The Impossibility of Neutrality

This is chapter one in a forthcoming book of mine entitled A Tale of Two Ethical Systems (I think).

Governmental Neutrality

Modern American culture is obsessed with the concepts of diversity and equality. The U.S. is a pluralistic nation. We are a country full of people who hold vastly different worldviews, and we like it that way. We celebrate the diversity of worldviews in our society. We think that this is one of the greatest things about America. We also pride ourselves on being a nation of equality, where all people are treated equally and no one is discriminated against on the basis of race, religion, social status, culture, sexual orientation, etc.

Our obsession with diversity and equality has led us to be obsessed also with the concept of neutrality. Most current American thought holds that in order to treat everyone in this country equally, the civil government and public institutions must be neutral between all the various religious and non-religious claims made by our citizens. Avoiding discrimination against Christians, Muslims, atheists, Jews, Buddhists, etc., involves being neutral between the truth claims of these groups, refusing to take sides or to promote or oppose anyone’s beliefs.

Current popular interpretations of the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provide a clear example of this public ideal of neutrality. The First Amendment says that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” The important part for our purposes is, of course, the first part, the prohibition on making laws about establishing religion or prohibiting the free exercise of religion. There have been many debates, and there are still today many debates, about exactly what this means, what it meant, and what it should mean for us. I am not interested here in getting into all of that. For my purposes, it is enough to note that the current dominant interpretation of the First Amendment in legal thinking today (as represented by the Supreme Court) is that it forbids the nation (and the states, following official interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment) from adopting any official religious viewpoint or from taking sides in any religious disputes. In other words, it requires neutrality towards all religious claims, so far as public institutions are concerned (which would include the federal government, state governments, public educational institutions, etc.). A classic example of this interpretation of the First Amendment is the well-known “Lemon test,” derived from the Supreme Court’s decision in Lemon V. Kurtzman. The Lemon test is designed as a way to evaluate whether a policy is in violation of the First Amendment principle of separation of church and state. There are three qualifications in this test which all public policies must meet if they are to be considered legal under the First Amendment: 1. They “must have a secular [that is, non-religious] legislative purpose.” 2. Their “principle or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion.” 3. They must not foster “an excessive government entanglement with religion.”1 The Lemon test, along with other similar ideas of how to gauge the legality of various public policies, is centered on the core idea that the government of the United States should be neutral with regard to religion. It should be neutral between all religions, and it should be neutral between religion and non-religion (such as agnosticism, atheism, secular humanism, etc.).

This concept of neutrality is held by many to apply not only to the public sphere, but also to personal morality and ethics. For example, a textbook for ethics classes authored by Judith Boss, Analyzing Moral Issues, says this about the relationship between particular religious views and ethical evaluations:

Most theologians and philosophers maintain that morality exists independently of religion--that religious ethics is not fundamentally different from philosophical ethics. Although a moral code is incorporated into the doctrine of most religions, moral issues can be discussed without appealing to religion. When people who are religious use the terms right and wrong, they generally mean the same thing as someone who is not religious. Religious differences tend to fall away in most serious discussion of moral issues, such as slavery and abortion, not because religion isn’t important to the participants but because the moral disputes can be discussed and even resolved without bringing religion into the equation.2 

Boss adds a very interesting footnote at the end of this paragraph:

An exception here is fundamentalist religion, such as fundamentalist Christianity or Islam, in which the Bible and the Koran are interpreted literally and are regarded as the final word on certain moral issues such as drinking and homosexuality.3 

This is a highly significant qualification. I will come back to it later.

John Rawls

One of the most important (some would say the most important) political philosophers of the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries is John Rawls. In his book Political Liberalism, Rawls, following the dominant ideal of neutrality in public affairs, sought to work out some practical principles for the making of laws and public policies that would help reach that ideal. Rawls held a version of the social contract theory of governmental authority, which we will look at in more detail in chapter six when we get into political ethics. In short, the social contract theory holds that governmental authority is only legitimate if based on the “consent of the governed.” It would be unjust for anyone to try to tell me what to do unless I consent to his authority and laws willingly. Rawls was particularly interested in how this “consent of the governed” can be maintained in a pluralistic society, where there are many different worldviews. People holding different worldviews have different beliefs, different priorities, different values, different goals, etc. How can people of many different worldviews be united in one society under one set of laws without violating the principle of the consent of the governed?

Rawls’s answer to that question is that laws and public policies should be based only on principles that all citizens can reasonably be expected to endorse, and not on principles that only some of the citizens could reasonably be expected to endorse. Rawls put it this way:

Our exercise of political power is fully proper only when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens as free and equal may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to their common human reason.4 

If laws and policies are based only on principles that everyone could endorse, then consent of the governed will be preserved and governmental authority will be legitimate.

What this amounts to in practice is that citizens should leave the peculiar aspects of their worldviews out of decisions relating to public policies and laws and base those decisions instead only on things that everyone could hold in common, no matter his particular worldview. This practice will ensure that public laws and policies will be neutral between all the citizens rather than favoring the particular beliefs of any group. Leif Wenar, in his article on John Rawls in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, provides an example of this practice of accepting or excluding principles based on whether or not they are public rather than simply a part of one person’s or group’s worldview:

To take a straightforward example: a Supreme Court justice deciding on a gay marriage law would violate public reason were she to base her opinion on God's forbidding gay sex in the book of Leviticus, or on a presentiment that upholding such a law would hasten the end of days. Not all members of society can reasonably be expected to accept Leviticus as stating an authoritative set of political values, nor can a religious premonition be a common standard for evaluating public policy. These values and standards are not public.5

If the Book of Leviticus and premonitions about the end of the world are examples of ideas that are impermissible to use in crafting public laws and policies because one cannot expect everyone to endorse them, what are some examples of ideas and standards that are public--that is, that can be endorsed by all people? This list would include standards that “rely on common sense, on facts generally known, and on the conclusions of science that are well established and not controversial.”6 The existence of the universe, the existence of human beings and basic human desires, the existence of China, basic facts known to science, and other such facts, would be included in the list of public ideas and standards. In short, basic facts about the natural world that are objectively generally knowable and known would qualify as public and would thus be acceptable to include as part of the basis of public laws and policies. If we will follow these principles, Rawls says, we will achieve genuine neutrality in our laws and policies and will therefore succeed in treating all citizens as equal no matter their worldviews.

Is Rawlsian Political Philosophy Truly Neutral?

Although Rawls claimed that his political philosophy was neutral between the various worldviews in our society, in reality it is not. Rawls ended up doing precisely what his whole theory was designed to avoid--advocating basing laws and policies on particular worldview beliefs and the rejection of other people’s worldview beliefs. His theory makes important assumptions that are not shared by all worldviews. To put it succinctly, his theory assumes an agnostic worldview, and thus rejects most of the religious worldviews of world history. Rawls assumes that there are things that can be objectively known to be true by common human reason, and other things that cannot be known to be true in this way. He assumes that facts about the natural world fall into the former category, while claims about God or religion fall into the latter category. But that is nothing more nor less than the very definition of agnosticism! Christians have historically believed that it is possible to objectively know that Christianity is true and that the Bible is a divine revelation. The Bible teaches that all men are without excuse if they reject God, for God is evident to the reason of all (see, for example, Romans 1:18-23). Christians have also historically believed that Christianity can be objectively known to be true, and that those who reject it likewise have no excuse in rejecting it (once they hear of it and understand it). (See, for example, Luke 10:16.) Rawls’s theory is thus implying that traditional Christianity is dead wrong on these very important points. These points are particularly important because if Christianity cannot objectively be known to be true, then those who wish to be rational and to base their beliefs solely on the evidence will be led by reason to reject Christianity as without any warrant. Thus, Rawls’s theory makes assumptions that are directly contrary to and which undermine the entire structure of traditional Christian doctrine. These assumptions can therefore hardly be called neutral!

Rawls never acknowledged that his theory privileges the agnostic worldview. He tried explicitly to insist to the contrary that his theory does no such thing. In Political Liberalism, Rawls devotes an entire section to arguing that his theory is not agnostic, or, as he puts it, “indifferent or skeptical”:

We try, so far as we can, neither to assert nor to deny any particular comprehensive religious, philosophical, or moral view, or its associated theory of truth and the status of values. Since we assume each citizen to affirm some such view, we hope to make it possible for all to accept the political conception as true or reasonable from the standpoint of their own comprehensive view, whatever it may be. Properly understood, then, a political conception of justice need be no more indifferent, say, to truth in philosophy and morals than the principle of toleration, suitably understood, need be indifferent to truth in religion. Since we seek an agreed basis of public justification in matters of justice, and since no political agreement on those disputed questions can reasonably be expected, we turn instead to the fundamental ideas we seem to share through the public political culture. From these ideas we try to work out a political conception of justice congruent with our considered convictions on due reflection. Once this is done, citizens may within their comprehensive doctrines regard the political conception of justice as true, or as reasonable, whatever their view allows.7 

However, despite Rawls’s assertions to the contrary, his view privileges an agnostic worldview and thus does indeed embrace a mild (but still a very crucially important) form of “skepticism.”

This commitment to an agnostic skepticism towards the possibility of knowing objective truth in religious matters can be seen in Rawls’s concept of what he calls the burdens of judgment, which he acknowledges to undergird and provide a foundation for his entire theory. Leif Wenar summarizes Rawls’s concept of the burdens of judgment:

Reasonable citizens want to live in a society in which they can cooperate with their fellow citizens on terms that are acceptable to all. They are willing to propose and abide by mutually acceptable rules, given the assurance that others will also do so; and they will honor these rules even when this means some sacrifice to their own interests. Reasonable citizens want, in short, to belong to a society where political power is legitimately used.

Each reasonable citizen has his own view about God and life, right and wrong, good and bad. Each has, that is, what Rawls calls his own comprehensive doctrine. Yet because reasonable citizens are reasonable, they are unwilling to impose their own comprehensive doctrines on others who are also willing to search for mutually agreeable rules. Though each may believe that he knows the truth, none is willing to force other reasonable citizens to live by that truth, even should he belong to a majority that has the power to enforce it.

One ground for reasonable citizens to be so tolerant, Rawls says, is that they accept a particular explanation for the diversity of worldviews in their society. Reasonable citizens accept the burdens of judgment. The deepest questions of religion, philosophy, and morality are very difficult even for conscientious people to think through, and people will answer these questions in different ways because of their own particular life experiences (their upbringing, class, occupation, and so on). Reasonable citizens understand that these deep issues are ones on which people of good will can disagree, and so will be unwilling to impose their own worldviews on those who have reached different conclusions.8 

The basic idea of the burdens of judgment is that the objective evidence regarding fundamental worldview questions--such as the existence of God, which religion is the right religion, etc.--is so slim that the evidence itself cannot tell us what is true, at least with any conclusiveness. Because of this, we all believe what we believe not because the evidence clearly points us to it but because of non-rational reasons such as upbringing, background culture, class, etc. This is essentially the very idea of agnosticism. Rawls himself is clear (although less clear than he would have been, no doubt, if he had not been trying desperately to avoid the unwanted implications) on the implications of the burdens of judgment:

The evident consequence of the burdens of judgment is that reasonable persons do not all affirm the same comprehensive doctrine. Moreover, they also recognize that all persons alike, including themselves, are subject to those burdens, and so many reasonable comprehensive doctrines are affirmed, not all of which can be true (indeed none of them may be true). The doctrine any reasonable person affirms is but one reasonable doctrine among others. In affirming it, a person, of course, believes it to be true, or else reasonable, as the case may be.

Thus, it is not in general unreasonable to affirm any one of a number of reasonable comprehensive doctrines. We recognize that our own doctrine has, and can have, for people generally, no special claims on them beyond their own view of its merits. Others who affirm doctrines different from ours are, we grant, reasonable also, and certainly not unreasonable. Since there are many reasonable doctrines, the idea of the reasonable does not require us, or others, to believe any specific reasonable doctrine, though we may do so. When we take the step beyond recognizing the reasonableness of a doctrine and affirm our belief in it, we are not being unreasonable.9 

Although Rawls steadfastly refused to acknowledge that his theory constitutes an endorsement of the public embracing of an agnostic worldview rather than real neutrality, he did come close to noticing this from time to time:

Nevertheless, in affirming a political conception of justice we may eventually have to assert at least certain aspects of our own comprehensive religious or philosophical doctrine (by no means necessarily fully comprehensive). This will happen whenever someone insists, for example, that certain questions are so fundamental that to insure their being rightly settled justified civil strife. The religious salvation of those holding a particular religion, or indeed the salvation of a whole people, may be said to depend on it. At this point we may have no alternative but to deny this, or to imply its denial and hence to maintain the kind of thing we had hoped to avoid.

To consider this, imagine rationalist believers who contend that these beliefs are open to and can be fully established by reason (uncommon though this view may be). In this case, the believers simply deny what we have called “the fact of reasonable pluralism.” So we say of the rationalist believers that they are mistaken in denying that fact; but we need not say that their religious beliefs are not true, since to deny that religious beliefs can be publicly and fully established by reason is not to say that they are not true. Of course, we do not believe the doctrine believers here assert, and this is shown in what we do. Even if we do not, say, hold some form of the doctrine of free religious faith that supports equal liberty of conscience, our actions nevertheless imply that we believe the concern for salvation does not require anything incompatible with that liberty. Still, we do not put forward more of our comprehensive view than we think needed or useful for the political aim of consensus.10

The fascinating thing about these passages is that Rawls acknowledges the very problem that we have been addressing--the fact that his theory endorses particular assumptions related to a particular worldview and rejects others--but doesn’t seem to notice that this is a fatal problem for his theory. He basically says, “My theory is aiming for consensus and neutrality. Of course, I guess I have to admit that there are some (really, really uncommon) viewpoints that my theory opposes, and I guess we’ll just have to say that they are wrong and we are right, which is exactly what my theory is designed to avoid; but that’s all right, because we only have to do this a little bit, just enough to achieve consensus.” Achieve consensus? How can the claim to be achieving consensus still be made when it is acknowledged that the so-called consensus rejects certain people’s views? Even a basic dictionary definition of “consensus” will tell you that you don’t have one once you’ve excluded certain people and their views. How could Rawls fail to miss this? How could he still claim to have a successful consensus-producing theory when he has just admitted that there is not a consensus?

I think he can embrace this seeming inconsistency because he does not take seriously the views that he is excluding. He treats those excluded views (and therefore the people who hold them) as unimportant. They are so unimportant that excluding them, and thus treating them unequally, is not really a big deal and is not a serious problem for the claim of equality, neutrality, and consensus. That this is Rawls’s attitude can be seen from other passages in his writings as well. Listen to these passages from Rawls’s later work, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, and note how cavalier his dismissal of “fundamentalists” and their viewpoints is:

The idea of the politically reasonable is sufficient unto itself for the purposes of public reason when basic political questions are at stake. Of course, fundamentalist religious doctrines and autocratic and dictatorial rulers will reject the ideas of public reason and deliberative democracy. They will say that democracy leads to a culture contrary to their religion, or denies the values that only autocratic or dictatorial rule can secure. They assert that the religiously true, or the philosophically true, overrides the politically reasonable. We simply say that such a doctrine is politically unreasonable. Within political liberalism nothing more need be said.11 

Those who reject constitutional democracy with its criterion of reciprocity will of course reject the very idea of public reason. For them the political relation may be that of friend or foe, to those of a particular religious or secular community or those who are not; or it may be a relentless struggle to win the world for the whole truth. Political liberalism does not engage those who think this way. The zeal to embody the whole truth in politics is incompatible with an idea of public reason that belongs with democratic citizenship.12

Rawls‘s attitude is basically this: “Those fundamentalists are so ridiculous that I don’t even have to take any time to refute their views. I can just exclude them and their views from consideration and go on claiming that I have achieved a basic consensus by, in effect, pretending that those who disagree with me don’t exist.” Such an attitude as this is rather shocking for someone who claimed to be concerned with equality and neutrality and finding a consensus that all people could reasonably be expected to endorse. Rawls’s theory can achieve a consensus, but only at the cost of, in effect, excluding from the human race those who hold alternate views. Rawls simply defines all his opposition away as the class of “unreasonable people” without any argument at all. Ironically, this makes Rawls’s view, I think, farther from the goal of neutrality than many official religious establishments, such as existed in many states when the United States was founded. Those establishments acknowledged openly that they were embracing a certain worldview and rejecting others, while Rawls’s system wants to establish agnosticism as the official religion of the nation in the name of neutrality. The old religious establishments had enough respect for their opponents to be up front with them in saying that their views were being rejected, while Rawls’s system basically pretends that those who differ from the establishment don’t exist and so claims consensus by completely ignoring them. Surely treating one’s ideological opponents as if they are effectively excluded from the table of human citizens is about as gross a violation as one can imagine of the principle of treating all people (even annoying minorities) equally no matter their religious beliefs. Certainly such a philosophy is anything but neutral!

This attitude is common in modern agnostic American culture. We saw it in Judith Boss as well, whose ethics textbook I quoted from earlier. You recall that she made the statement that “Religious differences tend to fall away in most serious discussion of moral issues, such as slavery and abortion, not because religion isn’t important to the participants but because the moral disputes can be discussed and even resolved without bringing religion into the equation.” Then, in a brief footnote, she added, “An exception here is fundamentalist religion, such as fundamentalist Christianity or Islam, in which the Bible and the Koran are interpreted literally and are regarded as the final word on certain moral issues such as drinking and homosexuality.” Boss regards fundamentalist religions as so unimportant that they need not interfere with her basic claim that you can resolve moral disputes apart from religion. Sure, you can resolve most moral disputes without religion, if you only consider religious views that have basically submitted to agnosticism to tell them what they are allowed to say and not say. If you take into consideration what Boss calls “fundamentalist” religious views, however--which, by the way, constitute the majority of religious views in human history and probably on the earth today--then you will certainly not be able to resolve most serious moral controversies without reference to religion. Boss’s attitude, like Rawls's, is that “fundamentalists” are not really important people, and so we can basically ignore them and pretend they don’t exist when we talk about moral issues. At the most, all they deserve is a grudging reference in a footnote, since they have the nerve to keep existing and bothering us, messing up our neat little theories of neutrality and consensus. Again, however, this is a very ironic attitude for a culture that prides itself on concern for neutrality and equality for all people, especially minorities. Rawls’s and Boss’s attitude suggests that modern American concern for minorities often only extends to those minorities that we like, and excludes those that are different enough from us that we find them annoying and subversive of our basic beliefs and values. Those minorities we can simply label as “fundamentalists” and quietly exclude from any serious consideration at all. Neutrality and consensus is the name of the game--at least when we are dealing with our fellow agnostics and those who are mostly just like them in all pertinent respects. Let’s just have the awareness and the honesty to admit that this attitude is certainly not the same as real consensus or neutrality.

John Rawls Meets Sayyid Qutb

Another article in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, this one on “Religion and Political Theory” by Chris Eberle and Terence Cuneo, does a good job of pointing out the lack of real neutrality in Rawlsian-type viewpoints (which they call the “standard view” because of its current dominance in American political thinking) by imagining how the Rawlsian arguments would work with someone like Sayyid Qutb, an Islamic intellectual from the mid-twentieth century. They suggest formulating the standard view to say that “A coercive law is justified to an agent only if he is reasonable and has sufficient reasons from his own perspective to support it.” As we have seen, this is a good formulation of a Rawsian-type perspective. But they go on to say that critics of the standard view can argue that this concept doesn’t work as a means of establishing neutrality and consensus:

Now consider a coercive law that protects fundamental liberal commitments, such as the right to exercise religious freedom. Is this law justified to each citizen of a liberal democracy? Liberal critics answer: no. For there appear to be reasonable citizens who have no good reason from their own perspective to affirm it. Consider, for example, a figure such as the Islamic intellectual Sayyid Qutb. While in prison, Qutb wrote an intelligent, informed, and morally serious commentary on the Koran in which he laid the ills of modern society at the feet of Christianity and liberal democracy. The only way to extricate ourselves from the problems spawned by liberal democracy, Qutb argued, is to implement shariah or Islamic legal code, which implies that the state should not protect a robust right to religious freedom. In short, Qutb articulates what is, from his point of view, a compelling theological rationale against any law that authorizes the state to protect a robust right to religious freedom. If respect for persons requires that each coercive law be justified to those reasonable persons subject to that law, and if a person such as Qutb were a citizen of a liberal democracy, then the argument from respect implies that laws that protect the right to religious freedom are morally illegitimate, as they lack moral justification—at least for agents such as Qutb. And for a defender of the standard view, this is certainly an unwelcome result.13

Eberle and Cuneo go on to suggest that proponents of the standard view might respond (and have responded) to this criticism by reformulating their position to say that “A coercive law is justified to an agent only if were he reasonable and adequately informed, then he would have a sufficient reason from his own perspective to support it.” But this formulation has problems as well:

Were we to ask Qutb whether he would have reasons to support laws that protect a robust right to religious freedom if he were adequately informed and reasonable, surely he would say: no. Moreover, he would claim that his compatriots would reject the liberal protection of such a right if they were adequately informed about the divine authorship of the Quran and the proper rules of its interpretation. While Qutb's say-so doesn't settle the issue of who would believe what in improved conditions, liberal critics maintain that his response indicates just how complicated the issue under consideration is. Among other things, to establish that Qutb is wrong it seems that one would have to deny the truth of various theological claims on which Qutb relies when he determines that he would reject the right to religious freedom were he adequately informed and reasonable. That would require advocates of the standard view to take a stand on contested religious issues. However, liberal critics point out that defenders of the standard view have been wary of explicitly denying the truth of religious claims, especially those found within the major theistic religions.14 

Once again, we can see that the neutrality of Rawlsian-type theories is a sham neutrality and a sham consensus. It is only neutral and a consensus if it is kept confined within the circle of people who wouldn’t disagree with it and ignores other people, viewing them as practically non-existent. Once those other people and their alternate viewpoints are taken seriously and given a place at the table, the façade of neutrality and consensus comes crashing down, and all we are left with is a bald appeal for an establishment of something like agnosticism as the official religion of the nation, no different in principle from Sayyid Qutb’s call for an Islamic establishment--except that Qutb admitted what he was doing while the Rawlsians, either through dishonesty or naiveté, don’t.

Secularism Is Not Neutrality

The basic point here is that the call for a secular government that avoids taking a stand on religious claims and pretends to be neutral on such matters is really not neutral at all, but is an establishment of a particular viewpoint--agnosticism--as the official worldview of the nation. Steven D. Smith, the Warren Distinguished Professor of Law at the University of San Diego, commented on this strategy to represent a secular, non-religious viewpoint as neutral in his 1995 book Foreordained Failure: The Quest for a Constitutional Principle of Religious Freedom. His insight is penetrating and witty and worth quoting:

Although deeply entrenched in modern legal discourse, this equation of secularism and neutrality is also curious. One need not suppose any implacable, across-the-board enmity between the religious and the secular to appreciate that in many contexts and on many issues some widely held religious values and beliefs are directly at odds with secular values and beliefs. Religion and secularism are not invariably foes, but sometimes they are antagonistic; and even in more peaceful settings they are, often enough, mutually suspicious competitors. Hence, the recurring pronouncement that the schools must be neutral and therefore entirely secular is much like an announcement, made by the president of the company: “In hiring employees this company will be strictly nonpartisan, and therefore we will hire only Republicans.” What is puzzling is that a host of judges and legal scholars can take such professions of neutrality seriously.15

Some proponents of a secular government suggest that secularism is neutral because it is the common denominator that all people share. All people, the argument goes, agree on the existence of the natural world and the things in it. We disagree about the existence and nature of the supernatural world and the things in it. So the neutral approach is to base law on what we all agree on and leave out what is controversial between us. It sounds plausible, but Smith detects the fallacy in it:

In more familiar contexts, we would immediately spot the common denominator strategy as fraudulent. Suppose Dad and daughter are discussing what to have for dinner. Daughter proposes: “Let’s just have dessert.” Dad suggests that it would be better to have a full meal, with salad, mean, fruit, vegetables, and then dessert. Daughter responds: “Obviously, Dad, we have some disagreements. But there is one thing we agree on; we both want dessert. Clearly, the appropriate solution--the “neutral” solution--is to accept what we agree on. So serve up the dessert.” Dad is not likely to be taken in by this ploy. The supposed agreement is spurious because Dad wants dessert if and only if it is preceded by other, more nutritious food.16

Smith’s point is that if we are comparing two views such as Christianity and agnosticism or secularism, it is true that there are things that both groups agree on, but it is not true that those things that are not agreed on are unimportant. Whether God exists and the Bible is a divine revelation are crucial issues that will greatly affect one’s life. What we do on the basis of facts derived from the natural world and not from anything else will be very different from what we will do based on facts derived from the natural world plus facts derived from revelation from God in the Bible. To exclude God and the Bible and to focus only on the natural world is not to have common ground between agnosticism/secularism and Christianity; it is to reject Christianity for the agnostic worldview.

The Official Religion of the United States: Agnosticism

We have seen that the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution is typically considered today by authoritative bodies such as the Supreme Court to require an official public and governmental policy of neutrality on religious matters. But we have seen that such a policy of neutrality is really not neutral at all, but rather the endorsement of a particular religious/worldview viewpoint: agnosticism. To act as if we can have knowledge of the natural world and things in it, while acting as if we have no knowledge available to us from the supernatural realm, is effectively to act as if the supernatural realm does not exist or at least that no knowledge is available to us about it, which is precisely the agnostic point of view as opposed to the point of view of religions such as Christianity or Islam, which do claim that knowledge--much crucial knowledge--is available to us about and from the supernatural realm. Therefore, the embracing of this kind of neutrality by the government of the United States is in reality the establishment of agnosticism as the official religion of the nation.

Before we move on from this point, let me illustrate this claimed-neutrality-but really-agnosticism position as it plays out in public, government education, particularly in science classes as they deal with the subject of evolution. Public education, as an official arm of the U.S. government, illustrates what the nation’s so-called neutrality looks like in practice.

Let’s take a look at the website Understanding Evolution, which is a joint project of the University of California Museum of Paleontology and the National Center for Science Education. The website is funded with public money and represents a public or governmental perspective on the subject of science and evolution. In the article on the website entitled, “The Nature of Science,” we run across this description of what belongs in science and what does not:

Science seeks to explain the natural world and its explanations are tested using evidence from the natural world. Birds and lizards are known to exist in nature and therefore fall within the scope of science. Elves and gnomes are great fun to read about and even to enjoy as statues in our gardens, but they do not dwell in the natural world. That means they are not appropriate for scientific study. The basis of any scientific understanding is information gleaned from observations of nature.

Science assumes that we can learn about the natural world by gathering evidence.
through our senses and extensions of our senses. A flower or a rock can be directly observed with no special aids. But using technology, we can expand the realm of human senses to observe such invisible phenomena as electricity and magnetic fields, and objects such as bacteria and faraway galaxies. Dreams, apparitions and hallucinations, on the other hand, may seem real but they do not arise from our senses and are not even extensions of our senses. The ultimate test of any conceptual understanding exists only in real materials and observations. Evidence is the basic stuff of science. Without evidence there is only speculation.17

Of course, the writers of this article are not concerned with people bringing elves and gnomes into science classes. “Elves and gnomes” is a phrase meant to stand in for “supernatural or religious beliefs.” Notice the clear agnostic (even atheistic) attitude expressed by this article. It puts belief in God and other religious beliefs into the category of elves, gnomes, dreams, apparitions, and hallucinations, which may “seem real” but which cannot be observed by the senses. The article equates “observation of the senses” with “evidence” in general and so dismisses all supernatural claims as “speculation” that has no evidential support at all. Notice that the article avoids making clear, explicit statements such as “God does not exist” or “The Bible is not a divine revelation.” This is because, as a document on a website expressing an official, governmental viewpoint, it must profess an attitude of neutrality in keeping with current interpretations of the First Amendment. But it is also obvious to anyone who is not dreadfully naïve that, as an attempt at neutrality, in the sense of truly not taking sides in any religious disputes, the article has failed miserably, for it has pretty clearly declared all supernatural beliefs to be based on evidence-less speculation and anything that cannot be observed by the senses (as naturalists would define this category) as unreal, thus contradicting the majority of religious beliefs on earth. The article illustrates, not true neutrality, but an official endorsement of agnostic naturalistic thinking, in keeping with the general implications of current understandings of the First Amendment.

Neutrality Is Impossible

The reason that such attempts at neutrality as we have been examining fail so miserably is because they are trying to do something that is inherently impossible and absurd. The fact of the matter is that neutrality in ethics, whether personal ethics or social ethics, is impossible. Different worldviews are going to lead to different conclusions on fundamental ethical issues. Which ethical conclusions are the right ones will depend on which worldview is true. If Islam is true, then it is a fact that the Creator and Ultimate Moral Authority of the universe wants all people on earth to cease from eating pork (which is forbidden in Islamic Law). If you do eat pork, your actions are declaring Islam to be a false religion, because you are clearly implying that you do not believe that Islamic Law comes from God, which is the foundation of the Islamic religion, without which it collapses into nothingness. If the Bible indicates that societies should not legalize same-sex marriage, and you want to legalize it, then you are declaring the Bible not to be a true, inerrant divine revelation, and thus declaring any version of Christianity which holds that it is (which would include all historic versions of Christianity) to be false.

The fact is that different worldviews, because they adhere to fundamentally and crucially important different beliefs about what is true, are going to lead to significantly different ethical principles and conclusions. There is absolutely no way to judge between these ethical principles and conclusions, to find out which ones are right and which ones we should adopt, either personally or as a society, without deciding on the truth or falsehood of the various worldview claims that are out there. Therefore, the most important and foundational question we need to ask in order to work out for ourselves and our society principles of ethics that we should live by is this: Which worldview claims are true, and which are false? There is no shortcut. We are going to have to take the time and the effort to examine the truth claims of various worldviews, looking at the evidence and the arguments, to figure out what is true. And once we think we know what is true, we will base our ethics and our laws on that, while rejecting false beliefs. We cannot avoid this task by taking the route of agnosticism, for agnosticism is simply one particular viewpoint among many other viewpoints. If agnosticism is right, then historic, orthodox Christianity is wrong, because Christianity is grounded on the claim that we can know many things about God, his nature, and his will. There is no way for a Christian to argue for Christian ethics--that is, ethics that flow from a Christian way of viewing the world--without first arguing for Christianity. And there is no way for an agnostic to argue for agnostic ethics--that is, ethics that flow from an agnostic way of viewing the world--without first arguing for agnosticism, which will involve arguing against the truth claims of all the religions that claim knowledge of truth in religious matters. I am going to spend the rest of this book talking about two particular worldviews, agnosticism and Christianity, and the different ethical principles and conclusions that flow from these two worldviews. We will see that the only way to tell which ethical perspectives are correct and which are not is to first figure out which worldview (if either of them) is actually supported by the evidence and which we therefore should regard as actually true.

1 See http://supreme.justia.com/us/403/602/case.html (from the U.S. Supreme Court Center at Justia.com) for the entire body of Lemon V. Kurtzman.

2 Judith Boss, Analyzing Moral Issues, Third Edition (New York: McGraw Hill, 2005), 19.

3 Ibid., N-2 (in the endnotes).

4 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 137.

5 Leif Wenar, "John Rawls", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = , accessed on 6/29/10 at 11:41 AM.

6 Ibid.

7 Political Liberalism, 150-151.

8 “John Rawls,” accessed on 6/29/10 at 12:40 PM.

9 Political Liberalism, 60.

10 Political Liberalism, 152-153.

11 John Rawls, The Law of Peoples, with “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited” (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 178.

12 Ibid., 132-133.

13 Chris Eberle, Terence Cuneo, "Religion and Political Theory", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2008 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = , accessed on 6/30/10 at 11:59 AM. Note that Eberle and Cuneo are not necessarily endorsing the liberal critics’ criticism of the standard view. Their article is attempting to describe the different sides involved in debates over the appropriate role of religion in political theory.

14 Ibid.

15 Steven D. Smith, Foreordained Failure: The Quest for a Constitutional Principle of Religious Freedom (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 82.

16 Ibid., 89.

17 "The Nature of Science." Understanding Evolution. University of California Museum of Paleontology. 28 June 2010 .

The Impossibility of Governmental Neutrality in Religious Matters

This is an adaptation of a paper I read at the Intermountain Philosophy Conference at Brigham Young University in the Fall of 2011.

The United States of America prides itself on its religious neutrality. We tend to think it one of our great distinctives that we have the ability to craft laws and policies on grounds that are religiously neutral. Our laws, we think, do not discriminate against any religion. They do not endorse or reject any particular religion or worldview. We contrast ourselves with nations like Iran, which embraces a certain form of Islam as the official religion of the state and enacts laws in accordance with this worldview. Our policy of neutrality goes all the way back to the era of the founding of the country and was expressed by many of our founding fathers, such as Thomas Jefferson and James Madison. We have embedded the ideal of neutrality in our Constitution. Article VI says that “no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States.”1 The First Amendment famously says that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” The current prevailing understanding of what this is saying includes the idea that the government is not to have an established religion or worldview. That is, the government is not to endorse one religious viewpoint over another or a religious viewpoint over a non-religious viewpoint or vice versa. The government is to remain neutral in matters of religion, not favoring or opposing anybody's worldview beliefs.

The Supreme Court has often reinforced this understanding, and a number of suggested tests for the constitutionality of various actions and policies are based on it, such as the Lemon Test (derived from the court case Lemon vs. Kurtzman), which says that any governmental action must have a secular purpose and a secular effect and cannot oppose or endorse religious views, and Sandra Day O'Connor's Endorsement Test, which says that a government action cannot “endorse” a particular religious or non-religious viewpoint. Justice O'Connor, describing how the government can violate the First Amendment by violating the Endorsement Test, put it this way in the 1984 court case Lynch vs. Donnelly: “The second and more direct infringement is government endorsement or disapproval of religion. Endorsement sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political community. Disapproval sends the opposite message.”2 Many American legal scholars and philosophers have expressed the same position. Martha Nussbaum, in her book Liberty of Conscience, says that an “‘establishment of religion’ means that government has put its stamp of approval on some particular religion or group of religions, creating an official orthodoxy.”3 She states,

This is also a country that has long understood that liberty of conscience is worth nothing if it is not equal liberty. Liberty of conscience is not equal, however, if government announces a religious orthodoxy, saying that this, and not that, is the religious view that defines us as a nation. Even if such an orthodoxy is not coercively imposed, it is a statement that creates an in-group and an out-group. It says that we do not all enter the public square on the same basis: one religion is the American religion and others are not. It means, in effect, that minorities have religious liberty at the sufferance of the majority and must acknowledge that their views are subordinate, in the public sphere, to majority views.4

In another place in the same book, she says, “Indeed, in order to avoid endorsing one religion over another, or religion over non-religion, the state will wisely seek to avoid making public statements of either agreement or disagreement. It won’t say that the Roman Catholics are right, and it also won’t say that they are wrong about ultimate reality and the Buddhists are right. To say such things is to establish a public orthodoxy. The hope is that public institutions can be founded on principles that all can share, no matter what their religion.”5 The basic idea is clear: The First Amendment forbids the establishment of any religious or non-religious viewpoint as the official orthodoxy of the nation, which means it cannot engage in any action that would send a message approving or opposing any viewpoint. The First Amendment Center website sums it up in this way: “Although the Court’s interpretation of the establishment clause is in flux, it is likely that for the foreseeable future a majority of the justices will continue to view government neutrality toward religion as the guiding principle. Neutrality means not favoring one religion over another, not favoring religion over non-religion and vice versa.”6

My purpose here is to point out that the claim that the United States does not have an official, established worldview and is neutral in religious matters is actually false. It is an illusion, created by rhetoric and question-begging. The United States, just like every human society, does indeed have an established religion or worldview. Indeed, it cannot do anything else, as religious neutrality is actually impossible. I am certainly not the first person to make this argument. Others have and are continuing to make it, such as University of San Diego Law Professor Steven D. Smith. But I have observed that it is very difficult to convince people to accept it. This is actually not very surprising, considering how committed Americans are to the ideal of neutrality as a core part of our identity. Any attempt to show that such an ideal is an illusion and an absurdity is bound to be, to quote a phrase, an “inconvenient truth.” Nevertheless, if we are honest, and if we want to have intelligent conversations that avoid simply throwing clichés back and forth, we need to acknowledge it and embrace its practical consequences.

In order to make my argument, I would like to enlist the help of the NRA. Not the National Rifle Association, but the National Reform Association. This is an organization of Evangelical Christians which, since the 1800’s, has been advocating that the United States become an officially Christian nation. They have repeatedly petitioned Congress to amend the Constitution to recognize Jesus Christ as King of the nation. Here is their statement of purpose:

The Mission of the National Reform Association is to maintain and promote in our national life the Christian principles of civil government, which include, but are not limited to, the following: 1. Jesus Christ is Lord in all aspects of life, including civil government. Jesus Christ is, therefore, the Ruler of Nations, and should be explicitly confessed as such in any constitutional documents. 2. The civil ruler is to be a servant of God, he derives his authority from God, and he is duty-bound to govern according to the expressed will of God. 3. The civil government of our nation, its laws, institutions, and practices must therefore be conformed to the principles of biblical law as revealed in the Old and New Testaments.7

Now, imagine that a representative of the NRA—we’ll call him Greg--sends a letter to the US government, and you are appointed the official representative of the government to respond to him. Here is a synopsis of his letter:

Dear Civil Government of the United States, 

I would like to state to you a few facts and then call on you to adopt the correct response to them: 1. God exists. 2. God is the ultimate moral authority in the universe. His will is the supreme, objective moral law, so that his will determines what is ethically good and bad. Also, he is the supreme judge, so that disobedience to him will, in the end, inevitably lead to woe, while obedience to him will, in the end, inevitably lead to happiness. 3. The Bible is the inerrant and infallible Word of God. 4. In God’s law as expressed in the Bible, God states that blasphemy is a sin, and it should not be tolerated by the civil government. This would include public advocacy of falsehoods such as atheism.

Greg then proceeds to provide some argumentation for all of these claims. He concludes,

Therefore, I call on you at once to put a stop to the public display of all those atheist signs that are going up all around the country, whether they be on billboards, on busses, or wherever. If you do not put a stop to this, you will be guilty of breaking God’s law, and thus you will be acting in a way that is morally wicked as well as bringing down damnation upon yourselves and doom to the entire nation (think Sodom and Gomorrah). 

Sincerely, 

Greg

Now, how are you going to respond to Greg? Of course, being a good modern American, you want to make sure that you will deal with this situation in a religiously neutral fashion and avoid creating an official national orthodoxy (even implicitly) that will say that anyone’s religious beliefs are wrong and thereby create an in-group and an out-group that fails to treat all people equally.

Perhaps you might say something like this:

Dear Greg, 

We can’t put a stop to the atheist billboards, because to do so would be to impose your religious beliefs on everyone else, and that wouldn’t be treating everyone’s beliefs equally. It wouldn’t be fair and neutral. After all, yours isn’t the only religion in the world. We should be fair and treat all religions equally. We don’t want to create a public orthodoxy where there are in-groups and out-groups. 

Yours, 

The United States Government

That sounds reasonable. But let’s see what Greg will say in response:

Dear United States, 

You are treating religions unequally right now by allowing the atheists to have their billboards. By allowing this practice to go on, you are expressing clearly the view that my religious beliefs on this subject are wrong. If you agreed with me that God himself, the ultimate moral authority in the universe, wants you to put a stop to the billboards, you would put a stop to them. So the fact that you are not putting an end to them sends a message that at least some of my religious beliefs in this area are wrong, which is setting up a public orthodoxy and putting me in an out-group. And besides, although you have failed to be neutral, even attempting to be neutral is not neutral, because God has declared that it is a sin to be neutral on these matters. So in trying to be neutral, you are really rejecting my viewpoint. 

Thanks again, 

Greg

Thinking about it, you see that Greg is right. By following a course of public policy that is at odds with what Greg thinks God wants, the United States is implicitly but clearly sending a message that Greg is wrong in some of his religious beliefs (perhaps that God exists, perhaps that the Bible is the Word of God, perhaps that God is the ultimate moral authority in the universe, perhaps that Greg’s biblical interpretation is correct) and that some other set of alternative beliefs (perhaps that God does not exist, that the Bible is not the Word of God, that some other interpretation of the Bible is correct, etc.) is right. Thus, in refusing to comply with Greg’s advice, the United States is not neutral; it is adopting an alternate set of beliefs as the official orthodoxy of the nation.

But you are not ready to give up yet. You decide to send Greg another reply and try again to be religiously neutral.

Dear Greg, 

I’m sure you wouldn’t want to be taking away anyone’s rights. But what you are suggesting would take away the rights of atheists to freedom of religion and freedom of speech. We are very much concerned to respect your rights, and the rights of atheists, and everyone else’s rights as well. If we have respect for equal rights, we won’t want to take away anyone’s freedoms, no matter what their race, gender, religion, or anything else, so long as they are respecting the rights of others and not causing any harm. 

Best wishes, 

The United States Government

That sounds like an effective response, doesn’t it? But then you get another reply from Greg:

Dear United States,

You are quite right; I do not want to take away anyone’s rights. But no one’s legitimate rights would be taken away if public expression of atheism were outlawed. You see, God’s law, as I have indicated previously, is the ultimate moral authority, and so it is the foundation, the true standard, for determining human rights. According to God’s law, atheists don’t have a right to express their views publicly. On the contrary, doing so is a crime to be punished. If you wish to preserve human rights and justice to the fullest degree, you need to follow God’s law, for it is the true standard of rights and justice. And as for causing harm—of course the public expression of atheism and the toleration of it will cause harm. For one thing, it is a violation of the honor of God, which God calls all civil governments to protect. The preservation of the honor of God is far more important than anything else. Also, the toleration of public atheism will lead to harm to the society and its citizens. For one thing, atheism sends people to hell; so if there are laws against indoor smoking to keep people safe from second-hand smoke, shouldn’t there be laws against advocating and spreading soul-destroying false doctrine? And if the government refuses to follow God’s law and instead tolerates this evil, God promises to avenge his wrath on the society itself, which will bring harm to all the citizens. 

Cheers, 

Greg

Once again, you realize with great frustration, Greg has a point. If his beliefs about God and his law are correct, then surely his conclusions are sound. To fail to follow Greg’s advice would be, from Greg’s point of view, to violate the true standard of social justice, to dishonor God, and to bring great harm to the society as a whole. If the country does not follow Greg’s exhortations, it is clearly communicating that it holds, not to neutrality, but to an alternate set of beliefs from Greg’s—for example, that God’s law as understood by Greg is not the real standard of ethics and social justice and therefore something else (but what?) is; that, contrary to Greg’s view of God’s law, atheists do have a right to express and promote atheism publicly; that the promotion of atheism is not ethically wrong; that it will not send people to hell; that it will not bring down disaster and wrath on the nation. It turns out that, just like Greg’s, the position of the United States is not neutral but rather is based on all kinds of underlying controversial theological and philosophical beliefs.

You decide to make another attempt:

Dear Greg, 

Look, there are lots of different religions in the world—Christians, Jews, Muslims, Buddhists, atheists, etc. If we are going to establish a religion, why should it be yours? Why not Buddhism, or Judaism, or Islam? And why your particular brand of Christianity? There are many different interpretations of the Bible. Many Christians think that it is just fine for atheists to publicly speak about and promote their viewpoint. And many of them don’t think that God will send such people to hell or punish the nation for such things. If we try to establish an official religion, it might turn out not to be yours, and you might bring persecution upon yourself! Wouldn’t it be better to establish a set of laws that is religiously neutral and doesn’t try to establish any religion or outlaw any religion, so that you and everyone else can freely practice your religion? 

With anticipation, 

USA

Now you’ve got him, you think. Once again, Greg replies:

Dear USA, 

Sure, there are many religions and interpretations of the Bible out there. So what? I am not advocating that we establish all religions, but only the true one. And we should not try to follow every interpretation of God’s law, but only the correct ones. You will say, “But it is impossible to know which religion and biblical interpretation is true! There is no way to objectively adjudicate these kinds of questions. I mean, we can know what is objectively true in empirical and scientific matters, but not in religious and deep philosophical matters!” In saying this, you reveal your own religion—it is the religion of Agnosticism. It is your theological and philosophical opinion that objective truth cannot be had in religious matters. But that is not my belief. I believe we can know what is objectively true in religious matters, which is why I gave you arguments for my views in my first letter to you. You think you are opting for an established neutrality, but you’re not. Instead, you are advocating that the civil government of the United States reject my religious views and the religious views of others in favor of establishing Agnosticism as the official religion of the nation, and that it make laws not on the basis of God’s law but on the basis of some standard that you’ve come up with that seems to you to make sense from your Agnostic point of view, but which from my point of view is completely wrongheaded and unethical. As for your concern for my safety should the wrong religion be established, I am not sure I am permanently safe in a country that has adopted Agnosticism as its official religion, for this seems to me a weak foundation for civil rights of any kind. But we’ll save that discussion for another day. For now, I’ll say that even if you are right that I am personally safer in the short run and temporally if I rest quietly in this Agnostic society instead of advocating for what I believe to be true, yet there are things more important than safety—things like doing what is right and advocating social justice based on God’s law. And, in the end, I am much safer siding with God than going against him. 

Warm regards, 

Greg

Once again frustrated, you sit back and reflect on the conversation. However odd and irritating it might be, Greg is actually right, you realize. Your approach and your response to his claims are not neutral; they are based on contested theological and philosophical claims. You realize that Greg is right that your positions are indeed based on some form of agnosticism—you have assumed that there is no way that Greg can back up his claims objectively any more than any other religion. You are unsure if Greg’s biblical interpretations are correct, but you realize that even if he could convince you that they are, it would not affect what you think US policy should be—and this fact reveals clearly that your views are based on the assumption that there is no objective reason to take the Bible seriously as the Word of God, contrary to Greg’s belief; for if you did take it seriously as such, you would want the USA to follow whatever it says. Greg, rightly, would label this a form of agnosticism. You try to come up with some other reasons you might be able to present to Greg—if atheists are denied the freedom to advocate atheism, it would make them unhappy; liberty of conscience should be granted; atheists might use violence to defend their desired freedoms—but you realize they all beg the question just as your previous arguments did. If Greg’s beliefs are right, then it is irrelevant whether atheists are unhappy (just as it is irrelevant to our laws against theft that they might make thieves unhappy). Liberty of conscience sounds good, but already consciences are limited. We would not, for example, allow murderers and thieves to roam free on the grounds that we don’t want to suppress their “liberty of conscience.” If public atheism is bad and harmful as well, it should not be tolerated on this ground either. If atheists revolt, whose fault is it? At first, you think that of course it would be the fault of an oppressive government. But then you realize that if Greg’s beliefs are right, it the atheists’ fault. Just as if there were a revolt of thieves, we would not think it the fault of laws against theft, but the fault of unjustly discontented criminals. You think also of the recent uprisings in the Arab Spring. How much blame we assign for violence, and to whom we assign the blame, depends a great deal on which causes we think are just and which unjust, and people’s views on these things are different. There is no neutral way to respond to Greg. To establish Greg’s beliefs as the basis of law would be to violate the principle of religious neutrality; but so would it be to reject Greg’s beliefs and have some other basis of law instead.

Of course, this fact—the impossibility of neutrality—does not just apply to the issue of the public expression of atheism, but to all other issues as well. Take same-sex marriage, for example. Some people think, on religious grounds, that homosexuality is a perversion of true sexuality and is wrong. Others think that it is perfectly acceptable. The former often hold the position that the government should not recognize same-sex marriages, while the latter often hold that it should. If the government were to oppose same-sex marriage on the grounds that it is opposed to God's will and will bring God's judgment down on the society, this would clearly be a violation of the ideal of neutrality. It would send a message of endorsement of the beliefs of some people, such as evangelical Christians, over other beliefs, because it would be basing law and policy on these beliefs and not others. However, if the government accepts or endorses same-sex marriage, it is clearly doing so on the assumption that allowing same-sex marriage is not evil or harmful to the society, which is to endorse other people's beliefs over against the beliefs of the Christian evangelicals and others who think differently. It would send a message that some of the beliefs of some evangelical Christians and others are wrong and are to be officially rejected by the government. Neither policy—allowing same-sex marriage nor opposing it—is neutral, for both amount to an endorsement of a particular set of beliefs over against some other set of beliefs.

And although I’ve focused on examples of the civil government disagreeing with certain forms of Christian beliefs, these Christians certainly do not have a monopoly on being disagreed with in the name of neutrality. Our government disagrees with lots of other people’s beliefs as well. We also fail to be neutral towards certain forms of Anabaptist Christianity, such as those which hold that the Bible commands pacifism. We are not neutral towards those who think that the Qur’an is God’s Word and that nations have a duty to endorse Islamic Law. We are not neutral towards those atheists who think that it is quite clear that God does not exist and that religion is a great harm that the government ought to discourage by teaching atheism explicitly to its citizens. We disagree, in various ways, with the majority of people on earth. I would argue that our hypothetical character Greg is right—what many of us mean by slogans like “religious neutrality” and “separation of church and state” is really the endorsement of agnosticism as the official worldview of the nation. And yet the conservative, historic forms of just about all the major religions affirm a non-agnostic view, as they claim to know something about matters beyond the natural world. So how pretentious for us to think and to claim that we are neutral in acting on an agnostic view!

In order for a civil government to be able to have a coherent set of laws and policies, it must embrace a particular view of the world and reject competing views. It must make certain things legal and other things illegal based on ideas of what is truly valuable, what is truly harmful, what goals human societies ought to have, etc. A civil government can extend tolerance to some degree to those who disagree with its prevailing philosophy, but it will decide how much tolerance to extend based on its own prevailing philosophy, and thus we must always have the kind of situation which Martha Nussbaum deplores, a situation in which “minorities have religious liberty at the sufferance of the majority and must acknowledge that their views are subordinate, in the public sphere, to majority views.” And if those minorities' views lead people to cross the boundaries of tolerance as determined by the majority view, the government will express intolerance towards such actions and such views, even if the minorities express that according to their worldview, what they are doing is completely acceptable and even virtuous. One example of this situation is the recent controversy over whether the religious practice of male circumcision should be tolerated. According to orthodox Jews and Muslims, circumcision of male newborns is the right thing to do, as God has commanded it. But many people are coming to other conclusions about the morality of this practice based on atheist and agnostic views. Which worldview will determine law and policy in this area?

So now that we can see the problem—we have an impossible illusion at the core of our self-identity as Americans—we need to ask the question: What are we going to do about it? There is no way we can avoid it. Neutrality is impossible. Whether we like it or not, our laws and policies will be based on certain controversial beliefs over against others. So I would suggest that we give up on the ideal of neutrality. But what is the alternative? Since we must base laws and policies on certain beliefs, I would propose we base them on true beliefs rather than false ones. That seems obvious. But it probably also seems terribly naïve. We are a pluralistic country full of people with diverse worldviews. We don’t agree on which beliefs are true and which are false. So what I suggest for now is that we open up public dialogue about which worldview beliefs are really true. We should all attempt to present and argue for our perspectives, bringing to the surface the underlying worldview assumptions that are the ground of them. We should listen to the arguments of others, and try to persuade others that we are correct and that they should join us in trying to base laws and policies on our beliefs rather than alternative ones. In our hypothetical dialogue, Greg did this. He presented his opinion and showed and argued for the assumptions on which it was based. But you (as our hypothetical government respondent) did not. You begged the question by assuming an agnostic worldview while claiming neutrality. What you should have done is say something like this:

Dear Greg, 

I understand your reasons for wanting to outlaw the public advocacy of atheism, as you hold that God is opposed to it and threatens judgment if we tolerate it, etc. But where you go wrong is in thinking that we have any objective reason to think that the Bible is really the Word of God and that therefore we should obey it. Actually, there are no good, objective reasons to believe this. Here is my response to your arguments, showing that agnosticism is really the correct way of looking at things. [At this point, you present some evidence for your agnostic point of view.] Therefore, on this agnostic basis, I see no good reason to outlaw the public advocacy of atheism. And that is the official position of the United States. 

Best of luck, 

The USA

Will this kind of response lead to difficulties? Well, it will certainly make it harder for us to argue for our political viewpoints! But that is a good thing, for what we have been doing is trying to win by using question-begging rhetoric and sweeping the real, deeper issues under the rug. We will have to stop doing that and embrace a more honest approach. Will this approach lead to conflict? Perhaps. But I think it is the right thing to do even if it does, as it is the only way to show true respect to others rather than trying to manipulate public life through dishonest rhetoric. And I think that our current approach—pretending our view is neutral and trying to silence opposition by using rhetorical labels, etc.—is not that great at avoiding conflict. I suspect that people like Greg just might feel a bit more respected if they were given an honest argument for the rejection of their religious beliefs and allowed to make an argument in response rather than having their beliefs rejected patronizingly in the name of “neutrality” while being given no argument but only rhetorical pejorative labels. Right now, there are culture wars in this country. They aren’t going to go away by pretending that we can all agree without having to deal with any of the deepest religious and philosophical issues from which they spring. We could, instead, deal with them head on by allowing and encouraging the truly important dialogues to occur. If we wish to be honest, I think we have no other choice.

1 Found at http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/constitution_transcript.html at 2:09 PM on 8/23/12.
2 Found at http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=465&invol=668 at 2:13 PM on 8/23/12.
3 Martha Nussbaum, Liberty of Conscience: In Defense of America’s Tradition of Religious Equality (New York: Basic Books, 2008), 20.
4 Ibid., 2.
5 Ibid., 23.
6 Found at http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/establishment-clause at 2:35 on 8/23/12.
7 Found at http://www.iclnet.org/pub/resources/g-823.html at 3:03 on 8/23/12.

Let's Not and Say We Did!

If you remember the 90s, you may remember a saying that was popular at that time.  A group of people would be standing around trying to decide whether or not to do something.  Some would say "Let's do it!"  Others would say "Let's not!"  And then inevitably some wise guy (or girl) would say "Let's not and say we did!"

I've been reminded of this saying recently as I have discussed the issue of church unity and authority with various people.  If you are familiar with my recent thoughts on these issues (such as can be found here and here), you know that I have been arguing that separate denominations do not recognize each others' ecclesiastical authority.  The very act of remaining out of formal communion with each other inherently implies this.  For example, when the Presbytery of the Dakotas (POD) of the OPC calls a presbytery meeting, they invite the officers in all the OPC churches in the region, but they do not invite the PCA officers, or the RCUS officers, etc., to come to the meeting as full voting members.  This quite clearly implies that the OPC does not recognize the de jure authority of these officers.  The OPC treats them as being without authority, as if they are not true, duly constituted, de jure officers in the church of Christ.  For if the OPC did regard these officers as true de jure officers in the church of Christ, how could they fail to treat them the same as the OPC officers and include them as full voting members in the meetings?  And if the OPC believed that the presbytery meetings of the PCA or the RCUS were valid, de jure regional meetings of the church, how could they fail to go to them and be a part of them as full voting members (or at least try to do so and feel an injustice has been done if they are not allowed)?

Now, frankly, this seems quite obvious to me.  And yet I have spoken with a number of OPC officers, as well as officers from other denominations, who simply can't seem to see it.  I've been told that I am wrong to say that separated denominations do not recognize each others' de jure authority.  "Of course we recognize the full de jure authority of officers in the RCUS and the PCA!" I'm basically told by some officers in the OPC.  "How could you think otherwise?"

How indeed.  Well, it seems to me that if officers in the POD claim to respect and recognize the full de jure authority of officers in other denominations (and, by the way, I am not saying that all of them make this claim), it is blatantly inconsistent of them not to invite those officers as full voting members to their meetings.  They are saying one thing and doing another.  They say with their words that they recognize the authority of these other officers and church courts, but their actions clearly say otherwise.  It seems to me a clear case of "Let's not and say we did!"

This sort of situation, where people say one thing and do another, comes up a lot in life.  The secularists loudly and proudly proclaim that they are neutral in religious matters, while at the same time advocating Agnosticism and rejecting Christianity and other worldviews as the official worldview of the nation.  LDS missionaries love to insist that they never attack anyone's faith, while at the same time explaining to you that your church is wrong and that you ought to join theirs.  People often say that their relationships are going along just fine, when anyone who is not blind can see that they are falling apart.  Sometimes people have trouble seeing reality for what it really is.  Particularly, sometimes people have trouble perceiving that their actions betray their stated positions and intentions.

With regard to the issue currently under discussion, I find it amazing that people cannot see that denominational separation implies a refusal to recognize de jure authority across denominational lines.  To use an analogy, imagine you are working for a company.  Your boss is speaking to a group of his employees, and he says, "I just want you to know that I consider you all members of the team.  In my view, you are all the same, and each of you has just as much a right to be treated as an essential part of the team as anyone else.  However, I will only allow some of you to come to our meetings as official team members and vote in team meetings."  I hope I'm not the only one who notices something contradictory about these statements!  Well, that is essentially the sort of statement I am getting with regard to denominational separation.  "Sure the RCUS and PCA officers are full, de jure officers in the church of Christ!  They are just as much true officers in the church as OPC officers.  They all have the same authority and privileges and rights as officers in the church of Christ.  However, when we have a meeting of all the churches in our region, we will only invite OPC officers to come as full voting members.  The rest of you we won't allow (though you can come and visit, and maybe even give a speech if you want)."

Some people may say that they do indeed recognize other denominations and their church courts and officers as having true de jure authority, but their actions speak louder than their words.  In reality, they do not grant de jure authority to them.  So why do they insist that they do?  I think it is just part of the general confusion on these issues that seems to plague Reformed circles these days.  Let's work harder to think harder about these important issues, so that we can have a coherent position that both makes sense and is biblical!  If we want to embrace some denomination and exclude others from being recognized as having de jure authority, let's do it clearly and consistently.  If we want instead to embrace these other denominations, let's do that clearly and consistently, both in terms of words and actions.  At least then, even if we get the wrong answer at first, it will be clear where we stand, which will enable us to much more easily be able to check ourselves against God's Word to make sure that we are doing what is right.

UPDATE 11/8/12:  Just a thought to add:  Perhaps the reason why Presbyterians sometimes think that they are recognizing de jure authority in other denominations when they obviously really aren't is because they are confusing the concepts of de facto and de jure. When they say they do indeed recognize the de jure authority of other denominations, perhaps all they really mean to say is that they recognize de facto that the people in the other denominations are true Christians and that the other denominations are true churches de facto.  In that case, there would be no contradiction, because there is no contradiction between recognizing de facto that a group of people seems to be a part of the Body of Christ and denying that they have any legitimate authority to function as the church de jure.  Perhaps we could even construe the idea of "fraternal relations" as simply a formal recognition by a denomination that "we think the guys in that other denomination are really Christians, though we rightfully don't grant them any de jure authority for the present."

This probably does explain some of the confusion over this issue in the Presbyterian world, but it also probably doesn't explain all of it.  I still think that this is likely more than simply a matter of semantics.  I think there is genuine confusion on the matter going on as well.  But perhaps pointing out a possible source of semantic confusion can help matters at least a little.

UPDATE 11/14/12:  I thought it might be useful here to provide an example of what I am talking about.  Here is a statement from an (anonymous) actual Presbyterian correspondent with whom I have spoken about these issues:

"No reformed denomination claims that other denominations do not possess legitimate authority.  No reformed denomination holds itself alone to be the visible church of Christ (the Prot. Ref. Church may be close to this).  To hold that is the mark of a cult, not a church of Jesus Christ.  Reformed churches confess the opposite.  They confess that the church is one and that God gathers his people in many different local churches, many of which are organized as denominations or federations of churches.  We do recognize the authority of assemblies, presbyteries, and sessions of other denominations."

You can see here the confusion and lack of a clear distinction between the idea of a true church de facto and the idea of a church having legitimate, formally recognized authority de jure.  You can also see the flirtation with a congregationalist rather than a presbyterian idea of church government, as there seems to be a contentment with having a bunch of different denominations working together informally without any formal full communion.

With regard to why, if full de jure authority is recognized between denominations, the church courts of one denomination do not invite officers from other denominations as full voting members at their meetings, this correspondent had this to say:

"The issue of who votes at an assembly is determined by whether the person is a member of that judicatory properly delegated to vote at it.  For example, no reformed church allows a ruling elder or minister in the same denomination to vote at a session meeting when that ruling elder or minister is not installed to serve as a voting member of that session.

Full recognition of authority does not require full union."

Notice that this answer sidesteps the real issue.  Of course one has to be formally ordained and appointed and recognized as a member of a judicatory in order to vote in it.  The question is, why do church courts of different denominations systematically refuse to invite officers in other denominations to be formally recognized as members of their church courts when they are in the same region?  For example, why does the Presbytery of the Dakotas of the OPC not invite to be formally recognized as full voting members officers in that same region in the PCA?  A presbytery is a regional gathering, so why leave out officers in that region?  And with regard to officers in different regions, why are they not all called together in a unifying higher assembly?  Of course, the real answer is that the denominations do not recognize each others' de jure authority, despite protestations to the contrary.

I'm afraid full recognition of authority does indeed require full union, because the very idea of all the courts and officers in the different denominations fully formally recognizing each other would be exactly the same as the idea of all these denominations merging and ceasing to be different denominations.

UPDATE 1/10/13:  An argument that no one yet has made but that could possibly be made by someone wanting to argue that denominations do in fact recognize each others' de jure authority is that while ministers and other officers are not invited as voting members in the synods of the church, yet that is not because their authority as officers is not being recognized, but because there are different kinds of officers in the church.  There are some kinds of ruling elders and ministers whose office includes being full voting members of presbytery meetings, etc., while there are other kinds of ruling elders and ministers whose office does not allow for this.  And assemblies of these latter sorts of officers don't get to be included in official church court meetings.

As I write this out, it is obvious to me how strained a person making this argument would have to be to hold their position in light of the contradictions of reality.  (In order to be as careful as possible to be fair to opposing positions, I have a tendency to try to invent any arguments I can think of that the other side could use, even if the other side never actually uses them.)  This would be a good argument if, say, the OPC Book of Church Order had a section in its chapter on church officers entitled, "On Non-Voting Church Officers, Such as the RCUS," etc.  But it doesn't.  The only offices recognized in presbyterian churches are ruling elders, ministers, teaching elders, and deacons.  And it is clear that RCUS officers simply don't fit in at all in this scheme of things in the OPC, or vice versa.  They simply are not recognized formally as legitimate officers, nor are their gatherings formally recognized as legitimate.  In a presbyterian system, to thus not recognize each others' officers and courts is quite clearly to charge the other side with schism and to deny the other side de jure legitimacy.  There is simply no other way to understand such actions.

UPDATE 1/12/13:  When Denomination A is separated from Denomination B, there are only three possible ways of understanding Denomination A's position:

1. Denomination A does not hold to presbyterian (or episcopal) church government, but rather congregationalism or semi-congregationalism.  In this case, denominational separation is seen as normal and implies no charge of schism towards Denomination B or a rejection of Denomination B's de jure authority and legitimacy.  (However, as presbyterian church government is the biblical view, congregational church government is an inherently schismatic principle that does not adequately preserve the unity of the church.  Church courts and officers are not recognizing each other as they should.  So, in that sense, it could still be said that congregationalist or semi-congregationalist churches are rejecting each others' de jure authority.)

2. Denomination A holds to presbyterian church government, and also attributes de jure legitimacy and authority to Denomination B and its officers and church courts, but simply refuses to give those officers and church courts their due or to hold them to their responsibilities.  In this case, Denomination A is deliberately refusing to do its duty and has chosen to act schismatically.

3. Denomination A holds to presbyterian church government, but does not attribute de jure legitimacy and authority to Denomination B and its officers and church courts, and for that reason does not treat them as having such legitimacy and authority by being in formal union with Denomination B.  In this case, Denomination A, obviously, is refusing to recognize Denomination B's de jure legitimacy and authority, and is also charging Denomination B with schism (for maintaining doctrines and/or practices that continue to cause an unlawful breach between the two denominations).  If Denomination A is correct in its position and actions in this case, then it is in the right and the other denomination is indeed schismatic and without proper de jure legitimacy and authority.  If Denomination A is wrong in its position and actions, however, then it is acting schismatically by inappropriately rending the Body of Christ.

UPDATE 2/5/13:  A couple of further thoughts:

1. First of all, let me put out a few quotations from the Westminster Confession and the Form of Presbyterial Church Government:

2. The visible Church, which is also catholic or universal under the Gospel (not confined to one nation as before under the law), consists of all those throughout the world that profess the true religion; and of their children: and is the kingdom of the Lord Jesus Christ, the house and family of God, out of which there is no ordinary possibility of salvation.

3. Unto this catholic visible Church Christ hath given the ministry, oracles, and ordinances of God, for the gathering and perfecting of the saints, in this life, to the end of the world: and doth by His own presence and Spirit, according to His promise, make them effectual thereunto. (Westminster Confession 25:2-3)

THERE is one general church visible, held forth in the New Testament.

The ministry, oracles, and ordinances of the New Testament, are given by Jesus Christ to the general church visible, for the gathering and perfecting of it in this life, until his second coming.

Particular visible churches, members of the general church, are also held forth in the New Testament. Particular churches in the primitive times were made up of visible saints, viz. of such as, being of age, professed faith in Christ, and obedience unto Christ, according to the rules of faith and life taught by Christ and his apostles; and of their children. (Form of Presbyterian Church Government, "Of the Church")

To whom are the "ministry, oracles, and ordinances of God" given?  To the "general church visible" or the "catholic visible church."  That general catholic church, then, for reasons of logistics, forms into smaller sub-groups.

IT is lawful and expedient that there be fixed congregations, that is, a certain company of Christians to meet in one assembly ordinarily for publick worship. When believers multiply to such a number, that they cannot conveniently meet in one place, it is lawful and expedient that they should be divided into distinct and fixed congregations, for the better administration of such ordinances as belong unto them, and the discharge of mutual duties.

The ordinary way of dividing Christians into distinct congregations, and most expedient for edification, is by the respective bounds of their dwellings. (FPCG, ""Of Particular Congregations")

This has implications for the meaning of denominational separation.  If the "ministry, oracles, and ordinances of God" have been given by God to the entire catholic church as a whole, then any true, de jure officers within the entire catholic church would have, by right, all the rights, responsibilities, and privileges of their offices, and all the church courts would have all the rights, responsibilities, and privileges of true church courts.  This means that if any officers or courts are regarded as possessing de jure authority and legitimacy, they must be granted all these rights and privileges.  They cannot be excluded from any of them, such as by not being invited to be full voting members in the assemblies of the church, or by having their assemblies left out of the highest general assembly of the church.  Denominational distinctions are foreign to the Westminster Standards.  In the Standards, there is only the one catholic church divided up for logistical reasons.  All the officers and courts of the entire catholic church, then, would have the same rights, responsibilities, and privileges (according to the nature of their office or the level of their assembly).  So the current popular practice of denominations not granting these rights and privileges to officers and courts of other denominations is either a refusal to grant their de jure legitimacy and authority, or it is a brazenly schismatic act, or it is a symptom of being confused by semi-congregationalism rather than holding more purely to presbyterianism.

2. I thought of another argument someone might use to escape all of the reasoning put forward on this subject.  If one denomination (D-A) is separated from another denomination (D-B), a representative of D-A might say this:  "We don't reject the authority of D-B.  It's just that we currently don't have an opinion about the legitimacy and authority of D-B, and that is why we are not in formal communion.  We need more time to consider the status of D-B.  But we don't formally reject their legitimacy."

Here would be my answers to this argument (which I have never actually heard made--yet):

1. Even if it is true that you don't have an opinion on D-B because you need more time to get to know them, that doesn't change anything.  It is still the case that, at this time, you only actually formally attribute de jure legitimacy and authority to D-A, and therefore you formally consider D-A at this time to be the entirety of the de jure catholic church, so far as you have any knowledge of.  An unapproved because unexamined would-be officer has no more formal authority granted to them in the church of Christ than an officer who has been examined and rejected.

2. Why have you not yet got to know D-B well enough to figure out whether de jure authority and legitimacy should be attributed to them?  This would be a good excuse if D-B had been until last week lost in the Amazon rainforest with no way to contact the outside world.  But if D-A and D-B have been able to interact with each other for a significant number of years, this is no excuse for not having figured out by now whether or not D-B is qualified to be granted de jure legitimacy and authority.  This is even more the case if D-A has had fraternal relations with D-B and lots of interaction on various levels.  The delay here is unreasonable and really shows a lack of concern for formal church unity, probably influenced somewhat by a semi-congregationalist rather than a pure presbyterian view of church government.

3. If you admit you don't recognize D-B's de jure legitimacy and authority right now, why are we arguing?  That is all I have claimed.  You have granted my entire point.  In fact, what people really want to say is that they do formally recognize each others' de jure legitimacy but they don't want to enter into formal communion with them anyway.  But this is simply to abandon biblical, presbyterian church unity for the schismatic principle of semi-congregationalism.