Further Thoughts Connected to the Cameronian Controversy

In an earlier post, I critiqued the Presbyterian position on civil authority known as Cameronianism.  In this post, I would like to add some further thoughts and clarifications that are relevant to that controversy and to the nature of civil authority in general.  I hope that these thoughts may aid dialogue between Cameronian and non-Cameronian Presbyterians.

It seems to me, as I continue to think about it, that there are really two distinct issues/questions involved in the Cameronian controversy.  The conversation can proceed much more clearly if these two issues are kept properly distinct.

1. Can only magistrates who meet the full biblical requirements indicating how civil magistrates should behave be considered legitimate, duly constituted, de jure civil magistrates?

My answer to that questions is no.  As we saw in the previous post on Cameronianism, the Scriptures indicate that anyone who, by providence, is actually filling the role of civil authority, regardless of how he came to fill that role, should be obeyed and honored as having civil authority.  I am going to make some more nuanced comments on this in a moment, but for now we can note from this fact that God holds the role of civil magistrate so important to human welfare that he wants us to recognize and support whomever is actually filling that role at any given time.  We are not to go without civil authority.

The importance with which God holds the role of civil magistrate is also seen in the fact that he commands his people to appoint civil rulers.  This is not an optional thing, but a commanded thing.  Again, we are not to go without civil authority.

If civil authority is so important to God, and if God commands his people to support even pagan rulers when he in his providence has put such over them,  then it is clear that whomever has the best claim to civil authority over a body of people should be considered to have de jure authority, even if he be pagan.  If a pagan government claims authority over a people, and there is no better claimant challenging that claim, then, as the people are to have civil rulers, this government should be considered to have legitimate, duly constituted, de jure civil authority over that people.

We can also see the answer to this question by looking at the essential nature of civil government.  It is of the essence of church government that it be Christian.  It is not necessarily of the essence of church government that it fully fulfill all the ideal requirements of God.  It can be imperfect in various ways and still be overall legitimate.  But it must be Christian, because the entire point of church government is to teach the Christian religion and to shepherd the members of Christ's church in that religion in doctrine and life.  A non-Christian church of Christ would obviously be a contradiction in terms.

On the other hand, it is not of the essence of parental government that it be Christian.  Parents are indeed commanded to raise up their children "in the nurture and admonition of the Lord," to teach them the law of God, etc.  It is one of the main roles of parents to raise up godly children, trained in Christian thinking and virtues.  However, the parental role can still exist and function to some degree even when parents are non-Christian.  Children are commanded to obey their parents in general, not just those that are Christians.  Just as husbands and wives still have duties relative to one another even when one or both are not Christians, so parents and children have duties relative to one another when one or more are not Christian.  Parents have a right and a responsibility, de jure, to care for and raise up the children who are under their care, whether the parents be Christian or not.  If they are not Christian, they will do this very badly in some very important ways, but it is still their rightful responsibility to do it, and in some aspects they may do well at it.  Children cannot withhold obedience to their parents on the grounds that their parents are not Christians, but are to submit to them in obedience to their lawful commands simply because they are their proper parents.

Civil government, in its nature, is more like parental government in this respect than it is like church government.  Though it is true that a civil government will rule wrongly in a number of crucial ways if it be not Christian, yet civil authority can still exist and function and have purpose even where civil governors are not Christian.  They can still restrain wrongs such as murder, theft, etc., and if they are duly and legitimately constituted they have a right and a responsibility to do so, and the people under them have a duty to obey and honor them.

Therefore, the Westminster Confession is quite right when it says that "infidelity, or difference in religion, doth not make void the magistrates' just and legal authority, nor free the people from their due obedience to them" (WCF 23:4).

2. Are all actually functioning civil governments, allowed to exercise authority by the providence of God, legitimate, duly constituted, de jure civil governments?

It seems to me that the answer to this question is no as well.  This is a distinct question from the former question.  I think that many of those opposed to Cameronian imbalances (including myself) have often not adequately articulated a clear answer to this question.

One of the main objections Cameronians have against a non-Cameronian position is that it seems absurd to say that any government which has actually become able to exercise power, no matter how villainous their methods of obtaining and maintaining that power, are to be regarded as having de jure, legitimately constituted, civil authority, and the right to rule.  Under this reasoning, if I conquer a country by means of unjust violence, and I end up actually winning, and I subjugate the people, as soon as I have succeeded I can quote Romans 13 and say that I am the rightful, legitimate ruler over the people, no matter what the conquered people may want, as if there has been nothing wrong with my method of attaining power.  Does God put his mark of sanction in this way on wicked and violent actions?  Surely a person who attains power in this way is not a rightful ruler, but a usurper and a tyrant!  This is especially the case if the previous ruling party has not been entirely destroyed, but has perhaps been banished or imprisoned, so that it would be possible to return the realm to their authority.  Does not the conqueror have a moral obligation to return the realm to its previous rulers if possible, or can he quote Romans 13 and refuse to do so on the grounds that he is now the rightful, duly constituted civil authority?  The Cameronians hold that it would be absurd to say that such a conqueror has fully legitimate authority.

I think the Cameronians are right about this.  If I have attained power illegally, and the previous legal power still exists and could have rule returned to it, surely my rule is illegitimate.  I am a thief, and I have a moral obligation to return power to its rightful owner.  And even if I have utterly wiped out the previous ruling powers, still I have attained my power illegally and unjustly, and so I ought to arrange for fair elections to be held so that new civil powers can be legally chosen (per Deuteronomy 1:9-18, etc.).  If I do not do so, I continue to hold my power illegally, just as I attained it illegally.  If, on the other hand, the people are given the chance but do not want to create a new government, but have come to accept my authority willingly (or at least they do not think it worth opposing and proposing an alternative), then while I attained power illegally and ought to repent of that, yet probably I can now continue to hold power legally.  The acquiescence of the people and--if any remain--the previous authorities would make my rule henceforth legitimate.

It seems evident that if power is attained and maintained illegally, that power should not be considered legitimate and de jure.  If a person kidnaps a child, he cannot declare himself the new "power that be" in the child's life and on that ground consider himself the rightful parent and refuse to return the child to his actual parents.  If a church officer attains office through fraudulent means, surely he cannot claim that his exercise of authority is still legitimate and de jure simply because he has been successful in his fraudulent dealings.  Surely this applies to civil magistrates as well.  If they attain authority illegally (like Absalom, or like Athaliah), and their authority is not by some legal act made legitimate, it remains illegitimate and illegal.

Passages like Romans 13:1-7, 1 Peter 2:13-17, etc., which teach that de jure authority belongs to whomever God in his providence places over a people, do not imply that there is no such thing as illegitimate rule.  If a conqueror conquers a nation, and the people and/or the original rulers do not agree to it (as is implied in the very idea of "conquest"), we should say that the providence of God has not in fact placed the conqueror over the people in a position of authority.  It is not simply the ability of someone to use power to make people do what they want that gives de jure authority, and I see no reason to think that passages like Romans 13, etc., are saying that it is.  If this were the case, then thugs in a dark alley mugging someone could be said to have de jure authority to take people's money, or a gang in an inner city with enough power to beat the lawful police could be said to have de jure authority to rule and be obeyed.  But instances in Scripture such as Absalom and Athaliah indicate that this is not the Scriptural view.  Rather, a ruler can be said to have legitimate de jure authority to rule if providence has placed him in a situation where he has the best claim to a legitimate right to rule.  The Roman government in the days of the early church had attained their rule by illegal conquest, and yet by the time of the New Testament there were no real, legal contenders to their position, and so their authority could be considered de jure.  And that is why Christ, and Paul and Peter and the whole New Testament, treat them as having de jure authority.

There is one more thing that ought to be added here briefly:  In some situations, a legitimate governing body may be overpowered by an illegitimate one.  This does not make the conquering party legitimate per se, as we've just been saying, but it may require the people, temporarily, to act in some ways as if the conquerors are legitimate.  For example, if a gang gets control of part of a city to such a degree that the true law enforcement cannot practically exercise jurisdiction, in this case, as a (hopefully) temporary and non-ideal expedient, the people may, practically in some ways, need to treat the gang leaders as if they are the true governors, simply because given the situation they are actually functioning as such and the only ones who are.  So if the gang offers some semblance of law and order, it would be appropriate for the people to take advantage of this in cases of necessity; and the gang, while holding its illegitimate rule, would have a moral obligation to provide such services.  (They would have a higher moral obligation to give up their rule, but we can sometimes talk about lower moral obligations in cases where higher moral obligations are not being met.)  We could compare this to a situation where the only skilled doctor in an area is an illegally-practicing surgeon.  Ordinarily, this "doctor" should not be practicing medicine, but if a need arises which only he can fulfill, it would be appropriate for him to use his skills to meet that need, and it would be appropriate for those in need to make use of his skills (while not condoning his illegality).

In closing, I think the above observations show that the Cameronian position does have more merit in some aspects than it is perhaps often given credit for.  And those who have opposed Cameronianism have sometimes fallen into an opposite imbalance (by acting as if there is no such thing as illegitimate rule).  However, even taking these things into account, the Cameronian position itself still shows itself to be imbalanced in some areas.  Hopefully, the addition of further clarity here will aid in dialogue between the differing positions.

Who Would You Invite to an Ecumenical Council?

According to the logic of the presbyterian form of church government (see here), which is biblical, smaller assemblies of the church are subject to larger assemblies of the church.  Church officers in a congregation are not without checks and balances, but they are accountable to each other and to the church (1 Timothy 5:19).  This does not stop at local congregations.  Just as a local congregational session can judge an officer in the congregation, so a regional gathering, or a national gathering, etc., of church officers can judge an officer or a group of officers in a congregation.  The authority of these gatherings is binding on all those who are under the authority of these bodies.  The logic of this pattern of concentric circles does not stop until it reaches the level of the "whole church" (Acts 15:22)--that is, an ecumenical council.  Such a council should meet more rarely than lesser councils and deal only with fundamental matters for the most part, as things that can be dealt with more locally ought not to be deferred to a higher court, but the conclusions of an ecumenical synod would be just as binding over the whole church as the conclusions of lesser courts are binding over their particular jurisdictions.

The Christian churches today are in a deplorable state of division.  One of the things that hinders the resolution of these divisions, or lessens the motivations of those in the church to work diligently for the sort of reform that would lead to their elimination if followed through, is a sense of complacency held by many in Reformed churches today.  Many people will confess that there are divisions, and that we ought to work for their elimination, but they are lulled into thinking the situation better than it is by the feeling that we don't really need to have organic union among all the churches of Christ.  Just as congregationalists/independents lull themselves into security regarding the disunity of the church (and thus split into thousands of mini-denominations) by their erroneous doctrine that church power does not extent beyond the local congregation (so that they hold that gatherings beyond the congregational level have only advisory and not binding authority), so many Presbyterian/Reformed people today have been lulled into security by the sense that the organic unity of the church need only extend up to a certain level, and after that we can adopt the model of the independents.

There is generally a recognition that congregations are under regional assemblies (presbyteries), and that presbyteries are under larger assemblies (often called general assemblies or synods), but at this point in the minds of many, things seem to begin to break down.  There is a failure to be as concerned as we ought to be that within a single nation, there are multiple Reformed denominations with different general assemblies, and that congregations of these different denominations often co-exist in the same areas.  There is often a degree of concern expressed regarding this situation, but it seems not to be as urgent in the minds of many as it ought to be; and this is partly owing, I think, to the existence of non-binding organizations and confederacies (like NAPARC in North America) which give to the churches a sense that they are getting along and cooperating, even though they are not in full, organic communion with one another under one general council.

Things are even worse on the international level.  While there is often at least an expressed concern about denominational divisions within nations, there seems to be very little concern expressed about denominational divisions between nations.  On this level, there seems to be a widespread failure to even think about the issue at all, with some even voicing opposition to the idea that all the national Reformed churches ought to be united under one binding ecumenical council.  But to fail to take the logic of presbyterian church government to the international level, and instead to settle there for an independent view of things, is ultimately to betray presbyterian church government.  On this level, as well, a sense of "peace in Zion" is helped along, I think, by the existence of advisory, non-binding organizations (like the ICRC) which facilitate the different churches working together in certain areas short of full organic union.  And this in spite of the fact that denominations like the OPC have expressed an interest in working for worldwide organic unity (see, for example, this very good article on the subject of church unity).

In another place, I have discussed the implications that come from having divided denominations.  Each denomination, by not being unified with another, is declaring that only it has formally recognized de jure authority and therefore de jure existence as a church (while division is compatible with a de facto recognition of the Body of Christ in differing denominations).  I think that raising the issue of an ecumenical council helps to bring this fact out clearly, and so it is something I want to raise and emphasize.  Basically put, we can ask the question, Who would you invite to an ecumenical council?  An ecumenical council would be a binding synod of the whole church throughout the world.  So one's answer to this question reveals whom one considers to be a part of the catholic church worldwide, considered de jure.  To not be invited to take part, with full voting privileges, in an ecumenical council is to be "unchurched," to be rejected as being a part of the universal Christian church, considered de jure.  So who would we invite to an ecumenical council?

The fact is that all the Presbyterian/Reformed denominations that exist would invite only officers and members in their own denominations to be fully voting members in such a council.  This is because they would recognize that to invite others would be to give them power over their own denominations, as their own respective denominational general assemblies and synods would be subject to the binding authority of this higher council.  But the very reason they are separate denominations is that they do not want to give those outside their denominations any power within their denominations, so they will not invite them to be fully voting members of the ecumenical council.  But while they might be able to ignore or put behind them the full implications of their decisions to remain separate from each other while going about their ordinary business, the act of calling an ecumenical council (or even considering doing such in a thought experiment) will make these implications impossible to ignore.  When denominations refuse to be in full organic communion with each other, they are not merely deciding to co-exist peacefully and happily as different parts of a larger church.  They are declaring everyone but themselves to be excluded from the universal, catholic, visible Church of Christ, considered de jure.  Obviously, such a declaration is something that is extremely weighty and not at all to be taken lightly.  To claim to be the one, holy, catholic, and apostolic church, de jure, is a tremendous claim.  Those who make such a claim dare not make it unless they are absolutely certain (at least to the extent that such matters allow) that it is true.  What Reformed churches today really often want to do is to think of the de jure catholic church as existing in all the different denominations as they work together in their divided state.  Such an idea of the church may work within the structure of congregational/independent church government, but it is not at all tenable within the context of presbyterian church government.

So, let me ask these question of all the different Presbyterian/Reformed denominations out there:  Who would you invite to an ecumenical council?  And are you prepared to deal with and accept and defend with full consciousness the implications of your answer?  Do you have a right to exist as a separate denomination, with all that that claim entails?  Or are you schismatic, and in need of repentance?  What are you going to do to help seek both the purity and the unity of the universal Church of Christ (both de jure and de facto)?  If you do want to make the claim that you have the right of separate existence, are you doing what you can to promote the purity and unity of the church on an international scale?  Are you looking at all the other nations as mission fields, where you have an obligation to work for the existence and maintenance of de jure catholic churches (however it is best to go about doing this in particular places)?  Are you taking the pains that need to be taken to deal with these many mission fields?  Are  you working to reform churches that are divided from you as you have opportunity?  Are you working to do all you can, while upholding the whole of your duty, to make things easier on other denominations who might seek union with you?  If you decide that you don't have a basis to make the claim that your denomination is the one, holy, catholic, and apostolic church worldwide, considered de jure, what are you going to do to end your schismatic separate existence?  Which denomination ought you to be joining, and what steps are you currently taking to make that happen within a reasonable period of time (understanding that it may take some, limited amount of time to make such a transition)?  If you are engaged in holding some doctrinal deviation or some unbiblical practice, or some other practice that unnecessarily hinders unity, how are you going to go about reforming this obstacle to unity?

UPDATE (10/5/12):  See here and here for related blog articles.

UPDATE 9/2/13:  Samuel Hudson makes some interesting comments about calling an ecumenical council in his 1649 book, A Vindication of the Essence and Unity of the Church-Catholick Visible, pp. 215-216.  (This is an excellent book overall, by the way, arguing for formal, visible, catholic unity in the whole church.)  After spending a good amount of time arguing for the legitimacy and binding nature of an ecumenical council, he says this:

But because there are so many superstitions, errours, and heresies in the Asian, African, European and American Churches, as M. A and M. S in their defense, p. 92, do take notice of . . . yet I say for these things' sake, I should be very tender in defining (as the case now standeth) what Churches, or how farre the visible Churches may with convenience or safety enter into actual combination, lest the truths of God, or the liberties or the more sound and pure Churches, should be prejudiced thereby.

Hudson is writing before what I call the "age of denominationalism" really dawned (which dawning I tend to place around 1690--recognizing, of course, a bit of subjectivity in this).  It was not yet clear at this point that the Protestant and Reformed churches were going to end up definitively splintered into a myriad of separated denominations.  Therefore, he is still contemplating at this time the calling of an ecumenical council that would include a variety of Protestant churches.  However, we can see that the age of denominationalism is almost upon us in his reasons for hesitation at the idea of calling such a council.  The various Protestant churches have become so divided and disparate already that Hudson doubts that it really makes sense anymore to call a council.  Errors have become established, and more orthodox churches are already functioning separately from less orthodox ones.  It was, perhaps, already too late to heal the divisions of Christendom by means of an ecumenical council.  Once the church came to be in a divided state, it would have been foolish to go back and pretend it hadn't happened by calling such a council.  From that time on, the only way forward would be dialogue between already-separated churches.  And if this was already becoming so in Hudson's day, how much more in ours!  The Reformed churches of today need to stop living in denial of the divided state of Protestantism, accept the schisms that exist without pretending that de jure catholic unity still exists between the various Protestant and Reformed denominations, and engage in serious soul-searching and dialogue in order to help bring the churches into greater agreement and so move closer to restoring the de jure unity of the de facto visible church.

UPDATE 10/15/14:  Here is another article which asks a similar question:  What would your church do if some other church invited it to a mutually-binding council?

Against Cameronianism

During the late 1600s, an error entered into Presbyterian circles.  This period (about 1660 to 1680) was a time of great persecution of Presbyterians in Britain.  During the 1640s, the governments of England, Scotland, and Ireland had agreed together in the Solemn League and Covenant, in which they had promised to work towards uniformity in religion along the lines of the orthodox Reformed faith.  However, when Charles II was restored to the throne around 1660, although he had sworn multiple times to uphold the Covenant, upon attaining actual power he reneged on his oath and reversed the Covenant, even eventually making a law that the Covenant must be abjured by all those holding public office.  Episcopalianism was reestablished as the official church form of the three kingdoms, and worship according to Presbyterian principles was declared illegal.  Of course, faithful Presbyterians continued to carry on anyway, and there was a great period of persecution (later called the "Killing Time") until tolerance for Presbyterianism was declared at the Glorious Revolution around 1688.

Needless to say, the attitude of Presbyterians during this time to the civil government was not very positive.  A few Presbyterian ministers, including Richard Cameron, began towards the last part of this period to develop and put forward an understanding of Christian duties to civil magistrates different in an important respect from that previously held to.  According to Cameron and some others (who later remained separated from the re-established Presbyterian Church of Scotland), civil magistrates are only legitimate and only have authority to command obedience if they fulfill the biblical requirements which pertain to civil magistrates.  They must rule in accordance with God's Word and in the fear of God, and with a proper respect for the rights of their subjects; and if they do not, they are not legitimate, authorized magistrates.  Under this thinking, a claimed magistrate who is an atheist could not be recognized as a legitimate civil magistrate, as he is not living up to the pattern God has set out concerning civil magistrates.  Therefore, the people have no obligation to obey him.  (See this view articulated in the Cameronian Sanquhar Declaration and in the Informatory Vindication, and in the later Act, Declaration, and Testimony.)  This view became known as Cameronianism.  Those who held to it and who remained aloof from the established Church of Scotland after the Glorious Revolution became known as the Society Men, and later as Reformed Presbyterians.  Historically, the Reformed Presbyterians have not recognized as legitimate the civil governments under which they have lived.  However, in more recent times, many RP denominations have become more lax on this point or even abandoned it, while some still hold to the historic position.

In contrast to this Cameronian view stands the teaching of the Westminster Confession of Faith, the official confession of the Church of Scotland since the 1640s during the time of the Second Reformation.  The Confession says this:  "Infidelity, or difference in religion, doth not make void the magistrates' just and legal authority, nor free the people from their due obedience to them" (WCF 23:4).

I believe the Westminster Confession to represent the correct viewpoint on this issue.  I would like, therefore, to provide a case for this position.

One of the central texts in the New Testament discussing civil magistracy is Romans 13:1-7:

Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers. For there is no power but of God: the powers that be are ordained of God.  Whosoever therefore resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God: and they that resist shall receive to themselves damnation.  For rulers are not a terror to good works, but to the evil. Wilt thou then not be afraid of the power? do that which is good, and thou shalt have praise of the same:  For he is the minister of God to thee for good. But if thou do that which is evil, be afraid; for he beareth not the sword in vain: for he is the minister of God, a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil.  Wherefore ye must needs be subject, not only for wrath, but also for conscience sake.  For for this cause pay ye tribute also: for they are God's ministers, attending continually upon this very thing. 7 Render therefore to all their dues: tribute to whom tribute is due; custom to whom custom; fear to whom fear; honour to whom honour.

This passage has a parallel in 1 Peter 2:13-17:

Submit yourselves to every ordinance of man for the Lord's sake: whether it be to the king, as supreme; or unto governors, as unto them that are sent by him for the punishment of evildoers, and for the praise of them that do well.  For so is the will of God, that with well doing ye may put to silence the ignorance of foolish men:  As free, and not using your liberty for a cloke of maliciousness, but as the servants of God.  Honour all men. Love the brotherhood. Fear God. Honour the king.

There are two errors that are often made with regard to these passages.  One of these errors is to read the texts as entirely and nothing but descriptive in nature.  That is, the texts are read as describing the duty of those who live in a society to submit to the civil government of the society, but as not containing any prescriptions for how the civil magistrate should govern.  In this view, the texts do not teach any duties of the civil magistrate, or give any normative authority to the magistrate, but only tell individuals to follow his laws.  In this view, civil magistrates are just people who have managed to attain rule over a society, without any authorization from God, and therefore there are no rules designated for their office (although they are under moral rules as normal human beings).  There are no duties they have to fulfill, but we are told to obey their laws.

There are two problems with this view:  1. The texts obviously imply an authority given to the magistrate, and rules for his conduct as a ruler.  Why would Paul and Peter tell us to submit to civil magistrates if they have no legitimate authority?  By telling us to submit to them obedience, honor, and taxes as "their due," the texts are obviously indicating that the magistrates have a right to demand these things of us.  It would be absurd to say that we ought to pay taxes to magistrates as "their due" and at the same time say that magistrates have no authority to ask us to pay taxes.  And why are we asked to give a special honor to magistrates when they have no special honor because no special authority?  Why are we asked to submit obedience to magistrates as "their due" when they have no authority to demand obedience from us?  It is evident that these texts indicate that a special authority to command obedience and taxes and to receive honor has been granted to civil magistrates, and that they have a right and a duty to demand and expect these things from us.

Also, if the texts are purely descriptive, they are highly misleading.  Clearly, it is not always the case that civil magistrates give praise to the good and punish the evildoer.  Too often magistrates reward the evil and punish the good.  This is especially noteworthy considering that at the time of the writing of Romans and 1 Peter, Christians were and would continue to be even more the subjects of great unjust persecutions by the civil magistrates.  Paul's and Peter's words clearly go beyond the merely descriptive, painting a picture of the ideal function of a civil magistrate--that is, what a civil magistrate is supposed to do (whether he actually does it or not).  But to describe what someone is supposed to do is give that person a duty and authority to fulfill it.  Therefore, these texts must be read as not only descriptive, but also as prescriptive.

 2. The second problem with the purely descriptive view is that this is contradicted by the rest of the Scriptures.  We see many places in Scripture where the civil magistrate is given direct commands by God to carry out his task, which gives prescriptive authority to the magistrate.  In the Law of Moses, we see rules for the appointing of civil magistrates, which are echoed at other places in the Scriptures as well.  And we see many commands directed to the authority of magistrates, such as commands to punish certain crimes in certain ways.  Crimes could not be punished merely by the whims of the people.  A criminal, before receiving sentence, must be lawfully tried by a lawful court, not simply captured and hung by a group of vigilantes.  We also see an implication of the magistrate's prescriptive authority in the obedience offered them by the people of God throughout the Scriptures (some examples of which I will provide shortly), and by the judgments of God threatened against magistrates for ruling unjustly.  None of this makes any sense if magistrates do not have any prescriptive authority from God to function as magistrates.  Therefore, even if our two immediate texts do not in themselves indicate a prescriptive role for civil magistrates (which they do), they ought to be read as implying such in light of the rest of the Scriptures.

The other error made with regard to our two texts is the error made by Cameronians--that the passages are not descriptive at all but are entirely prescriptive.  In the Cameronian view, Paul and Peter are not at all telling Christians to submit to presently-existing civil magistrates, but they are only outlining the sort of magistrates that ought to exist and saying that if they did exist, they would deserve obedience, honor, etc.

There are two main problems with this view that parallel the two problems with the previous view:  1. The texts themselves clearly suggest a present duty to existing civil magistrates, and they are clearly referring to the current Roman rulers in particular (even though those rulers were not Christian but pagan, and not always just in their laws and actions).  This is evident because both Paul and Peter bring up this subject not in order to discourse abstractly on the ideal role of hypothetical civil rulers who might sometime exist, but to press upon Christians a present duty of obedience to civil rulers then existing.  The occasion of their comments regarding civil magistracy in both cases is instructing Christians how they should live in the world that they were then living in.  Paul says, "Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers. For there is no power but of God: the powers that be are ordained of God."  Which governing authorities is the Christian to be subject to?  The ones that actually "exist," the ones who are currently actually functioning as "governing authorities."  The authorities that actually, currently exist are appointed by God, because "there is no authority except from God."  Clearly, Paul is telling us to submit to the actually-existing civil authorities now in place--which in the time of writing in Rome (where Paul's letter was sent) would obviously be the Roman civil rulers.  Granted, Paul, in the course of his instruction here, veers off into a description of ideal civil magistrates, which do not always well fit the descriptions of current rulers, but he does so only in the context of the subject of actual submission to current rulers, which leads him to it.  His logic runs in this way:  "You have an obligation to obey the civil rulers who actually rule over you, because civil rulers have been given authority by God.  Their job is to praise the good and punish the evil, and therefore you should give them appropriate honor, obedience, taxes, etc."  Paul goes into the ideal description as he gives the job description of magistrates, without intending to imply that all magistrates fill that description equally well, but with implying that anyone whom God in his providence has put in the role of civil ruler has civil authority and therefore deserves our obedience simply because of the role providence has given him.

Likewise,  Peter tells us to "submit to every ordinance of man for the Lord's sake," and then mentions "the king as supreme" and "governors . . . sent by him."  Who is this king, and who are these governors?  Clearly, as this is a present duty for Christians, Peter is speaking of present civil rulers.  The context, as with Paul, is instructions for Christians in their present lives.  Peter's next statement (in verse 18) is relevant as well:  "Servants, be subject to your masters with all fear; not only to the good and gentle, but also to the froward."  Which masters should servants be submissive to?  Their own current, actually-existing masters, and even to the ones who are harsh.  Now, it is a sin for masters to be harsh; but their being so does not give a license of disobedience to servants.  The instructions here are parallel enough (and the context is the same) that light is shed by verse 18 on verses 13-17 as well.  Peter's basic message is, "Obey the authorities who actually rule over you."  But his instructions, like those of Paul, also imply a prescriptive role for authorities.  Magistrates in particular are said to be "for the punishment of evildoers and for the praise of those who do good," clearly paralleling Paul's language in Romans 13.  It is clear, then, in both of these texts, that there is a descriptive and not just a prescriptive element involved in the instructions, and that the command to us to be submissive to civil rulers is not limited to ideal or hypothetical civil rulers, but to actually existing civil rulers, whether they be Christians or pagans.

2. Just as with the "purely descriptive" view, the "purely prescriptive" view of these texts is also contradicted by the rest of the Scriptures.  Jesus tells us to "render to Caesar that which is Caesar's" (Mark 12:17), implying (in light of the context) that taxes belong to Caesar.  This parallels Paul's instructions to pay taxes in Romans 13, and Jesus explicitly names the civil magistrate to whom taxes are to be paid in this case--Caesar, the Roman emperor, certainly no Christian and very often no pure and perfect maker of laws, a man who authoritatively authorized pagan worship throughout his empire and even demanded worship to be paid to himself by many.

Paul's conduct and attitude with regard to Roman magistrates in the Book of Acts is illuminating in this context.  Paul's general custom was to show respect and deference to Roman rulers, attributing to them legitimate civil authority in a number of ways:

Acts 24:10: “Then Paul, after that the governor had beckoned unto him to speak, answered, Forasmuch as I know that thou hast been of many years a judge unto this nation, I do the more cheerfully answer for myself.” Paul refers to Felix as a “judge of this nation,” without quarreling with this term, and he speaks to him throughout this speech as to one before whom cases are lawfully tried.

Acts 25:10-11: “Then said Paul, I stand at Caesar's judgment seat, where I ought to be judged: to the Jews have I done no wrong, as thou very well knowest.  For if I be an offender, or have committed any thing worthy of death, I refuse not to die: but if there be none of these things whereof these accuse me, no man may deliver me unto them. I appeal unto Caesar.” Paul makes a couple of remarkable statements here that should make any Cameronian nervous. He says that he “ought to be judged” at Caesar's judgment seat, implying that Caesar has actual authority to judge in a ruling capacity, and he even appeals to Caesar. He appeals to be tried, as in a legitimate court of justice, at Caesar's judgment seat. Also, he says that "if I be an offender, or have committed any thing worthy of death, I refuse not to die.” Paul does not object to being executed by the Roman rulers if he truly deserves it. But what right do Roman rulers have to execute people? None, according to Cameronians. But Paul differs.

Acts 26:1-3: “Then Agrippa said unto Paul, Thou art permitted to speak for thyself. Then Paul stretched forth the hand, and answered for himself:  I think myself happy, king Agrippa, because I shall answer for myself this day before thee touching all the things whereof I am accused of the Jews:  Especially because I know thee to be expert in all customs and questions which are among the Jews: wherefore I beseech thee to hear me patiently.” Paul speaks to King Agrippa with respect, calling him by his proper title, and appealing to him to hear his case patiently. Clearly, Paul recognizes Agrippa's legitimate civil authority. It should be noted also that Paul's attitude of respect to the Roman and Jewish civil authorities parallels his respect shown to the high priest in Acts 23:5. In the latter case, Paul explained that respect was owed because the high priest was a ruler of his people—implying legitimacy of authority.

The repentant thief on the cross says to Jesus that he and his companion are receiving "the due reward of our deeds."  But their execution would be unjust, if pagan governments cannot be legitimate.

We see this same attitude of respect and acknowledgement of the authority of non-Christian rulers placed over the people by God's providence in the Old Testament as well.  The Book of Daniel, in particular, provides numerous examples.  Consistently throughout the book, Daniel and his friends show deference, respect, and submission to Babylonian and Persian rulers, calling them by their authoritative titles, given them obedience (except when they command sin), accepting government appointments and positions, eating food provided by the government (which would have been stolen food had the government not been legitimate), etc.  The kings of Babylon and Persia, after seeing God's glory, often issue decrees that the God of Israel should be honored on pain of death, and the text suggests that this is a good thing, although if they were not legitimate rulers this would be sinful.  We see the same sorts of things in other books of Old Testament, such as Esther, Ezra, Nehemiah, and Jonah.  It is clear that the Scriptures regard pagan kings as having legitimate authority, even sometimes over the people of God if God places them there providentially.

It is therefore clear that the Scriptures do not share the Cameronian opinion that only godly and Christian civil rulers have legitimate authority.  The Scriptures instead support the view of the Westminster Confession.

Cameronians argue that the Scriptures lay out rules for the electing of godly magistrates (such as in Deuteronomy 1:9-18), and that this implies that those magistrates who do not meet these qualifications cannot be considered lawful magistrates.  But this position pits these passages against other passages, such as those we have looked at, that clearly indicate otherwise.  The fact that God has laid out qualifications for godly civil magistrates implies that we ought not willingly to make those civil magistrates who do not fit those qualifications.  It implies that those who do not meet these qualifications should not try to take the role of civil magistrate.  It implies that civil magistrates who do not fulfill these qualifications are sinning by not doing so.  But it doesn't imply that those whom God has providentially set into power over us who do not meet all of these qualifications are therefore not legitimate civil magistrates.  For example, I should not choose to have Barack Obama be the President of the United States insofar as I have a legal choice in the matter.  I think this entails that I ought not to vote for him to be President.  But it does not imply that he is not truly a lawful civil magistrate, having been elected, or that I do not owe obedience to him.  God clearly in his Word commands two things of his people, and we must hold both of these things together and not pit them in conflict with each other:  God has commanded us to choose only qualified individuals to be our civil magistrates when we have a choice in the matter, and he has commanded us to accept even unqualified individuals as civil magistrates when God in his providence puts such over us and we do not have a say in the matter (or our say is insufficient to change the result).

Cameronians put forward a number of other texts indicating that God does not approve of ungodly rulers, that he will judge them, that they are sinful, etc., but the comments previously made apply to them as well.  The fallacy is in thinking that if a ruler is sinning in his function and bringing down on himself the wrath of God, then that means that we ought not to recognize his legitimate authority.  But this does not follow.  Again, Scripture teaches both that magistrates have certain prescriptive functions that they have a moral obligation to follow and that they are subject to judgment when they don't fulfill them, and that even those who are wicked in some areas do not thereby lose their legitimate authority to issue lawful commands, and thus that we are still obligated to recognize their authority and honor it.

This should not seem such an impossible combination.  It is the same with parental authority.  Fathers, for example, have certain moral obligations and a certain pattern they ought to follow.  A person who is not willing to follow that pattern ought not to become a father, and a bad father is sinning and is bringing down judgment on himself (and his family).  And yet, at the same time, the wickedness of a father does not necessarily release all his children from being under his authority.  Children do not have the right to say, "My father does not meet the ideal qualifications and demands Scripture suggests for fatherhood.  Therefore, I no longer recognize him as a true father and I no longer owe obedience to him."  Fathers are supposed to raise up their children in the nurture and admonition of the Lord.  But it does not follow that atheist fathers are not due any obedience from their children.

I think that a similar rule applies to church leaders as well, except that it is of the essence of church leaders that they be teaching the true religion.  Otherwise, they are not church leaders at all.  With parents and civil magistrates, on the other hand, as the Confession says, "Infidelity, or difference in religion, doth not make void the magistrates [or the parents']' just and legal authority."  Therefore, church leaders who cease to teach the true religion are no longer church leaders and therefore have no more binding authority; but the authority of parents and civil magistrates extends beyond this.

The parallel to church leaders brings out another qualification worth mentioning.  Although it be wrong for a private member of the church to refuse to submit to the authority of a minister merely on the grounds that he is teaching some error, provided that error does not overthrow the foundations of the true religion, yet it is the proper province of fellow ministers, in the form of presbyteries, synods, and the like, to depose a minister from office if he ceases to teach biblical doctrine in some area.  Likewise, a private citizen has no authority to depose a corrupt civil magistrate from office, or to refuse obedience to his lawful commands on such grounds; but fellow magistrates may, in certain circumstances, have authority to depose an unruly magistrate.  For example, in the United States, if a mayor of a certain town begins to go against the trust committed to him in some ways, a higher magistrate (for example, a state governor) has the authority to put him out of office.  So the people can appeal to higher magistrates, if there be any, against lower magistrates, if they rule unjustly or in a way that violates the appropriate qualifications for office.

Another qualification which would seem to go without saying is that obedience to civil magistrates is only required with regard to lawful commands, or commands that do not require sin.  When a magistrate commands sin, the Scripture is clear that it is our duty to disobey him.  Also, we have a responsibility to engage in self-defense, defense of our households, etc., that in some circumstances might need to be exercised against invasions or attacks by civil authorities--for example, if the magistrate sends henchmen to murder myself and my family.  This kind of ethical consideration will sometimes allow for lower magistrates to protect those under them from unjust demands or attacks from higher magistrates as well.  Just as it is sin for an individual to obey a command to sin from a magistrate, so it is sin for a lower magistrate to govern in his own sphere sinfully out of obedience to a higher magistrate.

I would also add that there may come a point where the civil magistrate has set himself in such a way as an enemy to a person, that that person has no choice but to abandon the relationship of citizen to magistrate.  For example, if the civil magistrate declares a war on me, determined to bring about my destruction, and carries out this war in such a way as that I simply cannot act the part of a citizen (I must live as a fugitive, etc.), then for practical purposes I am free from consideration of his authority, at least for the time being.  But if that situation were to change, and I should be put back into a position where my obedience without sin becomes again possible, I will once again owe obedience.  And there are situations where I might be required to withhold obedience in one thing while granting it in another.

In light of all of these things, I conclude that the distinctive Cameronian position is contrary to Scripture, and that the Scriptural view is that embraced by the Westminster Confession.  I very much appreciate the Cameronian emphasis on the duty of the civil magistrate to follow the law of God, the emphasis on the binding authority of national covenants, etc., but on this issue, they have simply adopted an imbalanced perspective, one at odds with the Bible and the Confessions of historic Presbyterianism.

UPDATE 9/24/12:  I have added a new post with further thoughts relevant to the issues discussed here.

An Example of Rhetoric Over Substance from the Atheist Community

See the article linked to below, and notice how good the Atheist community is at using rhetoric that is naturally appealing to people raised in an American context to get across their own viewpoint and values on this subject. They are working towards helping all Americans "feel welcome." They are against "preferential treatment and minority alienation." They are "battling for minority rights." They are "fighting for equal representation for the family members of atheists." Etc. What American's heart doesn't stir with the passion of moral righteousness and indignation at words like these?

Of course, the rhetoric only makes sense if we assume that the Atheist outlook on the world is correct. If Atheist beliefs are true, then they are fighting for something that may be worth fighting for. However, what if Christian beliefs are true? What if Atheism is a false worldview that is evil and harmful? What if God, the ultimate moral authority in the universe, is calling all individuals and nations to acknowledge him and follow his laws, and to oppose wicked and harmful evil? In this case, the rhetoric is a mask for that which is ultimately fallacious and seriously misleading.

Why doesn't the Atheist community simply come out and say, "There should not be memorial crosses because Christianity really isn't true, and the nation should instead endorse a secular position because that makes more sense from our correct Atheist point of view."? Well, for one reason, it may be that many Atheists actually think their rhetoric is worldview-neutral. But surely one can see the rhetorical, persuasive advantages to keeping out of sight the actual argumentative basis of the position and instead trying to smuggle in the position, along with its worldview foundation, by means of rhetoric designed to appeal more to instincts and feelings than to critical thinking. It is hard to argue for Atheism and then the ethical and political implications of Atheism. It is much easier to craftily use rhetoric to smuggle in Atheism without people noticing too much (except those pesky fundamentalists).

I think that we Christians can learn a lesson from the Atheists and learn to use rhetoric better. We don't have to let them define the terms of the debate and smuggle in their worldview. We can use terms fitting our perspective following the bold and confident manner of the Atheists. However, we should always be honest and therefore willing to discuss the actual arguments when pressed, rather than trying to win the day by means of rhetoric without argument. We can use rhetoric to combat the rhetoric of the Atheists, but then we need to provide a substantial case for our point of view, straightforwardly and honestly. We should never hide behind pretenses of neutrality, but should instead be upfront, even when it is unpopular and misleading rhetoric would seem to serve us better, in insisting on the true reasons for our positions.

DISCLAIMER: I don't think all Atheists are dishonest and think that a substanceless rhetorical approach is best. It does seem that many do think it is best, either from dishonesty or naivete (that is, really believing their rhetoric is neutral). But I know Atheists who aren't naive and want a more upfront and honest approach. And I know plenty of Christians who seem content to use popular rhetoric misleadingly as well. See my previous post for an example of how Christians sometimes do this kind of thing.

http://atheists.org/update-american-atheists-file-objection-motion-dismiss-world-trade-center-cross-case

"My Religious Freedom is Being Repressed!"

The article linked to below well illustrates why the cry, "My religious freedom is being repressed!", is not a good plea to defend one's religion having an influence on public laws and policies. Religious freedom means that you cannot impose your religious beliefs/values in public laws and policies. If you want to engage in such imposition, you are an enemy, not a friend, of religious freedom. So all this talk of religious freedom being oppressed because religion is kept out of "the public square" (in other words, because religion is not allowed to influence laws and policies) is nonsense. Keeping religion out of laws and policies is not the repression of religious freedom; it is religious freedom.

Of course, this means that secularism is a violation of religious freedom as well, since it is the imposition of Agnosticism in public laws and policies. In fact, the only way to avoid violating religious freedom is to disband the nation, since neutrality in law is impossible. Therefore, we should all recognize that we are all actually fighting against religious freedom and stop talking about it. Instead, we should be talking about what the true beliefs and values are that should be imposed in law. The modern language of "religious freedom" is a nonsensical dead-end.

http://crooksandliars.com/susie-madrak/how-tell-if-your-religious-liberty-be

The Fallacy of the Shortcut

There is a fallacy currently going around that seems to be very popular.  It takes a few different forms, and pops up in different areas, but there is a similar theme in each instance.  I call it the Fallacy of the Shortcut.  Basically, the fallacy amounts to an attempt to convince someone to accept a certain position on the basis that if he does so, he will be able to escape the difficult, painful, and apparently futile quest to think through issues and sift through evidence in order to find out what is true.  There is a promise that if a certain route is followed, it will allow one to avoid this tedious and difficult process and arrive more quickly at a secure truth.  Let me illustrate this fallacy with a few prominent modern examples.

Modern American culture, and I think western culture in general today to a great degree, is Agnostic.  That is, to varying degrees, it is a common opinion that while we can know what is true in matters pertaining to the natural world, we cannot know what is true in matters beyond the natural world.  That is, we can know objective truths about giraffes, plants, stars, humans (at least as biological entities), grass, electrons, etc., but not about things like God, spirits, revelation from a divine source, the true religion, etc.

Agnostics love the Fallacy of the Shortcut.  It is one of their favorite rhetorical devices to make Agnosticism look appealing.  The Agnostic version of the fallacy goes basically like this:  "Do you see all of those squabbling people in the world, arguing back and forth endlessly with one another over questions like Does God exist?, What is the true religion?, Is the Bible really from God?, What is God's will for how we are to live?, etc.?  Do you see how hopeless it is that there will ever be any conclusion or consensus reached in these kinds of conversations?  After all, people have been arguing about these kinds of things for thousands of years, at least, and we are no closer to reaching a consensus now than we were thousands of years ago.  It's obvious from all this continuing disagreement that we simply cannot know what is true in these matters.  Therefore, we should be agnostic on these kinds of issues.  That is obviously the right way to go."

You see how it works?  Are you tired of constantly having to figure out what is really true while dealing with all of these different points of view and arguments, having to sift through all of the evidence, etc.?  Well, here's a way out!  You don't have to do it anymore!  Just look around at all the disagreement, and declare that since there is disagreement it is obvious that no one really knows, and then just embrace Agnosticism and forget about it.  Agnosticism is presented as being above the fray of all the squabbling, conflicting positions down below which are getting nowhere and working really hard at it

The problem with this way of looking at things, of course, is that it is an illusion.  The Agnostic position is not above the fray.  It is simply another of the squabbling, disagreeing positions in the fray.  It is not as though Christianity is a distinct position that must be argued for, and Judaism is another such position, and Buddhism another, etc., while Agnosticism is somehow a neutral party in the controversy who gets to win by default.  Agnosticism is simply one more distinct position, and it has to be established by good reasons just as much as any other view does.  It is true that it can be difficult to maintain a justified position on a controversial matter.  One has to deal with arguments from other positions, respond to objections, present evidence weighed against the alleged evidence of other claims, etc.  But taking an Agnostic position does not exempt one from having to go through this process.  A person taking the Agnostic position must deal with arguments from non-Agnostic points of view, respond to objections, and present evidence weighed against the alleged evidence of other claims as well.  In order to establish Agnosticism as a justified opinion, one has to have reasons to reject the alleged evidences and the arguments coming from all the non-Agnostic worldviews.  Christians, and Jews, and Muslims, and Buddhists, and Hindus, and people of all viewpoints, present arguments for their positions.  If I am a Christian, and I want to know that my Christian position is justified, I must know why these other viewpoints are not justified, and that involves knowing where and why their arguments fail.  Similarly, if I am an Agnostic, and I want to know that my Agnostic position is justified, I must know why all the non-Agnostic positions are not justified, and that involves knowing where and why their arguments fail.  Agnosticism claims to provide a shortcut around this required process of thinking and weighing arguments, but it does not.

(I call this Agnostic version of the fallacy also the Good and Intelligent People Disagree argument, for obvious reasons, and in this aspect you can find more evaluation of it in the first chapter of my book, Why Christianity is True, as well as here.)

Another place I often hear the Fallacy of the Shortcut come up is in conversations between Roman Catholics and Protestants and also between Eastern Orthodox and Protestants.  To illustrate this, let me quote from a chapter of a book called Surprised by Truth (San Diego: Basilica Press, 1994).  It is a Romanist apologetics book that contains the testimonies of a number of people who have converted to the Roman Catholic Church.  This is from the chapter by Bob Sungenis:

"The more I thought about it the more I began to see that the theory of sola scriptura had done untold damage to Christendom.  The most obvious evidence of this damage was Protestantism itself: a huge mass of conflicting, bickering denominations, causing, by its very nature of 'protest' and 'defiance,' an endless proliferation of chaos and controversy" (p. 118-119).

"God has given the protesters what they wanted--and much more: one long, continuous line of protesters: protesters protesting against the Catholic Church and protesters protesting against their fellow protesters.  This plague of 'protestantism' has spawned thousands of quarreling sects.  Time itself has shown that Protestantism is not God's plan for his Church, but rather, is a dismal failure. . . . As a Catholic, I am now at peace, away from the roiling controversies of Protestantism, secure in the consolation of the truth" (p. 132).

Sungenis, by joining the Roman church, is now above the fray, "away from the roiling controversies of Protestantism."  The problem is that the Roman church is not above the fray of disagreeing denominations at all; it is simply one option among many in the fray.  I am a Presbyterian.  How did I come to these convictions?  I examined the available evidence, weighed the numerous conflicting claims, and came to a conclusion as to what I thought was right.  How did Sungenis decide that Romanism is correct?  How could he have?  Assuming he chose it for rational reasons (which I certainly do not assume), he must have followed the same basic methodology I used to arrive at Presbyterianism.  Becoming Romanist does not exempt one from having to examine conflicting claims, weigh arguments and evidence, and then come to a conclusion based on one's best analysis of the state of the evidence.  Sungenis is no more above the fray than I am.  We've both come through the very same fray to embrace our different conclusions.

Sungenis cites the many different Protestant denominations that exist as proof that the Bible is too unclear to use to come to a clear conclusion.  Thus, he says, we should just give up listening to the Bible and believe what the Roman church says instead.  It's a shortcut!  You don't have to spend all that time and effort wading through conflicting biblical interpretations; you can just believe whatever Rome says and be done with it!  But this is an illusion, for if we are to be rational, we must have some reason to think that Rome is trustworthy.  Not everyone thinks it is, including that mass of Protestant denominations, as well as myriads of other religions and worldviews.  If the existence of differing Protestant denominations implies that my conclusion from the biblical evidence that Presbyterianism is true is unreliable, then why doesn't the existence of differing religions imply that Sungenis's conclusion from the evidence that Romanism is true is unreliable as well?  That's what the Agnostics would claim, as we saw earlier.  Sungenis is doing the same thing that the Agnostics do, except he's using the fallacy to get him to Romanism instead of to Agnosticism.  But it's the same line of reasoning, with the same fallaciousness.  In order to be justified in concluding that Prebyterianism is true, I had to go right through the fray of disagreements, examine the evidence and the conflicting arguments, and on the basis of this evaluation decide what is really true.  Sungenis must do exactly the same thing to establish Romanism, and the Agnostics must do exactly the same thing to establish Agnosticism.  There is no shortcut!

The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints loves this fallacy as well.  It is also one of their key arguments, going all the way back to their founder, Joseph Smith.  Listen to Joseph recount part of his experience that led him to found the LDS Church:

"9 My mind at times was greatly excited, the cry and tumult were so great and incessant. The Presbyterians were most decided against the Baptists and Methodists, and used all the powers of both reason and sophistry to prove their errors, or, at least, to make the people think they were in error. On the other hand, the Baptists and Methodists in their turn were equally zealous in endeavoring to establish their own tenets and disprove all others. 10 In the midst of this war of words and tumult of opinions, I often said to myself: What is to be done? Who of all these parties are right; or, are they all wrong together? If any one of them be right, which is it, and how shall I know it? 11 While I was laboring under the extreme difficulties caused by the contests of these parties of religionists, I was one day reading the Epistle of James, first chapter and fifth verse, which reads: If any of you lack wisdom, let him ask of God, that giveth to all men liberally, and upbraideth not; and it shall be given him. 12 Never did any passage of scripture come with more power to the heart of man than this did at this time to mine. It seemed to enter with great force into every feeling of my heart. I reflected on it again and again, knowing that if any person needed wisdom from God, I did; for how to act I did not know, and unless I could get more wisdom than I then had, I would never know; for the teachers of religion of the different sects understood the same passages of scripture so differently as to destroy all confidence in settling the question by an appeal to the Bible" (http://www.lds.org/scriptures/pgp/js-h/1?lang=eng).

Does this sound familiar?  "Look at all the mass of differing denominations!", says Smith.   "Obviously, this disagreement proves that it is impossible to understand the Bible."  So what was Joseph's way out of the fray?  He went out to the woods and asked God which sect was true, and according to him, God and Christ appeared to him and told him that none of the sects were true and that he needed to start a new church (which would restore the true Church of Christ).  But how do we know that Joseph didn't just make all of this up, or that he wasn't himself deceived in some way?  Certainly not by studying the Bible!  That would bring us back into the ever-to-be-feared fray!  No, the way we are supposed to find out is by praying about it and then trusting the positive feelings that we get telling us that it's all true.  But can't feelings be deceptive?  Stop asking questions!  You're bringing us back into the fray!  Just stop questioning and believe!  Are you tired of having to go through the laborious process of weighing evidence and conflicting arguments?  Have no fear!  The LDS Church has yet another shortcut to offer.  But there's the same catch we've seen before.  Mormonism is not really above the fray; it is yet one more option in the fray.  And the only shortcut to get to it, like all the other shortcuts offered in these matters, requires the abandonment of one's reason.

We see this fallacy often in evangelical Christian circles as well.  How often do we hear something like this?:  "There are some people who think that infants ought to be baptized.  There are some people who think they should not be.  Obviously, since there is disagreement here, the right answer is to say that both sides are equally acceptable!  You can baptize or refrain from baptizing, and it's all OK!"  Those who think both sides are OK try to present themselves as neutral, as above the fray.  But really this opinion is nothing other than merely a third option in the fray, and it must establish itself by weighing evidence and conflicting arguments just as much as any other side.  Whether the Bible requires infants to be baptized, forbids infants to be baptized, or considers it OK to baptize or refrain from baptizing infants, the true position can only be established by the painstaking duty of actually examining what the Bible says and weighing contrasting arguments, rather than declaring one point of view victor by default.  There is no more reason to simply default to the view that the Bible allows both baptizing and not baptizing infants than there is to default to the view that the Bible requires or forbids infant baptism.  None of these positions is any more likely or unlikely a priori.  Any conclusion reached here requires an examination of the actual evidence.  There is no shortcut!

I think you get the idea.

My Statement on Certain Issues Regarding the Regulative Principle of Worship as well as Church Unity and Authority

This is a statement I wrote up in May expressing some of the convictions I have come to over the past year regarding the application of the regulative principle of worship and the unity and authority of the church.  It is now a public statement, and so I am posting it here.

Over the past few months, I have been coming to some convictions on certain matters that are relevant to my continuing role both as a member and as an officer in the OPC. I therefore want to lay out these convictions so that my position will be absolutely clear to anyone who is concerned in these matters.

The Regulative Principle

First, I have come to hold some important positions regarding the application of the regulative principle of worship. It seems to me that people in the Reformed tradition have held to basically two ideas of how to apply the regulative principle (I am oversimplifying a bit here, but, considering things roughly, I think these delineations are fairly accurate): 1. The continental view seems to be basically this: Something need not be commanded in order to be done in worship; it only has to be considered useful. Now, the continental Reformed would not put it this way, because putting it this way highlights the fact that this idea is not really consistent with the regulative principle, which affirms that only things commanded can be done in worship. I think the continental Reformed have a vague third category in their minds, and the vagueness of it has caused them not to see the flaws in it. For them, there are things commanded, things completely indifferent, and things useful. The problem is that the “useful” category will collapse into either the commanded or the indifferent category upon more careful scrutiny. If something is so “useful” that in order to fulfill their God-ordained tasks church officers really ought to enact it, and they would be neglectful in their duty if they did not, then this is really something commanded. If that thing is not useful enough to say that church officers would be neglectful in their duty not to enact it, then it is not necessary to enact, and so is a thing indifferent. The regulative principle is all about keeping three categories distinct: the commanded, the forbidden, and the indifferent. The worship of God is a subset of the category of “good works.” Good works must be things that are commanded. The public worship service is a situation where the people have been commanded by church officers to come to a certain place and do certain things, and those things must be things commanded and not merely indifferent. This is the heart of the regulative principle of worship, and it seems to me the continental tradition has weaknesses in its traditional applications of it in certain areas. (I speak of the continental tradition as it is today, not as it was in earlier days, such as in Calvin's time.) For example, the celebration of Christmas is prescribed by the Order of Dordt. They would acknowledge that there is no command in the Bible to celebrate Christmas, but they would justify enforcing this celebration on congregations on the grounds that it is “useful” to the good order and growth of the church. But this smacks of precisely what Paul was warning against in Colossians 2:16-23—coming up with human rules and practices to supplement what God has given, thinking they will be “useful” in the Christian life. But they are not, for God has given us all that is necessary for Christian life in his Word, either expressly set down or by good and necessary consequence deduced. I can think of no reason why the celebrating of Christmas is necessary to fulfill any biblical requirement, and so it cannot be considered commanded, and so it cannot be commanded as an element of worship in the church.

2. The second position is what I will call the Westminster position. This is what I consider to be the more faithful interpretation of the regulative principle. In this view, if we want to do something in a worship service, we must prove that it is commanded by God to be done as part of public worship in the Scriptures, either explicitly or by good and necessary consequence. Being “useful” won’t cut it. We cannot command as necessary what God has not made so. Thus, the Westminster Directory for Public Worship opposes the celebration of extra-biblical holy days like Christmas. However one might make an argument for the “usefulness” of celebrating Christmas, it cannot be proven that it is necessary so that it would be a sin to neglect it, and so it cannot be imposed on congregations as a part of the worship of the church.

These two positions constitute one of the major differences between the modern continental Reformed and the British Presbyterian points of view, so far as I have seen. Both have a strong affirmation of the regulative principle, but the Presbyterians have been more consistent in applying it.

It seems to me that the stricter, Westminster interpretation of how to apply the regulative principle leads to certain conclusions advocated by many historic Presbyterians and by the Westminster Standards, such as exclusive psalmody, the exclusion of musical instruments from public worship, and the exclusion of the recitation of creeds in public worship. I can find no command in the Bible, either explicit or implicit, for singing hymns in public worship. I can find no command indicating that musical instruments are to be used outside of temple worship. I can find no biblical command for the recitation of statements of faith by the congregation in public worship.

The OPC Directory for Public Worship seems to me to be a bit continental in its approach to some of these things. For example, in the section on congregational singing, the Directory says this: “Congregations do well to sing the metrical versions or other musical settings of the Psalms frequently in public worship. Congregations also do well to sing hymns of praise that respond to the full scope of divine revelation” (DPW IIB2c). According to the terminology explicitly defined at the beginning of the Directory, the language of “is well” or “do well” indicates that something is deemed suitable for worship, but not commanded. So the Directory indicates that the OPC does not consider the singing of psalms a commanded element, but it considers both the singing of psalms and the singing of hymns “suitable” elements but not commanded. How does this square with the Directory’s strong affirmation of the regulative principle? “God may not be worshiped according to human imaginations or inventions or in any way not prescribed by his Word, nor may the church require her members to participate in elements of worship that God's Word does not require. Only when the elements of worship are those appointed in God's Word, and the circumstances and forms of worship are consonant with God's Word, is there true freedom to know God as he is and to worship him as he desires to be worshiped” (DPW IB6b). But if a particular church incorporates hymn-singing in its worship service, it is commanding its congregation to engage in a worship practice that the Directory itself acknowledges not to be commanded.

With regard to the reciting of creeds in worship, the Directory says this: “It is also fitting that the congregation as one body confess its common faith, using creeds that are true to the Word of God, such as the Apostles' Creed or the Nicene Creed” (DPW IIB3b). “Is fitting” means the same thing as “is well” in the Directory’s terminology. Again, why is this practice allowed if it is acknowledged not to be commanded, in light of the regulative principle?

It seems to me that in these cases, and perhaps some others, the OPC Directory for Public Worship is inconsistent with the regulative principle and with itself, and thus I cannot approve of these elements in it.

Church Authority and Unity

A broader issue has arisen for me as well that is very relevant to my relationship to the OPC. That is the issue of church authority and unity.

Churches obviously claim authority. Church officers claim authority to fulfill the various functions of their offices; sessions, presbyteries, and broader assemblies claim authority to function as legitimate synods; etc. Whenever there are multiple denominations, each denomination, by virtue of its existence separate from other denominations, is making a two-pronged statement: “We possess legitimate authority, and other denominations don’t.” We can think of the church de facto and de jure. Considered de facto, the church of Christ is of course broader than any particular denomination. That is to say, the Body of Christ and its essential activities and functions can be found in many different places and denominations. Considered de jure, however, each denomination holds itself alone to be the visible church of Christ. By existing as a separate denomination, the OPC, for example, recognizes the authority of the OPC General Assembly, of the individual presbyteries of the OPC, and the sessions that make up those presbyteries; but it does not recognize the authority of the assemblies, presbyteries, and sessions of other denominations. The OPC does not invite to its General Assembly meetings, as fully recognized voting members, ministers from other denominations. They are treated as being without authority. If the Free Church of Scotland comes to a decision in its General Assembly and mandates that it be enforced in presbyteries and sessions, the OPC treats this decision as being without authority. There may be a de facto recognition that the Body of Christ, the visible church, is present in these other denominations, but there is no de jure recognition of the authority of these other bodies. The full recognition of the authority of the authoritative bodies of other denominations would amount to full union with them so that there would no longer be two distinct denominations.

Now, this fact, I have come to see, is important in terms of selecting the denomination one is going to be a part of. As there are a multitude of conflicting Christian denominations, they cannot all be right in their claims to authority, for they all exclude each other. This means that there is an objective question to answer: Which denomination, if any, is the legitimate heir to the de jure Church of Christ? There have been many denominational splits in the history of Christianity. It is theoretically possible to have a split in which both sides are equally wrong. It is not possible to have a situation in which both sides are fully justified in the split, for otherwise there would be agreement and no split. A denominational split always involves sin and/or error. There is always heresy and/or (non-doctrinal) schism. Most of the time, there will likely be one side that is right and one side that is wrong, or at least one side that is more right than the other. When a split occurs, it is necessary as far as possible to ascertain which side is right and to follow that side, for that side will possess the continuing authority of the de jure church while the other side will not. (Again, I am not saying that both sides can’t be de facto true churches. I am saying that they cannot both be de jure true churches, because in their mutual separation they exclude each other. The side that is right, then, being legitimate in its exercise of authority involved in the split, will retain that authority, while the side that is wrong will lose it, as it has had its authority rightfully revoked by the other side.) The question of which denomination is the rightful heir of the true de jure church is thus an objective question that we all must answer, and there will be an objective answer to that question that will not differ depending on one’s location, culture, language, nationality, etc. (except insofar as one’s conditions prevent one by some means or another from knowing about or being unified with what otherwise ought to be considered the rightful heir). We must first look at the churches currently existing and determine which is the most orthodox, and then we must factor in historical information regarding how they came to be separated from each other, and from these we can determine which denomination ought to be regarded as having rightful de jure authority. We would then have a prima facie moral obligation to join that denomination and not to support other denominations (by doing anything that would attribute de jure authority to them, by joining them, being an officer in them, etc.).

In my efforts to engage in this search thus far, I have come to certain conclusions. As we go through church history, I am persuaded that the catholic church of the early years of the church is the rightful heir of de jure authority (as opposed to heretical sects like the Gnostics). I am convinced that the churches of the Reformation are right over against the claims of Rome and Eastern Orthodoxy. I am convinced that the Reformed churches are right over against the claims of the Lutherans, the Anabaptists, etc. And I am convinced that the British Westminster Presbyterian tradition is right over against the modern continental Reformed (for reasons articulated earlier). The Church that has held most consistently to this tradition historically has been the Church of Scotland. I’ve already mentioned the continental churches. The Church of England has not held to a consistent application of the regulative principle. Independents/Congregationalists have not held to biblical teachings on presbyterian church government. Therefore, I have come to the conclusion thus far that the Church of Scotland of John Knox and Andrew Melville and which embraced the Westminster Standards in the 1640s is the rightful heir to the Reformation. Therefore, my quest has become more specific—to find the rightful heir to the historic Church of Scotland. There are only a few plausible contestants for this position today. We can rule out churches that have unnecessarily altered the historic confessions and practices of the earlier Church of Scotland, such as the American Presbyterian churches. By altering these confessions and practices, they have not only drifted from biblical teaching and practice, but have engaged in schism by creating barriers to full union with the historic Church of Scotland. There are only a very few claimants to the role of heir of the Church of Scotland whose claims are somewhat plausible. I have not come to a full conclusion on this point as of yet, but currently I am leaning towards the Free Presbyterian Church of Scotland (FPCS) as the most likely candidate.

Now, all of this has obvious practical implications regarding my membership and office in the OPC. Ideally, my family and I have an obligation to join with whomever we find to be the heir to the historic Church of Scotland, and to terminate our formal relationship with the OPC. The OPC cannot claim to be the rightful heir to the historic Church of Scotland. It is rather the heir of an American Presbyterian tradition that has never been fully in line with the Westminster Standards. This is not to say the OPC is not an important part of the de facto Body of Christ, or that it is not a very faithful church that has been and continues to be diligent in glorifying God and serving his people in this world. It has been and is both of these things. But it is not the rightful heir to the historic Church of Scotland, speaking de jure. That means that it cannot be regarded as possessing any de jure authority as a church, which means that it should not be treated as possessing such authority by being joined with in formal membership, etc. We have an obligation to look at things from the perspective of the denomination that possesses de jure authority. If that denomination does not recognize the de jure authority of the OPC, then we should not recognize it either. To do so is to promote and abet schism in the Body of Christ.

This may seem to lead to a clear immediate duty for myself and my family. But there are other things, other duties, to consider. Although all denominations ought to reform themselves and come into full unity with the heir to the historic Church of Scotland, yet the fact of the matter is that there are many denominations out there that have not done so to varying degrees. And this means that there are many true members of the Body of Christ (de facto) that are under and dependent upon the ministries of denominations that exist in schism. This may entail with regard to some church officers a duty to remain at their current post, not abandoning the people of God who look to them for shepherding, when bad circumstances would likely follow for them. In my case, I am a member and a ruling elder with a church that is very small, by far the most faithful Reformed church in Utah. We have only three people on the session—myself, our pastor, and another ruling elder who augments the session from Denver, CO. In these circumstances, it seems that I may have a duty to remain where I am if I can, helping to shepherd the congregation, or at least to remain as a member in order not to abandon and discourage my fellow members and cause problems for the congregation. I also have an obligation to myself and to my family, to keep us all in a situation where we can receive proper shepherding, and this may require membership in a local body. Perhaps in this situation, it is my duty to follow a non-ideal path that is the right path given these difficult circumstances, and retain membership (and perhaps office) in the OPC. That is my current thinking on the topic, and therefore my current intention.

The question naturally arises: How can I continue to worship in a church that has worship practices that I believe to be contrary to the regulative principle of worship, such as hymn-singing and the recitation of creeds? My answer is that just as it is in the case of church authority and unity, so there are nuances in the issue of biblical worship. By a rather fallacious and weak form of reasoning, the singing of hymns, recitation of creeds, etc., can be justified as being particular forms of elements of worship that are commanded, such as, for example, teaching. There is no command to sing hymns, but the singing of hymns can serve a teaching function in the church. The recitation of the creed can be similarly justified. This is, of course, precisely the sort of justification used in the modern continental tradition to justify extra-biblical holy days, and it is also the sort of justification used in many modern evangelical churches to justify skits, movies, Christmas cantatas, etc., in the worship of the church. Just about anything could be justified by this sort of justification (“Sure there is a biblical command to go on a weekly nature hike as part of the worship service. After all, we are supposed to teach, and you can learn a lot from seeing God's glory displayed in nature.”). That is why I oppose this kind of justification. But it must be admitted that this is far better than simply bringing in extra-biblical elements of worship as if in themselves they are considered holy and essential to the worship of the church. The continental Reformed churches, thus, are far better than churches like Rome which intrude holy days as per se commanded elements of worship as opposed to ways of fulfilling other commands. Under these circumstances, I feel justified in participating temporarily in practices like hymn-singing, considering them as a highly stretched form of teaching that is in need of reform, whereas I could not join in any practice that was put forward as being per se necessary or which involved sinful practices (such as worshiping a golden calf).

At any rate, these are the positions I have been coming to recently with regard to the OPC, the regulative principle, and church authority and unity. I welcome any input, feedback, questions, comments, arguments, etc., from anyone. I am open to correction on anything that I have said or that I am thinking. I want to hear all the different sides and opinions regarding these issues as well as what I ought to do in these circumstances.

UPDATE (9/12/12):  I am still a member, but no longer an active ruling elder, in the Orthodox Presbyterian Church.

UPDATE (10/5/12):  See here and here for related blog articles.

UPDATE (11/19/12):  My family and I no longer sing hymns along with the rest of the congregation in public worship, nor do we participate in the reciting of the Nicene Creed.  We decided that it does not make sense to justify engaging in a practice by giving that practice a meaning other than what is intended by the session and the rest of the congregation.

UPDATE (1/8/13):  I thought I'd add here another brief statement of my views on church unity and authority that I wrote up for a different context, in order to further illuminate the issue:

The church of Christ is called to be one in formal unity throughout the world.  (I have found this particular article - http://www.opc.org/relations/unity.html - very helpful in laying out the biblical principles involved in what church unity ought to look like.)  Denominational separation is a sad and sinful situation.  Of course, formal unity would not always take the same form.  Churches in the same region ought normally to merge together so as not to have rival sessions, presbyteries, etc.  Churches in, say, different nations should be united under some kind of binding ecumenical council that would help preserve basic unity in doctrine and practice (though such a council would only deal with the most serious and fundamental matters and would likely meet only when special need was to call for it).  This is the ideal.  Because of differences in doctrine and practice among the various denominations, this unity is not achievable at this time.  These differences require more pure denominations to remain separate from less pure denominations in order to preserve as much as possible the whole counsel of God in the more pure denominations, as church officers have no authority from God to water down the truth for the sake of denominational unity.

When denominations are separate from each other, each denomination has full formal recognition of the authority of officers and church courts within its own denomination, but it fails to formally recognize the full authority of officers and courts of other denominations.  So, for example, when the Presbytery of the Dakotas of the OPC holds its stated meetings, it does not invite as full voting members officers from other denominations in the same region such as the PCA or the RCUS.  It may invite officers from these denominations to give a greeting or other such things, but those officers are not formally recognized as having authority as church officers in the official proceedings of the presbytery.  This is not to say that there is a failure to recognize officers and members of these other denominations as true parts of the visible church of Christ--where the Word of God is preached in fundamentals, the sacraments administered, salvation can be attained, etc.--but there is no formal recognition of their authority as officers to be included as full members of the presbytery, even though they are in the same region.  Likewise, OPC church courts don't formally recognize as binding the decisions of church courts in other denominations.  So when the RCUS, say, holds a classis meeting and makes decisions, the church courts of the OPC, even in the same region, do not formally recognize those decisions as having any binding authority, etc.

On the worldwide scene, denominations in different nations have their own general assemblies which are regarded and treated as the highest, formally recognized and binding judicatories of the church.  There is no formal recognition of a higher ecumenical council that binds the different national assemblies together, and thus there is no formal recognition of binding authority between these denominations.

Now, since the church ought to be formally united around the world as one, these failures of unity and formal recognition of authority are very serious and can only spring from doctrinal or practical error or other forms of schism.  In a congregational form of church government, denominational separation is seen as normal and ideal, for there is no recognition of any binding higher councils outside the individual congregations.  But in a presbyterian form of church government, such denominational separation and failure to recognize authority implies sinful schism.  For example, If the OPC fails to merge or in some way formally unite (as described above) with the PCA, in doing so the OPC is either manifesting a schismatic attitude itself for failing to adequately preserve the unity of the church, or, if there are good reasons not to formally unite with the PCA (such as doctrinal or practical error or other such concerns), the OPC is doing right and its remaining separate from the PCA necessarily implies a charge of schism against the PCA, for the PCA, in that case, is maintaining errors or other problems in itself that have become barriers to the unity of the church that Christ has called the church to.  So, in short, when denominations fail to be formally united and to fully and formally recognize each others' binding authority in the context of a presbyterian system of church government, each denomination that remains separate from others is either itself being schismatic in doing so or it is issuing (either explicitly or by necessary implication) a just charge of schism against the denominations from which it remains separate.

This has beet put very well and succinctly by a document on the front page of the official website of the Free Presbyterian Church of Scotland:

"Denominational walls are erected on a judicial level and the distinct jurisdiction of church courts is the final and fullest expression of separation. The setting up of rival Church courts from Kirk Session through to General Assembly is an express rejection of the jurisdiction of the Church courts of other denominations and is either schismatic itself or necessarily charges other bodies with the sin of schism. Persisting in such separation is either schismatic or else there is an implicit charge of schism against all those from whom separation is maintained." (http://www.fpchurch.org.uk/documents/Reformed_Scottish_Presbyterianism_A_Response.pdf)

It is my opinion that churches which hold to more historic Presbyterian attitudes and practices towards worship are, other things being equal, more pure than churches which hold these to a lesser degree.  So, for example, a church which holds to exclusive psalmody would, on that account, all other things being equal, be a purer church than one which allows the singing of hymns in public worship.  I believe that the above principles I have laid out--which I take to be nothing more than the clear and logical implications of presbyterian church government--lead to a moral responsibility we all have to examine the doctrines and practices of different existing denominations and to determine which are more or less pure, all things considered.  We ought also to take into account in our examinations the history of the denominations and why they are separated from each other, insofar as such information is available to us.  Respect for the church courts of more pure denominations in their decisions not to enter into formal unity with less pure denominations creates a moral obligation, I believe, on all of us as individuals, families, etc., to unite when possible with more pure denominations and to refrain from formal union with less pure denominations.  We ought to unite ourselves to the most pure denomination we can discern.  When a denomination like the Free Presbyterian Church of Scotland, for example, fails to enter into formal unity with a denomination like the OPC, as I articulated above, both denominations, by failing to enter into formal unity and formally to recognize each others' authority, are issuing an implicit charge of schism against each other.  If the reasons for the continuing failure to formally unite are that the OPC has introduced impurities into its doctrine and practice while the FPCS has not, then the OPC is not justified in maintaining formal separation while the FPCS is.  Respect for the just and legal decision in this matter by the FPCS church courts, then, creates a moral obligation for us when possible to unite in formal union with the FPCS and to avoid formal union with the OPC.  Of course, other factors may come to play here and create non-ideal situations, such as not having a congregation of a more pure church nearby, in which case it may often be necessary to remain in formal communion with less pure churches, at least for a time.  But, overall, there is a moral obligation to seek formal communion with the more pure church and to avoid formal communion with the less pure church when it is possible to do so without shirking other duties.

UPDATE 1/9/13:  I thought I'd add here as well a note I wrote up in another context to describe why I believe that schismatic churches can sometimes, in certain circumstances, be regarded as possessing authority to function as a church due to providential circumstances where the proper de jure denomination cannot adequately exercise oversight: 

"I do not see anything that I have said to imply that the OPC does not have a certain authority that ought to be submitted to by members. My current position is that there is a moral obligation to join a church with a right to separate existence whenever such a church exists locally and can be joined. However, when there is no local manifestation of such a church, I think that the need for a local congregation with local oversight by church officers, including the ability to receive the sacraments, proper church discipline, etc., leads to it being acceptable to grant the authority to function with church authority to a local church, even if that church is schismatic. So, in my case, for example, my family and I wish to remain in formal communion with the OPC and subject to the government and discipline of Christ Presbyterian Church while we continue to live in the Salt Lake area and so long as no local congregation of the FPCS is present (or at least so long as there is no possibility of joining the FPCS). We take our membership vows to submit to the government and discipline of Christ Presbyterian Church and the OPC very seriously, attributing real church authority to the OPC with regard to ourselves, and we do not see the schismatic nature of the OPC as a bar to being in membership in the OPC in these circumstances."

UPDATE 9/17/14:  We are now adherent members of the FPCS and have left the OPC.  See here for more on this.