tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-808697756426649418.post5156697475199958198..comments2023-12-25T09:58:54.563-06:00Comments on The Christian Freethinker: An Argument for Idealism (of the Berkeleyan Sort)Mark Hausamhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07371790103414979060noreply@blogger.comBlogger14125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-808697756426649418.post-71017481901925469582013-03-27T09:59:34.345-05:002013-03-27T09:59:34.345-05:00Exactly. No doubt about it.Exactly. No doubt about it.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11508892799669709427noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-808697756426649418.post-13709382429815192642013-03-27T09:42:04.030-05:002013-03-27T09:42:04.030-05:00We could also add that idealism makes God feel unc...We could also add that idealism makes God feel uncomfortably close to people who would really rather not deal with that. I think MIM partly functions as an attempt to find a hiding place for atheists.Mark Hausamhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07371790103414979060noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-808697756426649418.post-55046795739279710012013-03-27T09:39:32.346-05:002013-03-27T09:39:32.346-05:00"Being able to explain it takes more effort, ..."Being able to explain it takes more effort, in my view, than dualism – which is a big part of the problem many people have with it. They can’t wrap their mind around the idea that objects just ,aren’t figments of their imagination under idealism – it’s the, “But this chair exists!” type of thing."<br /><br />Well said. I think that's exactly it.Mark Hausamhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07371790103414979060noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-808697756426649418.post-12636406670722323892013-03-27T09:29:00.644-05:002013-03-27T09:29:00.644-05:00Thanks, Mark.
Great stuff. I’ve found that if i...Thanks, Mark. <br /><br />Great stuff. I’ve found that if idealism is properly explained, it’s very compelling. Being able to explain it takes more effort, in my view, than dualism – which is a big part of the problem many people have with it. They can’t wrap their mind around the idea that objects just ,<i>aren’t</i> figments of their imagination under idealism – it’s the, “But this chair exists!” type of thing.<br /><br />I just found your site while doing a little reading on the subject. Looks like lots of great stuff here!<br />Thanks<br />Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11508892799669709427noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-808697756426649418.post-59637423907621546392013-03-27T08:41:59.530-05:002013-03-27T08:41:59.530-05:00Hi Kevin,
My position is that MIM is intrinsicall...Hi Kevin,<br /><br />My position is that MIM is intrinsically meaningless, impossible, and absurd, so it cannot be a product of God.<br /><br />MIM is an idea that really has no content. MIM refers to material objects with all the mind-dependent characteristics that make up the essences of material objects removed. What is left of a chair, for example, when we've removed color, texture, sound, smell, taste, and even dimension (all of which can only exist in the mind's view of a chair)? It seems to me we have nothing at all. So a "MIM chair" is a content-less idea. We may use the words and think we are saying something, but we are only confused if we do so and are not adequately attending to the meaning (or lack thereof) of what we are saying.<br /><br />Also, MIM is impossible and absurd. Consciousness clearly exists. The very idea of MIM implies that if it exists, it is something other than consciousness. It is some fundamentally different substance. But ultimately, there can only be one substance, for everything must be traced back to a single ultimate source. If God is a single, simple entity, then there can be no fundamentally different substances that don't ultimately resolve into each other.<br /><br />Also, MIM and ideal objects would be incompatible with each other in terms of the context of reality. For example, if I have a MIM basketball, and a non-MIM desk, how do they relate to each other? The very idea of a material object like a desk suggests something that occupies some particular location relative to other objects around it. But "location" is a mind-dependent concept, so a MIM desk could have no location. It would have no place relative to other objects, and wouldn't even be an "object" in any meaningful sense at all.<br /><br />So I think that dualism simply has to go and can never be brought back in at any point. But who needs it? Idealism accounts for everything perfectly. We only think we need it because we are confusing ourselves with lack of clarity in our ideas. We think that we would lose material objects like desks, for example, if we lost MIM. But that is not so. A desk has nothing MIM about it. It is a collection of mind-dependent qualities. We lose nothing of it by losing the meaningless and absurd idea of MIM.<br /><br />MarkMark Hausamhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07371790103414979060noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-808697756426649418.post-5597289526476959172013-03-26T12:52:59.081-05:002013-03-26T12:52:59.081-05:00Mark,
I enjoyed the read. I have a question: Wh...Mark,<br /><br />I enjoyed the read. I have a question: What’s your response to the idea that the First Mind could have creating beings that interact with matter as defined as MIM, but not First Mind-Independent Matter (FMIM)? In other words, absent a First Mind, dualism obviously falls, but could a First Mind design such a system that dualism describes? OR, do you feel the logical impossibility holds?Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11508892799669709427noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-808697756426649418.post-75073893987191409332013-02-19T19:22:16.818-06:002013-02-19T19:22:16.818-06:00Oops, didn't mean to double post!Oops, didn't mean to double post!Aaronnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-808697756426649418.post-29786255335435700022013-02-19T19:20:23.512-06:002013-02-19T19:20:23.512-06:00Thanks for your prompt response, Mark. I think you...Thanks for your prompt response, Mark. I think you've answered my questions, and what you say makes sense. I'll let you know if I have any more questions while I continue to mull over this.<br /><br />AaronAaronnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-808697756426649418.post-50488191291094877792013-02-19T19:20:02.701-06:002013-02-19T19:20:02.701-06:00Thanks for your prompt response, Mark. I think you...Thanks for your prompt response, Mark. I think you've answered my questions, and what you say makes sense. I'll let you know if I have any more questions while I continue to mull over this.<br /><br />AaronAaronnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-808697756426649418.post-21953837519443817232013-02-19T16:58:28.634-06:002013-02-19T16:58:28.634-06:00. . . Continued (the program wouldn't let me p.... . . Continued (the program wouldn't let me post it all in one post).<br /><br />Idealism recognizes that there are things that are beyond our ability to experience, such as parts of the universe beyond the reach of our instruments. These objects, if we could perceive them, would have the same fundamental characteristics of physicality, such as texture, color, taste, shape (obviously some objects do not lend themselves to being tasted, etc., but what I am saying is that for all physical objects the substance will be sensory in nature). So in what way do they exist if we cannot perceive them? They exist as perceived in the universal mind, and as potentially perceivable by us (in that if certain changes were made in our abilities, such as being able to see further out in space or being able to experience things on a smaller level, we could perceive them).<br /><br />Am I making sense? What you seem to be thinking is that micro-particles would have to be fundamentally different from macro-objects because the latter are made up of perceived sensory perceptions while the former, not being perceived by us, are not. What I am trying to say is that there is no basis for this idea. Subatomic particles have the same properties as macro-objects, the only difference being that the former are only potentially perceivable by us while some (but not all, and probably not even most) of the latter are actually perceived by us.<br /><br />Imagine a star that no finite being has ever seen. How would such an object fit in in idealism? We would say that the star exists by virtue of two things: 1. It is perceived by the universal mind. 2. It is potentially perceivable by us, and functions as a coherent continuation of the universe actually perceived by us. I would say exactly the same thing about subatomic and other micro pieces of matter.<br /><br />Does that help?<br /><br />As I argued before, looking at a distant star or a subatomic particle as an object existing in a universal mind and as potentially perceivable by us makes far more sense than trying to explain its existence with MIM. The very idea of a physical object, including a star or a subatomic particle, is bound up with sensory qualities--either as actually perceived by us or as potentially perceivable by us and actually perceived by the universal mind. MIM posits a substance that is neither actually perceived nor potentially perceivable, for it is considered to be something other than perceptions (if it was nothing other than perceptions, we would simply have idealism and no MIM). This makes no sense of the fundamental idea of what a physical object is. But the idealist idea preserves the essence of what physicality means, whether we speak of objects perceived by us or objects potentially perceivable by us. Again, think of the star. We have discovered new stars we never saw before with new technology. Once the new stars are perceived, they are clearly made up of sensory qualities? So what were they before they were perceived by us? Not MIM, because then they would not be perceivable by us at all. They were objects actually perceived by the universal mind and potentially perceivable by us.<br /><br />I'd better stop here. I'm starting to ramble a bit. :-) It's hard to describe these sorts of things, so I sometimes find myself saying the same things over and over in slightly different ways in the hope of communicating my ideas more clearly.<br /><br />Let me know what you think.<br /><br />MarkMark Hausamhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07371790103414979060noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-808697756426649418.post-71704817380590420962013-02-19T16:57:52.397-06:002013-02-19T16:57:52.397-06:00Hi Aaron,
Good questions.
Desks, etc., are defin...Hi Aaron,<br /><br />Good questions.<br /><br />Desks, etc., are definitely made up of atoms and subatomic particles. (We don't even need the scientists to tell us that. It is evident that matter is potentially infinitely divisible. But that raises other questions I won't get into right now.) We don't perceive subatomic particles directly, but, in principle, they are going to be the same sort of things that desks and lamps and other macro objects are, just smaller (and with properties matching their size, whatever those might be).<br /><br />Whatever it is that makes a desk a physical object, clearly the particles that make up the desk must also be physical in the same way, or they would not be able to be the elements making up the desk. So what is it that makes something a physical object? The idealist answer is that physicality is sensory perceptions. So subatomic particles, if we could experience them, would be made up of sensory perceptions.<br /><br />To be continued . . .Mark Hausamhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07371790103414979060noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-808697756426649418.post-1296363705981148782013-02-19T16:27:42.623-06:002013-02-19T16:27:42.623-06:00Hi Mark,
I was checking out some other articles o...Hi Mark,<br /><br />I was checking out some other articles on your site (on apologetics and the myth of neutrality) and when I saw the "idealism" topic, I was curious as to what your thoughts were concerning it (and what kind of "idealism" you had in mind). While I can't say I consider myself an idealist just yet, my own dissatisfaction with both dualism and materialism has made me inclined to embrace a more plausible alternative if it were available, and idealism could very well be what I was looking for.<br /> <br />You said: "So atoms, subatomic particles, etc., exist outside our experience as the coherent continuation of the world we do experience, all of which is ultimately sustained by the universal mind."<br /><br />But would you say that the objects we consciously experience (such as the desk in front of me) are made up of, or constituted by, atoms/subatomic particles, and that their existence is thus dependent on the existence of such imperceptible things? The reason I ask is because you seemed to suggest in your article that physical objects are nothing more than the sensory experience we have of them. For example, you wrote, "An idealist looks at a table and says, 'That collection of sensory qualities you actually see right in front of you, with its particular texture, color, etc.--that thing is itself the table. There is no unknown and unknowable object behind it that is the real table. We can actually observe the table itself.'" But unlike tables, things such as atoms and their constituents are imperceptible, and not part of our sensory experience. So if atoms and their constituents do make up the objects of which I have a sensory experience, then such objects (such as tables) would be more than simply "a collection of sensory qualities."<br /> <br />You also said, "For one thing, if you remove from the idea of a physical object all its properties dependent on being perceived by a mind, there is nothing left of the idea. And there are other problems."<br /><br />But couldn't an atheist object that we DO, in fact, have ideas of physical objects even after we've removed from our ideas of them all experienced sensory qualities (i.e., atoms and their constituents organized in a certain way, which are not conceived of in terms of sensory qualities)?<br /><br />AaronAaronnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-808697756426649418.post-49805441708326424042013-02-18T08:31:53.478-06:002013-02-18T08:31:53.478-06:00Hi Aaron! Thanks for posting a comment! What bro...Hi Aaron! Thanks for posting a comment! What brought you to this article?<br /><br />With regard to your question, it is evident that the world extends beyond our own views of it or experience of it. We can encounter clues that lead us to find out things we didn't know before, we can explore and make new discoveries, the world goes on coherently beyond the vantage points of our experience, etc. As I pointed out in the article, idealists need to posit the existence of a universal mind in which all things ultimately are in order to account for this.<br /><br />So atoms, subatomic particles, etc., exist outside our experience as the coherent continuation of the world we do experience, all of which is ultimately sustained by the universal mind.<br /><br />Materialists and dualists posit MIM in order to account for the world going beyond our experience. The problem with this, as the article points out, is that the idea of a MIM object makes no sense. For one thing, if you remove from the idea of a physical object all its properties dependent on being perceived by a mind, there is nothing left of the idea. And there are other problems.<br /><br />What do you think?Mark Hausamhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07371790103414979060noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-808697756426649418.post-70178451231964140402013-02-17T20:56:50.698-06:002013-02-17T20:56:50.698-06:00This is a very intriguing view, but it raises some...This is a very intriguing view, but it raises some questions. Here's the first that came to mind: How would an idealist fit imperceptible physical things (such as atoms and subatomic particles) into their view? While it is commonly believed that the macroscopic objects we perceive are made up of such things, we don't directly observe them. So would an idealist say they don't really exist, or perhaps that they only have a counterfactual existence (i.e., they WOULD exist if we could perceive things that small)?Aaronnoreply@blogger.com