from Church history.
OK, here we go:
The Default Arguments:
1. Christianity is true.
2. By clear observation: Christianity is a divine revelation.
3. By logical inference: If God has given a revelation in Christianity, he wants us to know and follow it, so it must be possible to find out what it is, understand it, and follow it.
4. By observation from Christian historical literature (particularly the Bible, the church fathers, and the general observation of developing Christian tradition through the centuries): A plausible case can be made for sola Scriptura (A). A plausible case also can be made for Scripture interpreted in light of traditions involved in the living practice of faith in the church and trust in God's guidance through his Spirit of the overall tradition of the catholic church (B).
5. By observation of Christian historical literature: The Scripture is pointed to so clearly as a locus of divine revelation (and even the ultimate foundational source of Christian doctrine) that it is abundantly clear that Scripture is such. The historical record is such that we must say that if Scripture is not a revelation, we do not have one.
6. Since Scripture is able to function on its own, without any other infallible context of interpretation (if we add the assumption, logically necessary to make Scripture work on its own in this way, that “the best reading is the right reading”), Scripture alone (A) fulfills the requirement that we be able to find, understand, and follow, a divine revelation. Nothing else is therefore needed to satisfy that requirement.
7. Logically following from #6: The requirement to find a locus of divine Christian revelation (established in #3) does not justify believing in in infallible catholic tradition, for such is not needed to fulfill that requirement. Therefore, in order to warrant belief in such, additional independent evidence will have to be given. The default will be to A, for A is established as workable by the fact of the reliability of Scripture while B is not.
8. From #4, we observe that there is no such sufficient additional evidence.
9. Therefore, from #7 and #8, we conclude that we are unjustified in holding to any infallible catholic tradition, which leaves us with A as our conclusion. (In short, since A satisfies our requirement for a Christian divine revelation and we have no independent sufficient evidence for any other infallible authority, the situation described in #4 logically entails that we go with A.) Therefore, we should follow A, even if that means defying the stated teachers of the church and breaking the organizational unity of the church. We are commanded to defer to our teachers and to the unity of the church, but we have no reason from observation of the data to conclude that such deference must be absolute, and so we are warranted in defying it if obedience to God calls for it, and the lack of warrant for B constitutes such a call (for we cannot, in honesty, affirm what we have no basis to affirm) In short, the Reformation was justified.
1. Christianity is true.
2. By clear observation: Christianity is a divine revelation.
3. By logical inference: If God has given a revelation in Christianity, he wants us to know and follow it, so it must be possible to find out what it is, understand it, and follow it.
4. By observation from Christian historical literature (particularly the Bible, the church fathers, and the general observation of developing Christian tradition through the centuries): A plausible case can be made for sola Scriptura (A). A plausible case also can be made for Scripture interpreted in light of traditions involved in the living practice of faith in the church and trust in God's guidance through his Spirit of the overall tradition of the catholic church (B).
5. By observation of Christian historical literature: The Scripture is pointed to so clearly as a locus of divine revelation (and even the ultimate foundational source of Christian doctrine) that it is abundantly clear that Scripture is such. The historical record is such that we must say that if Scripture is not a revelation, we do not have one.
6. Scripture is able to function on its own without a further infallible context only if we add the assumption that “the best reading is the right reading” (for otherwise Scripture, as a complex and often somewhat informal and occasional literary document, does not give us sufficient information to clearly and positively decide its meaning or conclusions in a number of areas). By observation, it would appear that Scripture itself does not clearly tell us that this assumption is true. Therefore, the fact of the reliability of Scripture (established in #5 and assumed by both A and B) does not by itself logically imply that the assumption that “the best reading is the right reading” is true and therefore that Scripture can function on its own without an infallible catholic tradition.
7. From logical inference from #6: Both A and B require additional assumptions beyond the simple fact of the reliability of Scripture. Therefore, the fact of the reliability of Scripture does not by itself decide between A and B or lead us to default to one or the other. The fact of the reliability of Scripture does not by itself infer that A or B works. Therefore, we cannot infer A from that fact alone (or B). Additional information or argumentation is therefore required to decide between A and B or to warrant us to choose either of them.
8. Logical inference from clear observations in Christian historical literature: Since God has given us teachers in the church (the bishops or elders who have succeeded the apostles) and has commanded us to obey them, and since he has commanded us to preserve the organizational unity of the church, it follows that we ought to defer and default to submission to our teachers and to the preservation of the unity of the church and not break away from these at least unless there is good, sufficient reason to warrant this. In short, our practical default ought to be deference to the stated teachers and the unity of the church.
9. From #4-#7, it follows that we have no clear and sufficient reason from the data arising from Christian historical literature to affirm A over B (or vice versa). Therefore, combining this conclusion with the claim of #8, it follows that we ought to defer and default to the stated teachers and the organizational unity of the church and not break away from these, for we have no good reason for doing so and so insufficient warrant to do so.
10. Since adhering to the conclusion reached in #9 requires us to accept B, it follows that we ought to accept B. If it is objected that we have no reason from the data (following #4) to accept B and that therefore it is unwarranted for us to do so, it must be said in reply that we equally have no reason from the data to accept A and that therefore if B is unwarranted so equally is A. But, following #3, we must be able to decide between A and B. We are warranted to infer, therefore, that since, following #8, in such a situation we ought to defer to the stated teachers and the unity of the church, such deference will lead us to the right conclusion, and therefore we can conclude that B is true. In short, the Reformation was unjustified.
Analysis: The arguments are the same up to #5, and then at #6 they diverge. The divergence point is that the first argument asserts that the fact of the reliability of Scripture (established in #5) logically implies the workability of A, while the second argument asserts that #5 does not logically imply the workability of A. The first argument concludes that since A is workable (following logically from #5), we know that A satisfies the demand (established in #3) for a knowable and followable revelation of Christianity, and so that demand rests its case upon nothing more than the conclusion of #5 (the reliability of the conclusion that Scripture is a divine revelation). Therefore, since nothing more is needed besides Scripture alone, #4 leads us directly to default to A, and B is left to have to provide for itself additional independent data outside of anything determined from #4 to establish its warrant. But #4 indicates that it can't do so, and so B has no warrant, and so A is right. The second argument, however, does not believe that the workability of A can be logically inferred from #5. Therefore, #5 does not show that Scripture alone can satisfy the demand of #3, and so it does not show that nothing more is needed. Therefore, unlike with the first argument, #4 does not produce a default to A and leave B to establish additional warrant. Instead, #4 leaves A and B as equals. Both the first and the second arguments agree that we ought to defer practically to the stated teachers and to the organizational unity of the church, but both also acknowledge that such deference may not be absolute but may be able to be overridden by other concerns. The first argument, since it sees #4 (in light of the other points, particularly #7 and #8)) as implying that we ought to embrace A and not B, sees this as sufficient warrant to overturn our practical default of deferring to the established church in order to affirm A as correct, while the second argument, since it sees #4 as leaving A and B as equals, does not acknowledge a reason to override our practical deference to the established church, and so it concludes that, in the absence of other data leading to other conclusions, it must be right to continue that deference, and so concludes from this that B and not A is the right position.
My current observation of these arguments suggests to me that the second argument is correct while the first argument is flawed. It appears to me that the first argument begs the question by jumping from the fact of the reliability of accepting Scripture as divine revelation (established in #5 and agreed upon by both A and B) to the conclusion that A is workable without providing proof for this leap. #5 does not inherently imply that A is workable, because the additional assumption needed to make A work (“the best reading is the right reading”) is not clearly taught in Scripture. We have to provide additional data (which doesn't exist) in order to establish that assumption and so the workability of A. So then, it seems that #4 and #5 actually leave A and B as equals rather than giving us reason to default to A. Once that is granted, we no longer have sufficient warrant to overturn our deference to the established church, etc. So it would seem, granting all the premises of the second argument, that B and not A is our justified conclusion.
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