Wednesday, October 3, 2012

One, Holy, Catholic, and Apostolic Church

Note: The arguments of this paper have now been made in a fuller, book-length version, which can be found here.

THE PRESBYTERIAN FORM OF CHURCH GOVERNMENT AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITY OF THE CHURCH

In the Nicene Creed, the church confesses that she believes “one, holy, catholic, and apostolic church.” Likewise, in the Apostle's Creed, the church confesses that she believes in “the holy catholic church.” In the Reformed world, we are very used to these phrases. But I think that we have not always done a good job at remembering all that they mean.

The word “catholic” means “universal.” In the early church, it also came to have the connotation of “orthodox” as opposed to heretical, and to denominate a true church over against a false one. The idea of the “holy catholic church” is that there is one Body of Christ in the world, and that one Body is the true Body, holding the true faith delivered to it by Christ, over against other bodies which falsely claim to be the Body of Christ and which teach false doctrine or are divided from the true Body by schism. “There is one body, and one Spirit, even as ye are called in one hope of your calling; one Lord, one faith, one baptism, one God and Father of all, who is above all, and through all, and in you all” (Ephesians 4:4-6). Christ is the head of his Body, and as Christ is not divided, so neither should his Body be divided. “Now I beseech you, brethren, by the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, that ye all speak the same thing, and that there be no divisions among you; but that ye be perfectly joined together in the same mind and in the same judgment. For it hath been declared unto me of you, my brethren, by them which are of the house of Chloe, that there are contentions among you. Now this I say, that every one of you saith, I am of Paul; and I of Apollos; and I of Cephas; and I of Christ. Is Christ divided” (1 Corinthians 1:10-13)?

This unity of the Body of Christ, the church, has many aspects to it, as we can see from these passages and from the Scriptures in general. There is a unity in the Spirit shared by all believers. Many in the evangelical world today are content to leave it at that. However, biblical unity implies more than this. Christ has appointed not only the Holy Spirit to be with believers, but he has also appointed outward ordinances by means of which he guides and sustains his people through the power of the Spirit. “Unto this catholic visible Church Christ hath given the ministry, oracles, and ordinances of God, for the gathering and perfecting of the saints, in this life, to the end of the world: and doth by His own presence and Spirit, according to His promise, make them effectual thereunto” (Westminster Confession of Faith 25:3). Church unity is to be manifested not only informally and spiritually, but also by means of an outward, formal unity grounded in a common church government and common sacraments and other ordinances (1 Peter 5:1-5; Ephesians 4:11-16; 1 Corinthians 10:16-17).

The unity of the church, both in its spiritual and in its outward aspects, goes beyond particular congregations. Believers are not to formally recognize fellowship within their particular congregations, and then forget all about all other Christians in the world. There is a unity of members and officers within particular congregations, and that unity is to be extended between congregations as well. “Salute the brethren which are in Laodicea, and Nymphas, and the church which is in his house. And when this epistle is read among you, cause that it be read also in the church of the Laodiceans; and that ye likewise read the epistle from Laodicea” (Colossians 4:15-16). Although biblical church government does not possess the hierarchy of officers involved in the episcopal system of church government—such as rule by bishops (in the episcopal sense), archbishops, patriarchs, and the like—yet there is a hierarchy that transcends particular congregations. This hierarchy is horizontal rather than vertical, as officers in the church are able to judge other officers in the church. “Against an elder receive not an accusation, but before two or three witnesses” (1 Timothy 5:19). Here we have instructions for how to try an elder in a church court, which would be governed by other elders (Matthew 18:15-17). This horizontal exercise of authority does not stop at the local congregation, but continues throughout the whole church in all the world. “Then pleased it the apostles and elders with the whole church, to send chosen men of their own company to Antioch with Paul and Barnabas; namely, Judas surnamed Barsabas and Silas, chief men among the brethren” (Acts 15:22). Just as a local congregational session can judge an officer in the congregation, so a regional gathering, or a national gathering, etc., of church officers can judge an officer or a group of officers in a congregation.  The authority of these gatherings is binding on all those who are under the authority of these bodies.  The logic of this pattern of concentric circles does not stop until it reaches the level of the "whole church.”

Of course, what I have just described is nothing less than the classic presbyterian form of church government (as outlined in fuller detail in the Form of Presbyterial Church Government, written up by the Westminster Divines), which Reformed Christians are aware is the biblical pattern of church government. The Form of Presbyterial Church Government (FPCG) describes and gives names to the several concentric circles of church government, or church courts, which are found throughout the whole church:

It is lawful, and agreeable to the word of God, that the church be governed by several sorts of assemblies, which are congregational, classical, and synodical. . . . It is lawful, and agreeable to the word of God, that the several assemblies before mentioned have power to convent, and call before them, any person within their several bounds, whom the ecclesiastical business which is before them doth concern. They have power to hear and determine such causes and differences as do orderly come before them. It is lawful, and agreeable to the word of God, that all the said assemblies have some power to dispense church-censures.

Speaking in more detail regarding synodical church assemblies, the FPCG says this:

The scripture doth hold out another sort of assemblies for the government of the church, beside classical and congregational, all which we call Synodical. Pastors and teachers, and other church-governors, (as also other fit persons, when it shall be deemed expedient,) are members of those assemblies which we call Synodical, where they have a lawful calling thereunto. Synodical assemblies may lawfully be of several sorts, as provincial, national, and oecumenical. It is lawful, and agreeable to the word of God, that there be a subordination of congregational, classical, provincial, and national assemblies, for the government of the church.

(For additional biblical argumentation in support of presbyterian church government, see here.  For further examination of the Westminster Standards as they speak to presbyterian church government and its implications, see here.)

DENOMINATIONAL DIVISIONS ARE NECESSARILY SINFULLY SCHISMATIC IN NATURE

Presbyterian and Reformed churches have generally been good at practicing presbyterian church government at the congregational and classical level. In the early days of the Reformed churches, national assemblies were not uncommon, though today, because of differing relationships between church and state, we seldom hear much about them. Most Presbyterian and Reformed churches today have a higher synodical assembly above the level of congregational session and classis (presbytery) which usually meets on a regular basis, and is often called the “general assembly” or sometimes “synod.” This assembly is typically understood to be the highest court in each denomination. For example, here is how the Orthodox Presbyterian Church (OPC) describes the various assemblies of the church:

Each governing assembly exercises exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters belonging to it. The session exercises jurisdiction over the local church; the presbytery over what is common to the ministers, sessions, and the church within a prescribed region; and the general assembly over such matters as concern the whole church. (FOG XII:2)

The nature of this “general assembly” in modern Reformed churches is curious. What exactly is a “general assembly” supposed to be, and whom is it intended to represent? The OPC, following the typical pattern, says that the general assembly is the assembly of the “whole church” and is the highest judicatory of the church. Is the claim, then, that the general assembly is what the Westminster FPCG calls an “oecumenical” (or “ecumenical”) synod? The word “ecumenical” has a meaning similar to the word “catholic” as well as to the word “general.” They all mean, basically, “universal,” or “pertaining to the whole.” Is, then, the general assembly supposed to be an assembly of the whole church—that is, the entirety of the Body of Christ on the earth?

Here, the answers from modern Reformed churches tend to be a little fuzzy. This is because there is a tension at the heart of much Reformed thinking today. On the one hand, most Reformed denominations don't want to claim to be the whole church—the one, holy, catholic, and apostolic church. This generally seems absurdly presumptuous. Instead, each denomination wants to claim to be only one part of the universal catholic church. But this presents a serious problem. According to biblical, presbyterian church government, the government of the church must extend to the whole church throughout the world. The highest judicatory must be the ecumenical council. And that ecumenical council must have binding authority like all other synods, and not be merely “advisory” in nature. So if a particular denomination remains separated from other denominations and proclaims its own general assembly to be the highest judicatory, and yet does not claim itself to be the whole catholic church but only a part of it, what has become of presbyterian church government? It is betrayed. Christ calls for the unity of the whole church throughout the world. If a denomination only claims to be a part of the whole church, why does it divide Christ by remaining divided from the rest of the church with regard to formal unity? This is sinful schism and an embracing of congregational church government (at least beyond the provincial level). On the other hand, if a denomination wants to remain faithful to presbyterian church government and to the preservation of the formal unity of the church, and yet it still wants to remain divided from other denominations, it must, to be consistent, proclaim itself to be the one worldwide catholic church.

Some Reformed denominations, like the Reformed Church in the United States (RCUS), at least partly relieve the tension by simply abandoning presbyterian church government beyond the provincial level:

The Synod is composed of at least four Classes and represents the whole Church. It is the highest judicatory and the last resort in all cases respecting the government of the Church. (http://rcus.org/rcuswp/con-synod/)

John 17 is the premiere passage enlisted to prove organizational unity among all believers. The issue in John 17:21 concerns whether the oneness of the invisible and visible church is horizontal or vertical. Is this a command for all Christians to be so united that they strive to create one worldwide church (i.e., the Reformed Catholic Church!), or is the unity primarily with the Triune God? Three significant features emerge: (1) The unity of John 17 is not organizational unity since the unity envisioned is compared to the union of God the Father and God the Son (vv. 11, 21, 22). John 17 is not teaching organizational unity between the Father and the Son. (2) Christ is clearly not praying for horizontal unity but the vertical. The thrust is not that believers may be one with one another. Rather, it is that they may be "kept" (vv. 12, 21). John 17 is fundamentally a prayer for the preservation and thus perseverance of the saints by virtue of their unity with God. (3) It is impossible to consign all Christians in every era into the same visible organizational body. If this is what "all may be one" really means, then Christ's high priestly prayer will never be answered. However, if it means that believers are "kept" by God the Father and God the Son, it is beautifully answered time and time again and in every generation. In every generation of Christians those "kept" are kept because of their union and communion with God the Father and our Lord Jesus Christ. Thus, the high priestly prayer of Christ is not a prayer for organizational unity. The world will believe that God has sent Christ not because of a horizontal unity among churches but because of the church's union with the Triune God. (http://rcus.org/rcuswp/church-unity/)

On the other hand, other denominations, such as the OPC, maintain a commitment to full, worldwide, presbyterian church government:

The church is the body of Christ and there is no schism in the body (cf. 1 Cor. 12:25). As in the human body, there is diversity in unity and unity in diversity (cf. 1 Cor. 12). The point to be stressed, however, is the unity. If there is unity it follows that this unity must express itself in all the functions which belong to the church. Since government in the church is an institution of Christ (cf. Rom. 12:8; 1 Cor. 12:28; 1 Tim. 5:17; Heb. 13:7, 1 Pet 5:1, 2), this unity must be expressed in government. The necessary inference to be drawn is that the government should manifest the unity and be as embracive in respect of its functioning as the unity of which it is an expression. A concrete illustration of this principle is the decree of the Jerusalem council (Acts 15:28, 29; 16:4).

The ultimate goal of the unity of the church is nothing less than one world-wide presbyterian/reformed church. (http://www.opc.org/relations/unity.html – This is, in general, an excellent document outlining principles of the unity of the church.)

Denominations like the RCUS are more consistent, but they are consistent in opposition to presbyterianism and the genuine unity of the church. Denominations like the OPC are more faithful (at least on paper) to presbyterian church government and the unity of the church, but they are less consistent because they do not want to either proclaim themselves the worldwide catholic church or unite with those others they profess to be other parts of it.

An important distinction needs to be introduced here. Just as we can speak of the church invisible or the church visible, the same church but in different aspects, so we can speak of the church de facto and the church de jure. The church de facto refers to the actual existence of the church throughout the world. Wherever there are those who profess the true religion, and where the Body of Christ is maintained, there we have, in fact, the Body of Christ, the church. There is no doubt but that the Body of Christ, de facto, can exist in a multiplicity of denominations. The church de jure, on the other hand, refers to the church as formally recognized and as being properly and legally constituted. The two are not coextensive. For example, a minister in a church may have an informal friendship with a person who is a non-member of the church. “And yet,” the minister may say, “so far as I can tell, I think he is a true believer.” This is a de facto recognition. On the other hand, the minister (hopefully) has a formal roll of members, and he regards these members in a special way, as those who are formally recognized as being part of Christ's Body, and over whom the minister is formally responsible to function as a shepherd. Similarly, a minister may have an informal relationship with a pastor in another denomination down the street. He may regard this pastor as, in the providence of God, actually functioning as a pastor to a group of Christians. This is a de facto recognition. However, he has a more formal relationship with other ministers who are in his denomination and with whom he is formally united together in a legitimate presbytery. This is a de jure recognition.

It would indeed be presumptuous for any denomination to claim itself to contain within it the entirety of the Body of Christ de facto. This would be to say that there are no regenerate Christians outside of that denomination, and how can anyone possibly have a basis to make such a claim? The claim is evidently false, so far as we can judge such things. However, for a denomination to claim to be the whole church de jure is another matter. As a matter of fact, every denomination either implicitly or explicitly claims this about itself (at least if it holds to a presbyterian view of church government). The very fact of denominational separation implies such a claim on the part of the separated parties. This is evident from what we have already seen. Each denomination has a court of highest appeal, a “general assembly” of some sort. (Even congregational churches have a court of highest appeal, if they have any court at all. They just limit de jure authority to a single congregation because of their commitment to independency. Although, in reality, most congregationalist denominations are not truly fully congregational, as many of them have ministerial associations and other such bodies that sometimes and in some ways function suspiciously like presbyteries and synods.) This general assembly is general because it is regarded as representing “the whole church.” It is, in effect, treated as an ecumenical council. But who is invited to this general assembly and given full voting rights within it? Only the members of that particular denomination. But what does that say? What does it say when a denomination calls a meeting of “the whole church” and yet only includes (as full voting members) officers within that denomination? It clearly communicates the message that that denomination is the whole church, the worldwide catholic church, considered de jure. There is formal recognition of the authority of officers and assemblies within that denomination, but no formal recognition of the authority of officers and assemblies of other denominations. There may be (and often is) a de facto recognition that there are Christians in other denominations, but there is no de jure recognition of the church outside of the denomination. Each denomination, at least implicitly, claims itself to be the one, holy, catholic, and apostolic church of Christ, considered de jure; and this claim entails that all other denominations are schismatic sects that have cut themselves off from the de jure Body of Christ.1 A recent article on the website of the Free Presbyterian Church of Scotland puts this well:

Denominational walls are erected on a judicial level and the distinct jurisdiction of church courts is the final and fullest expression of separation. The setting up of rival Church courts from Kirk Session through to General Assembly is an express rejection of the jurisdiction of the Church courts of other denominations and is either schismatic itself or necessarily charges other bodies with the sin of schism. Persisting in such separation is either schismatic or else there is an implicit charge of schism against all those from whom separation is maintained. (http://www.fpchurch.org.uk/documents/Reformed_Scottish_Presbyterianism_A_Response.pdf)

RECOGNIZING THE FULL IMPLICATIONS OF DENOMINATIONAL DIVISION

Most Reformed denominations today have grown comfortable with claiming to be only a part of a divided church. Consistency and faithfulness, as we have seen, should drive them either to end their schismatic existences immediately (or at least within a very short period of time), or to come out and declare themselves to be the one holy catholic church de jure. But they do not see the full implications of their continued separate existence. One of the reasons, I think, is that many of them have engaged in certain activities that have tended to function in their minds as substitutes of a sort for full unity. Many of the Reformed denominations in North America, for example, are a part of a group called the North American Presbyterian and Reformed Council (NAPARC). NAPARC encourages and facilitates a certain degree of dialogue and cooperation between its member denominations, short of full organic unity. On the international scale, many Reformed denominations worldwide are a part of The International Conference of Reformed Churches (ICRC), a similar body to NAPARC but working on a broader scale. These organizations have only an “advisory” character and no binding authority. Because these organizations create the impression of a worldwide group of churches working together happily, they have a tendency to lull members into forgetting that “getting along with each other nicely and informally” is no substitute for full formal unity. Instead of seeing separation as the result of horrendous and sinful schism in the Body of Christ, they come to see the situation as only a “happy, gentle sort of schism” that is not such a big deal.

Another reason, I think, that Reformed churches in the modern day have generally not realized the gravity of what it means to exist as separate denominations is that there has been a lack of taking seriously the full meaning of the authority of church courts. Official courts of the church are not simply a group of wise individuals hanging around giving advice. Church authority is an ordinance of Christ that has his authority behind it.

It belongeth to synods and councils, ministerially to determine controversies of faith and cases of conscience, to set down rules and directions for the better ordering of the public worship of God, and government of His Church; to receive complaints in cases of maladministration, and authoritatively to determine the same: which decrees and determinations, if consonant to the Word of God, are to be received with reverence and submission; not only for their agreement with the Word, but also for the power whereby they are made, as being an ordinance of God appointed thereunto in His Word. (WCF 31:3)

And I say also unto thee, That thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build my church; and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it. And I will give unto thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven: and whatsoever thou shalt bind on earth shall be bound in heaven: and whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven. (Matthew 16:18-19)

Moreover if thy brother shall trespass against thee, go and tell him his fault between thee and him alone: if he shall hear thee, thou hast gained thy brother. But if he will not hear thee, then take with thee one or two more, that in the mouth of two or three witnesses every word may be established. And if he shall neglect to hear them, tell it unto the church: but if he neglect to hear the church, let him be unto thee as an heathen man and a publican. Verily I say unto you, Whatsoever ye shall bind on earth shall be bound in heaven: and whatsoever ye shall loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven. Again I say unto you, That if two of you shall agree on earth as touching any thing that they shall ask, it shall be done for them of my Father which is in heaven. For where two or three are gathered together in my name, there am I in the midst of them. (Matthew 18:15-20)

When a church court, in the legitimate exercise of its authority, comes to a conclusion or makes a practical decision, if that conclusion or decision is in accordance with the Word of God, it has the authority of God behind it. God ratifies it. When a session receives a member into the church, and the act is performed appropriately and biblically, God ratifies it by considering that person to be a formal member of the visible church of Christ, and he holds that individual to the covenant promises involved in that relationship. Likewise in reverse when a session rightfully excommunicates an individual. When a church court pronounces a doctrinal position, or commands a certain practice, and the pronouncement or command is lawful and in accordance with God's Word, the members of that church are under a moral obligation to believe that doctrine or to practice that commanded duty, not only because it happens to be biblical, but also because God has commanded them to do so through his official representatives who are backed by his authority. For “the powers that be are ordained of God. Whosoever therefore resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God: and they that resist shall receive to themselves damnation” (Romans 13:1-2).

Therefore, when a denomination holds a general assembly and excludes officers from other denominations from having a part in it as full voting members, thereby rejecting the claims of those officers to have authority as officers in the church of Christ, if the action of that denomination in doing so is just, legal, and biblical, then God himself ratifies it. Those other officers are rejected as having no authority not only by some human body, but by God himself. On the other hand, if the denomination is rejecting the authority of those other officers unlawfully or for unbiblical reasons, that denomination is guilty of the horrendous blasphemy of abusing the authority of Christ given to it. It has used its God-given position not to do God's will and promote the purity and unity of the church, but to create schism in the church, to rend the Body of Christ into pieces. (It may be doing so in ignorance, but it is still an evil act nonetheless.)

When we understand the awful power granted by God to church courts, we cannot take the act of separating or remaining separated lightly. The fact that there are multiple denominations within the de facto Body of Christ means that many people have much to answer for to God. Let all existing denominations take warning! Realize what an awful claim you are making when you decide whom you will and whom you will not invite to your general assemblies! You are either exercising the de jure power of the one, holy, catholic, and apostolic church, or you are grossly profaning the name of God by abusing your authority to unjustly rend his Body into pieces!

HOW TO PROMOTE CHURCH UNITY

The realization of the true meaning of separation provides us insight into the proper means of promoting the unity of the church. Church unity is not achieved through informal or “fraternal” relationships between divided denominations. Neither is it achieved through a compromised organic union where denominations are brought together by means of watering down commitment to the full truth of God. Both of these, unfortunately, are among the most common methods of trying to promote unity in the church today. But church authorities are not given the option to water down the truth of God for the sake of organic unity. The job of church authorities is to teach “the whole counsel of God” (Acts 20:26-27). What God commands can never be made optional.  (See here for more argumentation against this idea--typically called latitudinarianism.)

The Bible provides a different model for achieving unity: “Now I beseech you, brethren, by the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, that ye all speak the same thing, and that there be no divisions among you; but that ye be perfectly joined together in the same mind and in the same judgment” (1 Corinthians 1:10). How is unity preserved in the church? By the members and officers of the church “speaking the same thing” and being “perfectly joined together in the same mind and in the same judgment.” Unity is based on agreement in doctrine and practice.

Our task, then, is to examine the claims, doctrines, and practices of existing denominations. We are to determine which denomination is the purest in doctrine and practice according to the full standards of the Word of God. And we are to look at the history of how the denominations came to be separated. Remember that separation always involves at least implicit claims of divine authority. If a denomination has a right to exist separately, then that denomination is declared by God to have de jure authority to function as the church, while all denominations separated from it are to be regarded as having had their de jure authority revoked (or never granted) by God. We have a moral duty, whether as members or officers, to be joined to and to function within that denomination that has true de jure authority from God. And we have a concomitant moral duty to leave any denomination that has had its authority taken away (or never granted) by God. True unity will be achieved when those who have embraced false teaching and/or are existing in schism from the de jure catholic church of Christ cease to do these things and come back into full union with Christ's rightful church. We should grant that this may take some time, and that it is more practical for some than for others. Some people may not live in an area where there is a de jure congregation. Some people who are currently functioning as officers in a schismatic denomination may have an obligation to the flock that God has providentially placed under their care not to leave that flock without an appropriate shepherd. It certainly would not do for a minister to say, “Well, now that I know that I am in a schismatic denomination, I know that I am not a true de jure minister, and so I will simply cease to show up for Sunday services this week and stop retuning my parishioners' phone calls.” Even apart from the question of the rightfulness of one's authority generally speaking, there are duties that we often have due to providential relationships in which God has placed us. However, while these nuances are real and important, it is also important that they not become excuses for refusing to do our duty. If we are members or officers in schismatic denominations, we have a moral obligation to remedy this situation as soon as it is possible to do so without shirking other duties.

So which existing denomination today is the one, holy, catholic, and apostolic church de jure? Every one of us must make this examination for himself.  This is an objective question, and it can be answered like any other objective question—by means of weighing claims in the light of the objective evidence.  My position is that it is the Free Presbyterian Church of Scotland (FPCS).  This is not the place for me to go into my own reasons for favoring the claim of the FPCS, but I felt it appropriate to state my leanings.

Whether the de jure catholic church turns out to be the FPCS or some other denomination, this denomination has a moral obligation to state its claim and its reasons for that claim clearly. I think the FPCS has done a much better job of this than any other denomination I have personally been familiar with, but there is still room for improvement. For example, on the FPCS website, it says that the “Free Presbyterian Church of Scotland is an evangelical, Calvinistic denomination, reformed in doctrine, worship and practice. It was formed in 1893 and is a mainline descendant of the historic Church of Scotland of the Reformation. As part of the Christian Church, we accept the Bible as the inspired Word of God. We believe that the Westminster Confession of Faith is an accurate statement of the main doctrines of the Bible.” This is a nice description, but surely it falls significantly short of making clear the kind of claim the FPCS is making. The FPCS quite self-consciously considers itself and often explicitly claims to be the rightful heir to the historic Church of Scotland of the Reformation. Although this claim is made clear elsewhere, it is not clear on the front page of their website. (Note: It is now.) But, as we have seen, the FPCS, by existing separately from all other denominations, is claiming not only to be the rightful heir to the Church of Scotland; it is claiming to be the rightful heir to the Church of Christ, considered de jure. If the FPCS believes itself to be only the Church of Scotland, then it has a moral obligation to formally unite immediately with the true de jure churches in other nations. But the FPCS has no formal union with any denomination in any other nation. In addition, the FPCS has congregations in other nations, including Australia, Canada, and the United States of America. The implication of these things is clearly that the FPCS is claiming not only to be the Church of Scotland but the general, worldwide, catholic church of Christ. But if that is its claim, it needs to make this far more explicit and clear than it has done so far. Making its claim more explicit will no doubt make the duty of providing officers and sealing ordinances to be available to people in all other nations a more pressing and present reality as well. (Note: The FPCS has made this more explicit since the time of writing this, such as in their new catechism.)

The Reformed churches need to do a much better job at dealing with the issues pointed out in this article than they tend to do today. In fact, the Reformed churches have often through their history lacked somewhat in their performance in these areas. Even in the early periods of Reformed history, such as at the time of John Knox and the original reformation of Scotland, the Reformed churches have not always had the focus they ought to have had on maintaining the full, worldwide unity of the church of Christ. Let me cite one example of this lack from those early days: In 1566, Theodore Beza of the Reformed church in Geneva, Calvin's successor in the ministry there, sent a letter to the Church of Scotland. In the letter, he gave them a copy of the Second Helvetic Confession that had recently become a popular confession among the continental Reformed churches. In a laudable display of concern for church unity, he wanted the Scottish church to be aware of this confession and to have the opportunity to give their approval to it. The Church of Scotland wrote a letter back to Beza in which they praised the confession with great enthusiasm:

We are therefore altogether compelled, as well by our consciences, as from a sense of duty, to undertake its patronage, and not only to express our approval, but also our exceeding commendation of every chapter and every sentence. For that little treatise rests altogether upon the Holy Scriptures, which we both profess and are prepared to defend at the risk of our lives, or even to the shedding of blood. And we have all of us, as many as by reason of the shortness of the time allowed us, were able to be present, both subscribed our names, and sealed this letter with the common seal of this University. But if you should think that it would be of use to your churches at any future time, we will send you by the first opportunity both the public subscription of this Church, and the formula of our Confession of Faith, confirmed in the Assembly of the Three Estates of the realm.

However, the confession contained one small part in it that the Church of Scotland could not approve of. In chapter 24, it said this:

Moreover, if in Christian liberty the churches religiously celebrate the memory of the Lord's nativity, circumcision, passion, resurrection, and of his ascension into heaven, and the sending of the Holy Spirit upon his disciples, we approve of it highly. but we do not approve of feasts instituted for men and for saints. Holy days have to do with the first Table of the Law and belong to God alone. Finally, holy days which have been instituted for the saints and which we have abolished, have much that is absurd and useless, and are not to be tolerated. In the meantime, we confess that the remembrance of saints, at a suitable time and place, is to be profitably commended to the people in sermons, and the holy examples of the saints set forth to be imitated by all.

With regard to this segment of the confession, the Church of Scotland had this to say:

This one thing, however, we can scarcely refrain from mentioning, with regard to what is written in the 24th chapter of the aforesaid Confession concerning the “festival of our Lord's nativity, circumcision, passion, resurrection, ascension, and sending the Holy Ghost upon his disciples,” that these festivals at the present time obtain no place among us; for we dare not religiously celebrate any other feast-day than what the divine oracles have prescribed. Everything else, as we have said, we teach, approve, and most willingly embrace.

This difference in practice between the continental Reformed churches and the descendants of the Church of Scotland continues to this day, and is a significant barrier to full denominational unity. The question that comes to my mind is this: Why wasn't this problem dealt with at the time it became known? The Church of Scotland pointed out dutifully the difference in practice, but why did they not pursue the matter further and try harder to bring unity between the Reformed churches on this matter? And why did Beza and the continental churches not act on the Church of Scotland's expressed concerns? It seems that both churches were content to merely note the difference and then to go along as if nothing important needed to be done about it. If something had been done—if perhaps a formal council had been called to decide the issue, after a period of serious dialogue—perhaps a current barrier to unity between the descendent denominations would not exist today. By now this difference has become so entrenched that it will be perhaps much harder to remove. The Reformed churches were not as universally-minded as they ought to have been in this case.

We can learn a lesson from the past. Let us do even better than our Reformed ancestors did. Let us work to gain and maintain a clear understanding of the proper principles of church unity and authority, and let us put them into practice in our churches, even with regard to the unity of the whole church worldwide. Let us work to better recognize and live the true and full meaning of one, holy, catholic, and apostolic church.


1 It might be objected that there might be a case where a denomination has tried to be united with another denomination and yet that other denomination has refused union. How can it be said to be the fault of the first denomination if union is not achieved? But this is no exception to what has been stated. First of all, if the other denomination is not considered schismatic and its general assembly is considered valid and legitimate, then why don't the officers in the first denomination simply move over to the other denomination and join it, becoming a part of and accepting the rules of its legitimate general assembly? That would solve the unity problem. If the first denomination refused to join into what they regard as a legitimate de jure general assembly and accept its legitimate rules, they would be guilty of schism. On the other hand, if the first denomination feels that it is duty-bound not to join in with and accept the general assembly of the other denomination, but that the officers of the other denomination have a duty to unite with them in their own general assembly, or perhaps in a third joint general assembly, then the failure of the officers of the other denomination to do so should be considered a schismatic act and the first denomination should proceed without them, as they have cut themselves off from the de jure church, leaving the first denomination to be the one worldwide catholic church de jure. So in either case, there will either be a union or a claim to be the one catholic church. If there is no claim by the first denomination to be the one catholic church and the separation continues, the first denomination is declaring itself to be schismatic.

UPDATE (10/5/12):  See here and here for related earlier blog articles.  And see here for a much briefer version of the main argument of the article.  And see here for a fuller, book-length version of the argument.

UPDATE (10/15/12):  As an illustration of how the Reformed churches have historically understood the need to have full formal unity of the church throughout the world, culminating in the ability to have binding ecumenical councils, see this selection from the Second Book of Discipline of the Church of Scotland (1578) below.  Note how the Church of Scotland recognized the presbyterian nature of church government and how it implies concentric circles of binding authority all the way up to the level of the entire church of Christ in all nations.  This biblical model of the unity of the church is distorted when denominations treat their own general assemblies as the highest judicatory while failing to claim themselves to be the worldwide catholic church de jure.

Chapter 7 - Of the Elderships, and Assemblies, and Discipline
  1. Elderships and assemblies are commonly constituted of pastors, doctors, and such as we commonly call elders, that labour not in the word and doctrine, of whom, and of whose several power has been spoken.
  2. Assemblies are of four sorts. For, either are they of particular kirks and congregations, one or more, or of a province, or of a whole nation, or of all and diverse nations professing one Jesus Christ.
  3. All the ecclesiastical assemblies have power to convene lawfully together for treating of things concerning the kirk, and pertaining to their charge. They have power to appoint times and places to that effect; and at one meeting to appoint the diet, time, and place for another.
  4. In all the assemblies a moderator should be chosen (by the common consent of the whole brethren convened) who should propose matters, gather the votes, and cause good order to be kept in the assemblies. Diligence should be taken, chiefly by the moderator, that only ecclesiastical things be handled in the assemblies, and that there be no meddling with anything pertaining to the civil jurisdiction.
  5. Every assembly has power to send forth from them of their own number, one or more visitors to see how all things are ruled in the bounds of their jurisdiction. Visitation of more kirks is no ordinary ecclesiastical office in the person of one man; neither may the name of a bishop be attributed to the visitor only; neither is it necessary to abide always in one man's person; but it is the part of the eldership to send out qualified persons to visit pro re nata.
  6. The final end of all assemblies is, first, to keep the religion and doctrine in purity, without error and corruption; next, to keep comeliness and order in the kirk.
  7. For this order's case, they may make certain rules and constitutions appertaining to the good behaviour of all the members of the kirk in their vocation.
  8. They have power also to abrogate and abolish all statutes and ordinances concerning ecclesiastical matters that are found noisome and unprofitable, and agree not with the time, or are abused by the people.
  9. They have power to execute ecclesiastical discipline and punishment upon all transgressors and proud contemners of the good order and policy of the kirk; and so the whole discipline is in their hands.
  10. The first kind and sort of assemblies, although they are within particular congregations, yet they exercise the power, authority, and jurisdiction of the kirk with mutual consent, and therefore bear sometimes the name of the kirk. When we speak of the elders of the particular congregations, we mean not that every particular parish can, or may, have their own particular elderships, especially to landward; but we think three or four, more or fewer, particular kirks may have one eldership common to them all, to judge their ecclesiastical causes. Albeit this is meet, that some of the elders be chosen out of every particular congregation, to concur with the rest of their brethren in the common assembly, and to take up the delations of offences within their own kirks, and bring them to the assembly. This we gather from the practice of the primitive kirk, where elders, or colleges of seniors, were constituted in cities and famous places.
  11. The power of these particular elderships is to give diligent labours in the bounds committed to their charge, that the kirks be kept in good order; to inquire diligently of naughty and unruly persons, and travail to bring them in the way again, either by admonition, or threatening of God's judgments, or by correction.
  12. It pertains to the eldership to take heed that the word of God be purely preached within their bounds, the sacraments rightly ministered, the discipline rightly maintained, and the ecclesiastical goods uncorruptly distributed.
  13. It belongs to this kind of assembly to cause the ordinances made by the assemblies provincial, national, and general, to be kept, and put in execution; to make constitutions which concern to; prevpon[2] in the kirk, for the decent order of these particular kirks where they govern; providing they alter no rules made by the general or provincial assemblies, and that they make the provincial assemblies foreseen of these rules that they shall make, and abolish them that tend to the hurt of the same.
  14. It has power to excommunicate the obstinate.
  15. The power of election of them who bear ecclesiastical charges pertains to this kind of assembly, within their own bounds, being well erected and constituted of many pastors and elders of sufficient ability.
  16. By the like reason their deposition also pertains to this kind of assembly, as of them that teach erroneous and corrupt doctrine; that are of scandalous life, and, after admonition, desist not; that are given to schism or rebellion against the kirk, manifest blasphemy, simony, corruption of bribes, falsehood, perjury, whoredom, theft, drunkenness, fighting worthy of punishment by the law, usury, dancing, infamy, and all others that deserve separation from the kirk. These also who are found altogether insufficient to execute their charge should be deposed; whereof other kirks would be advertised, that they receive not the persons deposed.
  17. Yet they ought not to be deposed who, through age, sickness, or other accidents, become unmeet to do their office; in the which case their honour should remain to them, their kirk should maintain them; and others ought to be provided to do their office.
  18. Provincial assemblies we call lawful conventions of the pastors, doctors, and other elders of a province, gathered for the common affairs of the kirks thereof; which also may be called the conference of the kirk and brethren.
  19. These assemblies are instituted for weighty matters, to be treated by mutual consent and assistance of the brethren within the provinces, as needs requires.
  20. This assembly has power to handle, order, and redress all things omitted, or done amiss, in the particular assemblies. It has power to depose the office-bearers of that province for good and just causes deserving deprivation. And, generally, these assemblies have the whole power of the particular elderships whereof they are collected.
  21. The national assembly, which is general to us, is a lawful convention of the whole kirks of the realm or nation where it is used and gathered for the common affairs of the kirk; and may be called the general eldership of the whole kirk within the realm. None are subject to repair to this assembly to vote but ecclesiastical persons, to such a number as shall be thought good by the same assembly; not excluding other persons that will repair to the said assembly to propose, hear, and reason.
  22. This assembly is instituted, that all things either omitted or done amiss in the provincial assemblies may be redressed and handled; and things generally serving for the weal of the whole body of the kirk within the realm may be foreseen, treated, and set forth to God's glory.
  23. It should take care that kirks be planted where they are not planted. It should prescribe the rule how the other two kinds of assemblies should proceed in all things.
  24. This assembly should take heed that the spiritual jurisdiction and the civil be not confounded to the hurt of the kirk; that the patrimony of the kirk be not diminished nor abused; and, generally, concerning all weighty affairs that concern the weal and good order of the whole kirks of the realm, it ought to interpose authority thereto.
  25. There is, besides these, another more general kind of assembly, which is of all nations and estates of persons within the kirk, representing the universal kirk of Christ; which may be called properly the general assembly, or general council of the whole kirk of God. These assemblies were appointed and called together specially, when any great schism or controversy in doctrine did arise in the kirk, and were convoked at the command of godly emperors, being for the time, for avoiding of schisms within the universal kirk of God; which, because they appertain not to the particular estate of one realm, we cease further to speak of them. 
UPDATE 5/10/13:  The FPCS has recently released a new catechism of its distinctive principles that deals with the subject of the international catholicity of the church and other issues of church unity and schism.

UPDATE 7/29/13:  A few more reading resources (in addition to articles and books already cited):

The Unity of the Church, by Thomas M'Crie

The Due Right of Presbyteries, by Samuel Rutherford (this can be found as one of the books linked to here)

Undoing the Reformation: Schism, by Matthew Vogan

A Vindication of the Essence and Unity of the Church-Catholick Visible (1658), by Samuel Hudson

UPDATE 8/12/13:  The OPC Form of Government, Chapter III, articulates a beautiful description of the collegiate nature of church authority in presbyterianism.  No room for multiple independent denominations here!  De jure officers do not function independently, but exercise their rule jointly as part of an eldership ruling over the entire church.  Therefore, to exclude certain men (such as officers from other denominations) from having a place at the table in the governance of the whole church is to treat them as having no de jure authority as officers in the church.

Those who join in exercising ecclesiastical jurisdiction are the ministers of the Word or teaching elders, and other church governors, commonly called ruling elders. They alone must exercise this authority by delegation from Christ, since according to the New Testament these are the only permanent officers of the church with gifts for such rule. Ruling elders and teaching elders join in congregational, presbyterial, and synodical assemblies, for those who share gifts for rule from Christ must exercise these gifts jointly not only in the fellowship of the saints in one place but also for the edification of all the saints in larger areas so far as they are appointed thereto in an orderly manner, and are acknowledged by the saints as those set over them in the Lord.

Government by presbyters or elders is a New Testament ordinance; their joint exercise of jurisdiction in presbyterial assemblies is set forth in the New Testament; and the organization of subordinate and superior courts is founded upon and agreeable to the Word of God, expressing the unity of the church and the derivation of ministerial authority from Christ the Head of the church.

UPDATE 8/21/13:  Here is a brief numbered argument to spell out further my core contention:

1. In biblical presbyterianism, the church is to be one in formal unity through all the world, and the rule of the eldership is collegial in nature.  That is, no elder rules independently.  Elders rule in conjunction with other elders in church courts, and all legitimate, active elders have an inherent right and responsibility as a part of their authority to function as part of the courts of the church.  And no church court is independent, but all church courts have an inherent right and responsibility as part of their lawful authority to function in communion with each other under mutually-binding higher councils (sessions under presbyteries, presbyteries under synods, etc.) going all the way up to an ecumenical council of the whole catholic church.

2. Therefore, it is morally obligatory on all parties that all officers and church courts function collegially as described.  That they function in this way is not simply a nice goal, or an ideal to hope for someday, but is an essential requirement inalienably involved in the very concept of church authority, in the same way that submitting to husbands is an inherent part of the role of wife and caring for the wife is an inherent part of the role of husband.  Churches cannot opt out of this arrangement, citing non-ideal circumstances as an excuse, any more than churches can opt out of the prohibition against the worship of images or any other command of God.

3. Therefore, when presbyterian churches function separately in independent denominations, not united under mutually-binding councils, it is necessarily implicit in this that they are rejecting the de jure legitimacy and authority of each others' officers and church courts, for they are refusing to treat the church courts of the other denominations as would be required if they had de jure legitimacy and authority.

4. When de jure church courts act justly in the proper exercise of their responsibilities, their decisions and resolutions possess divine authority, for they have true authority delegated from Christ.

5. Therefore, when a denomination possessing de jure authority refuses to enter into union with another denomination under mutually-binding councils (thus rejecting the de jure authority of the other denomination), and it is acting justly and appropriately in so doing, its rejection of the other denomination's de jure authority is backed by divine authority, and thus it is an objective fact that the justly rejected denomination from that point on does not possess de jure legitimacy and authority, and therefore should not be treated as if it possessed such authority.

6. Therefore, with regard to the various currently existing presbyterian denominations, their separation from each other entails their rejection of each others' de jure authority.  Therefore, whichever of these denominations has the best claim to a right to separate existence should be joined with by Christians, unless all of them are beset with such doctrinal and/or practical error that there is a need to set up a new denomination.

For the most part, points #1 and #4 introduce the substantial ideas, while the other points simply follow logically from these.

UPDATE 4/27/14:  Here are a couple of relevant comments from Rev. James Porteous from his book, The Government of the Kingdom of Christ (pp. 322-323):


Presbytery is the proper manifestation of the unity of the Church. Let these principles of associated representative government be logically and fully embraced, and its range must be commensurate with the entire Church. It cannot stop with nations, it must embrace the world. The visible Church can no more be restricted to nations, or partitioned among these as separate and independent portions, than may the congregations of a locality. The Church is one in all the earth. . . .
Then the assembly at Jerusalem was not local, not even national—it was universal. Not only the Jewish nation, Syria, and other lands—yea, by the apostles, ‘all nations’ were represented in that assembly. If that example be refused as a model for a universal assembly, it must also be refused as a model for any. Decline to entertain the question as to an assembly for the world, as there exemplified, and all authority for national and local synods is removed. If this be so, then this is the model to which the Church must ever seek to conform.

UPDATE 6/9/14:  Here is a well-articulated comment from church historian James Walker:

The visible church, in the idea of the Scottish theologians, is catholic. You have not an indefinite number of Parochial, or Congregational, or National churches, constituting, as it were, so many ecclesiastical individualities, but one great spiritual republic, of which these various organizations form a part. The visible church is not a genus, so to speak, with so many species under it. It is thus you may think of the State, but the visible church is a totum integrale, it is an empire. The churches of the various nationalities constitute the provinces of this empire; and though they are so far independent of each other, yet they are so one, that membership in one is membership in all, and separation from one is separation from all . . . This conception of the church, of which, in at least some aspects, we have practically so much lost sight, had a firm hold of the Scottish theologians of the seventeenth century.' (James Walker, The Theology and Theologians of Scotland. Edinburgh: Knox Press, [1888] 1982. Lecture iv. pp.95-6.)

Monday, September 24, 2012

Further Thoughts Connected to the Cameronian Controversy

In an earlier post, I critiqued the Presbyterian position on civil authority known as Cameronianism.  In this post, I would like to add some further thoughts and clarifications that are relevant to that controversy and to the nature of civil authority in general.  I hope that these thoughts may aid dialogue between Cameronian and non-Cameronian Presbyterians.

It seems to me, as I continue to think about it, that there are really two distinct issues/questions involved in the Cameronian controversy.  The conversation can proceed much more clearly if these two issues are kept properly distinct.

1. Can only magistrates who meet the full biblical requirements indicating how civil magistrates should behave be considered legitimate, duly constituted, de jure civil magistrates?

My answer to that questions is no.  As we saw in the previous post on Cameronianism, the Scriptures indicate that anyone who, by providence, is actually filling the role of civil authority, regardless of how he came to fill that role, should be obeyed and honored as having civil authority.  I am going to make some more nuanced comments on this in a moment, but for now we can note from this fact that God holds the role of civil magistrate so important to human welfare that he wants us to recognize and support whomever is actually filling that role at any given time.  We are not to go without civil authority.

The importance with which God holds the role of civil magistrate is also seen in the fact that he commands his people to appoint civil rulers.  This is not an optional thing, but a commanded thing.  Again, we are not to go without civil authority.

If civil authority is so important to God, and if God commands his people to support even pagan rulers when he in his providence has put such over them,  then it is clear that whomever has the best claim to civil authority over a body of people should be considered to have de jure authority, even if he be pagan.  If a pagan government claims authority over a people, and there is no better claimant challenging that claim, then, as the people are to have civil rulers, this government should be considered to have legitimate, duly constituted, de jure civil authority over that people.

We can also see the answer to this question by looking at the essential nature of civil government.  It is of the essence of church government that it be Christian.  It is not necessarily of the essence of church government that it fully fulfill all the ideal requirements of God.  It can be imperfect in various ways and still be overall legitimate.  But it must be Christian, because the entire point of church government is to teach the Christian religion and to shepherd the members of Christ's church in that religion in doctrine and life.  A non-Christian church of Christ would obviously be a contradiction in terms.

On the other hand, it is not of the essence of parental government that it be Christian.  Parents are indeed commanded to raise up their children "in the nurture and admonition of the Lord," to teach them the law of God, etc.  It is one of the main roles of parents to raise up godly children, trained in Christian thinking and virtues.  However, the parental role can still exist and function to some degree even when parents are non-Christian.  Children are commanded to obey their parents in general, not just those that are Christians.  Just as husbands and wives still have duties relative to one another even when one or both are not Christians, so parents and children have duties relative to one another when one or more are not Christian.  Parents have a right and a responsibility, de jure, to care for and raise up the children who are under their care, whether the parents be Christian or not.  If they are not Christian, they will do this very badly in some very important ways, but it is still their rightful responsibility to do it, and in some aspects they may do well at it.  Children cannot withhold obedience to their parents on the grounds that their parents are not Christians, but are to submit to them in obedience to their lawful commands simply because they are their proper parents.

Civil government, in its nature, is more like parental government in this respect than it is like church government.  Though it is true that a civil government will rule wrongly in a number of crucial ways if it be not Christian, yet civil authority can still exist and function and have purpose even where civil governors are not Christian.  They can still restrain wrongs such as murder, theft, etc., and if they are duly and legitimately constituted they have a right and a responsibility to do so, and the people under them have a duty to obey and honor them.

Therefore, the Westminster Confession is quite right when it says that "infidelity, or difference in religion, doth not make void the magistrates' just and legal authority, nor free the people from their due obedience to them" (WCF 23:4).

2. Are all actually functioning civil governments, allowed to exercise authority by the providence of God, legitimate, duly constituted, de jure civil governments?

It seems to me that the answer to this question is no as well.  This is a distinct question from the former question.  I think that many of those opposed to Cameronian imbalances (including myself) have often not adequately articulated a clear answer to this question.

One of the main objections Cameronians have against a non-Cameronian position is that it seems absurd to say that any government which has actually become able to exercise power, no matter how villainous their methods of obtaining and maintaining that power, are to be regarded as having de jure, legitimately constituted, civil authority, and the right to rule.  Under this reasoning, if I conquer a country by means of unjust violence, and I end up actually winning, and I subjugate the people, as soon as I have succeeded I can quote Romans 13 and say that I am the rightful, legitimate ruler over the people, no matter what the conquered people may want, as if there has been nothing wrong with my method of attaining power.  Does God put his mark of sanction in this way on wicked and violent actions?  Surely a person who attains power in this way is not a rightful ruler, but a usurper and a tyrant!  This is especially the case if the previous ruling party has not been entirely destroyed, but has perhaps been banished or imprisoned, so that it would be possible to return the realm to their authority.  Does not the conqueror have a moral obligation to return the realm to its previous rulers if possible, or can he quote Romans 13 and refuse to do so on the grounds that he is now the rightful, duly constituted civil authority?  The Cameronians hold that it would be absurd to say that such a conqueror has fully legitimate authority.

I think the Cameronians are right about this.  If I have attained power illegally, and the previous legal power still exists and could have rule returned to it, surely my rule is illegitimate.  I am a thief, and I have a moral obligation to return power to its rightful owner.  And even if I have utterly wiped out the previous ruling powers, still I have attained my power illegally and unjustly, and so I ought to arrange for fair elections to be held so that new civil powers can be legally chosen (per Deuteronomy 1:9-18, etc.).  If I do not do so, I continue to hold my power illegally, just as I attained it illegally.  If, on the other hand, the people are given the chance but do not want to create a new government, but have come to accept my authority willingly (or at least they do not think it worth opposing and proposing an alternative), then while I attained power illegally and ought to repent of that, yet probably I can now continue to hold power legally.  The acquiescence of the people and--if any remain--the previous authorities would make my rule henceforth legitimate.

It seems evident that if power is attained and maintained illegally, that power should not be considered legitimate and de jure.  If a person kidnaps a child, he cannot declare himself the new "power that be" in the child's life and on that ground consider himself the rightful parent and refuse to return the child to his actual parents.  If a church officer attains office through fraudulent means, surely he cannot claim that his exercise of authority is still legitimate and de jure simply because he has been successful in his fraudulent dealings.  Surely this applies to civil magistrates as well.  If they attain authority illegally (like Absalom, or like Athaliah), and their authority is not by some legal act made legitimate, it remains illegitimate and illegal.

Passages like Romans 13:1-7, 1 Peter 2:13-17, etc., which teach that de jure authority belongs to whomever God in his providence places over a people, do not imply that there is no such thing as illegitimate rule.  If a conqueror conquers a nation, and the people and/or the original rulers do not agree to it (as is implied in the very idea of "conquest"), we should say that the providence of God has not in fact placed the conqueror over the people in a position of authority.  It is not simply the ability of someone to use power to make people do what they want that gives de jure authority, and I see no reason to think that passages like Romans 13, etc., are saying that it is.  If this were the case, then thugs in a dark alley mugging someone could be said to have de jure authority to take people's money, or a gang in an inner city with enough power to beat the lawful police could be said to have de jure authority to rule and be obeyed.  But instances in Scripture such as Absalom and Athaliah indicate that this is not the Scriptural view.  Rather, a ruler can be said to have legitimate de jure authority to rule if providence has placed him in a situation where he has the best claim to a legitimate right to rule.  The Roman government in the days of the early church had attained their rule by illegal conquest, and yet by the time of the New Testament there were no real, legal contenders to their position, and so their authority could be considered de jure.  And that is why Christ, and Paul and Peter and the whole New Testament, treat them as having de jure authority.

There is one more thing that ought to be added here briefly:  In some situations, a legitimate governing body may be overpowered by an illegitimate one.  This does not make the conquering party legitimate per se, as we've just been saying, but it may require the people, temporarily, to act in some ways as if the conquerors are legitimate.  For example, if a gang gets control of part of a city to such a degree that the true law enforcement cannot practically exercise jurisdiction, in this case, as a (hopefully) temporary and non-ideal expedient, the people may, practically in some ways, need to treat the gang leaders as if they are the true governors, simply because given the situation they are actually functioning as such and the only ones who are.  So if the gang offers some semblance of law and order, it would be appropriate for the people to take advantage of this in cases of necessity; and the gang, while holding its illegitimate rule, would have a moral obligation to provide such services.  (They would have a higher moral obligation to give up their rule, but we can sometimes talk about lower moral obligations in cases where higher moral obligations are not being met.)  We could compare this to a situation where the only skilled doctor in an area is an illegally-practicing surgeon.  Ordinarily, this "doctor" should not be practicing medicine, but if a need arises which only he can fulfill, it would be appropriate for him to use his skills to meet that need, and it would be appropriate for those in need to make use of his skills (while not condoning his illegality).

In closing, I think the above observations show that the Cameronian position does have more merit in some aspects than it is perhaps often given credit for.  And those who have opposed Cameronianism have sometimes fallen into an opposite imbalance (by acting as if there is no such thing as illegitimate rule).  However, even taking these things into account, the Cameronian position itself still shows itself to be imbalanced in some areas.  Hopefully, the addition of further clarity here will aid in dialogue between the differing positions.

Monday, September 17, 2012

Who Would You Invite to an Ecumenical Council?

According to the logic of the presbyterian form of church government (see here), which is biblical, smaller assemblies of the church are subject to larger assemblies of the church.  Church officers in a congregation are not without checks and balances, but they are accountable to each other and to the church (1 Timothy 5:19).  This does not stop at local congregations.  Just as a local congregational session can judge an officer in the congregation, so a regional gathering, or a national gathering, etc., of church officers can judge an officer or a group of officers in a congregation.  The authority of these gatherings is binding on all those who are under the authority of these bodies.  The logic of this pattern of concentric circles does not stop until it reaches the level of the "whole church" (Acts 15:22)--that is, an ecumenical council.  Such a council should meet more rarely than lesser councils and deal only with fundamental matters for the most part, as things that can be dealt with more locally ought not to be deferred to a higher court, but the conclusions of an ecumenical synod would be just as binding over the whole church as the conclusions of lesser courts are binding over their particular jurisdictions.

The Christian churches today are in a deplorable state of division.  One of the things that hinders the resolution of these divisions, or lessens the motivations of those in the church to work diligently for the sort of reform that would lead to their elimination if followed through, is a sense of complacency held by many in Reformed churches today.  Many people will confess that there are divisions, and that we ought to work for their elimination, but they are lulled into thinking the situation better than it is by the feeling that we don't really need to have organic union among all the churches of Christ.  Just as congregationalists/independents lull themselves into security regarding the disunity of the church (and thus split into thousands of mini-denominations) by their erroneous doctrine that church power does not extent beyond the local congregation (so that they hold that gatherings beyond the congregational level have only advisory and not binding authority), so many Presbyterian/Reformed people today have been lulled into security by the sense that the organic unity of the church need only extend up to a certain level, and after that we can adopt the model of the independents.

There is generally a recognition that congregations are under regional assemblies (presbyteries), and that presbyteries are under larger assemblies (often called general assemblies or synods), but at this point in the minds of many, things seem to begin to break down.  There is a failure to be as concerned as we ought to be that within a single nation, there are multiple Reformed denominations with different general assemblies, and that congregations of these different denominations often co-exist in the same areas.  There is often a degree of concern expressed regarding this situation, but it seems not to be as urgent in the minds of many as it ought to be; and this is partly owing, I think, to the existence of non-binding organizations and confederacies (like NAPARC in North America) which give to the churches a sense that they are getting along and cooperating, even though they are not in full, organic communion with one another under one general council.

Things are even worse on the international level.  While there is often at least an expressed concern about denominational divisions within nations, there seems to be very little concern expressed about denominational divisions between nations.  On this level, there seems to be a widespread failure to even think about the issue at all, with some even voicing opposition to the idea that all the national Reformed churches ought to be united under one binding ecumenical council.  But to fail to take the logic of presbyterian church government to the international level, and instead to settle there for an independent view of things, is ultimately to betray presbyterian church government.  On this level, as well, a sense of "peace in Zion" is helped along, I think, by the existence of advisory, non-binding organizations (like the ICRC) which facilitate the different churches working together in certain areas short of full organic union.  And this in spite of the fact that denominations like the OPC have expressed an interest in working for worldwide organic unity (see, for example, this very good article on the subject of church unity).

In another place, I have discussed the implications that come from having divided denominations.  Each denomination, by not being unified with another, is declaring that only it has formally recognized de jure authority and therefore de jure existence as a church (while division is compatible with a de facto recognition of the Body of Christ in differing denominations).  I think that raising the issue of an ecumenical council helps to bring this fact out clearly, and so it is something I want to raise and emphasize.  Basically put, we can ask the question, Who would you invite to an ecumenical council?  An ecumenical council would be a binding synod of the whole church throughout the world.  So one's answer to this question reveals whom one considers to be a part of the catholic church worldwide, considered de jure.  To not be invited to take part, with full voting privileges, in an ecumenical council is to be "unchurched," to be rejected as being a part of the universal Christian church, considered de jure.  So who would we invite to an ecumenical council?

The fact is that all the Presbyterian/Reformed denominations that exist would invite only officers and members in their own denominations to be fully voting members in such a council.  This is because they would recognize that to invite others would be to give them power over their own denominations, as their own respective denominational general assemblies and synods would be subject to the binding authority of this higher council.  But the very reason they are separate denominations is that they do not want to give those outside their denominations any power within their denominations, so they will not invite them to be fully voting members of the ecumenical council.  But while they might be able to ignore or put behind them the full implications of their decisions to remain separate from each other while going about their ordinary business, the act of calling an ecumenical council (or even considering doing such in a thought experiment) will make these implications impossible to ignore.  When denominations refuse to be in full organic communion with each other, they are not merely deciding to co-exist peacefully and happily as different parts of a larger church.  They are declaring everyone but themselves to be excluded from the universal, catholic, visible Church of Christ, considered de jure.  Obviously, such a declaration is something that is extremely weighty and not at all to be taken lightly.  To claim to be the one, holy, catholic, and apostolic church, de jure, is a tremendous claim.  Those who make such a claim dare not make it unless they are absolutely certain (at least to the extent that such matters allow) that it is true.  What Reformed churches today really often want to do is to think of the de jure catholic church as existing in all the different denominations as they work together in their divided state.  Such an idea of the church may work within the structure of congregational/independent church government, but it is not at all tenable within the context of presbyterian church government.

So, let me ask these question of all the different Presbyterian/Reformed denominations out there:  Who would you invite to an ecumenical council?  And are you prepared to deal with and accept and defend with full consciousness the implications of your answer?  Do you have a right to exist as a separate denomination, with all that that claim entails?  Or are you schismatic, and in need of repentance?  What are you going to do to help seek both the purity and the unity of the universal Church of Christ (both de jure and de facto)?  If you do want to make the claim that you have the right of separate existence, are you doing what you can to promote the purity and unity of the church on an international scale?  Are you looking at all the other nations as mission fields, where you have an obligation to work for the existence and maintenance of de jure catholic churches (however it is best to go about doing this in particular places)?  Are you taking the pains that need to be taken to deal with these many mission fields?  Are  you working to reform churches that are divided from you as you have opportunity?  Are you working to do all you can, while upholding the whole of your duty, to make things easier on other denominations who might seek union with you?  If you decide that you don't have a basis to make the claim that your denomination is the one, holy, catholic, and apostolic church worldwide, considered de jure, what are you going to do to end your schismatic separate existence?  Which denomination ought you to be joining, and what steps are you currently taking to make that happen within a reasonable period of time (understanding that it may take some, limited amount of time to make such a transition)?  If you are engaged in holding some doctrinal deviation or some unbiblical practice, or some other practice that unnecessarily hinders unity, how are you going to go about reforming this obstacle to unity?

UPDATE (10/5/12):  See here and here for related blog articles.

UPDATE 9/2/13:  Samuel Hudson makes some interesting comments about calling an ecumenical council in his 1649 book, A Vindication of the Essence and Unity of the Church-Catholick Visible, pp. 215-216.  (This is an excellent book overall, by the way, arguing for formal, visible, catholic unity in the whole church.)  After spending a good amount of time arguing for the legitimacy and binding nature of an ecumenical council, he says this:

But because there are so many superstitions, errours, and heresies in the Asian, African, European and American Churches, as M. A and M. S in their defense, p. 92, do take notice of . . . yet I say for these things' sake, I should be very tender in defining (as the case now standeth) what Churches, or how farre the visible Churches may with convenience or safety enter into actual combination, lest the truths of God, or the liberties or the more sound and pure Churches, should be prejudiced thereby.

Hudson is writing before what I call the "age of denominationalism" really dawned (which dawning I tend to place around 1690--recognizing, of course, a bit of subjectivity in this).  It was not yet clear at this point that the Protestant and Reformed churches were going to end up definitively splintered into a myriad of separated denominations.  Therefore, he is still contemplating at this time the calling of an ecumenical council that would include a variety of Protestant churches.  However, we can see that the age of denominationalism is almost upon us in his reasons for hesitation at the idea of calling such a council.  The various Protestant churches have become so divided and disparate already that Hudson doubts that it really makes sense anymore to call a council.  Errors have become established, and more orthodox churches are already functioning separately from less orthodox ones.  It was, perhaps, already too late to heal the divisions of Christendom by means of an ecumenical council.  Once the church came to be in a divided state, it would have been foolish to go back and pretend it hadn't happened by calling such a council.  From that time on, the only way forward would be dialogue between already-separated churches.  And if this was already becoming so in Hudson's day, how much more in ours!  The Reformed churches of today need to stop living in denial of the divided state of Protestantism, accept the schisms that exist without pretending that de jure catholic unity still exists between the various Protestant and Reformed denominations, and engage in serious soul-searching and dialogue in order to help bring the churches into greater agreement and so move closer to restoring the de jure unity of the de facto visible church.

UPDATE 10/15/14:  Here is another article which asks a similar question:  What would your church do if some other church invited it to a mutually-binding council?

Saturday, September 15, 2012

Against Cameronianism

During the late 1600s, an error entered into Presbyterian circles.  This period (about 1660 to 1680) was a time of great persecution of Presbyterians in Britain.  During the 1640s, the governments of England, Scotland, and Ireland had agreed together in the Solemn League and Covenant, in which they had promised to work towards uniformity in religion along the lines of the orthodox Reformed faith.  However, when Charles II was restored to the throne around 1660, although he had sworn multiple times to uphold the Covenant, upon attaining actual power he reneged on his oath and reversed the Covenant, even eventually making a law that the Covenant must be abjured by all those holding public office.  Episcopalianism was reestablished as the official church form of the three kingdoms, and worship according to Presbyterian principles was declared illegal.  Of course, faithful Presbyterians continued to carry on anyway, and there was a great period of persecution (later called the "Killing Time") until tolerance for Presbyterianism was declared at the Glorious Revolution around 1688.

Needless to say, the attitude of Presbyterians during this time to the civil government was not very positive.  A few Presbyterian ministers, including Richard Cameron, began towards the last part of this period to develop and put forward an understanding of Christian duties to civil magistrates different in an important respect from that previously held to.  According to Cameron and some others (who later remained separated from the re-established Presbyterian Church of Scotland), civil magistrates are only legitimate and only have authority to command obedience if they fulfill the biblical requirements which pertain to civil magistrates.  They must rule in accordance with God's Word and in the fear of God, and with a proper respect for the rights of their subjects; and if they do not, they are not legitimate, authorized magistrates.  Under this thinking, a claimed magistrate who is an atheist could not be recognized as a legitimate civil magistrate, as he is not living up to the pattern God has set out concerning civil magistrates.  Therefore, the people have no obligation to obey him.  (See this view articulated in the Cameronian Sanquhar Declaration and in the Informatory Vindication, and in the later Act, Declaration, and Testimony.)  This view became known as Cameronianism.  Those who held to it and who remained aloof from the established Church of Scotland after the Glorious Revolution became known as the Society Men, and later as Reformed Presbyterians.  Historically, the Reformed Presbyterians have not recognized as legitimate the civil governments under which they have lived.  However, in more recent times, many RP denominations have become more lax on this point or even abandoned it, while some still hold to the historic position.

In contrast to this Cameronian view stands the teaching of the Westminster Confession of Faith, the official confession of the Church of Scotland since the 1640s during the time of the Second Reformation.  The Confession says this:  "Infidelity, or difference in religion, doth not make void the magistrates' just and legal authority, nor free the people from their due obedience to them" (WCF 23:4).

I believe the Westminster Confession to represent the correct viewpoint on this issue.  I would like, therefore, to provide a case for this position.

One of the central texts in the New Testament discussing civil magistracy is Romans 13:1-7:

Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers. For there is no power but of God: the powers that be are ordained of God.  Whosoever therefore resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God: and they that resist shall receive to themselves damnation.  For rulers are not a terror to good works, but to the evil. Wilt thou then not be afraid of the power? do that which is good, and thou shalt have praise of the same:  For he is the minister of God to thee for good. But if thou do that which is evil, be afraid; for he beareth not the sword in vain: for he is the minister of God, a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil.  Wherefore ye must needs be subject, not only for wrath, but also for conscience sake.  For for this cause pay ye tribute also: for they are God's ministers, attending continually upon this very thing. 7 Render therefore to all their dues: tribute to whom tribute is due; custom to whom custom; fear to whom fear; honour to whom honour.

This passage has a parallel in 1 Peter 2:13-17:

Submit yourselves to every ordinance of man for the Lord's sake: whether it be to the king, as supreme; or unto governors, as unto them that are sent by him for the punishment of evildoers, and for the praise of them that do well.  For so is the will of God, that with well doing ye may put to silence the ignorance of foolish men:  As free, and not using your liberty for a cloke of maliciousness, but as the servants of God.  Honour all men. Love the brotherhood. Fear God. Honour the king.

There are two errors that are often made with regard to these passages.  One of these errors is to read the texts as entirely and nothing but descriptive in nature.  That is, the texts are read as describing the duty of those who live in a society to submit to the civil government of the society, but as not containing any prescriptions for how the civil magistrate should govern.  In this view, the texts do not teach any duties of the civil magistrate, or give any normative authority to the magistrate, but only tell individuals to follow his laws.  In this view, civil magistrates are just people who have managed to attain rule over a society, without any authorization from God, and therefore there are no rules designated for their office (although they are under moral rules as normal human beings).  There are no duties they have to fulfill, but we are told to obey their laws.

There are two problems with this view:  1. The texts obviously imply an authority given to the magistrate, and rules for his conduct as a ruler.  Why would Paul and Peter tell us to submit to civil magistrates if they have no legitimate authority?  By telling us to submit to them obedience, honor, and taxes as "their due," the texts are obviously indicating that the magistrates have a right to demand these things of us.  It would be absurd to say that we ought to pay taxes to magistrates as "their due" and at the same time say that magistrates have no authority to ask us to pay taxes.  And why are we asked to give a special honor to magistrates when they have no special honor because no special authority?  Why are we asked to submit obedience to magistrates as "their due" when they have no authority to demand obedience from us?  It is evident that these texts indicate that a special authority to command obedience and taxes and to receive honor has been granted to civil magistrates, and that they have a right and a duty to demand and expect these things from us.

Also, if the texts are purely descriptive, they are highly misleading.  Clearly, it is not always the case that civil magistrates give praise to the good and punish the evildoer.  Too often magistrates reward the evil and punish the good.  This is especially noteworthy considering that at the time of the writing of Romans and 1 Peter, Christians were and would continue to be even more the subjects of great unjust persecutions by the civil magistrates.  Paul's and Peter's words clearly go beyond the merely descriptive, painting a picture of the ideal function of a civil magistrate--that is, what a civil magistrate is supposed to do (whether he actually does it or not).  But to describe what someone is supposed to do is give that person a duty and authority to fulfill it.  Therefore, these texts must be read as not only descriptive, but also as prescriptive.

 2. The second problem with the purely descriptive view is that this is contradicted by the rest of the Scriptures.  We see many places in Scripture where the civil magistrate is given direct commands by God to carry out his task, which gives prescriptive authority to the magistrate.  In the Law of Moses, we see rules for the appointing of civil magistrates, which are echoed at other places in the Scriptures as well.  And we see many commands directed to the authority of magistrates, such as commands to punish certain crimes in certain ways.  Crimes could not be punished merely by the whims of the people.  A criminal, before receiving sentence, must be lawfully tried by a lawful court, not simply captured and hung by a group of vigilantes.  We also see an implication of the magistrate's prescriptive authority in the obedience offered them by the people of God throughout the Scriptures (some examples of which I will provide shortly), and by the judgments of God threatened against magistrates for ruling unjustly.  None of this makes any sense if magistrates do not have any prescriptive authority from God to function as magistrates.  Therefore, even if our two immediate texts do not in themselves indicate a prescriptive role for civil magistrates (which they do), they ought to be read as implying such in light of the rest of the Scriptures.

The other error made with regard to our two texts is the error made by Cameronians--that the passages are not descriptive at all but are entirely prescriptive.  In the Cameronian view, Paul and Peter are not at all telling Christians to submit to presently-existing civil magistrates, but they are only outlining the sort of magistrates that ought to exist and saying that if they did exist, they would deserve obedience, honor, etc.

There are two main problems with this view that parallel the two problems with the previous view:  1. The texts themselves clearly suggest a present duty to existing civil magistrates, and they are clearly referring to the current Roman rulers in particular (even though those rulers were not Christian but pagan, and not always just in their laws and actions).  This is evident because both Paul and Peter bring up this subject not in order to discourse abstractly on the ideal role of hypothetical civil rulers who might sometime exist, but to press upon Christians a present duty of obedience to civil rulers then existing.  The occasion of their comments regarding civil magistracy in both cases is instructing Christians how they should live in the world that they were then living in.  Paul says, "Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers. For there is no power but of God: the powers that be are ordained of God."  Which governing authorities is the Christian to be subject to?  The ones that actually "exist," the ones who are currently actually functioning as "governing authorities."  The authorities that actually, currently exist are appointed by God, because "there is no authority except from God."  Clearly, Paul is telling us to submit to the actually-existing civil authorities now in place--which in the time of writing in Rome (where Paul's letter was sent) would obviously be the Roman civil rulers.  Granted, Paul, in the course of his instruction here, veers off into a description of ideal civil magistrates, which do not always well fit the descriptions of current rulers, but he does so only in the context of the subject of actual submission to current rulers, which leads him to it.  His logic runs in this way:  "You have an obligation to obey the civil rulers who actually rule over you, because civil rulers have been given authority by God.  Their job is to praise the good and punish the evil, and therefore you should give them appropriate honor, obedience, taxes, etc."  Paul goes into the ideal description as he gives the job description of magistrates, without intending to imply that all magistrates fill that description equally well, but with implying that anyone whom God in his providence has put in the role of civil ruler has civil authority and therefore deserves our obedience simply because of the role providence has given him.

Likewise,  Peter tells us to "submit to every ordinance of man for the Lord's sake," and then mentions "the king as supreme" and "governors . . . sent by him."  Who is this king, and who are these governors?  Clearly, as this is a present duty for Christians, Peter is speaking of present civil rulers.  The context, as with Paul, is instructions for Christians in their present lives.  Peter's next statement (in verse 18) is relevant as well:  "Servants, be subject to your masters with all fear; not only to the good and gentle, but also to the froward."  Which masters should servants be submissive to?  Their own current, actually-existing masters, and even to the ones who are harsh.  Now, it is a sin for masters to be harsh; but their being so does not give a license of disobedience to servants.  The instructions here are parallel enough (and the context is the same) that light is shed by verse 18 on verses 13-17 as well.  Peter's basic message is, "Obey the authorities who actually rule over you."  But his instructions, like those of Paul, also imply a prescriptive role for authorities.  Magistrates in particular are said to be "for the punishment of evildoers and for the praise of those who do good," clearly paralleling Paul's language in Romans 13.  It is clear, then, in both of these texts, that there is a descriptive and not just a prescriptive element involved in the instructions, and that the command to us to be submissive to civil rulers is not limited to ideal or hypothetical civil rulers, but to actually existing civil rulers, whether they be Christians or pagans.

2. Just as with the "purely descriptive" view, the "purely prescriptive" view of these texts is also contradicted by the rest of the Scriptures.  Jesus tells us to "render to Caesar that which is Caesar's" (Mark 12:17), implying (in light of the context) that taxes belong to Caesar.  This parallels Paul's instructions to pay taxes in Romans 13, and Jesus explicitly names the civil magistrate to whom taxes are to be paid in this case--Caesar, the Roman emperor, certainly no Christian and very often no pure and perfect maker of laws, a man who authoritatively authorized pagan worship throughout his empire and even demanded worship to be paid to himself by many.

Paul's conduct and attitude with regard to Roman magistrates in the Book of Acts is illuminating in this context.  Paul's general custom was to show respect and deference to Roman rulers, attributing to them legitimate civil authority in a number of ways:

Acts 24:10: “Then Paul, after that the governor had beckoned unto him to speak, answered, Forasmuch as I know that thou hast been of many years a judge unto this nation, I do the more cheerfully answer for myself.” Paul refers to Felix as a “judge of this nation,” without quarreling with this term, and he speaks to him throughout this speech as to one before whom cases are lawfully tried.

Acts 25:10-11: “Then said Paul, I stand at Caesar's judgment seat, where I ought to be judged: to the Jews have I done no wrong, as thou very well knowest.  For if I be an offender, or have committed any thing worthy of death, I refuse not to die: but if there be none of these things whereof these accuse me, no man may deliver me unto them. I appeal unto Caesar.” Paul makes a couple of remarkable statements here that should make any Cameronian nervous. He says that he “ought to be judged” at Caesar's judgment seat, implying that Caesar has actual authority to judge in a ruling capacity, and he even appeals to Caesar. He appeals to be tried, as in a legitimate court of justice, at Caesar's judgment seat. Also, he says that "if I be an offender, or have committed any thing worthy of death, I refuse not to die.” Paul does not object to being executed by the Roman rulers if he truly deserves it. But what right do Roman rulers have to execute people? None, according to Cameronians. But Paul differs.

Acts 26:1-3: “Then Agrippa said unto Paul, Thou art permitted to speak for thyself. Then Paul stretched forth the hand, and answered for himself:  I think myself happy, king Agrippa, because I shall answer for myself this day before thee touching all the things whereof I am accused of the Jews:  Especially because I know thee to be expert in all customs and questions which are among the Jews: wherefore I beseech thee to hear me patiently.” Paul speaks to King Agrippa with respect, calling him by his proper title, and appealing to him to hear his case patiently. Clearly, Paul recognizes Agrippa's legitimate civil authority. It should be noted also that Paul's attitude of respect to the Roman and Jewish civil authorities parallels his respect shown to the high priest in Acts 23:5. In the latter case, Paul explained that respect was owed because the high priest was a ruler of his people—implying legitimacy of authority.

The repentant thief on the cross says to Jesus that he and his companion are receiving "the due reward of our deeds."  But their execution would be unjust, if pagan governments cannot be legitimate.

We see this same attitude of respect and acknowledgement of the authority of non-Christian rulers placed over the people by God's providence in the Old Testament as well.  The Book of Daniel, in particular, provides numerous examples.  Consistently throughout the book, Daniel and his friends show deference, respect, and submission to Babylonian and Persian rulers, calling them by their authoritative titles, given them obedience (except when they command sin), accepting government appointments and positions, eating food provided by the government (which would have been stolen food had the government not been legitimate), etc.  The kings of Babylon and Persia, after seeing God's glory, often issue decrees that the God of Israel should be honored on pain of death, and the text suggests that this is a good thing, although if they were not legitimate rulers this would be sinful.  We see the same sorts of things in other books of Old Testament, such as Esther, Ezra, Nehemiah, and Jonah.  It is clear that the Scriptures regard pagan kings as having legitimate authority, even sometimes over the people of God if God places them there providentially.

It is therefore clear that the Scriptures do not share the Cameronian opinion that only godly and Christian civil rulers have legitimate authority.  The Scriptures instead support the view of the Westminster Confession.

Cameronians argue that the Scriptures lay out rules for the electing of godly magistrates (such as in Deuteronomy 1:9-18), and that this implies that those magistrates who do not meet these qualifications cannot be considered lawful magistrates.  But this position pits these passages against other passages, such as those we have looked at, that clearly indicate otherwise.  The fact that God has laid out qualifications for godly civil magistrates implies that we ought not willingly to make those civil magistrates who do not fit those qualifications.  It implies that those who do not meet these qualifications should not try to take the role of civil magistrate.  It implies that civil magistrates who do not fulfill these qualifications are sinning by not doing so.  But it doesn't imply that those whom God has providentially set into power over us who do not meet all of these qualifications are therefore not legitimate civil magistrates.  For example, I should not choose to have Barack Obama be the President of the United States insofar as I have a legal choice in the matter.  I think this entails that I ought not to vote for him to be President.  But it does not imply that he is not truly a lawful civil magistrate, having been elected, or that I do not owe obedience to him.  God clearly in his Word commands two things of his people, and we must hold both of these things together and not pit them in conflict with each other:  God has commanded us to choose only qualified individuals to be our civil magistrates when we have a choice in the matter, and he has commanded us to accept even unqualified individuals as civil magistrates when God in his providence puts such over us and we do not have a say in the matter (or our say is insufficient to change the result).

Cameronians put forward a number of other texts indicating that God does not approve of ungodly rulers, that he will judge them, that they are sinful, etc., but the comments previously made apply to them as well.  The fallacy is in thinking that if a ruler is sinning in his function and bringing down on himself the wrath of God, then that means that we ought not to recognize his legitimate authority.  But this does not follow.  Again, Scripture teaches both that magistrates have certain prescriptive functions that they have a moral obligation to follow and that they are subject to judgment when they don't fulfill them, and that even those who are wicked in some areas do not thereby lose their legitimate authority to issue lawful commands, and thus that we are still obligated to recognize their authority and honor it.

This should not seem such an impossible combination.  It is the same with parental authority.  Fathers, for example, have certain moral obligations and a certain pattern they ought to follow.  A person who is not willing to follow that pattern ought not to become a father, and a bad father is sinning and is bringing down judgment on himself (and his family).  And yet, at the same time, the wickedness of a father does not necessarily release all his children from being under his authority.  Children do not have the right to say, "My father does not meet the ideal qualifications and demands Scripture suggests for fatherhood.  Therefore, I no longer recognize him as a true father and I no longer owe obedience to him."  Fathers are supposed to raise up their children in the nurture and admonition of the Lord.  But it does not follow that atheist fathers are not due any obedience from their children.

I think that a similar rule applies to church leaders as well, except that it is of the essence of church leaders that they be teaching the true religion.  Otherwise, they are not church leaders at all.  With parents and civil magistrates, on the other hand, as the Confession says, "Infidelity, or difference in religion, doth not make void the magistrates [or the parents']' just and legal authority."  Therefore, church leaders who cease to teach the true religion are no longer church leaders and therefore have no more binding authority; but the authority of parents and civil magistrates extends beyond this.

The parallel to church leaders brings out another qualification worth mentioning.  Although it be wrong for a private member of the church to refuse to submit to the authority of a minister merely on the grounds that he is teaching some error, provided that error does not overthrow the foundations of the true religion, yet it is the proper province of fellow ministers, in the form of presbyteries, synods, and the like, to depose a minister from office if he ceases to teach biblical doctrine in some area.  Likewise, a private citizen has no authority to depose a corrupt civil magistrate from office, or to refuse obedience to his lawful commands on such grounds; but fellow magistrates may, in certain circumstances, have authority to depose an unruly magistrate.  For example, in the United States, if a mayor of a certain town begins to go against the trust committed to him in some ways, a higher magistrate (for example, a state governor) has the authority to put him out of office.  So the people can appeal to higher magistrates, if there be any, against lower magistrates, if they rule unjustly or in a way that violates the appropriate qualifications for office.

Another qualification which would seem to go without saying is that obedience to civil magistrates is only required with regard to lawful commands, or commands that do not require sin.  When a magistrate commands sin, the Scripture is clear that it is our duty to disobey him.  Also, we have a responsibility to engage in self-defense, defense of our households, etc., that in some circumstances might need to be exercised against invasions or attacks by civil authorities--for example, if the magistrate sends henchmen to murder myself and my family.  This kind of ethical consideration will sometimes allow for lower magistrates to protect those under them from unjust demands or attacks from higher magistrates as well.  Just as it is sin for an individual to obey a command to sin from a magistrate, so it is sin for a lower magistrate to govern in his own sphere sinfully out of obedience to a higher magistrate.

I would also add that there may come a point where the civil magistrate has set himself in such a way as an enemy to a person, that that person has no choice but to abandon the relationship of citizen to magistrate.  For example, if the civil magistrate declares a war on me, determined to bring about my destruction, and carries out this war in such a way as that I simply cannot act the part of a citizen (I must live as a fugitive, etc.), then for practical purposes I am free from consideration of his authority, at least for the time being.  But if that situation were to change, and I should be put back into a position where my obedience without sin becomes again possible, I will once again owe obedience.  And there are situations where I might be required to withhold obedience in one thing while granting it in another.

In light of all of these things, I conclude that the distinctive Cameronian position is contrary to Scripture, and that the Scriptural view is that embraced by the Westminster Confession.  I very much appreciate the Cameronian emphasis on the duty of the civil magistrate to follow the law of God, the emphasis on the binding authority of national covenants, etc., but on this issue, they have simply adopted an imbalanced perspective, one at odds with the Bible and the Confessions of historic Presbyterianism.

UPDATE 9/24/12:  I have added a new post with further thoughts relevant to the issues discussed here.

Thursday, September 13, 2012

An Example of Rhetoric Over Substance from the Atheist Community

See the article linked to below, and notice how good the Atheist community is at using rhetoric that is naturally appealing to people raised in an American context to get across their own viewpoint and values on this subject. They are working towards helping all Americans "feel welcome." They are against "preferential treatment and minority alienation." They are "battling for minority rights." They are "fighting for equal representation for the family members of atheists." Etc. What American's heart doesn't stir with the passion of moral righteousness and indignation at words like these?

Of course, the rhetoric only makes sense if we assume that the Atheist outlook on the world is correct. If Atheist beliefs are true, then they are fighting for something that may be worth fighting for. However, what if Christian beliefs are true? What if Atheism is a false worldview that is evil and harmful? What if God, the ultimate moral authority in the universe, is calling all individuals and nations to acknowledge him and follow his laws, and to oppose wicked and harmful evil? In this case, the rhetoric is a mask for that which is ultimately fallacious and seriously misleading.

Why doesn't the Atheist community simply come out and say, "There should not be memorial crosses because Christianity really isn't true, and the nation should instead endorse a secular position because that makes more sense from our correct Atheist point of view."? Well, for one reason, it may be that many Atheists actually think their rhetoric is worldview-neutral. But surely one can see the rhetorical, persuasive advantages to keeping out of sight the actual argumentative basis of the position and instead trying to smuggle in the position, along with its worldview foundation, by means of rhetoric designed to appeal more to instincts and feelings than to critical thinking. It is hard to argue for Atheism and then the ethical and political implications of Atheism. It is much easier to craftily use rhetoric to smuggle in Atheism without people noticing too much (except those pesky fundamentalists).

I think that we Christians can learn a lesson from the Atheists and learn to use rhetoric better. We don't have to let them define the terms of the debate and smuggle in their worldview. We can use terms fitting our perspective following the bold and confident manner of the Atheists. However, we should always be honest and therefore willing to discuss the actual arguments when pressed, rather than trying to win the day by means of rhetoric without argument. We can use rhetoric to combat the rhetoric of the Atheists, but then we need to provide a substantial case for our point of view, straightforwardly and honestly. We should never hide behind pretenses of neutrality, but should instead be upfront, even when it is unpopular and misleading rhetoric would seem to serve us better, in insisting on the true reasons for our positions.

DISCLAIMER: I don't think all Atheists are dishonest and think that a substanceless rhetorical approach is best. It does seem that many do think it is best, either from dishonesty or naivete (that is, really believing their rhetoric is neutral). But I know Atheists who aren't naive and want a more upfront and honest approach. And I know plenty of Christians who seem content to use popular rhetoric misleadingly as well. See my previous post for an example of how Christians sometimes do this kind of thing.

http://atheists.org/update-american-atheists-file-objection-motion-dismiss-world-trade-center-cross-case

"My Religious Freedom is Being Repressed!"

The article linked to below well illustrates why the cry, "My religious freedom is being repressed!", is not a good plea to defend one's religion having an influence on public laws and policies. Religious freedom means that you cannot impose your religious beliefs/values in public laws and policies. If you want to engage in such imposition, you are an enemy, not a friend, of religious freedom. So all this talk of religious freedom being oppressed because religion is kept out of "the public square" (in other words, because religion is not allowed to influence laws and policies) is nonsense. Keeping religion out of laws and policies is not the repression of religious freedom; it is religious freedom.

Of course, this means that secularism is a violation of religious freedom as well, since it is the imposition of Agnosticism in public laws and policies. In fact, the only way to avoid violating religious freedom is to disband the nation, since neutrality in law is impossible. Therefore, we should all recognize that we are all actually fighting against religious freedom and stop talking about it. Instead, we should be talking about what the true beliefs and values are that should be imposed in law. The modern language of "religious freedom" is a nonsensical dead-end.

http://crooksandliars.com/susie-madrak/how-tell-if-your-religious-liberty-be

Wednesday, September 12, 2012

The Fallacy of the Shortcut

There is a fallacy currently going around that seems to be very popular.  It takes a few different forms, and pops up in different areas, but there is a similar theme in each instance.  I call it the Fallacy of the Shortcut.  Basically, the fallacy amounts to an attempt to convince someone to accept a certain position on the basis that if he does so, he will be able to escape the difficult, painful, and apparently futile quest to think through issues and sift through evidence in order to find out what is true.  There is a promise that if a certain route is followed, it will allow one to avoid this tedious and difficult process and arrive more quickly at a secure truth.  Let me illustrate this fallacy with a few prominent modern examples.

Modern American culture, and I think western culture in general today to a great degree, is Agnostic.  That is, to varying degrees, it is a common opinion that while we can know what is true in matters pertaining to the natural world, we cannot know what is true in matters beyond the natural world.  That is, we can know objective truths about giraffes, plants, stars, humans (at least as biological entities), grass, electrons, etc., but not about things like God, spirits, revelation from a divine source, the true religion, etc.

Agnostics love the Fallacy of the Shortcut.  It is one of their favorite rhetorical devices to make Agnosticism look appealing.  The Agnostic version of the fallacy goes basically like this:  "Do you see all of those squabbling people in the world, arguing back and forth endlessly with one another over questions like Does God exist?, What is the true religion?, Is the Bible really from God?, What is God's will for how we are to live?, etc.?  Do you see how hopeless it is that there will ever be any conclusion or consensus reached in these kinds of conversations?  After all, people have been arguing about these kinds of things for thousands of years, at least, and we are no closer to reaching a consensus now than we were thousands of years ago.  It's obvious from all this continuing disagreement that we simply cannot know what is true in these matters.  Therefore, we should be agnostic on these kinds of issues.  That is obviously the right way to go."

You see how it works?  Are you tired of constantly having to figure out what is really true while dealing with all of these different points of view and arguments, having to sift through all of the evidence, etc.?  Well, here's a way out!  You don't have to do it anymore!  Just look around at all the disagreement, and declare that since there is disagreement it is obvious that no one really knows, and then just embrace Agnosticism and forget about it.  Agnosticism is presented as being above the fray of all the squabbling, conflicting positions down below which are getting nowhere and working really hard at it

The problem with this way of looking at things, of course, is that it is an illusion.  The Agnostic position is not above the fray.  It is simply another of the squabbling, disagreeing positions in the fray.  It is not as though Christianity is a distinct position that must be argued for, and Judaism is another such position, and Buddhism another, etc., while Agnosticism is somehow a neutral party in the controversy who gets to win by default.  Agnosticism is simply one more distinct position, and it has to be established by good reasons just as much as any other view does.  It is true that it can be difficult to maintain a justified position on a controversial matter.  One has to deal with arguments from other positions, respond to objections, present evidence weighed against the alleged evidence of other claims, etc.  But taking an Agnostic position does not exempt one from having to go through this process.  A person taking the Agnostic position must deal with arguments from non-Agnostic points of view, respond to objections, and present evidence weighed against the alleged evidence of other claims as well.  In order to establish Agnosticism as a justified opinion, one has to have reasons to reject the alleged evidences and the arguments coming from all the non-Agnostic worldviews.  Christians, and Jews, and Muslims, and Buddhists, and Hindus, and people of all viewpoints, present arguments for their positions.  If I am a Christian, and I want to know that my Christian position is justified, I must know why these other viewpoints are not justified, and that involves knowing where and why their arguments fail.  Similarly, if I am an Agnostic, and I want to know that my Agnostic position is justified, I must know why all the non-Agnostic positions are not justified, and that involves knowing where and why their arguments fail.  Agnosticism claims to provide a shortcut around this required process of thinking and weighing arguments, but it does not.

(I call this Agnostic version of the fallacy also the Good and Intelligent People Disagree argument, for obvious reasons, and in this aspect you can find more evaluation of it in the first chapter of my book, Why Christianity is True, as well as here.)

Another place I often hear the Fallacy of the Shortcut come up is in conversations between Roman Catholics and Protestants and also between Eastern Orthodox and Protestants.  To illustrate this, let me quote from a chapter of a book called Surprised by Truth (San Diego: Basilica Press, 1994).  It is a Romanist apologetics book that contains the testimonies of a number of people who have converted to the Roman Catholic Church.  This is from the chapter by Bob Sungenis:

"The more I thought about it the more I began to see that the theory of sola scriptura had done untold damage to Christendom.  The most obvious evidence of this damage was Protestantism itself: a huge mass of conflicting, bickering denominations, causing, by its very nature of 'protest' and 'defiance,' an endless proliferation of chaos and controversy" (p. 118-119).

"God has given the protesters what they wanted--and much more: one long, continuous line of protesters: protesters protesting against the Catholic Church and protesters protesting against their fellow protesters.  This plague of 'protestantism' has spawned thousands of quarreling sects.  Time itself has shown that Protestantism is not God's plan for his Church, but rather, is a dismal failure. . . . As a Catholic, I am now at peace, away from the roiling controversies of Protestantism, secure in the consolation of the truth" (p. 132).

Sungenis, by joining the Roman church, is now above the fray, "away from the roiling controversies of Protestantism."  The problem is that the Roman church is not above the fray of disagreeing denominations at all; it is simply one option among many in the fray.  I am a Presbyterian.  How did I come to these convictions?  I examined the available evidence, weighed the numerous conflicting claims, and came to a conclusion as to what I thought was right.  How did Sungenis decide that Romanism is correct?  How could he have?  Assuming he chose it for rational reasons (which I certainly do not assume), he must have followed the same basic methodology I used to arrive at Presbyterianism.  Becoming Romanist does not exempt one from having to examine conflicting claims, weigh arguments and evidence, and then come to a conclusion based on one's best analysis of the state of the evidence.  Sungenis is no more above the fray than I am.  We've both come through the very same fray to embrace our different conclusions.

Sungenis cites the many different Protestant denominations that exist as proof that the Bible is too unclear to use to come to a clear conclusion.  Thus, he says, we should just give up listening to the Bible and believe what the Roman church says instead.  It's a shortcut!  You don't have to spend all that time and effort wading through conflicting biblical interpretations; you can just believe whatever Rome says and be done with it!  But this is an illusion, for if we are to be rational, we must have some reason to think that Rome is trustworthy.  Not everyone thinks it is, including that mass of Protestant denominations, as well as myriads of other religions and worldviews.  If the existence of differing Protestant denominations implies that my conclusion from the biblical evidence that Presbyterianism is true is unreliable, then why doesn't the existence of differing religions imply that Sungenis's conclusion from the evidence that Romanism is true is unreliable as well?  That's what the Agnostics would claim, as we saw earlier.  Sungenis is doing the same thing that the Agnostics do, except he's using the fallacy to get him to Romanism instead of to Agnosticism.  But it's the same line of reasoning, with the same fallaciousness.  In order to be justified in concluding that Prebyterianism is true, I had to go right through the fray of disagreements, examine the evidence and the conflicting arguments, and on the basis of this evaluation decide what is really true.  Sungenis must do exactly the same thing to establish Romanism, and the Agnostics must do exactly the same thing to establish Agnosticism.  There is no shortcut!

The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints loves this fallacy as well.  It is also one of their key arguments, going all the way back to their founder, Joseph Smith.  Listen to Joseph recount part of his experience that led him to found the LDS Church:

"9 My mind at times was greatly excited, the cry and tumult were so great and incessant. The Presbyterians were most decided against the Baptists and Methodists, and used all the powers of both reason and sophistry to prove their errors, or, at least, to make the people think they were in error. On the other hand, the Baptists and Methodists in their turn were equally zealous in endeavoring to establish their own tenets and disprove all others. 10 In the midst of this war of words and tumult of opinions, I often said to myself: What is to be done? Who of all these parties are right; or, are they all wrong together? If any one of them be right, which is it, and how shall I know it? 11 While I was laboring under the extreme difficulties caused by the contests of these parties of religionists, I was one day reading the Epistle of James, first chapter and fifth verse, which reads: If any of you lack wisdom, let him ask of God, that giveth to all men liberally, and upbraideth not; and it shall be given him. 12 Never did any passage of scripture come with more power to the heart of man than this did at this time to mine. It seemed to enter with great force into every feeling of my heart. I reflected on it again and again, knowing that if any person needed wisdom from God, I did; for how to act I did not know, and unless I could get more wisdom than I then had, I would never know; for the teachers of religion of the different sects understood the same passages of scripture so differently as to destroy all confidence in settling the question by an appeal to the Bible" (http://www.lds.org/scriptures/pgp/js-h/1?lang=eng).

Does this sound familiar?  "Look at all the mass of differing denominations!", says Smith.   "Obviously, this disagreement proves that it is impossible to understand the Bible."  So what was Joseph's way out of the fray?  He went out to the woods and asked God which sect was true, and according to him, God and Christ appeared to him and told him that none of the sects were true and that he needed to start a new church (which would restore the true Church of Christ).  But how do we know that Joseph didn't just make all of this up, or that he wasn't himself deceived in some way?  Certainly not by studying the Bible!  That would bring us back into the ever-to-be-feared fray!  No, the way we are supposed to find out is by praying about it and then trusting the positive feelings that we get telling us that it's all true.  But can't feelings be deceptive?  Stop asking questions!  You're bringing us back into the fray!  Just stop questioning and believe!  Are you tired of having to go through the laborious process of weighing evidence and conflicting arguments?  Have no fear!  The LDS Church has yet another shortcut to offer.  But there's the same catch we've seen before.  Mormonism is not really above the fray; it is yet one more option in the fray.  And the only shortcut to get to it, like all the other shortcuts offered in these matters, requires the abandonment of one's reason.

We see this fallacy often in evangelical Christian circles as well.  How often do we hear something like this?:  "There are some people who think that infants ought to be baptized.  There are some people who think they should not be.  Obviously, since there is disagreement here, the right answer is to say that both sides are equally acceptable!  You can baptize or refrain from baptizing, and it's all OK!"  Those who think both sides are OK try to present themselves as neutral, as above the fray.  But really this opinion is nothing other than merely a third option in the fray, and it must establish itself by weighing evidence and conflicting arguments just as much as any other side.  Whether the Bible requires infants to be baptized, forbids infants to be baptized, or considers it OK to baptize or refrain from baptizing infants, the true position can only be established by the painstaking duty of actually examining what the Bible says and weighing contrasting arguments, rather than declaring one point of view victor by default.  There is no more reason to simply default to the view that the Bible allows both baptizing and not baptizing infants than there is to default to the view that the Bible requires or forbids infant baptism.  None of these positions is any more likely or unlikely a priori.  Any conclusion reached here requires an examination of the actual evidence.  There is no shortcut!

I think you get the idea.