Wednesday, November 7, 2012

The Impossibility of Governmental Neutrality in Religious Matters

This is an adaptation of a paper I read at the Intermountain Philosophy Conference at Brigham Young University in the Fall of 2011.

The United States of America prides itself on its religious neutrality. We tend to think it one of our great distinctives that we have the ability to craft laws and policies on grounds that are religiously neutral. Our laws, we think, do not discriminate against any religion. They do not endorse or reject any particular religion or worldview. We contrast ourselves with nations like Iran, which embraces a certain form of Islam as the official religion of the state and enacts laws in accordance with this worldview. Our policy of neutrality goes all the way back to the era of the founding of the country and was expressed by many of our founding fathers, such as Thomas Jefferson and James Madison. We have embedded the ideal of neutrality in our Constitution. Article VI says that “no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States.”1 The First Amendment famously says that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” The current prevailing understanding of what this is saying includes the idea that the government is not to have an established religion or worldview. That is, the government is not to endorse one religious viewpoint over another or a religious viewpoint over a non-religious viewpoint or vice versa. The government is to remain neutral in matters of religion, not favoring or opposing anybody's worldview beliefs.

The Supreme Court has often reinforced this understanding, and a number of suggested tests for the constitutionality of various actions and policies are based on it, such as the Lemon Test (derived from the court case Lemon vs. Kurtzman), which says that any governmental action must have a secular purpose and a secular effect and cannot oppose or endorse religious views, and Sandra Day O'Connor's Endorsement Test, which says that a government action cannot “endorse” a particular religious or non-religious viewpoint. Justice O'Connor, describing how the government can violate the First Amendment by violating the Endorsement Test, put it this way in the 1984 court case Lynch vs. Donnelly: “The second and more direct infringement is government endorsement or disapproval of religion. Endorsement sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political community. Disapproval sends the opposite message.”2 Many American legal scholars and philosophers have expressed the same position. Martha Nussbaum, in her book Liberty of Conscience, says that an “‘establishment of religion’ means that government has put its stamp of approval on some particular religion or group of religions, creating an official orthodoxy.”3 She states,
This is also a country that has long understood that liberty of conscience is worth nothing if it is not equal liberty. Liberty of conscience is not equal, however, if government announces a religious orthodoxy, saying that this, and not that, is the religious view that defines us as a nation. Even if such an orthodoxy is not coercively imposed, it is a statement that creates an in-group and an out-group. It says that we do not all enter the public square on the same basis: one religion is the American religion and others are not. It means, in effect, that minorities have religious liberty at the sufferance of the majority and must acknowledge that their views are subordinate, in the public sphere, to majority views.4
In another place in the same book, she says, “Indeed, in order to avoid endorsing one religion over another, or religion over non-religion, the state will wisely seek to avoid making public statements of either agreement or disagreement. It won’t say that the Roman Catholics are right, and it also won’t say that they are wrong about ultimate reality and the Buddhists are right. To say such things is to establish a public orthodoxy. The hope is that public institutions can be founded on principles that all can share, no matter what their religion.”5 The basic idea is clear: The First Amendment forbids the establishment of any religious or non-religious viewpoint as the official orthodoxy of the nation, which means it cannot engage in any action that would send a message approving or opposing any viewpoint. The First Amendment Center website sums it up in this way: “Although the Court’s interpretation of the establishment clause is in flux, it is likely that for the foreseeable future a majority of the justices will continue to view government neutrality toward religion as the guiding principle. Neutrality means not favoring one religion over another, not favoring religion over non-religion and vice versa.”6

My purpose here is to point out that the claim that the United States does not have an official, established worldview and is neutral in religious matters is actually false. It is an illusion, created by rhetoric and question-begging. The United States, just like every human society, does indeed have an established religion or worldview. Indeed, it cannot do anything else, as religious neutrality is actually impossible. I am certainly not the first person to make this argument. Others have and are continuing to make it, such as University of San Diego Law Professor Steven D. Smith. But I have observed that it is very difficult to convince people to accept it. This is actually not very surprising, considering how committed Americans are to the ideal of neutrality as a core part of our identity. Any attempt to show that such an ideal is an illusion and an absurdity is bound to be, to quote a phrase, an “inconvenient truth.” Nevertheless, if we are honest, and if we want to have intelligent conversations that avoid simply throwing clichés back and forth, we need to acknowledge it and embrace its practical consequences.

In order to make my argument, I would like to enlist the help of the NRA. Not the National Rifle Association, but the National Reform Association. This is an organization of Evangelical Christians which, since the 1800’s, has been advocating that the United States become an officially Christian nation. They have repeatedly petitioned Congress to amend the Constitution to recognize Jesus Christ as King of the nation. Here is their statement of purpose:
The Mission of the National Reform Association is to maintain and promote in our national life the Christian principles of civil government, which include, but are not limited to, the following: 1. Jesus Christ is Lord in all aspects of life, including civil government. Jesus Christ is, therefore, the Ruler of Nations, and should be explicitly confessed as such in any constitutional documents. 2. The civil ruler is to be a servant of God, he derives his authority from God, and he is duty-bound to govern according to the expressed will of God. 3. The civil government of our nation, its laws, institutions, and practices must therefore be conformed to the principles of biblical law as revealed in the Old and New Testaments.7
Now, imagine that a representative of the NRA—we’ll call him Greg--sends a letter to the US government, and you are appointed the official representative of the government to respond to him. Here is a synopsis of his letter:
Dear Civil Government of the United States, 
I would like to state to you a few facts and then call on you to adopt the correct response to them: 1. God exists. 2. God is the ultimate moral authority in the universe. His will is the supreme, objective moral law, so that his will determines what is ethically good and bad. Also, he is the supreme judge, so that disobedience to him will, in the end, inevitably lead to woe, while obedience to him will, in the end, inevitably lead to happiness. 3. The Bible is the inerrant and infallible Word of God. 4. In God’s law as expressed in the Bible, God states that blasphemy is a sin, and it should not be tolerated by the civil government. This would include public advocacy of falsehoods such as atheism.
Greg then proceeds to provide some argumentation for all of these claims. He concludes,
Therefore, I call on you at once to put a stop to the public display of all those atheist signs that are going up all around the country, whether they be on billboards, on busses, or wherever. If you do not put a stop to this, you will be guilty of breaking God’s law, and thus you will be acting in a way that is morally wicked as well as bringing down damnation upon yourselves and doom to the entire nation (think Sodom and Gomorrah). 
Sincerely, 
Greg
Now, how are you going to respond to Greg? Of course, being a good modern American, you want to make sure that you will deal with this situation in a religiously neutral fashion and avoid creating an official national orthodoxy (even implicitly) that will say that anyone’s religious beliefs are wrong and thereby create an in-group and an out-group that fails to treat all people equally.

Perhaps you might say something like this:
Dear Greg, 
We can’t put a stop to the atheist billboards, because to do so would be to impose your religious beliefs on everyone else, and that wouldn’t be treating everyone’s beliefs equally. It wouldn’t be fair and neutral. After all, yours isn’t the only religion in the world. We should be fair and treat all religions equally. We don’t want to create a public orthodoxy where there are in-groups and out-groups. 
Yours, 
The United States Government
That sounds reasonable. But let’s see what Greg will say in response:
Dear United States, 
You are treating religions unequally right now by allowing the atheists to have their billboards. By allowing this practice to go on, you are expressing clearly the view that my religious beliefs on this subject are wrong. If you agreed with me that God himself, the ultimate moral authority in the universe, wants you to put a stop to the billboards, you would put a stop to them. So the fact that you are not putting an end to them sends a message that at least some of my religious beliefs in this area are wrong, which is setting up a public orthodoxy and putting me in an out-group. And besides, although you have failed to be neutral, even attempting to be neutral is not neutral, because God has declared that it is a sin to be neutral on these matters. So in trying to be neutral, you are really rejecting my viewpoint. 
Thanks again, 
Greg
Thinking about it, you see that Greg is right. By following a course of public policy that is at odds with what Greg thinks God wants, the United States is implicitly but clearly sending a message that Greg is wrong in some of his religious beliefs (perhaps that God exists, perhaps that the Bible is the Word of God, perhaps that God is the ultimate moral authority in the universe, perhaps that Greg’s biblical interpretation is correct) and that some other set of alternative beliefs (perhaps that God does not exist, that the Bible is not the Word of God, that some other interpretation of the Bible is correct, etc.) is right. Thus, in refusing to comply with Greg’s advice, the United States is not neutral; it is adopting an alternate set of beliefs as the official orthodoxy of the nation.

But you are not ready to give up yet. You decide to send Greg another reply and try again to be religiously neutral.
Dear Greg, 
I’m sure you wouldn’t want to be taking away anyone’s rights. But what you are suggesting would take away the rights of atheists to freedom of religion and freedom of speech. We are very much concerned to respect your rights, and the rights of atheists, and everyone else’s rights as well. If we have respect for equal rights, we won’t want to take away anyone’s freedoms, no matter what their race, gender, religion, or anything else, so long as they are respecting the rights of others and not causing any harm. 
Best wishes, 
The United States Government
That sounds like an effective response, doesn’t it? But then you get another reply from Greg:
Dear United States,
You are quite right; I do not want to take away anyone’s rights. But no one’s legitimate rights would be taken away if public expression of atheism were outlawed. You see, God’s law, as I have indicated previously, is the ultimate moral authority, and so it is the foundation, the true standard, for determining human rights. According to God’s law, atheists don’t have a right to express their views publicly. On the contrary, doing so is a crime to be punished. If you wish to preserve human rights and justice to the fullest degree, you need to follow God’s law, for it is the true standard of rights and justice. And as for causing harm—of course the public expression of atheism and the toleration of it will cause harm. For one thing, it is a violation of the honor of God, which God calls all civil governments to protect. The preservation of the honor of God is far more important than anything else. Also, the toleration of public atheism will lead to harm to the society and its citizens. For one thing, atheism sends people to hell; so if there are laws against indoor smoking to keep people safe from second-hand smoke, shouldn’t there be laws against advocating and spreading soul-destroying false doctrine? And if the government refuses to follow God’s law and instead tolerates this evil, God promises to avenge his wrath on the society itself, which will bring harm to all the citizens. 
Cheers, 
Greg
Once again, you realize with great frustration, Greg has a point. If his beliefs about God and his law are correct, then surely his conclusions are sound. To fail to follow Greg’s advice would be, from Greg’s point of view, to violate the true standard of social justice, to dishonor God, and to bring great harm to the society as a whole. If the country does not follow Greg’s exhortations, it is clearly communicating that it holds, not to neutrality, but to an alternate set of beliefs from Greg’s—for example, that God’s law as understood by Greg is not the real standard of ethics and social justice and therefore something else (but what?) is; that, contrary to Greg’s view of God’s law, atheists do have a right to express and promote atheism publicly; that the promotion of atheism is not ethically wrong; that it will not send people to hell; that it will not bring down disaster and wrath on the nation. It turns out that, just like Greg’s, the position of the United States is not neutral but rather is based on all kinds of underlying controversial theological and philosophical beliefs.

You decide to make another attempt:
Dear Greg, 
Look, there are lots of different religions in the world—Christians, Jews, Muslims, Buddhists, atheists, etc. If we are going to establish a religion, why should it be yours? Why not Buddhism, or Judaism, or Islam? And why your particular brand of Christianity? There are many different interpretations of the Bible. Many Christians think that it is just fine for atheists to publicly speak about and promote their viewpoint. And many of them don’t think that God will send such people to hell or punish the nation for such things. If we try to establish an official religion, it might turn out not to be yours, and you might bring persecution upon yourself! Wouldn’t it be better to establish a set of laws that is religiously neutral and doesn’t try to establish any religion or outlaw any religion, so that you and everyone else can freely practice your religion? 
With anticipation, 
USA
Now you’ve got him, you think. Once again, Greg replies:
Dear USA, 
Sure, there are many religions and interpretations of the Bible out there. So what? I am not advocating that we establish all religions, but only the true one. And we should not try to follow every interpretation of God’s law, but only the correct ones. You will say, “But it is impossible to know which religion and biblical interpretation is true! There is no way to objectively adjudicate these kinds of questions. I mean, we can know what is objectively true in empirical and scientific matters, but not in religious and deep philosophical matters!” In saying this, you reveal your own religion—it is the religion of Agnosticism. It is your theological and philosophical opinion that objective truth cannot be had in religious matters. But that is not my belief. I believe we can know what is objectively true in religious matters, which is why I gave you arguments for my views in my first letter to you. You think you are opting for an established neutrality, but you’re not. Instead, you are advocating that the civil government of the United States reject my religious views and the religious views of others in favor of establishing Agnosticism as the official religion of the nation, and that it make laws not on the basis of God’s law but on the basis of some standard that you’ve come up with that seems to you to make sense from your Agnostic point of view, but which from my point of view is completely wrongheaded and unethical. As for your concern for my safety should the wrong religion be established, I am not sure I am permanently safe in a country that has adopted Agnosticism as its official religion, for this seems to me a weak foundation for civil rights of any kind. But we’ll save that discussion for another day. For now, I’ll say that even if you are right that I am personally safer in the short run and temporally if I rest quietly in this Agnostic society instead of advocating for what I believe to be true, yet there are things more important than safety—things like doing what is right and advocating social justice based on God’s law. And, in the end, I am much safer siding with God than going against him. 
Warm regards, 
Greg
Once again frustrated, you sit back and reflect on the conversation. However odd and irritating it might be, Greg is actually right, you realize. Your approach and your response to his claims are not neutral; they are based on contested theological and philosophical claims. You realize that Greg is right that your positions are indeed based on some form of agnosticism—you have assumed that there is no way that Greg can back up his claims objectively any more than any other religion. You are unsure if Greg’s biblical interpretations are correct, but you realize that even if he could convince you that they are, it would not affect what you think US policy should be—and this fact reveals clearly that your views are based on the assumption that there is no objective reason to take the Bible seriously as the Word of God, contrary to Greg’s belief; for if you did take it seriously as such, you would want the USA to follow whatever it says. Greg, rightly, would label this a form of agnosticism. You try to come up with some other reasons you might be able to present to Greg—if atheists are denied the freedom to advocate atheism, it would make them unhappy; liberty of conscience should be granted; atheists might use violence to defend their desired freedoms—but you realize they all beg the question just as your previous arguments did. If Greg’s beliefs are right, then it is irrelevant whether atheists are unhappy (just as it is irrelevant to our laws against theft that they might make thieves unhappy). Liberty of conscience sounds good, but already consciences are limited. We would not, for example, allow murderers and thieves to roam free on the grounds that we don’t want to suppress their “liberty of conscience.” If public atheism is bad and harmful as well, it should not be tolerated on this ground either. If atheists revolt, whose fault is it? At first, you think that of course it would be the fault of an oppressive government. But then you realize that if Greg’s beliefs are right, it the atheists’ fault. Just as if there were a revolt of thieves, we would not think it the fault of laws against theft, but the fault of unjustly discontented criminals. You think also of the recent uprisings in the Arab Spring. How much blame we assign for violence, and to whom we assign the blame, depends a great deal on which causes we think are just and which unjust, and people’s views on these things are different. There is no neutral way to respond to Greg. To establish Greg’s beliefs as the basis of law would be to violate the principle of religious neutrality; but so would it be to reject Greg’s beliefs and have some other basis of law instead.

Of course, this fact—the impossibility of neutrality—does not just apply to the issue of the public expression of atheism, but to all other issues as well. Take same-sex marriage, for example. Some people think, on religious grounds, that homosexuality is a perversion of true sexuality and is wrong. Others think that it is perfectly acceptable. The former often hold the position that the government should not recognize same-sex marriages, while the latter often hold that it should. If the government were to oppose same-sex marriage on the grounds that it is opposed to God's will and will bring God's judgment down on the society, this would clearly be a violation of the ideal of neutrality. It would send a message of endorsement of the beliefs of some people, such as evangelical Christians, over other beliefs, because it would be basing law and policy on these beliefs and not others. However, if the government accepts or endorses same-sex marriage, it is clearly doing so on the assumption that allowing same-sex marriage is not evil or harmful to the society, which is to endorse other people's beliefs over against the beliefs of the Christian evangelicals and others who think differently. It would send a message that some of the beliefs of some evangelical Christians and others are wrong and are to be officially rejected by the government. Neither policy—allowing same-sex marriage nor opposing it—is neutral, for both amount to an endorsement of a particular set of beliefs over against some other set of beliefs.

And although I’ve focused on examples of the civil government disagreeing with certain forms of Christian beliefs, these Christians certainly do not have a monopoly on being disagreed with in the name of neutrality. Our government disagrees with lots of other people’s beliefs as well. We also fail to be neutral towards certain forms of Anabaptist Christianity, such as those which hold that the Bible commands pacifism. We are not neutral towards those who think that the Qur’an is God’s Word and that nations have a duty to endorse Islamic Law. We are not neutral towards those atheists who think that it is quite clear that God does not exist and that religion is a great harm that the government ought to discourage by teaching atheism explicitly to its citizens. We disagree, in various ways, with the majority of people on earth. I would argue that our hypothetical character Greg is right—what many of us mean by slogans like “religious neutrality” and “separation of church and state” is really the endorsement of agnosticism as the official worldview of the nation. And yet the conservative, historic forms of just about all the major religions affirm a non-agnostic view, as they claim to know something about matters beyond the natural world. So how pretentious for us to think and to claim that we are neutral in acting on an agnostic view!

In order for a civil government to be able to have a coherent set of laws and policies, it must embrace a particular view of the world and reject competing views. It must make certain things legal and other things illegal based on ideas of what is truly valuable, what is truly harmful, what goals human societies ought to have, etc. A civil government can extend tolerance to some degree to those who disagree with its prevailing philosophy, but it will decide how much tolerance to extend based on its own prevailing philosophy, and thus we must always have the kind of situation which Martha Nussbaum deplores, a situation in which “minorities have religious liberty at the sufferance of the majority and must acknowledge that their views are subordinate, in the public sphere, to majority views.” And if those minorities' views lead people to cross the boundaries of tolerance as determined by the majority view, the government will express intolerance towards such actions and such views, even if the minorities express that according to their worldview, what they are doing is completely acceptable and even virtuous. One example of this situation is the recent controversy over whether the religious practice of male circumcision should be tolerated. According to orthodox Jews and Muslims, circumcision of male newborns is the right thing to do, as God has commanded it. But many people are coming to other conclusions about the morality of this practice based on atheist and agnostic views. Which worldview will determine law and policy in this area?

So now that we can see the problem—we have an impossible illusion at the core of our self-identity as Americans—we need to ask the question: What are we going to do about it? There is no way we can avoid it. Neutrality is impossible. Whether we like it or not, our laws and policies will be based on certain controversial beliefs over against others. So I would suggest that we give up on the ideal of neutrality. But what is the alternative? Since we must base laws and policies on certain beliefs, I would propose we base them on true beliefs rather than false ones. That seems obvious. But it probably also seems terribly naïve. We are a pluralistic country full of people with diverse worldviews. We don’t agree on which beliefs are true and which are false. So what I suggest for now is that we open up public dialogue about which worldview beliefs are really true. We should all attempt to present and argue for our perspectives, bringing to the surface the underlying worldview assumptions that are the ground of them. We should listen to the arguments of others, and try to persuade others that we are correct and that they should join us in trying to base laws and policies on our beliefs rather than alternative ones. In our hypothetical dialogue, Greg did this. He presented his opinion and showed and argued for the assumptions on which it was based. But you (as our hypothetical government respondent) did not. You begged the question by assuming an agnostic worldview while claiming neutrality. What you should have done is say something like this:
Dear Greg, 
I understand your reasons for wanting to outlaw the public advocacy of atheism, as you hold that God is opposed to it and threatens judgment if we tolerate it, etc. But where you go wrong is in thinking that we have any objective reason to think that the Bible is really the Word of God and that therefore we should obey it. Actually, there are no good, objective reasons to believe this. Here is my response to your arguments, showing that agnosticism is really the correct way of looking at things. [At this point, you present some evidence for your agnostic point of view.] Therefore, on this agnostic basis, I see no good reason to outlaw the public advocacy of atheism. And that is the official position of the United States. 
Best of luck, 
The USA
Will this kind of response lead to difficulties? Well, it will certainly make it harder for us to argue for our political viewpoints! But that is a good thing, for what we have been doing is trying to win by using question-begging rhetoric and sweeping the real, deeper issues under the rug. We will have to stop doing that and embrace a more honest approach. Will this approach lead to conflict? Perhaps. But I think it is the right thing to do even if it does, as it is the only way to show true respect to others rather than trying to manipulate public life through dishonest rhetoric. And I think that our current approach—pretending our view is neutral and trying to silence opposition by using rhetorical labels, etc.—is not that great at avoiding conflict. I suspect that people like Greg just might feel a bit more respected if they were given an honest argument for the rejection of their religious beliefs and allowed to make an argument in response rather than having their beliefs rejected patronizingly in the name of “neutrality” while being given no argument but only rhetorical pejorative labels. Right now, there are culture wars in this country. They aren’t going to go away by pretending that we can all agree without having to deal with any of the deepest religious and philosophical issues from which they spring. We could, instead, deal with them head on by allowing and encouraging the truly important dialogues to occur. If we wish to be honest, I think we have no other choice.

1 Found at http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/constitution_transcript.html at 2:09 PM on 8/23/12.
2 Found at http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=465&invol=668 at 2:13 PM on 8/23/12.
3 Martha Nussbaum, Liberty of Conscience: In Defense of America’s Tradition of Religious Equality (New York: Basic Books, 2008), 20.
4 Ibid., 2.
5 Ibid., 23.
6 Found at http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/establishment-clause at 2:35 on 8/23/12.
7 Found at http://www.iclnet.org/pub/resources/g-823.html at 3:03 on 8/23/12.

Thursday, November 1, 2012

Let's Not and Say We Did!

If you remember the 90s, you may remember a saying that was popular at that time.  A group of people would be standing around trying to decide whether or not to do something.  Some would say "Let's do it!"  Others would say "Let's not!"  And then inevitably some wise guy (or girl) would say "Let's not and say we did!"

I've been reminded of this saying recently as I have discussed the issue of church unity and authority with various people.  If you are familiar with my recent thoughts on these issues (such as can be found here and here), you know that I have been arguing that separate denominations do not recognize each others' ecclesiastical authority.  The very act of remaining out of formal communion with each other inherently implies this.  For example, when the Presbytery of the Dakotas (POD) of the OPC calls a presbytery meeting, they invite the officers in all the OPC churches in the region, but they do not invite the PCA officers, or the RCUS officers, etc., to come to the meeting as full voting members.  This quite clearly implies that the OPC does not recognize the de jure authority of these officers.  The OPC treats them as being without authority, as if they are not true, duly constituted, de jure officers in the church of Christ.  For if the OPC did regard these officers as true de jure officers in the church of Christ, how could they fail to treat them the same as the OPC officers and include them as full voting members in the meetings?  And if the OPC believed that the presbytery meetings of the PCA or the RCUS were valid, de jure regional meetings of the church, how could they fail to go to them and be a part of them as full voting members (or at least try to do so and feel an injustice has been done if they are not allowed)?

Now, frankly, this seems quite obvious to me.  And yet I have spoken with a number of OPC officers, as well as officers from other denominations, who simply can't seem to see it.  I've been told that I am wrong to say that separated denominations do not recognize each others' de jure authority.  "Of course we recognize the full de jure authority of officers in the RCUS and the PCA!" I'm basically told by some officers in the OPC.  "How could you think otherwise?"

How indeed.  Well, it seems to me that if officers in the POD claim to respect and recognize the full de jure authority of officers in other denominations (and, by the way, I am not saying that all of them make this claim), it is blatantly inconsistent of them not to invite those officers as full voting members to their meetings.  They are saying one thing and doing another.  They say with their words that they recognize the authority of these other officers and church courts, but their actions clearly say otherwise.  It seems to me a clear case of "Let's not and say we did!"

This sort of situation, where people say one thing and do another, comes up a lot in life.  The secularists loudly and proudly proclaim that they are neutral in religious matters, while at the same time advocating Agnosticism and rejecting Christianity and other worldviews as the official worldview of the nation.  LDS missionaries love to insist that they never attack anyone's faith, while at the same time explaining to you that your church is wrong and that you ought to join theirs.  People often say that their relationships are going along just fine, when anyone who is not blind can see that they are falling apart.  Sometimes people have trouble seeing reality for what it really is.  Particularly, sometimes people have trouble perceiving that their actions betray their stated positions and intentions.

With regard to the issue currently under discussion, I find it amazing that people cannot see that denominational separation implies a refusal to recognize de jure authority across denominational lines.  To use an analogy, imagine you are working for a company.  Your boss is speaking to a group of his employees, and he says, "I just want you to know that I consider you all members of the team.  In my view, you are all the same, and each of you has just as much a right to be treated as an essential part of the team as anyone else.  However, I will only allow some of you to come to our meetings as official team members and vote in team meetings."  I hope I'm not the only one who notices something contradictory about these statements!  Well, that is essentially the sort of statement I am getting with regard to denominational separation.  "Sure the RCUS and PCA officers are full, de jure officers in the church of Christ!  They are just as much true officers in the church as OPC officers.  They all have the same authority and privileges and rights as officers in the church of Christ.  However, when we have a meeting of all the churches in our region, we will only invite OPC officers to come as full voting members.  The rest of you we won't allow (though you can come and visit, and maybe even give a speech if you want)."

Some people may say that they do indeed recognize other denominations and their church courts and officers as having true de jure authority, but their actions speak louder than their words.  In reality, they do not grant de jure authority to them.  So why do they insist that they do?  I think it is just part of the general confusion on these issues that seems to plague Reformed circles these days.  Let's work harder to think harder about these important issues, so that we can have a coherent position that both makes sense and is biblical!  If we want to embrace some denomination and exclude others from being recognized as having de jure authority, let's do it clearly and consistently.  If we want instead to embrace these other denominations, let's do that clearly and consistently, both in terms of words and actions.  At least then, even if we get the wrong answer at first, it will be clear where we stand, which will enable us to much more easily be able to check ourselves against God's Word to make sure that we are doing what is right.

UPDATE 11/8/12:  Just a thought to add:  Perhaps the reason why Presbyterians sometimes think that they are recognizing de jure authority in other denominations when they obviously really aren't is because they are confusing the concepts of de facto and de jure. When they say they do indeed recognize the de jure authority of other denominations, perhaps all they really mean to say is that they recognize de facto that the people in the other denominations are true Christians and that the other denominations are true churches de facto.  In that case, there would be no contradiction, because there is no contradiction between recognizing de facto that a group of people seems to be a part of the Body of Christ and denying that they have any legitimate authority to function as the church de jure.  Perhaps we could even construe the idea of "fraternal relations" as simply a formal recognition by a denomination that "we think the guys in that other denomination are really Christians, though we rightfully don't grant them any de jure authority for the present."

This probably does explain some of the confusion over this issue in the Presbyterian world, but it also probably doesn't explain all of it.  I still think that this is likely more than simply a matter of semantics.  I think there is genuine confusion on the matter going on as well.  But perhaps pointing out a possible source of semantic confusion can help matters at least a little.

UPDATE 11/14/12:  I thought it might be useful here to provide an example of what I am talking about.  Here is a statement from an (anonymous) actual Presbyterian correspondent with whom I have spoken about these issues:

"No reformed denomination claims that other denominations do not possess legitimate authority.  No reformed denomination holds itself alone to be the visible church of Christ (the Prot. Ref. Church may be close to this).  To hold that is the mark of a cult, not a church of Jesus Christ.  Reformed churches confess the opposite.  They confess that the church is one and that God gathers his people in many different local churches, many of which are organized as denominations or federations of churches.  We do recognize the authority of assemblies, presbyteries, and sessions of other denominations."

You can see here the confusion and lack of a clear distinction between the idea of a true church de facto and the idea of a church having legitimate, formally recognized authority de jure.  You can also see the flirtation with a congregationalist rather than a presbyterian idea of church government, as there seems to be a contentment with having a bunch of different denominations working together informally without any formal full communion.

With regard to why, if full de jure authority is recognized between denominations, the church courts of one denomination do not invite officers from other denominations as full voting members at their meetings, this correspondent had this to say:

"The issue of who votes at an assembly is determined by whether the person is a member of that judicatory properly delegated to vote at it.  For example, no reformed church allows a ruling elder or minister in the same denomination to vote at a session meeting when that ruling elder or minister is not installed to serve as a voting member of that session.

Full recognition of authority does not require full union."

Notice that this answer sidesteps the real issue.  Of course one has to be formally ordained and appointed and recognized as a member of a judicatory in order to vote in it.  The question is, why do church courts of different denominations systematically refuse to invite officers in other denominations to be formally recognized as members of their church courts when they are in the same region?  For example, why does the Presbytery of the Dakotas of the OPC not invite to be formally recognized as full voting members officers in that same region in the PCA?  A presbytery is a regional gathering, so why leave out officers in that region?  And with regard to officers in different regions, why are they not all called together in a unifying higher assembly?  Of course, the real answer is that the denominations do not recognize each others' de jure authority, despite protestations to the contrary.

I'm afraid full recognition of authority does indeed require full union, because the very idea of all the courts and officers in the different denominations fully formally recognizing each other would be exactly the same as the idea of all these denominations merging and ceasing to be different denominations.

UPDATE 1/10/13:  An argument that no one yet has made but that could possibly be made by someone wanting to argue that denominations do in fact recognize each others' de jure authority is that while ministers and other officers are not invited as voting members in the synods of the church, yet that is not because their authority as officers is not being recognized, but because there are different kinds of officers in the church.  There are some kinds of ruling elders and ministers whose office includes being full voting members of presbytery meetings, etc., while there are other kinds of ruling elders and ministers whose office does not allow for this.  And assemblies of these latter sorts of officers don't get to be included in official church court meetings.

As I write this out, it is obvious to me how strained a person making this argument would have to be to hold their position in light of the contradictions of reality.  (In order to be as careful as possible to be fair to opposing positions, I have a tendency to try to invent any arguments I can think of that the other side could use, even if the other side never actually uses them.)  This would be a good argument if, say, the OPC Book of Church Order had a section in its chapter on church officers entitled, "On Non-Voting Church Officers, Such as the RCUS," etc.  But it doesn't.  The only offices recognized in presbyterian churches are ruling elders, ministers, teaching elders, and deacons.  And it is clear that RCUS officers simply don't fit in at all in this scheme of things in the OPC, or vice versa.  They simply are not recognized formally as legitimate officers, nor are their gatherings formally recognized as legitimate.  In a presbyterian system, to thus not recognize each others' officers and courts is quite clearly to charge the other side with schism and to deny the other side de jure legitimacy.  There is simply no other way to understand such actions.

UPDATE 1/12/13:  When Denomination A is separated from Denomination B, there are only three possible ways of understanding Denomination A's position:

1. Denomination A does not hold to presbyterian (or episcopal) church government, but rather congregationalism or semi-congregationalism.  In this case, denominational separation is seen as normal and implies no charge of schism towards Denomination B or a rejection of Denomination B's de jure authority and legitimacy.  (However, as presbyterian church government is the biblical view, congregational church government is an inherently schismatic principle that does not adequately preserve the unity of the church.  Church courts and officers are not recognizing each other as they should.  So, in that sense, it could still be said that congregationalist or semi-congregationalist churches are rejecting each others' de jure authority.)

2. Denomination A holds to presbyterian church government, and also attributes de jure legitimacy and authority to Denomination B and its officers and church courts, but simply refuses to give those officers and church courts their due or to hold them to their responsibilities.  In this case, Denomination A is deliberately refusing to do its duty and has chosen to act schismatically.

3. Denomination A holds to presbyterian church government, but does not attribute de jure legitimacy and authority to Denomination B and its officers and church courts, and for that reason does not treat them as having such legitimacy and authority by being in formal union with Denomination B.  In this case, Denomination A, obviously, is refusing to recognize Denomination B's de jure legitimacy and authority, and is also charging Denomination B with schism (for maintaining doctrines and/or practices that continue to cause an unlawful breach between the two denominations).  If Denomination A is correct in its position and actions in this case, then it is in the right and the other denomination is indeed schismatic and without proper de jure legitimacy and authority.  If Denomination A is wrong in its position and actions, however, then it is acting schismatically by inappropriately rending the Body of Christ.

UPDATE 2/5/13:  A couple of further thoughts:

1. First of all, let me put out a few quotations from the Westminster Confession and the Form of Presbyterial Church Government:
2. The visible Church, which is also catholic or universal under the Gospel (not confined to one nation as before under the law), consists of all those throughout the world that profess the true religion; and of their children: and is the kingdom of the Lord Jesus Christ, the house and family of God, out of which there is no ordinary possibility of salvation.

3. Unto this catholic visible Church Christ hath given the ministry, oracles, and ordinances of God, for the gathering and perfecting of the saints, in this life, to the end of the world: and doth by His own presence and Spirit, according to His promise, make them effectual thereunto. (Westminster Confession 25:2-3)

THERE is one general church visible, held forth in the New Testament.

The ministry, oracles, and ordinances of the New Testament, are given by Jesus Christ to the general church visible, for the gathering and perfecting of it in this life, until his second coming.

Particular visible churches, members of the general church, are also held forth in the New Testament. Particular churches in the primitive times were made up of visible saints, viz. of such as, being of age, professed faith in Christ, and obedience unto Christ, according to the rules of faith and life taught by Christ and his apostles; and of their children. (Form of Presbyterian Church Government, "Of the Church")
To whom are the "ministry, oracles, and ordinances of God" given?  To the "general church visible" or the "catholic visible church."  That general catholic church, then, for reasons of logistics, forms into smaller sub-groups.
IT is lawful and expedient that there be fixed congregations, that is, a certain company of Christians to meet in one assembly ordinarily for publick worship. When believers multiply to such a number, that they cannot conveniently meet in one place, it is lawful and expedient that they should be divided into distinct and fixed congregations, for the better administration of such ordinances as belong unto them, and the discharge of mutual duties.

The ordinary way of dividing Christians into distinct congregations, and most expedient for edification, is by the respective bounds of their dwellings. (FPCG, ""Of Particular Congregations")
This has implications for the meaning of denominational separation.  If the "ministry, oracles, and ordinances of God" have been given by God to the entire catholic church as a whole, then any true, de jure officers within the entire catholic church would have, by right, all the rights, responsibilities, and privileges of their offices, and all the church courts would have all the rights, responsibilities, and privileges of true church courts.  This means that if any officers or courts are regarded as possessing de jure authority and legitimacy, they must be granted all these rights and privileges.  They cannot be excluded from any of them, such as by not being invited to be full voting members in the assemblies of the church, or by having their assemblies left out of the highest general assembly of the church.  Denominational distinctions are foreign to the Westminster Standards.  In the Standards, there is only the one catholic church divided up for logistical reasons.  All the officers and courts of the entire catholic church, then, would have the same rights, responsibilities, and privileges (according to the nature of their office or the level of their assembly).  So the current popular practice of denominations not granting these rights and privileges to officers and courts of other denominations is either a refusal to grant their de jure legitimacy and authority, or it is a brazenly schismatic act, or it is a symptom of being confused by semi-congregationalism rather than holding more purely to presbyterianism.

2. I thought of another argument someone might use to escape all of the reasoning put forward on this subject.  If one denomination (D-A) is separated from another denomination (D-B), a representative of D-A might say this:  "We don't reject the authority of D-B.  It's just that we currently don't have an opinion about the legitimacy and authority of D-B, and that is why we are not in formal communion.  We need more time to consider the status of D-B.  But we don't formally reject their legitimacy."

Here would be my answers to this argument (which I have never actually heard made--yet):

1. Even if it is true that you don't have an opinion on D-B because you need more time to get to know them, that doesn't change anything.  It is still the case that, at this time, you only actually formally attribute de jure legitimacy and authority to D-A, and therefore you formally consider D-A at this time to be the entirety of the de jure catholic church, so far as you have any knowledge of.  An unapproved because unexamined would-be officer has no more formal authority granted to them in the church of Christ than an officer who has been examined and rejected.

2. Why have you not yet got to know D-B well enough to figure out whether de jure authority and legitimacy should be attributed to them?  This would be a good excuse if D-B had been until last week lost in the Amazon rainforest with no way to contact the outside world.  But if D-A and D-B have been able to interact with each other for a significant number of years, this is no excuse for not having figured out by now whether or not D-B is qualified to be granted de jure legitimacy and authority.  This is even more the case if D-A has had fraternal relations with D-B and lots of interaction on various levels.  The delay here is unreasonable and really shows a lack of concern for formal church unity, probably influenced somewhat by a semi-congregationalist rather than a pure presbyterian view of church government.

3. If you admit you don't recognize D-B's de jure legitimacy and authority right now, why are we arguing?  That is all I have claimed.  You have granted my entire point.  In fact, what people really want to say is that they do formally recognize each others' de jure legitimacy but they don't want to enter into formal communion with them anyway.  But this is simply to abandon biblical, presbyterian church unity for the schismatic principle of semi-congregationalism.

Wednesday, October 24, 2012

The "Good and Intelligent People Disagree" Argument

This is an adaptation of a paper I will be reading Friday at the Intermountain Philosophy Conference at the University of Utah.

Agnosticism is a dominant viewpoint in modern America.  I would define "Agnosticism" as the view that objective truth cannot be known (at least with anything close to conclusiveness) in matters of religion and deep philosophy due to a lack of objective evidence for any religious or deep philosophical claim being generally available.  The number of people associating more explicitly with some kind of Agnostic label (including the label of "none") is increasing, as has been shown by a number of polls (so far as such things are conveying accurate information).  But aside from this more explicit sort of identification, Agnosticism dominates the minds of many implicitly.  I don't have time here to build a case for this claim, but it is evident in the attitudes and the language of many people (both at a grass-roots level as well as in higher-up academic and political settings) when it comes to talking about and relating in general to matters of religion and deep philosophy.

One of the ways in which this fact about our culture shows through is in the popularity of an argument I call the "Good and Intelligent People Disagree" argument (or GIPD, for short).  This argument seems to be the main, lynchpin argument for an Agnostic point of view in matters of religion and philosophy among a very large number of people.  It has come up in just about every conversation I have ever had regarding the truth of any controversial religious claim.  Those who make the argument almost never recognize it as a distinct argument or label it explicitly.  Usually it is just stated as an obvious fact to which no objection could be conceivable and passed over quickly.  It seems to function as an unquestioned assumption in the minds of many which has the tendency to make the Agnostic viewpoint seem like an unquestionable truism.

I think that it is helpful, in order to bring these kinds of unquestioned assumptions up to the surface and subject them to critical analysis, to give them an explicit label.  And therefore I have done so.  I am not aware of anyone else ever labeling this exact argument, though I would be surprised to find that it has never been done anywhere before, as the argument is so ubiquitous (and irritating to non-Agnostics!).

WHAT IS GIPD?

So what is the GIPD argument?  It goes basically like this:  "There is widespread disagreement on matters of religion and deep philosophy.  If there was enough objective evidence generally available to people so that the truth could be known in these matters, there would be far more of a general consensus.  Therefore, the only reasonable conclusion we can draw from the lack of such a consensus is that there is not enough objective evidence to know with any conclusiveness what is really true in such matters."

I consider the GIPD argument to be one of a number of arguments I have labeled together as "shortcut arguments".  Shortcut arguments are arguments that try to reach a conclusion without doing the necessary work to get there.  They are lazy arguments that rely on superficial appearances and gut reactions that are not carefully examined with more precision.

As with all shortcut arguments, a closer examination of the GIPD argument causes it a lot of trouble.  I want to provide such a closer examination by attacking the argument on two main fronts:  1. First, I want to show that the GIPD argument is both self-refuting and that, if successful, it refutes the very Agnostic position it is designed to support.  2. Secondly, I will show that the GIPD argument begs the question by resting on certain unquestioned and dubious assumptions about the nature and tendencies of human beings.  Once these assumptions are questioned and shown to lack support in the evidence, the basic thrust of the GIPD argument is fatally undermined.

GIPD IS SELF-CONTRADICTORY AND CONTRADICTS AGNOSTICISM

First of all, the GIPD argument is self-contradictory.  I wonder if you can anticipate what I am going to say here.  The GIPD argument says that when there is widespread disagreement over a matter, the only reasonable explanation of this disagreement is that there is not enough objective evidence available to know what is true.  Well, as we look at the various items out there over which there is widespread disagreement, guess what we find among them:  GIPD!  Perhaps I should pause here for a moment and let that sink in. . . . Good, I can see from some of the smiles on your faces that you've gotten the point.  Since there exists widespread disagreement over GIPD (all non-Agnostics reject the argument as fallacious--though the conversation seldom becomes explicit because the argument is seldom explicitly articulated), GIPD itself tells us that we have no reason to accept GIPD as being a good argument.  Well, if GIPD doesn't think itself a worthwhile argument to consider, I am happy to go along with its judgment here!

Also, GIPD opposes the very position it has been created specially to support: Agnosticism.  GIPD is designed to be a weapon to shoot at any non-Agnostic view when it rears its ugly head and makes any claims obnoxious to Agnostics.   So, for example, if a Muslim were to claim that it is objectively true and can be known to be true that the Qur'an is the Word of God, the Agnostic response will often be, "Well, you may think so, but the Christians think their holy book is the Word of God, and the Hindus think their holy books are the Word of God, etc.  So therefore you have no basis for your claim!"  (You can see how the GIPD argument is usually articulated, not explicitly as an argument but as an apparently obvious observation that can't be gainsaid.  "If there are lots of contradicting claims about holy books, well, that just must mean that each claim is roughly equally valid and thus all are equally worthless.  What else could the existence of contradictory claims mean?")

However, Agnostic users of the GIPD argument (as if there were any other kind) generally fail to see that the argument can be turned just as easily against their own Agnostic position.  If Christian claims are subject to skepticism on the grounds that lots of people disagree with them, and Islamic claims are subject to skepticism on the same grounds, and Hindu claims, and Buddhist claims, etc. . . . well, then, why not Agnostic claims?  Agnosticism itself is widely disagreed about.  So, according to GIPD, we don't have any good basis to believe the Agnostic position any more than any other controversial position.  So when an Agnostic claims, "There is simply not enough objective evidence available to conclude objectively that any particular religious claims are true," a non-Agnostic could simply reply, using the GIPD argument, "Well, you may think so, but the Christians think otherwise, as do the Muslims, the Hindus, the Buddhists, etc.  So therefore you have no basis for your claim!"

GIPD is one of those all-purpose arguments.  It slices, it dices, it refutes every single position and argument in existence, including itself and any argument or position it is used to defend!  Which makes it completely worthless!  One of the hallmark tendencies of the use of fallacious arguments is that they are often used selectively and arbitrarily rather than consistently.  And that is the case here.  GIPD gets turned on whenever some unwanted non-Agnostic argument or position comes by, and then is shut off again quickly enough to avoid it being turned on its user and on itself.

 GIPD RESTS ON DUBIOUS ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT HUMAN NATURE

The other major problem with the GIPD argument is that it is a question-begging argument.  I label it thus because it rests its case on certain assumptions regarding human beings and human tendencies which are themselves dubious and disputed and need to be subject to critical evaluation.  These dubious assumptions cause the GIPD argument to ignore alternative conclusions that can plausibly be drawn from the fact of widespread disagreement.

GIPD makes a lot of sense as an argument (besides it being self-refuting and all-purpose, as discussed above) if we assume the following description to be true of the generality of human beings:  "Human beings are generally competent, honest, and successful truth-seekers in matters of religion and deep philosophy.  They have a general tendency to follow the evidence wherever it leads, no matter what the personal consequences to themselves might be--whether there be negative social consequences, financial consequences, consequences in terms of prestige and dignity, or comfort, etc.  They would never come to a wrong conclusion motivated by a desire to avoid an alternate uncomfortable conclusion.  They would never cling to an old position or argument out of familiarity.  They would never avoid a conclusion because of feared social consequences, such as being thought wicked or stupid or being rejected by friends, family, employers, entire social communities, etc.  They would never cling to an opinion for financial reasons, or for reasons of pride, or bias, or apathy, or reputation, or opportunities that come with it, etc.  And they are are generally very competent and successful truth seekers.  They are all generally well skilled and practiced in precise and careful critical thinking in religious and deep philosophical matters, and never come to conclusions due to sloppiness or carelessness of thought, or irrational habit.  And they can be generally relied upon to come to the right conclusions.  They hardly ever get confused, or simply make errors in reasoning that lead to incorrect conclusions.  You can be pretty confident that if you ask a religious or a deep philosophical question to most of the people on earth, you will get a well thought-out, well-reasoned, competent, successful, and fully honest answer!"

Perhaps you think that I have just provided an accurate view of the general tendencies of human nature.  If you do, I have a bridge in Brooklyn I'd like to sell you, real cheap!  : )  For my part, let me understate my position by saying that I am a tad bit skeptical that this is what most people tend to be like when it comes to religious and philosophical matters!  And yet this general picture is required by the GIPD argument, because the GIPD argument assumes that if there was simply enough objective evidence available to people so that it was possible for people in general to find out the truth, then we should expect the generality of the human race to congregate around the truth and reject error, so that there would no longer be widespread disagreement.  That assumption is the entire basis of the argument.  It is on the basis of this assumption that the argument claims that the existence of widespread disagreement can only reasonably be explained by there being a lack of objective evidence available.

But in reality, there are lots of other possible reasons for widespread disagreement, because people are not always motivated by a pure desire for truth at all costs when they come to conclusions, and they do not always learn to practice the sorts of thinking skills that are required to be good at actually arriving at truth instead of error.  (Not to mention that the best and most honest thinkers on earth are quite capable of just being confused and wrong sometimes!)  These facts fatally undermine the GIPD argument.  The argument depends on there being no other plausible reasons for widespread disagreement besides lack of objectively available truth; but this is clearly not the case, or at least there is no reason to believe it to be the case.

There are many different views out there about human nature (which means that we can't know which of them are true!  Just kidding.).  The GIPD argument, as we have seen, requires an incredibly naive, optimistic view of human nature.  But some perspectives think far less of the natural good tendencies of human nature.  The Christian worldview, for example, holds that the entire human race exists since the Fall of man at the beginning of human history in a state of wickedness, under the curse and wrath of God.  We Christians hold that the natural tendency of human beings is not to be honest and competent truth-seekers in religious matters, but rather to be haters of truth and to run from it and invent for ourselves lies that better suit our desires.  By nature since the Fall, we humans are bent on going our own ways in rebellion against reality and the God of all reality.  The Apostle Paul describes our natural state this way in Romans 1:18-25:

For the wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men, who hold the truth in unrighteousness; because that which may be known of God is manifest in them; for God hath shewed it unto them. For the invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead; so that they are without excuse:1 Because that, when they knew God, they glorified him not as God, neither were thankful; but became vain in their imaginations, and their foolish heart was darkened. Professing themselves to be wise, they became fools, and changed the glory of the uncorruptible God into an image made like to corruptible man, and to birds, and fourfooted beasts, and creeping things. Wherefore God also gave them up to uncleanness through the lusts of their own hearts, to dishonour their own bodies between themselves: Who changed the truth of God into a lie, and worshipped and served the creature more than the Creator, who is blessed for ever. Amen.

According to Christianity, this is the natural state of man since the Fall, and it is only by the grace of God in Christ that anyone is restored out of this condition.  Now, if this is the actual condition of humanity, we would certainly not expect the GIPD argument to be reliable!  (Of course, grace is also out there in the world, counteracting sin.  But sin and its effects are still widespread.)  Therefore, the GIPD argument begs the question by assuming without argument a controversial view of human nature which contradicts other views of human nature, such as the Christian view.

In fact, I would go even further here and claim that the existence of widespread disagreement, ironically enough, is actually far more consistent with something like a Christian view of human nature than it is with the sort of human nature assumed by an Agnostic who is using GIPD.  If it really is so that human beings tend to follow the available evidence where it leads and to gather in agreement and consensus around the truth, and if it really is so that Agnosticism is the viewpoint to which the evidence leads, then why do we not see the generality of the human race gather in consensus around Agnosticism?  That's exactly what we should see if the GIPD assumptions are right.  So, actually, the Agnostic GIPD position does not predict widespread disagreement on religious matters!  Rather, it predicts a general consensus around Agnosticism!  So the existence of widespread disagreement is so far from being a confirmation of GIPD Agnosticism that it is actually strong evidence against GIPD Agnosticism!  On the other hand, what would you expect the world to look like if it was full of a large number of diverse groups of people who don't really care about ultimate truth and are in fact opposed to it, who are far more interested in living in a worldview of their own invention that suits their desires regardless of whether it matches up with reality (and even those who do care about truth don't necessarily care consistently or fully faithfully or fully competently, and even the best among us are susceptible to error and confusion)?  It seems to me it might look like . . . the world we live in!  We would expect widespread disagreement on religious matters, because while truth is one, individuals and cultures are very different from each other, and different worldviews suit different sets of values and preferences, and different biases, prejudices, and errors tend to be associated with different cultures.  John Calvin called the human heart an idol factory.  Well, what do you get when you have a world full of diverse people and cultures all supporting their own preferred idol factories--supporting those beliefs which best suit them (and, again, even those who, by grace, are trying to get the truth right are susceptible to the confusion that plagues us humans in this fallen world)?  You get widespread disagreement on religious matters!  So the existence of widespread disagreement does not support GIPD Agnosticism, but instead points to Christianity (or any other worldview that holds a relevantly similar view of human nature).

 WHY IS THERE MORE CONSENSUS IN EMPIRICAL MATTERS THAN IN RELIGION/PHILOSOPHY?

There is one more issue I ought to address before I close.  If objective evidence is available or at least might be available in matters of religion and deep philosophy, then why is there a lack of consensus in these areas when there is far more of a consensus in other areas, particularly in areas having to do with things that are empirically observable or scientifically testable?  For example, there is not widespread disagreement (though there is some!) regarding, say, the existence of giraffes.  There is not widespread disagreement over the boiling point of water, the capital of Idaho, the number of moons orbiting the earth, or that the American Revolution actually occurred.  Why is that?  Why is there widespread disagreement over the existence of God and the truth of Christianity, but not over these other kinds of things?  This requires an explanation.

Of course, the Agnostic explanation reflected in the GIPD argument will be that the difference is that there is sufficient objective evidence available on the boiling point of water, etc., but not in matters of religion.  That is certainly one possibility to be considered.  But, again, the GIPD line of reasoning begs the question by failing to consider other reasonable possibilities.  For one, we can point out the difference between more abstract claims vs. claims that are more immediately empirical and have more immediate practical consequences in life.  If you don't think that God exists, you can get by fairly well in life in terms of being able to live what would generally be considered a normal life.  On the other hand, if you start denying things like the existence of giraffes or, even more practically, the existence of your house or your best friend, you are very quickly going to run into serious disruptions in your ability to live a normal life.  This is not necessarily because there is less objective evidence available with regard to the existence of God than there is for giraffes or your best friend; it may simply be that some matters simply present themselves more forcefully and immediately before one's attention than others, making it harder to be wrong about them.

I've never had any arguments with anyone over the existence of giraffes.  But I have had quite a number of arguments with people over whether or not 2+2=4.  If you're surprised at this, well, just get yourself in the habit of asking people (particularly in a certain skeptical tone of voice) on various occasions whether or not we can really know if 2+2=4 and I imagine you will eventually have this fascinating experience.  Now, why is it that people will argue far more readily over whether or not 2+2=4 than they will over the existence of giraffes?  Is it because there is less evidence for the claim that "2+2=4" than there is for the claim that "giraffes exist"?  No.  Actually, the reverse is true.  The existence of giraffes is not as immediately evident as the fact that 2+2=4.  Giraffes might simply appear to exist, really being all-sensory illusions projected by extremely dedicated aliens with advanced technology and too much time on their hands.  On the other hand, there can be no distinction between the appearance of 2+2=4 and 2+2 actually =4, because the appearance is simply the thing itself, since we are talking not about an illusion vs. an actual thing but simply an abstract concept.  So we ought to be more certain, in this sense, that 2+2=4 than we are that giraffes exist.  So why the debates over this?  I think it's because 2+2=4 is more abstract.  It's not the sort of thing that one can form a visible image in one's mind about as easily as one can when it comes to giraffes, and it's not as much of a tangible thing that one can easily perceive with one's senses, and so people are more easily confused about it.  It's harder for many of us to be clear and focused on abstract concepts than on tangible, visible objects.

Another factor that needs to be taken into account here is that matters of religion and deep philosophy tend to deal with issues that are far more important to people than many empirical matters, such as how many moons orbit the earth or the capital of Idaho.  If you find out you are wrong with regard to the capital of Idaho (what is the capital of Idaho, anyway?  Is it Boise?), it is not likely to devastate your life or change it significantly.  On the other hand, changing one's religion or basic worldview is typically a very significant and often traumatic event with all sorts of personal and social consequences.  So, knowing human nature (even without Christian assumptions), we would expect far less resistance to be given to new ideas and calls to accept certain conclusions with regard to things like which cities are capital cities than things like which religion is the true religion.  So much more is at stake, we would expect greater diversity and less consensus to be maintained.

So it very well may be the case that the reason why we have greater consensus in some areas and less in others has nothing to do with the amount of objective evidence available and more to do with other factors, such as those mentioned above.  Therefore, this fact cannot be used, without further argumentation, to conclude that objective evidence is not available in religious and deep philosophical matters.

CONCLUSION

So the GIPD argument turns out to be a bad argument.  It is self-contradictory; it contradicts the position it is intended to support; and it begs the question by assuming without argument controversial and dubious views of human nature while ignoring alternative plausible explanations of the data.  It therefore cannot do the work required of it to support an Agnostic position regarding deep philosophical and religious matters.  Refuting GIPD, of course, does not imply that Agnosticism itself is refuted.  There are other arguments for Agnosticism that would need to be refuted as well, the refutation of which would take us beyond the scope of this paper.  However, inasmuch as the GIPD argument tends to function for many Agnostics as a key argument supporting their reasons for being Agnostic, its refutation should have the tendency to call Agnosticism into question and to open minds up to the possibility that more may be available to know than many of us had previously considered.

And by the way, the capital of Idaho is indeed Boise.  I looked it up.  And I don't care if you agree or not.

Wednesday, October 10, 2012

Dialogue with a Skeptic

Below is an argument against agnosticism and skepticism, in the form of a dialogue.  More specifically, it is a refutation of the argument that we should all be agnostic skeptics on the ground that we are all fallible and therefore could possibly be wrong.

SKEPTIC:  Do you believe in God?

CHRISTIAN:  Yes, I’m a Christian.

SKEPTIC:  Well, you shouldn’t be, because there is not enough evidence to warrant belief in it.

CHRISTIAN:  Well, I think there is, based on what I have seen.  I think the objective evidence warrants acceptance of Christianity, and in fact warrants no other response.

SKEPTIC:  How do you know the objective evidence warrants that?

CHRISTIAN:  Well, I have looked at the evidence, and that is what it says.  I would be happy to share some of my reasoning with you.  First of all . . .

SKEPTIC:  No, no, that won’t be necessary.  I don’t need to look at your arguments.  I can already tell that they won’t prove what you think they prove.

CHRISTIAN:  Really?  How can you tell that?

SKEPTIC:  Let me ask you this:  Are you fallible, or infallible?

CHRISTIAN:  Do you mean, am I capable of being wrong?  Yes, I am capable of being wrong.

SKEPTIC:  And have you been wrong in the past?

CHRISTIAN:  Yes.

SKEPTIC:  Well, there you go.  Since you admit you are capable of being wrong, and you even admit you have been wrong in the past, therefore you must admit that you could be wrong in your evaluation of your arguments for Christianity.  And therefore you really can’t know whether or not your arguments are any good, and so you should stop asserting things on the basis of them.  So you should stop making the assertion that Christianity is true.

CHRISTIAN:  Well, I admit that insofar as I am a fallible human being, I could potentially be wrong in my arguments for Christianity.  However, I have thought about these matters quite a bit, and it appears to me quite certain that Christianity is true.  So I should continue to believe and assert it.

SKEPTIC:  But you just admitted that you could be wrong!  If you could be wrong, how can you have any basis to claim that you are right?

CHRISTIAN:  My basis is that I have done my best to reasonably examine the evidence, and the conclusion that appears to me clearly to be true is that Christianity is true.  I admit that I have the potential to be mistaken, insofar as I am fallible; but I also assert that all the evidence says that I am not mistaken and that I ought therefore to continue to believe Christianity and assert that it is true.

SKEPTIC:  But if you admit that you could possibly be wrong, then you must admit that you can’t possibly have any basis to claim that you are right.  For if you are capable of being wrong, and you have been wrong in the past, then who knows whether this isn’t one of those occasions where you are wrong?  Who knows whether or not your arguments for Christianity really hold water conclusively?  They may seem to hold water to you, but you could be wrong!  You are fallible!

CHRISTIAN:  Let me ask you a question:  Are you fallible, or infallible?

SKEPTIC:  What?

CHRISTIAN:  I said, are you fallible, or infallible?

SKEPTIC:  Well, I’m fallible, of course.  I’m only human!

CHRISTIAN:  Have you ever been wrong before?

SKEPTIC:  Well, sure I have, lots of times.

CHRISTIAN:  Well then, according to your own reasoning, you have no basis to make any of the claims you have been making to me throughout this conversation.  It may seem to you that there is no basis for a fallible person ever to claim that he is right in any instance, but you are fallible!  You might be wrong!  And so, according to you, you can have no basis for that claim.  And since you must admit, to be consistent, that none of your claims have any basis, why should I pay any attention to anything you have to say?  You yourself tell me that you have nothing to say, and I am not inclined to argue.

SKEPTIC:  Um, well, I, uh . . . Now just a minute!  OK, I agree that I am fallible, and so there is really no basis for me to make any claims.  But it still remains the case that my position is a more modest and reasonable position.  I don’t claim to know that Christianity is not true.  I am merely an agnostic skeptic.  I take no position.  But you, on the other hand, are making a very large and dubious claim!  You are claiming that there is enough evidence to know that Christianity is true!  Since we both admit that we are fallible, and it follows that we don’t really know anything or have any basis to make any claims, it makes sense for both of us to give up making such grandiose claims and just be agnostic skeptics, doesn’t it?

CHRISTIAN:  You’re still doing it.

SKEPTIC:  Doing what?

CHRISTIAN:  Making claims.  You have now said multiple times that you don’t think you have any basis to make any claims since you are fallible.  So why do you keep making claims?

SKEPTIC:  I’m not making any claims!

CHRISTIAN:  Sure you are.  You just claimed not to be making any claims, for one.  And you’ve made a number of other claims.  For example, you have claimed that given the fact that we are all fallible, the rational and modest thing for us all to do is become agnostic skeptics.  That’s a pretty big claim.  You are asking me to give up my entire worldview and embrace a new one on the basis of a claim that you yourself acknowledge that you have no basis to make.  That seems pretty irrational to me.  I mean, here you are getting on to me for endorsing Christianity for insufficient reasons, while you yourself are openly and admittedly endorsing agnostic skepticism for what you admit are no good reasons at all.  If you have no basis to claim that I should not be endorsing Christianity, why don’t you stop asserting it and end this conversation?

SKEPTIC:  OK, you’re right.  I have no basis for any claim that I am making.  But neither do you!  You still haven’t faced that fact!

CHRISTIAN:  You’re doing it again.

SKEPTIC:  Doing what?

CHRISTIAN:  Making claims.  You just made two of them:  You claimed that you have no basis for any of your claims.  And you claimed that I don’t either.  But you yourself admit that you don’t have any basis to make any claims at all.  So why don’t you stop doing it?

SKEPTIC:  OK, let’s approach this a little differently.  Let’s stop talking about my claims.  Let’s focus some attention on your claims.  As I said, I admit that neither of us have any basis to make any claims.  Now, you want to try to twist me all up in a knot here and accuse me of self-contradiction for making claims when I say I have no basis to make claims.  But let’s put that aside for a moment.  What about you?  You are fallible too, and so you have no basis to make any claims.

CHRISTIAN:  Sure I do.  I have lots of good reasons to think that Christianity is true.

SKEPTIC:  But you’ve already granted that you could be wrong!  So how can you continue to assert that you have good reason to think you are right?

CHRISTIAN:  I don’t grant your assumption that only infallible people can ever claim to know anything or be right.  And neither do you, as is evidenced by the fact that you keep making claims as if you do indeed think you can know things even though you are fallible.

SKEPTIC:  What?

CHRISTIAN:  Let me put it this way.  The situation is like this:  I must start with how things appear to me.  What else could I do?  So how do things appear to me?  Well, on the one hand, I see what appears to me to be conclusive evidence proving Christianity to be true.  On the other hand, we have the fact that I am fallible.  Since I am fallible, I have the potentiality of being wrong.  Hypothetically speaking, looking only at my fallibility, it could potentially be the case that the evidence for Christianity is not nearly as conclusive as it seems to me to be (although the evidence clearly indicates otherwise).  But on the other hand, using the same reasoning, since I am fallible, I could potentially be wrong in my assessment that I am fallible.  How do I know that I am fallible?  I might appear to be fallible, but I could potentially be wrong!  No matter what position I embrace, no matter what belief I hold, no matter what assertion I make, since I am fallible (so far as I can tell), I could be wrong.  You are asking me to give up on what appears to me very strong and conclusive evidence on the one hand merely on the grounds that I am fallible and could potentially be wrong.  But, on the other hand, you are asking me to ignore the fact of my fallibility when considering the possibility that your agnostic skeptical conclusion could be wrong.  If my fallibility is important on one side, it must be important on the other side as well (so far as I can tell!), and so the two sides cancel each other out.  If I follow how the evidence appears to me and embrace Christianity, well, I could be wrong!  But if I abandon the appearance of the evidence and instead embrace an agnostic skeptical outlook on the basis that I am fallible, well, I could be wrong about that too!  Since no matter what I believe or do my fallibility will be there, it cancels itself out, leaving me with only one rational choice: to follow the evidence where it appears to me to lead.  And it appears to me, abundantly, to lead to Christianity.

SKEPTIC:  But you could be wrong!

CHRISTIAN:  So could you!

SKEPTIC:  But since you are fallible, you should embrace agnostic skepticism, for that is the only safe, rational, and modest choice!

CHRISTIAN:  So it appears to be to you.  But you could be wrong!  Right?

SKEPTIC:  Well, uh, I . . .

CHRISTIAN:  Look, no matter what course I take, I have only one option:  I must follow the evidence where it appears to me to lead.  If I embrace Christianity, I am doing so because I think that is where the evidence leads.  If I were to embrace your agnostic skeptical view, it would be because the evidence seems to lead me there.  So the agnostic skeptical position is in no better epistemological position than my Christian position.  So there is no advantage to embracing agnostic skepticism, particularly when the evidence seems conclusively to point instead to Christianity.  Or let me put it another way:  If my fallibility is not a problem in coming to the conclusion that I am fallible and that therefore I could be wrong, it cannot be a problem in coming to the conclusion that Christianity is true.  So the argument from fallibility is self-refuting.  If I take it seriously, it refutes itself as well as everything else.  But if it refutes itself, it is refuted and therefore wrong.  If I don't take it seriously, well, then, I don't take it seriously.  Either way, it is merely a phantom and not a real problem in the way of examining evidence and coming to conclusions, such as I have done with regard to Christianity.

SKEPTIC:  But how can this be?  Doesn’t it make sense that fallible beings could not know if they are right?  Doesn’t it make sense that they could not know if they really have a good basis for any of their claims?  Doesn’t the agnostic skeptical position seem to follow from human fallibility?

CHRISTIAN:  On a superficial level, it does seem to make sense.  But on a deeper level, it really doesn’t.  The problem with the skeptical position is that ignores an obvious fact of reality.  It ignores the fact that we really can examine reality and learn truths about it, and that we do this all the time.  Skeptics themselves are actually assuming this very thing, right at the same time they are denying it!  Skeptics are claiming to be describing a true feature of reality that they claim to know—the feature that no one can know anything.  But if it were true that no one could know anything, then no one could know the truth of skepticism either.  So in the very act of asserting that no one can know anything, they are at the same time asserting that people can know things!  Skeptics themselves don’t really believe their own skeptical claims.  And how could they?  They are absurd and contradictory, and they are patently false.  The right way of thinking about things is not "Well, it looks like such and such is true; but I am fallible, and so I could be wrong, and so I cannot come to any conclusions."  This is obviously false and self-refuting.  The right way of thinking about things is rather "So far as I can tell, the evidence seems to be pointing clearly enough in such and such a direction; and therefore, as I ought to follow the evidence wherever it leads as best I can, I ought to embrace that conclusion."  In my case, this means that since, as far as I can tell, I see the evidence clearly pointing to Christianity, I ought to follow that evidence and embrace the conclusion that Christianity is true.

SKEPTIC:  But I'm still bothered by the fact that you could be wrong.  And think of the consequences of being wrong about so important a thing as Christianity!  If you embrace, follow, and promote Christianity, and it turns out to be wrong, you will have caused harm to yourself and many others by leading them to embrace beliefs and follow practices that, if wrong, are harmful.  For example, let's say that Christianity turns out to be wrong.  Christianity says that homosexual acts are unethical, because God designed sex to exist only between a man and a woman in a heterosexual marriage relationship.  In that case, Christianity encourages homosexual people to feel guilty for simply exercising their natural desires and being together with those they love, and tells them to avoid such relationships, and this is a cause of great harm to these people who are forced to go against their own nature and deny themselves the kind of companionship they are "designed" for.  Since the stakes are so high, in this and in many other matters, doesn't it make more sense to go the modest, agnostic route and decline to embrace the conclusion that Christianity is true, or at least to publicize such a conclusion, in light of the possibility (however slim it may seem) that you could be wrong in your evaluation of the evidence?

CHRISTIAN:  But you are once again using selective argumentation.  You are failing to see that I could turn around and ask you exactly the same kind of question.  Let's say that the evidence is as it appears clearly to be and Christianity is in fact true.  But you, in the name of modesty and carefulness, have instead taken an agnostic position and refrained from embracing or promoting it, and you are encouraging others to avoid embracing the truth of Christianity as well.  But if Christianity is really true, it is immensely important.  It is God's message to humanity, telling us fundamental truths about reality so that we can live in reality rightly, in a way that pleases God and brings ultimate happiness.  By refraining from following Christianity and encouraging others away from it, you are pointing people in a fundamentally wrong direction.  You are pointing them away from the true source of goodness and happiness, and, if you or they follow your advice to its full, logical conclusion, it will be a source of great displeasure to God and infinite calamity to yourself or others.  And even in a best-case scenario where a person is not entirely turned away from God in their deepest hearts by means of your teaching, they will still fall into many errors and harms and will lead others into serious errors and harms by their fundamentally incorrect beliefs.  With regard to homosexuality more specifically, if homosexual acts really are unethical, then they are out of accord with God's design for sexuality, and they are displeasing to God and harmful to us, even if in ways we can't perhaps ourselves perceive from our vantage point.  This is what you are promoting, and you are doing all of this on the basis of what is nothing more than a self-refuting, groundless argument!  The evidence clearly points in one way, but instead of following the evidence where it leads, on the ground that humans are fallible you go in the opposite direction and embrace an agnostic point of view, even though your argument from fallibility, if a good argument, strikes just as much against itself and your agnostic approach as it does against the Christian conclusion.  So taking all things into consideration, what you are really advocating is that we refrain from following the evidence where it really seems to lead and instead embrace a conclusion that the evidence points away from for no reason at all, even though if it turns out that the conclusion the evidence is pointing to is actually right you are bringing grave dishonor on God (which is the greatest harm, since God is the Supreme Good) and causing the spiritual and perhaps eternal harm of yourself and possibly (potentially) a great many others.  That doesn't sound like a modest, careful course to me.  To be blunt, it sounds more like reckless, immoral stupidity.  Surely the only reasonable and wise course to take, all things considered, including one's own well-being and the well-being of others, is to examine the evidence and to follow where it seems to lead.  And that is exactly what I am doing.  And it is what you should be doing too.

SKEPTIC:  Hmmm . . . Well, I do see your point.

CHRISTIAN:  And let me make one more important clarification.  I've acknowledged that, being fallible, I have the potentiality of being wrong.  But we must distinguish between our potentiality of being wrong, as we are fallible creatures, and the objective state of the evidence.

SKEPTIC:  What do you mean?

CHRISTIAN:  Although we are fallible in ourselves, yet that does not mean that there is not enough evidence available to us to know what is true.  For example, take the claim that 2+2=4.  Could I be wrong about that?  Well, simply considering my fallibility, we can always talk about a general potentiality of being wrong.  So you shouldn't take my word for anything as if I were infallible!  However, in the case of 2+2=4, the evidence that it is and must be true is so clear that I can see without a doubt that it must indeed be true and cannot be false.  So, really, I would say that I am certain 2+2=4, not because I am personally infallible, but because the objective certainty in the evidence itself is clear to me.  This sort of thing is what I meant earlier when I said that one of the big problems with the skeptical position that you are advocating is that it ignores an obvious and important fact about reality--the fact that, though fallible, we do indeed have the ability to examine evidence and come to reasonable and warranted conclusions.

SKEPTIC:  OK, granting that we can know that some things are true, such as 2+2=4, surely you wouldn't say that all claims can be made with objective certainty!

CHRISTIAN:  Of course not.  There are things we can potentially know with certainty because the evidence is objectively certain.  There are other things that we can only know to a degree of probability, because the evidence only consists of an analysis of probability.  For example, I got on a bus this morning.  I got on that bus holding the belief that it would not explode.  Now, I would not have claimed to have had objectively certain knowledge that the bus would not explode.  My belief rather was based only on a conviction that it was highly unlikely that the bus would explode.  In the case of 2+2=4, I can see directly that it is true and cannot be false, and so my knowledge is based on an objective certainty in the evidence.  In the case of the bus not exploding, on the other hand, strictly speaking, all I saw was a statistical probability.  So, strictly speaking, my claim was not that the bus would not explode, but only that it was highly likely that the bus would not explode.  So, strictly speaking, I would not have been wrong if the bus had exploded.  My expectation would have turned out to be wrong, but my actual claim would not have been wrong; for even if the bus had exploded it would still have been true that this was an unlikely event from my vantage point before getting on the bus.  And that was all I was claiming.

SKEPTIC:  So your position is that the evidence for Christianity is clear enough that you can see that it is true, despite being personally fallible and thus potentially wrong.  Do you ever doubt that Christianity is true?

CHRISTIAN:  Sure, from time to time.  There were times in the past when I was more troubled by doubts on this score than I am generally today.  But even today, my level of conviction is capable of wavering from time to time.  We have to distinguish between sufficiency in the objective evidence vs. subjective conviction in the believer.  I've known people who have doubted that 2+2=4, and yet it remains clearly the case that this is objectively certain.  Similarly, I can see that Christianity is true, even though mood swings, irrational concerns, cloudy thinking, etc., can sometimes make it harder to see than at other times.  On the whole, by the grace of God, I am able to see reality clearly enough.  And my ability to do this has increased over the years with practice and maturity, thanks to God's preserving grace.

SKEPTIC:  So why do you think Christianity is supported by the objective evidence?

CHRISTIAN:  Ah, are we ready to look at some actual arguments now?

SKEPTIC:  I suppose so.  You've given me a lot to think about!

CHRISTIAN:  Very well.  First of all, consider . . .

Edited on 11/19/21.

ADDENDUM 7/21/15:  One of the fundamental mistakes of the skeptical argument is that it makes the unwarranted assumption that a person who can be wrong and who has been wrong before cannot know anything at any given time.  The argument, in addition to being self-refuting and incoherent (how do you even know if you've been wrong before unless you know now that you are right about what you now think you were wrong about before?!), functions as a smokescreen that obscures the evident fact that the validity of any claim at any moment in time is dependent not upon whether the person making the claim has been wrong before but whether the evidence and arguments that currently function as the basis of that claim are adequate to warrant it.  No matter how many times I have been wrong before, even no matter how stupid I may have been in the past, it is completely irrelevant unless right now I am misconstruing the evidence or being stupid.  If I make a claim right now, the only way you can evaluate that claim is to look at the arguments for it right now and see if they hold up.  Of course, if a person has tendency to continually be wrong about certain things, this should raise a healthy skepticism and an intention to examine his arguments for any current claims very carefully, but his wrongness (even continual wrongness) in the past is not sufficient evidence in itself that he is wrong now.

It may be in some cases that we learn from our getting things wrong in the past that a certain method of knowing is not useful and should be abandoned.  But whether that is the case in any given instance must be examined on a case-by-case basis with specific reasoning; we should not discount a method simply on the grounds that someone allegedly using it in the past has come to some wrong conclusions, if it appears upon present examination that we have reason to think that the method applied in the present case is yielding accurate results.  In fact, progress is often spurred on by our learning from the mistakes of the past in order to do better in the future.  A person who is well trained to learn from his past mistakes might be expected to be more likely to be right the next time after being wrong the previous time.

At any rate, the main lesson is this:  We must be specific and careful in our reasoning, and not allow ourselves to be carried to a conclusion by superficial reasoning based on vague generalizations and surface impressions, etc.

ADDENDUM 6/26/17:  See my brief follow-up post here, where I examine why the skeptical argument seems so plausible, despite its obvious fallaciousness.